

गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय, हरिद्वार  
पुस्तकालय



विषय संख्या

954

पुस्तक संख्या

57 (VII)

प्रागत पञ्जिका संख्या

पुस्तक पर सर्वप्रकार की निशानियां  
लगाना बर्जित है। कृपया १५ दिन से अधिक  
समय तक पुस्तक अपने पास न रखें। 6.8875

पुस्तकालय  
गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय

RR  
954- बन्दिपार  
वर्ग संख्या 57(VII) आ. सं. 68.275  
पुस्तक-वितरण की तिथि नीचे अंकित है। इस  
तिथि सहित 15वे दिन तक यह पुस्तक पुस्तकालय  
में वापिस आ जानी चाहिए। अन्यथा ५ पैसे प्रतिदिन  
के हिसाब से बिलम्ब-दण्ड लगेगा।





MINUTES OF EVIDENCE  
TAKEN BEFORE  
THE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON THE  
AFFAIRS  
OF  
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY;  
AND ALSO AN  
APPENDIX AND INDEX.  

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VI.  
*Political or Foreign.*  

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[COMMUNICATED BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO THE HOUSE, 21st JULY 1853.]

1853.

1853.



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Ordered to be printed 20th August 1853

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## VI.—Political or Foreign.

## EXTRACT from the REPORT of the COMMITTEE.

ON the State of the Political and Foreign Affairs of India, recourse has been had to the oral Evidence of several gentlemen who, either from their long official residence in India, or from the long application of acknowledged abilities to Indian Affairs, were most calculated to throw light on the subject; to several Papers and Documents communicated by the Board of Control; and to several Statements, affording very valuable information, from gentlemen who have held official situations in India, in reply to the Circular Letter of the Secretary of the Board of Control.

With respect to the changes which have taken place in the Political and Foreign Affairs of the Company since the renewal of the Charter in 1813, the annexed Tabular Statement exhibits in one view the additions of Territory acquired during that Period, whether by war or by amicable arrangements with *Native States*. Malacca, Singapore, and the Dutch Possessions on the Continent of India were ceded by the *King of the Netherlands* in 1824, in exchange for the British Settlement of Bencoolen in Sumatra.

Treaty with the  
King of the Nether-  
lands, 1824.

In order to afford a clear and comprehensive view of the relations of the East India Company with the various Foreign States, whether within or without the limits above described, a List is subjoined of the several States, arranged according to the nature of their relations to the British Government.

## Foreign Independent States

China	Persia.
Cochin-China.	Cambul.
Siam.	Muscat
Ava.	

## Native States not under British Protection.

Nepaul  
Lahore (subject to Runjeet Sing)  
Chiefs of Scind, at the mouth of the Indus  
Scindia.

## Native States with which Subsidiary Treaties exist.

King of Oude.	Travancore (whose capital is Trivandrum)	12.
The Boodlah, or Rajah of Nagpore.	Cochin (whose capital is Cochin)	
The Nizam (whose capital is Hyderabad).	The Guicowar (whose capital is Baroda).	
Holcar (whose capital is Indoor)	Cutch (whose capital is Bhooj)	
Mysore (whose capital is Mysore)		

## Native States under British Protection but without Subsidiary Treaties.

Sicim.	States of Rajpootana.
The Sikh, or Hill States, on the left bank of the Sutledge.	States of Malwa
Jaut, and other States, on the right bank of the Jumna.	States of Guzerat.
Boondela States.	States on the Malabar Coast.
	Burmese frontier.

## State Pensioners

The King of Delhi.	Rajah of Tanjore.
Nabob of Bengal.	The Peshwa.
Nabob of the Carnatic.	The Princes of the House of Tippoo, &c. &c.

Advertence will first be had to Foreign States, extra-Indian, which, for the purposes of the present Inquiry, it is only necessary to mention in a cursory manner.

The state of the Company's relations, both Political and Commercial, with the Empire of *China*, has been considered in a former Report, in connexion with the important question respecting the Monopoly of the China Trade.

1, 21, 22, 23, 24. With *Persia* the Company are in Alliance, and have a Resident at the Court of the Sovereign.

20. With *Cochin-China*, *Siam*, *Caubul*, *Nepaul*, and *Ava*, the intercourse of the Company is principally of a Commercial nature, but they have Residents established at *Nepaul* and *Ava*. These Residents, in the opinion of one witness, might be withdrawn, and the intercourse kept up by occasional special Envoys; in which case the witness represents that the Company would be relieved from a considerable annual Expense.

With the *Imaum of Muscat*, and with other Chiefs on the Western shores of the *Persian Gulf*, the Company have Treaties for Commercial purposes, and with a view to the suppression of the Slave Trade, and of Piracy in the Gulf. In order to secure the fulfilment of the provisions of these Treaties, the Company have established Political Agents on the shores of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs. It is suggested by the same witness that a native Agent at *Muscat*, or an European Merchant as Consul, with one or two Cruisers in the Gulf, would do all that is necessary at a considerably diminished expense.

421. Before the war which broke out during the administration of Lord  
446. Hastings, the *Nepaulese* held a very threatening and commanding  
438. position along the whole of our Northern frontier. The opinion of the witnesses is, that the Treaty by which that war was terminated has amply secured us against this danger. The *Nepaulese* are now confined on three sides by our Territory, and on the North by the Himalaya Mountains, so that they are completely enclosed, and have no power of acting in any direction beyond their own Territory.

14, 53, 54, 55. The most powerful independent Prince in India is *Runyeet Sing*. His Territory is, in the language of one witness, the only one in India that is not substantially British dominion. It consists principally of the Punjab, or country lying within the five branches of the Indus. The population consists of various tribes of unsettled and predatory habits.


17, 18. Within the Peninsula, *Scindia* is the only Prince who preserves the semblance  
374. of independence, and he preserves no more than the semblance; his power has been completely broken by a succession of reverses. His dominions are surrounded by the Territory of the Company, or of Allies who are bound to negotiate with Foreign States only through the intervention of the Company. We have a Resident at his Court, and a stationary camp in his neighbourhood.

The States which compose the *Subsidiary System* have been already enumerated. It is unnecessary here exactly to define the various degrees of interference which the Treaties with these States permit. It will be sufficient to describe the leading features which are common to all the Treaties.

The chief provisions contained in these Treaties are, 1st, The stipulated protection of the British Government against all enemies, foreign or domestic. 2d, Mutual co-operation in the event of hostilities with other powers. 3d, The Allied State agrees to receive and maintain a British force for the protection









# ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

## VI. POLITICAL or FOREIGN.

protection of the State. 4th, The State agrees to receive a British Resident, through whose medium is imparted the advice and counsel of the British Government on all affairs connected with external, and sometimes with internal, administration, by which advice and counsel the Allied State is bound to abide. 5th, The Prince agrees to abandon all political intercourse with other powers, except through the medium of the British Government, and binds himself to refer to the latter all disputes that may eventually arise with other powers.

On the other hand, the Prince retains in general the exercise of his independent authority on all civil matters within his dominions.

In some cases the Princes who had engaged to pay a pecuniary Subsidy for the maintenance of a British force have subsequently ceded territory in lieu of Subsidy. In the recent Subsidiary Alliances this practice has been generally adopted.

On the question whether the Subsidiary system be favourable to the happiness of the great body of the people, great diversity of opinion appears to exist.

The old remedy, it is said, for gross misgovernment in India, was conspiracy or insurrection. The Subsidiary system, by introducing a British force, bound by Treaty to protect the Sovereign against all enemies, domestic or foreign, renders it impossible for his subjects to subvert his power by force of arms. That fear of the physical strength of the people which, in the independent States of the East, checks in some degree the cruelty and rapacity of rulers, has no effect on Princes who are assured of receiving support from Allies immeasurably superior to the Natives in power and knowledge. Thus the dependant Sovereign, restricted from the pursuits of ambition, and secured from the danger of revolt, generally becomes voluptuous or miserly; he sometimes abandons himself to sensual pleasure; he sometimes sets himself to accumulate a vast hoard of wealth; he vexes his subjects with exactions so grievous that nothing but the dread of the British arms prevents them from rising up against him. The people, it is said, are degraded and impoverished. All honourable feeling is extinguished in the higher classes. A letter from Sir Thomas Munro has been quoted, in which that distinguished officer states that the effects of the Subsidiary System may be traced in decaying villages and decreasing population, and that it seems impossible to retain it without nourishing all the vices of bad government. Mr. Russell, who was, during nearly 21 years, Resident or Assistant Resident at Hyderabad, and Mr. Bayley, who was, during five years, a Member of Council in Bengal, have expressed the same opinion in the strongest terms. Colonel Barnewall, who was Political Agent in Kattywar, says that "it is the most difficult thing to prevent our 'protection from being abused.'" Mr. Jenkins, who was Resident at the Court of Nagpore, says that "our support has given cover to oppressions and 'extortions which probably, under other circumstances, would have produced 'rebellion.'"

On the other hand, some witnesses, whose evidence is entitled to great respect, speak of this system more favourably. Sir John Malcolm is of opinion that it is not ill adapted to the present state of society in India. Colonel Munro speaks well of its operation in Mysore and Travancore. But it is in evidence that Mysore was for a considerable time governed by an able Minister, whom the British Government had selected, and who acted under the direct superintendence of the British Resident; and that in Travancore, where Colonel Munro held the office of Resident, he assumed (with the full approbation of his own Government) the charge of the whole administration of the country. He states,

(445.—VI.)

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3 193.  
308. 314.  
3. 518. 594  
193.  
276. 481. 535.  
552.

204.  
380.  
229.550.  
564. 569, 570.

that the British Resident has of late ceased to direct the Government, and that in consequence affairs have relapsed into disorder. There is also reason to believe that the evils which have been described as belonging to the Subsidiary system have, since the death of Poorneah, been grievously felt in Mysore. In fact, Colonel Munro distinctly says, "the Subsidiary system is calculated to occasion misgovernment and oppression of the inhabitants, unless it is corrected by the influence of the British Resident." Colonel Baillie, who was Resident in Oude, and whose opinion is, on the whole, favourable to the Subsidiary system, states, that the Sovereign at whose Court he was stationed collected vast sums in discreditable and oppressive ways; that the British force was frequently employed in assisting the collection of the revenue; that we were bound by treaty to put down all resistance to the Established Government; and that the Prince was, by his connexion with us, completely relieved from all fear of deposition.

219. 587. 613, 614. It seems to be the general opinion of the witnesses who are most favourable to the Subsidiary system that the constant interference of the British Government is necessary to make that system tolerable to the body of the people; but about the degree and mode of interference great diversity of opinion seems to exist. In some of the dependant States, the British Government has insisted on the appointment of a Dewan or Minister, in whom is placed confidence: and it appears to have been the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro that this plan, though objectionable, is yet, on the whole, the best which can be adopted. "It is," he says, "the only measure by which any amends can be made to the people of the country for the miseries brought upon them by the Subsidiary force in giving stability to a vicious Government." The opinion of some witnesses of great authority is adverse to this plan. In Mysore, during the long minority of the young Rajah, it is said to have succeeded perfectly. In the dominions of the Nizam, on the other hand, it is said to have aggravated all the evils which are ascribed to the Subsidiary system.

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616.

It is proper to add, that all the evidence which has been offered to Your Committee on this subject tends to show that any sudden change would be attended with difficulty and danger. Those witnesses who have dwelt most on the evils of the Subsidiary policy, have admitted that we can remove those evils only by watching for favourable conjunctures, and by gradually introducing a better system.

If we are not to abandon the Subsidiary system, it is clearly our duty to render it as beneficial, or rather as little detrimental, as possible, to the interests of the inhabitants of the Allied States.

6 588.

573.

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316.  
486.  
557.

563, 564.

The personal character of the Resident must always be a matter of the greatest importance. He is much more of a minister than an Ambassador; he carries the Subsidiary system into effect; and is the organ through which the views of the British Government must be promoted. He has to perform the delicate task of governing those, who, from their station, should themselves be Governors, and has to contend with the perpetual intrigues of the natives who surround the Court. But there is evidence to prove that, if the efforts of the Resident are judiciously directed, he may not only promote the interests of his own Government, but increase the prosperity of the country in which he is placed. In many cases, the Treaties leave to the Subsidized Prince independent authority within his own dominions, yet if the Prince, in the exercise of that authority, so vexes his people as to endanger public tranquillity, in that case it must be the duty of the Resident (with the sanction of his own Government) to address the strongest remonstrances

to the Prince, with a view to induce him to adopt a more equitable system of rule. In point of fact, as already observed, it appears that efforts of this nature have been frequently made, and sometimes with good effect.

In consequence of so large a portion of British troops being maintained by the Subsidiary Princes, the Supreme Government appear to have felt themselves enabled, within the last three years, to make great military reductions. At present the British Subsidiary Force is distributed amongst the Allied States according to the terms of the Treaties; in addition to which the general security and tranquillity of our own territories are provided for by permanent camps, stationed in such positions within the Company's territory as are considered to be the most eligible, with a view to guard against external danger, and to preserve internal order and tranquillity. If the direct sway of the Company should be hereafter extended over the territories of the Princes with whom we are now in alliance, we should of course be relieved from the obligation of stationing a specific number of troops within those territories; and it is the opinion of one of the witnesses, that in such a case a *smaller* aggregate force, disposed where it might act with the greatest advantage for general purposes, would be quite as efficient as the larger force which, under present circumstances, it is necessary to maintain.

Those States which are dependant on the Company, but are not Subsidiary, will now be noticed. Among these are the *Rajpoot States*; a collection of principalities which stand to us in the same relation in which they stood towards the paramount power in former times. Having always been under the control of one superior or another, these Princes have the less reason to be jealous of our supremacy. The general feature of our engagements with them is protection and guarantee of their territory on our part, and acknowledgment of the British supremacy on theirs. Some are bound to furnish contingents of a specified amount; others to place the whole of their resources at our disposal. Some pay a tribute to the British Government, whilst others are exempt from that obligation.

The Rajpoot Chiefs are men of a high military spirit, and would be likely to revolt from vexatious restraints. It is said to be our policy to interfere as little as possible in their internal affairs.\* Some of the witnesses conceive that it would be desirable to emancipate them altogether from the obligations which have been imposed upon them; but upon this point a difference of opinion exists between high authorities, and it is not deemed necessary to enter into that question.

With reference to the several minor States, not Subsidiary, with whom we are connected, Sir John Malcolm conceives that, instead of keeping up so many substantive Political Agents, carrying on a direct correspondence with the Supreme Government, it would be better to assign extensive districts to the superintendence of Commissioners, or Officers of a high rank, under some other designation, to whom the subordinate Agents should report their proceedings, and from whom they should receive instructions. Upon this plan, it is stated, a more uniform system of political management would be established, and the Governor-General in Council be relieved from the necessity of attending to matters of inferior importance.

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\* Note.—This observation is mainly founded upon Col. Tod's Letter in the Political Appendix.  
(445.—VI.)

It remains only to notice the *State Pensioners*. These Princes are the descendants of those Native Sovereigns whose dominions we possess. On these Princes, and their posterity, we have settled Pensions sufficient to maintain them in a manner suitable to their birth. They are greatly attached to the remnant of dignity which is left to them, and held in a certain degree of respect by the natives; but there does not appear to be any danger of their disturbing the peace of India, by attempts to recover the power of which they have been deprived.

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MEMBERS BEFORE WHOM THE FOLLOWING  
EVIDENCE WAS TAKEN.

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Sir James Macintosh

Mr Williams Wynn

Mr East

Mr Edward Lytton Bulwer.

Mr Jenkins.

Sir Francis Vincent.

Mr. Gally Knight.

Mr. John Ponsoby.

Mr John Forbes.

Mr. Macaulay.

## LIST OF WITNESSES.

<i>Luna, 13<sup>a</sup> die Februarii 1832.</i>		<i>Luna, 27<sup>a</sup> die Februarii 1832.</i>	
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James Mill, Esq.	- - - p. 3	Francis Wilde, Esq.	- - - p. 52
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Henry Russell, Esq.	- - - p. 10	Major Carnac	- - - p. 53
<i>Martis, 6<sup>a</sup> die Martii 1832.</i>		<i>Jovis, 8<sup>a</sup> die Martii 1832.</i>	
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Richard Jenkins, Esq. M.P.	- - p. 24		
<i>Jovis, 12<sup>a</sup> die Aprilis 1832.</i>		<i>Jovis, 23<sup>a</sup> die Februarii 1832:</i>	
Major-gen. Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.	- p. 27	Colonel J. Baillie	- - - p. 58
<i>Martis, 17<sup>a</sup> die Aprilis 1832:</i>		<i>Mercurii, 30<sup>a</sup> die Maii 1832:</i>	
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William Butterworth Bayley, Esq.	- p. 41	Richard Jenkins, Esq. M.P.	- - - p. 67



# MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

*Lunæ, 13<sup>o</sup> die Februarii 1832.*

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACINTOSH,

IN THE CHAIR.

*William M<sup>c</sup> Culloch, Esq., called in; and Examined.*

1. WHAT opinion have you formed upon the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India, and of their effect upon the good government of the respective territories to which they relate?—The subsidiary system gives the British Government a more complete command over the military resources of the countries to which it extends, and better security against treacherous combination on the part of the native powers, and popular insurrection on the part of their subjects, than probably could be obtained by any other means, it must, however, be confessed that these advantages are purchased at a considerable (some may be of opinion) too high a price. I cannot so well describe the evils incident to the system, as by the following quotation from a letter, addressed by the late Sir Thomas Munro to the Marquis of Hastings, dated 12th August 1817: "There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists weak and oppressive, to extinguish all honorable feeling among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion or foreign conquest: but the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security, and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Whenever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Peishwa and the Nizam, and is now beginning to be seen in Mysore. A subsidiary force would be a most useful establishment if it could be directed solely to the support of our ascendancy, without nourishing all the vices of a bad government: but this seems almost impossible. The only way in which this object has ever in any degree been attained, is by the appointment of a Dewan. This measure is no doubt liable to numerous objections, but still it is the only one by which any amends can be made to the people of the country for the miseries brought upon them by the subsidiary force, in giving stability to a vicious government. The great difficulty is to prevent the prince from counteracting the Dewan, and the resident from meddling too much; but when this is avoided, the Dewan may be made a most useful instrument of government. There is, however, another view under which the subsidiary system may be considered, I mean that of its inevitable tendency to bring every native state into which it is introduced, sooner or later, under the exclusive dominion of the British Government. It has already done this completely in the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic, it has made some progress in that of the Peishwa, and the Nizam; and the whole of the territory of these princes will unquestionably suffer the same fate as the Carnatic." Sir Thomas Munro proceeded in that most able and interesting letter to show, with prophetic sagacity, how this result was likely to be brought about, and to state the grounds on which it appeared to him "very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired." To the observations of

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN

*W. M<sup>c</sup> Culloch, Esq.*  
13 February 1832

W. M'ulloch, Esq.  
13 February 1832.

that excellent man I only beg leave to add, that the multiplicity of perplexing details arising out of the extension of our political relations, has tenched most seriously upon the time and attention both of the governments in India and of the authorities at home, and have thus tended in no slight degree to divert to foreign interests a large portion of those cares, which might perhaps have been more profitably bestowed on improving the administration of our own territories.

2. Have you any observations of a general nature to add to the answer you have given?—I have only to add, that the policy of introducing a system of that sort, and of retracing our steps after it has been widely established, are very different questions. It may be liable, as I think it is, to all the objections already stated; but if the question be put, what is to be done now, I confess I am unable to give an answer.

3. Do you think it has produced more harm than good?—I think in the countries where it has been introduced the evil preponderates. In Mysore, while Poorneah was at the head of the government, it went on exceedingly well, during the minority of the rajah; but since the death of Poorneah, and the rajah has chosen to take an active part in his own administration, and, in fact, has been acting almost without any minister at all, things have gone on badly. The whole of his treasure, amounting to about 70 lacs of pagodas, that Poorneah left in the treasury, has been squandered; and I believe there has been lately an insurrection in the Mysore territories. But serious as the evils of the system are, it appears to me a matter of almost insuperable difficulty to retrace our steps, because this can only be done with the consent of the other parties to the treaties; and though some of them might not hesitate to give their consent, yet the mischiefs that would ensue would probably be very great, and might throw the whole country into confusion.

4. Would it not in fact be opening the treaties of all those states?—Yes. If there was a question respecting any of them, it would be respecting those with the Rajpoot states. I think it would be easier to dissolve the subsidiary connexion with those states, and that there would be less danger in doing so than there would be in abrogating the treaties with the small states in Central India, for in the latter case, I am satisfied those states would fall into great confusion and anarchy, and a new predatory power might again rise up in the heart of India. On the other hand, the Rajpoot states, though they might not improbably quarrel among themselves if they were emancipated from British control, have never been considered as belonging to the predatory association; and I have in my memorandum, in reply to one of the questions put to me, expressed a doubt whether it was necessary to exact the permanent sacrifice of their independence, in order to secure the future tranquillity of Central India.

5. Can you state shortly the changes which have recently taken place in our relations with the state of Nagpore?—Under the treaty of 1826 it was stipulated, that the lands then reserved for the maintenance of the rajah's military force should continue under British management until the rajah should give satisfactory evidence of his ability and disposition properly to administer those territories. By a provisional agreement, concluded in 1829, those territories were delivered over to the rajah's own management, on his agreeing to pay eight lacs of rupees per annum to the British Government; and he was at the same time relieved from the obligation of maintaining any force for our use beyond 1,000 horse. The British officers who had been appointed to the command of the rajah's force under the treaty of 1826, were likewise withdrawn. The subsidy which his Highness had agreed to pay, and the expense of the contingent which he had agreed to maintain under the treaty of 1816, were, by the provisional engagement of 1818, commuted for territory, and hence we got possession of the districts upon the Nerbudda, yielding a revenue of upwards of 20 lacs.

6. Are you prepared to offer any suggestions by which the disadvantages attending the present system can be obviated?—No general suggestions. In particular cases means may be found for preventing mischief in sometimes increasing and occasionally in relaxing our interference; and upon a judicious choice of the persons selected to fill the office of British Resident at Native Courts much will always depend. But I cannot offer any suggestions calculated to counteract the general tendencies of the system.

7. What opinion have you formed upon the subject of Sir Ithomas Munro's suggestion, of managing the country through a Dewan?—We have two instances in point, the one favourable and the other unfavourable. In the case of Mysore, under Poorneah, whom I have before mentioned, things went on very well. In the Ni-

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*W. M. Culloch, Esq.*  
13 February 1832.

zam's country this expedient has not succeeded so well. In 1808, when Meerallam died, there was a good deal of correspondence between the Bengal government and the Nizam, upon the subject of the choice of his successor, and it terminated in a compromise, by which the Nizam was allowed the choice of his nominal prime minister, and we of the effective minister. The result was, that Mooneer ul Moolk was appointed minister by the Nizam, in which capacity, however, he never acted. the whole public business of the country having been transacted by Chundoo Loll, the deputy of our selection, and things have certainly not gone on prosperously. The great objection to such an arrangement is, that under it you never can know who is really the author of the measures adopted. If anything very objectionable occurs, the minister may plead that it was done at the recommendation or by the desire of the British resident, to whom it was his duty to defer. the latter, on the other hand, may say that it was solely the act of the minister, and that he had nothing to do with it. There is thus a sort of divided and undefined responsibility, which amounts to no responsibility at all. To the arrangement in question may be in great measure ascribed the enormous debt contracted by the government of Hyderabad, to the house of Palmer & Company; the decline of the revenue and the re-accumulation of the public debt, after it had been almost wholly paid off; and, I may add, that the anarchy of the country have been completely sacrificed to the personal interests of the acting minister.

8. Do you consider, from what you know upon the subject, that the Nizam's country is a particularly ill-governed country?—I do not know precisely what has been the result of the measure adopted by Sir Charles Metcalfe, about the year 1820, when he appointed European officers to assist in forming the revenue settlements, a measure which, though disapproved by the authorities at home, continued in operation until the accession of the present Nizam; but the last report that I read respecting the Nizam's revenues, and the state of the debt, certainly was not favourable.

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*Jonia, 16<sup>o</sup> die Februarri 1832.*

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THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACINTOSH, IN THE CHAIR.

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*James Mill, Esq., called in; and Examined.*

*James Mill, Esq.*  
16 February 1832.

9. HAVE you prepared for the Committee an outline of the territories and tributaries acquired by us in India since 1813?—I have.

*[The Witness delivered in the same.]*

10. How many of the chiefs and princes do you consider in the light of mere pensioners, the payment of whose pensions are stipulated by treaties?—In this statement are included tributaries, and states in alliance, without payment on the one side or the other. You may consider all those as distinct from mere state pensioners.

11. Do you consider the first nine articles in the Statement I now show you, of our political relations, as being the case of pensioners who may be excluded from our present consideration?—Yes.

12. Have the goodness to enumerate the chief subsidiary princes and the protected states?—I have in my hand a list which, I believe, contains the answer, and which, with permission of the Committee, I shall read.

Native States, with which Subsidiary Alliances exist.

Oude	Holkar's State	Cochin
Nagpore.	Mysore.	Baroda
Hydrabad.	Travancore	Cutch

**VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.**

*James Mill, Esq.*  
16 February 1832.

**MINUTES OF EVIDENCE BEFORE SELECT COMMITTEE**

**Native States under the Protection of the British Government, but without  
Subsidiary Treaties.**

		Sieccin.
		The Sikh and Hill States, on the left bank of the Sutledj.
		Bickaneer.
		Jessmere.
		Jyepore.
		Jondpore.
		Oudeypore.
Rajpoot States - - - - -		Kotah.
		Boondee.
		Seroway.
		Kishengurh.
		Dowleah and Pertaubgurh.
		Doorapoor.
		Banswarra.
Jaut, and other States on the right bank of the Jumna.		Bhurlpore.
		Ullwar, or Macherry.
		Kero vlee.
		Sumphthur.
		Jhanai.
Boondela States - - - - -		Jaloun.
		Oorchah, or Tehree.
		Dutteah.
		Kewah.
		Bhopaul.
		Dhar.
		Dewas.
States in Malwa - - - - -		Rutlaum.
		Silana.
		Nursinghur.
		Amyherra.
		&c. &c. &c.
		Pahlumpore.
		Rahdunpore.
States in Guzerat - - - - -		Rapeepia.
		Loonawala.
		Soonth.
		The States in the Myhee Caunta.
		The Kattywar States.
States on the Malabar Coast (chiefly Mahratta)		Sattarah.
		Sawunt Warree.
		Colapore.
		Colabba.
Burmese Frontier - - - - -		Cachar.
		Jyntia.

**States not under British Protection**

Scindia  
The Rajah of Dholapore, Barree and Rajakera (formerly Rana of Gohud).  
Runjeet Sing of Lahore.  
The Ameers of Scind.  
The Rajah of Nepaul.

13. Where are the seats of the people called Seiks?—The principal part of the territory they occupy is the Punjab, or country within the five branches of the Indus. Those under British protection are some small communities on the left bank of the Sutledj.

14. They are a sort of predatory tribe, are they not?—They consisted of various tribes of unsettled and predatory habits, until they were combined (as those beyond the Sutlej are now), under a chief of great power, who has consolidated them into a sort of kingdom, very likely, however, to go to pieces when he dies. Properly speaking,

speaking, his territory may be considered as the only one in India that is not substantially British dominion. The subsidiary and protected states are, in truth, part of our empire.

15. The smaller states on the left bank of the Sutledj, which we have taken under our protection, are not subject to Runjeet Sing?—Those smaller states on the left bank of the Sutledj solicited our protection, to prevent their being swallowed up by Runjeet Sing. We willingly granted them our protection to prevent that chief's coming more close upon our frontier. He has agreed to respect our alliance, to confine himself to the north bank of the Sutledj, and not to meddle with those states.

16. Nepal is the whole length of the northern frontier?—Not the whole, though the greater part. It is bounded by Siccim on the east, and by Kenna, ceded to us, and some protected Seik states, in the west.

17. How would you class Scindia?—He is nominally independent, but, in truth, as dependent as any of the allied states; for he is perfectly surrounded by our territories, direct or allied, and can have no intercourse with any state but ours.

18. But he is an independent prince, with whom we have treated, is he not?—He neither at present has subsidiary alliance with us, nor do we include him among the protected states; in that respect he stands alone; while every state by which he is surrounded is bound not to negotiate, except through us; by consequence, Scindia can negotiate with none but us.

19. Malwa belonged to Scindia, and Holkar is in the same condition?—We have a subsidiary alliance with Holkar, whose territory is now reduced to an inconsiderable extent. The simple mode of considering our position in India is to consider the extent actually pervaded by our power, really and truly under our dominion, that is, whether the subsidiary and protected princes are not entirely nominal. The case is this, with respect to all of them: we take the military powers of government entirely into our own hands, allowing them to keep only a small number of troops, to be employed in preserving internal order. Now if it is considered what the military power implies; that it is, in truth, the whole power, it will be seen that what we do with those protected princes is merely to delegate to them the powers of internal administration, which, in such a case in their hands, are in truth the powers of oppressing their subjects. This unfortunate intermediate state between British government and native, is filled up with nothing but abomination.

20. Does this description apply to Nepal and Ava?—Nepal and Ava are to be classed with foreign states really out of India, with which we have only occasional intercourse; and with such our relations are merely of a commercial nature. We have agreements of this kind with several of the ruling people in the Persian Gulf, and of the maritime states to the eastward, between India and China. In fact, we have hardly any political relations that deserve attention out of India. We maintain indeed a resident at the court of Persia, but with more of reference to European than Indian politics.

21. You have a resident independent of any envoy immediately from this country?—The envoy we maintain at Persia is accredited from the Bengal government. Instructions, which do not originate with the Bengal government, are commonly transmitted to the Bengal government, and forwarded to the envoy, who is put in communication with the King's minister at Constantinople and at St. Petersburg.

22. He does not communicate with the supreme government at Calcutta?—Yes, directly.

23. And directly here?—When he thinks the emergency requires it; and then he corresponds with the secret committee.

24. Do despatches always go by the way of India?—That is the general rule; but there are exceptions when expedition is considered of importance.

25. Have the French and Dutch foreign possessions in India, on anything but factories?—Nothing deserving the name of territory. Some small places were restored to the French at the general pacification. Pondicherry is something of a mercantile station, and they have Mahé, on the Malabar coast, and some other places. The Dutch have nothing on the Indian continent.

26. Have not the Swedes some?—The Swedes never had any. Serampore belongs to the Danes, near Calcutta, and has been distinguished as a missionary station, most meritoriously employed in promoting the education and instruction of

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the natives; they have also Balasore, and they have Tranquebar, in the Madras territory.

27. Is there a French factory at Chandernagore still?—There is.

28. Singapore is nothing but a factory of ours, is it?—It is an island conveniently situated for an emporium, a dépôt of merchandize in transit; and is of importance in no other light.

29. Is it fortified?—I believe not, nor should I think it required.

30. Is it valuable as a naval station?—It is valuable as a port for merchantmen, and I believe for that only.

31. To supply the loss of Batavia or the Dutch settlements?—Batavia was not considered an important possession for us; this was reckoned a more convenient station, as in the route of all ships to the eastward.

32. Has it turned out as good and as useful as was expected?—It has answered the purposes expected from it. The quantity of traffic has not been so great as entered into certain sanguine expectations; but all the traffic the state of the countries yields has found accommodation there, I believe sufficient.

33. You think we should not be much better off if we had Batavia?—It would probably have cost us more than it is worth.

34. Batavia would have been a Government possession, and Singapore belongs to the Company?—Singapore belongs to the Company.

35. Is the defence, in your opinion, of our dominions more easy from having the whole of India, not a part merely?—Greatly so. It is not easy to find a great empire with so small a frontier to defend as India, when you possess the whole, as in three parts it is bounded by the sea, and in the other by mountains, which can only be passed at a few places, or through a desert scarcely passable at all. The best of these passes, by Attock through the mountains of Cambool, we might defend (such I believe is the opinion of the best judges) against all the world.

36. What is your opinion as to the effect of the subsidiary system upon the well being of the inhabitants of the countries to which it relates?—With respect to its effect on the people of the country, my opinion is very unfavourable. The substance of the engagement we make with these princes is this: we take their military protection upon ourselves, and the military power of the state into our own hands. Having taken from them the military powers of government, that is, all the power, we then say to them, We give up to you the whole of the powers of civil government, and will not interfere with you in the exercise of them. It is well known what the consequences are. In the collection of the revenue, one main branch of the civil administration, they extort to the utmost limits of their power, not only impoverishing, but desolating the country. In regard to the other great branch of civil government, the administration of justice, there is hardly any such thing. There is no regular establishment for the administration of justice in any native state of India. Whoever is vested with a portion of power, great or small, hears causes when he pleases, and when he does not please, refuses to hear. The examination of the case is commonly very summary and hasty, and liable to be erroneous, when the examiner is not (what he is generally) appealed to by something more prevailing than a sense of justice, and then the case is decided according to the motive by which he is actuated. It has been found by experience (and the same was predicted), that misgovernment under this divided rule does go to its utmost extent, far beyond its ordinary limits, even in India. And the causes cannot but be considered equal to the effect. In the ordinary state of things in India, (though under such governments as that of India there was little of anything like a regular check), the princes stood in awe of their subjects. Insurrection against oppression was the general practice of the country. The princes knew that when mismanagement and oppression went to a certain extent, there would be revolt, and that they would stand a chance of being tumbled from their throne, and a successful leader of the insurgents put in their place. This check is, by our interference, totally taken away; for the people know that any attempt of theirs would be utterly unavailing against our irresistible power, accordingly no such thought occurs to them, and they submit to every degree of oppression that befalls them. I may refer to the instances of Oude, of the Nizam's country, and that of the Peishwa while he was in the state of a subsidiary prince. Misgovernment went to its ultimate excess, and there have hardly been such specimens of misgovernment as exhibited in those countries. Complaint has been frequently made of the effect of these subsidiary alliances, in subduing the spirit and relaxing the springs of the government

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government of those native princes. It appears to me that the subsidiary alliance does not take away the spirit of sovereignty by degrees from those princes; this is taken from them, along with the sovereignty, at the first step. It does not remain to be done by degrees. We begin by taking the military power, and when we have taken that, we have taken all. The princes exercise all the power that is left them to exercise, as mere trustees of ours, and unfortunately they are very bad trustees.

37. Then upon the whole, you consider that under the subsidiary system the people are worse off than before we interfered at all?—Yes; and I believe that is the natural tendency of such a state of things.

38. What would be a better state of things?—There are two other modes; one, that of letting them alone altogether, not meddling with them.

39. That would be reducing it to what it was before?—Yes; and there is the other mode: when we have taken really the dominion of the country, to take the government of it wholly into our hands; and instead of leaving it to be governed abominably by the old rulers, to govern it ourselves as well as we can.

40. What is your opinion of government through the means of the dewan?—Governing by the dewan is, in reality (if I correctly take the meaning of the question), assuming powers of civil government, but under infinite disadvantages. We place a resident, who really is king of the country, whatever injunctions of non-interference he may act under. As long as the prince acts in perfect subservience, and does what is agreeable to the residents, that is, to the British Government, things go on quietly; they are managed without the resident appearing much in the administration of affairs; in the detail of the government his presence does not become conspicuous, for it goes on quietly, in a manner that is agreeable to him; but when anything of a different nature happens, the moment the prince takes a course which the British Government think wrong, then comes clashing and disturbance. The mode of preventing such collision which has been generally resorted to, has been the creating a dewan; that is, forcing the prince to appoint a prime minister of our choosing. A dewan, or prime minister, who knows he depends on the support from British power, and would be dismissed the moment that support should be withdrawn from him, takes care to conduct business in conformity with the inclinations of the British Government.

41. You consider the dewan as a less effective or more clumsy mode of absolute government?—When you appoint a dewan, you still can interfere only in a very imperfect degree for the prevention of misrule. Unless you take the collection of the revenue into your hands, and appoint your own collectors, with your own people to supervise those collectors, you may be perfectly sure the people will be plundered. In like manner, there will be no justice unless you administer it. All you can accomplish through the dewan is, to a certain degree, to prevent the prodigal expenditure of the government, improper interference with neighbours, and the violation of some of the general and broader lines of good conduct; but you cannot, without taking the government entirely into your own hands, know that he does not overcharge the people, and you know that you cannot have any security for anything like the administration of justice. All this goes on according to the usual plan in native states, and although a dewan or minister, who manages in accordance with your wishes, endeavours to prevent abuses, the means are wanting, and it is well known that they still go on.

42. Has it not been rather the disposition of the Indian government lately to restore the princes to their sway, to leave them to themselves, than to carry the interference further, and extend it?—The instructions sent from England have been very strong against interference, and against extending our relations at all. Both the British Legislature and the East India Company have declared strongly against extending our conquests, but every now and then it has happened that those conquests were pressed on the Indian rulers by a species of necessity. All our wars cannot perhaps be, with propriety, considered wars of necessity; but most of those by which the territories we possess have been obtained, and out of which our subsidiary alliances have grown, have been wars, I think, of necessity, and not of choice. For example, the wars with Tippoo and the Mahrattas. The conquests actually made by these wars, the dominion acquired and kept, we have frequently chosen not to acknowledge. There being a certain anticipation on the part of the conquering government that the avowed conquest, taking in short, the government of the acquired territory, simply and frankly, as we took all the military power into our hands, would raise a storm of indignation in England, where, so long as we

only made the conquest, but took care to call it by the wrong name, all would be very well received,—the expedient of subsidiary and protective alliances was resorted to. The misfortune is, that to elude this species of prejudice in England, we were obliged to incur all the evil of the most perfect misgovernment in those states in the mean time.

43. Then the spirit of those instructions is diametrically opposed to your opinion of what would be the best thing for the happiness of the people?—In my opinion the best thing for the happiness of the people is, that our government should be nominally, as well as really, extended over those territories: that our own modes of governing should be adopted, and our own people put in the charge of the government.

44. That would lead to the deposing of the native princes, would it not?—It would lead to the making them all Rajahs of Tanjore, with palaces to live in, and liberal pensions, both for comfort and dignity, assigned them.

45. Do you imagine that the influence of the resident is never applied to alleviate the sufferings of the people?—It is always applied; sometimes more, sometimes less directly, but under infinite disadvantages. He has no instruments in the provinces to let him know what is going on. What he hears incidentally; he may know that the country is oppressed, not prospering; that it is impossible it should prosper, and yet find it wholly impossible to use any effectual means to prevent the mischief. Such has been found to be the case in a most remarkable degree both in the Vizir's and Nizam's territories; and matters were still worse under the Peishwa, so long as territory was left to him.

46. In those cases, where there is no special clause, as in some cases, for larger intervention with the internal affairs of the country, the only plausible ground on which the resident could put his interference to protect the people from oppression would be, that the oppression might endanger the peace of the country and the produce of the revenues which paid our subsidy, and might render our protection more difficult to be afforded; do you not think so?—Yes; and even on that ground, the resident is always restrained by his instructions not to interfere but on occasions of the greatest urgency. Upon certain occasions we have considered ourselves bound by some of our treaties to interfere, in order to coerce refractory subjects.

47. That emergency might chiefly consist in the way in which the oppression of subjects of a particular state might endanger the security of government, and increase the burden upon us in consequence of our alliance?—In the case of subjects, unless the resistance to exaction took the shape of a regular force, so as to threaten seriously the efficiency, if not the existence of the government, the resident would not think himself entitled to interfere further than by his advice.

48. Do you imagine the people themselves had rather be under the immediate dominion of the Company than that of their own native princes, circumstanced as those princes are?—The question admits of two answers; one, as regards the class of people who have held the powers of government, or might hope again to hold them under native princes. They are of course averse to our rule. The mass of the people, I believe, care very little by what sort of persons they are governed. They hardly think at all about the matter. They think of the present pressure and of relief from that pressure; but if they find themselves at peace in their dwellings and their fields, and are not burthened by too heavy an annual exaction, they are equally contented whether their comfort is under rulers with turbans or hats.

49. Then it brings itself to this: whether the immediate government of the Company is better than the intermediate or virtual government?—Yes; I consider the only other choice, that of leaving the entire dominion to the princes themselves, as wholly out of the question. I conceive that territories not only surrounding our own, but actually mixed with them, given up to princes whose great and almost sole object of ambition is to maintain a great rabble of irregular troops, more than they are able to pay; who are therefore perpetually hurried on to enterprises of plunder, for the gratification of their predatory bands, are inconsistent with relations of amity. It would be impossible for us ever to feel in security against neighbours of this description, quarrelling with and plundering one another, and perpetually tempted, by the riches of our peaceful dominions, to turn their ravages upon them, without incurring such an expense for standing defence as would be equivalent to that of a perpetual war. The most obvious policy would call upon us to make war on those states and subdue them; which, to any power so far advanced beyond the native in civilization as the English, is never likely to be a matter of difficulty. Such a power, finding its own views of order and regularity constantly



*James Mill, Esq.*  
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constantly broken in upon by neighbours of that description, is not only naturally, but in some sort inevitably, induced to go on conquering one state after another, until it has got the whole territory. When you have proceeded to that extent, where nature seems to have pointed out the most admirable boundary, then you should stop, and govern what is included as well as possible.

50. The seat of the Pindarees was on the Nerbudda?—Yes; to the south of Malwa, whence they carried their incursions in every direction.

51. What has become of them?—They were entirely extirpated by Lord Hastings; I do not mean that every individual was slaughtered, they were entirely broken up, their leaders taken off, and they dispersed.

52. Had they any place that was their capital at all?—No; the different chiefs had forts and small territories, granted them chiefly by Scindia, where the marauders collected at a certain part of the year, and then issued out in parties of 500, 600 or 700 horsemen.

53. Have we not established our supremacy over all that it is desirable for us to obtain?—I consider that we have nothing now between us and the most desirable frontier everywhere, but the territory of Runjeet Sing. If we were threatened on the north-west frontier, for example, by an invasion of the Russians, we should, in self-defence, be obliged to take possession of the country to the foot of the hills, as we could not leave an intermediate space, in which the enemy might establish themselves.

54. Is his country in the mountains?—He occupies the Punjaub, or the country within the streams of the Indus. The boundary between him and the Hill States is not very definite.

55. Does the pass through the mountains at Attock open into his dominions?—Attock is in his dominions.

56. Where is Cashmere?—It is a valley up in the mountains, north of the Punjaub, and belongs to Runjeet Sing.

57. You may then almost be considered to say, that India has been conquered and administered in spite of instructions from England?—To a considerable degree that is the truth.

58. What is the meaning of the word Circars, in the term Northern Circars?—Circar, means a government. The Northern Circars are on the eastern coast, south of Cuttack. They are five districts, which got that name, probably, from being under separate governments. They have always belonged to the Madras presidency.

59. Were they administered by the Madras presidency directly, or through the medium of the native princes?—By the Madras presidency directly, though in the case of some of the hill districts, where the people are wild and unmanageable, the owners, a sort of local chiefs, have not been much interfered with in the management of their own people.

60. Do they come under the head of protected states?—We do not consider them as states, but as subjects. The Northern Circars were among the earliest of the Madras possessions.

61. Have you anything further to add on the subject of the subsidiary and protected states?—I can only repeat my opinion, that then real condition, in respect to us, is that of subjugation; they are part of our dominion, which we manage by no means to the advantage either of the people of those states, or to our own advantage. And farther, we bear all the expenses of the government pretty nearly, while we obtain but a part of the revenues; and the native rulers, ruling as our delegates, are wasting the rest, and destroying the resources of the country.

62. In a financial point of view, then, a more competent incorporation would be profitable?—Decidedly so. Beside what I have already said, one thing is clear, that under an obligation to maintain subsidiary troops within the territories of these states, you incur an unnecessary expense. A smaller force, disposed where it might act with greatest advantage for general purposes, would be equally efficient for general protection. It is still possible that this may be an intermediate state, through which it is expedient to pass. But what is of chief importance is duly to estimate an opinion maintained by persons of high name, whose opinions deserve the greatest attention (among others Sir John Malcolm), the opinion that we ought to endeavour to retain this intermediate state as long as it is possible. From the view which I take of the matter, my opinion cannot but be (of little weight, indeed, compared with that of Sir John Malcolm), that the more speedily we get out of it the better.

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63. Do you imagine that the longer it continues the greater will be the difficulty in putting an end to that eventually?—No, I think that by degrees we are proceeding towards it; and one effect of it, pointed out not by those who, under the name of conservative policy, would preserve the intermediate state as long as possible, is, that in the meantime these troublesome parties, the old military families who formerly enjoyed power, and do not willingly give up the hope of it, are gradually worn out, without bringing odium upon us. They would ascribe the cause of their declension to us, if we were to take the government entirely into our own hands; but when we merely take the military power, and leave a nominal sovereignty in the hands of the old sovereigns, they are equally unemployed and exposed to this decline and gradual annihilation, but do not seem to owe their calamities to us. I believe, however, that a good deal of this supposed advantage is fanciful; for they are not so ignorant as not to know that we are the cause of all the change which has taken place.

64. Do you conceive that it will be facilitated, the assumption of the power, by its still being allowed to continue some time longer?—I think the facilitation is more with respect to English feeling and prejudice than to India. There would be very little risk, I think, in putting all the subsidiary and protected powers in the state of the Rajah of Tanjore by judicious means; but I conceive there would be a very great outcry against it in England.

65. If you took the whole of the government, you would take the whole of the revenues?—Yes, and grant pensions to the chiefs.

66. You think the best policy would be always to have that object in view and that tendency?—Yes, and to accomplish it according as circumstances would allow.

67. Taking advantage of opportunities as they occur for realizing that system?—Yes, it is a result to which the nature of things is carrying us; it is inevitable; in the meantime the present state is attended with deplorable consequences; my opinion is, that it ought to be as short as you can conveniently make it.

68. During this suspense the exaction of the revenue is so much greater, and we bear the odium of it?—Yes, certainly so.

69. The means of levying the revenue is perhaps more objectionable than the amount?—Yes, because there is endless fraud and exaction by the subordinate people, who are under little or no control.

70. Do not the assignments of the revenue tend particularly to the distress of the inhabitants?—When they are not managed by our officers.

71. That is when assignments are made to individual natives for debts?—Yes, such assignments are invariably found to be a great source of oppression. When a needy government, unable to pay its creditors, gives an assignment of the revenues of certain territories to its creditor, and permits him to collect the revenue under no restraint, he takes whatever he can get; he is not in the least interested in the welfare of the ryots, in their being enabled to cultivate their land next year or not, which the government is; he carries off the bullocks of the ryot, all his implements of industry, even his miserable furniture, and leaves him nothing.

72. Do you imagine that the native princes, who are in fact under our government, attach much importance to the name and dignity of sovereign, or that they very much dislike being reduced?—Yes, they dislike it exceedingly; nothing is more ridiculous than their attachment to their mock majesty. The pageantry kept up at Delhi by the Mogul is an example. He holds his durbar every day, and gives pensions to people to come and present nuzzers, morning and evening, as if he were on a real throne.

*Martia, 21<sup>o</sup> die Februarii, 1832.*

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACINTOSH, IN THE CHAIR.

*Henry Russel, Esq. called in; and Examined.*

*Henry Russel, Esq.*

21 February 1832.

73. HOW long were you Resident at Hyderabad?—I held the office of resident there 10 years; I was there nearly 21 years altogether.

74. Were you 11 years assistant?—No, I was eight years assistant; I was then a year and a half at Madras, on a commission for the investigation of the Rabbob

Nabob of Arcot's debts; I was a year and a half in charge of the residency at Poonah, and for 10 years held the office of resident at Hydrabad.

75. What opinion have you formed from your experience and observation of the manner in which the subsidiary system affects the well-being of the inhabitants of the countries where it is established?—One of the most striking effects, perhaps the most striking of all, which a close connexion with us upon the subsidiary system has produced upon the native states that have embraced it, is the condition of premature decrepitude into which it inevitably hurries them. Every faculty that is valuable to a state, every organ that contributes to its wholesome existence seems to decay under our alliance. From the moment that we engage to protect a foreign prince he ceases to have any inducement to maintain himself. The habit of going upon crutches deprives him of the use of his own limbs. By taking away the occasion we take away in the end all power of exertion. Let a prince in this state of tutelage do what he may his government must progressively decline. He has no longer anything to hope from good measures, or to fear from bad; he has no longer any inducement to strengthen himself against the hostilities of foreign powers, or to conciliate the affection of his own subjects; all community of interest or feeling between them is at an end, and, having no longer any occasion for their attachment or support, he treats them as if he had none. He exacts, in the shape of revenue, not what they ought to pay, but what his own rapacity desires to receive. Those impediments which his people, if left to themselves, would raise against him are prevented or removed by the dread of the exercise of our power, and he proceeds in his course of injustice, violence, and extortion without any fear of resistance or rebellion. I speak here principally of the Nizam's government, as that with the condition and progress of which I am best acquainted; and perhaps it furnishes the fairest example that could be chosen, as it is the one with which our alliance has been longest in operation. If the Nizam had not been protected as we were bound, to protect him, either he must have abstained from the system of internal misgovernment which he has pursued, or his subjects would have been driven to redress themselves. The system of confederation which we have hitherto pursued with the protected states of India is inevitably progressive in its nature. Every new alliance that we contract brings us into territorial or political contact with other states, which, in their turn, submit to the same system, and fall under the same consequences. A state that has once resorted to an alliance with us can no longer remain stationary. By degrees our relations become more intimate, the habit of relying upon foreign support gradually paralyzes its own faculties, and in the end it loses the form as well as the substance of independence. If it is galled by its trammels and makes an effort to shake them off, as the Peishwa did, it only precipitates its own destruction; if it submits it declines by degrees from one stage of weakness to another until, like the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, it expires from exhaustion. The choice is between a violent and a lingering death. When once we changed the character of our establishments and relinquished our capacity of merchant for that of sovereign, we entered upon a career in which it was difficult to check, and impossible to stop ourselves. Our largest and most frequent acquisitions of territory have been made since the declaration of the Legislature in 1784, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of the nation." Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786 with this declaration ringing in his ears, and found Sir J. Macpherson engaged in a negotiation with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, in which the object of those powers was to inveigle us into a war with Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis's first act was to break off this negotiation, under a declaration that the English would engage in none but strictly defensive wars. His second act was to propose an alliance to those very powers for a war, of which the result produced a large accession to our territory; but this was the fault, not of Lord Cornwallis, but of the circumstances in which he was placed. Events were no longer under his control; he was controlled by them; and the same has been the case with almost every one of his successors. Unless we are arrested in our progress by some formidable disaster the result of our present course must be the falling to pieces of all the native states, and the acquisition of the whole territory of India to ourselves. The collection of the Pindarries, and the war we were obliged to undertake for their dispersion, were another consequence of the relations established by us with the principal states of India. Predatory bands have in all ages existed in India, and the name of Pindarry was known, I believe, as long ago as the time of Aurungzebe; but organized

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bodies of such magnitude as those which were collected before the war of 1817, permanently occupying tracts of country acknowledged as their own, openly treating with the governments in their neighbourhood, and systematically conducting predatory expeditions, from which even our own territory was latterly not exempt, were unheard of before the extension of our power, and while the principal states retained their independence; but as they declined in power, and entered successively into more intimate relations with us, they no longer required nor were able to maintain the same military establishments as before. Large bodies of cavalry were consequently discharged both in Hindostan and in the Deccan. Legitimate service was no longer open to them; they could not or would not change their mode of life; and by degrees they congregated and established themselves in those districts next the Nerbudda, which were at once the most accessible to them, and the most secure from our reach. The rapidity of their increase was promoted by the same causes that had produced their original foundation, and by the success with which their early enterprises were attended. They were constantly recruited by parties or individual horse-men, who fell out of employ; and the regular states, too feeble to resist them, had recourse to the fatal policy of buying off their incursion, in some cases by payments in money, in others by cessions of territory. But this, though a serious was a temporary evil. Having once been encountered with decision it was extinguished. The source in which the Pindarries originated has been stopped; the native states have no longer large bodies of cavalry to discharge, and even if they had there is no longer any secure position in which those bodies could assemble and establish themselves.

76. Can you shortly state to the Committee the progress of subsidiary treaties with the native states; for instance, what was the first subsidiary treaty with the Nizam?—We had an early treaty, in the nature of a subsidiary engagement, with the Nabob of Lucknow, now called the King of Oude. But that was so old in point of time and so distant in respect of place that it cannot be considered as forming a part of what may now be considered as our subsidiary system.

77. That treaty?—Yes; that treaty.

78. When was that treaty made; was it by Lord Clive?—I do not immediately recollect.

79. What was the time of the first treaty with the Nizam?—Our first treaty with the Nizam was made in 1766. By that treaty we engaged, on receiving three months' notice, to afford him military assistance, and he, in consideration of the yearly payment of one, afterwards reduced to seven, lacs of rupees, granted to us the tract, upon the sea coast between Ganjam and Masulipatam, called the Northern Circars. The next was a treaty of peace in 1768, the Nizam having in the interval joined Hyder Ally in a war against us. By that we agreed to furnish the Nizam with two battalions whenever he should require them; but he never did require them.

80. Their being furnished depended upon a requisition from him?—Yes.

81. They were both subsidiary treaties?—They were only for temporary assistance.

82. They were not for keeping up a force?—No, the first treaty that can fairly be called a subsidiary treaty was that of Panagah, concluded with the Nizam in 1790, preparatory to Lord Cornwallis's war.

83. Was that a subsidiary treaty?—Yes; but the force furnished by us under it was not permanent. It was preparatory to the war with Tipoo; it made the Nizam a member of the triple alliance, consisting of himself, the English, and the Mahrattas, against Tipoo. The force furnished under that treaty consisted of only two battalions.

84. Did we do it by one general treaty with the three powers, or by separate ones?—By separate treaties.

85. The Nizam was no party to the treaty with the Mahrattas, nor the Mahrattas to that with the Nizam?—No, not directly.

86. Was this intended as a permanent arrangement, or merely for that particular purpose?—It depended upon the pleasure of the parties; it was determinable at any time that either party chose; and in point of fact the two battalions were dismissed by the Nizam in 1795 in resentment of our refusing to assist him in his war with the Mahrattas; but they were recalled almost immediately afterwards in consequence of the rebellion of his eldest son.

87. Was the occupation of any part of the territory of the Deccan or of the Nizam's dominions any part of the stipulations of that treaty?—No; no territorial cession was provided for until 1800.

88. Having

88. Having in view a war with Tippoo, and contemplating a partition of dominions?—Yes; and there was a partition treaty afterwards.

89. Was that partition treaty after the peace?—It was; in 1792, after the peace.

90. It was understood, was it not, that there was to be a partition treaty when they first went to war?—It was expected, though I think there was no specific provision made for the scale of partition. We had then a second subsidiary treaty with the Nizam in 1798, preparatory to another war with Tippoo.

91. That was Lord Wellesley's?—Yes; and that was the treaty that made the subsidiary force permanent, though it did not provide for any cession of territory for the payment of it. The Nizam was still bound to provide a money payment for the subsidiary force. The last subsidiary treaty took place in October 1800, the year after the fall of Seringapatam.

92. Did that treaty provide for the cession of territory?—Yes, it did.

93. With the same Nizam?—Yes.

94. Can you tell the Committee what was the outline or plan of that treaty?—The force provided for by that treaty consisted of eight battalions of native infantry, of 1,000 men each, and two regiments of native cavalry, of 500 each, with the due proportion of artillery, and the Nizam agreed, in commutation of the money payment, to cede to us all the territories acquired by him under the two partition treaties of 1792, and the other in 1799, after the war with Tippoo.

95. In respect to the subsidiary troops, do we levy them in the dominions of the princes for whose protection they were intended, or in our own possession?—Generally speaking, we levy them in our own possessions, but on one occasion a recruiting establishment was formed in the Nizam's country to supply the regiments with troops, but I believe that even the men recruited there were inhabitants of our own territories, who came into the Nizam's country in search of service.

96. The inhabitants of the territory of the native state would not be reckoned safe, would they?—No, nor are they the kind of persons we should like to take.

97. Were those 10,000 men to be stationed in the Nizam's territories?—Yes, permanently; there was a provision made, that in the event of war, they should all be applicable to the purpose of general hostilities, with the exception of two battalions, which were to remain near the person of the Nizam.

98. Was he to pay them?—He ceded territory in commutation of the money payment; he ceded to us all the territory acquired by him under the treaty of 1792, after Lord Cornwallis's war with Tippoo, and under that of 1799, after Lord Wellesley's war.

99. We were to maintain them after that cession?—Yes.

100. And we were at liberty to increase them if we saw occasion, were we not?—No.

101. Not in the event of hostilities?—We might, considering his territories as the territories of a friendly power, have sent troops to act in them; but we had no power to increase the subsidiary force permanently stationed in them.

102. Was, then, the first cession of territory in consequence of a subsidiary alliance?—The first, with the exception of the Northern Circars ceded to us in 1766.

103. Was there any subsequent alteration in the provisions of the treaty?—There was one trifling alteration in the composition of the force immediately before the war with the Mahrattas, in 1803: it was thought inconvenient to have so large a force as the Hyderabad subsidiary force, consisting of natives only; a separate arrangement was therefore entered into with Nizam, by which he agreed to receive a regiment of 1,000 Europeans instead of 2,000 sepoy.

104. There was no other alteration in the federal relations?—No.

105. What year did you go to Hyderabad?—Originally in the year 1800, just before the conclusion of the treaty of that year.

106. You had occasion to see a good deal of the Nizam's country, making excursions of various sorts, going down to Madras, travelling, and so on?—Yes.

107. Did you observe any, and if so, what alteration in the state of the inhabitants of the country from the beginning of your acquaintance with that province to the end of it?—I should say, that a very material and constant change was going on for the worse; the population was becoming more scanty, their poverty was increasing, and they were being gradually and progressively reduced to a still more and more abject condition of misery.

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108. Between what years?—1800 and 1820.

109. There was a commercial treaty in 1802, that had nothing to do with subsidiary arrangements, was there not?—Yes; but it was hardly attended with any practical consequences.

110. To what was the deterioration to which you have alluded to be ascribed?—To the increasing rapacity and misrule of the government. The government was originally a bad government; and the persons composing it were of one religion, while the people were of another. I think a great deal is to be referred to that cause.

111. It was a Mahometan government?—Yes, with a Hindoo population.

112. Did it ever occur to you, that any part of that constant degeneracy of government arose from its inability to protect?—A great deal arose in this particular instance from the personal character of the old Nizam, and of his minister, Azim-ool-Omrah, a man who was in absolute power for many years; they were both very weak, very extravagant, and very rapacious men.

113. After making all allowance for personal character, do you consider the subsidiary relation itself as having a tendency to produce that?—I have no doubt it gave efficacy to all the bad features of that character.

114. Were you for some time resident at Poonah?—Yes, a year and a half.

115. At that time the Peishwa was a subsidiary ally?—Yes.

116. In the space of time between 1800 and 1820, what sort of change did you happen to observe in the ceded territories?—I never had an opportunity of seeing the ceded territories. I have no doubt the progress that had taken place there had been precisely the reverse of what I have mentioned; having been transferred to our government, they were reviving in much the same ratio in which the rest of the Nizam's territories were declining. I have always understood they were progressively improving. Our own territories are better governed than those of the native states in close alliance with us, but not so well governed as the territories of those native powers which have retained any considerable portion of their original independence. There was a great difference between the character of the Peishwa's government, under the influence of our subsidiary alliance, when I saw it, from what I noticed in that of the Nizam. The alliance with the Peishwa was of more recent origin, and his government was in a much more vigorous state. And that I take to have been one of the causes of his breaking out as he did; he relied on his own people and on his own vigour. His government had not been weakened and humbled like the Nizam's; he could not brook the weight of our control, and he fell in the effort to cast it off.

117. Was he a Hindoo?—Yes, a Mahratta, as well as his people.

118. You think upon the whole, that the marks of the vigour of his government were discernible in the better condition of the people?—Remarkably so; his people were contented, and had great reason to be so.

119. Is there the same importance attached to caste that there was?—Among the Hindoos as much as ever.

120. Would they not dislike being governed by princes of inferior caste?—Yes; they look down with great disgust upon their own lowest castes.

121. Had we ever a subsidiary treaty with the king of Tanjore?—Yes, I think we had.

122. Is the natural course of a subsidiary treaty that it will end in the complete dependence of the state in time?—Yes, inevitably.

123. Lord Wellesley was the first who began that subsidiary system, was he not?—Yes, that system in the shape and to the extent in which it is now contemplated by the Committee.

124. Were you at Poonah before or since the termination of the Peishwa's government?—Before the war with him.

125. You have no knowledge of the actual state of it?—No; I left India shortly after the war which placed his territories in our possession.

126. You do not know anything particularly of the Nagpore country?—I apprehend it was better governed than the Nizam's, but not so well as that of the Peishwa; and in point of condition, it occupied perhaps an intermediate place between the two.

127. Our first connection with the Peishwa begun when he was under a regency?—No; we had in early times a close connection with his father Ragobah, but not of a permanent nature; we espoused his interests when he was opposed by the  
other

other branches of the Mahratta confederation; but we had no connection with this individual Peishwa.

128. He was an infant when he came to authority?—Not when our first treaty was concluded with him; we had no treaty with him till that of Bassein, concluded in 1802. An attempt was made by Lord Wellesley to induce him to join the alliance with the Company and the Nizam against Tipoo in 1798, but he refused. After the conquest of Mysore a considerable portion of territory was reserved, and offered to the Peishwa as a gift, on condition of his becoming a member of the subsidiary alliance, but he persisted in his refusal.

129. You mean of the triple alliance?—No; the triple alliance was that of 1790.

130. Was not territory offered to Holkar, which he refused?—No.

131. Were not treaties made with Scindia and Holkar before the war of 1790?—No, not on that occasion. I believe that Scindia and Holkar joined as dependents of the Peishwa, but not as independent powers.

132. We have treated with them as independent powers?—Yes, we did long anterior to that, though the treaty of Sahley in 1782 was rather negotiated through Scindia than concluded with him. By our treaty with the Peishwa in 1817, the Mahratta confederacy was "dissolved in form and substance." Since that time, therefore, Scindia, Holkar, the Rajah of Bejar, the Guickwar, and the other smaller Mahratta princes have been nominally as well as really independent. Our first *subsidiary* treaty with the Peishwa took place in 1802: he was de-throned or abdicated, whichever it may be called, in 1818; he therefore survived his alliance with us only 16 years.

133. You say, in your answers to the written questions proposed to you, that the only danger we have to apprehend is from a well-concerted conspiracy, or a rebellion of our own army; do you mean a conspiracy among the immediate subjects of the Company, or among the native princes under our control?—Among our own subjects. The greatest danger is from our native army; and the next, and perhaps the only other, is from our own subjects. I do not apprehend that there is any danger from a conspiracy of the native princes; they might concur in it, and render assistance, but the greatest source of danger appears to me to be in our native army, and there, I think, there is very considerable danger.

134. Immediate danger?—It might occur at any time; particularly if among the native officers a man of considerable talent were to arise, and to acquire influence, as such a man might, over the sepoys.

135. You do not think there is any foundation now for such an apprehension?—No; I think the occurrence of the danger would be sudden; if there were time to discern its approach, I think it might be averted. In 1806 we had a formidable and an extensive insurrection among our native troops.

136. That arose from a particular cause?—It is doubtful what the real cause was. Those generally assigned lay upon the surface. The efficient causes, I believe, lay deeper.

137. You do not apprehend there is any settled disaffection?—Certainly not.

138. But you think there is a constant indefinite danger belonging to our position in India?—The magazine is charged, though at present there is no spark likely to be applied to it. The danger most to be apprehended is the appearance of any person of considerable talents and ambition among the native officers, whose situation would enable him to take advantage of any accidental disaffection among the sepoys. I have no doubt that many of those individual native officers having got all that they can get, are very much discontented.

139. Would a Hindoo be readily received into Mahometan society if he abandoned his religion?—Yes; they do not look upon an apostate with the abhorrence that we do. The Mahometans receive converts readily. The Hindoos, as they do not admit proselytes, look with great indifference on the followers of other religions.

140. Do you conceive that employing a great number of natives in civil and military stations of trust would be attended with danger, or would be an improvement?—The process of introducing them would necessarily be one of time and considerable difficulty; but the result would be very beneficial. The great mischief of our internal government in India has been, the abolition of the respectable class of natives; it has occasioned the utter extinction of that class.

141. You think it could not be done immediately?—It must be a work of both time and difficulty.

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142. And of some danger?—Yes, of course; all very great changes involve some degree of danger. I think, however, that it might be accomplished without any serious danger; and it is a measure of such eminent importance, that I am satisfied it ought to be attempted.

143. The effect of it would be, raising natives to become conspicuous among their countrymen, so far setting them forward to do mischief?—We should hardly increase their power of doing mischief, and we should very much diminish their inducement. By affording them, what we do not afford them now, respectable employment, and placing them in a creditable condition of life, we should do more than we could effect in any other way to reconcile them to our government. At present they cannot but be dissatisfied with it, not as a foreign government only, but as a government in which they have no stake, and which holds out to them no objects of hope or expectation. I take the reign of Akber, who was contemporary with our Elizabeth, to have been that under which India was the best governed. We have no reason to suppose that it had ever been so well governed before, and we know that it has never been so well governed since. The instruments that were principally chosen by him were not of his own race and religion, but Hindoos, the natives of the country; and the result justified his choice.

*Martis, 6<sup>o</sup> die Martii, 1832.*

THE HON. CHARLES WATKINS WILLIAMS WYNN, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant-Colonel *Barnwall*, called in; and examined.

*Lt.-Col. Barnwall.*  
6 March 1832.

144. HOW many years have you been in the service of the Company?—Thirty years.

145. During that time what diplomatic situation have you held?—During the last 10 years I have held the situation of Political Agent in Kattiawar.

146. During that time had you many opportunities of witnessing the effect of the subsidiary system upon the native powers?—As far as our subsidiary treaty with the State of Beroda, I had an opportunity of witnessing its effects.

147. What power was the subsidiary in the service of?—The Guickwar, one of the Mahiatta powers, with whom we entered into a treaty in the year 1802.

148. For what period can you speak to what has been the effect of that arrangement on the internal state of the country?—From the period of our treaty with the Guickwar until the year 1820, during which the natural defects and condition of the prince caused the government to be controlled under the advice and aid of the resident.

149. Do you mean the whole internal government?—A minister and a regency conducted all the details of the Beroda government, subject to the advice of the resident, who superintended their proceedings, reporting everything that took place to his own government for their approbation and information; the effect of this control was very favourable. In 1802, at the period of our first connection, this government had been nearly subverted by the Arab soldiery, and by disputes that existed between the different members of the Guickwar family; it also was so oppressed by pecuniary embarrassments as to be in a state of bankruptcy. Through our interference money was advanced and loans were raised by mortgaging or rendering (under our blanderry) the revenues of the State liable for the sums advanced; the effect of our control and arrangements up to the year 1818, cleared nearly all the old debt of the State, and raised it from a condition of anarchy and bankruptcy to one of comparative prosperity and tranquility.

150. You were in Goojerat as late as a year ago?—I was, 18 months ago.

151. Can you state in what state the country now is with respect to its revenue?—A depreciation in the value of agricultural produce had taken place, and the revenues had decreased. The eastern districts of Goojerat are very rich and fruitful, especially those under the direct rule of the British Government.

152. Part of the country has been ceded to us, we understand?—We have a great number of districts in the Goojerat, others came under us by the conquest of the Peishwa's dominions.

153. What



153. What is the depreciation arising from?—Agricultural produce being depressed, and not being saleable at the former prices.

154. What is the cause?—The changed state of India; it was formerly greatly disturbed, and it is now in a state of internal peace; this prevents the employment of numbers of men, as well as all extra demands; from this cause a larger part of the population have become agricultural, and the supply of grain, which is the principal produce, so far exceeds the consumption, that there is a glut which causes a depreciation in the value of the produce.

155. I should have thought, as the country was less disturbed, that would have been counterbalanced?—This has not been the case in India. During the disturbed state of the country large establishments were maintained; these were consumers of the produce of the soil; they have now become its cultivators for a subsistence. There is therefore now a great deal of increased tranquillity, but a less demand.

156. You say the cultivation of the country is improved, and tranquillity increased?—Tranquillity has generally increased, but the profits of the farmer is reduced, and therefore a remission of his revenue has become requisite.

157. Are the native powers in general consenting to a remission of the revenues in consequence of the fall in the prices of agricultural produce?—I can only speak with respect to Goojerat, the part that I was employed in: I do not think that they have made any remission to the degree that they ought to have done, but they have been obliged to make some remissions, because if they had not, their ryots would seek shelter in the Company's districts; their vicinity affords to the ryots of the native States a place of refuge, and this asylum, which they can always obtain, tends materially to lessen the power that the native governments would otherwise possess of oppressing with impunity their ryots by over exactions.

158. Are you of opinion that that counterbalances the increased power which he has of collecting the revenue by the service of a more efficient force, which is subsidiary to it?—In a degree it does so, the force within the Guickwar possessions affords increased security to the subjects of it, while it also gives increased power to the ruler of the State.

159. What I mean to say is this, does the increased power which that subsidiary force gives it, is it counterbalanced by the facility which the vicinity of the Company's territory affords them of transferring their residence there, and of migrating from the State?—How far it operates in doing so it is very difficult to specify.

160. Previous to the employment of the subsidiary troops for collecting the revenue, is it necessary for the Guickwar to obtain the approbation of the resident?—Certainly, he cannot employ any part of the troops unless the resident concurs in the justice of the way in which they are employed; he is not entitled to the aid of the force unless to obtain a just object.

161. Have the force been employed for collecting the revenue?—Never; the Guickwar, by mismanagement, might excite a disturbance that would make it necessary to employ the forces to put it down, and to preserve the general peace of Goojerat; we cannot deprive the Guickwar of the aid he is entitled to by treaty, but we have a right, which would be rigidly maintained, of not allowing our aid to be used for unjust purposes.

162. The only security then appears to be in the conduct of the prince?—While we have no control over his government it is so; and it is the most difficult thing to suggest an effectual check against our protection being abused. So long as the resident had a control sufficient to influence the government, our protection could not have been made use of to a bad object; this control ceased with the life of the late prince, whose natural defects caused it; the succession of the present prince was accompanied by his assumption of the management of his own government, and our influence being limited to the fulfilment of our blanderry contracts to bankers and other individuals.

163. Since what time is that?—Since 1820. I beg leave to refer the Committee to the Minute of Mr. Elphinstone, dated in April 1820; it will supply all the particulars that rendered it necessary for us to retire from a greater interference. Sir John Malcolm's Minute of the 1st March 1828, and his further Minute and his Journal of his proceedings at the Court of Beroda in January 1830, will furnish the Committee with a detail of all transactions with this State up to the latest period.

164. Is Sir John Malcolm's Minute published in his book?—No. There is a letter also of the 7th January 1820, from the Bombay government to the supreme government

government of Bengal, in which they take a full review of the nature of our Beroda relations, which would be also a useful paper to refer to.

165. Are you prepared to suggest any effectual check under the subsidiary system short of assuming the entire direction of the native forces?—I cannot suggest any plan. I believe experience has shown the impracticability of carrying on interference, with benefit to the people or the ruler, unless the prince will be entirely controlled by our advice; this is a species of management few independent princes will ever be reconciled to. Our political relations with Oude are similar to those at Beroda, and I believe all attempts to induce the king of Oude to make arrangements for an improved system of internal government has proved ineffectual, in consequence of the prince being decidedly opposed to any degree of control that is calculated to lessen his patronage, or to limit his profits of management.

166. In point of fact, previous to the year 1820 our resident was himself the acting governor?—The ruling prince being, from his natural defects, unable to conduct the details of his government, they were managed by a minister and a regency, who acted under the advice of the resident, and the State was relieved from a great debt it had incurred. Under this control, by this period, could a similar system have been continued, it is probable the old as well as the new debt would have been paid off; but the result is no very different, as, after we withdrew from interference, the prince has not paid the loan contractors, but put the revenue in his private coffers.

167. Is not that very general in consequence of the interference, the prince having a private coffer of his own, independent of his public treasury?—In the Mahratta State it is frequently the case; I believe no State in India has derived so much benefit, both as affecting the government and the people, as the Guickwar State, from our interference. Soon after the prince was left his own master his government fell into disorder, and his avarice involved it in great pecuniary embarrassments.

168. Is that from profusion or avarice?—In this instance avarice impelled him to violate our guarantee. That offence would justify, according to usage, any degree of severity or penalty that government might have thought proper to inflict, as the State failed to fulfil its obligations to the bankers who had advanced loans on the faith of our bhanderry. This is a contract by which our government comes under an obligation to fulfil a mortgage on the annual revenues. The prince pledges a certain portion of the receipts of the government, or the revenues of particular districts, to pay it; we are bound, as the bhanderry, to use all the power we possess, if such becomes necessary, to enforce the fulfilment of this contract: we might confiscate. It differs from a guarantee so far, as if we had been guarantee, a pecuniary responsibility would attach to us, but a bhanderry obligation is limited to the enforcement only of the contract.

169. It seems to be the disposition of these princes rather to amass treasure than to waste it?—Their object is to accumulate private treasure and hoard it.

170. Do they lead a jolly life?—The present prince is not of a disposition to do so, or to spend money, as he is very parsimonious.

171. Is their object in amassing this treasure to provide for their family?—No, the treasure of this prince would be the property of his successor at his death: his family are provided for by the State.

172. It seems now to be more the continuance of inveterate habit than anything else?—The habits of all the Mahratta princes lead them to desire to accumulate treasure, as the possession of it gives them weight and consideration.

173. Can you inform the Committee whether it is a usual clause in the treaties with these princes to give a bhanderry for the public?—No clause in our treaties mention it; the practice we found to exist on forming a connection with the Beroda State: this custom was general throughout the Goojerat, and shows the mistrust of the people with respect to their government. In every contract between the prince and his subjects mistrust was so great that security was essential to produce confidence from those possessing sufficient power: the Arab zemindars were selected to be the security to every contract for money lent and the engagements of government, and we were obliged, as a condition for obtaining quiet possession of the fort of Beroda, to substitute our bhanderry in the room of that of the Arabs, which we removed.

174. Who stipulated for that?—Government. It is a point of honour with the Arabs not to withdraw unless replaced by a new security; their character is concerned in the observance of this rule; the native governments in Goojerat all observed

observed this system for enforcing claims; in fact it was the only way in which all engagements were entered into and fulfilled.

175. For what time and in what part of India were you employed?—In the province of Goojerat.

176. In what department were you employed?—In the Revenue department for about twelve years, in the Political for nine years.

177. You were employed in the collection of the revenues for the districts ceded for subsidy by the Guickwar?—I was.

178. Will you mention the comparative state of the ceded districts compared with the districts under the direct sovereignty of the Guickwar?—The Company's districts are in a better condition, and both person and property are more secure.

179. The revenue of the Guickwar is in a most involved state?—It is embarrassed from the misconduct of the present sovereign.

180. What is the revenue of the Ceded Districts now, are they in arrear?—It is impossible for me to state the arrears. The provinces under our direct rule in Goojerat yield about 38 lacs of rupees of revenue, but within that sum are included provinces that we have acquired by conquest from the late Peshwa.

181. Have the revenues of the Goojerat districts fallen off since they have been in our possession?—No, they have rather increased by increase of cultivation, and by the increase of population; the rates of revenue I believe have not been increased.

182. Have they been diminished?—The revenues have been diminished, and are diminishing with the price of produce; our system was not to increase but from new cultivation.

183. Is the general cultivation of the Ceded Provinces superior or inferior to that of the provinces in the direct dominion of the Guickwar?—Both are remarkably well cultivated.

184. Do you say there is any difference between them?—I think there is a greater increase of cultivation in the Company's provinces than in the Guickwar.

185. You consider the profits of cultivation to have diminished since the war; in what proportion?—I do; from the depreciated value of produce: it is felt particularly by those who have a fixed property, and who pay a fixed rent; their produce of course yields a less profit than it formerly did.

186. I think you said the value of the land in cultivation generally was decreased since the war in the proportion of about one-third, if I understood you?—Cotton had fallen in price, and so had grain; the market prices would be the best criterion for ascertaining to what extent; I cannot exactly state the degree, from memory, that they have fallen in the market.

187. You can only state that there is a considerable decrease?—Yes, a considerable decrease in the revenues, and a fall in the prices of produce.

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*Martis, 27<sup>o</sup> die Martii, 1832.*

HENRY GALLY KNIGHT, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel *Munro*, called in; and Examined.

188. IN what part of India were you?—In the Madras establishment.

189. Only at Madras?—Yes.

190. In what situation were you?—I was Resident at Travancore and Cochin for about ten years.

191. What opinion have you formed of the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India and their effect on the good government in the respective territories to which they relate?—I may state that our subsidiary alliances appear to me eminently calculated to strengthen our military and political power in India. How far they may be conducive to the internal good government of the several states with which we are connected must depend entirely on the use we make of our influence over the administration of those states.

192. Are you aware of any states in which it was usefully exercised for the happiness of the inhabitants of the country?—Yes; in Mysore, while the late Sir Barry Close and Mr. Webb were residents, it promoted the prosperity and happiness

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ness of the country; and in Travancore, when I was resident, several measures were adopted at my suggestion for the amelioration of the condition of the people.

193. Were there any particular features in the possession of the resident with regard to these countries?—In Mysore there was a very able duan, who acted under the superintendence of the residents. In Travancore I was obliged to take direct charge of the administration of all the branches of the government and to act myself as duan, in consequence of the great difficulties and embarrassments in which all the departments of the state were involved.

194. Was that by native mismanagement?—By native mismanagement.

195. Previous to any subsidiary alliance?—Both previously and after it. The country had declared war against the British Government, and it was soon after the conclusion of peace that I was appointed resident. But no description can exhibit an adequate idea of the oppressive character of the native government of Travancore, and of the great embarrassments under which every part of the administration laboured.

196. You found great fiscal exaction and mal-administration of justice?—There was no administration of justice whatever; the rajah was absolute; the duan exercised in the most despotic manner all the powers of the government. There was a chain of officers, from the duan to the meanest inhabitant, exercising also all the powers of government, judicial, revenue, and military; bribery and extortion prevailed in all parts; every officer of the government had authority to impose fines on the people at his pleasure; the property of the inhabitants was considered to belong to the rajah on their death, and was only redeemed by very oppressive fines.

197. Were you authorized by treaty to take upon yourself that direct interference?—The treaty authorized the general interference of the British Government; but I assumed the charge of the administration at the express request of the rajah, with the authority of the British Government.

198. In short, it was completely voluntary on the part of the rajah?—It was at the earnest request of the rajah.

199. With the concurrence of his subjects?—They were never consulted.

200. Have the kindness to state the changes that were introduced in consequence of your suggestions?—Many most oppressive monopolies and imposts were abolished, improved arrangements were adopted in the collection of the revenue, the powers of the public servants were limited and defined, a system for the administration of justice was introduced under their own laws, and all the debts of the state were paid off.

201. You made an attempt to introduce the Hindoo law?—That is the law of the country; no other law has ever been admitted.

202. You introduced that because there was no law at all before?—Only the arbitrary will of the servants of government; practically there was no law whatever, although the Hindoo law is the law of the state.

203. With what success was this measure attended?—In general the results were extremely satisfactory, and the administration, after these objects were effected, was delivered over to a native duan.

204. Then subsequently did it go on well?—While the influence of the resident was employed in guiding the administration of affairs, it did go on well; but I have understood that latterly that influence has been very much withdrawn, and that affairs have relapsed into their former state of misrule and disorder.

205. And that the condition of the inhabitants is much less happy than it was?—I have understood so.

206. How long had you the charge of the situation?—About three years.

207. Between the years 1809 and 1812?—About the year 1811. I was appointed in 1810; I took charge in 1811; from 1811 to 1814.

208. What was the nature of their relations with this country?—It was connected by a subsidiary alliance, authorizing the British Government to interfere for the good of the people.

209. To an indefinite extent?—The degree of interference was not specified.

210. That was the treaty of 1795? There were two treaties; the last was negotiated by Colonel now General Macaulay: I believe it was in 1805 that the last subsidiary treaty was made.

211. Those treaties authorized our almost indefinite interference?—They authorized our interference, without stating or imposing any limits to the exercise of it.

212. Was this treaty accompanied by any stipulation of military protection?—

Yes;

Colonel Munro.  
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Yes; it was a subsidiary treaty, by which a military force was to be maintained for the protection of Travancore.

213. And in the country?—The government, to the best of my recollection, reserved to itself the power to employ part of the force in the Company's territories, if it should be necessary.

214. This force was there while you were there?—Yes, it was; I have understood it has been since withdrawn by Mr. Lushington's government, but that the subsidy has been continued.

215. There was a subsidy as well as protection?—Yes, to pay the troops.

216. Was not the subsidy converted into a cession of territory latterly?—There was no cession of territory.

217. It was hard cash, in short?—Yes, and is now paid, since the removal of the troops.

218. You know that of your own knowledge?—I have understood so, it is only from information.

219. Have you reason to suppose the natives viewed your interference with satisfaction, when you took upon yourself the administration of the government?—I have every reason to believe they did; it relieved them from a most oppressive system of government.

220. What opinion have you formed on the subject suggested a good deal by Sir Thomas Munro, of employing a dewan in the management of a country?—A dewan must necessarily be employed if the states preserve any appearance of independent government; while they retain the appearance of independent government the British influence must be exercised through a dewan.

221. Will the country be better managed indirectly through a dewan, or directly by a resident?—While the native states retain possession of the government of their territories it would be highly inexpedient that the resident should take charge of the administration; it is only in a case of great exigency that it would be necessary for the resident to assume the direct management of affairs.

222. Do you think a country is more happily and better governed indirectly through the dewan, or directly by the resident?—It must depend on the character and capacity of the dewan; I suppose there would be a greater security for good government in the integrity and ability of a British resident; but that measure could be employed only in a case of great extremity; its permanent adoption would excite extreme jealousy, and involve, in fact, the subversion of the independence of a state.

223. Have you reason to believe that since the resident has exercised a less direct interference, the affairs of government have relapsed into disorder?—I have been informed so.

224. Do you recollect the amount of the subsidy?—It is eight lacs of rupees a year, and it is now drawn from the country without any return, as the subsidiary force has been removed.

225. Of course it is on the understanding that the troops shall be forthcoming in case of necessity?—Yes; but if no subsidiary treaty existed, we should find it necessary, from a regard to our own interests, to protect that country, both against foreign invasion and internal anarchy.

226. You seem to be of opinion that it would be more for the happiness of the natives to continue the subsidiary system than to retrace our steps?—We cannot abandon the subsidiary system without endangering our own security; and I consider that the employment of the resident's influence over the management of the affairs of the states connected with us by subsidiary treaties, (I understand, of course, when that influence is exercised with judgment and ability,) will not only be conducive to the happiness of the inhabitants of those states, but will in general be necessary to prevent oppression and injustice on the part of their governments.

227. What was the tenure of land in this country; did the zemindary system prevail?—The tenures are very various; a ryotwar system prevails, in which the most absolute property in the soil is recognised.

228. Were you resident at any other place?—No.

229. Have you any observations of a general nature to make, in addition to what you have given, to throw a light on the subsidiary system?—It appears to me that the subsidiary system is calculated to occasion misgovernment and oppression of the inhabitants, unless it is corrected by the influence of the British resident.

230. Then you think the disadvantage attending the subsidiary system can only

be obviated by the personal character of the resident?—By the abilities and integrity of the resident.

231. Do you conceive in general the powers of the resident are too much restricted by the nature of the subsidiary system?—He generally acts under the instructions of his government, which vary according to circumstances; but a disposition has been manifested to abstain from interferences in the internal affairs of the allied states.

232. Without reference to such treaties?—Always with reference to the treaties.

233. The residents are in constant communication with the government?—In constant communication; they report all their proceedings to government, and act under its directions.

234. There are no stated times of communication?—No.

235. What sort of intervals did you usually have?—It depends entirely on circumstances; a week or a fortnight, perhaps only a day.

236. What was the longest time you were ever without?—Usually 10 days or a fortnight, seldom more.

237. Had you never to wait for answers?—Yes; occasionally there was a delay in receiving answers.

238. Were you ever inconvenienced by the delay?—I cannot say that I was; points of urgency were answered with expedition.

239. There were no points in which it was necessary to refer home: they did not frequently occur?—No, they did not.

240. But sometimes?—They might occasionally have occurred. The government took on itself to decide on matters relating to the local government that required immediate execution.

241. The other place at which you were resident was Cochin?—Yes.

242. What were the particular circumstances of that?—Very much resembling those in which Travancore was placed. I was obliged to take charge of the internal administration of Cochin also.

243. That had been in a state of maladministration?—Yes, in great confusion; and it had a very heavy debt to pay to the Company, occasioned by the expenses of the war in which it had been engaged against the British Government.

244. Did not a considerable part of the debt originate in a pepper contract?—No, the greater part of it was occasioned by arrears of subsidy, and by the expenses of the war, which those countries have to pay to the English Government. The contract for pepper expired before I arrived at Travancore.

245. The subsidy was paid in money?—Entirely in money.

246. At Cochin, likewise, you found almost the non-existence of justice?—The same general description will apply to Cochin as to Travancore.

247. And in the same way it was revised and improved while you were there?—Yes, the same remedies were employed, with similar results.

248. What proportion did the subsidy bear to the whole revenue of the country?—A very great proportion. I frequently applied for a reduction of the subsidy to the British Government, but without effect.

249. Do you conceive, in consequence of the extent of that subsidy, the country was impoverished so as to interfere with its produce?—Of course, greatly so. The revenues of the country scarcely amounted to seven lacs of rupees, and the subsidy was three lacs and a half. The removal of so great a quantity of specie from the country must operate injuriously to its prosperity.

250. What were the amount of the revenues in Travancore?—Twenty-eight lacs of rupees when I took the charge of it; they were raised to 34 lacs when I delivered back the charge of the government to a native dewan.

251. In the Company's territories, your idea is that too great a revenue was exacted?—Yes. In the same way I may state, that the drain of treasure from the Company's territories, without any adequate return from a balance of trade, must, in the course of time, produce very injurious effects to their prosperity.

252. You stated that the subsidy was heavy with regard to Cochin; do you consider it heavy with regard to Travancore?—Not in so great a degree as at Cochin, where it amounted to half of the revenue of the country. It was not much greater at Travancore than was necessary to provide a sufficient subsidiary force in defence of the country.

253. In Travancore and Cochin the only use of a subsidiary force is to protect it from external enemies?—Since the conquest of Mysore there is no external danger excepting

excepting from invasion by sea; the presence of the subsidiary force prevented internal commotions. The country had been long subject to insurrections, which were the only remedy the people had against the cruel oppressions and exactions to which they were exposed. Frequent insurrections occurred before the British force was stationed there.

254. Do you understand that insurrections now occur?—I have been informed that discontent prevails; but insurrection is less likely to occur, because the government is supported by the British power.

255. Hence, you suppose, originates the necessity of Government interfering decisively, if it interfere at all?—Certainly; insurrection, which was the only remedy of the people, is now hopeless.

256. When these insurrections took place, having for their object to effect some mitigation in the collection of the revenue, did they ever succeed in their object?—Their success was generally limited to the removal of some very unpopular minister, and the abolition of any obnoxious regulation of the government, after which the march of affairs fell back into its ordinary course.

257. As a mean it was very ineffectual?—Yes, the government resumed their usual system of administration.

258. Do you believe these two countries were in a better or a worse state than the other countries of India, how would you say they stood relatively?—They were in a very miserable state.

259. Rather more so than the other parts of India?—I think they were, from the peculiar oppressive character of the government.

260. What are the peculiar features of the state of Nairs?—Their usages are very remarkable. They are Hindoos; marriage is not known among them; property is inherited through the females entirely.

261. Is it equally divided?—It is equally divided among the sons. There is great corruption and relaxation of morals.

262. That is peculiar to the Nairs?—Yes, on the coast of Malabar.

263. There is promiscuous intercourse, and not marriage?—Not promiscuous intercourse; temporary connexions are formed and dissolved at the pleasure of the parties.

264. The property goes through females?—Yes. The same rule applies to the government. The rajah's son does not inherit, but the eldest son of the females of the rajah's house.

265. Who would actually succeed him?—The eldest son of any of the females of the rajah's house. The Nairs are a brave and turbulent race of men, degraded, however, especially in Travancore, by great vices. Their character stands higher in the Company's territory in the north of Malabar.

266. Were there many British residents, and in what way were they occupied in Travancore and Cochin?—Some were employed in shipbuilding from the teak wood, and others in private trade.

267. And some were resident up the country in the interior?—Yes, they were.

268. And then you found that they did not ill-treat the natives?—Their conduct was always satisfactory; and they were found extremely useful in introducing the circulation of money in the country, and giving employment to the people.

269. You think it is so much for their interest to treat the natives well, that they do so?—It is so much their interest to acquire the respect and confidence of the natives, that their conduct is generally kind and conciliatory.

270. There is no foreign settlement?—Cochin had been a Dutch settlement, and Anjengo was a British settlement; the latter was under the resident.

271. Has the country improved during your residence; has the agricultural produce and the revenue also improved?—I have mentioned the increase of revenue: the commerce and agriculture of the country were greatly improved.

272. Did the revenue increase, notwithstanding the abolition of the monopolies?—Yes, it did.

273. Did the price of agricultural produce fall?—The free exportation of agricultural produce was allowed, and its price was not found to fall, it was prohibited under the old system, but under the new arrangements the freest exportation of all the productions of the country was permitted and encouraged.

274. Is it necessary to employ troops in the collection of the revenue?—Not while I was in charge of the administration.

*R. Jenkins, Esq.,  
M.P.*  
27 March 1832.

*Richard Jenkins, Esq., a Member of the Committee, Examined.*

275. WHAT situation did you fill in India?—I was originally a Writer in the Bombay establishment; I went to the College at Calcutta in 1801, from that I was appointed in 1804, as an assistant to the resident in Scindia's camp. On the death of the resident taking place, I acted for a year in that situation; and for the remaining nearly 20 years of my services in India I was political resident at Naghpore.

276 What opinion have you formed upon the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India, and of their effect upon the good government of the respective territories to which they relate?—The question regarding our subsidiary alliances seems to require a short reference to the still more general one, viz. are we to maintain our ascendancy as the paramount power in India; and if so, is it to be maintained through the means of subsidiary alliance, or through what other system.

The rise and progress of our power in India have been rapid and marvellous. Unlike other empires ours has been in a great degree forced upon us, built up at almost every step against our own deliberate resolution to avoid it, in the face, I may say, of every opposition which could be given to it by the Legislature, by His Majesty's Government, by the Court of Directors acting upon corresponding dispositions in our governments abroad. Each successive Governor-general for the last half century, sent from this country, with minds fresh and untouched by local prejudices, including Lord Cornwallis during his first administration, who went to India under the Act containing the well-known denunciation against conquest and extension of dominion; Lord Wellesley, Lord Minto, Lord Hastings, (the two last strongly impressed against the existing foreign policy in India) and Lord Amherst, have seen reason to enter into wars and negotiations, defensive in their objects, but generally terminating in that very extension of territory and dominion which was dreaded.

What are we to infer from this, but that our position in India has always been such, that our existence has depended on the very steps proscribed by the Legislature, and which would surely have been most religiously avoided by those noblemen, had not the public safety demanded a contrary course; that at no one time for the last 50 years have our ablest and most enlightened politicians been able to find a resting-place where we might repose in security amidst the wreck of surrounding states, and that we are now perhaps in the same uncertain predicament, though all but masters of the whole of India.

With regard to the system on which this ascendancy, if necessary to our existence in India, is to be maintained, I have to observe, that a very great proportion of our power has arisen out of the subsidiary policy. It is indeed the main source of our ascendancy, both military and political; it has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. It is interwoven with our very existence, and therefore the question of abandoning, or materially departing from it, seems to me to be quite irrational, unless we are at the same time prepared to abandon India.

We first appeared in India as traders, but it was as armed traders, and our various contests with our European rivals, the prospect of which rendered a warlike garb necessary to support our peaceful objects, were the origin of our military reputation in that region. Courtied even by the Great Mogul, and by the Sophi of Persia, as useful instruments to free the coasts from pirates, we acquired, as the price of our aid, many of those commercial advantages which fixed us on the continent of India. Then again the breaking up of the Mogul empire led to arming our factories, to protect our lives and properties. The same skill and gallantry which had at first won our way to commercial settlements, displayed anew, induced the native powers newly arising out of the wrecks of the empire, to court our aid in their contests with one another; and the views of securing and improving our commercial establishments, through the favour of those powers, forbade our refusing to intermeddle with their politics. Here the first step was the decisive one; once committed we could not recede.

The French in the meantime had made still bolder advances to empire in India, and our destruction or their expulsion became the alternatives. Could we hesitate which to choose? We now began to raise armies. These were to be paid; and could only be paid by the princes whose cause we espoused against the French and their



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their allies: pecuniary payments often failing, territorial assignments took their place, and we were obliged to exercise a civil as well as military power. Our whole dominion on the coast of Coomandel arose in this way, and much of that on the Western coast; and through it, and the armies it enabled us to maintain, the power of Hyder was checked, and that of his son Tippoo was annihilated: the French power and influence in the Deccan was destroyed, and the Mahratta empire brought under subjection. In Bengal, though the acquisition of the Dewannee gave us the great nucleus of our power in that quarter, still it was extended and secured through the same system of subsidiary alliances, applied to Oude; and in fact, if we examine the composition of our territorial acquisitions, we shall find that a very considerable portion of them has accrued to us in payment by the native states of specified numbers of our troops, amounting in revenue to the whole military expenses of Bengal, as the following rough Statement will show. The civil charges being deducted, the balance is given as applicable to military purposes.

1827-28	REVENUES	CIVIL CHARGES.	BALANCE
	£	£	£
Carnatic, in lieu of } Subsidy - - - }	1,404,343	493,279	911,064
Tanjore - - -	394,672	186,638	208,034
Nizam - - -	584,369	132,911	451,458
Peishwa - - -	estimated at -	- - -	430,000
Travancore Subsidy -	- - -	- - -	89,498
Cochin ditto - - -	- - -	- - -	22,837
Mysore ditto - - -	- - -	- - -	280,000
Gueckowar - - -	382,796	147,170	235,626
Oude - - -	1,813,565	506,223	1,307,338
Bonares - - -	778,533	232,359	546,174
Nagpore Cessions -	estimated at -	- - -	150,000
No Tribute { - - - }	- - -	- - -	60,000
Total Subsidies, and Cessions in lieu of ditto - - - }			£ 4,689,049

If with these great advantages, and many others, we also experience some inconveniences from our subsidiary alliances, we must not complain, but I really see none of the latter to ourselves at all to be put in competition with the former. I do not believe that we have ever been engaged in a war in defence of our allies, which did not call upon us to interfere in their favour whether they were our allies or not. Whilst having the right to guide their political conduct in the minutest points, we are secure from any involvement in hostilities of an offensive nature through their ambition or want of faith, many other advantages of our alliances will be obvious on consideration of the general position of the several states and our own. Our subjects, I presume, derive benefit from any political situation which strengthens our power, and relieves them from the dangers of invasion; and by preserving peace and order amongst our neighbours, takes from before their eyes the temptation to a life of plunder and irregularity; settles their minds to a determined adherence to peaceable avocations, and opens sources of foreign trade to their industry and enterprise; and such is the result of the subsidiary system.

With regard to the effect of our alliances upon the native princes themselves, and their subjects, I would premise, that our alliances are such as were concluded with states that were at the time upon some footing of equality with ourselves, though led by some external danger to submit to certain terms implying a diminution of sovereignty, as the Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Gueckowar, or such as exist with states owing their very existence to our creation or forbearance, or those with inferior states whose internal independence in civil affairs we acknowledge, with certain exceptions inseparable from their subordination to us in military matters and in circumstances affecting the public tranquillity.

With respect to the first class, they have all obtained the benefit they sought, of security from external danger, by which they were left at liberty, if so inclined, to cultivate the arts of peace. The natural effect, however, of such a connection is to lessen the energy and self-dependence of the native state, and to induce it to neglect

its natural resources, or only to cultivate them to the degree necessary to swell their personal treasures, with a view to contingencies, either of hostile attempts on their own part or on ours; and the result, speaking broadly, has been a gradual falling of the power of the state into our hands, (even where, by treaty, all interference in internal affairs has been prohibited,) whether from the weakness or the evil disposition of our ally, giving rise to dangers and disorders that would otherwise have dissolved the alliance, and caused the destruction of the state by a contest with us, or its own dissolution from internal or external force. These consequences, too, have occurred, in spite of our efforts to prevent them, at Hyderabad, whilst at Poonah the success of such efforts has not prevented the forcible disruption of the alliance. With the affairs of the Quikowar we have been involved *ab initio* in a direct interference; and the necessity of reverting to it, after a trial of our opposite system, is the best proof of the evils of the latter, if not of the benefits of the former, only adopted from absolute necessity in the first instance.

With regard to their subjects, our support has given cover to oppressions and extortions, which probably, under other circumstances, would have driven them to rebellion; and such evils have only been remedied where we have been forced to a direct interference for the special purpose of remedying them.

The freedom from external invasion, unless accompanied with such interference, I should fear would hardly be a boon to the inhabitants; for with all the horrors of such invasions, especially by the Pindarries, they were usually well prepared to mitigate their effects in part, and in part to turn them to their own account in evading the exaction of their princes.

With regard to the second class of states, as Holkar, Mysore, Saltarah, Oude, and Nagpore, (not to speak of the states of Travancore and Cochlin,) we have a formal right of interference with all but that of Holkar; and although with regard to him there may exist some grounds of exception to the conclusion, it appears to me that in all the considerations of the interests (I mean the real welfare, apart from the pride of independence) of the governments and their subjects, the benefits of direct interference and control will be found to predominate. In such cases, if we have the court, the highest classes civil and military, viz. the official classes, the great land-owners, and a few leading bankers against us, we have the middle and lower orders, moneyed, mercantile, manufacturing, agricultural, and even military for us.

The last class, as the states in Central India and Rajpootana, have undoubtedly received benefits from the connection with us, in being saved from destruction, or at least a constant state of depression and misery, under Malhatta, Pathan, and Pindarie domination, beyond that of any other state or people, and the increased cultivation and prosperity of those regions is a proof of it; still there are difficulties and hazards attending these connections which I am not prepared to go into.

If there be any class of states, which may be supposed to embrace our protection with a certainty of its unmixed advantage both to them and ourselves, such states are the latter. The less we interfere with their internal concerns, I should say the less likely it would be that causes of discontent would arise; and free as they are, or ought to be, from the jealousy of our domination, having been always dependent on one power or other, generally on all who are stronger than themselves, yet the high military spirit of the tribes of which they are composed will hardly submit for a length of time even to the just restraint imposed by us on their hostilities with each other or their domestic fends. Still we may hope to keep them attached to ourselves in a greater degree than any other class of our allies.

Of the latter I fear we can never be sure, through any course of policy, however liberal, but by the means of our actual military strength; and although it is, of course, just to do our utmost to keep them in their actual condition, as settled by treaties, and perhaps politic with a view to the alternative of bringing their dominions under our direct rule, and to other considerations of keeping up the respectable classes of natives as long as our institutions are at variance with that object, I am rather of opinion that, in all points of view, such an alternative is not the worst, if we regard our own interest, those of our own subjects or those of foreign states, whether governors or governed. Act as we will we cannot divest ourselves of the high station we are placed in without the danger and almost certainty of a complete fall; nor, were we philanthropic enough to view such an event with indifference, if conducive to the real good of India, can we anticipate any such consequence. On the other hand, the ebbs and flows of our policy, sometimes interfering for the people, sometimes withdrawing our protecting arm, are a positive evil both to the native princes and to their subjects, and injurious to our reputation for consistency and good faith, encouraging

encouraging to our enemies, and mortifying to or even worse, disgusting to our friends. I am of opinion, then, that we ought not to recede from any step we have gained, but to improve every occasion legitimately presented, to compensate the inhabitants of India for the unavoidable evils of foreign domination, by securing to them the benefit at least of more enlightened, just, and humane principles of government.

Placed in the midst of nations foreign to us, and inimical not only to us, but to every other people, by the extraordinary and exclusive nature of their religion, manners, customs, and habits, not to mention language, which hardly alludes to foreigners but in terms of contempt, and not taking into account those sources of hatred and jealousy common to all nations under a foreign yoke, and particularly to those native states who have fallen from a high estate to one of humiliating dependence, it is expecting I may almost say impossibilities, to look to any means of maintaining our footing in India, but by the cultivation and improvement of our intrinsic strength, to exclusion of all reliance on our foreign relations for anything but a gradual preparation for the entire conquest of the Continent.

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*Jovis 12<sup>o</sup> die Aprilis 1832.*

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SIR CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNNE, BART., IN THE CHAIR.

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Major-General Sir *John Malcolm*, G.C.B., called in ; and Examined.

Major-Gen.  
Sir *John Malcolm*,  
G.C.B.  
12 April 1832.

277. WILL you state your opinion with regard to the effect of the subsidiary treaties?—I am aware that a very different opinion will be formed, connected with the policy and result of our subsidiary treaties, between persons who have judged them at a distance, and from records, however full, and those who have personally had an opportunity not only of being instrumental in their negotiation, but have seen them in all their results: the latter is my case. I consider, that from our condition in India, we have had in the Political Branch always an option of difficulties, and that our subsidiary alliances have been formed either for the purpose of defending ourselves through them against our enemies, or subsequently for maintaining that general tranquillity which we pledged ourselves to protect at their original formation. In the war in which we became engaged with Tippoo Sultan, we were obliged to form subsidiary alliances with the Nizam and the Peishwa, and without these alliances, we could not have protected our own dominions in the south of India from the invasion of that prince, much less have subdued so irreconcilable an enemy to the British Government. After we had taken this first step, the fulfilment of our engagements with good faith towards the Nizam, led to the subsidiary alliance with him being maintained and extended, for the purpose of protecting him against a combination of the Mahrattas. That combination assuming a hostile aspect towards our government, obliged the Governor-General of India, of the period I am speaking of, 1802, to adopt the best measures he could for enabling the British Government to resist the attacks with which it and its allies were threatened, from the policy and conduct of the Mahratta princes, Dowlut Row Sindia, Ragoojee Bhonsela, and Jeswunt Row Holkar—rulers who continued to be influenced by the principles of predatory warfare, which are inherent in the constitution of Mahratta states. The Peishwa Bajerow, who had long been solicited to enter into a subsidiary alliance, in order to protect himself, as well as us and our allies, against the chiefs of his own nation, was withheld by jealousy of the British power from contracting such an engagement, until an actual attack upon his capital forced him to fly to its territories for protection, and led to the treaty of Bassein. That treaty no doubt might have precipitated the hostilities that took place afterwards with the Mahratta chiefs in 1803; but I am quite confident, that war could not have been ultimately avoided, and that the continual preparation which we had been for several years obliged to make, in order to save us from attack, could have been ruinous to the finances of government. The result of our subsidiary alliance with the Peishwa, gave our troops military positions, before the war of 1803 commenced, within his territories, that insured a success which established for a period

the peace of India; and had our subsidiary system been then extended, we should have, I believe, avoided those subsequent horrors to the inhabitants of a greater part of India, and our subsequent expensive measures of defence, as well as the war of 1817 and 1818. These events, in my opinion, resulted from an attempt to adopt an impracticable system of neutral policy, which allowed the great herds of freebooters to become formidable, and to plunder and despoil some of the finest provinces of India for a period of more than 10 years. About the same period, or rather before the treaty with Badjerow, a subsidiary treaty had been entered into with the Guicowar State of Guzerat, in order through that alliance to protect the possessions and maintain the tranquillity of that province. We had before made a treaty with the Nabob of Surat, and by the treaty of Bassein, some of the richest provinces of that country were ceded to the government by the Peshwa, in payment for the troops which it furnished; and by the result of the war of 1803 the rich district of Brooch was ceded to the Company by Dowlut Row Sindia, to form and maintain its alliance with the Guicowar, which was matured gradually, and without war or internal commotions of any consequence. The English Government found itself compelled, before it could effect the dismissal of large bodies of subsidiary Arab troops, which had long had a predominating influence at the Court of Baroda, to gain to its support the numerous and influential creditors of the state, who held the security of the Arab commanders for loans advanced to the prince, and to give to those creditors what are termed boundary or guarantee engagements for the adjustment of the claims upon the native state. This arrangement, which gave to the government the great advantages of settling without war the countries of Guzerat, has been since the fruitful source of that embarrassment which has attended the course of this subsidiary alliance, and of which I shall speak hereafter.

With respect to the state of Lucknow, subsidiary alliances, which commenced nearly 70 years ago, have undergone great vicissitudes. The working of these the Committee will no doubt receive from persons that possess more minute information than I do upon the subject. After the death of Tippoo Sultan, the heir of the ancient Hindoo Rajah of Mysore was restored to that country, and a subsidiary alliance formed for his protection, it being of course indispensable to protect a prince whom we had taken from a prison and placed upon a throne. There was also a subsidiary alliance with the petty state of Travancore. This is, I believe, a short account of the principal subsidiary alliances into which we entered before 1803. Subsequently to that date, we entered into a subsidiary alliance with the court of Nagpore, and in 1818 with that of Mulhar Row Holkar, both the latter states having been from the events of the wars of 1803 and 1817-18, reduced to a condition in which they could not have supported themselves without our protection. We could not have abandoned the Nagpore state without resigning it to the enemies of the British, and I may say of all civilized governments, the Pindarees, as well as to the probable hostility of the Mahratta chiefs, Jeswunt Row Holkar and Dowlut Row Sindia. The young prince Mulhar Row Holkar, after the battle of Mehidpore, was, in fact, though not in form, placed by us upon the throne, and the whole of his territories were in that condition, that it was quite impossible they could have been consolidated into a substantive power in Central India by any other means than through the arms as well as the influence of the British Government.

Having thus stated my opinion of the necessity by which we have been impelled to contract these alliances, I shall say a few words upon their general results. These have been very different in different situations, and have been very dependant upon the characters of the princes, their ministers, and I may add, of the British representatives employed at their courts. Several of these states had their countries relieved by these alliances from great and increasing evils. The territories of Mulhar Row Holkar, for instance, was one scene of desolation, and have recovered to one of prosperity with a rapidity that is quite surprising. Mysore for a long period of years improved under our protection, in all branches of its government, as well as in its resources; cultivation was increased, roads of an excellent description made throughout the whole country, and wheel-carriages, which had hardly ever been known, introduced to a very great extent, while the people appeared and were contented and happy. One of the most evil consequences which has attended our alliance in other parts was here in a great degree avoided; I mean the destruction of the chiefs and the aristocracy of the country, by our abstaining from any very minute interference, and by the prince maintaining, according to the stipulations

stipulations of the treaty, a body of 4,000 irregular horse, under the same chiefs and officers, or their sons, who had distinguished themselves in the war of Hyder Ally and Tippoo against the British Government, and who have evinced for 30 years as much zeal, fidelity and courage in contributing to the success of every subsequent war in which they have served in association with our troops.

To give the Committee an impression of the character of the commanders of this force, and of those men of whom it is composed, I can almost positively affirm, that during various wars, particularly the campaigns of 1803-4, and of 1817-18, through the whole of which they were in the field, and marched to the distant countries of Malwa and Rajpootana, that there is no instance of the slightest misconduct on the part of any of their high and respectable officers, or any instance that I know, and I was with them on both of these campaigns, of the desertion of one man from this excellent and most useful body of troops. The prosperity of Mysore in its internal administration, was no doubt in a great degree to be attributed to the prince being a minor when the state was established, and to the personal character of Purnea, who was dewan or minister, an office he held with Tippoo Sultan, and to the experienced and able men who having held office for a long period in that country were maintained in different high stations. Since the prince has come of age, I regret to learn that his habits of extravagance and his addiction to vicious courses have combined to give to his government a character of oppression and injustice, and to raise a feeling of opposition in some part of his subjects which has led to the direct interference of the British Government with his administration. I am not acquainted with the particulars of these transactions, and can therefore only state my hope that they will not lead to the annihilation of this power, being fully satisfied that, upon the whole, the inhabitants of that country, and particularly those of the higher classes, have enjoyed a happiness and consideration superior to what I think our system of rule, and its character as that of foreigners, could have enabled us to bestow upon them. With respect to the Nizam, with which country I have been acquainted for 40 years, it was, when our first subsidiary alliance was formed, in a very distracted state, and continually subject to internal revolts of dependant chiefs, and to a dread of annual visitations from the neighbouring Mahattas. It is difficult to calculate between the increasing evils which such a condition must have brought upon this state, and those which have undoubtedly been the consequence of our subsidiary alliance. There is no doubt that in this country our influence and support has paralysed the power of the prince, and given the sanction of our name, if not our authority, to the acts of oppressive ministers; and that much of what we have done and left undone appears to have had the same effect of deteriorating the happiness of the people, and the respectability and condition of some of its principal nobles. Many causes have led to this result, on which I shall not now expatiate; one very prominent has been the occurrence of wars, which forced us on measures that, though they might have promoted the success of our military operations, have injured the internal prosperity of the country. But nothing can be less calculated to enable us to form a true judgment upon such a subject than to dwell upon the evils which our system has created in a native state, without adverting to those from which it has been rescued, or looking prospectively to those in which it might be involved by our withdrawing from the connection, or substituting our own rule. The decision upon such points can never be made upon any general principles; they are, from the character of our power in India, and our not being a national government, practical questions, and must be decided in each case with reference to persons and localities, of which it is impossible to judge, except at the moment of their occurrence. This observation refers to our other subsidiary alliances, as well as those of the Nizam. My own opinion is, that the native state is only to be preserved, when connected with us by intimate ties, by suiting our conduct to its actual condition, and by attention to a general principle which equally avoids that fretting, constant interference that degrades men as instruments of rule, and ultimately destroys the government, through the means of British agency, and that abstinence from interference which inevitably leaves such states to destroy themselves. But considering, as I do, from all my experience, that it is our policy to maintain as long as we possibly can all native states now existing, and through them and by other means to support and maintain native chiefs and an aristocracy throughout the empire of India, I do think that every means should be used to avert what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule.

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It is my opinion that no native state can exist if we exact a strict observance of the terms (in a literal sense) of the various alliances we make. It belongs to good faith to interpret our treaties with consideration to the sense in which they are understood by those with whom they were contracted, and with every indulgence to their lax habits in such points; we can, I think, have no right, except under the most positive and clear breach of treaty on their part, to go in any shape beyond the spirit of our engagements, except on occasions where the public peace of the country under our general protection is threatened in a degree that calls for a change of rule as a matter of positive necessity, in order to preserve the tranquillity of our own territories and those of others. I mean, however, to exclude from this admission that right which has been often assumed with respect to our view of the comparative benefit that the inhabitants would enjoy under our rule, from that which they enjoy under that of their native princes. I am not, from my experience, prepared to admit this result is a general position to be founded upon truth. I particularly allude to the condition of those superior grades of society, without which I consider no community can long exist; and, in a political view, I certainly must apprehend much danger from the extinction of the higher classes. My reasons for this opinion are fully stated in my letter to the Secretary of the India Board (which is before the Committee) of the 26th March 1832. I have also stated in that letter that the native states, who still remain subject to our general influence and authority, but who exercise their internal administration in an independent manner, absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion which, in my opinion, must come into action if their power was extinct, and more certainly, as I should expect that an apparent state of peace might lead, from financial considerations, to the further decrease of our military force, on the very general but very false supposition often made, that because tranquillity is established in a particular quarter, troops are not required; when the fact is, that the tranquillity is referable to the establishment and continuance of that force, and its removal produces the evil which it was calculated to prevent. I have frequently heard it stated that it is consistent with the principles of good policy to increase the territories under our direct rule, and that upon the assumption that we can govern them better than their actual rulers. Some, indeed, assert that it is a moral duty to do so. While I deny the first position, I cannot understand that to argue for our rights to enlarge our Indian territories, on the latter ground, is in any degree different from a doctrine which would justify unlimited usurpation and conquest, on the vague speculation of improving the condition of a native state, by a process that commenced in destroying its established institutions and government.

278. In your opinion, was the substitution of our government for the misrule of the native princes, the cause of greater prosperity to the agricultural and commercial part of the population?—I cannot answer this in every province of India, but I shall as far as my experience enables me. I do not think the change has benefited, or could benefit either the commercial, the landed, or the agricultural interests of many of the native states, though it may of others. It has not happened to me ever to see countries better cultivated and so abounding in all produce of the soil as well as commercial wealth, than the southern Mahratta districts, when I accompanied the present Duke of Wellington to that country in the year 1803; I particularly here allude to those large tracts near the borders of the Krishna. Poonah, the capital of the Peshwa, was a very wealthy and thriving commercial town, and there was as much cultivation in the Deccan as it was possible so arid and unfruitful a country could admit. But there is no doubt that during the few last years of Badjerow's reign, he fell under the influence of low and wicked counsellors, and the inhabitants of all classes suffered oppression and injustice. This, however, was a temporary evil, and his conduct was in contrast to those of almost all his Hindu predecessors.

With respect to Malwa, I saw it in a state of ruin, caused by the occupancy for a period of more than half a century of that fine country by the Mahratta armies, the Pindaries, and, indeed, the assembled predatory hordes of almost all India; yet, even at that period, as I have stated in my work on Central India, I was perfectly surprised at the difference that exists between a distant view of such countries and a nearer examination of their actual condition. I had ample means afforded to me, as the person appointed to occupy that territory and to conduct its civil, military, and political administration, to learn all that the records of government could teach, and to obtain from other sources full information of this country; and I certainly entered upon my duties with the complete conviction that commerce

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commerce would be unknown, and that credit could not exist in a province which had long possessed, from its position, the transit trade between the rich provinces of Western India and the whole of the north-west provinces of Hindostan, as well as the more eastern ones of Sagur and Bundelcund. I found to my surprise, that in correspondence with the first commercial and monied men of Rajpootana, Bundelcund and Hindostan, as well as with those of Guzerat, dealings in money to a large amount had continually taken place at Onjein and other cities, where soucars or bankers of character and credit were in a flourishing state, and that goods to a great amount had not only continually passed through the province, but that the insurance offices which exist throughout all that part of India, and include the principal monied men, had never stopped their operations though premium rose at a period of danger to a high amount. The native governments of Malwa, when tranquillity was established through our arms, wanted nothing but that which the attachment of the natives of India to their native soil soon supplied them with, a return of the inhabitants. And I do not believe that in that country the introduction of our direct rule could have contributed more, nor indeed so much, to the prosperity of the commercial and agricultural interests, as the re-establishment of the efficient rule of its former princes and chiefs, who, though protected from attack, are quite free in their internal administration from our interference.

With respect to the southern Mahratta districts, of whose prosperity I have before spoken, if I refer, as I must, to their condition before the few last years of Bajerow's misrule, I do not think that either their commercial or agricultural interests are likely to be improved under our rule, except in that greatest of blessings, exemption from war, which while under our protection they equally enjoy, and I must unhesitatingly state, that the provinces belonging to the family of Putwarden and some other chiefs on the banks of the Kishna, present a greater agricultural and commercial prosperity than almost any I know in India. I refer this to the system of administration, which, though there may be at periods exactions, is on the whole mild and paternal; to few changes; to the complete knowledge and almost devotion of the Hindoos to all agricultural pursuits; to their better understanding, or at least better practice, than us in many parts of the administration, particularly in raising towns and villages to prosperity; from the encouragement given to monied men, and to the introduction of capital; and above all, to the jagheerdars residing on their estates, and these provinces being administered by men of rank who live and die on the soil, and are usually succeeded in office by their sons or near relatives. If these men exact money at times in an arbitrary manner, all their expenditure as well as all they receive is limited to their own provinces: but above all causes which promote prosperity, is the invariable support given to the village and other native institutions, and to the employment, far beyond what our system admits, of all classes of the population.

In Guzerat, which I never visited before 1830, I learnt from the records of government, and much from the reports of those officers who had known it before, and who accompanied me, that the districts of this favoured province which have been ceded to us were to the full in as good an agricultural and commercial state as they are at this moment when that cession was made; but it is necessary to state that this province possesses so many advantages, and has been so completely exempt from wars and other calamities, that it has been subject to few of those violent changes which have visited other parts of India.

With respect to the provinces now in possession of the Gincowar, I travelled through most of them; they are very much intermixed with our own, and I cannot say that I observed in those I travelled through, any difference in their commercial or agricultural state. Indeed, there is one efficient check upon misrule; the ryots, if oppressed, would migrate into our provinces, where many have relatives residing and often possess lands.

The capital of Baroda itself has become, from various causes, and in some degree no doubt from the protection which our guarantee arrangements afforded to the monied men who were the creditors of the prince, one of the richest cities in point of commercial and monied capital that I know of its extent in India. The former capital of Guzerat, Ahmedabad, from its having been subject to a distant government, and latterly much oppressed by Trimbuejee, the profligate minister of Bajerow, was in a deteriorated state when we received it, but I am glad to say that it is now recovering very rapidly, and promises to be more prosperous, both in its commercial and agricultural population, than it was before. The rich district of Barooch was in the highest state of agricultural and commercial prosperity

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prosperity when delivered over to us by the agents of Dowlut Row Sindia. It has, I regret to state, subsequently declined, owing to indifferent management, which was corrected by my predecessor, Mr. Elphinstone, and by most positive orders from England. It is now reviving fast to the consequence it has long had as a commercial and agricultural province.

With the districts of Oude I am not sufficiently acquainted to be able to give any opinion. The Ceded Districts from Hyderabad had been, before we obtained possession of them, a constant scene of petty warfare, owing to the distance from the capital, and being in possession of chiefs, with troops and forts, which the native government had neither means nor energy to reduce. The appointment of that most able and superior man, Sir Thomas Munro, to the management of these provinces has given them every advantage; but it is here to be remarked, that the means he suggested to restore them to posterity could not be put in action till a strong military force had reduced the various usurpers and plunderers with which the country was then infested. These provinces have, from the causes stated, increased in commercial and agricultural prosperity since they came into our possession.

With respect to the territories of Mysore which, consequent on the death of Tippoo Sultan, came into our possession, I can only state, that from my own observations during two wars, those of 1792 and 1799, in which I was with the armies that entered that country, that however tyrannical the government of Tippoo had been in other respects, neither he nor his ministers could be complained of, as far as the general face of the country enabled us to judge of its cultivation, and the state of its general internal commerce. I think it however likely, without being aware of facts, that the Baramahal, Malabar, Coimbatore and Salem, and Canara, and other countries we came into possession of on the fall of Seringapatam, are in a fully equal, if not a superior condition, under our government, to what they were under that of Tippoo: I refer here to their commercial and agricultural state.

With respect to the territories of the Peishwa, the provinces of the Deccan have lost sources of wealth by the introduction of our power, which it is almost impossible for any good government on our part to restore. From the healthiness of this climate, and its favourable soil for the breed, and food of horses, it always maintained and supplied a large proportion of the Mahratta army; and it was, from that and other causes, a country in which there was great expenditure, into which many luxuries were imported. The Deccan was also the native place of almost all the principal soldiers and princes of the Mahratta army; and from the residence of a court at Poona, and government of the provinces by the principal chiefs of the country, wealth was distributed among all the higher and many of the industrious classes, while the attachment of the Mahratta to the place of his birth, at whatever distance he might be employed, or however long his absence, sent always a share of that booty he gained, or that wealth he acquired, to promote the cultivation, or to add to the beauty of his native town or village. Under these circumstances, the deteriorated state of this country since it fell into our power is to be ascribed to causes which we cannot control; but every effort has been made to improve it, and the proportion of this country still left to native chiefs, and the peculiar indulgences and privileges granted to these during the administration of Mr. Elphinstone, have tended in some degree to counteract the depressive effects of our rule; and I state this particularly, because I am of opinion, that cherishing such persons and maintaining them in their present condition, and using them as instruments of improvement, is essential to the promotion of the agricultural and the commercial interests of that part of the territories. But I should here mention, that every effort has been made to introduce capital, and some new sources of industry have been created, and particularly the establishment of the cultivation of silk, which promises to be a source of future commercial wealth; but its introduction is yet too young to speak on this subject with any confidence.

The Concans, which were also ceded from the Peishwa, and are the districts which intervene between the mountains called the Ghats, which form the table land of the Deccan, and the sea, were in excellent condition when delivered to the English, particularly the southern Concan, which was a favoured province, from being the birth-place of the reigning family of the Peishwas, and many of the Brahmins employed by him. Circumstances arose to obstruct in some degree the prosperity of these provinces; but I am happy to state they are now fast improving, though I do not think they are yet in a better state than they were when we received them.



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479. Are you of opinion that the admission of natives into a larger share of government, and perhaps the extension of such distinctions as the privileged classes of the Deccan enjoy, would tend to satisfy the wants and wishes of aspiring natives? —I am of opinion that no measures are so essential to the good government and preservation of our native empire as the advancement of the natives to a share in the administration: that has always been my opinion, and I have had a full opportunity, during the few years I was Governor of Bombay, of proving in practice the truth of the opinions I long entertained upon this subject. I had always considered, that to expect we could, through schools and colleges, do more than give the mere elements by which men would be enabled to fulfil, according to their acquirements, better or worse, the stations to which they might be named, was impossible; and it was only by introducing them into situations of responsibility and trust, and giving them our confidence, that we could expect to elevate their minds in a degree that would render them efficient aids to our government, and their becoming so is, I consider, alike as essential in a financial and a political point of view. I was also satisfied that such encouragement was necessary to ensure the attachment of this class of the natives. My predecessor at Bombay, Mr. Elphinstone, entertained the same sentiments, and he had, both in the fiscal and judicial branches, given the natives employments, salaries and powers, exceeding, I believe, what they then enjoyed in any other part of India. While I presided over the government of that settlement, these powers were so greatly extended, that at present every civil suit is tried in the first instance by a native ameen or judge, with appeal to an European session judge, and from him to the High Court of Sudder Adawlut. Some of those native judges, who are termed sudder ameens or principal judges of large cities, and the able native who is sudder ameen at Poona, received, from pay and fees which were attached to his office, a sum, I believe, of not less than 800 rupees a month, which to a native is a very large amount. The other ameens or native judges of provinces received from 200 to 400, as far as I can recollect; but I will give the Committee as correct information as I can obtain upon this subject, my doubt being at present whether the fees they formerly had have not been commuted, as recommended, for fixed salaries.

In the fiscal branch, natives have also been employed with increased powers and liberal salaries, varying from 30 to 600 rupees per month. Referring to those public native servants and others, I deem it necessary here to state a regulation of particular importance. By the rules which I found established by my predecessor, no native in the public service, enjoying a salary of 30 rupees per month or higher, can be dismissed from his office without the sanction of government. In the measures I adopted to combine education with the promotion of the employment of natives, a regulation was made by which all offices were divided into four classes; the first and second class being of those above the salary I have mentioned, while the third, termed pupils, were below it, and also the fourth, who are called boys. The latter were directed to be chosen from the best scholars of the principal provincial and other schools; these can be dismissed within two years by the person at the head of the office into which they are introduced, while pupils can be dismissed by the heads of the department to which they belonged; the two higher classes only, as before stated, by government. It is fixed, that though they were not to rise by seniority in the office, that no person could be promoted to a superior grade who had not passed the inferior; and by these means the great advantage was gained of encouraging natives of rank and influence to make their sons efficient and acquainted with their duty before they had charge. This rule limited patronage, but gave great encouragement to education, and promoted the efficiency of the service.

The privileged classes of the Deccan were established by Mr. Elphinstone, on the representation, I believe, in the first instance, of some of the principal Marhatta chiefs, who assumed the implied obligation from the proclamation issued by Mr. Elphinstone, in 1818, to protect them and the nobles of that country. This protection was desired against the incursions of the adawlut courts and other English courts of justice, of whose forms as well as rules they stand, from the condition of the community and their habits, in peculiar dread. Mr. Elphinstone, with a view to meet what he deemed the just expectations of these chiefs, and to reconcile them to the British rule, formed the privileged classes: the first of those classes included the highest chiefs, with whom we had entered into engagements, who had considerable territories, and in the internal administration of which they were continued independent. They were wholly exempt from all processes of

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our provincial courts. The second class were jagheerders or chiefs, not so high as the former, but who possessed heritable lands, and had held high rank under former governments. These were made exempt from ordinary processes, and permitted to answer any suits against them, through a vakeel or agent. The third class are subject to jurisdiction, and obliged to attend in person, but are entitled to courtesy in a variety of forms connected with summonses, and have also individual privileges to which they attach the highest value. A civil officer of rank was appointed what was deemed sirdar agent, and through him all matters connected with the privileged classes were conducted. This public officer attended to all processes, claims and petitions from or against these chiefs, which do not fall into the ordinary courts. The duties of this agency are combined with those of the principal judge at Poonah, but he has for this part of his jurisdiction the aid of a deputy or civil officer of experience, and holds a distinct court for all cases connected with the interests and rights of the first and second class. To the third class several persons have been advanced. It includes some of the highest servants of government, who have distinguished themselves in various ways; merchants even who have rendered themselves eminent by their public works, have been promoted into it; and on a late occasion a banker was raised by me, on account of his having, in accordance with the desire of his deceased father, built a bridge over a river near Poonah; a gold medal with a bridge engraved upon it was given at the same time. The ceremony took place at a crowded durbar I held at Poonah for the purpose; nothing could exceed the gratification of the individual, and the effect produced on all present. Another inhabitant of Poonah (a parsee) has since received a similar honour in reward of the zeal and liberality with which he employed his capital in aiding a very skilful Italian in the introduction of the cultivation of the mulberry plant and the manufacturing of silk. It is impossible to describe the value that the higher ranks of natives give to this separation from the other classes, which has been made by the English Government, and its value is greatly increased to our own public servants, in the estimation of the civil and military, from its associating them with men of the highest rank. A gallant old subadar-major (the name of this old and distinguished native officer is Purseram Sing), of fifty years standing, distinguished for his bravery, when he had conferred upon him his commission for the command of a hill-fort, received personally from me at the same time a horse and sword, in the name of the government. He was also created a member of the third class of the privileged order. The ceremony of his investiture took place at Poonah. The Commander-in-Chief was present, and the troops drawn out, in honour of the native officer and several others receiving the rewards of long service and valour. The elevation of this old soldier to the privileged class, appeared to gratify him more than any other mark of distinction; "I am now," said he, "on a footing with the jagheerders and sirdars of the Deccan." I mention this fact, as a proof of the great value natives give to such distinctions.

Morts, 17<sup>e</sup> die Aprilis, 1832.

SIR CHARLES WATKYN WILLIAMS WYNNE, BART., IN THE CHAIR.

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Sir John Malcolm,  
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Major-General Sir John Malcolm, G. C. B., a Member of the House, Examined.

280. HOW far, in your opinion, has the substitution of our Government for the misrule of the native princes increased the happiness of the agricultural and commercial classes?—Generally speaking, the boon of protection and peace which our government, from its strength, gives, must render it beneficial to a great proportion of the agricultural classes, and so far increase their happiness; but from this observation must be excluded the heads of those classes, such as desays, dessmookhs, patells and other principal hereditary district and village officers.

281. What do they at all correspond to in our country?—They were hereditary district and village officers. Under the native rulers, many of this description of men had consequence, and often rose to considerable wealth and power. Under us, even when they continue to exist, they have no prospect of rise, and are reduced often to comparative poverty by the subdivision of property which takes place

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place under the Hindoo law, having to support their brothers or sons in idleness. For these, under native governments, they almost always obtain employment from individuals or government, and this enabled them to continue in management, if not enjoyment, of the small portions of land that were the property of the younger branches, and relieved the superiors who held office from the necessity of contributing further to their support. These heads of the agriculturists have had in all our provinces where they remain their condition deteriorated, and must, from their feelings and cherished recollections of the situation of their forefathers, have had their happiness decreased by the introduction of our power. Much has been recently done, but more is required to raise this class, particularly the patells or heads of villages. I consider it a political object of importance to attach the superior classes, from the head of a principality to the head of a village, to our government, and to use them as our chief instruments for the administration of our Eastern empire. We have destroyed or depressed those heads, and particularly those of the agricultural class, on the ground of their abusing their influence and power in oppressing those below them. Had we maintained them, and established a strict control over their conduct while we treated them with indulgence and consideration, we might, I think, have reformed their habits and retained the incalculable benefits of their influence over the various classes of society to which they belong. But before our information or knowledge of the various classes of our subjects was complete those entrusted with authority, shocked no doubt at the oppressions exercised by the hereditary officers, which were exaggerated by petitions and by the representations of interested natives in the employ of European public officers, hurried to the work of demolition before they had maturely considered that of reconstruction. The consequence has been constant changes of system; the frequent introduction of persons into office who are strangers to the province in which they are employed, and are often men of low birth, without local character, and having no recommendation but quickness at their business in the cutchery or native office of the collector. These command no respect from those placed under their authority. There are besides other underlings of the European collectors and magistrates, such as peons with badges, taken from the very dregs of society. These underlings, proud of their upstart power, and the badge of their European employer, are too prone to insult the higher classes of the community, and their conduct tends to alienate the attachment of them to our rule. The underlings to whom I have alluded have little alarm at detection, for they are too useful to the inferior native officers to be much restrained by them, and the enlarged duties of the European superior makes it impossible he can supervise the whole of the province entrusted to his management. These persons, it is also to be remarked, were generally men whom even detection and punishment could not place much lower in the scale of society than they were before they were employed in the public service. Much has been done of late to remedy this evil, which has in its operation tended greatly to decrease the happiness and content of the higher classes of the agricultural population of many of the provinces of India subsequent to the introduction of our rule. The principles we have adopted have, in many cases besides these stated, operated very injuriously on their actual condition and in depressing their future hopes; and regard for the happiness or welfare of this class of our subjects, as well as our political interests, alike demand that they should meet with more attention and consideration than they have been, and be used as they might be, as the most beneficial aids in the fiscal administration of their native provinces.

The mass of the cultivators enjoy tranquillity, and therefore are benefited by the change. They are very sensible to the blessings of peace, and they may be said to have had their happiness increased from that being more permanently settled by the introduction of our rule. They are a submissive and quiet race, unless in cases where their claim to lands are at issue. Their attachment and allegiance to the British government is of a very passive character, and they never can be calculated upon as aids on the occurrence of war or revolts; on the contrary, the strongest feeling they have is that of a superstitious character, and would be more likely, if excited, to be against us than for us. The commercial classes of India have been decidedly benefited by the introduction of our rule; more, however, from the tranquillity we have established than the protection we give, for, with very rare exceptions, this class of the community receive efficient protection even from the most despotic of Asiatic princes, who are restrained from oppressing them by a knowledge that they can inflict injury or injustice upon no individual of this class that does not vibrate throughout the whole, and is consequently calculated to diminish

one of the greatest sources of wealth of their government. It is here to be observed that the commercial class are a body of men from whom, although we may increase their happiness, we cannot expect that a sense of gratitude will ever produce results that will give us any efficient aid on the occurrence of emergencies, as they are men of such pacific habits, that they almost invariably shrink from mixing themselves in any way, even through their influence, in case of any revolt, sedition, or wars. There is a considerable portion of this class, which I shall best describe by terming them the money dealers, whom I do not think have had their happiness (which is associated in their view particularly with their personal interest) advanced by the introduction of our rule. These often rented large tracts of countries, and were in all cases associated with the ryots in the cultivation of the soil under native governments. I have explained the working of this system very fully in my memoir of Central India. It was in many respects beneficial to the prosperity of the country; and they have been too generally condemned by us on grounds that I think are not well founded. These money dealers we often find on our records reprobated as usurers and extortioners, who live on the fruits of the industry of the cultivators, whom they are described as oppressing. Many public officers have taken an almost exclusive view of the evils of this system, and have not given, in my opinion, the consideration it merited to the great benefit that was derived from introducing and keeping capital in the country, the good of which the cultivators as well as the government are always certain to reap in one way or another. I have elsewhere\* fully stated the checks that prevented these money dealers oppressing the ryots, much less their adoption of any measures calculated to ruin them. I have shown that their profits, which might be great for one year, were by bad seasons reduced to little or nothing the next; but under all circumstances, it became their interest to support the cultivators, for without these were contented and equal to the duties of their condition, it was quite impossible the monied men could continue to derive any profit from the connection.

A plan is now in progress for equalizing the currency in gold, silver, and copper over all India, which will no doubt have many good effects; but it will injure the interests, and with that decrease the happiness of a very numerous portion of the commercial class, I mean the shroffs or money changers, whose profits, in a considerable degree, depend upon the vast variety of different coins now in circulation throughout the whole Indian empire. While I state this fact in answer to this query, I by no means intend it should be inferred that the partial injury to the interest of the shroffs merits a moment's consideration. The simplifying and equalizing the currency of India will be attended with equal benefit to government and to the community at large. In reference to this and former queries, I must here make some general observations. Our great error in India appears to me to have been a desire to establish systems founded on general principles, in all branches of our administration, that were often in advance of many of the communities for whose benefit they were intended, but by whom they were neither understood nor appreciated. In our precipitate attempts to improve the condition of the people, we have often proceeded without sufficient knowledge, and been in many cases obliged to retrace our steps with great disadvantage to our own interests, as well as disturbance to the happiness and confidence of our native subjects. The vast difference in character and condition of the inhabitants of the various provinces of our dominions has too often been overlooked by those who were eager for the introduction of favourite plans; and I have been led, by what I have seen, to apprehend as much danger from political as from religious zealots. If the latter at times create alarm to the natives from infringing their superstitious observances and religion, the former unsettle their minds by the introduction of principles and forms of administration foreign to their usage, and at variance with long established habits and prejudices. We should proceed with much caution, for the natives never appear to forget that we are strangers; and I have observed, that throughout the provinces of the interior every report, however improbable or unfounded, that gives a rumour of change, is listened to by all classes, even to the lowest, with unaccountable attention; they attend to and circulate idle and false prophecies respecting future political events, that are of the most extravagant nature. This I think shows a general impression regarding the character of our government

\* *Vide* Memoir of Central India, vol. 2, Revenue Chapter, p. 1, for a full account of the revenue system under native government.

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ment, and a disposition to believe that it will not be permanent. We are slow to credit this fact, and draw deductions of the existence of a contrary feeling from the comparison we make of the superiority of our rule over that of the natives, for which it was substituted. The sentiments we entertain on this subject are re-echoed by the natives around us, and with whom public officers in general communicate; but much experience has satisfied me that this will be found a very dangerous delusion, if it ever makes us cease to place our chief reliance on our military power, or to decrease our efforts to merit the attachment of our Indian subjects, by the strictest attention to their usages, prejudices and religions; and above all, if it encourages us to innovation, or to a premature introduction of improvement in the forms and substance of those parts of our administration which is likely to affect the happiness or interests of any part of the population.

The higher classes of natives, including all those of the military tribes, who are very numerous, although they enjoy tranquillity and protection from our system, have not the value we suppose for these blessings, particularly when they see that our rule is incompatible with their advancement, and with the attainment of those objects to which they deem themselves born, and have been accustomed from habit to look. In the actual condition of India, unless our administration is so constituted as to give to these classes consideration and employment, as far as is consistent with the nature of our government as foreigners, I must anticipate frequent revolts and seditious movements, and no person but one who has been accustomed to see these in progress can form an idea of the rapidity with which they spread. Every one of such revolts may be considered, however trifling in its origin, as a crisis: for unless immediately subdued, those impressions on which our rule so much depends, are greatly impaired, and the local peace of the quarter in which they occur seriously endangered. Add to this, that while those who desire to throw off the yoke of foreigners are bold, energetic and enterprising, those whose happiness our rule increases, and who would, from their being attached to peaceable habits, desire its continuance, are unlikely, under any changes that I can contemplate, to be imbued with that zeal and attachment to our government that will enable them to be an efficient aid in expressing those who must continue disposed to subvert it. I state these results of my experience in our relying too implicitly upon sources of believed strength, that will fail in the hour of trial.

282. What is your opinion as to the tyranny of the native princes when left to themselves, particularly with reference to the agricultural and commercial classes?—The tyranny of the native princes over the classes stated in the question depends much upon the character and power of the princes; but in general I should state that even with the worst of those princes, (excluding, of course, adventurers and plunderers who have temporarily assumed that rank,) there is not that oppression even of the agricultural classes which would appear from a general view of the power of the one party to oppress, and the apparent inability of the other to resist. In all native governments there is, in the first place, a just estimate of the value of a good name. There is also the greatest regard for district and village institutions, and any attempt to injure the ryots seriously is sure to be attended, if upon a large scale, with open opposition; if on a lesser one, with a decrease of the revenue, through the discontent and often desertion to other states of the cultivators of the soil. The heads of villages also when a prince or his minister are oppressive, enter into collusion with the collectors to defraud the revenue, and these again connect themselves with the principal officers at court, and sometimes with the ministers, who, gained by bribes, grant them their support, and a diminution of the actual revenue is often effected, which more than balances any unjust imposition that has been laid on the country. There is, in short, in many cases relief from tyranny, through the arts and frauds of the village officers and cultivators, and of those who have the immediate collection and receipt of the revenue, and this not unfrequently operates as a check, when others are wanting, on the misrule of oppressive and unjust rulers. When the prince is of a just character, I know of no system that I ever read of or saw for the collection of the public revenue that is more calculated to be beneficial to cultivators than that established under native administration in India, particularly that of Hindoo princes. And I could here mention many countries which, for a great number of years, enjoyed as much prosperity as could result from the best and most paternal rule. The opinions we form of the great oppression practiced by native princes upon the inhabitants of the agricultural classes are I know, from its having been on many occasions

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my duty to make specific inquiries into the facts much exaggerated. We receive them from discontented persons of the country, and sometimes from those who are anxious for change from their own personal advancement being concerned; and we often judge them on principles little applicable to the condition of the government or community on whose interests and actions we are called upon to decide. I can only further state, that if the effects of our own rule were to be considered by any other judges upon the same data that we so frequently condemn those of the natives, we should be considered as persons who had practised great oppression. Without referring, as I could, to proofs of the truth of this assertion of an old date, I have within the last four years had frequent opportunities of seeing in countries in which every effort had been made to satisfy the inhabitants, and to establish our rule on the best and justest principles, loud and almost universal complaints, in many districts and villages, against what they deemed oppression and injustice; and in several cases the inhabitants of districts and villages have left their homes to seek the Governor of Bombay in a body, abandoning their wives and children, and their houses for several months, to obtain relief from what they deemed injustice. I mention this fact to show, that all governments are liable to such imputations. In most of these cases I have noticed there was little real foundation for the clamorous complaints that were made; and they proceeded chiefly from a desire of forcing government by such means to the lowering of the assessment, or to a change in the mode in which they were governed. The body of the complainants, I found, were generally influenced on these occasions, as I believe they are in many similar ones under the native rulers, by a few interested and seditious individuals. In cases where military adventurers, like the late Jeswant Row Holkar and the Pindarries, retain power over large tracts of country for a very considerable number of years, although the cultivators were not annihilated or wholly driven out of the country, they suffered great oppression: and in the Nizam's country, circumstances have created, I believe, a great deal of misery to many of the agricultural inhabitants. With regard to the commercial classes, I have before answered this question; they have much influence under native governments, and have many checks upon tyrannical power, and have in many cases many more opportunities of enriching themselves than they have under our government. Their influence is greatly increased by a number of the principal men, and particularly the bankers, being of one sect, that of Jain, who are associated, however scattered throughout India, by the most intimate ties; and the consequence is, that they act, in all cases of tyranny and oppression, with a union that gives them as a body, great strength. The Bovaahs are also a numerous and united commercial class in several parts of India. I must, however, referring to these classes, observe, that their being free from the effects of tyranny and oppression depends upon their keeping themselves clear of all government employment; for from the moment they become servants, or are employed by the State, they are much at its mercy; and in the difficulties and embarrassments they bring on themselves, or the oppressions they suffer from that cause, they do not receive the support they would from their brethren if they had limited themselves to their commercial concerns.

283. Have you not expressed your opinion, that it is on the happiness of the people that the prosperity and continuance of our empire mainly depends?—I make no doubt I have expressed that opinion often; and that is what always has rendered me so anxious, that in the shape as well as substance of our government, we should adapt it as much as it is possible to their understandings, to their usages, and to the feelings and impressions under which they act, and by the gratification of which, on such points, I consider their happiness can alone be promoted, and their attachment secured.

284. Is it your opinion, that from the complete change in our situation within the last 15 years, a re-constitution of our local rule is necessary?—I am decidedly of that opinion.

285. What, in your opinion, would be the nature of that re-constitution?—I consider that the natives of India, provided a rule is calculated upon the principle I have stated, to promote their happiness, neither care nor understand much with respect to the shape we may give it, as far as it affects the European parts of our establishment. With respect to the latter, I do conceive that the changes that have recently occurred require greater power to be vested in the persons entrusted with the general government of India, and that authority should be more concentrated than it now is in individuals who have the charge of the large divisions of that empire. I consider that the vast population of India, and the nature of our government,

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government, make it as inexpedient as it is unwise, both in a financial and political view, to continue to administer that country by that multiplicity of European public officers hitherto employed; and I consider the numerous local checks which we have desired to establish, when our territories were more limited, to be impracticable in our actual condition. We should afford ample means of administering this vast country to those who are placed at the head of its separate branches, and who rule over different parts of the empire. From the magnitude of our territories, we are compelled to invest them with great power; but I must consider that such a system, though it confers authority and distinction on individuals that will render them more equal to their duties, in no degree removes them from the strict supervision of their superiors; while their minds are elevated by the great trust reposed in them, they will act under checks equally as efficient, if not more so, than those that now exist. I have, however, stated my sentiments upon this subject in my letter to Lord William Bentinck, which forms an enclosure of a letter to Mr. Villiers, the Secretary of the India Board, and is on the table of the Committee. I can only add, that I think the period has arrived when this subject should be taken into immediate consideration.

286. Is it your opinion that no war has been undertaken which, in your judgment, might have been avoided?—I have for a period of nearly 40 years been employed in the Political department of India, and with the exception of the war of Nepal, and with the Burmese, when I was not in India, I have had opportunities of forming a judgment on all the others that have occurred; and though I believe there were some which might have been evaded for one or two years, with increased danger to the English Government, yet I am decidedly of opinion that no war has been undertaken that could have been avoided.

287. Is it your opinion the establishment of our supremacy has enabled us to make great military reductions?—We have within the last three years made as great reduction in our military establishment as I consider consistent with policy or even with safety; for though there is no power in India of sufficient strength and means to engage in a general war with the British Government, the increased extent of the countries to which we must afford protection requires us to keep up a large military establishment, otherwise we shall be exposed to revolts or risings in the quarters from which they are withdrawn, and these will have besides other consequences, that of increasing our military expenditure in a degree far beyond any saving that could be effected by further reduction in this branch. It is, however, necessary to add, that the great reduction which has been recently made could not have been effected had either the Mahomedan power of Tippoo, or that of the Mahattas and Pindarries continued in the condition which they were previous to the wars of 1799, 1803-4, and 1817-18. And I must further state, that the defensive system we long pursued compelled us to military preparations, which were attended with all the expenses of war without giving us or our allies that security which has been the result of success.

288. Then is it your opinion that the government in India, in obedience to maxims from home, wasted millions upon a mistaken system of defence?—I consider that while upon particular occasions expenses may have been increased by attention to these maxims, that upon the whole they have had a beneficial effect, not only as being consistent with our interest, which it has never been to increase our territory to too great an extent, but as it became of consequence in every point of view that our progress to power should be gradual, and also that the natives of India should be satisfied that nothing short of necessity would make us depart from those rules of policy which we had professed since the first day of our occupying territory in India.

289. Do you conceive that they can understand any rules or principles of policy which can put any boundary to conquest?—I do not mean by what I have said to say that the natives give us credit for motives to which they are such strangers, as having the power to increase our territories and not doing it; but I believe that their princes saw that we were limited by attention to treaties, and by never acting as other conquerors had done, except upon the ground of aggression; and that they often refrained from a line of policy they might otherwise have adopted, had they believed we sought every opportunity of aggrandisement through extension of territory. In this view, the maxims by which we were governed have had a salutary influence upon their minds. Independent of what I have stated, it is my opinion that those often-repeated maxims by the authorities in England against the extension of their power, have, though they could not arrest a progress which

was caused by circumstances over which neither the authorities at home nor the local government had any control, in many cases had a good effect in rendering our advance slower than it otherwise might have been. It has given time for gaining that knowledge of the inhabitants of India of all classes, as well as of the country, which has rendered us fitter to govern the territories that have become subject to our power. There cannot be a stronger proof of this benefit than the acknowledged difference between those systems of administration over countries which have lately fallen under our rule, and of those for which we proceeded to legislate in the earlier periods of our rule.

290. How far has the increase of population corresponded in those parts of India which are under our immediate control, and those parts which are not under our immediate control?—I cannot correctly answer that question. The increase of the population of India has always depended, as in other countries, upon the supply of food, and the comparative tranquillity which it has enjoyed; and I should consider that of late years it must have increased in an almost equal ratio in the states of the native rulers who have enjoyed peace and those under our immediate rule.

291. What is your opinion of the situation of the country of Kattywar and Cutch?—The province of Kattywar, which lies between that of Guzerat and Cutch, stretching along the sea-coast from the Gulf of Cambay to the Gulf of Cutch, and bounded to the west by the Desert, has been from time immemorial subject to a great number of Hindoo princes and chiefs. These have always paid tribute, or given service to the native sovereigns, who were considered as their lords paramount. Our first intimate knowledge of this country was caused, many years ago, by its being the source for supplying our cavalry with a very superior breed of horses, which are produced upon its sandy plains. We succeeded, by the treaty of Bassein, to the power of the Peshwa over a part of Kattywar, and all the rights of the Guicowar prince have been recently made over to us for the purpose of liquidating his debts. We have by these means become the lords paramount of the country, which imposes upon us a duty very difficult of execution. A full account of this country will be found in Mr. Elphinstone's minutes, and of mine of the 24th of September 1830, and also in that of the 30th of November 1830, which comprises a summary of every branch of the administration, and is before the General Committee. The numerous chiefs of Kattywar have all separate authority over their own territories, and by their general engagements with us, their lands are forfeited if they do not protect the peace of their respective possessions. This many of them have not the power to do, and much embarrassment has been created by our having hesitated in exercising that authority which the native rulers had done, as lords paramount, in punishing criminals whose condition in life, or family connections, made it dangerous for one of the petty chiefs to attempt to bring such criminals to justice. By late arrangements made in 1830, the political commissioner of Guzerat has had this country placed under his authority, and the political agent who resides in Kattywar is under his orders. The political commissioner is directed to visit this country twice every year, and to hold a criminal court, in which he presides, having in aid the political agent and three or four of the principal chiefs of Kattywar, as assessors, for the trial of those state criminals whom it is considered the chiefs have not the power of bringing to justice. The sentence upon any one of these, of death, cannot be carried into execution without the confirmation of the government of Bombay. This plan was adopted as the only one which could enable a great proportion of the chiefs of Kattywar to fulfil their engagements and maintain their principalities in peace; and I earnestly hope that we shall, by it and other arrangements with this high and independent body of military chiefs, be able to avoid for a long period of years, their falling under the ordinary rule of the British Government, an event which I should greatly deprecate. Their being under our direct rule would bring no benefit to the revenue, or at least none equal, after the expenses it would involve were paid, that could much exceed the tribute which is now punctually paid; and our subjection of them to our courts of justice, and our revenue collection, would not only be attended with internal troubles, but make the most dangerous impression upon the minds of all the military classes to which they belong, along the whole western frontier of India up to the proximity of Delhi, but cause an increased jealousy and dread of our power, that would be very injurious to our local interest in Cutch, Sinde, and on the banks of the Indus, from which Kattywar is only separated by the Desert. We maintain a small body of troops within this country for the protection of its internal peace; but they could not be better



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better situated as belonging to the force necessary for the defence of our western frontier, as Kattywar is much healthier than any part of Guzerat. With regard to Cutch, which is only separated from Kattywar by a narrow arm of the sea, and by what is called the Runn, a sandy desert periodically overflowed by the sea, it is governed by a prince who is the head of the Jarajah tribe of Rajpoots, too celebrated for their crime of infanticide, which it has been an object, through negotiations and engagements with him, his chiefs, and those of his tribe in Kattywar, to eradicate. This small principality has been for many years exposed, from its position, to attacks from Sind, and from plunderers called Khosas, who inhabit the eastern side of the Desert, by which it is bounded. From these alarms, and from the misrule of its princes, Cutch has been for many years a scene of crime and confusion: it is, since we have formed a subsidiary alliance with it, in the enjoyment of comparative tranquillity. Our troops stationed within its limits have been lately reduced, and the expense we are at to afford it protection exceeds by a very trifling amount, the sum that is annually paid us by the government. I deem this country from its position to be of much political importance, and that is greatly increased by the recent discovery of the Indus being navigable to steam vessels for at least 1,000 miles. It is also valuable on account of its flourishing seaport, Mandivi; and our alliance with it enabled us to check in a very considerable degree the smuggling of Malwa opium, which, while our former system of realizing that revenue continued, was carried on to a great extent. My minute of the 30th of November, gives full information upon this as upon all other points connected with the various branches of the administration of Bombay, during the three years that I presided over that presidency.

292. What is your opinion as to the expediency of establishing an additional seat of government in Central India?—I have, as particularly relates to Central India, given my opinion most fully upon the subject in various documents, and in my work upon that country, as part of a general system which I deem the present situation of India to demand; I mean the establishment of provincial administration upon an enlarged scale. I must refer the Committee for my sentiments to the letter to Lord William Bentinck, which is upon their table. I certainly think that Central India, with Rappootana, will form one of the most important subordinate governments.

293. Is it your opinion that, for the good government of India, an enlarged system of policy is necessary, and such as can embrace the whole empire?—In answer to this and the former question, I must refer the Committee to my letter of the 26th of March 1832, to the Secretary of the India Board, and to its enclosure to Lord William Bentinck, under date the 2d December 1830.

*Muris, 21<sup>o</sup> die Februa-rii, 1832.*

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACINTOSH, IN THE CHAIR.

*William Butterworth Bayley, Esq., called in; and Examined.*

294. WHAT opinion have you formed from your experience and observation of the manner in which the subsidiary system affects the well-being of the inhabitants of the countries where it is established?—I think that it has proved generally injurious to the happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants of those countries.

295. You have been in the Secretaries' Office of Calcutta?—Yes, in the judicial department.

296. How long have you been in the political department?—I was employed in the political department only for a short period, when I was assistant in an office instituted by Lord Wellesley, called the Governor-General's Office, and in the Persian Secretary's Office.

297. You were secretary in the judicial department?—I was secretary to government in the judicial department for about nine years, and for nearly three years of that period chief secretary to government.

298. What judicial situation did you fill?—I held for about three years the office of deputy register and translator in the court of Sudder Dewanny and Nizamut Adawlut, and I was then appointed register of those courts.

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*William B. Bayley,*  
Esq.  
21 February, 1832.

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299. That was the native court of appeal?—Yes; the chief court of civil and of criminal justice. I subsequently held the situation of judge and magistrate of the district of Burdwan for about five years.

300. That is west of Calcutta, how much?—Seventy or eighty miles west of Calcutta. I was afterwards employed in drawing up some new regulations, on the completion of which duty I was appointed secretary in the judicial department, and ultimately a member of the Supreme Council.

301. How long were you a member of the council?—I was called to the council by Lord Hastings for about 10 months, during a casual vacancy in the year 1822, and was a member of council, under an appointment from the Court of Directors, from November 1825 to November 1830.

302. In what respect do you think that the subsidiary system operates unfavourably on the condition of the inhabitants?—The subsidiary system operates to protect the country of our ally from foreign invasion, as well as from the danger arising from internal disturbances, and so far ought not to be otherwise than beneficial; but the prince or ruling power, in the confidence created by our support, feels it less necessary to administer justice, to protect and to promote the interest of his subjects, than he would do if he were liable to the ordinary consequences of bad government; that is, to prevent the people from deposing a bad prince and choosing a good one, the natural remedy for bad governments in all Eastern states. I think also that the sense of dependence necessarily involved in the plan of a subsidiary alliance operates to weaken the interest of a prince in the administration of his own government. Upon these grounds, and from the result of past experience, I think the system of subsidiary alliances is, on the whole, injurious to the subjects of the allied states.

303. Do you consider that the subjects of a prince, before we interfered at all, were happier than under this system?—They were doubtless frequently subject to bad government, but they had the power then in their own hands of redressing themselves; they would not bear long continued exactions, or oppressions of a nature generally and deeply injurious; they would ultimately rise against and put down such a government.

304. They were happier, because they had certain violent means of redress within their own powers, but not from being well governed?—I do not think it a necessary, though certainly a probable consequence of such a connection, that they would be worse governed under a subsidiary system than before such a system was in force.

305. Only that they had greater means of redress?—They had more power of redressing themselves than they have now.

306. The fear of the exercise of that power you consider is a check on bad government?—Yes, certainly; I think good government amongst native states in India is almost always dependant on the personal character of the prince or minister, or both. There are no laws, no institutions powerful enough to control the will of the individual ruler. A strong-minded, well-disposed prince has great consideration with his subjects, and has the means of making them happy, and of governing them well.

307. You consider the natives in these ceded territories of which we had complete possession some time were more prosperous than in a dependant or subsidiary state?—Generally speaking, I do certainly; but there are instances of native chiefs or states, though our feudatories or dependants, making their subjects more happy than we do.

308. Which would you specify?—I am speaking rather from what I have read, than from my own personal knowledge. I am not aware that at the present moment the subjects of any native state in India are so effectually protected or so mildly governed as the inhabitants of our own provinces; the Mysore country prospered under the administration of Poornah, and Mr. Elphinstone bears testimony to the good government of the Jageerdars of the Putwurdun family.

309. When you say, in all those states it depends on the personal character of the ruler, do you think there is a greater security for prosperity and happiness under us, guarded by our institutions?—Undoubtedly; I think under our institutions, the natives are protected from violence, both in property and person; their rights and prejudices are regarded; there is an efficient police, and a fair administration of justice, under laws and regulations which are published and embodied in a code.

310. There is a greater security of permanence?—Undoubtedly there is. The natives

natives of Oude, adjoining our own frontiers, have long been subject to great misrule and oppression, and are generally supposed to be anxious to come under our government.

311. That is so?—I have no doubt of it, so far as regards the mercantile and agricultural classes.

312. They think the condition of our subjects is better than those who are left under the nominal rule of the vizier or king of Oude?—So I am led to believe.

313. In fact, the subsidiary force acts as much for good as it does for evil; and if on the one hand it protects princes from rebellion among their subjects, it seems to be good for the people also?—It is good for the people as preventing foreign invasion; but the subsidiary force is sometimes used to enforce the payment of revenue, or to put down rebellion, and in those cases it operates always against the people.

314. We could interfere more on behalf of the people than we could do were there no subsidiary force?—Under some of our subsidiary treaties the British Government is authorized or bound to interfere to check or prevent gross misgovernment.

315. Does not that amount to that interference which it is forbid residents to exercise?—In some of our alliances the right of interference forms one of the specific stipulations. Such is the case with Mysore, Travancore, Sattarah, Nagpore, the Guicowar, and Oude.

316. Has the interference of the resident ever been effectually exercised to rescue the people from the oppression of the princes?—It has. It may be sufficient to refer to the instance of Hyderabad, where European officers were employed in different parts of the country vested with the powers to correct or prevent the injustice and oppression which the natives suffered from the exactions of aumils and farmers sanctioned by the minister of the Nizam.

317. In what way is communication carried on between government and residents?—The secretary in the political department corresponds with the residents, and the residents sometimes correspond directly with the Governor-general. There are regular means of communication by post throughout India.

318. There are frequently points occur which can hardly be settled in India, but which require to be referred home, are there not?—In matters of importance, which may admit of the delay, a reference is made to England; but in cases of emergency, where delay would be injurious, the government exercises its discretion, and acts without previous reference to the home authorities.

319. The native governments in India are pure despotisms, are they not?—They are so: but as regards the agricultural classes, that despotism is softened or modified by the municipal institutions of the villages, where such institutions are still in existence.

320. What is the punchayet?—Any number of arbitrators, generally five, and selected by the parties. It bears the character of a court of arbitration. It is also a kind of tribunal for settling questions of caste, and professional disputes; but it is seldom resorted to in common civil controversies in Bengal.

321. You do not conceive that a prince deprived of all political importance has the same strong and constant inducement to watch over the safety of his subjects as one who possesses that importance?—I do not.

322. Or to enforce laws for their protection?—No, certainly not.

323. Have there been any gross instances of our interference against subjects?—I recollect some instances in which our troops were employed to enforce the authority of the king of Oude over subjects who had been driven to resistance by oppression and injustice.

324. Is it at the option of the resident to order our subsidiary force to assist princes, or is he bound by treaty to do so at the request of princes?—He would not do it without the request of the prince.

325. Is it imperative?—He would in doubtful cases consult his government, and suspend the order until their authority was received.

326. It is not imperative then?—No; it has for sufficient reasons been often refused.

327. The only case understood by the treaties is either protection against some foreign enemy, or against domestic revolt?—Generally speaking, such is the case; but we are authorized by some of the treaties to interpose by advice, and in other instances even to assume the management of the country.

328. That is not in the majority of the cases, is it?—No, our subsidiary alliances

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do not all warrant our interference in the internal administration of the protected states.

329. At present, in most of the states there is so little chance of foreign invasion and foreign aggression, that the subsidiary force is merely nominal, is it not?—At present we have paramount authority all over India, and have the power to prevent aggression on the part of one state towards another. All our treaties stipulate that disputes between any two states shall be referred for adjustment to the British Government, and that they shall enter into no negotiation without our knowledge.

330. Are the courts of justice in those places with which we are connected by subsidiary treaties exclusively administered by native punchayets?—They have no regular system of justice. Disputes are sometimes settled by the chief of a village or of a district, by a farmer or other person in authority; sometimes by punchayets or arbitration, and very frequently by a bloody affray. Where there are courts of justice, the natives prefer going to them; where none exist, they must either fight or resort to arbitration.

331. Is not one practical consequence of subsidiary alliances universally acknowledged, namely, that the multiplicity of business it entails on us prevents our consideration of and attention to matters of more importance?—The duties devolving upon us in our capacity of the dominant power in India are doubtless difficult, and occupy much of the time and attention of government; but on the other hand, if we were not in that situation, we should have a great deal more trouble in maintaining our interests, in guarding against hostile combinations, and in repelling aggression.

332. And it is the most economical system, you think?—Calculating, as I think we have a right to do, on the long continuance of peace and tranquillity in India, I think our present system more economical.

333. Has the Nabob of Bengal any power?—No, he is a mere pensioner.

334. He has no territory whatever?—No, none at all.

335. Do you know since what time he has ceased to have territory?—The internal administration was altogether withdrawn from the Nabob and transferred to the English about the year 1772. The grant of the Dewanny was obtained in 1765.

336. We have residents at the Rajpoot states?—There were residents or political agents at Oudipore, Jypore, and Cotah. The political affairs of Joudpore and some other Rajpoot states were superintended by the commissioner at Ajmere. At present the latter officer has charge of our interests, with the state of Oudipore also.

337. What is the name of the prince to whom he is more nearly accredited; what is the head of the Rajpoot states?—The highest in point of rank is the state of Oudipore.

338. Are those countries better governed than those in which we have direct interference?—They are scarcely recovered from the devastations of the Pindarries and other predatory bands.

339. You have hardly had an opportunity of observing their internal condition?—I have not: but it is notorious that they are in a much better situation than before. The internal government, I imagine, is very lax, but they are no longer exposed to the ravages of plunderers.

340. The general tenor of the instructions from home, both from government and the Company, has always been strongly against conquest?—It certainly has.

341. Then it would seem the government of India has always been active in spite of their instructions?—Most of the wars into which the British Government has entered have been forced upon us; our interference has often been reluctantly exercised. We cannot recede, and it is probable that, ultimately, the whole of India will come under our own dominion.

342. You are entirely of opinion that the result of what has been done is for our own advantage and the happiness of the natives?—I think that the bulk of the inhabitants of those states which have fallen under our own direct government have derived benefit from our aggrandizement. I cannot say the same with regard to some of those states which are under our control partially.

343. These advantages have been achieved in spite of instructions from home?—The instructions from home have always discouraged the extension of territory, and have deprecated war as leading to that consequence; but after having gone

gone to war we have been compelled to extend our dominion, both as indemnity for the past, and as security for the future.

344. It has, then, led to a much better state of things, to a much more easily defended country, which is more likely to lead to the happiness of the natives, and there is less expense, because there is less recurrence of war?—Generally speaking, such has been the result; but the expense of increased military and civil establishments has exceeded in several instances the advantages acquired by our conquests.

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345. Do you think it has increased out of the proportion to the increase of territory?—Out of proportion to the increase of revenue.

346. As they improve, will they not meet the expense?—The revenues will probably increase very considerably. Some of our acquisitions are very productive: others (for instance, the cessions from Ava,) are much the reverse. It will be long before the latter will yield a revenue at all commensurate with the expense incurred in conquering and maintaining them.

347. You consider the superiority of the countries governed by the English administration directly, to be much more clear and certain over the administration of the subsidiary states than over the administration of native powers, independent powers, without giving any absolute opinion on the latter part of the subject?—Yes; I think that those states with whose government we interfere occasionally, and which are supported by our military power, are rarely so well governed as our own territories, or as those which are more completely independent of us.

348. So that the intermediate state is the worse?—Such is my opinion.

349. Taking all the circumstances into account, perhaps the superiority of the English government over a good native government (that is, the appearance of vigour and spirit) is not by any means so certain as the superiority over the others?—The bulk of the people, the agricultural and commercial classes, the bankers, manufacturers and artisans, are all better off under our direct government; but the aristocracy of the country, the military classes, those who had formerly the means of aggrandizing themselves by offices of trust and emolument, have suffered in proportion; their prospects are very much deteriorated, and their occupation is gone.

350. The people are better, and those who prey on the people are worse off?—Generally speaking such is the case.

351. Do you imagine that it requires fewer troops to keep our own immediate subjects in order, than the subjects of princes with whom we have subsidiary treaties?—The greatest part of our force is stationed either in the territories of our allies beyond our frontiers, or in positions close to our frontiers. In the provinces of Bengal and Behar, containing a population of at least 30,000,000, there are not more than 12,000 or 13,000 troops of all arms, of which one half is stationed in the immediate vicinity of Calcutta.

352. There is no disposition to revolt?—In our old established territories under the presidency of Bengal, I have never seen any disposition to revolt.

353. You think it would be attended with less expense to maintain the government if we had it under us immediately, rather than under the present system?—That is a question which I am scarcely prepared to answer; but I think that if we had complete possession of all India, exercising all the powers of civil government, and collecting the revenue for our own purposes, the expense would be less in proportion to the revenue than it is at present; but there is an obvious benefit in the continuance of some independent or partially independent states to which turbulent and bad spirits may resort, and find some employment. Such individuals might prove mischievous if all India were under our exclusive government.

354. There are back settlements in which there would be still room for them perhaps?—Not if we were in possession of the whole interior of India.

355. We have to control these bad spirits only under another name?—The individuals to whom I allude would find no employment under us; there have been a vast number of soldiers of fortune in India, many of whom cannot even now find employment. If we had the whole of India under our dominion, and our military system continued as at present, those soldiers of fortune would find no employment whatever.

356. Do you consider that there is a constant indefinite danger existing from our own army?—Constituted as our native army is, it cannot be otherwise than that there should be some indefinite danger; but I do not see any present cause for apprehension; when it does arrive, it will probably have been caused by our own mismanagement.

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357. You do not see any particular danger?—Partial mutinies may arise from very trifling causes, and revolt and disaffection may be expected if ever the state of the finances should render us unable to pay the troops with regularity, or an ill-judged economy should enforce a reduction of their allowances.

358. Do you think the subsidiary system as good as any that could be substituted for it?—I do not see how it is possible now to change it. We cannot retrace our steps without weakening our own power, and exposing our dominion to serious hazard.

359. On the plan of governing the country by a dewan, what do you think of it?—I think that is the very worst of all, if by a dewan is meant a minister supported by our influence, and exercising authority properly belonging to the prince.

360. You do not agree with Sir Thomas Munro?—I am not aware that he has given an opinion upon the case I have supposed; the question is a different one if it refers to the administration of a dewan during the minority of a prince. The success of Poornah in Mysore is an instance of the latter; the atrocious misgovernment of Chundoo Lal at Hyderabad, of the former.

361. Do the natives enlist willingly?—We find more difficulty in getting sepoys than we used to do from our own territories; our Bengal army is chiefly recruited from the territories of the king of Oude; our own subjects have lost their military character, they now follow commercial and agricultural pursuits in preference.

362. That speaks in favour of their prosperity?—No doubt; it is a proof that they are protected in the enjoyment of the fruits of their industry.

363. Have you heard of the scheme of the Supreme Government being discharged from local concerns?—I have.

364. What do you think of it?—I have recorded my sentiments on the subject in a minute, dated the 9th of November 1830, to which I beg leave to refer. I think it impossible for the Supreme Government to exercise an effectual control over the other presidencies, while it has to conduct the administration in detail of extensive territories containing 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 of inhabitants.

365. At what town would you place the central government?—Somewhere in the Western Provinces probably; but it should not be fixed to one spot.

366. Is there a direct overland communication kept up between Bengal and Bombay?—There is a daily communication by post.

367. In what time do they come?—It depends on the season; in the rainy season it is as long as three weeks, but ordinarily 16, 17, or 18 days.

*Luncæ, 27<sup>o</sup> die Februarii, 1832.*

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACINTOSH, IN THE CHAIR.

Major Close, called in; and Examined.

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368. HOW long were you in India?—Rather more than 22 years.

369. What diplomatic stations did you fill?—I had been assistant to the residents at Nagpoor and at Poonah; afterwards I was resident with Scindia at Gwalior.

370. Who were you assistant with at Poonah?—I was assistant with Mr. Elphinstone.

371. At Nagpoor whom did you assist?—Mr. Elphinstone first, and Mr. Jenkins afterwards.

372. For what time in all?—About 12 years.

373. You were afterwards resident with Scindia?—Yes, for about eight years.

374. What is the relation in which Scindia stood to the Company?—He was independent.

375. Has he no treaty with the Company?—Yes, there are several treaties, but they are not such as to abrogate his independence, or to place him in acknowledged submission to the British Government.

376. Are they in the nature of what we commonly call offensive and defensive treaties?—No, not even that.

377. Do they imply any guarantee of his dominions?—No.

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378. Is there nothing peculiar in them?—Nothing peculiar in their general character beyond that of reducing his resources and curtailings his influence.

379. Do they not even amount to treaties of defence and alliance?—No, certainly not; unless, indeed, the last treaty which we made with him for a temporary and special purpose might be considered so; but we have no permanent one. His political relations, however, have been effectually confined, and his power of injuring his neighbours equally restrained in consequence of the claim to our protection which all the other states have established by their treaties with us.

380. Do they contain any provision restricting him from employing European officers, foreign officers, or anything of that sort?—They are no more than treaties of peace, very little more than that; at one time there was a treaty of the nature alluded to, but it was dissolved soon after its conclusion, and never came into practical operation.

381. There is none now?—No; there was none when I left India in 1824.

382. Now, under those circumstances, and separating the two parts of your experience, when you were assistant to the residents at Poonah and Nagpore, what opinion did you form from your observation of the way in which the connection between the Company and its dependant allies affected the good government and good condition of the inhabitants of the countries respectively?—At the time when I was at Nagpore we had no such treaty as we have formed since; so that we had no opening given us to interfere at all with the administration of the country. With regard to Poonah, where we had such a treaty, my opinion was, that the general effect was good, and was favourable to the prosperity of the inhabitants.

383. What do you think of the well-being of the inhabitants, the subjects of the Peishwa, as compared with their condition before we interfered at all in Mahratta affairs, on the one hand, and the condition of those who are direct subjects of the Company on the other?—Why, inasmuch as those who are our direct subjects live under a more systematic and just government, I should certainly conclude that their condition was infinitely superior to that of the Mahrattas.

384. Do you think, from your observation, that the subjects of the Company were in a better condition than those who were the then subjects of the Peishwa?—I should think so.

385. Do the observations, therefore, which you made, apply to a comparison of their condition after we began to interfere in the Peishwa's internal government or with what it was before our interference?—Not having been in that country before our connection with the Peishwa's government, I can only speak from general conjecture on that subject; but I should fancy that the condition of our subjects was better on a comparison with the Peishwa's at either of those periods.

386. Was the treaty by which there was a certain right of interference the treaty of Bassein? It was.

387. Did that take place in 1803?—No, it was at the end of 1802, and just before the Mahratta war of 1803. That war arose partly perhaps from the discontent of the subordinate chieftains, at the low condition to which the head of the state was reduced by it, but principally from the mortification they felt at the diminution of their own influence which resulted from it.

388. What was the comparative state of the people in the province of Berar, under the rajah, and those who were the subjects of the Peishwa before our frequent and familiar interference?—I had never known anything of the Poonah territories before our treaty of defensive alliance with the Peishwa in 1802.

389. When you were at Nagpore there was no treaty authorizing our interference?—No, not at Nagpore.

390. What was then the condition of the security of person and property, and the administration of justice in the rajah of Berar's government?—Indeed I should say there was very little of either.

391. Did he collect his revenue by military means?—It was not always necessary to employ military force, but occasionally it would be so.

392. In the Mahratta territory, was it generally necessary to employ military means to collect the revenue?—I should not suppose that it was so on all occasions.

393. Was a great part of the revenue of the Mahrattas derived from a tribute paid by the neighbouring states?—A considerable part.

394. Was that collected by force?—That was generally collected by force before

our engagements with the Mahratta states, which put a stop to their violent aggression.

395. Who paid choul to the Mahrattas so late as the period immediately following the war against Mysore?—Little or no tribute of that description was collected by the Mahratta states south of the Nurbudda, but to the north of it there was.

396. Do you remember any of the states that paid chout to the northern Mahrattas?—All the Rajpoot states, without exception, I believe.

397. But confining yourself to the Poonah Mahrattas at present?—There certainly was none paid to them after 1802; nor do I suppose there had been for some time before.

398. Did all the Rajpoot states pay chout to the Mahratta chiefs?—Yes, to those situated north of the Nurbudda, of which Scindia and Holkar were the principal; but that system of plunder and exaction has ceased with the extension of our influence and the formation of our engagements with nearly all the states lying north of the Nurbudda.

399. Have you anything to state further with regard to the subsidiary system?—I can only say generally, with respect to the subsidiary system, that it was calculated to promote our own interests, and also under good management, to increase the prosperity of the country at large. It has given the means of maintaining, without a constant drain upon our ordinary resources, a well equipped force, ready at all times for any emergency; and it has enabled us to preserve, in a great degree, the peace of the country, which before its introduction was constantly exposed to the ravages of undisciplined and contending armies. The effect has also been to put it in our power to control, or in a considerable degree to moderate the defects of at least some of the native governments, much to the advantage, as I should conceive, of their subjects.

400. Can Major Close specify any state in which that system had been under good government, so as to promote beneficial effects?—As far as my observation has gone, I have formed the opinion that the system had not answered so well under some of the Mahomedan governments as in the Hindoo states; but I think that in the Hindoo states it has generally been productive of advantage.

401. Is there any direct cause which would account for its being more beneficial in the Hindoo states than in the Mahomedan states?—I do not exactly know to what it is to be traced; but if true, it may perhaps be ascribed to this, that the Hindoo governments may harmonize better with the feelings of the inhabitants, the great mass of whom are themselves Hindoos; and that the Mahomedan government may not be so acceptable to the people at large.

402. Would that have anything to do with the subsidiary system?—No, I should apprehend not; unless it be that the Mahomedan governments might therefore stand more in need of our assistance to support their authority.

403. Do you think, or not, that the success of the English administration in Hindoo countries was likely to be greater than in those under Mahomedan government, partly because the Mahomedans were a set of conquerors like ourselves, and therefore disliked our presence?—I should not say that it was from any aversion borne by the Mahomedan governments to us that those effects to which I allude had proceeded; it has not been from that cause, since although the cordiality of our intercourse with them has occasionally met with slight interruptions, they had, up to the period of my leaving India, eight years ago, proved more faithful to their alliance with us than some of the Hindoo governments.

404. Were not a great number of Mahomedans driven out of military service at Mysore?—Very many.

405. The peace which has been established in India has injured their interest very materially there, has it not?—Yes, very much; but the same effects must in some degree have been felt by the Hindoo soldiery also.

406. But as to Hindoo officers or chiefs, does that remark apply?—Not to the same extent, certainly. I should wish to explain a previous allusion to our treaties of peace with Scindia, by observing that those treaties were the consequence, either of open hostility, or of a state of things nearly approaching to war; that in the former case our purpose had been to effect such a reduction of Scindia's power as should disable him from prosecuting future wars against us; and in the latter, to give such a direction to his employment of the resources still left to him, as might contribute to the general and permanent peace of the country.



The Hon. *Edward Gardner*, called in; and Examined.

407. WERE you engaged in diplomatic service in India?—Yes, I was.

408. For how long a period?—I resided in India altogether about 27 years, of which time I was employed in the Political department from 1808 to the period of my leaving India. I was attached first to the Delhi residency, in the situation of assistant to the resident; and I remained there until the Nepaul war, which occurred in 1814, when I was called to that quarter, and have been employed within that country until I left India in 1829.

409. How long were you at Delhi?—About six years in the Delhi territory, but very little at Delhi itself.

410. In Nepaul how long?—I was about 12 years altogether in Nepaul.

411. Now the principal duty which you had to perform at Delhi was administrative, was it not, with respect to the district?—I was in a subordinate situation, and was employed during nearly the whole time I was there in charge of the district of Hurriana, a territory that fell into the British government in consequence of the chief to whom it was assigned not being able to maintain his own authority in it, and he gave it up to the government for a certain stipend.

412. Then were you employed for six years in Delhi in the duties of local administration, and 12 years at Nepaul in diplomatic negotiations?—Just so; I was political resident at Khatmandoo, at the court of the rajah of Nepaul.

413. What is the nature of our political relation with the rajah of Nepaul?—It is founded upon a treaty of amity consequent on the war which we were engaged in with that state, and which ended in its being compelled to admit a treaty with the British Government of that nature.

414. There is no subsidiary force?—None whatever; we were under no obligations for its support or defence, neither was anything required from it in the shape of subsidiary or of military aid.

415. From your long residence in that territory, you will be able to inform the Committee what you think of the condition of the inhabitants, especially the lower classes of that territory, compared with those of the Company's territories which you have seen?—I think their condition generally would bear a very favourable comparison with those of the Company's territory; the people I consider, on the whole, to have been well governed, and in as good and happy a condition as those of any other states with which I have been acquainted.

416. Have you seen the whole of the Company's Bengal presidency?—I have had very little experience in Bengal; I resided chiefly in the Upper Provinces and within the Delhi territory; I have passed through the country, certainly, but I have not sufficient knowledge to speak to its actual condition.

417. Had you any opportunity of seeing the Nabob of Oude's territory?—Simply as a traveller through it.

418. What do you think of its state?—It was, when I passed, considered to be in a disturbed state as regarded the police, but it appeared to be very highly cultivated; it was no doubt in rather an unsettled state at the time.

419. Who are the inhabitants of Nepaul?—The Gookahs are the ruling race.

420. Have the Gookahs always remained Hindoos?—They are entirely and strictly Hindoos, and no part of the inhabitants profess the Mahomedan religion. I suppose there are not a dozen Mahomedans in the whole country.

421. Do you apprehend any danger to our possessions from their vicinity?—Not in the position in which they have been placed in consequence of the late war between the British Government and the Gookah nation; before that event, they certainly held a very threatening and commanding position along the whole extent of our northern frontier.

422. What was their native state?—They came from a place called Gookah, whence they derive their appellation.

423. Where is that?—It is a small mountain territory situated to the north-west of the valley of Nepaul, whence the Gookahs issued, and successively conquering all the petty states into which the whole of that region was formerly divided, united them under one rule, and established the government in their own tribe and family.

424. Had the conquered people the same institutions and manners with the conquerors?—Not exactly; the inhabitants, for example, of the valley of Nepaul

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are called Newars, and although Hindoos, they are Boodhists in religion, while their conquerors, the Goorkahs, are of the Brahminical faith.

425. What time did the Goorkah's conquest begin?—I think the conquest of Nepal Proper, as it may be called, was effected in about 1767–8, between 60 and 70 years ago.

426. You think the condition of the people in the Nepal country, in the whole province of the Goorkah dominions, might be advantageously compared with the subjects of the Company?—I have not visited the whole of their dominions, but considering the nature of their government, which is a military one in its character and arbitrary in its form, I think the inhabitants generally are under a lenient government, and that the condition of the people would bear a very favourable comparison with the subjects of the Company, or those of any other state in India.

427. Have they one supreme head, or is it a federative state?—The authority is vested in the rajah alone, but its exercise is much modified by the influence of the baradars, or chiefs of the state, who claim a voice in their national councils; they are summoned by the rajah, or by those acting in his name, on all important occasions, where they deliver and express their sentiments very freely, and the majority of their opinions generally decide questions of peace or war, or other matters of moment; the authority is usually in the rajah's hands, no doubt, but modified in this way.

428. Is the rajah's authority hereditary?—It is.

429. Are these chiefs hereditary in general?—In general they are; they are the heads of the families whose ancestors bore a share in the conquests effected by Prithwee Narain, their chief; they generally fill, like ourselves in India, all the principal offices of state, and have the command of the troops, keeping the conquered people in inferior situations under the government. These chiefs have always, therefore, been looked on as having a direct interest and voice in public affairs, and they thus modify the power of the rajah.

430. Are there many slaves in Nepal?—There does exist a species of domestic slavery, but not in the acceptation of the word in which it is understood in Europe.

431. Have you any labourers slaves?—If the family they belong to is an agricultural one they are sometimes employed in the field, but not particularly so; they are used for all domestic purposes. They cut wood and fetch water, and are employed as servants.

432. Can they be sold?—I apprehend they may be.

433. Without the soil?—They are not attached to the soil at all.

434. Did you ever know any instance of a sale?—I cannot say decidedly that I have. I believe that it did take place; but I had no means of knowing absolutely that it did.

435. Do they form a large proportion of the inhabitants?—By no means.

436. May it be called an inconsiderable proportion?—An inconsiderable proportion. Indeed, I believe they are chiefly foreigners from the side of Thibet principally, and from among the Bhotea people.

437. Are any of them those who have been made prisoners?—No; they are people who, I believe, have been chiefly sold when children, in times of famine and scarcity.

438. By what means have we secured our possessions against the danger which formerly existed from the Nepal state?—Its power has been considerably reduced by the treaty. All the mountain territory which had been acquired by us in the course of the war to the west of the river Kulee was ceded to the British Government; to the eastward, the Nepal government agreed to abstain from any interference with the petty state of Sikkim, which forms its boundary on that side, and to submit any disputes that might arise between them to our arbitration. Consequently, the Nepaulese are now confined on three sides by the British power and territory or by the Sikkim country, the possession of which is guaranteed to the rajah; and on the north they are shut in by the Himalayan, or great snowy range of mountains which extends along that portion of their frontier, and now forms part of the Chinese empire, so that they are completely inclosed, and have no power of acting in any direction beyond their own territory.

439. Is the source of the Ganges within the Goorkah territory?—It was, but is now within the province Kumaon.

440. These are now English provinces?—Yes; Kumaon has been annexed

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to the British possessions, and the petty states lying to the westward of Kumaon, about eight in number, were restored under British protection to the chiefs from whom they had been taken by the Goorkahs in the progress of their conquest. They are insignificant in extent, and their revenues are very small; and with the exception of a few places which were reserved as military stations for some hill corps, that were raised as an employment for the military classes in the country, were restored to the chiefs in the same condition as they had originally possessed them, without their paying tribute or furnishing military aid, which they are unable to do.

441. Has the Mogul any independent territory at all?—None.

442. Is Delhi his?—No; the country round Delhi was assigned for his support, but the revenues are collected by our government, and a stipend is paid to him out of it.

443. Does Nepal appear to differ from any other Indian state, in its government and in the condition of its people?—Yes; it differs very essentially. The country has never been subdued by any of the foreign invaders or conquerors of India. The people are more simple, unmixed and original in their manners, less superstitious, and less bound by rules of caste and other Hindoo observances than the people of Bengal.

444. Before the Goorkah conquest, was the country divided into small rajahs?—Yes, in the valley of Nepal alone, which is only about 50 miles in circumference, there were no less than three princes whose capitals were within a few miles of each other; they each had a share of the valley, which was considered the most valuable portion of their principalities. One of the articles of the treaty engages that they shall not give service to any European without the sanction of the British Government.

445. Is there any restriction on their rights as to making peace and war?—The usual article in our treaties with the native powers, by which they bind themselves not to enter into political negotiations with any other state, is not a part of the treaty with Nepal.

446. Was Sukim a Nepaul state?—No, but the Nepaulese were in progress of its conquest when the war broke out, and it was restored to the rajah, and the possession guaranteed to him with the view of forming a barrier in that direction against the further aggression of the Nepaulese, and to put an end to that career of conquest to which they had so long been accustomed, and which, but for the war with the British Government, would in all probability have carried them eventually to Cashmeer.

447. In what manner are they armed?—Their troops are armed, disciplined, and clothed on the model of the sepoys in the British service; the words of command are given in English, and the gradations of ranks are copied from ours, or rather applied as they were used in the time of Mr. Hastings' administration. They cast some cannon, and to each of their battalions they have two guns attached; they were taught this by a Frenchman, who was in their service formerly. They manufacture their own muskets, from excellent guns produced in their territory. Their artillery is not, however, of much use, from the difficult nature of their country.

448. Is their force chiefly infantry or cavalry?—Entirely infantry; they have no cavalry; there is not a road in the country on which cavalry could be moved.

449. How do you travel?—Generally on foot: women are carried in a kind of hammock. Horses, except in the valley, are nearly useless.

450. Did you walk to Khatmandoo?—On my first going there I travelled in a kind of litter used for the purpose; afterwards I frequently walked on journeys, or used a litter, or rode on small ponies which are brought from Tibet.

451. Have the inhabitants of this place made greater progress in science than in other places?—They know not much of science; education, as far as it goes, is very general; it is uncommon to see a person who cannot read or write, or know something of accounts; every village has its instruction in some way, but it seldom proceeds further than that; and the higher branches of learning are quite unknown.

452. Have you had an opportunity of comparing the territory of Nepal with other parts?—I have been entirely employed at the court of the rajah of Nepal since the peace of 1816.

453. In the administration of justice, is there more security of persons and property than elsewhere?—Yes, I never know it more so elsewhere. The Nepaulese, like all mountaineers, are particularly honest, and very little given to crime or violence of any kind.

454. Are there tribunals there?—Yes; heinous crimes are very unfrequent;  
(445.—VI.) a 2 petty

petty criminal cases are heard in the first instance by the magistrates of the towns, or local authorities in the country; they punish to a certain extent. Graver crimes are brought before the rajah, or those exercising his authority, and are decided once a year. There is, I think, a greater degree of security for person and property than I have ever observed in any other part of India.

455. Have they public works?—Scarcely any. They have built a few bridges, and made a few roads in the vicinity of the capital, but it is contrary to their policy to construct roads or throw open their country in any way.

456. Is it quite an agricultural country?—Yes; and it is well cultivated where circumstances admit of it, and the valley itself is cultivated by what in this country is called spado cultivation, and is productive.

457. Have they any commerce?—Not much; it has increased somewhat since our connection with them; they export some things not got from other parts of the world, such as musk and borax. It is not found in their own country, but comes through it from Thibet.

458. Is there great facility for merchants?—Why no, every thing must be carried on porters' backs; but merchants meet with every protection.

459. Have you much tea from China over land?—No.

460. Do they bring it down to Benares?—I believe not. It comes down in cakes occasionally, but we should not consider it as good, or drinkable indeed.

461. Did you ever hear of a tea plant being raised?—I remember seeing one in Nepal. The Nepaulese are considered as tributary to China, and every five years they send a mission to Peking through Thibet; on one occasion of this kind they brought a tea plant with them, and in a Cashmerian's garden close to Khatmandoo, it was still growing where I saw it, at a place between the residency and the town.

462. Is it a good climate?—An excellent one, I think; not much unlike that of Switzerland, I should suppose.

Mr. Francis Wilder.

Mr. Francis Wilder, called in; and Examined.

463. HOW long were you in India?—Exactly 22 years.

464. In what department did you serve?—Chiefly in the political department.

465. In the diplomatic department?—Yes.

466. Were you diplomatically employed?—For the first six years I was employed at Delhi in a subordinate situation entirely in the local administration, and afterwards at Ajmeer for six years more; during which time the states of Joudpore, Jesselmere, and Kishengurh were placed in communication with me; but I still continued under the resident as an assistant.

467. Just state where you were afterwards?—I was afterwards at Sangur for one year; and after that (in 1827) I succeeded to the residency at Nagpore, where I remained until the end of 1829, when I came home.

468. Whom did you succeed?—I succeeded Mr. Jenkins.

469. How long were you resident at Nagpore?—About three years.

470. In what condition, compared to neighbouring countries, did it appear to you that our territory around Delhi was when you were employed there?—At Delhi the territory was entirely under the British Government.

471. In comparing that country with the neighbouring native dominions, what do you think of their comparative well-being?—I think the subjects of the Company in the Delhi territory were far better off than the subjects of the neighbouring native princes.

472. Who are the native princes whom you make the subjects of comparison chiefly?—The Sikh territories to the north, Ulwur, Bikaner, and the other Rajpoot states to the westward.

473. Do you know anything of the dominions of the King of Oude?—I do not, I never was in that country.

474. You have seen the country of Rajpoot?—Yes, I have.

475. In what state, in the country you have seen, is the security of persons and property and the administration of justice?—I do not think, in any of the Rajpoot territories I have visited, there is much security for persons or property, though the state of things has very much improved since we have formed an alliance with them.

476. Had they any regular administration of justice?—No regular system.

477. What is the nature of our federal connection with the Rajpoot chiefs?—Entirely protective; and in return for our protection they bind themselves to afford military

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military aid on requisition, to submit to our arbitration of external disputes, and not to form any new alliance with other powers.

478. Anything with regard to foreign officers?—No.

479. Would that be prevented?—Certainly, I should suppose so.

480. Is there any subsidiary force on foot?—Not in the Rajpoot states, but Joudpoor is bound to furnish 1,530 horse, when called upon.

481. Do the residents interfere to prevent anything wrong taking place?—They would do so; but during the time I had charge of Joudpoor and Jesselmere there was no occasion for any interference whatever.

482. Do you think that was in consequence of the improved administration?—I think it was owing to the nature of our connection with them.

483. Do you ascribe that improved administration to the effect of the presence of the English resident, and the fear of displeasing the English?—Yes, I think it was.

484. Do they show anxiety to maintain a connection with the Company?—The states with which I have had any concern, I conceive, certainly do.

485. So that you think there is no stipulation in any one of the treaties with them for the resident's interference?—No, none whatever in their internal affairs.

486. So that with that very limited degree of influence, you think the connection with England, and the fear of the displeasure of the English Government have very sensibly improved their administration?—I think it has.

*Veneris, 2<sup>o</sup> die Martii, 1832.*

#### THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACINTOSH, IN THE CHAIR.

Major Carnac, called in; and Examined.

Major Carnac,  
2 March 1832.

487. YOU were the Resident at Baroda?—I was the Resident there for nine years, and an assistant to the Resident eight years previously.

488. How long is it since you ceased to be Resident?—I ceased to be Resident in 1819.

489. What is the population of the Guicowar territories?—The population of the dominions of the Guicowar I estimate to be from five to six millions in the province of Guzerat, the states tributary to it, and in the Surat Attavees, possessions in the neighbourhood of that city.

490. When did we enter into any subsidiary engagement or treaty of alliance with the Guicowar?—Our first negotiation to establish an alliance with the Guicowar state was early in the year 1802, when the prince deputed a mission to Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, to solicit the aid of the East India Company to put down the rebellion of one of his own family (Mulhar Row), who was aiming at supremacy in Guzerat.

491. Was there any diplomatic intercourse between the two governments prior to that?—A treaty of amity was entered into with the first Futeh Sing Guicowar so far back as the year 1780; but for the purpose of a more intimate connection, none except through the agency of the mission in 1802 to Bombay.

492. Was there a Resident at that time or previously at Baroda?—Not at any time. The Governor, early in 1802, went to Cambay (the territory of a Mahomedan), in order to have an opportunity of a nearer communication with the Guicowar, on the subject of the alliance proposed; he was accompanied by a small force, placed under the command of Major Alexander Walker. A negotiation ensued with the minister of the Guicowar at Cambay, the result of which was the advance of the force for the suppression of the rebellion of Mulhar Row Guicowar, which, after several engagements with his forces, was accomplished. At this period, namely, May 1802, there was merely a written engagement with the Guicowar minister, dated the 15th March of that year, to reimburse the expenses of the expedition against Mulhar Row, and for the Guicowar state to subsidize a permanent force from the Company. In June 1802, articles of agreement were drawn up, which were afterwards consolidated into a definitive treaty. It was then engaged that we should liberate the Guicowar from the thralldom of his mercenary troops, composed of Arab scoundry, and to assist in discharging the

debts which the Guicowar state had largely contracted. This laid the foundation of the extensive system of interference which prevailed at the court at Baroda, different from that pursued with any of the other powers with which we are allied in India. In consequence of the wars which took place in 1803, 1804, and part of 1805, with the confederated Mahratta powers, Dowlut Row Scindiah, the rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Row Holkar, the definitive treaty was not executed until the latter year. It contracted that a contingent of three battalions of native infantry, a company of European artillery, and a company of lascars, should be furnished, the expense of which was provided for by the Guicowar state, by cessions enumerated in the schedule attached to the treaty, amounting to 11,70,000 rupees per annum. It was also stipulated that the subsidized troops should be stationed within the territories of the Guicowar state, and that one battalion should be employed in the province of Kattywar.

493. Is that treaty existing up to this time?—It was in full force till 1817, when supplementary articles were added to the definitive treaty, which I will advert to presently. The expulsion of the Arab mercenaries from the service of the Guicowar, and their ultimate ejection from Guzerat, involved the Company in the responsibility of engagements to bankers who had advanced monies to the state, for the payment of arrears to troops and general debts. The Company also advanced from its own resources a sum of 30 lacs of rupees, and guaranteed to the bankers or soucaris a further sum of not less than 70 or 80 more. It was at this time stipulated with the minister (the rajah Anund Row having long been in a state of mental imbecility), that a reformed scale of expenditure should be adopted, and that the resident with the minister should form a commission for the government of the affairs of the state. These arrangements were made by Major, afterwards Lieutenant-colonel Walker, and came into full operation immediately after the period of his quitting India, and my succession to his office in 1810. There were other important arrangements also made in 1807 by that distinguished officer, Colonel Walker, with the states tributary to the Guicowar and Peishwa, in the province of Kattywar, which are fully developed in the despatches of that time. Shortly after my succeeding to the residency, it was deemed proper by the Bombay and Supreme Governments to introduce into the commission of government the heir presumptive, Futteh Sing Guicowar, who was considered the president of the commission, and measures of internal administration or foreign intercourse were conducted in the dubai of his highness Futteh Sing, in the name of the rajah Anund Row, but with the cognizance and under the direction of the resident, in conjunction with the minister of the state. The reformed scale of expenditure was strictly followed till the year 1817, when the war with the Pindarahs and the Peishwa took place. In November 1817 the Guicowar government was called upon to augment the subsidiary force by two regiments of native cavalry and one battalion of native infantry of the complement of 1,000 men. He was also required about that time to furnish a contingent of his own troops to act with the forces then employed in the province of Malwa, which necessarily caused a very heavy expense. The supplementary treaty was made on the 6th November 1817: it not only provided for the augmentation of the subsidiary force, and the cession of all the rights which the Guicowar had obtained from the perpetual farm of the Peishwah's territories, subject to Ahmedabad, but for his highness maintaining at all times a force of 3,000 horse, to be paid by himself, and mustered by the resident or his agent, and to act under the command of the officer commanding the subsidiary force wherever employed. As far as concerns the debt guaranteed by Colonel Walker, I may say that it was entirely discharged, although when the honourable Mr. Elphinstone visited Baroda in 1820 and 1821, he found the state encumbered with a heavy debt, created chiefly by the Pindarahs and Mahratta war of 1817, and other causes which will be found reported in the public despatches. Subsequently to my departure from India, I have understood that Mr. Elphinstone had directed the resident to withdraw from all interference with the internal affairs of the Guicowar state, and placed in the Guicowar's hands the uncontrolled power of his dominions. Having arranged that the rajah should pay within seven years the debt then existing, it was discovered on the expiration of that period, that the debt was increased very considerably from the incapacity of the rajah, who had diverted the resources of the country to his own coffers; he was required in 1828 by Sir John Malcolm, who had succeeded Mr. Elphinstone in the government of Bombay, to adhere to the engagements he had contracted in 1820-21, and in consequence of his manifesting no inclination to do so,

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Sir John Malcolm had deemed it proper to sequester, in March 1828, a portion of his dominions for the liquidation of the debts for which the Company were responsible. He also required him in 1830 to provide the funds for the payment of the contingent of horse stipulated for in the supplementary treaty, which having persisted in refusing, these troops have consequently been maintained by the East India Company, and further territory sequestered for their maintenance. These troops are now employed under the orders of the commissioner of Guzerat, Sir John Malcolm having abolished the residency at Baroda; the territories sequestered have been placed under the management of one of the late ministers of the Guicowar, subject to the supervision of the commissioner, whose residence I should state was fixed in the city of Ahmedabad. No alteration has taken place in this state of affairs up to the present time. The revenue of the ceded territories, on account of subsidy, amounted in the whole to about 27 lacs, as realized by the native government, and the gross amount of the remaining revenue of the Guicowar state was upon an average something more than 70 lacs.

494. What proportion should you conjecture that the two successive sequestrations of territories produced of the rajah's whole revenue?—I have no means of knowing exactly the amount of revenue derived from these sequestrations, but I believe the revenue at the disposal of Seejee Row, the present rajah, divested of claims guaranteed by us for personal stipends and pensions, does not much exceed 20 lacs. I should imagine that the value of the sequestered territory is rather more than that of the territory ceded in subsidy.

495. You mentioned some territories of the Peishwa and the Guicowar, they were chiefly in Kattywar, were they not?—On the conquest of Guzerat by the Mahrattas, the states of Kattywar (composed principally of Rajpoots) and the principality of Junagui (the only remnant of Mogul power at Guzerat) were in a state of independence. On the decline of the Mogul empire, incursions were made annually by the Mahratta forces, which levied what sums they could obtain from each of these chieftains, and in instances of resistance, which were very general, it was then practice to devastate the open country. On the Mahratta power being established in Guzerat, these states were willing to compromise for a fixed tribute: the larger portion of this tribute was allotted to the Peishwa as the head of the Mahrattas, and the smaller to the Guicowar, then the local governor of the whole province. The Guicowar tribute was afterwards fixed by Colonel Walker, and amounted to something less than four lacs of rupees, and that of the Peishwa (subject to his Subah of Ahmedabad) to more than six lacs. The tribute to the Guicowar is included in what I before stated as the average amount of his revenues.

496. And with respect to the tribute paid to the Peishwa, what has become of that?—It became the right of the East India Company, by virtue of the conquest of the Peishwa in 1817.

497. What was the province of the Company's territory which adjoined the Guicowar's country before 1802?—The possessions under the presidency of Bombay were extremely limited in the year 1802; the only possession subjected to it was the town of Surat and the circumjacent country, obtained in 1800 from the nawab of that place, and the island of Salsette.

498. What opinion have you formed from your observation, of the condition of the people in the Guicowar's and the Company's territories?—As long as the British resident was associated with the Guicowar government, I consider its subjects to have been in quite as prosperous a condition as any of those belonging to the Company: this will, I think, be corroborated by the reports of the governor, Mr. Elphinstone, on his first visit to the province of Guzerat.

499. During the time of the commission of government for the whole of the Guicowar territories, the resident interfered as generally in the territory left under the nominal authority of the rajah as in the ceded or sequestered territory, did he not?—The resident had no concern with the territory ceded; and the sequestered territory is, as I have already explained, under the charge of the late minister of the Guicowar, subject to the control of the political commissioner.

500. Can you state what system of government was adopted on our acquiring the Deccan?—We adhered as nearly as possible to the system we found; but in subsequent years, I have been informed that it has been deemed advisable to introduce the courts of adawlut, and the Company's judicial regulations.

501. What was the system of the native government?—The mamlutdars or farmers of districts were the chief local authorities; judicial and revenue powers were vested in them, subject to the control of the prince or his ministers, which was very irregularly exercised, and seldom but on urgent occasions.

502. Has the Deccan improved since it came into the possession of the Company?—I do not believe that it has equalled the expectations which were entertained on our first possession of it; the revenue derived from the country has fallen short of anticipation; but much of this has arisen from the depression of agricultural produce.

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*Jovis, 8<sup>o</sup> die Martii, 1832.*

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SIR FRANCIS VINCENT, IN THE CHAIR.

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Mr. Wm. Chaplin.  
8 March 1832.

Mr. William Chaplin, called in; and Examined.

503. WILL you have the goodness to state how long you were in the Company's service?—I have been in the Company's service 26 years.

504. In what parts of India were you?—I was in several parts of India, I was originally employed for a short time in the Northern Circars; I was then appointed registrar under Colonel Munro, in the ceded districts, in which situation I remained about a year and a half. I was then promoted under him to a subordinate collectorship, a situation which I held for about a twelvemonth; and upon Colonel Munro's departure for England, I succeeded to the charge of the particular ceded districts of the Cudapa division. About a twelvemonth afterwards, I was transferred to the other division of the ceded districts, in which situation I remained till the year 1818, when I succeeded Sir Thomas Munro in the charge of the Southern Mahratta country; there I remained for about a year and a half, as principal collector and political agent, when I succeeded Mr. Elphinstone as sole commissioner of the Deccan, on his appointment to the government of Bombay; and the administration of the Deccan I held for about six years, till I returned to England. I returned to England about five years and a half ago.

505. Will you have the goodness to state your observations upon the subsidiary system during your residence in the Deccan?—I myself was never employed as a political resident at any foreign court, and had never personally any opportunity of seeing the effects of the subsidiary system.

506. You were chiefly collector, I think?—I was general superintendent in the Deccan.

507. You have never been much resident at the courts of any of the native princes?—No, I have never resided at any of the courts of any of the native princes.

508. Was there any great improvement observable in the condition of the natives?—After we had charge?

509. After you had charge of it?—Yes, there was considerable improvement; there was a gradual extension of cultivation, and a great improvement of revenue.

510. And the condition of the natives themselves, they had greater security of their persons and property?—Their persons and property were more secure unquestionably under our rule than under the Peishwa, which had been a system of mismanagement for some years previous to our getting possession of the government. The Peishwa's system of government for several years past had been as bad as possible; the districts had been farmed out to managers, and again sub-rented by them to under-managers; nothing could exceed the misrule that had prevailed for several years; but that is not to be attributed to the subsidiary allowances, but rather to the propensity to disorder which prevails in all the native states.

511. That is to be attributed to the native princes?—Chiefly so; because the system of misrule had commenced before our subsidiary treaty had been formed with the Peishwa.

512. You had no opportunity personally of observing the effect of the subsidiary system?—No, I had not.

513. Were there courts of law established in the conquered territory?—There were



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were no regular courts of law established for three or four years after we took possession of the country; the judicial affairs were conducted by the collectors and revenue officers under my superintendence.

514. Since then regular courts of law have been introduced?—Yes, they have.

515. Had you an opportunity of observing the condition of other neighbouring countries under the dominion of native princes, as compared with the territory in which you served?—I had an opportunity of observing the management of the countries of several of the native chiefs which were immediately under me, particularly the Putwurdun family.

516. That I believe was a favourable instance of native government?—They were in a particularly prosperous condition, and very well conducted.

517. Although you were not in the courts of any of our independent alliances, you must have heard a great deal of current opinion with respect to the subsidiary system, I should think?—I have heard a great deal of opinion certainly.

518. What was the particular objection to it?—The objection was that they tended to impair the vigour of the native government, and destroy the independence of the princes, and gradually to bring those native states under our subjection; that was considered to be the effect of those native alliances. I am myself disposed to think that the evils that have been too exclusively ascribed to the alliances rather than the misrule, ought to have been ascribed to the misrule.

519. Did it appear to you that the inhabitants of the country regretted their former system of government?—The upper classes, I think, unquestionably regretted their former system of government.

520. With regard to the great bulk, I should think it had little effect one way or the other?—I conceive the lower orders were rather favourable to the change of government, as it gave them greater security, and made them less liable to exaction.

521. It was conducted with more regularity?—Yes, it was.

522. Do you apprehend that any cause of apprehension exists to the Company from the discontentment of the upper classes in these ceded districts?—It has been the policy of our government, since we have had possession of the Deccan, to conciliate the upper classes and allow them almost the whole of the privileges which they enjoyed under the former government, and therefore they have no great reason to be discontented; but one may fairly conceive that they must feel that they are under foreign rule, and that they are excluded from all the higher offices of government, and therefore in a degraded condition.

523. Your observation would apply principally to those territories that were under the dominion of the Hindoo princes; it would not apply to provinces under the dominion of the Mahomedan?—It would apply to all, I think.

524. Do you think it would apply equally to the country under the dominion of the Mahomedan as of the Hindoo?—The Mahomedans are more assimilated to the native Hindoos than we were. They would also feel the subjection to the Mahomedan government.

525. All offices were open to the natives under the Mahomedan rule?—They were; almost all offices were open to the native Mahomedan.

526. Does not the effect of the partition of property lead gradually to the entire subversion of all hereditary aristocracy in India?—It has, unquestionably.

527. Is not that very much increased by there being no lines of employment open to them, by which they could accumulate property?—Unquestionably, I think that is very much the case.

528. Do you apprehend that the force necessary for maintaining obedience in the conquered districts is kept up at a less expense than the subsidiary force in a district of equal extent?—I have never had an opportunity of forming a comparison between the two.

529. Do you know whether the expense is less to the Company?—I am not able to answer that question with any sort of accuracy.

*Martis, 27<sup>o</sup> die Martii, 1832.*

H. GALLY KNIGHT, ESQUIRE, IN THE CHAIR.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.Mr.  
*John Crawfurd.*  
27 March 1832.Mr. *John Crawfurd*, called in ; and Examined.

531. WHAT political stations did you fill in India?—I was first, from 1811 to 1817, in various political situations in the island of Java, during the British occupation of that colony; I was resident at the court of one of the native princes, called the Sultan of Java; and I went afterwards on a mission to Siam, and Cochin China, which was of a commercial description. Afterwards, I was British resident of the new commercial settlement of Singapore; I was in that situation for a period of about four years. I was then a commissioner in the Burman country, and latterly envoy to the court of Ava.

532. Is that your letter of the 24th of February 1832, Mr. *Crawfurd*?—I have written my opinions in that letter which has been delivered in. I beg to refer to that as my evidence.

*See Appendix**[The letter is delivered in.]**Jovis, 28<sup>o</sup> die Februarii, 1832.*THE RIGHT HON. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN,  
IN THE CHAIR.Colonel *J. Baillie*, called in ; and Examined.Colonel *J. Baillie.*  
13 February 1832.

533. WHAT diplomatic situation have you filled under the East India Company?—I filled during the period of four years, from 1803, the commencement of the Mahratta war, till the middle of 1807, the office of Political Agent to the Governor-general in the province of Bundelcund; and from that period till my return to England in 1815, the station of Resident at the court of Lucnow.

534. During that period had you an opportunity of tracing the character and effects of the subsidiary system?—From my political situation and duties at Lucnow, at the court of the sovereign of Oude, with whom a subsidiary engagement subsisted, I had necessarily an opportunity of tracing the origin and character, and marking the general consequences of that system.

535. Will you be so good as to detail to the Committee the observations which occur to you upon it?—I should say of the subsidiary system, that I have always viewed it as just and expedient; if not indispensable in its origin, as natural and necessary, I may add, with some exceptions, wise and liberal in its progress; and in its consequences, according to circumstances, occasionally beneficial and occasionally injurious to the interests of the protected state; meaning, thereby, however, the sovereign or head of the state, rather than the people; the government of the protected state rather than the mass of its population. I should say further, that whatever may be the difference of opinion regarding the original character and present tendency of that system in its practical operation, I consider the abandonment of it to be quite impossible now, without hazarding the subversion of our empire in India by a more rapid transition than that of its rise.

536. At what period did the first subsidiary engagement take place with the state of Oude?—That is a matter of history, but I believe the date of the first subsidiary treaty between the British Government and the state of Oude was during the time of the vizier Shoojah-ood-Dowlah, about the year 1765. By that treaty, if I mistake not, a small detachment of our troops was provided to be stationed near the person of the prince, and a brigade stationed in his dominions.

537. Was that intended as a permanent treaty, or merely for temporary purposes?—Unquestionably a permanent treaty.

538. Will

Colonel J. Baillie.  
28 February 1832.

538. Will you state the progress of the subsidiary system in Oude?—I am not aware of any alteration in the arrangement established by treaty with the vizier Shoojah-ood-Dowlah, until the death of that prince, when on the accession of his son Asaf-ood-Dowlah, I think in 1775, a considerable pecuniary subsidy was granted to the Company for the maintenance of a large body of troops to be stationed in the vizier's dominions, under the command of British officers; and that treaty continued to subsist, with occasional modifications, till the year 1798, when Sir John Shore (now Lord Teignmouth), on the deposition of Vizier Ali, and the substitution of Saadut Ali Khan in his stead as the sovereign of Oude, contracted an alliance offensive and defensive with that prince, under which the pecuniary subsidy was greatly increased, and a stipulation introduced which placed a further augmentation of the British military force in Oude at the discretion of the Company's government, and bound the vizier to increase the pecuniary subsidy in proportion to the augmentation of force, as also, in the case of arrear in the regular payment of the subsidy, to furnish such security as should be satisfactory to the British Government. Under the provisions of that treaty, our political relations with the state of Oude continued without alteration till 1802, if I mistake not, during the administration of Lord Wellesley, when some arrear in the payment of the subsidy, and a just apprehension on the part of Lord Wellesley of essential injury or inconvenience to the British Government from the state of the vizier's government and country, induced his lordship to propose to the vizier a new subsidiary treaty, by which a great territorial cession should be substituted for the pecuniary subsidy, and other rights of interference on the part of the British Government in the concerns of Oude should be established; and that proposition (to the acceptance of which an alternative having been offered, the justice of which may be questioned, namely, the total abdication of the sovereignty of Oude by the vizier, and his retirement from the cares of government, with an allowance for the support of himself and family) having been finally acceded to by the vizier, a treaty was accordingly concluded in the month of January 1802, by which a moiety of the vizier's dominions was ceded in perpetuity to the Company, and some new obligations were imposed upon the sovereign of Oude, for a detail of which I refer to the treaty. Such is the nature of our present relation with the state of Oude. The result of that relation has unquestionably been continued misgovernment on the part of the sovereign, and oppression of certain classes of the people, which however may perhaps with justice be ascribed to the inefficient exercise of the legitimate right of interference possessed by the British Government under the last mentioned treaty, rather than to any inherent quality in the general system of subsidiary alliances, or to the effect of that system in particular as regarding the state of Oude.

539. Have the subsidiary engagements superseded all other military force maintained by the king of Oude, or does he employ any force in addition?—By the last treaty with the sovereign of Oude the number of his own troops was limited to, I think, four battalions of infantry and 2,000 horse; but that the treaty will show. I should have said that the last treaty of Lord Wellesley was meant to supersede entirely the necessity of the vizier's maintaining a force of his own, by furnishing an ample force for his protection.

540. Then he is not subject to a contingent force?—No.

541. When Lord Wellesley proposed that alternative, the abdication of the vizier, did he intend to take the territory for the Company, or to give it to some other person?—To take on himself the government of the country, to administer the government on behalf of the East India Company.

542. The vizier was considered a dependent of the Mogul, was not he?—Yes; nominally a servant of the empire, but always independent of the emperor since the commencement of his alliance with us, and ultimately declared to be even nominally independent of that sovereign, by an act of the British Government during the administration of Lord Hastings, who permitted and encouraged the vizier to assume the title of sovereign.

543. Was that with the concurrence of the Mogul?—Certainly not.

544. He is now called King of Oude?—He is.

545. In fact, we freed him from his allegiance?—Yes; but the allegiance has been almost entirely nominal ever since our political connection with Oude, except in its very beginning.

546. What has been the effects of the subsidiary engagement, as far as regards the sovereign of Oude, as to relieving him from all the cares of government; has not the resident assumed all the powers of government?—It has certainly relieved him

him from most of the cares, and almost all the charges of government? but I am not aware that the resident has ever assumed any of the powers of the government, nor interfered with them in any respect beyond the most limited sense of the provisions of the subsidiary treaty. I cannot, perhaps, better explain the immediate effects of that treaty, as regarded the vizier's power and wealth, than by stating, that whereas at the date of the treaty the state of his treasury was such as to occasion a great arrear in the payment of the subsidy to the British Government, there being a load of public debt besides, and although by that treaty one half of his territory was ceded to the British Government, yet at the period of his death, which happened when I was minister at his court, in the year 1813 (11 years after the date of that treaty), his treasury was ascertained to contain a sum of not less than 15 millions sterling, realized from half his original territory during a period of 11 years. It is obvious, therefore, that he must have derived considerable advantage in one respect at least from the stipulations of that treaty.

547. In what manner had that revenue been collected?—In a variety of ways, not altogether creditable, I fear, to the character of the sovereign.

548. Had it been collected under the influence of the British force?—Certainly not altogether, though the British force was frequently employed in assisting the collection of the revenue.

549. Was there not a case in 1810 where the collection of the revenue was enforced by the subsidiary force?—It was always enforced when it was necessary so to do, under an express provision of the treaty by which we are bound to protect the state of Oude from foreign invasion and internal commotion; and therefore every resistance to the authority of the prince must be put down by our assistance.

550. Do you apprehend so large a sum could have been collected by the sovereign of Oude, but under the terror of the employment of the British force, if necessary, to collect it?—The great amount which I have stated to have been found in the treasury of the vizier cannot all be supposed to be the realized revenue of his dominions during the period of 11 years, but unquestionably was partly the result of extortion practised by himself, not from the general population of the country, but from wealthy individuals connected with his person and government, over whom at all times he exercised an uncontrolled authority, except in particular cases, where the subjects of his government or the relations of his family having become by particular circumstances the objects of especial regard to the British Government, and entitled to claim its protection, were protected from the extortion of their sovereign.

551. You have stated he exercised an uncontrolled power; supposing the subsidiary engagement had not existed, might not that have been controlled by the terror of insurrection or resistance on the part of his subjects?—It is possible that the government of Oude might have changed its possessor several times during the period of its connection with us, if that connection had not subsisted, and general commotion or rebellion might thus have been productive of much worse effects to the country than any that can possibly be ascribed to the effects of the subsidiary alliance.

552. But does not the fear of insurrection or resistance, in fact, operate as a control over the native princes in their natural state, when the British Government does not interfere to protect them?—It may have that tendency certainly in some cases, while, on the other hand, the fear of British interference may produce a similar effect to a still greater degree.

553. During the period that you exercised the functions of resident, did it appear to you that the sovereign interested himself more or less in the concerns of his government, in consequence of the subsidiary alliance?—The vizier, Saadut Ali, was a person of extraordinary talents and powers of mind, although those were unhappily perverted to the gratification of the leading passion of his mind, avarice; but unquestionably his time was very much occupied in and devoted to the management of the concerns of his government.

554. Is not the general effects of the subsidiary system to direct the minds of the native rulers rather to increase their own private treasure than to consult the general welfare of the country?—I am not aware that it can be justly said to have generally that tendency, inasmuch as the predecessor of the prince to whom I have referred, though certainly inattentive to all the concerns of his government, was also constantly poor and labouring under the pressure of debt, without any accumulation either of public or private treasure; while, on the other hand, the condition of his successor affords an example of the contrary tendency, namely, of

great attention to the concerns of his government, and also of great accumulation of wealth.

555. Has the king of Oude two separate treasures, a private and public treasure?—I believe not. I never understood there was any separation.

556. Have not some of the native rulers?—I should say not, as far as my observation or knowledge extends.

557. Was the interference of the resident ever exercised to relieve the inhabitants of the country from any oppression or extortion?—Constantly; on every necessary occasion, as far as his power extended.

558. Was his right of interference recognised to the extent of making him a medium between the prince and his people, so that they both referred to him as to their natural protector?—That question, if I understand it right, may be answered affirmatively in only a limited sense. The immediate relations and other subjects of the vizier, who had from particular circumstances on certain extraordinary occasions established claims to the protection of the British Government or to its mediation with their sovereign, naturally, on all occasions when necessary, appealed to the British resident for protection, and his right of interference in their behalf was recognised by the vizier; but with that exception alone, the resident could never be considered as a medium of intercourse between the people of Oude and their sovereign.

559. Did you find the necessity for that interference gradually and unavoidably increased?—The number of persons entitled to the mediation of the British Government, as above explained, was fixed either by treaty or by occasional conventions between the two states, and therefore was not subject to increase, but rather to diminution, except in cases where large families succeeded to individuals, and the number of claimants was increased though the subject of interference remained the same. As for example, a person entitled to British protection, whose pension was guaranteed to him for his life and to his descendants after him, if he died and left a number of children, the number of claimants or protected persons was increased, as a distribution of his pension must have followed, and the arrangement of that distribution was a matter generally settled between the prince and the British minister, that is, between the power from whom the stipend was derived, and the representative of the power who guaranteed it.

560. The Committee wished to have directed the question to the interferences of the British Government in the internal concerns of the government of the country, whether that did not increase the necessity for interference?—The necessity for interference must always in a great measure, if not exclusively, depend on the character of the prince. If his demands from his subjects be just or unquestionable, or if they be submitted to without resistance or appeal, no interference on the part of the British Government can ever take place: it is only in cases of resistance on the part of the subject, and demand of assistance by the prince, that our interference can ever be exercised.

561. Do you mean that the interference of the resident in the internal concerns of the country is confined to cases in which the people resist or object to the payment of revenue?—In my own case, I should say positively that it was. Cases of individual appeal from subjects or dependents of the British Government residing in the territory of the vizier may occasionally have required my interference, but that was of a different nature from the interference to which the question refers.

562. But the resident interferes in no other part of the internal administration?—No; only in the cases which I have stated.

563. Can you state to us the beneficial results which in any instance have followed the exercise of your interference?—I have no hesitation in stating, that during the period of my residence at Lucnow many cases of injustice and extortion on the part of the vizier and his subordinate functionaries, in the collection of the revenue and otherwise, were either entirely prevented or greatly diminished in their effects.

564. Will you state more in detail what the interference was to which you allude?—In every instance of an application from the vizier for the aid of the British troops, either to enforce a demand or to quell an insurrection, it was my duty, if I had any doubts on the subject, first to ascertain as nearly as possible the true cause of the resistance complained of, and to submit the result of my inquiry for the consideration of the prince, before proceeding to employ a military force in support of his authority. In many cases my representations were productive of

beneficial results; on some occasions the vizier was less disposed or indisposed to listen to my representations, and the result was necessarily different.

565. You have mentioned that there was no other interference in the internal administration than when application was made for assistance in collecting the revenue; did the resident never enter into discussions with the sovereign as to a reform of the expenditure or diminution of his expenditure?—Never, to my knowledge, as to his expenditure. The great question of a general reform in the vizier's government, which was agitated between him and me for several years, as may be seen in the *Oude Papers*, was of a different nature entirely from that of the question of his expenditure.

566. Was it not the practice with the residents at the other native courts?—Not to my knowledge, nor do I see how it could be so, except in the supposed case of an arrear of subsidy.

567. In most instances have our subsidies been changed into cessions of territory?—They have.

568. In which case all interference on that head is out of the question?—Yes.

569. If any serious rebellion had taken place in consequence of a very gross act of oppression, should you as resident have felt yourself at liberty to refuse giving your influence to suppress it, or to refuse to allow the troops at your disposal to act?—Certainly not.

570. However gross the oppression might have been?—It was the duty of the British Government, under the stipulations of the treaty, to put down any actual rebellion without stopping to consider either its remote or proximate cause; but in all the ordinary cases of a demand for assistance in the collection of the revenue, I should have felt it my duty to inquire into the causes of resistance, and if possible to suggest a remedy without the employment of military force.

571. If you conceived the enforcement of the claim to be decidedly unjust, should you have thought yourself at liberty to refuse the assistance of the subsidiary force to collect it?—I should have stated the case to the Government in all its details, and have required the order of Government before I proceeded to comply with such a requisition for the employment of the subsidiary force.

572. Has there ever been any case within your knowledge in which such a requisition has been refused to be complied with?—The volume of *Oude Papers*, comprising my correspondence with the Government during the time I was resident, contains several of the cases referred to.

573. Are the instructions given to residents very precise, or is there a considerable latitude allowed to them?—It is impossible generally that they should be so. I have stated in my written answer to one of the questions proposed by the Board of Control, as nearly as I could, what is the nature of a resident's duties, and I beg to refer to that statement in answer to this question.

574. Will you refer to some of the cases contained in that volume?—There are several cases of the nature referred to in these *Papers*, and in one page, accidentally opened at this moment, I see an extract from a letter of mine to the vizier, in answer to a requisition for the aid of troops, which shows the nature and extent of the interference that was exercised by me on that occasion.

575. There was also the proposal of appointing an officer of your own selection to conduct the inquiry proposed?—Yes, on that occasion.

576. Would not that be taking the patronage out of the vizier's hands?—So it was considered by the vizier, and therefore refused, and immediately abandoned by me.

577. A very sudden emergency might happen, in which it was impossible to refer to the Government; in that case the resident would consider himself bound to support the reigning prince under all circumstances whatever?—Unquestionably.

578. In short, the vizier is completely relieved from all fear of deposition?—Completely so.

579. Is there not usually an article in the treaties restricting the prince from employing the subsidiary force in the collection of the revenue, or in any part of the civil administration?—No; I am not aware of any such stipulation.

580. Not a soldier can move without the orders of the resident?—No, not of the subsidiary force.

581. You have mentioned the increase of the public treasure during this period; did it appear to you that the internal condition of the country derived an equal improvement during that period?—I should say not. I should say that there has been little or no improvement in the state of the country since I have known it;

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in that portion of the country I mean which remains under the government of the vizier.

582. Has there been deterioration?—I should say that there must have been since my return to this country; indeed I have reason to know that the state of the country is much worse than it was in my time, or at any antecedent period; but that I ascribe to the want of an efficient interference on the part of the British Government.

Colonel J. Baillie,  
23 February 1832.

583. Did you consider that the country had at all improved during the time of your residence?—In some districts which were committed to able management, I did perceive a manifest improvement in the state of the country. I cannot say any great amelioration of the condition of the inhabitants, but an improvement by increased cultivation of the soil, and augmented sources of revenue.

584. Did you, during that period, conceive the general situation of the inhabitants to be ameliorated, deteriorated, or stationary?—Stationary, I should say.

585. Was the condition of the ceded territory improved since its cession?—Very greatly.

586. Is the non-efficient interference of the British residents attributable to the restrictions imposed on them?—No doubt.

587. Then a more efficient interference would amount to their assuming the whole powers of government?—Not altogether that; much must depend on circumstances. It is impossible to suggest a perfect remedy for any evil the exact nature and extent of which are unknown. I should say that an efficient interference is unquestionably preferable to the vacillating and inefficient system which has sometimes prevailed in the state of Oude, to which of course I apply my observation.

588. Will you describe some of the occasions to which you allude as examples of vacillating interference?—There are a few striking examples of what I mean afforded in this collection of Papers. It will be seen, that on several occasions of requisition for military aid to enforce the collection of the revenue, a doubt had naturally arisen in the mind of the resident respecting the justice of the demand, inasmuch as the employment of military force for the collection of revenue is entirely unknown in our own dominions. In consequence of that distrust, the resident naturally felt himself bound to inquire into the circumstances which produced the requisition for military aid, and finding his suspicions confirmed by the result of his inquiry, he suggested to the prince a mode of accommodation short of the employment of military force. The adoption of that recommendation was generally productive of the desired effect; whereas the rejection of it necessarily required on the part of the resident a statement of the facts of the case for the consideration and instructions of the government. In some instances the efficient support which was afforded to him by direct remonstrances on the part of the Governor-General, or otherwise, occasioned an acquiescence in his suggestions; in other cases that support was withheld, and in consequence the influence of the resident was necessarily diminished, and effects more injurious were produced than might have been the consequence of his immediate compliance with the requisition for military aid. Examples, however, of improper interference may also be supposed, and perhaps discovered in these Papers, on the part of the resident himself, without any reference to the government; and thus it may be said that the degree of interference to be exercised, and the result of that interference, must depend at all times partly on the character of the resident, partly on the conduct of the government, and mainly on the character of the prince.

589. You never had an opportunity of seeing the effect of native government by means of a deewan?—In my own personal experience I never had, but there were two ostensible ministers of the vizier's government supported for a series of years by Lord Cornwallis, under whose administration the state of the government and people of Oude was certainly not better, and I should say generally worse than at any other period of my observation.

590. In short, it is not a system you approve of?—I cannot speak of the two systems comparatively from my own experience. There are certainly some examples of good government by means of a deewan, of which I can speak historically; for instance, the deewan of Mysore.

591. Which is very much attributable to the personal character of the minister?—Yes.

592. And that was during a minority?—Yes.

593. Do you conceive the internal state of the districts which were ceded to the  
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British Government to differ materially from the rest of the territories?—Yes; I have no doubt whatever of the great amelioration of the condition of the people, the great improvement of the lands, and a very great increase of revenue, which have arisen under the Company's management.

594. Is it your opinion that the subsidiary system generally tends to produce good or bad government, as far as regards the condition of the people?—I am very doubtful, I confess, of its tendency to produce either the one or the other. The principal objection which has been stated to our subsidiary alliances in general, is the great inconvenience and embarrassment occasionally produced to our government by the practical operation of those alliances; with regard to which I would observe, that to deny the existence of those embarrassments would be, in fact, to maintain the proposition that the cares and difficulties necessarily attendant on the government of a mighty empire, are no more than those which attend the direction of a commercial establishment; or that it is as easy to govern the vast empire which we now hold in India, as to superintend our original commercial concerns. But, on the other hand, to infer from the existence of such embarrassments as those, that the subsidiary system in itself is either unjust or impolitic, or that the disadvantages attending it counterbalance the benefits which it has produced by contributing to the establishment of our empire and to the maintenance of public tranquillity in India, is, in my humble judgment, as extravagant as to maintain the other proposition.

595. You stated you were first employed in the province of Bundelcund?—Yes. We occupied that province in 1803, partly as a measure of defence against the confederated Mahratta states, and partly under the provisions of a supplemental article of the treaty of Bassein with the Peishwa. I was employed in conducting that occupation.

596. Were you with the Peishwa at that time?—No; Bundelcund is a province of Hindostan.

597. You can hardly speak to its effects there?—There is no subsidiary system there.

598. There is no subsidiary treaty existing with Bundelcund?—No.

599. Is Bundelcund now under our own dominion?—Yes.

600. Did you administer the government of the ceded territory, or were there agents from Calcutta?—The treaty of cession took place in 1802, and I became resident in 1807.

601. Does the resident administer the government of the ceded territory?—No, he has no connection with it whatever; it is under British rule, like the original dominions of the Company.

602. Is it your decided opinion, then, that the subsidiary system is the best which, in the existing circumstances of our Indian empire, can be adopted for its government?—I am decidedly of opinion that it cannot be totally abandoned without hazarding the subversion of our empire. In some instances, particularly with regard to the more remote and the more recent subsidiary arrangements, and more especially those with the petty states of Central India, it may perhaps justly, and if so, I think ought to be modified.

603. Our late subsidiary treaties have been more definite, have they not, with regard to interferences?—Yes, I believe so. The subsidiary treaty with the rajah of Mysore was in some important respects more definite than the original treaty with the sovereign of Oude; but I have no distinct recollection of the precise stipulations of any of the treaties referred to, except those which I have already described.

604. In what year did you leave India?—In the year 1816; I was nearly nine years resident at Lucnow.

605. Would your idea of an efficient resident be realized by giving him a seat in the cabinet or council of the prince, so that he should have a voice in his measures?—The prince to whom I was accredited had no cabinet nor council; there was no such thing during my residence at Lucnow. The government was purely despotic, in the person of the sovereign alone.

606. He has his leading minister, and he takes a part in the public business himself; would not it be as well to associate the resident with the sovereign and the minister; would not that be giving him an efficient control?—The present sovereign of Oude, has, I believe, an efficient minister, but I doubt the practicability of the suggestion, in the first place, and the efficiency of it, even if acceded to by the prince.

607. Did



607. Did you not conceive yourself authorized under the treaty to interfere with your advice in every part of the internal administration of the state of Oude?—Certainly not in every part of the internal administration, if by that is intended the household concerns of the vizier.

608. That is, not with his private transactions, but an interference with the internal concerns of the country?—I should say not, unless my advice was desired, or until I became aware of some act of the government having a tendency to infringe the relations established by treaty, and here I beg again to refer to my description of the duties of resident, according to my conception of them, contained in the written answer to the questions of the Board of Control.

609. Under the treaty do you not conceive there was an express stipulation for the resident to offer his advice on every part of the internal administration of the country, and an engagement on the part of the vizier to act in conformity with his counsel?—In answer to that question, I must state that my conception of the rights and duties of the British Government and its representative at the court of Lucknow, under that particular provision of the treaty, was always more extensive than its interpretation by any of the governments which I served.

*Mercurii, 30<sup>o</sup> die Maii, 1832.*

# THE RIGHT HON. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN,

IN THE CHAIR.

*Henry Russell, Esq., again called in; and Examined.*

610. IS there anything you wish to state to the Committee in addition to your former evidence?—There is one fact in my former evidence which I am desirous in the first instance of correcting; and after having done so, with the permission of the Committee, I should wish to take this opportunity of making a few additional observations on the subject of the subsidiary system. When I had the honour of attending the Committee before, I stated that the first treaty that could fairly be called a subsidiary treaty was that of Paungul, concluded with the Nizam in 1790, preparatory to Lord Cornwallis's war with Tippoo. The treaty of Paungul was not in terms a subsidiary treaty, though the conclusion of it was, in point of fact, the origin of our subsidiary relations with the Nizam. By the treaty of 1768 we had engaged to supply the Nizam with two battalions whenever he should require them: but he did not require them; and it was only when the treaty of Paungul was made, with a view to combined operations against Tippoo, that those troops were required by the Nizam, and furnished by us, which constituted the foundation of our subsidiary force at Hyderabad. Having in my former evidence laid stress upon the mischief that has been done by our subsidiary system, I am anxious to make a few observations respecting the circumstances under which we resorted to that system; the consequences which were likely to ensue if we had not done so, and those which would in all probability be produced if we were now to abandon it. At the time when Lord Wellesley concluded the treaty of Hyderabad in 1798, the power of Tippoo and the Mahrattas was unbroken. Tippoo's hostility against us was implacable: he was actuated by both political jealousy and religious fanaticism, and would unquestionably have attacked us if we had not attacked him. The Mahrattas were alarmed at our progress, and would rather have assisted to overthrow than to support us. Bodies of disciplined troops, commanded by French officers and influenced by French feelings, were maintained by both Scindia and the Nizam; and Tippoo had to a certain extent adopted the same policy, though his jealousy of all Europeans, and his hatred of all Christians, prevented his allowing the French in his service to acquire the same influence which they had attained under other governments. The Nizam, who had been just defeated by the Mahrattas, and was afraid of a renewal of their attack, was compelled to look abroad for support; and if he could not obtain it from us, was resolved to seek it from the French. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for us either to abstain from acting at

*Henry Russell, Esq.*

30 May 1832.

all, or to act differently than we did. Our alternative lay, not between enlarging our possessions, and preserving them as they were, but between the abandonment of what we had and the acquisition of more. Standing still was out of the question; we were compelled either to advance or to recede: to advance was, as it has proved, to subjugate by degrees all the native states; to recede was to sacrifice our own power, and not only to throw away but to throw into the hands of our enemies all the fruits of our previous enterprise. We had no longer the choice of peace or war; our only option was whether we would attack our enemies at our own time, or leave it to them to attack us at theirs. A system of protracted defence was wholly incompatible with our position; it would have exhausted us by its expense, and have given our enemies that confidence, in their want of which our superiority mainly consisted. We had a choice of difficulties; and even now, with all the consequences before us, there is no reason to suppose that we should have fared better if we had pursued a tamer course. Whatever effect our measures may have produced upon the native states, they at least served the purposes for which we adopted them; they prostrated all our enemies, both Indian and European, and averted those dangers by which, if they had not been averted, we should unquestionably have been crushed. It is not easy to say what shape events would have taken if Lord Wellesley had rejected the overtures of the Nizam for a closer alliance, and abstained from making the provocations of Tippoo a ground of war. Things could not have continued as they were; a crisis had arrived in which some state or other must have taken the lead. India had, from long usage, become accustomed to acknowledge one dominant power, and if we had hesitated to take that character upon ourselves it would have been assumed by some of our rivals. The French, from their want of naval power, and the consequent inability to draw resources from their own country, could hardly have reached a higher position than that of auxiliaries: but although they could not have acquired so firm a footing as we have, they would still have prevented our acquiring any footing at all; and be the advantages that any European power can derive from an establishment in India what they may, they would have secured all those advantages for themselves. The struggle for supremacy would have been between Tippoo and the Mahrattas, and neither of them would have suffered us to retain what we had acquired; whichever had prevailed, whether Mahomedans or Hindoos, we should not, as a political state, have been tolerated by either. In the progress of events some enterprising leaders might have established separate principalities, and some small states might have risen to consequence at the expense of their neighbours; but the probability is that the Nizam and other feeble princes would have disappeared, and that their territory would have been divided or contended for between Tippoo and the Mahrattas. Strong governments would have been substituted for weak ones; and after a process, which has been of too frequent occurrence in India to be looked upon as a very grave calamity, the people generally might have attained a degree of prosperity greater than we have been able to confer upon them, certainly in the protected territories, and probably even in our own. But although the people of India might have fared better if we had originally thought of them rather than ourselves, we could have promoted their interests only by the sacrifice of our own; and it by no means follows that it is now in our power to repair the mischief by the abandonment of our ascendancy. If we were to withdraw our control and protection now, in what condition should we leave the native states, and in what condition should we place ourselves? Though we may take from them what we have given, we cannot restore what we have taken away. Our control has been so long in force, and has been pushed to such an extent, that not a government is left capable of standing by itself. There is neither any single power to take our place, nor any number of powers to contend for it. The only bond that holds the political community of India together would be broken; the native states would fall to pieces from their own weakness, and become the victims of intestine commotion, or the prey of lawless plunder. The contagion once abroad, would spread in every direction; India would be a scene of universal anarchy and rapine; our own possessions would be invaded and distracted by the disorders that surrounded them; and we should find that our change of policy, instead of restoring the power of our allies, had been the destruction of our own. Peace and order, though they might be the ultimate, would be a distant result, and would be that order only into which anarchy subsides; India would have many a bloody struggle to undergo before she was at rest. It is now too late for us to recede, either with

*Henry Russell, Esq.*  
30 May 1832.

justice to other states, or with safety to ourselves. Whether we consider the interests of India, or those of England only, we must pursue the career in which we have advanced so far. It is vain to think of stooping from our ascendancy, or reviving among the native states that vigour which has been extinguished. Their decline is not to be arrested by any sacrifice we may make of our own power. They must proceed and complete their course; in spite of all that we can do to prevent it, they must fall successively into our hands, and partake at last of our downfall; of which, whether it be slow or sudden, violent or easy, the period will probably be hastened by every increase of our territory or subjects.

611. Can you state what, in 1798, was the opinion of the English authorities with respect to the system of policy adopted by the Marquis of Wellesley?—I have not the means of speaking positively as to any orders which may have been transmitted on the subject from England. I apprehend that a general disapprobation prevailed of any measures likely to lead to an extension of territory, or to more intimate relations with the native states of India; but the position and designs of Tippoo at that time constituted a crisis which suspended all ordinary principles and orders.

612. Are you of opinion that it will be advantageous to increase our interference in the states of India, so as to give it a more direct character, or to continue the subsidiary system upon the best regulated plan possible?—I am afraid that where we have already contracted subsidiary engagements, we must of necessity increase our interference; but at the same time we ought to do what we can to check the extension of it, and to administer it in such a spirit as to give as little offence as possible to the officers of the native states whom it is intended to control, and by whose opposition, if we drive them to oppose it, its efficacy must be essentially counteracted.

613. Do you think it would be advantageous to increase it so as to give it a more direct character, or not?—It is almost indispensably necessary to increase it where it already prevails. I am afraid that much of the mischief that has arisen has been the result of an indecisive mode of exercising our interference; we have acted without any uniform principle, sometimes going beyond and sometimes falling short of the proper line.

614. Then your decided opinion is that, where it has already begun, you think it must of necessity be increased?—Precisely so; I am afraid there are no means of curtailing it.

615. Does that opinion apply generally to India, or do you think there would be reason for distinction in the different states?—Generally to that part of India under the rule of native princes.

616. Should you say it applied to the Rajpoot states?—Our alliance is not of such long standing in the Rajpoot states, and therefore has not acquired so firm a hold; but I am afraid it will in the end be the same there as everywhere else. We have taken the native states generally under our protection; and one of the objects for which we are bound to exercise our interference, is to protect the people against their own sovereigns, as well as those sovereigns against external enemies.

617. Then it has not gone to so great a length in the Rajpoot states as in the other states?—Certainly not; it has not been so long in action.

618. Will you be good enough to state how long it has been in action?—It has been more or less in action since the war which took place in 1803. At that time we formed engagements with the Rajpoot states, which were subsequently abandoned; but they have since, after a considerable interval, been renewed.

*Marts, 17<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1832.*

# THE RIGHT HON. CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN, IN THE CHAIR.

*Richard Jenkins, Esq., a Member of the Committee; Examined.*

619. HOW far, in your opinion, have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to in the general course of policy towards the Native States of India since 1813?—In answering this question, I shall confine myself to that head of politics with which I am chiefly conversant, viz. the last great advance of the subsidiary system, (445.—VI.) and

*Richard Jenkins,  
Esq.  
17 July 1832.*

and its justice and expedience, as connected with the war of 1817-18. The great powers of India unconnected with us by subsidiary alliances, in 1813, were Sindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. Our treaties with all of them, the result of their confederacy against us in 1803, were mere instruments of general amity. Their intercourse with one another was unrestrained; but they were bound to submit to our arbitration in all disputes with our allies. Sindia and the Rajah of Berar only had residents at their courts, but they were left perfectly independent in their internal concerns; all three had been sufficiently weakened to prevent them from endangering the existence of our empire by a new confederacy, and their strength was too equally balanced to lead us to fear the union of their resources in the hands of any one of them by conquest; whilst it was believed that a judicious system of internal defence, joined to the established reputation of our superiority in arms and policy, would avert the only danger we had to fear, which was the predatory incursions of the irregular bodies of horse scattered over Central India.

These expectations, however, proved fallacious, and partly the weakness and partly the insidious policy of the Mahatta powers, guided by their enmity to us, were the means of bringing upon us and our allies a succession of serious losses and expenses not inferior to those of open war. Between 1806 and 1817, besides other military charges of considerable magnitude which we had been compelled to incur, (two armaments, for instance, against Meer Khan, in 1809 and 1812,) to prevent the establishment of a predatory Mahomedan power in the Deccan, our own provinces had several times, and the dominions of our allies, the Nizam and Peishwah, incessantly been plundered by the Pindarries; and to guard against their ravages we were exposed to the annual burthen of extensive military arrangements on all our frontiers. The armies of Sindia and Holkar too were broken into different bodies, acting under the mask of independence of their nominal masters, though in real concert with their views, and had on several occasions violated our territories, and those of our allies and dependants.

The field for plunder was daily becoming exhausted in Central India and the Deccan, and year after year was distinguished by some extension of plundering expeditions; Hyderabad and Poonah, Surat, and Mirzapore even, no longer bounded them. The Carnatic to the south, and Cuttack and the Northern Circars to the east, felt their ravages, and vain were all defensive arrangements against an enemy whom no difficulties or distance could deter, no obstacles, natural or artificial, impede in their rapid career of plunder and devastation, which, especially in our provinces, was attended with cruelties and horrors that have hardly a parallel in history.

We had applied in vain to Sindia and Holkar to take effectual measures, with or without our aid, to repress the Pindarries. The only measures adopted by Sindia were directed to render their subservience to his purposes more strict and definite than they had lately become; to secure a share in the fruits of their depredations on us and our allies; at the same time covering his secret support of them by some show of zeal for their suppression, in order to prevent us, as long as possible, from taking our own measures. Finding, however, that we were not to be deceived by such demonstrations, he ratified our suspicions of his hostile dispositions by uniting them with his own army, and even assuming a tone of defiance during the Nepal war.

Holkar's government was entirely in the hands of Meer Khan, who, we had certain grounds of knowing, was in league with the Pindarries; and the proceedings of Holkar's government, under the councils of that chief, with regard to those bodies of Pindarries who were acknowledged to belong to the Holkar State, were parallel with those of Sindia towards his portion of them.

The Rajah of Berar (Raghoojee Bhoosla) was equally hostile in disposition to the other Mahatta powers; and whilst his weakness and perverseness had exposed us to dangers, through his position with reference to our rich provinces of Bengal, Behar, Cuttack, and the Northern Circars, as well as those of our ally the Nizam, to which his territories furnished an unmolested route to the Pindarries, he was not disposed to join with us in any efficient plan against those freebooters. It was not till his death, in 1816, that an alliance with the Bhoosla was effected. But the consequent advance of our troops to the Nerbudda, which at first alarmed the Pindarries, and if any defensive measures could have been effectual, would have kept them in check, in the end only served to aggravate the evil, by showing the futility of such measures, and rendering those freebooters bolder than ever.

Considering, then, the Pindarries as subjects of Sindia and Holkar, we had a right

right to demand their suppression at the hands of those chiefs, as well as restitution and reparation to ourselves and our allies, on pain of instant war; or if we found those chiefs unable to remove the nuisance, and at the same time too perverse to admit of our interference; still more, if we found them in league with the plunderers, as was the fact, we were justified in taking our own measures, and acting for them as they ought to act, according to our views of their duty, and of the plans requisite to place our interests on a permanent footing of security, in spite of any appeal on their part to treaties or to arms.

If, then, the justice and expediency were admitted, and indeed it could not be denied, of putting down the predatory powers, and providing permanently against their revival, it appeared that no half measures could be adopted, with any sort of justice to ourselves. The strong probability that existed of hostile opposition on the part of the Mahratta powers, singly or united, required us to put forth all our strength, and under such enormous charges as this would involve, we could not submit to be thwarted, or to be cajoled, by any of them, into anything short of a radical cure of the system. No military operations, based upon any trust in the assistance or good-will of those powers, would have been effectual to the destruction even of a tithe of the predatory bodies in question. The chiefs of Rajpootana and Central India, whose co-operation was essential, and who were anxious, as joint sufferers, to assist us, would not dare to do so, unless we guaranteed their future safety from the revenge, which could only be done by releasing them from the yoke, of the Mahrattas and Pathans. Nor had we a shadow of ground for anticipating any improvement in the native governments, great or small, who, during 10 years, had neglected, and even fostered, the growth of the predatory system, without the constant exercise of a close and vigilant control on our part over their future conduct. This could only be effected through a new system of treaties and military arrangements, supported by corresponding acquisitions of means, in territory, subsidies, or tributes, and uniting the States of Central India in one common bond of defensive alliances, under our supremacy. Such was the plan adopted by Lord Hastings in 1817. Under it, the spirit of predatory association has expired; our own dominions, and those of our old allies, have been allowed to flourish, unvexed by foreign invasion. The prosperity of Rajpootana and Central India has been resuscitated, and to this day they remain substantially in peace, both domestic and external; whilst as, as far as I know, the occasional inconveniences and embarrassments which naturally attended such complicated concerns, have scarcely been a blot on the general happiness and good feeling of the rulers or inhabitants of those regions.

The contests with Holkar, the Peishwah, and the Bhoosla were most important episodes in what is called the Mahratta and Pindarry war, but what was intended to have been purely a Pindarry war, until those princes identified themselves with the predatory powers. I have said before that resistance was anticipated from Holkar and Sindia; the latter, indeed, was only kept out of the field by the masterly military combinations of Lord Hastings: but no one could have foretold without the imputation of unjustifiable distrust in their good faith and honour, the treacherous defection of our allies, the Peishwa and Bhoosla, who had both suffered, and particularly the latter, from the Pindaries and the Pathans, most severely, for a series of years.

The whole course of these contests, in their origin, progress and consequences, are fully developed in the printed collection of papers relative to the Mahratta and Pindarry War; and their justification, as far as we are concerned, is therein so complete, in my opinion, that I will not attempt further to enlarge upon them.

## APPENDIX.

## VI.—Political or Foreign.

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Appendix, No. 1.

TERRITORIES AND TRIBUTARIES ACQUIRED IN INDIA SINCE 1813.

DISTRICT or REGION	NAME OF STATE	DATE of TREATY OR CESSION.	PARTICULARS OF CESSIONS, TRIBUTE, &c.	ACQUIRED TERRITORIES	GRAND RECEIPTS The Net Receipts of the Sum which remains after deducting the expenses of the acquisition, surveys, &c. Chargers, &c. in some cases, of the territories with the several States, and the sum given with security	POPULATION	SURFACE in SQUARE MILES
RAJPOOTANA	KOTAH -	36 December 1817	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	See, Ho. 1, 22, 229	-	-
	BUNDIRA -	10 February 1818	The Tribute and Revenue paid to Gondia -	-	10,000	-	-
	QUERORE -	13 January 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
	JAYPORE -	13 January 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
	SANDEW -	2 April 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
MALWA	PUNTAPORE and DOWLA -	5 October 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
	BAHAWAN -	10 November 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
	BUTAN -	11 December 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
	SILAH -	11 December 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
	SEENA -	11 December 1818	A Tribute of 1000 Rs. per annum -	-	10,000	-	-
GUZERAT	HOGAR -	6 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	DHAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	BHOPAL -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
DECCAN	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
BEHAR	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
NEPAUL	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
MALAY STATES	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-
	CHANDAR -	10 January 1818	The Tribute paid to the Malharas -	-	10,000	-	-



CIRCULAR LETTER from *T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.*

Sir,

India Board, January 1832.

I am directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to inform you, that it is their intention to propose your being called as a witness before the East India Committee in the course of the inquiries which they will probably institute into the state of our external and internal political relations in the East; and I am to state, that the Board will feel much obliged to you for any information and opinions which your experience may enable you to offer on the following points, in regard to the several states with which your course of service has made you acquainted, and for a specification of any papers on the subject to which it may appear to you useful to direct attention:

I. What new acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1813?

II. What is the actual condition of our relations with the several states?

III. What is the amount of military force required in each instance; whether,

1. By express stipulation;
2. By the ordinary effect of our obligations; or,
3. As a security against extraordinary risks?

IV. What is the character, and what the extent, of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the protected states?

1. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents?

2. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated on the interests of the protected princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us, as heretofore acted upon?

V. What have been the financial effects of the conquests, and of the changes or enlargements of our political relations, which have been made since 1813? to be exhibited under the following heads:

1. Increased or decreased revenue or tribute.
2. Increased or decreased charge of civil administration
3. Increased or decreased appropriation of military force
4. Increased or decreased risk of external or internal hostility.

VI. How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

VII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition with reference to the forces belonging to native states on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard?

VIII. How far have the civil establishments of the several residencies and agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

IX. How far have the residents and agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

X. How far has the existing system of Indian government, or home direction and control, been successful, or calculated to succeed, in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude and unity of purpose, in the several gradations of government, direction, control or influence, and (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the home or of the Indian government?

I have the honour, &c.

(signed) *T. Hyde Villiers.*

Appendix, No. 3.

EXTRACT of a Letter from William M'Culloch, Esq. to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq., dated January 1832

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 3.

Letter from  
W. M'Culloch,  
Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

I was honoured on the 13th instant, through the Chairman of the East India Company, with your letter dated the 9th, acquainting me that it is the intention of the Right honourable the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East India Committee, and desiring a communication of any information and opinions which my course of service might enable me to make on the points therein enumerated, together with a specification of any papers to which I might think it useful to draw attention.

It will of course be my duty to obey the summons of the East India Committee when served upon me.

I herewith submit, through the Chairman, in compliance with the requisition of the Board, such facts elucidatory of the several questions propounded in your letter as I have been able to gather from the printed collections of Indian treaties, accompanied (solely out of deference to the expressed wish of the Board) with a few thoughts which have occurred to me on some of the points to which they have been pleased to direct my attention.

I have, &c.

W. M'Culloch.

19, Upper Bedford-place,  
January 1832.

I What new acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1813?

This question may be best answered by a reference to the most important of the treaties concluded in the intervening period; viz treaties with

The Rajah of Nepaul	-	-	-	-	1815
Rajah of Siccim	-	-	-	-	1817
The Peishwa	-	-	-	-	1817
Dowlut Row Scindia	-	-	-	-	1817
Supplemental with the Guickwar	-	-	-	-	1817
Ameer Khan	-	-	-	-	1817
Mulhar Row Holkar	-	-	-	-	1818
Nawab of Bhopaul	-	-	-	-	1818
The Rajpoot and other States in Central India	-	-	-	-	1817-1818
Ameers of Scind	-	-	-	-	1820
Government of Cutch	-	-	-	-	1816, 1819, 1822
Rajah of Nagpore	-	-	-	-	1816, 1818, 1826, 1829
The Nizam	-	-	-	-	1822
King of Ava*	-	-	-	-	1826

A map (of which there are probably copies at the India Board) was constructed about two years ago by order of Lord Ellenborough, indicating the recent territorial acquisitions, and, if I recollect right, how they were obtained.

II What is the actual condition of our relations with the several states?

This may be ascertained from the engagements above enumerated, and from pre-existing treaties still either wholly or in part subsisting. To the latter class principally belong,

The treaties with the Nabob of Oude, concluded in 1798 and 1801, and what was termed the final arrangement in 1802.

The treaties with the Nizam, concluded in 1798 and 1800, and the commercial treaty of 1802.

The treaties with Scindia, concluded in 1803 and 1805.

The treaties with the Guickwar, concluded in 1802 and 1805

The treaties concluded with the Rajah of Mysore in 1799 and 1807.

The treaty concluded with the Rajah of Travancore in 1805; with the Rajah of Cochin in 1809; and with the Rajah of Lahore and the King of Caubul in the same year.†

Oude.

Under the engagements existing previously to 1813, and still in force, with the state of Oude, the Company are bound to defend the territories which remained to the vizier after the commutation treaty "against all foreign and domestic enemies, provided always that it be

\* All these treaties, with the exception of that with the King of Ava and the two last with the Rajah of Nagpore, will be found in a collection printed by authority of the Court of Directors in 1824.

† All these treaties will be found in a collection printed by authority of the Court of Directors in 1812.

be in the power of the Company's Government to station British troops in such parts of his Excellency's dominions as shall appear to the said Government most expedient, and provided further that his Excellency, retaining in his pay four battalions of infantry, one battalion of Nujeebs and Marwatties, 2,000 horsemen, and to the number of 300 Golundauze, shall dismiss the remainder of his troops, excepting such numbers of armed Peons as shall be deemed necessary for the purposes of the collections, and a few horsemen and Nujeebs to attend the persons of the Amils.\* The amount of force to be so employed by the Company was not stipulated in the commutation treaty, but in the subsidiary treaty of 1798 it was stipulated that, in return for an annual payment by the vizier of 76 laes of rupees, the force employed should never consist of less than 10,000 men, including Europeans and native cavalry, infantry and artillery; it having been at the same time agreed that if from necessity more than 13,000 men, or from the same cause less than 8,000 should be employed, there should be a proportionate increase or diminution of the subsidy†

The gross revenue of the territory ceded in lieu of subsidy was computed at Lucknow rupees 1,35,23,474.

*Nisam.*

In exchange for the cession of all the territories acquired by the Subadar of the Deccan, under the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, and under the treaty of Mysore in 1799, the Company are bound to maintain, for his general defence and protection, eight battalions of sepoy (or 8,000 firelocks) and two regiments of cavalry (or 1,000 horse, with their requisite complement of guns, European artillery, lascars and pioneers, fully equipped, with warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be stationed in perpetuity within his Highness's territory‡ The revenues of the ceded territories were scheduled at 18,13,188 Cantera pagodas

*Scindia.*

In 1804, the Company concluded a treaty of alliance and subsidy with this prince, by which the Company agreed to furnish, for their mutual defence, a force of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of artillery, and a proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition. But this engagement seems to have been superseded by the definitive treaty of amity and alliance concluded with his Highness in the following year, by which the Company agreed to make him an annual payment of four laes of rupees, and to grant to his wife and daughters respectively Jaghira within their territories, to the value, the one of two laes, the other of one lae per annum. The Company therefore are under no obligation to furnish any military force to the successor of Dowlat Row Scindia, the treaty concluded with his late Highness in 1817 being one merely of concord and alliance, entered into for the double purpose of obtaining his co-operation against the Pindarries, and securing the Rajpoot states against the incursions of his troops, to which they were constantly liable, for the real or professed purpose of collecting the tribute payable to his Highness.

*Guickwar*

By the treaty concluded in 1805 with Anund Row Guickwar, the Company, in consideration partly of territorial cessions, and partly of other territorial securities, to the estimated annual value of rupees 11,70,000, agreed to furnish a permanent subsidiary force of 3,000 native infantry, with one company of European artillery, and two companies of gun lascars, with the necessary ordnance, warlike stores and ammunition.

By the supplemental treaty concluded with his Highness in 1807, this force was augmented to four battalions of infantry (or 4,000 men) and two regiments of native cavalry, to defray the increased expense of which, the Guickwar ceded to the Company his rights in the farm of Ahmedabad, and agreed to certain exchanges of territories. Being but very imperfectly acquainted with the late proceedings of the Bombay government, I know not whether, or to what extent, these engagements are deemed to be still binding

*Mysore*

By the 2d article of the treaty concluded with the rajah in 1799, the Company agreed to maintain and the Rajah to receive a military force (amount not stated) for the defence and security of his Highness's dominion, in consideration of which the Rajah engaged to pay the annual sum of seven laes of star pagodas. By the third article of the same treaty it was stipulated, "If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or of either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any state or power, his Highness agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the military force, and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as shall appear to the Governor General in Council, on an attentive consideration of the means of his Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his Highness." The third article of the treaty of 1799, above cited, was modified in the subsequent treaty concluded in 1807, by which the Rajah was relieved from the indefinite pecuniary contribution to which he had been made liable in the former treaty, and in consideration thereof his Highness engaged

\* See Article 8 of Treaty of 1801.

† See Articles 2 and 7 of Treaty of 1798.

‡ See Articles 3 and 5 of Treaty of 1800.

engaged "to maintain at all times, fit for service and subject to muster, a body of 4,000 effective horse, of which about 500 shall be Bargees and the rest Silladar horse." Such portion of this body of horse as shall not, in the opinion of the British Government, be needed for the internal protection of Mysore are to be ready at all times to accompany and serve with the Company's army, the extra expense of their maintenance, if not exceeding the period of one month, to be borne by the Rajah, but if exceeding that period to be borne by the Company, at the rate of four star pagodas per mensem for each effective man and horse. To this was added a further stipulation that if at any time it should be found expedient to augment the cavalry of Mysore beyond the number of 4,000, the Rajah should, on receiving from the British Government an intimation to that effect, use his utmost endeavours for that purpose; but the whole expense of such augmentation to be defrayed by the Company at the rate of eight star pagodas per mensem for each effective man and horse when employed within the territory of Mysore, and of four additional star pagodas per mensem for each effective man and horse when employed beyond the Mysore territory, after the expiration of one month from the date of their passing the frontier

*Travancore.*

I know not whether anything, or what, has been done by the Supreme Government in India, in consequence of the recommendation of the Court of Directors in their general revision despatch of the 10th February 1830, to endeavour to effect some modification of the Company's obligations to the state of Travancore. If no change has taken place, the following is the state of their reciprocal obligations as they respect the employment of a military force. By the treaty of 1795, in consideration of the Company undertaking to protect his country against all unprovoked aggressions, the Rajah engaged to pay annually, both in peace and war, a sum not specified, but equivalent to the expense of three of the Company's battalions of sepoys, together with a company of European artillery, and two companies of lascars, which force it was agreed, on the part of the Company, should always be stationed in his country or on the frontier near it, or in any other place within the Company's possessions, which the Rajah might prefer, but they were always to be in readiness. It was further stipulated in the seventh article of the treaty of 1795, "that when the Company shall require of the Rajah any aid of his troops to assist them in war, it shall be incumbent on the reigning Rajah for the time being to furnish such aid, to such extent and in such number as may be in his power, from his regular infantry and cavalry, &c." From this last stipulation the Rajah was relieved by the subsequent treaty of 1805, and in consideration of the relief thus afforded to him, he engaged to pay annually to the Company a sum equivalent to the expense of one regiment of infantry, in addition to the sum payable under the treaty of 1795. And in case of any apprehended deficiency of the Rajah's funds, the Company was to be at liberty either to regulate, or, through their own officers, to assume the management and collection of the revenues.

*Cochin*

A subsidiary treaty was concluded with the Rajah of Cochin in 1809, by which, in consideration of the Company engaging for his defence and protection, he agreed, in addition to the annual tribute of one lac of rupees payable under the previous treaty of 1791, to defray the expense of one battalion of native infantry, computed at Arcot rupees 1,76,037, making an aggregate annual payment of Arcot rupees 2,76,037, the same provision being made in the event of failure as had been made in the case of Travancore.

*Caulbul.*

The treaty with the King of Caulbul in 1809, was entered into solely for the purpose of securing his co-operation to repel an apprehended invasion of India by the French and Persians.

*Lahore.*

And the treaty concluded in the same year with Runjeet Singh, had, in point of fact, mainly the same object, though this does not appear on the face of the engagement, wherein it was stipulated that we should take no concern with his territories and subjects to the north of the Sutledge, that he should not entertain more troops on the left bank of that river than was necessary for internal duties, and that he should neither commit nor suffer any encroachments on the possessions or rights of the chiefs in that vicinity.

Having thus, with reference to the 3d Question propounded in the letter of Mr. Hyde Villiers, adverted to our military obligations arising out of treaties concluded prior to 1813, and still in force, it becomes necessary, in pursuance of the same inquiry, to advert to obligations of a similar character which have been incurred since that period.

The treaty concluded in 1817 with Dowlat Row Scindiah, and the supplemental treaty with the Quickwar in the same year, have been already noticed.

The treaty concluded in June 1817 with the Peishwa, and all preceding treaties with that prince, have been since abrogated by the conquest of his dominions.

Our relations with the Rajah of Nepal, the Amcra of Scind and the King of Ava, as established by the treaties of 1815, 1820, and 1826 respectively, are merely those of amity and friendship, and entail no military obligations.

Appendix, No. 8

Letter from  
W. M. Chuluck,  
Esq.,  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Our military obligations to the Nizam were not affected by the treaty of 1822, which merely provided for a division of the conquests made in the last Mahratta war.

*Sicim.*

By the treaty concluded in 1817, the Company transferred to the Rajah of Sicim the hilly tract of country lying between the Meitchie and Teistah rivers, which they had conquered from the Rajah of Nepal, and guaranteed to the Sicim Rajah and his successors the full and peaceable possession of it.

*Holkar.*

By the treaty concluded with Holkar in January 1818, in consideration of the cessions therein made, the British Government engaged to support a field force to maintain the internal tranquillity of his territories, and to defend them from foreign enemies. The force to be adequate to its object, and to be stationed where the British Government should determine to be best. At the same time the Rajah agreed not to keep up a larger force of his own than his revenues will afford, engaging, however, to retain in his service a body of not less than 3,000 horse to co-operate with the British troops.

*Chiefs of Bundelcund, Central India and Rajpootana.*

It seems unnecessary to describe in detail each particular engagement contracted in 1817 and 1818 with these chiefs, as a common character belongs to them all. Protection and defence were promised on our part without any specification of the amount of force to be employed for those purposes, and assurances were given to those princes that they were to remain absolute rulers of their respective states, and that British jurisdiction should not be introduced within their territories. They, on the other hand, engaged to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, and to co-operate with it when so required, either generally, according to their means, or to furnish fixed contingents, as in the case of Joudpore, of 1,500 horse, and Bhopaul, of 600 horse and 400 infantry, to renounce all connection with other chiefs and states, to commit no aggression upon any one, and to submit any accidental disputes which might arise to British arbitration. It was further stipulated that they should give no asylum to criminals or defaulters of the British Government, and that the tribute formerly paid to the Mahratta chiefs should in future be paid to the British Government, excepting in the instances of Kerowlee and Boondce, where it was remitted wholly or in part. The aggregate tribute derived from these states amounts to between 15 and 16 lacs of rupees. In some of the treaties engagements of a rather an ambiguous and decidedly inconvenient character were introduced. In a supplemental article to the treaty with Kota the administration of the Raj was guaranteed to the heirs and successors of the minister who negotiated the treaty. By the 7th article of the treaty with Bickaneer it was stipulated that the British Government, on the application of the Rajah, should reduce to subjection the Thakours and other inhabitants of his principality who had revolted and thrown off his authority. By the 7th article of the treaty with the Rajah of Dowlaugh and Purtanbghur the British Government agreed to aid the Rajah in subduing the Meenabs, Bheels, &c. &c.; and in the treaties with the Rajahs of Doongerpore and Banswarra it was stipulated that the British Government should not countenance the connections or relations of the Rajahs who might prove disobedient, but assist in bringing them under control.

*Nagpore*

The following is the state of our engagements with the Rajah of Nagpore, as defined in the treaty of 1826, and the revised engagement of 1829.

The Rajah renounced all dependance on or connection with the Rajah of Sattarah and other Mahratta powers, and engaged to have no communication with any power whatever excepting through the British resident.

The permanent British subsidiary force, which by the treaty of 1816 had been fixed at not less than one regiment of native cavalry, six battalions of native infantry, one complete company of artillery, and one company of pioneers, was left indefinite by the treaty of 1826; and in the latter treaty the restriction contained in the former as to stationing the force was removed.

The territorial cessions stipulated for in the provisional agreement of 1818, in lieu of the pecuniary subsidy of rupees 7,50,000 payable under the treaty of 1816, were confirmed by the treaty of 1826, an opening being left for exchanges which might suit the convenience of both parties, and the management of the Rajah's country, which had been undertaken by the British Government during its minority, was restored to him under certain conditions and exceptions. By the 8th and 9th articles of the treaty of 1826, the military force of the state of Nagpore was to remain under the authority of the British Government, and lands, yielding a clear revenue of 17 lacs of rupees, were to be placed under the management of European superintendents acting for the Rajah, but subject to the orders of the British resident, to provide for the regular payment of the Nagpore troops. It was, however, at the same time declared, that whenever the state of the districts thus retained, and the success of his Highness's management of that portion of the country then transferred to him should appear to the British Government to warrant such a measure, the retained districts should be transferred to the Rajah's management. By the revised engagement of 1829, the

8th and 9th articles of the treaty of 1826, above described, were cancelled; and it was agreed that the reserved districts should be given up to the Rajah's management on condition of his paying on annual subsidy to the Company of eight lacs of Sonaut rupees, and it was further stipulated in the revised engagement, that the Rajah's auxiliary force, which had been placed under the command of European officers should be gradually disbanded, and a national force raised in its stead adequate to the ordinary protection of his subjects and the performance of internal duties. And the Rajah specifically engaged to maintain at all times in a state of efficiency a body of not less than 1,000 of the best description of irregular horse, organized and disciplined after the native fashion, commanded by his own native officers, and subject to his Highness's exclusive authority, but liable in the event of war to serve with the British army, receiving *batta* from the Company when employed beyond the Nagpore frontier.

The powers of almost ununited interference in the internal affairs of the Rajah's government which were reserved to the British Government by the treaty of 1826 were modified by the revised engagement of 1829. It was still provided, however, that it shall be competent for the British Government, through its local representative, to offer advice to the Rajah in all important matters, as well of internal as of external concern, and the Rajah is bound to act in conformity thereto. And in the event of gross systematic oppression, anarchy and misrule prevailing hereafter, in neglect of repeated advice and remonstrance, to such an extent as to endanger the public tranquillity and disable the Rajah from performing his obligations to the Company, the British Government is left at liberty to resume the management through its own officers, of the district or districts in which such disorders may prevail.

#### Cutch.

By the treaty of 1819, we have engaged to guarantee the power of the Rao of Cutch and the integrity of his dominions against all foreign and domestic enemies; the regency acting during his minority, and of which the British resident for the time being is a member, having entered into stipulations similar to those which are to be found in our treaties with the petty states of Hindostan. A British force is stationed in the country for the security of the government, and provision (though very inadequate to the end) is made in the treaty for the payment of this force from the revenues of Cutch, the option being reserved to the Company of either reducing or entirely withdrawing its troops (and relieving Cutch from the expense) whenever, in the opinion of the British Government, the stability and efficiency of the Rao's authority may admit of its being done with safety. By the 17th article of the treaty the Rao was pledged to abolish in his own family the practice of infanticide, and heartily to co-operate with the Company in abolishing the practice generally throughout the country.

III. What is the amount of the military force required in each instance, whether,

1. By express stipulation;
2. By the ordinary effects of our obligations; or
3. As a security against extraordinary risks?

From the foregoing short sketch it will appear that the amount of military force to be employed in discharging the obligations which we have incurred by treaty is left unfixed in a great majority of instances, and as to the amount required either by the ordinary effect of our obligations, or as a security against extraordinary risks, I do not feel competent to offer any opinion.

IV. What is the character, and what the extent, of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the protected states?

1. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents?
- 2d. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated, on the interests of the protected princes, of their people, and of our own subjects from the relations in which they stand to us as heretofore acted upon?

The character and extent of our interference must of course be regulated by the tenour of our engagements, as well as the frequency and urgency of circumstances calling for interference, and will also depend in some measure on the personal temper and dispositions of the agents employed, and on the policy of the British Government at particular periods, influenced as it naturally will be by experience of the good or ill effects which may have resulted from want or excess of interference.

In some instances it has been found expedient indirectly to govern allied and protected states by the instrumentality of native ministers, appointed under our influence or by our express recommendation. In other instances, where the minister has possessed the confidence of his master, together with the talents suited to his station, our interference has been comparatively rare, unimportant and obtrusive. During the government of Lord Hastings, abstinence from all irksome and unnecessary interference was generally inculcated on his Lordship's political agents, although it must be confessed that treaties calculated to afford occasion for interference, not likely to be always very palatable to the objects of it, were multiplied during the same period of time. The practice, too, of officering the troops of native princes with European officers was then greatly extended. Lord Wm. Bentinck

has not only professed an earnest desire to circumscribe our interference within the narrowest possible limits, but in the revised treaty with the Rajah of Berar has afforded a signal proof of his determination, as fit occasions may offer, practically to conform to this policy.

The duties of political residents vary of course according to the nature of our engagements with the princes at whose courts they are stationed. They are the organs of communication between their own government and those princes; they conduct negotiations, report all important occurrences at the native courts, and keep the Supreme Government informed of the resources, characters and administration of the princes to whom they are accredited; they offer advice and sometimes assistance to those princes in matters both of external and internal concern, and, where it has been so provided, they arbitrate differences which may arise between them and their neighbours and subjects, and finally, the operations of the British subsidiary force are placed under the immediate control and direction of the residents.

With respect to the general effects of the subsidiary system, it gives the British Government a more complete command over the military resources of the countries to which it extends, with better security against treacherous combination on the part of the native powers, and popular insurrection on the part of their subjects, than probably could be obtained by any other means. It must however be confessed, that these advantages are purchased at a considerable (some may be of opinion) too high a price.

I cannot so well describe the evils incident to the system as by the following quotation from a letter addressed by the late Sir Thomas Munro to the Marquess of Hastings, dated 12th August 1817. "There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists weak and oppressive, to extinguish all honourable feeling among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace or a violent one by rebellion or foreign conquest. But the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security, and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Wherever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Peishwah and the Nizam, and is now beginning to be seen in Mysore.

"A subsidiary force would be a most useful establishment, if it could be directed solely to the support of our ascendancy, without nourishing all the vices of a bad government, but this seems almost impossible. The only way in which this object has ever in any degree been attained is by the appointment of a dewan. This measure is no doubt liable to numerous objections, but still it is the only one by which any amends can be made to the people of the country for the measures brought upon them by the subsidiary force in giving stability to a vicious government. The great difficulty is to prevent the prince from counteracting the dewan, and the resident from meddling too much, but when this is avoided, the dewan may be made a most useful instrument of government.

"There is, however, another view under which the subsidiary system may be considered; I mean that of its inevitable tendency to bring every native state into which it is introduced, sooner or later, under the exclusive dominion of the British Government. It has already done this completely in the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic. It has made some progress in that of the Peishwah and the Nizam, and the whole of the territory of these princes will unquestionably suffer the same fate as the Carnatic."

Sir Thomas Munro proceeded, in that most able and interesting letter, to show, with prophetic sagacity, how this result was likely to be brought about, and to state the grounds on which it appeared to him "very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired."

To the observations of that excellent man, I only beg leave to add, that the multiplicity of perplexing details arising out of the extension of our political relations has trenchanted most seriously upon the time and attention both of the governments in India and of the authorities at home, and have thus tended, in no slight degree, to divert to foreign interests a large portion of those cares which might perhaps have been more profitably bestowed on improving the administration of our own territories.

V. What have been the financial effects of the conquests, and of the changes or enlargements of our political relations, which have been made since 1818?

To be exhibited under the following heads:

1. Increased or decreased revenue or tribute.
2. Increased or decreased charge of civil administration.
3. Increased or decreased appropriation of military force.
4. Increased or decreased risk of external or internal hostility.

The last is the only topic on which my course of service enables me to submit an opinion; and this I do with some reluctance and the utmost diffidence.

As long as we continue to administer our own territories with justice and moderation, and with due regard to the prejudices and usages of the natives, I do not think that there is much

much danger of insurrection; still it is highly important that the local governments should exercise a vigilant inspection and unremitting control of the conduct of their subordinate European and native functionaries. The difficulty of so doing is of course enhanced by every addition to their numbers or enlargement of the sphere of their duties; and in this point of view extension of territory may be regarded as unfavourable to the good administration, and consequently to the tranquillity, of our own dominions. There are, however, I think, still more solid grounds of apprehension from the multiplication of our foreign connexions, and the disaffection of the protected states. We greatly deceive ourselves if we suppose that there is a single state with which we have contracted subsidiary engagements, or which we have placed on the list of British feudatories, who does not feel galled by the yoke imposed on them, and who would not throw it off if they could. All the higher ranks in India must naturally be indisposed to our rule, because it reduces their consequences, and excludes them from stations of honour and emolument. It is true that they want leaders, and obstacles have been opposed to any hostile combination among the remaining native powers. But men of enterprise occasionally start up unexpectedly, and the events which took place towards the close of 1817, show that hostile combinations may be concerted, notwithstanding all our precautions. Less formidable they probably would be now than they were then, but the risks seem to be diminished rather in magnitude than in number. Whether the extension of our relations has been caused by the irresistible course of events, or proceeded from general views of policy entertained by individual statesmen, I humbly conceive that, after the experience we have already had of its results, it can hardly fail to be matter of regret to all. The vindication of the engagements which we have entered into with the states of Central India and Rajpootana rests upon the proposition that they were indispensable to the complete suppression of a predatory power, the existence of which was found to be incompatible with the security of bordering countries and the general peace. I may, perhaps, be pardoned if, with much deference, I suggest a doubt whether this object, desirable and necessary as it is, readily acknowledged to have been, was not substantially effected by the extinction of the Pindarries, the dissolution of the Mahratta empire, the extinction of the Peshwa's power, the reduction of Holkar's, the disbanding of Ameer Khan's force, and the restraints imposed upon Scindia by the treaty of 1817. If wherever a state is to be found ill-governed, a prey to distraction and disturbances, and exhibiting a want of security for persons and property, we are to be considered as warranted in interposing to remedy defects and abuses in its administration, and to correct its supposed propensity to freebooting, we may go on crusading to the end of time, with the sword in one hand and a bundle of subsidiary treaties in the other. The Rajpoots had been the victims, not the associates of the Mahratta marauders. Even when their country was desolated, and thrown into confusion by the incursions of Scindia, Holkar, &c., we had found them much less troublesome neighbours than we do the King of Oude at this moment, with a British force stationed within his territory. The terms of the treaties concluded with them were of a character rather to indispose and irritate, than to conciliate and attach a warlike and high-spirited race of men. Whether, instead of destroying their independence, the establishment simply of general relations of amity between them and the British Government, and the remission of the tribute now exacted from them, but paid, I believe, with great irregularity and reluctance (in some instances at least), would have secured the future tranquillity of that part of the country, may be doubtful, but such an arrangement would have prevented a world of annoyance and embarrassment. It is questionable whether, even in a financial view, we should have been losers by it. At any rate, for the temporary sacrifice we should probably have been amply compensated in the long run.

#### VI. How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

The thoughts suggested by the last Question are in a certain degree applicable to the present. No candid inquirer will, I imagine, refuse to the Company's governments in India general credit for aiming to do what is right, and if on their records some questionable proceedings are to be found, they may safely and almost invariably be imputed, without any extraordinary exercise of charity, to error of judgment rather than of intention. The records of the Court of Directors in like manner afford abundant evidence of a steadfast love of fair dealing, and an earnest desire on the part of the home authorities, to maintain and inculcate the principles of justice and moderation. The first Lord Melville, when a member of the House of Commons, once observed that an admirable code of political morality might be compiled from the correspondence of the East India Company, and it will be found on investigation not to have degenerated in that respect since his time.

VII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army been regulated by due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition, with reference to the forces belonging to native states on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard?

The strength of the British Indian army has been regulated by advertence to the circumstances stated in this Question, as will appear from many recorded discussions in the councils of government at Fort William and the other two presidencies. Respecting the distribution of the army, as fixed or altered at successive periods, I am not qualified to speak. It has been considered to be more a military than a political question.



Appendix, No. 3.

Letter from  
W. M'Culloch,  
Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

VIII. How far have the civil establishments of the several presidencies and agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

In the year 1828, a committee composed of a civil and military officer, selected from the establishments of each of the three presidencies, was appointed by the present Governor-General, for the express purpose of inquiring into the state of those establishments, and of suggesting the means of improving their efficiency and reducing expenditure. The Court of Directors also have been incessantly occupied during the last three years with inquiries and deliberations directed to the same objects in both branches of the service. The result of these inquiries and deliberations, in so far as they respected the civil branch, was communicated to their local governments in a circular despatch, dated 10th February 1830, and the effect of the combined endeavours of the authorities here and in India has been a large, immediate, and still more considerable prospective saving. The precise amount I have not the means of stating, but it can be easily ascertained.

IX. How far have the residents and agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

The checks upon political residents and agents appear, on first thought, to be less efficient than upon any other class of functionaries. A collector of the revenue is placed under a superintending Board. The decisions of a zillah judge are liable to revision by a court of appeal, which in its turn is amenable to the Sudder Adawlut. A political resident is the historian of his own proceedings, and may occasionally give them a false colouring in his reports to Government. But it should be borne in mind that all important transactions at native courts being carried on in writing, and the documents being transmitted to the presidency, these, together with the privacy of his assistants to almost every step he takes, will probably be deemed sufficient checks upon his conduct.

X. How far has the existing system of Indian government, or home direction and control, been successful, or calculated to succeed, in maintaining the requisite vigour, consistency, promptitude, and unity of purpose, in the several gradations of government direction, control or influence, and if any, what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the home or of the Indian governments?

My humble but sincere opinion is, that the Indian government, as at present constituted, both as respects the established gradations of authority abroad and the system of direction and control at home, (making fair allowance for the difficulties of no ordinary character with which it has to contend), has answered the ends of its institution, not merely in a reasonable, but in a very remarkable degree. A vast empire has been acquired for the British Crown, creditably administered, and successfully defended against all assailants. The people of India have enjoyed, both in their persons and property, a security which they never experienced under the Governments of their own princes. The Company's service has produced a greater number of individuals distinguished for talent and virtue than perhaps any other service in the world. The division of authority at home, instead of occasioning either collision and useless controversy, or timid subservency and weak submission, has rarely been attended with any serious practical inconvenience, whilst it has, in very numerous instances, given rise to a liberal and free discussion of important public questions, and led ultimately to more enlightened decisions than either the directing or controlling body might have come to separately. The way in which the business is conducted, and the records are kept in India, the care with which they are examined in this country, and the detail in which the despatches of the local governments are replied to by the Court of Directors, with the approval of the Board of Commissioners, besides being well calculated to excite emulation throughout the service, are probably the mildest, and at the same time most effectual checks that could be devised against the abuse of power. The system, doubtless, is susceptible of improvement, particularly in respect of regularity and promptitude in the correspondence, and vigour in enforcing strict obedience in India to orders from home. But in neither of these two respects are any new legislative provisions wanted. All that is requisite to the accomplishment of both objects is a just adaptation of the strength of the establishments here and in India to the duties which they have to perform, and an inflexible determination on the part of the home authorities to visit with exemplary punishment every violation of their orders for which the most satisfactory reasons shall not be assigned.

19, Upper Bedford-place,  
19 January 1832

(signed) W. M'Culloch.

Appendix, No. 4.

LETTER from David Hill, Esq. to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 4.

Letter from  
David Hill, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Sir,  
I HAVE had the honour to receive, on the 15th instant, your letter of the 9th, apprizing me of the intention of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East India Committee in the course of the inquiries which they

St. Andrews, 19th January 1832.

they will probably institute into the state of our external and internal political relations in the East, and calling for any information and opinions which my experience may enable me to offer on certain specified points in regard to the several states with which my course of service has made me acquainted, and for a specification of any papers on the subject to which it may appear to me useful to direct attention. I regret that my experience and my course of service have been such as to enable me to afford but little information on the several points to which your inquiries are particularly directed, and I cannot presume to hope that my opinions upon any of them will be considered to be of much value. I shall however, answer the inquiries which you have done me the honour of putting to me, according to the best of my ability.

I. What new acquisitions of territory, &c ?

My own sources of official information do not enable me accurately to answer this Query, but I may answer it in a general way, which, I apprehend, is all that any one can do, otherwise than by means of analyzing the public records, in which complete and accurate information on the subject is to be found. Our new acquisitions of territory since 1813 consist of our conquests from the Goorkhas of the whole of the Peshwa's dominions, and part of those of Holkar, the Berar Rajah, and the Burmese. The material change and enlargement of our political relations since that period consist generally in the avowal of our supremacy over the whole political relations of India, which till then we had studiously disavowed, even after it had for a number of years been habitually exercised, and particularly in our more intimate relation to the Goorkhas and Burmese, and to the Berar Rajah and some of the minor states of India, and in our substitution of the relation of sovereignty for that of ally towards the countries conquered from the late Peshwa, in 1827 and 1828.

II. What is the actual condition, &c. ?

III. What is the amount of military force, &c. ?

To these Queries I am not competent to give more than vague and unsatisfactory replies.

IV. What is the character and what the extent, &c. ?

The real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents is of course dependent upon the relation subsisting between the British Government, which they represent, and the native states to which they are accredited. Where the relation is that of authority on one side and subjection on the other, the duties of the officers enforcing that relation are those of absolute control over the subject states. This control, which has become universal throughout India Proper since the change noticed under the first head of inquiry, is exercised in various degrees, according to the views of policy which have happened to be adopted with regard either to the controlling or to the subject state. In Travancore, owing no doubt in a great measure to the smallness of the territory, and the consequent facility of exercising it, for 20 years it was minute and absolute, to the great benefit of both states. In the Nizam's dominions, on the other hand, owing perhaps to their greater extent, it was for many years rarely interposed, and never in matters of detail, and the country went to ruin. Mysore is an instance in which little interference was exercised by the resident in the internal government of the country, and its affairs prospered for 10 or 12 years under the management of an able minister, Ponniah, and have since fallen into complete disorder. Within the last few years our Government has shown a disposition to adopt the policy of non-interference with the protected states in the administration of their internal affairs, but their affairs are invariably so ill administered and their people so grossly oppressed, that it will be impossible long to adhere to that policy.

The relation in which protected states stand to us seems universally to have proved injurious both to the princes and to their people, if, perhaps, the small state of Travancore be excepted. We have swallowed up the Peshwa's dominions, and seized upon a great part of those of the Berar Rajah of Holkar and of Scindia. The administration in Oude, in the Nizam's territory, and latterly in Mysore, is execrable, and I believe the case is the same in all the protected states. Our protection has the effect at the same time of encouraging the rulers to abuse their power and of sheltering them from the just vengeance of the people, and if things take their course, will ultimately in every instance, bring the protected state under our direct dominion. I am not aware that the relation between our Government and the protected states has produced any specific effect upon our own subjects.

V. What have been the financial effects of the conquests, &c. ?

The three first heads under which this Inquiry is classed admit of being answered with accuracy by figured statements. I can only reply generally, that the uniform effect of conquest upon our finances has been to augment our revenues, but our charges in a still greater degree. Under the fourth head, I would reply that the risk of external hostility has been greatly decreased by our conquests, and, as far as I can judge, has not been increased by them at all. Since 1813, the risk of hostility from the Goorkhas and from the Maratta states has been destroyed. From the Burmese it has been lessened, and from any powers to the westward of our empire, though it has been brought more openly into view, (415.—VI.) x yet

yet in reality it has been rendered less formidable. The risk of internal hostility is only to be apprehended either from disaffection among our troops, or from alarm among the Hindoos that we mean to subvert their religion; and unless we blindly rush on our fate, I do not think the risk from either source is considerable. Partial resistance to our authority will continue to be excited by over-exaction or oppression; but it will continue to be withdrawn when these evils are redressed by a government having the welfare of the people at heart.

VII. How far have the principles of justice and expediency, &c.?

The principles of justice and expediency are not always coincident; but I believe that the politics of no empire are administered with greater regard to justice than that of India, and that what, upon the whole, is best is made the rule of our administration, as far as justice will allow.

VIII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army, &c.?

For my sentiments with regard to the strength and distribution of the army in India, I beg leave to refer to a paper of mine which was submitted to the Supreme Government towards the end of the year 1830, as accompanying a report of the Finance Committee upon the constitution of the Indian Government. I also concurred in a report by that Committee at the same period, on the strength and distribution of the Indian army; and to that paper I take the further liberty of referring. My persuasion is, that as long as there are three armies for India, instead of only one, and a general government, whose functions as a controlling authority are hampered and biased by attention to its own local concerns, the military resources of the empire can never be regulated with any tolerable regard to efficiency or economy.

VIII. & IX. How far have the civil establishments, &c.? How far have the residents, &c.?

I should be disposed to answer these two Questions in the affirmative.

X. How far has the existing system of Indian government, &c.?

This Question opens a very wide field of speculation. In the government of an empire so remote and so vast as that of all the nations and tribes from the Ganges and Indus to Capo Comorin, we must necessarily be contented with a more limited degree of vigour, constancy, promptitude, and unity of purpose, than if we were managing a province of moderate extent, lying immediately under our view. Extravagant expectations on that head would only lead to disappointment. I have had little means of closely observing the mechanism of the system of direction and control of Indian affairs in England, and am aware that, as part of the complicated scheme by which the constitution is preserved unimpaired by the power and influence of the executive authority, its merits cannot be duly appreciated by reference exclusively to the manner in which it operates upon the government of India. I doubt not but those who have possessed better opportunities of observation may have many practical improvements to suggest. In this case, as in others of the same kind, it would be wise to receive cautiously all speculative suggestions of improvement, and to make it the object of pursuit to find remedies only for evils and inconveniences which have actually been experienced. On that principle, the reform which seems to me most material is that the direction and control of Indian administration in England should not pass rapidly and frequently into new hands, by which vigour, constancy, promptitude and unity of purpose are all defeated. Beyond that suggestion, I am not sure that my experience, certainly very incomplete, would lead me to desire any further change in the system of English supremacy over the governments of India. In the system of Indian governments I am of opinion that essential changes are absolutely necessary. I beg leave to refer to the paper above noticed, which, as a member of the Finance Committee, I had occasion to lay before the Supreme Government at Calcutta. If the administration of India is to be conducted with efficiency, with consistency, and above all with economy, I consider it indispensable that the controlling authority in that country should be disengaged from the ordinary administrative functions of government, and should, as nearly as possible, bear the express image of the controlling authority in England. The besetting sin of our Indian governments is extravagance. They are extravagant because in India it is always popular to squander, and unpopular to retrench. The only persons who pass comments upon the financial measures of government there are its own European officers and their native followers, who live and thrive upon the public expenditure. Nobody feels or takes any interest in restricting it. In England the public (those by whom government are judged) consists of persons paying taxes: in India it consists of persons for whose support taxes are levied. Moreover, our revenues and establishments have always been on the increase, so that our governments have acquired the habit of being in the "giving vein," and indulge the habitual belief that if more be spent than formerly, there also is more to expend. Everything has been regarded as progressive: nothing as fixed and stationary. The annual accounts and estimates of our resources and charges also are on so vast a scale, and are so voluminous and intricate in their details, that governors and members of government seldom confide in these oracles unless when they utter propitious responses. They are besides less scrupulous about the outlay of thousands and tens of thousands from being used to part with lace and crowns.

There may be no adequate remedy for this consuming evil, because a large discretion must necessarily

necessarily be vested in the governors of possessions so immense and so remote. But the evil would be kept within bounds if the supreme authority in India were withdrawn from the injurious influence to which the local governments are exposed, and were restricted to the duty of control. The authorities in England are constantly lecturing the governments on their extravagance: if their delegate abroad had only like them to watch over the conduct of others, without the temptation to transgress on his own part, his prompt interposition would be likely to prove effectual. I would propose further that the officers of account and audit in India should be trained to a system of duty at the India House, and should hold their appointments and receive their instructions from the Court of Directors, so as to be a restraint upon Government in its natural turn to extravagance.

Another new provision has become necessary in consequence of a practice which has arisen out of the discovery of an oasis in the desert of each of the three presidencies. The Legislature has provided for the absence of the Governor-General from the seat of the Bengal government, but, until the discovery above alluded to, the Governor-General never absented himself unless on occasions of actual emergency. For the two subordinate presidencies there is no such provision, and formerly the Governor resided all the year round at the seat of government. Of late years, however, the Madras and Bombay Governors have passed the hottest months of the year at the cool stations which have been found out within the limits of their respective presidencies, and as no provision exists for the exercise of their authority during their absence, the functions of government have for that period been nearly in abeyance, and its affairs and the records of them have been thrown into great confusion. It would be open to serious objection to authorize the individual at the head of government to exercise its powers in his own person at a distance from his colleagues appointed to assist and control him, from his proper official advisers and from the public records, and therefore it seems necessary either to require him to remain at his post as formerly, or to supply the means of regularly carrying on the functions of government when he is absent.

From the foregoing imperfect manner in which I have endeavoured to meet the requisition which you have done me the honour of addressing to me, it will be sufficiently seen that the information I possess is of a loose and general nature, which the Commissioners for the Affairs of India may probably not deem such as they would be desirous of laying before the East India Committee as the evidence of a witness. I shall, however, hold myself ready either to attend before the Committee or not, as I may be further instructed by you at the proper period.

I have the honour to be, &c  
(signed) David Hill

#### Appendix No. 5.

LETTER from Major Olose to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Sir,

London, January 25, 1832

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the India Board, dated the 9th instant, and shall use my best endeavours to answer the inquiries contained in it, although I do not feel quite assured that it has been the intention of the Board to invite a reply to them in this form. The last renewal of the East India Company's charter having taken place in 1813, (the period from which it is the desire of the Board to obtain the information required of me,) and my departure from India having occurred early in 1824, there remains a period of 10 years to which those observations will be applicable, which it is my intention now to submit to you.

The increase of our Eastern dominions, in consequence of the Nepal war, of the subversion of the Poonah state, of the hostilities in which we were engaged with the state of Nagpore and with Holkar, and the consequent submission of those powers, besides some inconsiderable cessions made to us by Scindia, and a small addition to our possessions on the side of Guzerat, constitute the principal if not the entire augmentation of our territorial possessions which took place in the last 10 years of my stay in India.

2 Previously to the period now adverted to our relations with the states in question were of a diversified character, arising from the various circumstances that marked the commencement of our connection with them, from their local position and character, and from the relations which we found existing amongst them. With the state of Nepal we had been on terms of general amity only, holding but little communication with it, I believe, before the unfortunate border disputes which produced the last rupture. The peace of 1816 restored the good understanding that has since subsisted, nor is there, as far as I am aware, any likelihood of its being disturbed; but that the Nepalese should not sometimes look back with regret to the losses they suffered in the last war, or that they should do so without a desire to repair those losses at a fit opportunity, is a supposition that I should think cannot reasonably be entertained. Our relations with the other states differed essentially from those above noticed. Up to the end of 1802, when the treaty of Bassein was concluded between us and the Peishwa, our intercourse with them had been rather of a general nature, varying according to circumstances; but that treaty produced an entire change in them, and had ultimately the effect of reducing the Mahratta states, with the exception of Scindia's government, to a state of acknowledged dependence upon us. The treaties which we at intervals concluded with each of them invested us with a right of control in all matters affecting the general interests, and more especially over the political relations of each with

(445.—VI.)

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#### VI. POLITICAL, or FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 4.

Letter from  
David Hill, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 5.

Letter from  
Major Olose  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

the

the other powers of India. It was scarcely possible that the right now described could have been exercised without an occasional interference in the internal administration of the country, or that it should not sometimes lead to steps calculated to give offence or to hurt the feelings of the chiefs thus held in subordination; and more particularly will this appear to be the case if we consider the character and condition of the people we had to deal with; their reluctance, which yielded only to the necessity of their affairs, to enter into so unequal an alliance with us, and their consequent endeavours to elude those parts of the engagement which bore with any severity on themselves, whilst they required from us a scrupulous compliance with those articles of it from whence they hoped to derive advantage. These general remarks seem to me to indicate the cause that our alliances, whatever general advantages they have procured for us, should have been of so hollow and deceitful a character as seldom to have stood the test to which they have been exposed in trying circumstances. The natural unsteadiness of the native character, the want of foresight, and the desire to grasp at immediate advantages without considering remote consequences, are also some of the principal reasons to which may be ascribed the fall of many of the native states and the extraordinary rise of our political ascendancy in those countries.

3. As to the general effects of our alliances on the protected states, they have varied, as must have been expected, according to the disposition and character of the chiefs themselves; but in general terms I should say they had been to check the rapacity and misrule of the native governments on the one hand, and, in numerous instances, to control the spirit of insubordination and the predatory habits of their subjects on the other; thus contributing, on the whole, to introduce more regular government, and to improve the condition of the people at large. The declared principle of policy generally avowed by our government in India has been that of non-interference in the internal affairs of our allies, as far as was practicable consistently with the right derived from the letter of our engagements, and with such intervention as must necessarily occur from our occupying a military position in the heart of their country; and this leads me to the consideration of another topic in the letter now under reply, namely, the character and extent of the interference exercised by us in the affairs of the native governments. In the early period of Mahratta history, when the power of that nation was concentrated under one head, it is well known that the system prevailed of conferring large grants of land on the principal chiefs of the state, and of delegating to them extensive powers of government; those dependencies by degrees erected themselves into separate principalities, still however with that attachment to ancient forms and respect for hereditary power for which the Mahrattas are remarkable, acknowledging the nominal supremacy of the head of the state, whose authority they submitted to or evaded as suited the interests of the moment. This irregular state of things lasted, with regard to the principal states at least, so long only as there was wanting a power of sufficient strength and energy to reduce it to order, and it therefore assumed a new form accordingly as those states became connected with the British Government; but it was not possible wholly to obviate the many inconveniences that sprung from that origin, one of which had been to establish a confused intermixture of the possessions of the different chiefs, besides certain claims for tribute, that became the source of constant dispute, and not unfrequently of open conflict between them. The consequence of so much disorder was to impose upon us, when in the situation of a protecting power, the duty of arbitrating in disputes of that nature, and hence one principal source of the necessity of our interference. It is further to be observed, as another prominent cause of that necessity, that although the native governments placed themselves under our protection with seeming reluctance, yet they have evinced a disposition to turn the connection thus established with us to the best advantage, by employing the general impression of our power and promised assistance as a means of tyrannizing over their subjects and dependents. As we were bound by our treaties to maintain within its own limits the due authority of the state in alliance with us, it was indispensable, in order to prevent the abuse of the right thus conferred on the native government to claim our support, that we should strictly observe its conduct, and interpose to prevent such acts of misadministration as might produce serious discontent in the country and drive the inferior chiefs or other inhabitants into insurrection. The natural principles of justice, and the obvious expediency of exempting our troops from a harassing and unnecessary warfare, have thus established not only the policy but the necessity of interfering to a certain extent; but the right to interfere, and perhaps also the necessity of our doing so, must, I presume, be much stronger with regard to those states which have become tributary to us, and have bound themselves to pay us in some cases a fixed sum, but in others a certain proportion of the revenue. The effect of these arrangements may in time be to compel us to take measures against the attempts that will be made to defraud us of the share to which we are entitled, and in the end to lead to more extensive consequences.

It will be evident that, in a country of so great an extent, in many instances an answer to references made to the supreme British authority by its agents cannot be expected in less time than a month. The degree to which the power above adverted to is exercised, and the manner in which it is used, must very much depend, not only on local circumstances and on the disposition and conduct of the native governments, but also on the temper, character, and discretion of the British resident.

The usual efforts of our residents have, under the orders of the Supreme Government, been directed to the prevention of violence and injustice, as well as to the maintenance of the just authority of the governments to which they have been deputed, and accordingly as those endeavours have been generally successful or otherwise have the people benefited or been injured by our influence; since in those cases where our interference has not

not been successful to a good purpose, it was almost sure of being made by the native authorities available for a bad one.

4. This seems the proper place to consider the 8th and 9th heads of inquiry in the letter from the India Board, and to point out what checks have appeared to me to exist to prevent any great abuse of the powers with which it has been shown that our political residents have of necessity been invested. These, I conceive, are to be found in the practice, always observed, of sending to Government a report in writing of every transaction, so that any omission or incongruity in the correspondence of the resident would be open to detection. Not only are those reports sent to the Supreme Government, but it has also been enjoined that copies of them shall be sent to the other residents, so that those officers also are kept minutely informed of the state of public affairs, and, besides being guided by the reports of the country, would easily observe discrepancies, if such existed. It is likewise to be observed that several of the native chiefs have, and all might have, vakeels or agents residing at our seat of government and in communication with our public officers; to which should be added, that the chiefs are not debarred from the liberty of addressing themselves by letter to the Governor-General, and that they have often availed themselves of that mode of communicating their sentiments.

In conclusion, I may observe on this head, that the checks above enumerated, added to the certain knowledge our officers have that all matters of importance are submitted to the authorities in England, together with what is to be expected from the tone of mind possessed by men of liberal education, have rarely proved insufficient guards against malversation or the unworthy authority of their influence. Considering the authority vested in the resident, it has been judged expedient by the Supreme Government that his establishment should be on a scale commensurate with the importance of his office, and with the station that he occupies in the observation of the public; nor do I believe that a more severe economy could well have been observed, consistently with the efficient performance by the resident of the duties expected from him, in a country especially where natives of rank are accustomed to indulge in expensive pageantry, and where the importance of public station is very apt to be estimated by the liberality and style of expense which accompany it, it will easily be imagined that the authority of the resident might be greatly impaired, and his influence diminished were he to appear in a style much inferior to the capability of those public officers whose conduct he might so often be required to control.

But the allowances granted to the residents, though sufficiently liberal, are subject to the check imposed by a revision of their accounts every month. A certain sum is fixed, which they are not permitted to exceed; and even within that amount it is the duty of the auditor of accounts at the seat of government to see that no unauthorized or exceptionable charges are included. Should it be thought necessary to consider of other securities besides those above stated, I leave it to be considered what the probable effect would be of removing the residents more frequently than has been usual from one native court to another, by which means the system pursued by each individual would obtain greater notoriety, and would consequently be somewhat more under the control of public opinion.

5. I purposely abstain from noticing in any detail the extent of our acquisitions in territory or in revenue since 1813, because the course of my experience did not lead to my obtaining more than a very general knowledge on those subjects, and because any statement that I could now give must fall infinitely short, in point of correctness and authenticity, of the official documents to be found amongst the public records of the government.

A review of those possessions, with the increase that we had derived in the 12 years immediately preceding, will at once show the extraordinary and rapid strides that we have made towards obtaining a dominion over the whole of India; not, as has often with truth been observed, from any systematic plan or premeditated scheme of conquest, but from the ordinary effects to be expected, where a system of government, powerful in the elements that constitute strength and stability, comes in contact with one of the feeblest description, disunited in all its parts, and conducted by a people, who, if not wholly devoid of enterprise and resources, have yet, from a variety of moral causes, been destitute of the skill necessary for the successful employment of them. It would probably, or it may with more truth, perhaps, be said that it would certainly, have tended to the consolidation of our power in India, had it been marked by a more slow and gradual progress, so as to have allowed time for the new system of government introduced by us to take deep root in one part of the country before it was extended to another, and to have afforded greater opportunities for the full development of its effects, and the correction of its errors; but whatever defects may be discovered in some of its details, it scarcely admits of a doubt that the principles of justice upon which it is founded must ever give it the preference, at least when abstractedly considered, over the loose and irregular system which it has supplanted. I say, "when abstractedly considered," because however sound or incontrovertible a system of government may be in theory, it may require a very complex union of circumstances to reconcile a people to it to whom it is, in its principle and spirit, perfectly new. Accordingly I should conceive, from such observations as I have made, that in those parts of India, which have been the longest subject to our rule there is the least desire of change, whilst in those provinces in which we have not been so long established there is the greatest dislike of our authority. In those parts of the country, however, where our system of government is known only by report, and of course is but imperfectly understood, individuals, contrasting the security of our subjects with the insecurity in which they live themselves, have often been known to express a wish to live under our rule, provided they could be exempt from the jurisdiction of our courts of justice. This feeling is to be

imp... first place, to the respect that is paid to ancient usage and to established forms; and in the next, to our maxim, so foreign to all their habits and opinions, "that all are equal in the eye of the law," and our consequent practice of excluding from our courts that consideration for individuals and those forms of respect according to the various grades in society, which are carried by the people of India in general to an extent known only in eastern nations.

6. Great as the importance must ever have been of a careful civil administration in our Indian possessions, it has been greatly augmented of late years by the vast increase of the population now subject to us. The duties I had to perform were not of a description to make me practically acquainted with the details of our civil government; but I may be allowed to observe, that the evil consequences of trying to adapt to India those forms of internal government which are suited to the inhabitants of Europe seem at length to be well understood, and to have led to a change of our system, in legislating for some of our late acquisitions, which is likely to produce the most important and beneficial results, both in improving the condition of our new subjects and in imparting to our rule a certain degree of popularity, which cannot fail, I should think, to increase its stability, and to enlarge our power of being useful to the people. I allude more particularly to the form of government that has been established in the Poonah territories, in which greater regard has been paid to the habits of the people and to the usages we found already existing than had in former instances been usual; and I mean, in the few remarks I have now offered, to advert also to the enlightened views which have of late prevailed, so far as to diminish, I think, the great source of unpopularity to our government, by admitting natives of respectability to a share in the civil administration, from which they formerly were, if not wholly, in a great degree excluded.

7. But although I am of opinion that too great attention cannot be bestowed on our civil administration in India, I also think it would be extremely dangerous to underestimate the necessity of our maintaining a large and efficient military force in this country.

It would be hazardous to affirm, even excluding all idea of future wars with those states which still retain a shadow of independence, that our government is so popular amongst our own subjects as to justify our reliance in the permanency of their attachment, and if to this be added the recollection that the country which we may be said to have the military occupation includes 20 degrees of latitude, and, though of very unequal breadth, rather more than 20 degrees of longitude in its widest part; that in this large space is a mixed population of various classes, some of which are of an independent, unruly, and intractable character, and few or none of which can be very strongly disposed in our favour, it will appear how essential a powerful army is to the preservation of our dominion and that a force which, when I was in India, fell little short, I believe, (including the King's troops there), of 250,000 men, was not more than adequate to the efficient protection of our widely-extended interests. The latest important transactions of a political nature that occurred before I left India brought us into more immediate contact than formerly with the Ranjpoot states to the west and north-west. Excepting, perhaps, some part of the Mahomedan population of our own territories and those of our allies, the Ranjpoot tribes may be considered the most high-spirited, independent, and warlike of the inhabitants of India; but as the different governments to which they are subject have generally been much divided within themselves, and distracted by violence and faction, the spirit of disunion may in their case, as it has in that of the other native states, be one of our best securities against a combination to oppose our power. That security, however, is rendered much more perfect by the judicious positions occupied by several divisions of our troops, so that even partial insurrections might there, as in most other parts of the country, be almost instantly met by a force sufficient to quell them. As long, therefore, as our army is kept up to its full strength, there seems little to apprehend either from the designs of foreign enemies or from internal commotion. The state of the army, as respects its equipment and the discipline of the men, when under the immediate inspection of their officers, I should say was such as to render it adequate to any service likely to be required of it, the only defect I would point out being the insufficiency in point of number of the European officers. The complement of officers to a native regiment had for years past been little else than nominal, owing to the necessity the government was under of withdrawing many of them from regimental duty, there being no distinct sources from whence men of capacity and experience can be taken to supply the other wants of the service. So very material a defect would best be remedied, I conceive, by making a suitable addition to the complement of regimental officers. The present strength of the European force sent out from this country may be fully sufficient in ordinary times, but should a prospect ever open of external war on a large scale, a considerable addition to it would seem almost indispensable. In time of war very heavy duties have fallen on that description of force, and as the scene of our operations becomes enlarged, the difficulty may, without a further augmentation, be very great of ensuring its assistance in time of need, a matter of no small moment, considering the degree of confidence and energy which the presence of such a body of troops always communicates to the army of which it forms a part in that country.

8. I am aware of the paramount necessity, in all questions of this sort, of considering the state of our finances, a subject, however, on which I regret to say that I can offer to the Board no information or opinion deserving its attention; neither is it in my power to give the Board any useful information on the only remaining topic in your letter of the 9th instant, to which I now propose to advert, that is to say, the 10th, or last in order, which respects the general efficiency of the system both abroad and at home by which our Eastern

possessions are governed or controlled. Those individuals who have been employed in the higher departments of the government must, of course, from the opportunities they have had of minute observation, be much better qualified than I can pretend to be to form just opinions on that important branch of the inquiry. With regard to the government of India I shall therefore confine myself to the remark, that the seat of government seems to me much too remote to admit of its exercising a sufficiently vigilant superintendence and control over our extensive possessions and interests that lie to the westward of Calcutta. Authority must be delegated for that purpose, and there may in time be some danger lest the chain of responsibility in being thus made longer may also become weaker. I am not prepared to offer any particular suggestions concerning the home government, the present system of which I think sufficiently competent for the degree of control that ought to be exercised over the distant government of India; but although in its general outline it may not, according to my judgment, require alteration, I nevertheless perfectly concur in the opinion, very generally entertained, I believe, amongst those who are acquainted with Indian affairs, that the constitution of the Court of Directors as a body admits of improvement, and that some change should be introduced, by which the qualifications of those who are admitted into it should have greater scope allowed them, and be thus rendered more efficient for the good of the service. I would, in the last place, venture to suggest the advantage that might be expected to result from a recurrence to the former practice of occasionally laying before Parliament a general statement of Indian affairs and finance. It would serve the purpose of drawing the public attention in this country to the state of India, and thus, besides operating as a check against misgovernment, would act as a powerful stimulus to the administration abroad, and to all the public functionaries employed under it.

This letter having now drawn to much greater length than was originally intended, I shall bring it to a close, only regretting my inability to reply in a more full and satisfactory manner to the many important heads of inquiry which have been suggested in the communication I have had the honour to receive from you.

I have the honour, &c.  
(signed) R. H. Close.

#### Appendix, No. 6.

LETTER from Colonel Baillie to T. Hyle Villiers, Esq

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 9th instant, announcing the intention of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East India Committee of the House of Commons, and requiring such information and opinions as I may be enabled to offer on certain questions connected with the state of our political relations in the East.

2 In proceeding to comply with the desire of the Board of Commissioners to the utmost extent of my power, consistently with my other avocations, I deem it proper to premise, that the period of my residence in India having terminated with the year 1815, I cannot offer any information, nor submit any opinion founded on my personal knowledge or experience subsequent to that year, or having reference to circumstances or events supervening to the second year of the Company's present charter.

3. The several questions or heads of inquiry proposed in your official letter shall be recapitulated in their order, and such answers as occur to me for the present shall be stated as briefly as possible, and without entering into any details.

#### I. What new acquisitions of territory, &c.?

A tabular statement of the several treaties now subsisting between the East India Company and the several Asiatic states has been prepared, or is in the course of preparation, at the India House, which will exhibit at one view every acquisition of territory, tribute or pecuniary subsidy since the date of the present charter.

#### II. What is the actual condition of our relations with the several states?

The actual state of those relations may be ascertained to a certain degree by a reference to the provisions of the several treaties, a complete collection of which is in preparation at the India House, and will be laid before the Committee; but a memorandum descriptive of the present state of our political relations has been recently prepared in the Examiner's Office, and will, in a still more perfect state, I understand, be submitted to the Board. It is, however, necessary to observe, that some changes may have lately taken place in our relations with particular states, a knowledge of which can only be attained by a perusal of the secret records of the Company, to which I have not had access; and for myself, I may take this occasion of stating that all the information which I possess is limited to the sovereignty of Oude, and to the petty states of the province of Bundelcund, with which alone I was officially connected during the period of my residence in India.

#### III. What is the amount of military force required in each instance?

The amount of military force to be employed with each particular state was originally regulated

VI.  
POLITICAL  
OR  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 5.

Letter from  
Major Close  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 6.

Letter from  
Colonel Baillie  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.



Appendix, No. 6.

Letter from  
Colonel Baillie  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

regulated in every instance, as I believe, by an express provision of treaty, and may be ascertained by a reference to the treaty.

At the same time there is reason to infer, that the course of political and military events supervenient to the dates of those treaties, and the altered position of certain states, with relation to the general frontier, as extended by conquest or otherwise, has admitted of a considerable reduction of the amount of force in some of the interior states, proceeding either on express agreement or on the tacit consent of the parties, for the full explanation of which the political records of the Government may be consulted. In one instance, namely, that of the kingdom of Oude, it consists with my own knowledge that the amount of force has been materially diminished since the date of the treaty of Cession in 1804.

IV. What is the character, and what the extent of interference?

To this it may be answered, in the first place, that the character of our interference in the general concerns of each of our allies, as originally settled by treaty is different in different states, and accordant with the relative degree of power and independence possessed by those states at the commencement of their alliance with the Company, as may be seen by a perusal of the treaties; but that the extent and even the original character of our interference has been, in many instances, materially and unavoidably altered by the course of events in India, is a fact which cannot be denied, and may be very easily ascertained for.

Of the present real character and extent of the interference exercised by us in the affairs of protected states, I would say, that it is absolute and universal as regards their external and political concerns. They cannot enter into alliances nor levy any troops, nor employ European servants of any nation without the consent of our government, and their correspondence with each other is subjected to the approbation of our functionaries; but all this is provided for by treaty, and the grounds of the provision must be evident to all who are conversant with Indian affairs.

With regard again to the internal government of the states, and the management of their domestic concerns, I should say, that, while the original principle and general rule of our government was unquestionably non-interference, except by friendly advice when solicited, we have been gradually led by a train of unavoidable events to exercise a degree of internal interference in the affairs of some of our allies, exceeding perhaps the original terms of the alliance and the general rule of the government, as prescribed and repeatedly enjoined by the home authorities, and especially by the Court of Directors.

At the same time, it may safely be affirmed that unnecessary interference, with a view to self-aggrandizement, has never been the object of our governments abroad, and that in almost every instance of a contrary nature which can be cited, the principles of international law, and the legitimate objects of maintaining the general tranquillity and protecting our own subjects and dominions, will be found to justify the extent of interference which has been exercised.

On the subject of non-interference in the affairs of our allied states a number of despatches have been framed and forwarded at different times by the Court of Directors to the Supreme Government of India, copies of all which may be seen in the records, and of which the more material will be laid before the Committee.

V. What is the nature of the duties of political residents, &c.?

The nature of the duties of political residents and agents at the courts of our allied states is generally regulated by treaty, and differs in character and importance according to the terms of the alliance and the relative powers of the states.

As an example in my own case, I should say, that it was my duty to take cognizance of all the political transactions of the government to which I was accredited, and to guard against the adoption of any measure tending to infringe its political relations with our government; to watch over all its proceedings; to observe the state and condition of its subjects and dominions, to report every event or occurrence of moment, and in all practicable cases to apply for and await the instructions of government regarding these occurrences, to receive and comply with the requisitions of the allied sovereign for aid or advice on emergency, to direct and superintend the employment of British troops in his dominions when their services were required for the purpose either of external defence or of maintaining internal tranquillity, by suppressing disaffection or rebellion, and to attend to a variety of matters of detail which it is unnecessary and impossible here to enumerate.

VI. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are anticipated, &c.?

This is purely a matter of opinion, and the question is of such importance, and of so complicated a nature, that it would require a volume of historical and political disquisition to explain the grounds on which a just opinion could be formed of it.

Without entering at all on the extensive field of discussion which this inquiry would suggest, I would say generally, that the natural effects of alliances such as ours with the several states of India, that is, of offensive and defensive engagements between paramount or powerful, and weak or subordinate states, so closely connected with each other, must be the gradual depression and ultimate subversion of the power of the one and the substitution of the other in its stead.

That such has been, in several instances, the effect of our progressive power in India, cannot with truth be denied; and that such will be the ultimate, though I trust, the long protracted

protracted result of our connection with the protected states, if we maintain our present position, which to be maintained, must still be progressive, I entertain a confident belief.

As to the effect of this result on the general condition of the people, I should say that it must be greatly to their advantage, inasmuch as it never, I believe, has been doubted that the condition of the Company's subjects in India is preferable in every respect to that of those of the best governed of all the other states of the Peninsula.

Appendix, No. 6.

Letter from  
Colonel Baillie  
to  
T. H. Viltre, Esq

#### VII. What have been the financial effects?

For authentic and particular information under this head of inquiry, I refer to the Financial Accounts which were laid before Parliament in February 1830. That an increase of gross revenue has arisen by the acquisition of territory and tribute is, I believe, certain, but that a proportionate increase upon the whole in the charges of administration has been produced is, I should think, speaking from recollection, equally unquestionable. With regard to the military charge, a return exhibiting the whole number of King's and Company's troops serving in India during all the years from 1793 has been prepared by the military secretary, from which it appears, and is worthy of remark, that while all our military establishments have been raised at different periods during the administration of Lords Wellesley, Minto, Hastings, and Amherst, to double or more than double the number maintained in the year above stated, the actual number which will remain, when the reductions recently ordered shall be carried into complete effect, namely, at the close of the ensuing year, will be less by several thousand men than the amount of our military force at the commencement of the present charter in the year 1813.

With regard to the risk of external or internal hostility, as affected by our conquests, and the changes and enlargements of our political relations in India, I would observe, as a matter of opinion, that while every extension of empire in the course of human events may be considered as bringing with it the seeds of dismemberment and decay, there is no particular event in my present contemplation, or consistent with my knowledge, that would lead me to apprehend increased or extraordinary risk from our recent conquests in India, or the extension of our political relations.

#### VIII. How far have the principles of justice, &c.?

I am not aware of any recent instance of importance in which the principles of public justice have been departed from on grounds of doubtful expediency, or without a strong plea of political necessity, with a view to the maintenance of our own power or the protection of our subjects and dominions.

At the same time I am ready to admit that there have been cases of demand from some of our allies, and of interference in their internal concerns, which I should feel it difficult to justify, although the grounds of such demand and interference were considered to be satisfactory at the time by far higher authorities and more competent judges than myself.

#### VII. How far have the strength and distribution of our armies, &c.?

This question is purely of a military nature, and one on which the habits of my public life, being different from my original profession, and early studies and duties, should perhaps preclude me from pronouncing an opinion. It may however be inferred, from the high military character and eminent professional talents of the several distinguished officers who have commanded our armies in India, and uniformly led them to victory, aided too by the extensive geographical and local knowledge of the officers of the general staff, that the strength and distribution of the forces at the several presidencies have been generally well adapted to the various changes and events which have occurred, and to the position, power, and circumstances of the states to which they were opposed, and of the times which called forth their exertions.

As exceptions to this general remark, the commencement and early progress of the Nepaul and Burmese wars might perhaps, without injustice, be cited, but on these particular instances the records are sufficiently explicit, and I refrain from further remarks.

#### VIII. How far have the civil establishments of the several residencies, &c.?

They have generally, in as far as consists with my knowledge, been regulated in such a manner as to combine efficiency with economy, though in some instances economy has been carried too far, and in others the number of assistants has been, I think, greater than was necessary.

#### IX. How far have the residents and agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

For the answer to this question, I would refer you to my description already given of the duties of residents and agents. As they are bound to report every event or occurrence of moment, and in all practicable cases to await the instructions of the Government for their guidance, the absence of necessary check can only proceed from a gross dereliction of duty by the resident or the Governor, or both.

In every instance of the indispensable exercise of his own judgment or discretion on emergency, the resident immediately reports his proceedings to the Government, and from

the readiness of communication with the presidency, his errors, if committed, may be remedied before any serious injury can arise. Upon the whole, though I possess a very limited knowledge of the rules and checks of European diplomacy and of the practices of European ambassadors, I will venture to assert that, considering the great number of political functionaries employed by the British Government in India, as few instances of departure from the strict line of duty and integrity, and as many of able and successful diplomacy will be found in the history of the Company's political administration, as in that of any European Government.

X. How far has the existing system of Indian government, &c. ?

This last is the most difficult question contained in your official communication. It is one on which the Legislature must finally decide, after considering all the evidence before it, and one on which I could wish to decline pronouncing any opinion.

Devonshire-place,  
27 Jan. 1832.

I have the honour to be, &c.  
(signed) J. Baillie.

Appendix, No. 7.

LETTER from Frank Wilder, Esq. to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq

Sir,

Appendix, No. 7.  
Letter from  
F. Wilder, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

In reply to your letter of the 7th ultimo, intimating to me the intention of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East India Committee on the subject of our external and internal political relations in the East, and requesting any information I might be able to afford regarding the states which my course of service had made me acquainted with, I have now the honour to state as follows:

I. What new acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1813?

As I was not appointed a political resident till 1827, nearly 10 years after the Nepal and Pindary wars were concluded, and was not engaged in any of the operations which led to the acquisitions made during those wars, I have no further acquaintance with the events of that period than what is known to all the world, and is now a matter of history.

I went out to India in 1807, and, excepting a short time at Moradabad in the commencement of my career, was employed at Dibblee, Ajmere, Saugor, and Nagpore; but, both at Dibblee and Ajmere, (at which latter place, from the convenience of position, the states of Joudhpoor, Jesselmere, and Kishengurh were placed in communication with me,) my duties were quite of a subordinate nature, having been wholly under the orders of the different presidents. I had not an independent charge until I was appointed, in 1825, Governor-General's agent at Saugor, where I only remained one year; and, in fact, I had no political employment of any importance until I succeeded to the residency at Nagpore in 1827, which I quitted again to return to England at the close of 1829. Even at Nagpore, with exception of some modifications in the late treaty which were negotiated through me just before I left that residency, my functions were simply those of carrying into execution the arrangements framed by my predecessor, Mr. Jenkins, for transferring to the young Rajah the management of his country on coming of age. I deem it right to enter into this detail, because I feel that my evidence before the East India Committee, with the very slender information I possess, would only be uselessly taking up their time, when there are so many others now at home who were personally employed in settling the new acquisitions of territory to which your letter refers, and who consequently must be far better qualified to afford the particulars required. I should state further, that on account of ill health I left India the moment I had completed 22 years' residence, and that not intending to return, or ever expecting to be called upon for my evidence or opinions on any matters connected with my course of service there, I have not brought home with me a single paper or document of any description, so that any testimony I could give must be entirely from general recollection.

II. What is the actual condition of our relations with the several states?

The general basis of our alliances is a virtual acknowledgment of the Company's supremacy, affording military aid on requisition, according to means, granting our protection in return, on the usual condition of not forming any new connections with other powers, and submitting external disputes to our arbitration; but those terms vary, of course, according to local circumstances. Joudhpoor, Jesselmere, and Kishengurh may be considered tributary to or under the protection of the British Government, and the alliance with Nagpore is of a subsidiary nature. Joudhpoor and Nagpore are likewise bound to furnish contingents of horse when called upon, the former 1,500 and the latter 1,000, and these are the only states I have any acquaintance with.

III. What

III. What is the amount of military force required in each instance, whether,

1. By express stipulation?

The military force which was required for the states with which my course of service brought me in contact was as follows:

At Nagpore a subsidiary force is kept up, as stipulated by treaty, and consisted, when I came away, of one regiment European infantry, four regiments native infantry, one of cavalry, and some horse and foot artillery; but the strength of the force is left always to our discretion.

2. By the ordinary effect of our obligations?

Joudhpoor, Jesselmere, and Kishengurh we are bound to protect from all external enemies; but no extra force is maintained for those states, the troops stationed at Nussurabad (principally, I believe, if not entirely, on account of Jeypoor) being found sufficient for all purposes.

Or, 3. As a security against extraordinary risk?

Saugor is the head-quarters of a division of the army, and a force is cantoned there for service in that neighbourhood, preserving at the same time the line of communication with our other military posts.

IV. What is the character, and what the extent, of interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the protected states?

The degree of interference exercised by us in the affairs of the protected states must always depend on the character of the prince and the circumstances of the state at the time; but wherever I have been employed, no interference whatever has been used, either in the selection of the ministers, management of the country, or any other internal matters.

1. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents?

The duty of a political resident and agent is to keep himself informed of everything that passes at the court to which he is accredited, and to report the same to Government, to maintain unimpaired the relations of amity and good understanding between the two powers, by timely interposing when occurrence arises at variance with the terms of the alliance, and to be the channel of communication on all occasions.

2. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated, on the interests of the protected princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us, as heretofore acted upon?

I think that benefits have resulted to the native powers as well as to ourselves from the relation in which they now stand towards us. The prince, being freed from all apprehension of external danger, has been able to turn his mind to the internal affairs of his dominions, while his people, in the enjoyment of this perfect security from foreign invasion, have given themselves more to agriculture and commerce. This improved state of things has necessarily led to an increased intercourse with the British territories, and our subjects likewise have been partakers of the benefits arising from it.

I can only speak of the states of which I have a knowledge.

V. What have been the financial effects of the conquests, and of the changes or enlargement of our political relations which have been made since 1813? To be exhibited under the following heads.—

1. Increased or decreased revenue or tribute.

No revenue or tribute is exacted from Jesselmere or Kishengurh; and though a sum of one lac and 8,000 rupees is paid yearly into our treasury by Joudhpoor, the amount is always accounted for to Scindia, agreeably to the treaty with that prince. However, an annual subsidy of eight lacs, in commutation for the *auxiliary* force heretofore kept up at Nagpore, has lately been obtained from that state, in addition to the former cession of the Jubbulpore territories, for the maintenance of the *subsidiary* force there, and about eight lacs more are received from Saugor and Hutta: but the increased charges for troops stationed in those districts for their protection, together with the civil establishments, probably absorb the whole amount.

2. Increased or decreased charge of civil administration

The increase of our territories since 1813, has of course rendered requisite an increase of civil establishments, but those establishments have been paid out of the revenues derived from those territories.

3. Increased or decreased appropriation of military force

An increased appropriation of military force was required in the different quarters I was stationed; but regarding the arrangements of the army I am necessarily quite ignorant, and know not what troops have been raised exclusively on this account, or what numbers have been furnished from other stations in our possession before.

Appendix, No. 7.

Letter from  
F. Wilder, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

A. Increased or decreased risk of external or internal hostility.

I believe the effect of the conquests, and the enlargement of our political relations since 1813, have undoubtedly diminished the risk both of internal and external hostility; for, as there is now no state remaining of any importance within the British frontier, there is in consequence less cause for alarm internally; and for the same reason of there being no longer any power within capable of affording assistance to foreign foes, there is less danger of hostility from without.

VII. How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

During the period I was in the East no wars were entered into that were not rendered unavoidable by the misconduct or aggression of the native rulers. From the peculiar nature of our political position there, the extension of our conquest has hitherto always led to a further collision with other powers; but now that the whole peninsula of India has come under our control or influence, I think that peace and tranquillity may be considered to be permanently established.

VIII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political relations, and to their actual condition with reference to the forces belonging to the native states on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to contend?

Of the general details of the Indian army I am wholly unacquainted; but wherever I had an opportunity of forming a judgment, the distribution appeared to me to be regulated always with reference to the degree of aid or hostility that might be expected from the changes in our political relations.

IX. How far have the civil establishments at the several residencies and agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

The civil establishments at the different residencies and agencies to which I have been attached have been framed with every regard to economy, combining at the same time efficiency and respectability.

X. How far have the residents and agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

The residents and agents are subjected to every possible check, as no charge, however trivial, is allowed to be made without being first submitted for the approval and sanction of government. To ensure a rigid observance of this rule, no payment is ever made from any treasury that has not undergone examination at the audit-office, and no account is ever passed in that office unless accompanied by the requisite vouchers.

XI. How has the existing system of Indian government or home direction and control been successful, or calculated to succeed in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude, and unity of purpose in the several gradations of government, direction, control or influence, and (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the home or of the Indian government?

Judging from the increasing prosperity of the country, as well as the happiness and contentment of the people wherever our rule or influence has extended, I should say that the existing system works extremely well. Some slight changes might perhaps be beneficial both in the constitution of the Indian and the home governments; but I do not feel myself competent to offer an opinion on either of these points, as in regard to the former I have only been employed in one branch of the service (the political), and with respect to the latter, I really know not what degree of interference is exercised by the Board of Control, never having belonged to any of the offices at the presidency, where alone access could be had to any records affording such information.

I have the honour to be, &c

20, Bruton-street,  
14 Feb. 1832.

(signed) Frank Wilder.

Appendix, No. 8.

LETTER from John Crawford, Esq. to Thomas Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Sir,

Appendix, No. 8.

Letter from  
J. Crawford, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

In answer to your letter of the 9th January, I have the honour to submit to the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India a statement of my sentiments and views on the subject of our political relations with the native states of India. These may be divided into six classes. 1st, Independent states distant from the British territory, such as China, Cochin China, Siam, and Persia; 2d, States in the immediate neighbourhood of the British dominions, but

but of which the princes exercise independent sovereignty, with little or no interference on the part of the British Government, such as Ava, Nepal, Lahore, and Cabul, 3d, Small independent states distant from the British possessions, and having no other than commercial relations with the Indian government, such as the Imam of Muscat and other petty states on the shores of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs; 4th, States whose possessions are intermingled with the British, commonly called, in the language of Indian diplomacy, "Protected States," and within which nearly the whole military power, and, through our resident diplomatic agents, no inconsiderable share of the civil, is exercised, 5th, Petty states intermingled with the British possessions, of which the princes exercise the sovereignty, because politically too inconsiderable to have called for our interference, such as the Rohilla, chief of Raupoor, and a great number of petty chiefs widely spread throughout the north-west and south of India, usually known under the name of Independent Jaghirdars; and, 6th, More pensionaries of the British Government without territory, or with very little, such as the Mogul, Nabob of Arcot, the Rajah of Tanjore, and the Peishwah.

Upon each of these classes I shall offer some brief remarks; but before doing so it will be proper to state what personal opportunities I have enjoyed of forming a judgment upon the various important questions on which my opinions have been called for. From 1811 to 1817 I served as a civil officer of the government of Java, chiefly as political resident at the court of one of the native princes. This prince, the sultan of Java, had a fertile territory, and about a million and a half of subjects. I negotiated a treaty with this chief in 1812, which was ratified by the local government, and eventually by the Governor-general. In the affairs of his government we exercised, during our possession of Java, the same kind of interference which we exercise in the administrations of Hyderabad, Oude, and Mysore, or the Guicowar. The Dutch government had done the same thing before us, and the Netherlands government has continued to do so to the present day. After a quarrel with him, which followed almost immediately on the conquest of the island, and which arose out of a desire to throw off the yoke of the European supremacy, which terminated in hostilities, tranquillity was afterwards tolerably maintained during our remaining occupation of the island. It was this same interference, perhaps more indirectly exercised on the part of the Netherlands government, which produced the formidable insurrection which broke out in 1824, and which continued to desolate some of the finest provinces of the island for six years. The same meddling, indeed, with the other native princes of Java, had, on previous occasions, produced exactly similar effects. It would be irrelevant to add anything further upon this point, since the subject has long ceased to be one in which we are directly interested.

In 1821 I was sent by the Governor-general of India on a mission to Siam and Cochin China. The object, on this occasion, was purely commercial; and as the particulars are before the Board and the public, I need not further refer to them. From 1823 to 1825, inclusive, I was charged with the civil administration of Singapore, and at the same time held the office of political agent to the Governor-general for the native states of the Malay islands. In this situation I corresponded with many of the native princes of Borneo, Sumatra, and Celebes, as well as with some of the public officers of the Siamese and Cochin-Chinese governments, and negotiated a treaty with the princes of Johore for the sovereignty and property of the island of Singapore, the particulars of which I shall, in the sequel of this letter, refer to. In 1826 and 1827 I was employed, first, in the civil administration of Pegu, and eventually as envoy to the court of Ava, in which latter capacity I negotiated a treaty, which, as it was for the most part of a commercial nature, it is not necessary to make further allusion to.

The Board of Commissioners will perceive, from this short recital of my services, that I am not competent, from personal knowledge, to speak with any authority on some of the most essential points connected with the relations in which we stand towards the native princes of India. The opinions which I shall offer in regard to these are, therefore, chiefly founded on a careful perusal of those public documents which, for the most part, have been laid before Parliament in considerable detail, and to a consideration of which I shall endeavour to bring the analogies of my own immediate experience to bear.

With respect to the first class of native, or more correctly, of Asiatic states, consisting of China, Cochin-China, Siam, and Persia, it is my clear and distinct opinion, that all our diplomatic intercourse with those should emanate from the Crown, and not from the delegated authority of the Governor-general of India. On this subject I can speak with confidence, having experienced great obstacles in Siam, Cochin-China, and even in Ava, within a few months after the successful termination of hostilities with that state, in consequence of not being accredited by the Sovereign, a point respecting which I found every one of these states equally jealous and tenacious. The court of Persia is known to have objected, on more than one occasion, to receiving an agent from the Governor-general, and to be solicitous for a direct communication with the Sovereign, and as to China, the impropriety of attempting any political correspondence between that state and the local government of India has always appeared so obvious that it has not even been attempted. Our relations with the states in question, not even excepting Persia, must, as it appears to me, be always no other than commercial. An occasional friendly correspondence with them, emanating from the Crown, will not be without its value, in maintaining or extending our commercial intercourse, while it is certain that a correspondence with the Governor-general can have no other effect than that of wounding the vanity or exciting the fears or jealousy of proud and barbarous governments.

With respect to the second class of princes, or those exercising independent sovereignty, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the British dominions, our relations are with those

Appendix, No. 8.

Letter from  
J. Crawford, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Return of all Civil  
Offices and Estab-  
lishments, 1830.

Treaties with Cabul  
and Amers of  
Scind, 1809

political, as well as commercial, and they must of necessity be maintained through the direct agency of the Governor-general only. I presume to think, however, that the less we interfere in their internal affairs the better. Political residents are at present maintained by us, both at Ava and Nepal, in virtue of treaties with these courts. I confess I am unable to discover any utility in these agencies. The relations subsisting between the British Government and these states are those of a powerful nation with weak and vanquished allies. It is always in the power of the British Government, in a campaign of a few months, to overthrow either state, and it is now sufficiently ascertained that it was only our ignorance of the means of setting about it, an ignorance which no longer exists, which made our first attempts to conquer them tardy and expensive. The presence of a British diplomatic agent under the circumstances of our political connection, either with Ava or Nepal, seems to me more likely to be the source of irritation than of conciliation. All useful diplomatic functions may be performed far more quietly, and with equal efficiency, by the nearest civil or military functionary on the frontier; and if occasion should require it, a special envoy might be deputed, a measure which, as being in accordance with Eastern usage, would be considered complimentary, while the presence of a resident agent is notoriously viewed by the Indian princes as a mark of vassalage or thralldom. The charges of the residency of Nepal, exclusive of the military escort, amount, according to the returns made to Parliament, to about 10,000*l.* per annum. If the charges of the residency of Ava be of the same amount, and the relative importance of the parties does not seem to imply that it ought to be less, a saving of 20,000*l.* per annum might be effected, without the smallest detriment to the public service, by the abolition of these two residencies.

Our political connection with Cabul and the Ameers of Scind, as far as can be collected from the printed treaties, appears to have originated in the apprehension of an invasion of the French, who had formed an alliance, having this object in view, with the court of Persia. The fears which led to these arrangements were perhaps unnecessarily exaggerated.

The princes of the third class are of no political importance whatever, and our connexion with them ought to be considered purely of a commercial character. They consist principally of chieftains on the Persian and Arabian Gulfs; with the former of which, in particular, our commerce has been greatly extended since 1814. The object of our treaties has been the suppression of piracy, and the reduction and regulation of the duties imposed on British ships and merchandise. The establishments maintained with this view, independent of military and marine, amount, according to Parliamentary documents, to about 14,000*l.* per annum. It may be much doubted whether advantages to our trade, corresponding with so large an expenditure, are derived from our political establishments at these places; and whether every useful purpose might not be served by the presence, as is the case at one of the places, Muscat, of a native agent, or at the utmost of an European merchant, having consular authority. Under any circumstances the presence of one or two cruisers, for the protection of the British flag from piracy and insult, is indispensable; but what diplomatic agency is further requisite ought to be distinctly shown, to justify the large expenditure which at present takes place.

By far the most important of the political relations of the British Government are those with the "protected states." These may be described as being under a joint British and native administration, with all the imperfections of the one, and all the vices of the other, and both, it may be said, incurable, as long as this system of rule is persevered in. The experience of nearly 70 years warrants us in believing that, as far as the welfare of the people is concerned, these protected states are among the worst governed countries in the world. The effects which have resulted from this mixed government are too well known to require being dwelt upon in any detail, and I shall, therefore, simply enumerate a few of them. By our military protection, and our interference in the civil administration, the powers of the native governments are necessarily enfeebled; the prince is reduced to a pageant—often into a mischievous one; all responsibility to his subjects for good government is removed; and the natural check of apprehended insurrection against the vices of a feeble or tyrannical sovereign, the only one which exists in most Asiatic governments, is wholly withdrawn. All interest in the good government of his country being taken away, the prince, according to his personal character, degenerates either into a besotted voluptuary, a miser, or a discontented intriguer, surrounded by parasites or usurers. The management of the revenue of the country (and there is no exception to this course) is delivered over into the gripe of contractors, and along with it, as usual, the administration of justice. The country necessarily becomes a scene of anarchy and confusion. Resistance to authority becomes habitual, and petty insurrections break out, which, just or unjust, are immediately suppressed by the irresistible arm of British power.

The consequences which result to the protecting power are scarcely less injurious than to the power protected. It incurs, and not unjustly, both from the subjects of the protected state and its own, all the odium of the misgovernment to which the former is a prey; and the protected countries, instead of giving support, and adding strength to the British Government, have become in reality a heavy burthen upon it.

The larger, and consequently the more unwieldy, the territory of the protected state, and the more direct and complete our own interference and control, the worse appears to be the condition of the country. This is strikingly exemplified in the cases of Oude, Hyderabad, and Mysore, to which I shall briefly advert for illustration. The state of Oude embraces above 25,000 square miles of the finest territory in India, with probably not less than four millions of inhabitants. Ever since the year 1765 it has been secured by the power of the British Government from all foreign aggression; and for the greater part of the time relieved

relieved by our subsidiary troops from the burthen of maintaining military establishments. Notwithstanding these apparent advantages, the country has been pretty uniformly throughout a scene of anarchy, disorder and maladministration.

The territory of Hyderabad embraces about one-tenth part of the entire surface of Hindustan, and is equal in extent to about one-fifth of the British dominions themselves. Our political connection with it has subsisted nearly as long as with Oude; and all accounts seem to agree that it is still worse governed than the latter. It is in vain that we have endeavoured to bolster up this weak and tottering state by military aid, and by fresh accessions of territory. Its sovereigns are discontented; the resources of the country are dilapidated; the government seems utterly incompetent to the management of a territory exceeding 100,000 square miles in extent; and the more we interfere, the worse the circumstances of the country seem to become. One article of our engagements with the princes of Hyderabad, which I shall beg leave to copy, will strikingly point out the injurious effects upon the character and credit of the British Government of our protective alliance. The 17th Article of the Convention of 1800 is in the following strain: "By the present treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union, by the blessing of God, are drawn so close, that the friends of one party will be henceforward considered as the friends of the other; and the enemies of the one party as the enemies of the other; it is therefore hereby agreed that if in future the Shorapoor, or Gudwall zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of his highness's government, should withhold the payment of the circar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbances, the subsidiary force, or such portion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the fact shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with his highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience." A succeeding clause of the same article provides that, in certain cases, if his highness should require it, the British troops on the contiguous frontier shall enter his dominions, and be employed in the same manner as the subsidiary force. In short, it is provided that the effective military power of Great Britain shall be employed, not only in the suppression of rebellion and insurrection, but even in the collection of the revenue. No doubt the article provides only that it shall be employed for the enforcement of the just claims of the native government, after the reality of the facts shall be ascertained; but who is to judge of the justice or injustice, the reality or unreality of the claims made, or the facts alleged by a profligate and rapacious government? The diplomatic agent of the British Government must be totally incompetent to such a task in a country extending over 108,000 square miles, and containing a population of certainly not less than eight millions of people.

The state of Mysore is a very striking example of the evils arising from the mixed government which prevails in the protected states. This was a gratuitous creation of our own, at the moment when we were most deeply imbued with the mania of subsidiary treaties. It embraces 80,000 square miles of some of the most fertile territory in the south of India, with a temperate climate and a docile population. Although of little more than 30 years' standing, and from the first moment of its origin under our immediate auspices, and subject to our direct control, its government seems to be just as ill administered as those of Lucknow or Hyderabad, and it was only last year that a necessity arose for employing a considerable portion of the disposable troops of the Madras Presidency in the suppression of a formidable insurrection within it. The particulars of this rebellion are, no doubt, before the Board, and although I am unacquainted with them, I will venture to predict, without any apprehension of drawing a rash conclusion, that it originated in some gross acts of extortion or oppression, and most probably in a long continued series of such acts on the part of the native government. It is due to the late Sir Thomas Munro to state, that his sagacity predicted, even before the treaty was signed, the consequences which would follow the placing of a pagan prince on the throne of Mysore: a prince, as he states, unknown to the people, and whose father and grandfather were equally unknown to them.\*

In round numbers, nearly one-half of the entire area of Hindustan comes under the denomination of protected states, and all this vast territory is more or less subject to the evils which are incident to this condition; although the territories being generally less unwieldy, and our meddling less direct, the inconveniences arising from it are not always so aggravated a character as in the examples just alluded to. As long as our present engagements with the protected states are persevered in, it is obvious that the system of misrule which prevails in them is doomed to be perpetual, or, at least, to endure as long as the British power itself. We are instrumental therefore in giving consistency and permanency to a system of bad government. Through our support alone the states of Oude and Hyderabad have existed now for near 70 years, a period far beyond the average duration of Indian monarchies, and indeed, it may be added, of Asiatic monarchies; for, with the exception of China and Japan, there is not a considerable nation of Central Asia in which a revolution has not taken place, or a dynasty been overthrown within the same period.

It is far easier to point out the evils of the existing system than to show what practical remedy ought to be attempted for their redress. Before offering any suggestions, however, on the latter subject, I shall advert to our relations with the petty states, absolutely or virtually exercising independent sovereignty, as well as to our connection with the pensioned princes. The character of the administration of the petty states affords in general a striking contrast to the management in the great states. Wherever the land is not utterly sterile, the localities not very unfavourable, nor the people in a very low and uncivilized state, they are almost invariably in a flourishing and prosperous condition. They are not only far better governed

\* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii. p. 231.



Letter from  
J. Crasford, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Vickers Esq.

governed than the larger states, but in general in a more flourishing situation than the neighbouring British possessions, always excepting, however, those in which the land-tax has been fixed in perpetuity, and to which the beneficial influence of an active external commerce has been extended. The causes of this prosperity it is not, I think, difficult to explain. The states are small, and not beyond the capacity of their rulers to govern. They are managed by them rather as private estates than as principalities. The chiefs feel their responsibility to their subjects for their good or bad administration, and the influence of public opinion, consequently, always more or less governs their conduct. Extortion, which can be practised with little fear of detection and with impunity in a distant province by a deputy or a contractor, under the larger protected states, cannot be practised without detection and exposure, either by an agent or by the chieftain himself, in a petty domain. Justice, however rudely, is more efficiently administered. In short, less is taken from the people, and what remains to them is better protected. I shall give two or three examples of the effects resulting from this state of things, derived from authorities, the credibility of which can hardly be impeached.

The first refers to the small and independent territory of Rampoor in Rohilcund. The condition of this petty principality is described in the following terms, in a well known Report on the Ceded and Conquered Provinces under the Bengal Presidency, made in 1808,\* and it should be added, that by the most recent accounts the same degree of prosperity appears to characterise it. "In passing through the Rampore territory," say the Commissioners, "we could not fail to notice the high state of cultivation to which it has attained, when compared with the surrounding country; scarcely a spot of land is neglected, and although the season was by no means favourable, the whole district seems to be covered with an abundant harvest. As we have no reason to conclude from the description we had received of the present Regent, that this state of prosperity had been produced by any personal exertions on his part, we were solicitous to trace its source, and to discover whether, in the nature of the tenures, the mode of arrangement, or otherwise, there were any peculiar circumstances which it might be useful for us to advert to, in the course of executing the duty entrusted to us. The management of the Nawaub Fyz-oolah Khan is celebrated throughout the country. It was the management of an enlightened and liberal landlord, who devoted his time and attention, and employed his own capital in promoting the prosperity of his country. When works of magnitude were required, which could not be accomplished by the efforts of the individual, the means of undertaking them were supplied by his bounty. Water-courses were constructed, the rivulets were sometimes made to overflow and fertilize the adjacent districts, and the paternal care of a popular chief was constantly exerted to afford protection to his subjects, to stimulate their exertions, to direct their labours to useful objects, and to promote by every means the success of the undertaking."

On this statement it may be remarked, as a fact of no inconsiderable interest, that the people under whose government this state of things was produced were strangers in Hindustan, and at the period of the Report had been little more than 90 years settled in India, and still, as is the case to the present day, speaking their native language, as well as the dialects of the country. The people in question, the Rohillas, an industrious as well as a warlike race, had possessed themselves of the sovereignty of the whole of the country which bears their name; and in the same Report we have the following testimony to their good management, and to the equally conspicuous bad management of the government of Oude, which, with the assistance of British troops, had conquered the country. In 1774, the year in which the conquest was effected, the annual revenue was 84 lacs of rupees, or about 800,000*l.* sterling. "The province," says the Report, "rapidly declined under the administration of the Vizier, and when it was ceded to the Honourable Company, in 1801, it produced only a revenue of about 46 lacs of rupees per annum, independently of the Rampore Jaghire." The revenue of the Rampore Jaghire was but 10 lacs of rupees per annum, so that in reality, under the management of the government of Oude, a decrease in the public revenue of 28 lacs of rupees, or 38 per cent., had taken place in the comparatively short space of 27 years. If the comparison for the same territory be made between the management of the Rohillas, and that of our own government, it is painful to think that the balance of advantages is clearly in favour of the former. After seven years' possession of the country, it appears by the Report that the revenue had increased only by two lacs of rupees, or 20,000*l.* The Papers laid before Parliament show that in the 20 years which have since elapsed, the collective revenues of Rohilcund, and the other districts forming the Ceded Provinces of Oude, had actually declined by a sum exceeding 200,000*l.* per annum. I give the amount of the revenue as the test of the prosperity of the country; because every government of India, under the varying and fluctuating assessments which have prevailed, as well under British as native rule, has invariably taken whatever the people could afford to give. The difference between one government and another has, in fact, mainly consisted in the higher or lower degree of skill which was exercised with the object of placing the people in the capacity to pay a greater or smaller rate of taxation.

The next example which I shall adduce is drawn from the same authority, and refers to two Jaghiredars in the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna, the Rajahs Diaram and Bugwant Sing, well known in Upper Hindustan some years back as the proprietors of the strongholds of Hattaras and Moorsamin, both besieged and captured under the government of the Marquis of

\* Report of Messrs. Cox and Tucker; Selection of Papers from the Records of the East India House, vol. i. p. 19.

of Hastings. "We could not fail, however," say the Commissioners, "to observe the singular difference which the application of greater capital and greater industry is capable of producing in the state of contiguous lands. While the surrounding country seemed to have been visited by a desolating calamity, the lands of the Rajahs Diaram and Bugwant Sing, under every disadvantage of season, were covered with crops produced by a better husbandry or by greater labour." It should here be explained, that the neighbouring lands alluded to in the Report consisted of British territory, already five years in our occupation.

The last example which I shall adduce, is given on the authority of Bishop Heber, and refers to the well known principality of Bhurtpore, but a short period before its subjugation. The passage is of some length, but as the facts appear to me in general to be stated with great correctness, and the reasoning to be equally just and acute, I shall beg leave to quote it. "The country, though still bare of wood, has more scattered trees than we had seen for many days back; and notwithstanding that the soil is sandy, and only irrigated from wells, it is one of the best cultivated and watered tracts which I have seen in India. The crops of corn now on the ground were really beautiful; that of cotton, though gone by, showed marks of having been a very good one. What is a sure proof of wealth, I saw several sugar-mills, and large pieces of ground where the cane had just been cleared, and contrary to the usual habits of India, where the cultivators keep as far as they can from the highway, to avoid the various molestations to which they are exposed from thieves and travellers, there was often only a narrow pathway winding through the green wheat and mustard crop, and even this was crossed continually by the channels which conveyed water to the furrows. The population did not seem great, but the few villages which we saw were apparently in good condition and repair; and the whole afforded so pleasing a picture of industry, and was so much superior to anything which I have been led to expect in Rajpootana, or which I had seen in the Company's territories since leaving the southern parts of Roelincund, that I was led to suppose that either the Rajah of Bhurtpore was an extremely exemplary and parental governor, or that the system of management adopted in the British provinces was in some way or other less favourable to the improvement and happiness of the country than that of some of the native states.

"What the old Jemautdar of Khauwah said as to the rent he paid to government, and the answers he made to questions put to him, were not, however, such as would lead one to expect an industrious or prosperous peasantry. No certain rent is fixed by government, but the state takes every year what it thinks fit, leaving only what, in its discretion, it regards as a sufficient maintenance for the zemindars and ryots. This is pretty nearly the system which has produced such ruinous effects in Oude, but which is, of course, tempered in these smaller states by the facility of bringing complaints to the ear of the sovereign, by the want of power in the sovereign himself to withstand any general rising, to which his tyranny might in the long run drive his subjects, and most of all, by the immediate and perceptible loss of income which he would sustain, if, by dealing too hard with any particular village, he made its inhabitants emigrate to the territories of his neighbour. Nor must the old hereditary attachment be lost sight of, which makes the rulers or subjects of a Ját or rajpoot state regard each other as kindred, and feel a pride, the one in the power and splendour of a chief who is the head of his clan, the other in the numbers and prosperity of those who constitute his society and court in time of peace, and in war his only army."

The only objection I have to offer to Bishop Heber's statement is, that allowance is not made by him for, and probably, indeed, he was unaware of its existence, the private coparcenary right of property in the soil, which uniformly exists throughout Upper Hindustan, which necessarily exerts so beneficial an influence on the welfare of the country, and is never altogether disregarded, certainly never with impunity, even by the most oppressive governments. It is by no means true, as Bishop Heber thought, that "the state takes every year what it thinks fit." The most powerful governments of Hindustan have not been able to do so in the particular part of India here alluded to, and such a proceeding would be utterly inconsistent with the genius and character of the petty governments. On the right of property in the land as existing in the upper portions of Hindustan, it will be quite sufficient for the present purpose to quote the words of a most intelligent officer, Mr. Boulderson, when describing the neighbouring province of Moradabad "I consider," says he, "the only real description of the khood-khasht-ryot to be of the family of the zemindar, and he cannot be dispossessed, for he will never suffer himself to be so without bloodshed." The capacity of the proprietors or occupants of the land to resist the arbitrary power of their rulers, forms indeed a large element in contributing to the prosperity both of the petty and large states. For the greater part, the most spirited and warlike of the tribes of Hindustan are at the same time the most industrious, because the most able to secure the fruits of industry. The Rohillas and the Jauts, the nations to whom I have just alluded, are very striking examples of this most important fact.

The prosperity of the territories of the minor princes of India, under whatever denomination, is, as already stated, far from being confined to the few instances which I have cited. With the exception of some polighars, zemindars and other hereditary chieftains whose lands have been assessed by ourselves at quit-rents beyond their means of paying, the flourishing condition of the smaller principalities is pretty nearly general. For the prosperous condition

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\* Heber's Journal, vol. 2, p. 361.

† Selections of Papers from the Records at the East India House, vol. 3, p. 196.

of the states of the Mahratta jaghiredars of the Deccan, I refer to the strong testimony given by an experienced officer, Mr. Chaplin, before the Committee of the Lords in 1839, and to the printed reports of the officers who served under him, and from which last it appears that the emigration of cultivators, not only from the territories of Hyderabad, but even from those of the British Government, to those better protected spots, were not unfrequent.

The prosperity upon which I have dwelt is not confined to estates or principalities within the limits of the British possessions, and which it might be expected must derive no small share of it from the security against foreign aggression incident to their position. On the contrary it is found to exist in situations exposed even to the invasion of foreign armies; to that of the worst description of foreign armies, the armies of the Mahrattas. Many of the rajpoot states which lie in the direct route of invading armies between Hindustan and the Deccan are examples, particularly that of Kotah, the flourishing condition of which has been remarked by every European traveller. Of the countries which I have now cited as examples of good management, it is proper that I should state that I cannot speak with any confidence from my own personal experience, although I have either resided in or travelled through all of them, for my knowledge of them dates at least five-and-twenty years back. I can, however, safely affirm that the same favourable impression was made upon me when I saw them as upon all others, and abundant testimony, drawn from more recent and careful observation, might easily be adduced to shew that they were not exaggerated.

I proceed to offer a few observations on the sixth and last class of our native allies, princes who are now prisoners of the British Government. The most important of these is the Mogul. On the subject of our connection with this prince, a tract has been circulated within the last few months, purporting to be drawn from official documents, and the allegations contained in which are such as appear to me to deserve the serious attention of the Honourable Board. It would appear from this paper that in 1805, two years after the acquisition of the territories conquered from the Mahrattas in Upper Hindustan, and when the nominal sovereign of Delhi fell into our hands, a treaty or engagement was made with him, stipulating that certain territories, the limits of which were defined, should be considered as Crown lands, and reserved as such for his maintenance, and that until the revenue of such Crown lands should be adequate to the intended purpose, a fixed stipend should be paid to him, and that when they exceed the amount so paid, he should enjoy the surplus. Nothing, to all appearance, can be clearer or more unequivocal than the terms of the engagement. The allegation is that they are evaded on the part of the local government of India, on the plea that the document called a treaty was the mere "intimation of the intention of the British Government at the time, and not an engagement positively binding as to its future conduct," and that an increase of the stipend of his Majesty would at present "be very inconvenient." The present revenue of the assigned Crown lands appears, from the anonymous statement, considerably to exceed the stipend paid to his Majesty, and a claim for arrears to the amount of about 400,000*l.* is set up in behalf of the King. If the documents referred to be authentic, the pretext alleged for non-fulfilment of a written engagement are undoubtedly anything but creditable to the British administration of India; and I am bound in fairness to observe, that since Lord Cornwallis first gave a new tone to the character of the Indian government, now five-and-forty years ago, there has been no such departure, nor indeed any departure at all that I am aware of, from the faith of our political engagements. The treaty, I have no doubt, like many others made at the time, was an improvident one, and the fulfilment of its stipulations, I make no question, may be very inconvenient. They ought, notwithstanding, like many other onerous engagements which we have entered into, to be fulfilled to the letter.

Under the head of Stipendiary Princes came the petty princes of Johore, with whom I negotiated a treaty in 1824, already alluded to; and a few of the particulars of which, as I was personally engaged, I shall now describe, reserving the further consideration of our relations with the stipendiary princes of Hindustan to a future part of this Paper. The island of Singapore, the object of the treaty, and, at the moment of our occupation of it, little better than one continuous forest, belonged to two Malay princes, the one a vassal claiming the property of the soil, and virtually exercising the sovereignty, and the other, his paramount, possessed only of nominal power, although in reality the hereditary sovereign. This was no unusual state of things in the native politics of India. When a British settlement was formed on the island in 1819, the first of the chiefs now named had, for eight years, fixed his residence in the island, with a band or colony of a few piratical followers. The last-named prince was invited to reside by ourselves after we had formed our settlement, with the view of covering by treaty with him our claim of occupation. A joint treaty was entered into with both, the conditions of which were extremely loose and ill-defined. The sovereignty was reserved to the native princes, and the cession made to us extended only to a few miles along the coast, and to the depth of a few hundred yards inland; a participation on their part in the expected port and custom duties was stipulated for; and the treaty engaged us in an alliance offensive and defensive, tending to embroil us not only with the petty states of the neighbourhood, but with the government of the Netherlands. Great and obvious inconveniences immediately followed this arrangement: the princes insisted upon and exercised the rights of maintaining slavery; money was extorted from the native commanders of vessels which frequented the port, and their persons were imprisoned for alleged want of respect; heavy fines were levied for felling timber in forests that were inexhaustible; assassinations were committed by the followers of the native chiefs, who claimed exemption from our jurisdiction, and frequent risk was incurred, through their vanity or imprudence, of involving us in altercations or quarrels with  
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the neighbouring governments. The treaty of 1824 put an end to this state of things, by the entire purchase of the rights of sovereignty and property of the island for a pecuniary consideration; by a pension for life to each of the princes; by the stipulation of a sum of money for their removal from the island, in case they should not think proper to make it their residence; and by the dissolution of the offensive and defensive alliance. British sovereignty, in virtue of this engagement, is now as completely established, free from the embarrassments of a native connexion within a circle of a hundred miles, embracing not only the principal island, but also the straits, narrow seas, and islets which surround it, as in any possession of the Crown; and upon the demise of both the native princes, (one of them died within a few months after signing the treaty,) even all pecuniary inconvenience will have ceased.

I have now to submit the very few remedial suggestions which I have to offer on the state of the protected and pensioned princes. With respect to the first, the great evil seems to be the unwieldy and unmanageable extent of their possessions, too great, perhaps, for a native government under the most favourable auspices, and aggravated tenfold by the debility which is necessarily superinduced by our own interference. Our interposition, indeed, alone saves them from that dissolution which is the common fate of all weak and vicious dynasties; and we consequently obstruct the only course which has hitherto given the people an occasional glimpse of a wise or vigorous administration. The rough but obvious remedy would be to dissolve our political connexion, and withdraw our troops and diplomatic agents. In such an event the larger protected states would inevitably be broken down into numerous petty communities. However beneficial the ultimate effects would be, and however agreeable such a step as our withdrawal from interference to the native princes, a temporary anarchy and confusion would be the certain consequence, and good faith and humanity, not less than the security of our own possessions, must prevent us from having recourse to such a measure. The same effects may, I conceive, be brought about by less violent although slower means. Unless we interpose to prevent it, (and it ought to be our object to encourage rather than oppose it,) the larger states would, I conceive, in time be partitioned and broken down by the mere operation of the native laws of inheritance, an event of which there are innumerable examples in the history of India. Another and perhaps more effectual means would be to induce the native princes to fix in perpetuity, as has been done with the zemindars of Bengal, moderate quit-rents upon the present possessions of the existing jaghiredars, talookdars, or other subordinate chiefs, who now hold them on the most insecure and uncertain tenures, and who consequently plunder the people instead of protecting them. This would give the parties in question a permanent interest in the good government of their estates, and we might expect to see them prosper in the same manner as in the examples of the small principalities which I have already cited. The most favourable result, under all circumstances, would probably be the occupation of the territories of the protected states by the British Government, and the permanent establishment of British rule throughout the whole, as has been the case with Bengal, the Carnatic, and a large part of Oude. To this, in all likelihood, it must come at last. Any other arrangement must be attended with obvious inconveniences; but how, in the meantime, the result is to be brought about, consistently with the obligations of good faith, I confess myself at a loss to understand. If the advantage of the inhabitants of the protected states alone were to be considered, we need not certainly be over scrupulous, for according to every account nothing can well be worse than their present condition. If the interests of the people be admitted to be the paramount consideration, I think it must be allowed that few or none of the princes themselves have, from ancient prescription or hereditary right, any very strong claims to be supported in the exercise of a tyranny which is productive of such deplorable effects upon the welfare of their people; unless, indeed, what they derive from the fictitious circumstances arising out of their alliance with ourselves. According to European notions there is not an individual of the Mahomedan chiefs that does not derive his power from the rebel governor of a province, and there is not one of their dynasties which dates much more than a century back, or indeed that was of one-half that standing, when we formed our first connection with them. The origin of the principal Hindu dynasties is still later, and the greater number of them are in reality more recent conquerors and usurpers than ourselves.

The subject of the pensioned princes, although involved in sufficient difficulty, is somewhat more easy to deal with than that of the protected states. As far as I am able to gather from the scattered information contained in Parliamentary documents, for there is no distinct and specific return before Parliament which furnishes it, the annual charge for political pensions appears to be about a million and a half sterling, which, according to the estimated revenues of India, at the close of the Company's Charter, is equal to one-twelfth part of the entire gross amount.\* This is a tax paid by the people beyond, and in excess of, the disbursements, which in the ordinary circumstances of any country ought to be necessary for maintaining the establishments indispensable for the purposes of legitimate government, and peculiarly burthensome to so poor a country as India. In the meanwhile, a numerous class of state paupers may be said to be entailed upon the country. In the natural course of things, the numbers of the families of these pensioners increase, and the original stipend, however respectable numerically, becomes inadequate when sub-divided for the support of many. Some of the princes and princesses of Delhi, for example, I am told,

\* Return of all Offices and Establishments, 1830; Second Report of Select Committee of 1830; and Report of Select Committee of 1831.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

100 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE [VI. Political.

Appendix, No. 8

Letter from  
J. Craufurd, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

told, receive no larger an allowance for their maintenance than 30s. a month, and some of the numerous retainers and followers of the Mysore princes are understood to be in a very indigent condition, although the annual stipend allotted for their maintenance exceeds 30,000*l.* per annum. The character of the parties themselves is necessarily degraded and demoralized by the state of hopeless pupillage in which they are retained. Some measure appears to me urgently to be demanded for gradually abating this evil; perhaps the most effectual would be to make the pensions an inheritable property, to descend by the native laws, and at the same time to commute the present annuities for a grant of lands, still chargeable with a moderate quit-rent to the state, or for a capital sum, estimated by a given number of years' purchase, to be invested as the party might consider most beneficial. From the reckless and improvident habits which the unfortunate circumstances of the parties have generally engendered, this is a plan which of course could only be acted upon gradually and cautiously. In time, however, it might be hoped that the extinguishing of these political pensions might be effected through its operation; the country be relieved from an intolerable burthen; and the pensioners themselves, merging into the common mass of society, and taught to look to their own exertions only for success in life, acquire the provident and industrious habits of ordinary men. In the present undisputed strength of our political power, I cannot anticipate that any danger could arise from acting prudently on such a scheme.

I shall close this letter with noticing the diplomatic expenditure of the Indian government, which, making every allowance for the peculiarities of our political position, must, I think, be deemed excessive. As far as I am able to ascertain from dispersed and very inadequate data, the ordinary disbursements of our diplomatic agencies, exclusive of pensions, military escorts and subsidiary troops, amounted in 1827 to a sum exceeding 400,000*l.* or including temporary missions, to half a million sterling,\* which is much more than the present diplomatic and consular charges, pensions included, of Great Britain, by far the largest of any nation of Europe. Some reductions, I believe, have been made since the period quoted; but it is obvious that there must be abundant room for still greater, when it is considered that the charge is equal to near three per cent. on the gross revenue of India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

London, 24th February 1832

(signed) J. Craufurd.

Appendix, No. 9.

LETTER from N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. to Thomas Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 9.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq.  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

1. OUR acquisitions of Territory since 1813 have originated,

1st. In the war with Nepal, by which we acquired possession of the provinces of Kemaon, Sebatoon, and Dehra Doon.

2dly. In the faithless and hostile conduct of the Peishwah, in the years 1816 and 1817, which occasioned the treaty with that Prince of June 1817, by which treaty the Northern Concan, the Peishwah's possession in Guzerat, the forts of Dharwar and Koosigul, with their adjacent territory, and his possessions in Bundelcund, were ceded to us.

3dly. In the similar hostility of the Rajah of Berar, towards the close of the same year, terminating in a treaty by which the whole of the Rajah's possessions north of the Norbudda, extending eastward to the confines of Bundelcund, and a large tract of territory south of that river, were ceded to us.

4thly. In the general war of 1817, 1818, and 1819, by the result of which all the remaining territorial possessions of the Peishwah, together with considerable portions of the territory formerly belonging to Holkar, came under our direct dominion.

5thly. In subsidiary arrangements with the Gnykwar, by which the farm of Ahmedabad was transferred to us.

6thly. In the war with Ava, by which Arracan, Tavoy, Mergui, Tenasserim, and Yé, on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, and Assam, on our north-eastern frontier, were added to our possessions.

With regard to the second branch of the question :

The first material enlargement of our political relations, since 1813, was the accession of the Rajah of Nagpore to the subsidiary system in 1816, by the conclusions of a treaty of subsidiary alliance, corresponding with the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein, with the exception of the cession of territory to defray the expense of the subsidiary force. The next material alteration was that produced by the treaty with the Peishwah of June 1817, already adverted to, under which all the rights of supremacy exercised by him as head of the Mahratta confederacy in Guzerat, and over the numerous chiefs of Bundelcund, in Hindostan and in Malwa, were transferred to us. The last great enlargement of our political relations is that which has resulted from the triumphant issue of the war undertaken for the suppression of the Pindarries, and the predatory powers of Hindostan. The result of it has been to complete the establishment of the paramount ascendancy of the British power over

\* Return of all Offices and Establishments; copies of Letters from the Court of Directors, 1830, p. 16.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq. to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.  
\* Vide 16th and fol-  
lowing paragraphs.

over the whole of the states, princes and chiefs of the Peninsula, not before connected with it by alliance, or subjected to its control by the transfer of tributary allegiance under the treaties already noticed; with the exception of the successor to the late Dowlut Row Sindial, who, though nominally exempt from the obligations of an alliance subjecting him to the paramount authority of the British Government, is virtually placed under its control by the geographical and political position of his territories, and the comparative insignificance of his power and resources.

The subject will be found much more fully and satisfactorily developed in the accompanying Paper of Notes.\*

If. Our engagements with most of the substantive States are of a subsidiary nature, such, for instance, as the States of Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Holcar, Nagpore, Gujwar, Cutch; in all of which a British force is maintained for the protection of the State. The stipulations of our treaties with these States vary, of course, according to the circumstances of each, but their general features are these: protection on the part of the British Government against external and internal enemies; mutual co-operation in the event of hostilities with other powers; a prohibition against all political intercourse with other Princes and Chiefs, except through the medium, or with the sanction, of the British Government; an obligation to refer to the latter all disputes that may eventually arise with other States; and also to receive and abide by the advice and counsel of the British Government, delivered through their Representative, on all affairs connected with the internal administration of the country, combined at the same time, generally, with a provision for the Prince's exercise of independent authority within the limits of his dominions.

With many other States and Chiefs, those for instance in Rajpootana, our engagements are tributary, but in all other respects similar to the provisions of our subsidiary allowances.

With numerous petty principalities, the obligations of our engagements are simply protection on one part, and subordinate co-operation or allegiance on the other.

Numberless fiefs or jagheers, especially within the territories formerly subject to the dominion of the Mahrattas, are held by sunnuds or grants from the British Government, all involving the reciprocal duties of protection and allegiance; and in many cases the British guarantee is interposed by specific engagements between a substantive State and its dependant tributaries.

Such is the nature and present condition of our foreign relations in India, of which it will be observed, the governing and pervading principle is a general submission of all the States and Principalities with which engagements have been contracted to the paramount power and control of the British authority.

[Mr. E. here refers to the accompanying Paper of Notes for an account of our political relations as affected by the alliances with the various States.]

If, however, information be sought regarding the present condition of each State, under the operation of its connection with the British Government, reference must be made to the later correspondence of our political residents and agents, which unhappily will show, with few exceptions, that the prosperity of the country has not been promoted by the alliance, but that, on the contrary, it exhibits, in the prevalence of disorder and oppression, and the defalcation of its resources, the invariable effects of a vicious, or a weak and inefficient administration: and the condition of a large and most important class of our political relations, namely, those which were established during the progress, or at the close of the last general war, with the several States of Rajpootana, is exhibited in a narrative contained in the draft of a proposed despatch to Bengal, prepared in 1829, which gave occasion to the Paper of Notes before referred to, and which, after a correspondence between the Court of Directors and the Board, was, with the concurrence of the latter, withdrawn, but is among the records of the Court. That narrative exhibits a deplorable picture of the disorganized state of those misgoverned principalities; of the intrigues and contentions of their Courts, and of the vacillating system of our interference in their concerns, at one time actively exerted, at another suspended, and exercised on no one principle, but assuming various forms and degrees in different States, and at different times within the same State.

III. In reply to this question, as connected with its first subdivision, it seems sufficient to refer to the subsidiary treaties, which, in every instance, describe the amount of the force to be furnished by us for the protection of the allied States.

I am unable to discriminate between the exigencies of the two other subdivisions, namely, the amount of military force required by the ordinary effect of our obligations, and as a security against extraordinary risk; the latter being, as I conceive, intended to be provided by the military dispositions arising out of the former; in elucidation of which I have only to advert to the military stations established, (exclusive of those of the subsidiary forces already noticed,) in consequence of the treaties and engagements concluded with foreign states and principalities, and with a view both to provide the most effectual means of fulfilling the obligations so incurred, and of guarding against extraordinary risks. Lodiana, on the banks of the Sutlege, with reference to the treaty of 1808, with Rajah Runjeet Sing, of Lahore, by which the Sikh chiefs, between that river and the Jumna, were placed under our protection.—Nusserabad and Neemuch, with reference to our treaties and engagements with Jyensagur, Jodepore, Odeppoo, Kotah and Boondee, in Rajpootana.—Mhow, with reference to our treaties and engagements in Malwah.—Deesa, on the frontier of Guzerat, as applicable to our political engagements with the various petty states in that quarter.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 9.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq. to  
T. E. Villiers, Esq.

102 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE [VI. Political.

IV. Answers to the main part of this question will be found in the accompanying Paper.

[After alluding to the necessary progress of interference of the British Government with the internal concerns of the Subsidiary States, as described in that Paper, Mr. E. observes, in addition to the remarks that were made,]

The obligation to protect the prince from the dangers of internal anarchy or insurrection, from whatever cause it may arise, appears to involve the corresponding privilege of interfering to arrest the progress of proceedings tending to produce it; and the necessity of such interference is the greater and more frequent, because all the States of India being (with some few partial exceptions) purely monarchical, the good government of the country must ever depend upon the personal character and qualifications of the prince.

The tendency of our political relations, therefore, is gradually to supersede the governments of the Protected States, to extend over them our own influence and authority, and ultimately to bring them under our direct dominion.

The object of our interference, in whatever way, and in whatever degree exercised, has ever been the true interest of the prince, the prosperity of the country, and the protection and happiness of the people, and that interference has been most beneficial where it has been carried furthest. I may adduce, as instances of this, the state of the Guykwar, relieved from a condition of political and pecuniary ruin by the active interference of the British power, exercised through the able agency of the late Colonel Walker, who, for that purpose, became associated with a regency in the actual administration of the Government, and by that of his distinguished successor, Major Carmac Cutch, Nagpore, and Travancore, in each of which States a similar arrangement prevailed, for a time, for similar purposes; and Hyderabad, where our interference was carried to the extent of the entire reform of the Nizam's military establishment, and the introduction of our own officers into his army, and the formation of revenue settlements throughout his dominions, under British functionaries and the British guarantee. But this degree of direct interference has of necessity been only temporary, and it is to be feared that the good effects of such direct interference have been, or will be, temporary also.

While we confine ourselves, therefore, within the limits prescribed by our engagements, the effects of our subsidiary and protective relations must apparently continue to be such as are described in this address, and more fully in the accompanying Notes. On the other hand, by extending our interference, we virtually supersede the local authority, and introduce no permanent improvement in the condition of the country, or in the system of the administration.

Experience has shown that the right reserved by our treaties of tendering our advice to the prince on all points connected with the internal administration of his country, accompanied with an obligation on his part to conform to it, has entirely failed whenever an attempt has been made to give effect to that provision of our engagements. Of this attempt, and its failure, the strongest instance was afforded, in 1810 and 1811, in the case of the State of Oude, when an effort was made to give effect to that article of the Treaty of November 1801, by which the Vizier engages, "That he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants;" and "that his Excellency will always advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the Honourable Company." This provision arose out of the long existing system of misrule, which created and perpetuated all the evils of corruption, oppression, injustice, and insecurity of life and property. The British Government was bound by every principle of justice and humanity, if possible, to provide a remedy for these evils, since the stipulated obligation to suppress insurrection and rebellion within the Vizier's territory, as well as to protect it from external enemies, frequently compelled us to employ our troops against zemindars and others, who, by the rapacity and extortion of the aumils or governors of the provinces, had been driven to resistance, and thus indirectly to support, by our interference, the cause of violence and oppression.

On the occasion referred to, the most persevering exertions, and the truly able agency of the resident (Colonel Baille), supported by all the influence of the British power, failed of effect, and afforded a signal proof of the inefficacy of mere counsel and remonstrance, however fortified by the stipulations of treaty and the influence of Government, and with whatever ability and zeal it may be urged, to remedy abuses and accomplish reforms in the administration of a protected State in opposition to the wish or disposition of the prince. This subject will be found fully discussed and exemplified in two despatches from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated the 21st of June and 8th July 1811.

The experience of this truth has almost unavoidably led to the exercise of a direct interference in the internal affairs of the allied States, calculated to degrade and disgrace the ruling authority, but inadequate to the accomplishment of its benevolent purpose, which the introduction of British laws and institutions, under British authority, is, perhaps, alone capable of effecting.

Yet, under all the inherent defects of the existing system of our foreign relations, the general condition of the people of the Protected States has been improved by their relief from the ravages of external enemies, and the evils of internal insurrection or disturbance; and in some instances perhaps by the diffusion of better principles, and the discontinuance of flagrant abuses, which a near connection and intercourse with the British Government,

Government, and the agency of its public functionaries, has produced. On the other hand, the power, independence, dignity, and consequence of the princes and chiefs with whom we are thus connected have naturally diminished, and must continue to diminish, under the exercise of our paramount sway.

The fundamental difficulty of our political relations seems to be the want (it is to be feared the irremediable want) of a clear and definite course of action in our conduct towards the Protected States, a consequence proximately of the above exemplified inconsistency of the provisions of our treaties, but primarily attributable to the essential difference between the genius, the civil and political institutions, the principles and views, the religion, manners and customs of the princes, chiefs, and people of the Allied States and Protected Territories, and those of the government and nation with which they are thus subordinatedly connected.

I should be misunderstood, if, from the foregoing representation of the evils and embarrassments attending our political relations, were to be deduced an imputation on the wisdom of those great statesmen who originated or pursued the system of our subsidiary alliances. In the case of Hyderabad in particular, the substitution of our subsidiary alliance with that State for the military force and political ascendancy of the French, was a master-stroke of wise and energetic policy on the part of the Marquis Wellesley, and was wisely (it might be added necessarily) followed by the prosecution of the same system of policy with respect to other substantive powers. As indeed, from causes inherent in the character of the native States of India, the formation of a balance of power on the principles of international law was impracticable, there was no alternative between the adoption of that system, or the perpetuation of war among the native States, the dangerous aggrandizement of some, or a renewal of their hostile combinations against us. In cases of absolute conquest, it is true the option was left of annexing the conquered territory to our own dominions, or restoring it to its original possessor under the subsidiary or protective system; and if the former could be deemed a wise and justifiable policy, to that extent the latter might have been abridged. It may therefore be justly asserted, that the prosecution of it was, to a certain extent, imperative, and no doubt can be entertained that it mainly contributed towards the tranquillization of India, and to the security of our power.

In answer to the first subdivision of the question now under reply, (the second has already been disposed of,) "What is the real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents?" I have to state as follows

The duties of these functionaries must of course be regulated and controlled by the nature and extent of the stipulations of the treaties and engagements existing with the States to which they are respectively accredited. They are required to watch over and enforce the fulfilment of those stipulations, acting under such instructions as they may occasionally receive from Government; to report regularly to the Government every transaction or event of importance within the range of their official cognizance, and the substance of every material conference they may hold with the chief or his ministers on public affairs, to state their opinions upon all points of public interest connected with their respective situations, and to suggest such measures as may appear to them advisable under any occurrence, or with respect to any position of local affairs, or calculated to promote the interests and objects of the alliance; to conduct themselves towards the prince or chief to whom they may be respectively accredited in a manner to acquire his confidence, and thereby establish an influence, to be exercised in aiding, by their counsel and advice, the prosperity of the State, and in giving effect to the purposes and objects of the alliance

V. I respectfully submit, that the financial information required by this question can only be satisfactorily obtained by returns from the Financial Department of the India House.

VI. I know not of any procedure on the part of the British Government in India, with respect to our political relations, since the designated time, which could justify the imputation of a departure from the principles of justice. That some doubt has been entertained as to the expediency of the vast extension of those relations, supposing it to have been a matter of option, will be seen by the narrative of proceedings contained in the Paper of Notes so often referred to. If an explanation of the ground of that doubt should be required, it would be necessary to refer to the very voluminous discussions on the subject of the prosecution of that vast and comprehensive scheme of general supremacy which has actually been accomplished, contained in the correspondence between the Governor-General and the Vice-President in Council, and in their Minutes, recorded in the Secret Department in the years 1815, 1816, and 1817, some of which are noted in the margin.\* I transcribe, however, the following extract from the last of the documents enumerated in the margin, as it briefly explains the opinion which I myself entertained on that subject, called upon, as I conceive I am, to declare it.

\* Despatch, from the Governor-General to the Vice-President in Council, dated 9th February 1815  
Answer of the Vice-President in Council, dated 21st March  
Despatch from Governor-General, dated 15th June  
Answer of Vice-President in Council, dated 25th August,  
enclosing Minutes of the Vice-President 31st July, Minutes of the  
Members of Council, dated 10th and 21st August  
Minute of Vice-President, dated 3d October.  
Governor-General's Minute, 1st December  
Minute of Vice President, 16th April 1816  
Ditto - - - 22d April 1816  
Ditto - - - 14th June 1817

"Perhaps

\* "I may refer to the ( ) and following paragraphs of a Minute which I recorded under date the 29th April 1814, for some remarks on the operation of our subsidiary alliances"



"Perhaps the most embarrassing part of the complicated system of the British power and ascendancy in India, that which involves difficulties, evils, and dangers the least susceptible of prevention and remedy, is our subsidiary or protective alliances. This, however, is not the place for a discussion of so extensive a subject. I allude to it here merely for the purpose of referring to the ground on which, as a general principle, I conceive it to be of importance to abstain as much as practicable from the further extension of our protective and subsidiary alliances. The advantages of them are certain and considerable for a season, but their inevitable tendency is, to create a necessity for that gradual aggrandizement to which the annals of the world refer the downfall of every mighty empire." That "the principles of expediency" have not been observed in the measures and proceedings of the political agents stationed with the principalities of Rajpootana, is shown in this Address, No. II.

VII. This question partakes so much of a professional character, that I cannot consider myself competent to offer a satisfactory reply to it. I may, however, state generally, that as far as can be judged from a reference to the military stations of the Indian armies, their present distribution has been carefully regulated by the considerations stated in the question. It will be seen by a reference to the map of their positions, now under preparation, that an adequate force can be assembled at a short notice at any point on an occasion of exigency or danger, within the range of our political relations, and that a junction of the troops of the three presidencies can be accomplished with facility to oppose an external enemy.

VIII. These establishments have of late been reduced, on a principle of economy, without, as far as I have heard, affecting their efficiency.

IX. All the check over the conduct of the political residents and agents that the nature of their situation and duties admit of, appears to be established by the obligation they are under to report events and proceedings, as stated in the answer to the first subdivision of the 4th Question (*see* p. 103), and by the shortness of the time requisite for the transmission of any orders from the seat of Government even to the most distant of these functionaries. A considerable latitude of action, however, must necessarily be left to them, as events may sometimes occur not provided for by their instructions, and requiring the adoption of appropriate measures before instructions can be received.

X. I by no means feel myself competent to the satisfactory discussion of so vast and complicated a subject as that which is presented in this question; and I may, perhaps, be allowed to plead, as an additional reason for requesting to be excused from complying with the requisition of the Board in this instance, the delicacy of my situation as a member of the Court.

India House,  
25th February 1832. }

I have, &c.  
N. B. Edmonstone.

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NOTES on the Character and Operation of the ALLIANCES and ENGAGEMENTS formed by the BRITISH GOVERNMENT with FOREIGN STATES and PRINCIPALITIES in India; combined with a consideration of the Means of Ameliorating the Condition of its Political connexion with the States of Rajpootana.

1. The position in which the British power in India is placed, with respect to its foreign relations, has no example or parallel in history, and, therefore, we should seek in vain from history a guide to measures calculated to relieve us from the difficulties and embarrassments in which we are involved by the nature and effects of our situation relatively to foreign states.

2. The aggrandizement of the empires which have preceded us has been the consequence, as it was the object, of the exertion of military power. Our extended dominion has arisen from the hostility and turbulence of other States. We have, never, like our predecessors, systematically pursued the objects of ambition. We have never aimed at conquest except as connected with self-defence. This principle of self-defence has compelled us occasionally to add to the territories under our direct dominion; but increase of territory and dominion has never been our aim. The object of our political measures has ever been the prevention of war, and the preservation of tranquillity. We have sought to attain these benefits by the form of our subsidiary and protective alliances.

4. These legitimate objects of the political relations thus established with the Native States of India have generally been accomplished without difficulty, and have, in the outset, been productive of reciprocal advantage to ourselves and our allies, unaccompanied with any material inconvenience, but their necessary tendency is to produce in the Protected States weakness, inefficiency, and misrule on the part of the governing authority. The prince with whom the alliance is formed had antecedently been supported by his own strength and resources; he had been accustomed to govern, and the pre-existing organization of the State, the reciprocal feelings and obligations of the governing and the governed, the frame

and structure of society, its laws, usages, and habits, continue for a time to act under the new condition of the State

5. But the decay, which in the life-time of the prince would be slow, though ultimately certain, usually advances with rapid strides under the operation of the unequal alliance when he has ceased to exist. The legitimate heir, whatever be his capacity or his disposition, must be secured in the succession by virtue of the terms of the treaty of alliance. If a minor, a regency must be appointed under the influence and guarantee of the paramount State, the direct interference of which in the administration of his country then becomes unavoidable. One act of interference necessarily produces another, and the evil is aggravated and perpetuated by the very means which are taken to remedy it. Allowing even to the successor the qualities necessary to the government of a kingdom, the dependent situation in which he is placed prevents their being called into action under the depressing influence of a state of dependence (of which too the presence and proceedings of the representative of the superior power ever reminds him). He loses his respect and dignity both in his own estimation and that of his subjects. Secure in his possessions through the power of the superior state, he sinks into apathy, or abandons himself to the indulgences and personal gratifications which he is enabled to command. Those below him take advantage of the weakness of the administration for the pursuit of their own personal interests, the bonds of society are loosened, and oppression, disorder, plunder, and insecurity of life and property, succeed. In fact, when once a kingdom is rendered dependent for its protection upon the power of another, the impulses, the energies and restraints that enter into an efficient and vigorous administration gradually become paralysed, and the evils and embarrassments which we at this time experience from the effects of these alliances necessarily ensue.

6. We complain, and with too much justice, of the evils attendant on our interference in the affairs of the protected States, but if we examine the nature and operation of the compacts which we have formed with them, it will be found that such interference is absolutely unavoidable.

7. Those compacts may be divided generally into two classes; the first class consisting of subsidiary alliances; the other of alliances of supremacy and protection on our part, unaccompanied by the maintenance of a subsidiary force. The fundamental principle of all is the same, control on the one part, dependence on the other, and control cannot exist without interference, nor can interference be exercised without being progressive. A review of the operation of all our definitive and protective alliances would substantiate the truth of these political dogmas, but it is sufficient for the present purpose to exemplify those of Hyderabad and Poona. By the engagements finally concluded (in 1800) with the Nizam, we were bound to protect him against all enemies, and to secure the lawful succession to the throne. On the other hand, the Nizam engaged to receive a subsidiary force (for the expenses of which territory was ultimately ceded), to abstain from all connexion with other States, and to carry on no negotiations except through the British Government, to refer to us, and abide by our arbitration on every occasion of dispute with any other power, and to assist us with his troops and resources on occasions of joint war. During the life of the Nizam with whom the treaty was formed, and until the death of his able minister, Auzun-ool-Omra, which happened in 1804, a year after that of his master, no occasion arose to require or justify our interference in the internal affairs of the administration, for the immediate effect of the imbecility, incompetency, and (it may be added) hostility, of the Nizam's successor, his second son, Secunder Jah, was counteracted by the weight, influence, and authority of Auzun-ool-Omrah, who, in the formation of the alliance, was identified with his late master.

8. From his death may be dated the commencement of that interference on our part in the internal affairs of the administration which has gradually attained its late and present extreme and most burthensome degree. The character of the sovereign rendered it indispensable to the preservation of the alliance, that we should interpose our influence in the selection of a successor to the late Auzun-ool-Omra. There was not wanting a powerful party which had always been hostile to the alliance, and the weakness of the sovereign's mind and intellect left him an easy prey to their intrigues and machinations. The late able Meer Allum, who for many years had filled the office of minister for English Affairs at the Court of the Nizam, and to whose exertions and influence the formation of the alliance was mainly to be attributed, was the individual whose appointment to the vacant office it became necessary for us to secure, by the direct exercise of our influence in opposition to the wishes of the adverse party, and even of the Nizam himself. The interference employed for his appointment was necessarily continued for his support. A widely organized conspiracy, directed to the removal of Meer Allum, and the subversion of the alliance, was formed, with the concurrence and participation of the Nizam himself. In this state of things no alternative was left to us but to leave Meer Allum to be the victim of hostility, created by his attachment to the interests of the British Government, and to abandon the alliance, or to interfere authoritatively for the protection of both, every consideration of honour, justice, and policy, opposed the former course; a course, indeed, which could not have been adopted without endangering in its consequences the very existence of our power, as was conclusively shown by the minute recorded by the Governor-general on that occasion.

9. On the death of that able and extraordinary man in 1808, the same necessity, in an increased degree, arose for the direct interposition of the British power. Various competitors for the office arose, and, by a species of compromise, an administration was ultimately formed under our guarantee, of which Moonceer-ool-Moolk, the brother-in-law of the Nizam, was the ostensible head; but the actual functions of which, according to a written

**Appendix, No. 9.**

Letter from  
*N. E. Edmonstone,*  
Esq. to  
*T. H. Vallée, Esq.*

agreement, were to be exclusively exercised by *Rajah Chundoo Lahl*. This was another great, yet unavoidable, step in the progress of our interference, which, from the peculiar character and disposition of the *Nizam*, the intrigues and hostility of *Mooneer-ool-Moolk*, and the weakness and want of personal weight and energy of *Chundoo Lahl*, who depended, not only for his continuance in office, and for the means of exercising its duties, but even for the security of his person, upon our support, necessarily extended to the internal concerns of the administration in all its branches. Under such a government the reins of authority naturally became relaxed in an extreme degree, and insubordination, turbulence and disorder began to prevail throughout the country. The reform of the *Nizam's* military establishment became an object of paramount importance; but to such a task *Chundoo Lahl* was of himself utterly unequal, and through our agency, and through the instrumentality of our own subjects alone, was it capable of being accomplished. But the internal condition of the country continued to decline, and the still farther interference of the British Government was indispensable to obviate the extreme evils of insurrection and unrestrained anarchy and confusion, until, as has been seen, we have proceeded to the length of appointing British officers to superintend and conduct the formation of revenue settlements, and control the local government of the provinces.

10. The above scanty outline, without adverting to various incidents and conjunctures requiring the energetic application of our controlling influence or physical exertions, will suffice to show that the progress of our interference in the internal administration of the state of *Hyderabad* could not by possibility have been arrested without a retrogradation, which must in its effects have led to the downfall of our power.

11. The effects of our alliance with the *Peishwah*, under the treaty of *Bassein*, were similarly manifested within a few years after its conclusion. They are accurately described in the following extract from a letter from the Political Secretary to the Resident at *Pooná*, under date the 18th August 1805, when *Marquis Cornwallis* had succeeded to the government. "His Lordship observes with deep concern the utter inefficiency of the *Peishwah's* authority to maintain the allegiance and subordination of his officers and subjects. His Highness is compelled to solicit the interference of the British Government to repress civil commotion among the public officers of his government, and to provide the means of paying the troops which by treaty he is pledged to furnish for the service of the war. His Highness himself, solicitous only of personal ease and security, seems disposed to leave to the British Government the internal regulation of his dominions, and the suppression of that anarchy and confusion which is the necessary result of a weak and inefficient government. We are thus reduced to the alternative, either of mixing in all the disorder and contentions incident to the loose and inefficient condition of the *Peishwah's* administration, or of suffering the government and dominion of His Highness to be completely overthrown by the unrestrained effects of general anarchy and rebellion."

12. Here is a striking example of the effects of that apathy and loss of energy on the part of the governing power which is the natural offspring of the dependence of a weaker on a more powerful State. In this instance the paralyzing operation of the alliance began in the lifetime of the party with whom it was formed.

13. These instances are adduced to exemplify the necessary effects which sooner or later must be produced by supremacy on one hand, and dependence on the other;\* and it is unnecessary to lengthen this discussion by tracing in a similar manner the operation of other subsidiary alliances. The common incidents of the world, and the varieties of the human character, will for ever be changing the relative situation of the two parties, and create the necessity of a change of measures on the part of the superior member of the alliance in the manner above exemplified. In a disputed succession, the protecting power must interfere to decide between the rival claimants, and continue to support the successful candidate. In the case of a minority, the paramount State must have a share in the nomination of the regency. Where the weakness and incompetency of the prince involves the dependent kingdom in anarchy, or his person is endangered by insurrection, the interposition of the power which guarantees his rights becomes unavoidable. If he be hostile, it must control him, and coerce all who may be disposed to support him. If a dispute arises between the protected State and any other, the protecting party is bound by its engagements to become a judge in the cause, and to enforce its decision; and this compulsory interference, once exercised, is in its nature progressive.

14. These remarks are equally applicable to that class of alliances of which subsidiary engagements do not form a part. There are of course different stipulations in the several treaties, varying according to local or personal circumstances, but the general principle of all is the same. The contracting party places himself and his country in a state of dependence upon the British Government; he engages to act "in subordinate co-operation" with it, to recognise its supremacy; to furnish troops, if required, to have no connection with other States, except through the British Government; to submit all disputes with other States or chiefs to our arbitration. In some of these engagements, the party binds himself to receive and abide by our advice. On our part, we engage to protect the other party against all enemies; and we are bound by the very nature of the compact to guarantee the legitimate succession to the throne. Every engagement contains a stipulation to this effect, that the prince shall be absolute ruler of his own country, and that the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced into it: in other words, we engage not to interfere in the internal administration of the country; an engagement which the very nature of the connection renders, and events have shown to be, nugatory; and not only does this interference become unavoidable, but also incapable of being regulated by any fixed principle, or confined by any fixed limits, for it must vary, both in quality and in degree, with the ever varying incidents

\* Mysore has furnished another example.

\* The phrase introduced into most of the Treaties at the close of the last war.

incidents that give rise to it, with the character, qualities and temper of the sovereign, with the accidental circumstances of his personal situation, with the condition of the country, and the disposition of the people.

15. We arrive then at this conclusion, that we cannot avoid an embarrassing, vexatious and onerous interference in the internal concerns of the protected States, without either an essential modification of our treaties, or an entire abandonment of our alliances. The latter measure, as respects the States of Rappootana at least, having been contemplated, it is important to consider the policy and practicability of adopting it, and the discussion of this question appears to require a retrospective view of the principles by which we have been guided in the establishment of our political relations on the Continent of India, in connection with the antecedent condition, and the inherent genius, character and disposition of the native States.

16. It is an unquestionable fact, that the fundamental principles and the leading objects of our governments abroad have been self-defence, and the security, tranquillity and prosperity of our possessions, to abstain from the pursuits of conquest and the extension of our dominion; and to promote, as far as our means and influence could contribute to that end, general peace and tranquillity. In these respects, the character of our policy is diametrically opposed to the genius and disposition of the native States of India, for, "with them," (to quote the words of Lord Minto) "war, rapine, and conquest constitute an avowed principle of action, a just and legitimate pursuit, and the chief source of public glory, sanctioned, and even recommended, by the ordinances of religion," and prosecuted without the semblance or pretext of justice, with a savage disregard of every obligation of humanity and public faith, and restrained alone by the power of resistance." Hence it is, that the establishment of a balance of power in India, such as exists in Europe, has ever been, and will ever be, impossible, and hence too it is that we have been drawn into those contests which, terminating in our favour, have gradually led to the extension of our territorial possessions and our political ascendancy in that country. As the only practicable substitute for an impracticable balance of power, the British Government, under the administration of Marquis Wellesley, pursued the policy of establishing subsidiary alliances with all the principal States. "Every principle of true policy" (says his Lordship) "demands that no effort should be omitted by the British Government to establish a permanent foundation of general tranquillity, by securing to every State the free enjoyment of its just rights and independence, and by frustrating every project calculated to disturb the possessions or to violate the rights of the established powers of Hindostan, and of the Deccan." The prosecution of this policy, with respect to the treaty of Bassem, however, chiefly produced the war with the confederated Mahratta chiefs, which ended in the acquisition of new territory, and the formation of new alliances, in the spirit of the same defensive, pacific and tranquillizing system. The progress of it was arrested by the effects of the alarm which it excited in England, which occasioned the recall of Lord Wellesley, and the re-appointment of Lord Cornwallis.

17 That nobleman, deeply impressed, like his employers, with a perception of the embarrassment of these alliances, was not only adverse to their extension, but desirous of taking advantage of any circumstances that would warrant the abrogation of those already formed, and was most particularly anxious to abridge the degree of our interference in the internal concerns of the States with which we were thus inconveniently allied. His successor, Sir G. Barlow, pursued the same policy, and the refusal of the Rajah of Jodopore to ratify the treaty which his agent had concluded, and the dissolution of that with Jyenagur, left us free, at the termination of the war, from all such alliances with any of the States or Chieftains of Rappootana and Malwa, and we even created a bar to the formation of them by a specific article in the treaty, which was finally concluded with Dowlat Row Scindia. The subsidiary treaty with that chief ceased in consequence of his renewed hostile proceedings, and neither that which succeeded, nor the treaty of peace with Holkar, contained subsidiary or protective stipulations. The only semblance of departure from this system of policy occurred in the engagements of protection against the ambitious designs of Runjeet Sing, of Lahore, which we were compelled to form, in the year 1808, for our own defence, with the Sikh chiefs between the Jumna and the Sutledge, and in the endeavours (unsuccessfully) employed by the Governor General, Lord Minto, with the sanction of the home authorities, to effect a subsidiary alliance with the State of Nagpore, in consequence of the attack of Ameer Khan upon that State in 1810. This system of forbearing, or (as it may be termed) retreating policy; this endeavour to stay the progression of our power, however, combined with the result of the Mahratta war, has, in the end, only led to that condition of things in Central India which called forth our exertions for the destruction of the predatory power of the Mahrattas, Patans and Pindarries, and brought about the present vast extension of our dominion and supremacy.

18. By the conquests of the former war, the field of occupation for the military forces of the Mahrattas and others was most materially limited. Multitudes, therefore, of the military class, including the hordes of Pindarries antecedently attached to the armies of Scindia and Holkar, were left comparatively unemployed, and obliged to seek subsistence by plunder. To the Pindarries, lands were assigned by those chiefs as the price of their abstaining from the plunder of their territories. Hence their embodied state, and their annual dreadful incursions into neighbouring and distant countries, while the predatory troops of Ameer Khan occupied the field which we had abandoned, and Central India became the scene of violence, oppression, devastation, anarchy and misery.

19. The endeavour was thus made to stop in the career of advancement towards the  
(445.—VI.) supremacy

Appendix, No. 9.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq. to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

\* This, however, must be understood to refer exclusively to Mahomedan governments.

Appendix, No. 9.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq., to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

† 3d April 1814,  
answered under  
date 29th April.

supremacy over all the States of India. It was retarded, but whether or not it could have been prevented from being established in some shape or other, is a question which most of those who have contemplated the subject have been disposed to answer in the negative.

20. It is certain that we must have undertaken measures for the annihilation of the Pindarries as a concentrated force. Whether or not that object could have been accomplished without encountering that combined opposition of the Mahratta powers, our triumph over which has placed us in our present condition of supremacy, may be questioned, but the attempt was not made. The mind of the public has been impressed with the belief that this combination was occasioned by our resolution to effect the extirpation of the Pindarries. The Peishwah, the Rajah of Nagpore, Scindia and Holkar, have been supposed to be instigated to combine against us by no other motive than a solicitude to protect these inhuman plunderers, these scourges of the human race, from the penalty which their atrocious barbarities had so long and so loudly demanded. Such, however, it may be confidently asserted, was not the case\*; in point of fact, the late Marquis of Hastings, very soon after his arrival in India, recorded his opinion, that a system of policy, opposed to that which had been adopted by Marquis Cornwallis, and followed up by Sir George Barlow and Lord Minto, was demanded by the actual condition of India; and in a Minute, framed within a few months† after he assumed the office of Governor General, containing a review of the state of our political relations, he described a plan of a federation of States, of which the British Government should be the controlling head, as that which it was our wisest policy, if possible, to carry into effect. Under this impression his Lordship availed himself of all the opportunities, which succeeding events abundantly supplied, for the realization of this scheme of political federation. It had long been obvious, that if our views extended beyond the suppression of the embodied Pindarries, if we were to pursue the object of putting down the predatory powers of Hindostan, it would be necessary to relieve the several States and principalities of that region from the lawless violence and oppression of the Mahrattas and the Patans, and restore them to the free exercise of their rights, and the full possession of their respective territories, under our protection and guarantee, as shown in the following extract from a Paper of Notes on the subject of establishing a subsidiary force with the Rajah of Nagpore, written in January 1812, during the administration of Lord Minto, and subsequently recorded by desire of the Marquis of Hastings.

"From all these considerations, therefore, this conclusion may, perhaps, be drawn, either that we should pursue a system entirely defensive, or that we should proceed upon a great scale of military and political measures, for the purpose of putting down the increased and increasing predatory powers of Hindostan. The latter would obviously involve a plan for the restoration and future support of the regular and established States of that now distracted region under our paramount protection and control. It is not proposed at present to enter into a discussion of the details of such a plan, which involves a variety of difficult and embarrassing questions, the object of the preceding remarks being merely to show, that if we proceed beyond the limits of a system purely defensive, we should apparently be compelled to act upon the plan above described, and, perhaps, it results also from these remarks, that we cannot expect permanently, nor even for any considerable period of time, to avoid that necessity."

21. The plan above adverted to, however, differed materially from that which was contemplated by the Marquis of Hastings, at the commencement of his administration; and also from that which was ultimately accomplished by him, although the fundamental principle was the same. But under any possible modification the prospective embarrassments of such a plan presented themselves to the mind of his Lordship's predecessor, in a form which deterred rather than encouraged the prosecution of it; and it became subsequently the anxious subject of consideration, and of private as well as official correspondence with our principal political agents, to organize a scheme for the extinction of the Pindarries, in co-operation with other States, which might not involve the necessity of ulterior proceedings. At this point the policy of the two administrations diverged; and as it may tend to aid a judgment in the question under consideration, to show that difference in a more detailed and perspicuous form, it seems useful to transcribe the following extract (though long) from a Minute recorded in July 1815, having reference to a despatch from the Governor General to the Vice-President in Council:

"The Governor General, in the despatch now before us, distinctly intimates his decided opinion, that the actual condition, views and dispositions of the States of India are such as to expose the British dominions constantly to a degree of danger that demands an immediate and extensive augmentation of the military force of this establishment, and that an essential change in the relative condition of the States of Central India is indispensably necessary to the security of this empire; and his Lordship adverts to the enterprise against the Pindarries as desirable and important, principally because leading to the accomplishment of such a change. His Lordship's words are as follow:—"It was these remoter contingencies which made it desirable to settle the question of the Pindarries while we had the irritated passions of the Peishwah‡ in unison with us upon it, and when Nagpore, if it did not co-operate, would at least have been neuter. That settlement would necessarily have been followed by arrangements of much greater import. I allude to the dissolution of those bars which, by the existing treaty with Scindia and Holkar, forbid our availing ourselves of the supplications of the Rajpoot Rajahs to become our feudatories;

a spontaneous

‡ They had been ravaging his country.

\* A paper of observations on the origin of the great revolution which was effected by our arms in 1817-18, written about eleven years ago, discusses this question in great detail.

a spontaneous offer, whereby, were we at liberty to accept it, we could secure, for very many years, the untroubled repose of India." And in another place, "But there must be a very different settlement of Central India from that which at present exists to justify us in saying we have no sudden emergencies to dread."

"We are to infer, therefore," the Minute proceeds to say, "that the Governor General contemplates the actual and early prosecution of the arrangement above described, as essential to our political security."

"That such a settlement of the Central States affords the only means of being permanently secured from the eventual incursions of the predatory bodies which infest the region of Hindostan, is a position which I myself have maintained. I have also always entertained, and more than once recorded, the opinion, that an enterprise against the Pindarries might possibly, without any previous design on our part, lead unavoidably to the prosecution of military and political operations and arrangements of a very extensive and complicated nature, and this sentiment has been expressed in our despatches to the Secret Committee. But this eventual and probable consequence of an enterprise against the Pindarries is the very consideration that has principally withheld us from undertaking it. The enormous expense of the military preparations which would be necessary at the three presidencies, with a view either to prevent or to be prepared to meet such an exigency, the degree of hazard which of course could not but attend a warfare in the heart of Hindostan; a consideration of the numerous and conflicting interests which, in the event of success, we should have to adjust; the consequent total change in the political system of India, and the complete departure from the declared and prescribed principles of our policy which the arrangement would involve, all presented themselves in a form which tended rather to discourage than invite the prosecution of the enterprise, and, as the Board will recollect, induced the Governor general in Council to record the resolution to abstain from undertaking the extirpation of the Pindarries from the territories which they occupy, until the sanction of the authorities at home should be received."

"Since the final adjustment of our external relations in the year 1806, the settlement of Central India, in the sense above described, has never been contemplated as a direct object of pursuit, because it has never been deemed indispensably necessary to the stability of our dominion, however requisite it might be if we aimed at the complete and permanent extinction of the predatory powers of Hindostan."

"Between the views, therefore, formerly entertained by this government, and those now professed by the Governor-general, there is this essential difference, that the former contemplated a settlement of Central India such as the Governor-general seems to have in view, involving, as it must, extensive and complicated operations and arrangements, military and political, merely as an eventual consequence of measures directed to the suppression of the predatory bodies infesting Hindostan and the Dekhan; whereas his Lordship appears to regard it as a primary object of systematic pursuit, on which the safety of these dominions essentially depends."

"I am bound, however, to declare, that I am unable to join in the opinion which his Lordship has expressed regarding the perils of our situation. I am unable to discover any traces of that combination against which his Lordship deems it necessary to provide by an extensive augmentation of our permanent military force, and by the prosecution of the military operations and political arrangements to which his Lordship has adverted, in connection with the meditated enterprise against the Pindarries. On the contrary, it appears to me that the events of the last twelve months have amply justified the confidence in our security, which a uniform attention to the character, condition, proceedings and interests of the states and powers of Hindostan, during a long series of years, had led me to derive, from a consideration of the extreme difficulty and improbability of any combination directed to the subversion of the British power in India."

22. Events, as already incidentally remarked, abundantly proved the prosecution of the comprehensive scheme of political ascendancy in Central India thus projected by the Governor-general, and, as a first step towards it, he availed himself of the prostrate condition of the Peishwah's power, the result of his treacherous conduct, to exact from him, by the treaty of June 1817, the renunciation of his character of chief of the Mahratta federation, and the cession of all his rights, interests, and pretensions in Bundelcund, Malwa, Rappootana, and Hindostan; thus planting at once, to the extent of the Peishwah's rights, our dominion and control in the centre of India. Remotely to antecedent measures and events, and proximately to the humiliation of the Peishwah, is to be attributed that combination of the Mahratta States which first removed the barrier opposed by pre-existing treaties to the formation of alliances with the chiefs of Malwa and Rappootana; and, by the splendid success of our arms under the masterly arrangements and guidance of the Marquis of Hastings, ended in the liberation from their thralldom and devastation of the predatory armies of the Mahrattas, Patans, and Pindarries, and the formation of the existing numerous treaties and engagements by which every State and chieftain in the Peninsula, with the exception of Scindia, was placed in a condition of dependance upon our power, and the British supremacy was established over all."

23. The principle and end of this plan of policy, as before observed, are most benevolent, and form a most honourable contrast with the motives and objects which actuated our predecessors in the empire of Hindostan. Its motive and its end are external tranquillity and peace, internal prosperity and happiness, among the states and principalities subject to our paramount power. The former, indeed (external tranquillity and peace), may be said to have been accomplished, but accomplished at the sacrifice of the latter. The system has not been productive of its intended effects, because it is not adapted to the genius, disposition,

sition, character, and habits of the people. It presupposes, what does not exist, an inclination among the native States, if protected from external danger, to cultivate the arts of peace; and a tendency in the character of their institutions, and in their forms of government, favourable to that object; and therefore it is, that the internal prosperity of almost every State that has been placed under our guarantee and protection has declined, and disorder and anarchy have ensued. What then is the remedy for this most undesirable state of things? or is there indeed any remedy, or any means of palliating the evils of the system? These are the questions which we have to consider.

24. To take advantage of every opportunity, and to endeavour to create the means of withdrawing, to the utmost practicable extent, from the alliances and engagements which we have contracted, but especially from the alliances formed with the States of Rajpootana, seems to have been one suggested remedy. A change of such magnitude and importance, however, in the character and principle of our policy in India, requires to be considered and examined with anxious care. When we reflect upon the very peculiar and unprecedented nature of the tenure by which we hold an empire, either of direct dominion or paramount control over millions dissociated from us by the absence of all those ties which unite or admit the union of the nations of the western hemisphere, we must be cautious of adopting any line of proceeding calculated to diminish that general sense of our moral and political ascendancy and supremacy, that awe and respect, the prevalence of which among the native states and people of India is unquestionably essential to the maintenance and security of our imperial dominion; and the problem to be solved is, whether we can diminish or withdraw the active exercise of that supremacy without impairing the estimate of our credit, our constancy, our public faith, and our power, in the eyes of the people whom we govern, and the States with which we are allied.

25. We have seen that, in the opinion of some of the greatest statesmen that have presided over the affairs in India, the attainment of that political elevation which should enable us to control (what may be aptly termed) the endemic elements of disorder was necessary to the maintenance of our position in that country, and that, in fact, events, arising out of the character and disposition of the people, and the political condition of India, left us no alternative but the loss or the aggrandizement of our power; it may then be perhaps more than doubted whether the reverse of that policy to which we owe our security may not even now endanger it. We could not of course dissolve any of the alliances which we have contracted without the consent of the other contracting party; and as it might suit the views of one and not of another to consent, we should probably have to encounter additional inconvenience and embarrassment, without materially diminishing the evils of the existing state of things; whilst the manifestation thus afforded of a solicitude to get rid of these alliances, would naturally tend to shake the credit of our public faith, and at the same time invest us, in the eyes of the native population of India, with a character of vacillation, weakness, and inconsistency, injurious to the credit and to the reality of that political ascendancy which the preservation of our power demands. The political axiom, that to recede from ascendancy is to court decay, is no where in any degree so operative as in India.

26. Apparently the dissolution of the alliances with the States of Rajpootana is alone contemplated; but supposing that this object were attainable and attained, are we not to expect that, under the natural operation of those protective engagements (described in a preceding part of this discussion) embarrassments, difficulties, and evils, similar to those which we experience from our treaties with the Rajpoot States, will arise elsewhere? Look, for instance, at the numerous petty states and principalities in and on the confines of Guzerat and in Malwa with whom we have formed these engagements. Look at the great feudatories, usually designated by the title of Southern Jagheerdars, whose respective rights and possessions we hereditarily guarantee. Are we to proceed in the work of political retrogradation, *pari passu*, with the evils and inconveniences which the indefensible duties of political supremacy are liable to produce in the progress of human events and vicissitudes, such as have occurred at Boondee, Kota, Jodepoor, Odepore, and Jynaghiur? And can we avow and pursue such a system consistently with honour, equity, and public faith? If, from the inherent disposition and intrinsic character of the native States of India, we have either systematically or compulsorily pursued the policy of gradually establishing our political supremacy over every state and principality, great and small, throughout the Peninsula, as the only means of securing our own possessions, repressing lawless plunder and devastation, and establishing general tranquillity and peace, and have finally completed that object (for the State of the late Dowlat Row Scindia, in its present relative condition, hardly forms an exception), the conclusion seems inevitably to follow, that this supremacy must be maintained; and if so, the endeavour to withdraw from the connexion with the Rajpoot States must be abandoned. And the next object of inquiry will be, how far is it possible to preserve the benefits and fulfil the obligations of that supremacy, without continuing to suffer the evils which have hitherto resulted from it.

27. It is to be feared that a fundamental error was committed in the formation of these alliances with the States of Central India, by the introduction of stipulations which have rendered unavoidable our interference in their internal concerns; stipulations which perhaps were unnecessary for the attainment of the object we had in view. That object was the relief of those States from the grievous thralldom, exactions, and devastations of the predatory powers, and the consequent restoration of their rights, with the unrestricted exercise of their authority, within the limits of their respective territories, under the paramount protection and guarantee of the British power. The success of our arms did relieve them from the bondage and oppression under which they had so long laboured. The chiefs

of those States hailed us as their deliverers, gave us entire credit for the liberality of our professions, and both readily and gratefully recognised us in the character, which we desired to assume, of guardians and protectors. They acknowledged our supremacy, and were prepared to yield to us a willing allegiance. As far, therefore, as that point was concerned, the great objects of the alliances might apparently have been secured without the specific stipulations which were introduced for their security, such as those which debar the sovereign from intercourse or connection with any other States, from entering into any negotiation except through the British Government, which require a reference to us of all disputes with other States, and provide for a contingent of troops, the stipulations which transfer to us the tribute formerly paid to the Mahmttas, and in some cases a gradual increase of that tribute. These stipulations have occasioned the appointment of residents or political agents at the courts of these princes, in order to watch over the fulfilment of them. The presence of functionaries, the representatives of a power paramount to that of the chiefs at whose courts they reside, has of itself a tendency to degrade them in the eyes of their vassals, feudatories, and subjects, and the high bearing which those functionaries, from the very nature of their office, are obliged to maintain, aids this effect; whilst the duties of supervision, which the stipulations of the treaties demand, lead to a degree of interference in the proceedings and internal administration of those States injurious to the authority, and offensive to the feelings, of their rulers, and of the high-minded t'hakoor or barons who compose the feudal federation of these ancient principalities. Hence the spirit and the operation of these treaties are at variance. In terms we disclaim that very interference which other conditions of the treaty render unavoidable, and hence the feelings of gratitude and attachment have, it is to be feared, been changed into irritation and aversion. The civil has increased from the great number of political agents stationed within the region of Central India, and corresponding separately with the Supreme Government, the effect of which has been to destroy all uniformity of system. The zeal of our political agents has, on some occasions, carried them too far; and the Supreme Government, at such a distance, necessarily guided, in a great measure, by the representations and the counsels of their agents, have been led to sanction proceedings which have been productive of the most serious embarrassments. The introduction, therefore, of a more proximate control, intermediate between them and the Supreme Government, with a view to prevent undue interference, and to harmonize the operation of the numerous treaties and engagements in that quarter, formed the basis of the plan proposed by Sir John Malcolm, in the year 1827, for the management of our political relations in Central India. Whatever may be thought of the specific machinery of that plan, the wisdom of its theory seems to be indisputable, and in the consideration which has been given to it, both at home and abroad, it does appear to me, that a due distinction has not been drawn between the machinery and the theory of his plan.

28. The principle which he lays down is precisely that which was originally professed: it is well and comprehensively described, by the term "*conservative*;" to maintain the ruler of each State in the full and unshackled exercise of his rights of sovereignty, and of the powers of internal government; not to degrade, by making him sensible of his dependent condition, but to elevate him in his own eyes and those of his subjects by our own example and forbearance, when any events should render the influence or the counsel of the paramount power indispensable; such interference to be exercised with reference to those governing principles. Such a uniform system of action, Sir John Malcolm justly conceived (and indeed facts have sufficiently demonstrated), could not be secured whilst numerous political agents exercised their functions in a direct and separate communication with the distant authority of the Governor-general in Council. He considered it to demand the superintending and controlling authority of an individual, locally approximated, possessing the capacity for such a charge, and directing his whole and exclusive attention to its duties, with the aid of a gradation of subordinates, but controlled and guided in his turn by the general superintendence of the Supreme Government, with whom he would exclusively correspond. His expectation was, that by keeping continually in view, and acting upon the principle of preserving and elevating the dignity, respect, and authority of the allied chief; by systematically and scrupulously abstaining, as far as possible, from taking part in the internal concerns of the State; by not considering as causes for interference many of those circumstances which have produced it, and by carefully guarding and modifying with delicacy the interference which might become unavoidable, the evils which have resulted from a different course might be mitigated or removed, and we might for a long time retard, though we might not be able permanently to obviate, the tendency which supremacy naturally has to absorb the power which it controls.

29. If the existing stipulations of these treaties of alliance are to be maintained, this species of machinery would seem to be absolutely necessary, in order to secure a uniformity of system, and at least to mitigate the evils of the existing state of our political relations in the region of Central India. But it may be apprehended, that a material modification of those articles of treaty is requisite to the efficient operation of the "*conservative*" principles above described. To this object, therefore, our views should be directed, and the rule of action should be, to abrogate what is injurious and offensive, and tends to produce the necessity of interference, and to preserve that which is beneficial and acceptable to the other party; carefully, however, guarding against the supposition that we are desirous of withdrawing from the alliance, or of resigning the supremacy and general superintendence and control which forms the basis of it.

30. This revision of our alliances would become the subject of negotiation with each of the Rajpoot States, and would require to be conducted with great skill, delicacy, and

\* Not less than 14  
or 15.



Appendix, No. 9.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq. to  
T. H. Phipps, Esq.

attention, in order to guard against a misapprehension of our motives, and make manifest our real views. On their part, if so conducted, no difficulty is to be anticipated, since our object would be to remove, not to add to, existing restrictions and impediments to their free agency, limited only by the obligations of submission to the paramount authority of the British Government. In such renewed engagements, it would probably be thought advisable to omit those articles which preclude the other contracting party from all connection or communication with other States, which stipulate for our arbitration of disputes, and which require them to furnish a contingent of troops at our demand. The omission of these stipulations would not affect our right of interference, in the event of their prosecuting any negotiation, or becoming involved in any disputes, calculated to affect the interests of the alliance, nor prevent our obtaining their co-operation in the only case in which its necessity could be anticipated, a case in which their safety or their interests would be equally endangered with our own. A modification of the articles relative to the payment of tribute would also be particularly worthy of attention. If the present amount of any should be burthensome, we should gain more politically than we should lose financially by its reduction. But especially it would be advisable to abrogate those stipulations which provide for a gradually increasing payment of tribute. In a word, our relations under the suggested modifications would be reduced to the simple form of internal independence on one part, and political supremacy and protection on the other. It would be a part of the system to withdraw our political agents\*, the effect of whose presence at the courts of the protected States has already been described. Consistently indeed with the relative situation of the contracting parties, and with the *restorative* and "*conservative*" object in view, the system of representation should be reversed: the inferior state should send its representative to the superior, and our intercourse generally be maintained through that agency, an arrangement which would serve, in a peculiar degree, to give consequence and dignity to the allied State, and thus produce an effect diametrically opposite to that which is almost unavoidably produced by the commanding and depressing presence of a representative of the paramount power at the court of its protected ally.

31 If the object of this simplification of our alliances with the Rajpoot States should be attained; if, restored to their rank and dignity in the scale of nations, they enjoyed independence and freedom of action within the limits of their respective territories, under the fostering power and guarantee of the British Government, they would feel the strongest interest in the maintenance of the relations so established, and in a season of exigency would become more efficient allies, and furnish more active and real assistance, than ever could be enforced by the specific stipulations of a treaty. Indeed, under a system of connection, the operation of which is to degrade the dignity, and impair the authority of the chief, to wound his pride, and alienate his attachment, his hostility, open or clandestine, rather than his cordial co-operation, is to be expected in the hour of need, and the articles of treaty which require him to furnish his contingent, and bring forward his resources, as in a common cause, will either prove unavailing, or serve as a cover to the prosecution of hostile designs against us.

32 I am aware, however, of the difficulty and the disadvantage of thus fundamentally changing a system of policy that has been acted upon for more than ten years. Perhaps, indeed, such may be the alterations which events have produced, especially in those States which, in the minority of the chiefs, are governed by regencies, that it may not be practicable thus to retrace our steps, and to render these States what it is conceived they might have been rendered under a more forbearing and confiding scheme of political arrangement, but the evil and injustice of the present state of things are so great, and the prospective and still increasing embarrassments, and even dangers, of the existing system are so manifest, that no obstacle, short of physical impracticability, the violation of public faith, or the abandonment of a vitally important principle, should be permitted to impede the adoption of any measures that afford a reasonable prospect of relief and remedy. But if we must maintain our alliances and engagements in their present form, and if the operation of them must continue to be superintended by resident ministers and political agents, it must be our endeavour to conduct our relations with the allied States as much as possible in suberviency to the professed principles of their formation. We must endeavour to render the chiefs, what in words and by our treaties we recognise them to be, "the absolute rulers of their country." But how can they in effect be so, if we, by our agents, interfere in any manner in the administration of their affairs? It seems theoretically harmless, nay, wise and benevolent, for instance, to interpose the weight of our influence or our counsel for the appointment or support of an efficient minister; for the improvement of some branch of the administration, for the remedy of some gross abuse, or the promotion of some obvious good; but such interposition on the part of the representative of supremacy is in its effect an authoritative act of interference in the internal concerns of the administration, and leads of necessity to greater; for the influence of the paramount power must not be exerted in vain, and its counsels must not be despised. Are we then to allow the country to fall into ruin through the incapacity or the vices of the administration, the machinations of a faction, or the abuses of authority? To which it may be answered, that in a State really left unfettered by external power, such evils bring about their own remedy, and especially in States constituted as are those of

Rajpootana

\* The reduction of expense which this would produce would be a set-off against a diminution of the amount of tribute.

Letter from  
N. B. Edmonstone,  
Esq. to  
T. H. Vilters, Esq.

Rajpootana the high-minded character of the federative barons would be efficiently called into action, and so has it been in ancient times. It is a remarkable fact, that during centuries of the paramount sway of the Mogul and Patan dynasties, this high-minded race have preserved, unimpaired, the independence of their internal administration, and the pride and efficiency of their federal and feudal institutions; and they showed themselves, in some periods of their history, not less useful as allies, than they were at others formidable as enemies, to the Mahomedan rulers of the empire of India.

33. It may, perhaps, be alleged, that in the cases which have actually occurred of the minority of the eluel, of a contest for the regency, of rival candidates for the post of minister, and other predicaments endangering the tranquillity or welfare of the State, it was impracticable for us to remain entirely neutral, and will be so again under the recurrence of any similar exigency. This is the very evil of our situation. But whatever may have been the unavoidable necessity of our interference on such occasions under the existing conditions of our treaties, it does not follow that such interference would have been called for under the simple form of our connection before noticed, as that which our experience now teaches us it would have been wise to form. Our interference, however, on those occasions, has not been regulated by any fixed or uniform principle, and this at least is susceptible of remedy, although it may not be practicable, without an essential change in the conditions and the management of these foreign relations, to obviate altogether the evils of our interference. It is scarcely possible for us to lay down positive rules for the guidance of our political agents (if they must be retained at the several Courts of Central India) on the point of interference in specific cases. General principles only can be laid down, and rules must be negative rather than positive.

34. Unfortunately, there is one of our alliances so singularly encumbered by a provision of treaty, that unless that provision can be abrogated, interference on our part of the most vexatious, injurious and embarrassing nature must be perpetuated. The supplemental article\* of the treaty with Kota, of course, is that alluded to. No proposition suggests itself of a nature to be offered with a chance of obtaining the concurrence of the party to whom the British Government is pledged by that subsidiary article of treaty to its abrogation; apparently, it must be left to the local government to devise the means of accomplishing this important object without a breach of faith.

27 October 1829.

(signed) N. B. E.

# Appendix No. 10.

LETTER from Lieut.-Colonel *Barnecall* to *T Hyde Vilters, Esq.*

Sir,

London, March 5, 1832.

1st. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th ult., which my absence at Brighton occasioned my not receiving until my return to London, and which ill health has prevented me from before replying to.

2d. My public services being confined to the western side of India, my experience therefore is limited to the provinces and the dependant states subject to the presidency of Bombay, and more especially to the districts ceded to the British Government in the provinces of Guzerat, and the dependant tributary states of the western peninsula, commonly denominated Kattiwar.

3d. The new acquisitions of territory on this side of India since 1813, are those set forth in the schedule to the treaty of Poonah, dated on the 17th June 1817, and also the districts and right to tribute ceded by his Highness the Guicowar, which will be found particularly stated in the supplementary treaty of offensive and defensive alliance concluded with that state on the 6th November 1817.

4th. After the termination of the war that concluded by the conquest of the possessions of the late Peishwa, a further acquisition of territory was obtained, the value and extent of which I cannot state from memory, but all particulars relating to it will be found accurately detailed in the report of the Honourable Mount Stuart Elphinstone, on the Poonah conquests, dated in the year 1819.

5th. Independent of the acquisitions that have become subjected to the direct rule of the British Government in Guzerat, our political relations have been enlarged, from undertaking the payment and recovery of the tributes that his Highness the Guicowar is entitled to recover from the tributary states of Kattiwar and the Myhee Kanta.

6th. The condition of our political relations on this side of India are accurately stated in the minutes of Mr. Elphinstone, on the state of them with the Rajah of Kutch and the tributary states of Katiwar and Myhee Kanta, dated in February and March 1821, and in the further minutes of Sir John Malcolm, on a visit to all these courts and countries in February and March 1830.

7th. The

Appendix, No 10.

Letter from  
Lt.-Col. *Barnecall*  
to  
*T H. Vilters, Esq*

\* Guaranteeing the succession to the Principality in the Rajah's family, and of the administration of affairs in that of his Minister, or rather Regent.—See Malcolm's Central India, vol. ii. p. 406.

7th. The exact condition of our relations with the Baroda state is also stated in the minute of Mr. Elphinstone, dated April 1820, when on a visit to the court of the Guicowar, and at which period he prescribed the degree of interference that was afterwards to regulate our intercourse with it. The definitive treaty with the Guicowar, dated April 21st, 1806, is generally on the model of those of Hyderabad and Bassein; it does not, like those treaties, contain a renunciation of all manner of concern with the Guicowar's children, subjects and servants; on the contrary, the 1st Article confirms and declares to be binding on both parties, their heirs and successors, the agreement of June 6th, 1802, and July 29th, 1802, in both of which our right to interfere in the internal government is expressly stipulated in the 5th Article of the treaty of June the 6th: it is agreed the Company is to grant the said chief its countenance and protection, according to justice, and what shall appear to be for the good of the country; respecting which also he is to listen to advice. We have also become bhanderry for the persons and property of some of the late ministers and bankers, and of many zemindars, and also for honourable treatment to various branches of the Guicowar family, and their enjoyment of certain allowances so long as the affairs of the Baroda state were under the influence of the British resident (owing to the imbecility of its prince). The effects were most favourable; and though dissatisfaction prevailed among some parties, this was more than compensated for by this state being relieved from the usurpation of the Arab soldiery, by the regularity introduced into the control of its finances, as well as by the entire liquidation of its old debts, under the reforms adopted and put in force by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, the first resident.

8th. Anund Row having died about 1819, he was succeeded by present ruling prince, Seajee Row, and as he was unwilling to allow a similar degree of interference on our part, we withdrew from all control in the details of this government.

9th. Upon withdrawing from our late system of control, the ruling prince engaged that the assignment on his revenues of 15 lacs of rupees, should be paid annually to the bankers in liquidation of the loans for which we had become bhanderry, and that all treaties and engagements should be carefully attended to.

10th. The minutes of Sir John Malcolm, dated in March 1828, reviewing our relations with this state from 1820 to 1828, will exhibit the effect of the misconduct of Seajee Row, and the measures that became essential for redeeming our obligations to individuals and the creditors of the state; and the further minute of Sir John Malcolm, dated on the 15th January 1830, will show all the late proceedings of this prince, and the measures subsequently adopted to furnish payment to the bankers, and to enforce the obligation we were under for their demands.

11th. The effect of our interference with the tributary states of Kattiwar has been the substitution of a state of comparative tranquillity for a state of anarchy, but with this change a decline has taken place in the energy of the chiefs and in the spirit of all the military classes. The reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker of 1807 and 1808, afford a complete history of the state and condition of the chiefs at that period. These are able and clear on every subject, from the conduct that ought to be observed by the princes and chiefs, to the rules for the recovery of the tribute and the preservation of general tranquillity.

12th. Our right in these states consists of a tribute, with the power of taking the necessary means to recover it; the tributaries are recognised as independent princes, entitled to the uncontrolled exercise of all the powers of government within their own territories, but subject to the obligations (under our guarantee) of not molesting our allies, our subjects, or one another.

13th. The effect of our protection has entirely changed the nature of the relations of the chiefs with reference to each other: it has forced them to relinquish their habits of private war and all their designs of ambition. It leaves to them the means of living in ease and security, but in doing so it has destroyed the energy which was heretofore kept alive by feelings of pride, as well as the necessity for great exertions for their personal security. As these stimulants have now ceased, the chiefs resign themselves to a life of indolence and indulgence, that leads to a careless expenditure of their revenues, and to the neglect of the duties of their governments.

14th. In this condition of their affairs several of the petty states are destitute of all vigour in their administrations, and their subjects are ill protected. Their ability to pay their tribute and to fulfil their police responsibilities is much impaired; they require to be more under the care and control of the political agent, and his interference to be active, in order to preserve their governments from decay. We can never reconcile the chiefs to the system that is in operation in the districts under our direct rule: our control within theirs must be of a nature suited to our obligations, the actual condition of the country, and to the usages and character of the people. The effects of our interference in these countries has preserved them and our own, as well as those of our allies, from internal disorders. The petty states and all others have acquired great advantages, but the chiefs and military classes regret the change, while all engaged in trade and agriculture view our interference as a benefit; our own subjects have in a degree profited from the same cause.

15th. In Kutch the government is carried on under the influence of the British resident, in conjunction with the regency formed of members of the family of the Rajah of Kutch.

16th. At Baroda, the British resident interferes to enforce treaties and attention to our guarantee obligations; and in the tributary states the political agents do not interfere in the internal management of the chiefs, so long as they fulfil their tributary obligations and preserve the peace of the country. They, however, interfere in arbitrating differences and disputes which arise between each petty state, and in all measures forced upon them for the security of the payment of the tribute, or the settlement of claims, all which demand their  
attention,

attention, as conservators of the general peace, by enforcing the obligations the states are under to each other and to us to preserve it.

17th. Our express stipulations with his Highness the Guicowar, oblige the British Government to maintain within his dominions 4,000 native infantry, two regiments of cavalry, a company of artillery and of pioneers. We are also bound by our treaty with the Rajah of Kutch to maintain within his territories one regiment of native infantry and a detachment of artillery.

18th. The military force required against extraordinary risks depends on the political relations, foreign or otherwise. As far as my information justifies my offering any opinion on this question, I should say, that the force which occupied Guzerat when I left India, is not more than adequate to fulfil the stipulations of our treaties, our ordinary obligations, and to provide against extraordinary risks.

19th. I regret that the want of data disables me, in the absence of all records, from replying with satisfaction to the question, as to the financial effects of the conquests, and the enlargements of our political relations on the western side of India.

20th. The principles of justice and expediency have, to the best of my knowledge, been adhered to in all our political relations. I am not aware of any instance in which they have been departed from.

21st. The duties of residents and political agents are to maintain the integrity of the engagements and treaties entered into with the several native states, and to perform all duties arising out of them or which they are instructed to undertake by their government.

22d. I can only answer this question with reference to the western side of India, where three political agencies and the duties of the British resident at Baroda, have been consolidated under our commissioner. By this arrangement a great saving in the public expenditure has been effected; and the residencies and political agencies are so regulated as to secure both efficiency and economy.

23d. As far as this question refers to India in general, and not to the western side of it, to which my information is limited, I cannot answer it with the accuracy that is desirable. My former answer, as to the amount of force requisite to meet our ordinary obligations and extraordinary risks, applies to it. The effect of our late treaties and engagements has been to induce the native states to discharge a force that was no longer necessary, either to protect them or to extend their power; they now rely chiefly upon our means for protection; and this circumstance widely extends the claims upon our establishments, and especially in countries in which the predatory classes abound in great numbers, and the frontiers of which are inhabited by tribes of a warlike and restless character, who alone are prevented from disturbing the peace by the means we have in readiness to repel and punish their aggressions. A great reduction in the numerical strength of our army and of irregular troops has taken place of late years.

24th. I beg to defer replying to the concluding question respecting the system of the Home and India Governments until I have more maturely considered so extensive a subject

I have, &c.

*R. Barnewall.*

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or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 10.

Letter from  
Lt.-Col. Barnewall  
to  
T. H. Viltres, Esq.

## Appendix, No. 11.

LETTER from Colonel Munro to T. Hyde Viltres, Esq.

Sir,

I beg permission to submit to your consideration the observations that have occurred to me on the subject of the Queries contained in your letter of the 7th of January last. These observations are necessarily of a general nature. I have been unable from the want of materials to enter into details.

I have, &c.

*J. Munro.*

Appendix, No. 11.

Letter from  
Colonel Munro  
to  
T. H. Viltres, Esq.

OBSERVATIONS in reply to the Queries contained in a letter from the Secretary to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, dated 7th January 1832.

1. Considerable acquisitions of territory have been made by the Nepal, the last Maharratta, and the Burmah wars, and by the treaties and engagements consequent on them. The result of these wars has established our political and military ascendancy in India, and imposed upon us the necessity of acting on the principle of maintaining that ascendancy in all the relations of our government.

2 & 3. I must beg leave to refer to the documents in the office of the Board for precise information on the points stated under these heads.

4. It is not possible to state any fixed rule with respect to the degree of interference proper to be exercised by political residents and agents, as it must depend upon circumstances. In Travancore, and also at Nagpoor, the residents found it necessary to take charge of the whole internal administration of affairs: and these extreme cases are stated in order to show the difficulty of adopting any fixed principles of conduct in this branch of government.

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The general duties of the residents are to watch over and report to their government the proceedings of the allied states, and to employ their endeavours to direct those proceedings in the way most conducive to the happiness of the people and the internal benefit of both governments. I am decidedly of opinion that there is more danger to the interests of humanity and of the British power from abstaining from exercising the interference of the residents in the affairs of the allied states than even in urging it too far. The usual character of the native princes, as shown by history and our own experience, is marked by a love of power, state, and conquest, by an eagerness to enter into war, to struggle for empire, and to commit the decision of their fortunes to battle. To such men our alliance, which deprives them of the exercise of political rights, of the power to form alliances, to make war or peace, to command and lead their armies, and reduces them to the condition of being merely civil administrators of their dominions, and in some degree for our benefit, must harass and mortify their native feelings and passions. They permit misgovernment in order that the odium of the sufferings of the people may fall on our alliance; and that commotions or other opportunities of shaking our power may occur, they engage in intrigues against us. They endeavour to amass treasure by oppression, resting on our alliance for protection from the vengeance of their subjects; or they frequently fall into a state of sensual indulgence that incapacitates them from the duties of government, or they commit the administration of their affairs to ministers often profligate and rapacious. In these cases, and the description of them is warranted by experience, the people suffer, and they blame the alliance which supports their rulers in their oppression. In such cases are we to remain passive spectators? To do so would be an abandonment of duty, a dangerous fault against our own power. The very nature of the alliance justifies and demands our watchful superintendence over the conduct of the allied states, and our interposition in preventing evil, and procuring a system of benevolent and efficient administration: the well-being of the people of these states is an essential object of the alliance, for to permit that alliance to become a cause of oppression and suffering would be equally inconsistent with justice, and dangerous to the permanency of our power. We have more extended obligations than any other state; we have all India to protect, and our responsibility for the enforcement of good government within the sphere of our influence is therefore increased. A glance at the history of some of the protected states may be useful in considering this subject. Mysore, while subject to the active superintendence of such able men as Sir Bary Close, Mr. Webbe, and Colonel Wilks, and managed by an able dewan, prospered in a remarkable manner: when, however, a change of system took place, and the Rajah was allowed to conduct his government without constraint, an unhappy alteration ensued, the dewan was driven from office, and a course of gross misrule and waste occurred. The nabob vizier was left for many years in the uncontrolled management of his internal government, and his country was ruined by oppression. The people had no remedy; insurrection was hopeless against a government supported by our military force; complaint was useless, for where could they complain? We refused to interfere for the redress of their wrongs. The Peishwa was restored to power by our arms; he was left in the free exercise of internal rule, excepting that some of his feudatories were protected by us from his vengeance, and what was the result of our abstaining from interference in his affairs?—long intrigues against our power, and at last open rebellion for its subversion. Our interference may sometimes occasion jealousy, but experience has shown that its evils and dangers are less than those that have resulted from our declining to employ it. Our alliance may be considered as formed with a state collectively, rather than with its ruler alone, at least its influence should be directed to the general good of the whole, including the chief and his subjects. Our alliances are not like those between equal and independent states, when the principle of non-intervention would be just and prudent; but the very character and circumstances of these alliances involve the duty of protecting the people as well from internal misrule as from foreign enemies. The mode and extent of our interference must depend upon circumstances, on the character of the allied prince and governments, and must rest very much on the judgment and discretion of the British resident and government. To procure the choice of an able and active minister, and to guide and support his proceedings, will often be the policy of the British Government, connected with assiduous endeavours to concentrate and maintain the dignity of the prince. Justice and policy equally dictate the necessity of avoiding every occasion that might lead us to take territorial possession of the dominions of any of the allied states; for it is of high importance to retain these native governments, on the ground, without reference to other reasons, of their giving situations of trust, enolument, and dignity to the natives in general, and especially to the higher classes of them. In our actual state of circumstances in India, the formation of subsidiary and protecting alliances seems quite essential to the maintenance of our power: we need only advert to what Mysore was formerly under Hyder and Tippee, and to what it is now; to what the Seiks are now under an active and ambitious chief, and to what they would be if reduced to a protected state, to be convinced how important to our safety and to the tranquillity of India the subsidiary system has been. If we should leave a state to itself, it would immediately be open to foreign influence and intrigue; it would immediately endeavour to organize and maintain an efficient military force, ready to take advantage of every opportunity to act against us. History informs us that the native states have invariably pursued this conduct hitherto. how much more they might be expected to pursue it hereafter, since they have witnessed the progress of our power. On grounds of self-preservation we are obliged to favour such alliances; our object now is to render them as conducive as possible to the happiness of the people. This, I believe, can never be effected by a systematic plan of abstaining from interference; on the contrary, I believe

believe that it is only to be effected by a wise and temperate exercise of those rights of friendly interposition which our situation, from the nature of things, gives us.

5. The results of the conquests and territorial arrangements made since 1813 will be found in the proceedings of the Government, and cannot be fully known to individuals who have not for a considerable time been in public situations. It is, however, believed that these results in general have been extremely beneficial to the British Government. The increase of revenue has been considerable, and has been more than proportionate to the increase of expense occasioned by the civil administration and military defence of the acquired territories. The risk of internal and external hostility has been manifestly diminished very materially; for the establishment of our military and political ascendancy over all the states of India affords more effectual means than we had previously possessed of watching the proceedings of every class of the people and of all the states, and checking at once any disposition to commotion that may be manifested in any quarter of India. Every point is brought within the reach of our inspection and our military force.

6. It is difficult for an individual who has not had access to the documents connected with the subject stated under this head, and has not devoted much time to the examination of them, to form an opinion regarding it; but there were evidently just causes for the Nepal and Mahratta wars, and the arrangements resulting from them appear to have been just and expedient.

7. I believe that the distribution of the military force consequent on the political and territorial changes that have occurred since 1813 has been directed with judgment and ability.

8. When the important interests, and the difficult and intricate duties entrusted to the residents are considered, it will be admitted that their salaries and establishments have been rather too much regulated by considerations of economy, and fixed on too contracted a scale. Those political situations, on the prudent and able execution of whose duties the happiness of extensive dominions, and in some degree the security of the British interests depend, should be distinguished by highly liberal allowances, and granted only to men of superior talents and character, without reference to the establishment, whether civil or military, to which they may belong.

9. It appears very difficult indeed to establish any other check over the political residents than their own honour and conscience, and the vigilant examination and control of their proceedings by the government under which they serve. To associate any persons with them in the form of a committee or a board would give an administrative appearance to their functions offensive to the states to which they are accredited.

10. This is a question of much difficulty. The cause of the success of the English in India is more to be found, in my opinion, in the ability of their servants abroad, than in the wisdom or the stability of the views and principles of the home government. The systems of proceeding adopted in this country and the instructions sent to India, with respect both to measures and men, have been often uncertain and contradictory, but the evils calculated to be produced by this state of things have generally been prevented or diminished by the prudence and judgment of the servants of the Company in India. The civil service in that country is a most efficient and valuable body of public servants, and ought to be retained in its present state under whatever plan of government may be adopted in this country. The annual changes in the Court of Directors must be expected to produce fluctuations in the views of that body; and similar fluctuations have been remarked in the controlling authority. If a change in the system of home government of India should be deemed advisable, a plan of administration might be devised that should combine ministerial responsibility with the conservation of mature experience, extensive knowledge, practical ability, and fixed and enlightened principles in the body charged with the direction of India affairs. In India, it appears to be desirable that the Governor-General should be relieved from the internal administration of Bengal, and left free to direct his mind to the political and general government of the whole empire.

J. Munro.

#### Appendix, No. 12.

LETTER from Colonel Pitman to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Bruntfield, near Edinburgh,  
19th March 1832.

Sir,

It was early on the 1st instant that I had the honour to receive your letter, dated so far back as the 7th January, intimating "the intention of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East India Committee, and expressing the Board's desire for any information and opinions which my experience may enable me to offer on the points specified in your letter, in regard to the several states with which my course of service has made me acquainted, and for a specification of any papers on the subject to which it may appear to me useful to direct attention."

With all possible deference and an earnest desire to meet the intentions of the Right honourable the Commissioners, I regret to be under the necessity of stating, that domestic circumstances of the utmost importance to me and to my family urgently require my presence here for the next two months; should it therefore be deemed necessary to examine

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Appendix, No. 11.

Letter from  
Colonel Munro  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 12.

Letter from  
Colonel Pitman  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

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Appendix, No. 12.

Letter from  
Colonel Pittman  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

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me, I respectfully solicit I may not be called upon to attend the East India Committee before the middle or the latter end of May next.

The several very important subjects referred to in your letter demand much longer and deeper consideration than I have been able to give to them during the few days it has been in my possession; still, in compliance with the desire therein expressed, and to avoid further delay, I shall willingly submit to the Board the very limited information I possess, and the opinions, however imperfect, I have been enabled to form; craving their indulgence for any inaccuracies or inadvertencies that may have arisen from the want of access to official documents.

In endeavouring to reply to each of the questions proposed to me, I beg to premise, that belonging to the Bengal army, and the Nizam's being the only state with which the course of my service has made me particularly acquainted, my observations will in general have reference only to that state and to the Bengal Government.

I. What new acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected, since 1813?

I do not feel myself competent to reply to this question as it regards India generally.

As far as it applies to the Nizam's state, I am not aware of any new acquisition made from it since 1813, with the exception of some exchanges which took place after the war of 1817-18 for the better defining the frontiers of the Nizam, the Rajah of Nagpore and the Company, for which equivalents were given.

As to our political relations with the Nizam, I believe they have remained nearly the same for the last 34 years, although there has been a material change in the positions of the Company's and Nizam's territories relatively to other states.

At the commencement of our more intimate connection with the Nizam in 1798, the geographical position of his country, interposed as a barrier between the Company's provinces and the then all-powerful Mahrattas, rendered it of the greatest importance to our interests to preserve the Nizam as a substantive state. This political expediency continued to operate during all our subsequent struggles with Tippoo, the Mahrattas, and other powers, till the close of the war of 1817-18, when the accession of the Company to the sovereignty of the Peishwa's country and to a controlling influence over the other native states, insulated the Nizam's country from all external enemies.

II. What is the actual condition of our relations with the several states?

Having left India more than seven years ago, I have no means of answering this question.

III. What is the amount of military force required in each instance; whether,

1. By express stipulation;
2. By the ordinary effect of our obligation; or,
3. As a security against extraordinary risks?

The amount of military force originally stipulated for by the Nizam has been altered by subsequent treaties. The force now furnished amounts to about 8,000 men, and consists of two regiments of cavalry, eight regiments of infantry, and details of horse and foot artillery, complete for field service. One half of this force is stationed near the Nizam's capital, and the other at the distance of 800 miles, in the province of Berar.

Besides the subsidiary force there is an auxiliary force of four regiments of horse and eight regiments of infantry, amounting to about 12,000 men, composed of the Nizam's reformed troops, commanded and disciplined by the Company's officers.

These two forces are fully competent to the protection of the Nizam's country, and all that can be required either "by the ordinary effect of our obligation, or as a security against extraordinary risks;" but in the event of war, I apprehend we are bound to support the Nizam with our whole army, or to the utmost of our ability.

IV. What is the character, and what the extent, of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the protected states?

1. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents?

2. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated, on the interests of the protected princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us, as heretofore acted upon?

The general question will be best answered by replying to those which follow: First, then, as to the duties of political residents and agents.

The terms political resident and agent are nearly synonymous with, and have, I imagine, been adopted in India as a modification of those of envoy and ambassador, given in Europe to the representative of one king or independent state at the court of another. In India, since the dissolution of the Mogul empire, the several states formed out of its ruins have never, properly speaking, acquired all the rights of sovereignty although they have usurped the powers; they, therefore, have not ventured to assume the title of king, (till very lately, in the case of the Nabob of Oude,) and this I conclude may be one reason why the British agents at their courts are not designated as they would be in Europe. In the same way, although

although the Company's government exercises the powers of sovereignty, it is not, correctly speaking, either a kingly or even an independent state, holding as it does of the King of Delhi, in common, I believe, with most other states in India. When the Company's government sent Sir J. Malcolm to the King of Persia and Mr. Elphinstone to the King of Causal, they were designated envoys.

The duties of a resident at the court of a native state are very extensive.

He acts under direct instructions from the Governor-General, and makes regular reports of his proceedings; he is the channel of communication between the two governments; he has to guard the interests of his government and to take care that existing treaties are carried into effect. At those courts where there is a subsidiary force furnished by his government, or an auxiliary force commanded by Company's officers, they are under the resident's control, and can only be employed by his direction either against external enemies or for the suppression of internal disorders.

Since the war of 1817-18 certain of the residents have been directed to interpose their advice and influence for the amelioration of the condition of the subjects of some of the native princes: this interference has added considerably to the civil duties of the resident.

The duties of a political agent are similar to those of a resident, but sometimes not so extensive; those with the small Rajpoot states are instances, and the agent at Aumungabad in the Nizam's country was immediately under the direction of the resident at Hyderabad.

2dly. As to the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated, &c. from our relations, &c.

For the better understanding the efforts that have resulted from our relations with the Nizam, it will be necessary to recur to the state of his affairs previous to his close alliance with us in 1793, the circumstances that led to that treaty, and some of those that have followed.

For more than 40 years before that period the Nizam's government had been gradually declining, from the vicious extravagance of the princes, the rapacity of their ministers, and the encroachments of the Mahrattas. In 1794 the Nizam's affairs were in so perilous a state from these united causes, that he urgently sought the aid of the Company's government; this aid was refused by the then Governor-General, Sir J. Shore, from motives of political expediency, although he seems to have been well aware that his refusal was at the hazard of the subversion of the Nizam's then tottering power. The reasons for this refusal will, I believe, be found either in a minute of Sir J. Shore or in a letter from him to the Court of Directors in 1794; and it is curious to remark, that one of these reasons was, "the impossibility of directing the Nizam's politics without usurping his government."

The Nizam, thus left to his own resources, was forced to purchase peace from the Mahrattas by extensive concessions of territory. The consequence of these sacrifices and of the large chout or tribute exacted from him by the Mahrattas, was most disastrous to the Nizam and to his subjects, who were exposed to the predatory incursions of freebooters of all descriptions.

At this period many extensive districts belonging to the Nizam became the resort of banditti, who assumed independence under their respective chiefs, possessed themselves of numerous forts and strongholds, and bade defiance to the Nizam's government for a long series of years, till finally reduced to his authority by the Nizam's reformed troops in 1818-19.

From 1794 to 1798 the Nizam's court and country were torn by intestine discord, and he seems to have retained political existence as a state solely by the forbearance of his neighbours. His only efficient army was officered by French and other European adventurers, and French influence prevailed in his councils. Under these circumstances, but for our timely interference, there is every reason to believe the Nizam's state more than 30 years ago would have fallen to pieces from internal weakness and decay, or have become the seat of the French power in the East, or what perhaps is still more probable, would have been absorbed in the then increasing power of the Mahratta confederacy.

It was to destroy the French influence at Hyderabad, and to prevent the Nizam being drawn into a confederacy with Tippoo or the Mahrattas against our government in 1798, that Marquess Wellesley entered into close alliance and gave the Nizam a subsidiary force to protect his country, and for the maintenance of his authority. By this energetic measure, and those which immediately followed, our political interests in the peninsula were firmly established, and the Nizam was preserved as a substantive state under our sole influence. He engaged by treaty to pay a subsidy equal to the expense of the force furnished by our government, and subsequently bound himself to contribute an efficient body of his troops in the event of any foreign war.

From the wretched state of the Nizam's army, the contingent force sent by him was seldom of any use. Great complaints and strong remonstrances were made on this subject during the war of 1803-4, and at the close of that war Lord Wellesley declared that the Nizam had forfeited every claim he could have derived from fulfilling the obligations of the treaty. These remonstrances were followed by various attempts on the part of our residents, to induce the Nizam to place his army on a better footing, which, however, was only accomplished in, I believe, 1816, when he was prevailed on to reform a considerable body of his troops, and to place them under the charge and discipline of officers selected by our Government.

By this means alone was the Nizam enabled to contribute his contingent in the war of 1817-18, when he furnished two brigades of infantry, with artillery, in so efficient a state



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POLITICAL  
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Letter from  
Colonel *Pitman*  
to  
*T. H. Vickers, Esq.*

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of discipline as to act in company with the King's and Company's troops, under Generals Hislop and Doveton, besides 4,000 reformed cavalry commanded by officers of the Company's army.

Independently of the advantage to the cause of the allies at that critical period, from the services of a force far more efficient than the Nizam had ever been able to contribute in any former war, from having thus fulfilled his part of the treaty, the Nizam became entitled to a share of the territories taken from the Mahrattas, was freed from the payment of choute, and from an enormous amount of arrears.

During the early part of our connection, the principal objects of our Government appear to have been to support the Nizam as a substantive state, to control all his political relations with other states, and to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of his country. The long continued mal-administration, therefore, which in 1798 had brought the Nizam so low, was still permitted to operate, and after the war of 1817-18, his affairs were in so desperate a condition that Government felt it could no longer withhold its interference, to rescue, if possible, our ally from impending ruin, and his subjects from the rapacity and extortion under which they laboured. Accordingly, early in 1820, the Bengal government authorized the resident to interpose his advice and influence "to establish the prosperity of the Nizam's dominions, and the happiness of his subjects." These orders were carried into execution, as far as circumstances permitted, during the year 1820, by the then resident, Mr. Russell, and the following year to a much greater extent by his successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, when the resident's assistant and several officers from the Company's service were employed, under the resident's directions, to superintend the assessments and collection of revenue throughout the Nizam's country. This decided interference promised to be very advantageous to the Nizam, his subjects and finances, and one of its immediate effects was to bring back into his provinces a numerous population that had been driven to emigrate into the neighbouring states to avoid the oppressions of the Nizam's zemindars and collectors. At the period of my quitting India in 1825, considerable progress had been made by Sir C. Metcalfe in correcting abuses, and similar measures were, I believe, pursued by his successor, Mr. Martin. In 1829, I am informed most of the European superintendents were withdrawn from the Nizam's country, but I am ignorant of the reasons for this change of system.

From the foregoing statement, I think it will appear that, by his connection with our government, the Nizam's has been preserved as a substantive state during the last 34 years; that he has been exempted from payment of tribute to the Mahrattas, and a large amount of arrears; that his country and subjects have been freed from the inroads of the Mahrattas and Pindarees, and many extensive districts which had thrown off their allegiance for a long series of years, have been restored to his authority; that by the results of the war of 1817-18, his territories being surrounded either by the Company's provinces or those of states immediately under their influence, he is protected from all external enemies; that by the influence and authority of the Company's Government, attempts have been making since 1820 to ameliorate the condition of the Nizam's subjects, which attempts have partially succeeded; and that since the establishment of a subsidiary force, the Nizam, his country and his subjects, have enjoyed comparative tranquillity.

On the whole, therefore, as far as I am able to judge, the effects that have resulted on the interests of the Nizam, of his people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which he stands to us, have been, particularly of late years, beneficial; and that we may anticipate an increase of advantages to the interests of the several parties, so long as our Government continues fully and decidedly to pursue the line of policy which commenced under the auspices of the Marquess of Hastings in 1820. On the contrary, should we either withdraw from or evade the exercise of an interposition, which I think is clearly imposed on us by the paramount position of our power in India, and which can alone ameliorate the condition of the Nizam's subjects, we shall incur the awful responsibility of a renewal of all their miseries, and of the evils inseparable from the vicious government of the Nizam, as well as those that may be anticipated from the downfall of the state at no very distant period.

V. What have been the financial effects of the conquests, and of the changes or enlargements of our political relations which have been made since 1813?

I have no means of replying to this question.

VI. How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

These principles have, I think, been adhered to in our political relations with the Nizam. The intimate connection between the two states was formed originally from motives of self-preservation on both sides, and it has been continued in fulfilment of treaties. For the first 20 years of that connection, however, I am of opinion we adhered too rigidly to the rule of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Nizam's country. Interfering as we did most decidedly in all that concerned our own special interests, we were, I think, bound to have interfered also to prevent as far as we could the miseries of his people.

With respect to our political relations with other states, I believe it has been the honest intention of our Government to adhere strictly to the principles of justice and expediency, and if there has been any deviation from those principles it can only be attributed to error in judgment.

VII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position

position and relations, and to their actual condition, with reference to the forces belonging to native states, on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard.

As far as I had the means of judging, to the period of my leaving India in 1825, I am of opinion the strength and distribution of the British Indian army had, in general, been regulated by a due attention to the changes that had occurred in our political position and relations.

Instances to the contrary must, however, have sometimes happened in so extensive an empire. The only instance that at present occurs to me very important in its consequences, is that in which for a series of years the S.E. frontier of Bengal had no other military defenders than a few companies of sepoy. Instead of treating our Burmese neighbours with contempt, had we, during Lord Hastings's administration, paid more attention to their proceedings, and posted a brigade of troops on their frontier to keep them in awe, and immediately to punish any aggression, we should in all probability have prevented more serious hostilities with that power.

By this means all the loss of blood and treasure incurred by the war of 1824-25, and the expensive mode of carrying it on at a distance from our resources, might have been avoided. Besides which we should still have had our former easily protected south-east frontier, instead of being extended and weakened as we now are by the ill-judged measure of retaining in our possession a part of the Burmese territories.

VIII. How far have the civil establishments of the several residencies and agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

As far as my information extends, the civil establishments of the several residencies and agencies have been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy. I believe they were all regulated on a principle established by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, "that each resident should be enabled to save or lay by the whole of his salary, and that all his expenses, public and personal, should be paid by his government." When the highly responsible situation of a resident, and the intriguing and dangerous influence of a native court are duly considered, the wisdom and expediency of Lord Cornwallis's view of the subject, must I think be evident. Nothing can tend more to keep men in their proper path than by combining their interest with their duty, and to the exercise of this principle may, I think, in a great degree, be attributed the almost total absence, of late years, from the service in India, of those instances of mal-practices which were so justly complained of 30 years ago.

IX. How far have the residents and agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

From the confidential nature of a resident's duties, this can, I think, only be correctly estimated by the governments under which they were employed.

The difficulty of imposing any direct check on a political resident may be compared with that which must be experienced by the government at home in controlling the conduct of governors of distant colonies. The most effectual check hitherto devised has been to give governors councils to act with, and restrict them to the line of proceedings authorized from home. If a similar check could be applied to those residents who have civil as well as political duties to perform, I think much good might result, and by giving them councils, composed of two or three of the civil and military officers employed under their authority, no additional expense need be incurred.

After all, however, the best security for the faithful discharge of the high and important duties of a resident must, I think, be found in his previous reputation for high principle, capacity for political affairs, and general respectability in the service of which he is a member. When the selection for the office is made on these grounds, combined with claims arising from previous services, without regard to private interest or favouritism, I think the interests of government will be best secured by leaving such a resident to act on his own personal responsibility, without any other checks than those which will necessarily arise from carefully supervising his proceedings.

X. How far has the existing system of Indian government, or home direction and control, been successful in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude, and unity of purpose in the several gradations of government, direction, control or influence, and (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the home or of the Indian government?

So far as my information and experience enable me to judge, I am of opinion the existing system of Indian government and home direction and control has been successful, in an extraordinary degree, in maintaining all the objects specified in this question; and that the system generally is better calculated to succeed than any other I am acquainted with.

Still, in some respect, I think the system might be improved, although I am not prepared to state the precise nature of the improvements required. Indeed the subject appears to me to be so delicate and momentous, involving as it does not only the preservation and consolidation of the British power in India, but also the best interests of the millions of subjects so wonderfully committed to our charge, that before even the slightest alteration in the system can be proposed, much more information than I possess must be obtained, and more intense consideration given to it than I have had the power to bestow.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
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Appendix, No. 12.

Letter from  
Colonel Pitman  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

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In elucidation of some of the points I have adverted to, I beg to direct the Board's attention to the following Papers:

1. Mr. John Shore's Minute regarding the Nizam's affairs in 1794, and his letter to the Court of Directors on the same subject.
2. Treaty with the Nizam in 1798, and those subsequently entered into with that State.
3. Instructions from the Bengal government to the resident at Hyderabad in 1820, authorizing him to interpose in the Nizam's internal affairs; and the resident's report to the Bengal government, dated 1st September 1820.
4. All subsequent correspondence on the above subject between the residents at Hyderabad and the Bengal government.

I am, &c.,  
Robert Pitman.

Appendix, No. 13.

LETTER from Lieutenant-colonel Tod to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Sir,

Appendix, No. 13.

Letter from  
Lieut.-Col. Tod  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your official letter of the 9th January; and if there has been any apparent delay in this communication, it has arisen partly from the necessity of concluding my work on Rajpootana, and partly from my anxiety to form correct conclusions on the momentous subjects it embraces. The opinions I have expressed, under a full sense of the responsibility attached to their promulgation, are given without regard to any consideration but the duty which, at this crisis, requires every Indian functionary to speak without reserve. If any influence preponderates, it is, perhaps, in favour of the governed; and with this object in view, if I should utter truths somewhat unpalatable, I disclaim every motive but the desire of being instrumental to good.

Though the questions propounded by the Board embrace our entire Indian possessions, I purpose to confine my observations chiefly to that portion of India with which I am most familiar, but at the same time I will not neglect the opportunity of giving an opinion on some general points where it may appear desirable. The first question belongs to this class.

I. WHAT new acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations have been effected since 1813?

In order to the proper elucidation of this point, I submit two sketches; the one representing India in 1813, the other India in 1832; the respective colourings of which exhibit the changes made in the interval.\*

From these outlines it will appear that the entire surface of India, from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin, has undergone a political metamorphosis, in which our direct acquisitions, although great, are as nothing compared to the extension of our power and influence consequent to the wars of 1813 and 1817-18.

Having considered the Quere in the aggregate, I shall now restrict myself to the Central and Western portion of India; or all those regions still entitled to be styled "Independent India," between the Valley of the Indus and Boondelcund, and between the Junna and the Nerbudda, a space comprehending 10° of latitude and 7° of longitude. Over this surface of 300,000 square miles, having a population of about 7,000,000, i.e. about 3,000,000 Rajpoot, the rest Mahratta, Jat, and Mahomedan, and capable of yielding a revenue of 5,000,000*l.* sterling, we had neither authority nor influence in 1813. Nearly all this vast region was then under Mahratta domination. In 1832 both the spoiler and the prey, the Mahrattas and the Rajpoots, are subservient to the British Government.

Let the eye rest on the map of 1813, with its orange coloured boundaries, denoting Mahratta dominion, and then turn to the red and blue of Britain and her allies of 1832. Of this vast region the Chmbul river has been made the great political boundary;† a character first applied to it by Marquess Hastings in 1817, as the basis of his policy; but, unhappily for Rajpootana, when complete success had crowned our arms against the last confederation of our enemies, and the maturing of this plan rested solely with ourselves, it was partially abandoned, and many rich districts, forfeited by the perfidy of Sindia and Holcar, west of the river, were restored to these chiefs. The districts of Runtungurh, Kheyri, Jeerun, Neemutch, Jawad, belonging to Méwar, and worth 10 lacs annually, are in Sindia's hands; and Rampoor, Bhanpoora,‡ Malharguih and Neembahaira, worth as much more, and also appertaining to Méwar, were left in Holcar's hands, or in those of his traitorous

\* I have been unable to prepare these outlines, from the same cause which has delayed the appearance of this letter; but the suggestion may easily be acted upon from the documents at the India House, and would aid to give a rapid and correct view of the question.

† I present a copy of my own map of Central and Western India, which will show the existing boundaries of every power in those regions.

‡ Part of this district lies east of the Chmbul.

traitorous partisans. Who will question that those 20 lacs of territory should rather have reverted to a state of 1,100 years duration, than have been assigned for the support of a mercenary soldiery, who would turn against us on the first prospect of success?

Eastward of the Chumbul, to our frontier of Boondelcund, Mahratta power predominates; and Sindia, either as sovereign lord or lord paramount receiving tribute, possesses continuous rule from the Jumna to the Nerbudda, and westward almost to the Gulf of Cambay. Kotah is the only Rajpoot principality east of the Chumbul (besides the little Mahomedan state of Bhopal, and the two small districts of Meer Khan) which intervenes to break the unity of Mahratta sway in all this region, embracing Central Rajwarra and Malwa.

In 1813, throughout this immense region, whether east or west of the Chumbul, we possessed not a single foot of land; and our sole influence was that extorted from the fears and hatred of Sindia and Holcar, who equally desired our annihilation; and the one joined our foes covertly, the other openly. But the results were different. Holcar was deprived of the power to do mischief, while Sindia rather benefited by his treachery, from exchanges which consolidated his dominions. Our influence over Holkar's court is complete, his territories lying between our two subsidiary camps at Mhow and Neemuch. To a certain extent, though far less than with Holkar, our ascendancy at Sindia's court is great, and so long as no enemy appears to oppose us, we shall experience unqualified submission, but we must not forget that we have successively driven them from Delhi, the Punjab, and the Ganges, wrested Rajpootana from their grasp, and confined them between the Chumbul and the Nerbudda. It would have been wise had they only been permitted to reflect on these mortifying facts as *patals*\* of the Dekhan, when their power of injuring us would have been paralysed.

In 1818 we lost an opportunity, never to be regained, for utterly destroying the baneful influence of the Mahattas north of the Nerbudda; and with this the power of restoring all those ancient petty states in Central Rajwarra, which fell a prey, one after the other, to our successes over the Mahattas in the wars of 1803-4, between which period and 1818, Sheopoor, Kherchwarran, Onutwarran, Chandern, Golud Gwalior and Omra-Kotah, capable of yielding 80 lacs of revenue, fell to Sindia, and are now apportioned into fiefs for the maintenance of his mercenary hordes. If, instead of the impolitic magnanimity, so unsuited to the character of those we had to deal with, and so ill appreciated by them, when Sindia's treachery was made manifest, we had acted towards the Central as we did towards the Western States, and formed a confederation entirely at our disposal, there would have been both justice and good policy in the measure. But our leniency has left a mortal foe in the heart of a warlike and idle population, who, from mere want of employment, would join in any commotion. If a foot of land were to be left to either Holcar or Sindia, north of the Nerbudda, it should have been restricted to their dependencies round Oojein and Indore.

Throughout all this extensive region, termed Central and Western India, over which our influence is supreme, our sole acquisition of territory is the important fortress of Ajmér and its lands, yielding about four lacs annually.

## II. WHAT is the actual condition of our relations with these States?

Our relations with all the States of Rajpootana are of a uniform character, but with shades of modification, namely, protection on our part, for the admission of our supremacy on theirs; and while we guarantee them from every species of interference in their internal administration, we claim the privilege of arbitrating their international disputes, and the control of their mutual political relations. They are, both by treaty and their own desire, politically severed from the rest of India. The modifications respect the tribute, from which some, as Bikanér, Jessulmér and Kishengurh, are altogether exempt, and which in others varies with the circumstances under which their alliance with us was effected. From Jesspoor and Méwar we enjoy a stipulated (but progressive) portion of their gross revenues; from Marwar and Kotar we receive the amount which these States paid heretofore to the Mahattas; and in other still smaller States, as those bordering on Guzerat,† we have negotiated a progressive ratio, making ourselves amenable to the Mahatta for the amount. The tribute received is about 16½ lacs, (of which we are accountable to Sindia for the Boondi tribute), and with the revenue derived from Ajmér the sum total is about 20 lacs of rupees annually‡. It is my decided opinion that the finances of none of these States can ever bear any

\* Sindia's original rank in society.

† Dongerpoor, Pertabgurh, Deolah, Ruttun, and other chieftainships in Malwa, and on the Guzerat frontier.

‡ Rough estimate of Tributes

Jesspoor	-	-	-	-	-	8,00,000
Méwar	-	-	-	-	-	4,00,000
Kotah	-	-	-	-	-	2,60,000
Boondi	-	-	-	-	-	80,000
Marwar	-	-	-	-	-	1,08,000
						16,48,000
Ajmér	-	-	-	-	-	4,00,000
Total	-	-	-	-	-	20,48,000

any advance on the amount now exacted, as specified in the note, and that Jeypoor and Méwar\* are even too heavily taxed; for it must be distinctly understood that our negotiations for tribute were founded, not on the gross income of the respective States, nor derived from the feudal lands, but solely from the *khalisa* or *fisc*. This was a wise and judicious measure; and, indeed, any treaty which should have exacted a tribute from each individual feudatory would have led to serious and endless disputes.

Independently of these pecuniary stipulations, all the allied States are under obligations to aid us, on emergency, with the whole of their forces: and with Marwar and Bhopal the amount of contingents is fixed, in the former, at 1,500 horse, and in the latter at 600 horse, and 400 foot. It has been deemed neither necessary nor politic to call on Marwar to fulfil this part of the obligation, which was entered into when the present Rajah was under temporary insanity, and in the agency of his son, a dissipated youth. The stipulation, however, has caused much disquietude, and being a dead letter, the formal renunciation of it would afford great satisfaction. It must ever be borne in mind, that any species of service from the Rajpoots, not arising out of a sense of benefits conferred upon them, would not only be worthless, but may prove a positive evil.

III. WHAT is the amount of Military Force required in each instance, whether, 1st, By express stipulation; 2d, By the ordinary effect of our obligations; 3d, As a security against extraordinary risks?

The treaties with the Rajpoot States differ from all our former engagements in this important point, that there is no mention of *subsidiary* alliance; and the tribute which we draw from them, though galling in a financial point of view, has none of the odium that attached to paying for a force which, under the name of protection from external danger, was in fact a degrading check upon themselves.

The permanent camps established amongst the Central and Western States have been happily chosen both for military and political objects. They are three in number; viz. Nusseerabad, within a few miles of Ajmér, whose castle is garrisoned by our troops, Neemutch and Mhow. Nusseerabad is in our own territory; Neemutch, in a district of the same name, was alienated by Sindia from Méwar; and Mhow is in Holcar's territory of Indore. Thus we do not exhibit a single red coat upon the lands of our Rajpoot allies to excite a feeling at variance with the independence solemnly guaranteed to them, while the camps are not only sufficiently near each other for concentration, whenever any occasion may arise, but completely interpose between the Rajpoots and the Maharratas, over whom they are a perpetual check. In one fortnight the capital of any power in this region could be invested by an army of 8,000 to 10,000 men. This subject will be resumed in the reply to the 7th Query.

IV. WHAT is the character, and what the extent, of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the Protected States?

1. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to Political Residents and Agents?

2. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated on the interests of the protected Princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us, as heretofore acted upon?

Born the degree and character of the interference exercised in the allied States of Rajpootana vary with the circumstances under which they individually became connected with us, from the peculiarities of their political condition prior to such alliance. It was the decided intention of the Marquess of Hastings, who framed these treaties, that one uniform system should be established and maintained in this most important point, the basis of which was a rigid non-interference, like exacted by the Rajpoots, and desired by the protecting power, which guarantees the following article in each treaty. "*The Rajah is absolute ruler of his dominions; and the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced therein.*" Two years, however, had not elapsed, after the formation of these treaties, before we discovered the difficulty of adhering to this essential pledge; and with each of them it was broken. How far these deviations have arisen from the force of circumstances, how far from the faulty construction of the treaties, we may endeavour to point out; I shall therefore take up a subdivision of the 4th Query.

Section I. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to Political Residents and Agents?

The duties of political residents in Rajpootana were intended to be confined to the maintenance of friendly intercourse between the State where he resides, and the government he represents; that he should be at hand to arbitrate (according to the article of the treaty) any international disputes that may arise between the prince and his neighbours; and to enforce the prohibition of all foreign intercourse between the Rajpoots and the rest of India. In the early stage of our alliances, the resident agents of Méwar and Jeypoor were called upon to mediate between the princes and their feudatories; but in both cases the rulers of these countries

\* I just learn that the tribute of Méwar is at present *three* lacs; whether this is to be the permanent rate I know not. It should be the maximum.

countries especially requested this interference for the restoration of their affairs, from anarchy. We offered, nay pressed the same mediation on the Jodpoor prince, who throughout firmly, and perhaps wisely rejected our aid, but, with deep penetration, made the offer subserve his views, using it as an instrument to effect the expulsion of nearly all the chieftains from their estates and the country. Here a question arose, as in all those feudal principalities the rights of the princes and their vassals are co-eval, being all, in fact, members of one great patriarchal family, whether we should only proffer auxiliary mediation to the sovereign, thus applying our own monarchical principles to a dissimilar form of government; or whether, if we interfered at all, it was not equally incumbent on us to guard the well-defined rights and privileges of the feudatories against the abuse of authority, which these engagements tend to increase. This was the origin of an interference, in which, notwithstanding the stipulation in the treaties, we at once found ourselves involved. In Méwar it was unavoidable, since the balance of authority between the prince and his feudatories had been annihilated, and the country from being a garden, had become a wilderness; but as soon as this mediation was effected, and the necessary impulse was given to the machinery of government, the chief study of the political agent was to withdraw from interference, a task of no little difficulty where there were continual demands for it, arising out of the indolence of the ruler, the intrigues of men in office, the turbulence of the feudal interest, or undue pressure upon them, or the abundant grievances of the mercantile and cultivating classes. But in addition to these causes, with two of the most important states, Méwar and Jeypoor, we left the door open to interference by the undefined nature of our tributary exactions, which were to increase in the ratio of their reviving prosperity. It was then, but at all events it is now, in our power to close this door, which leads to the worst kind of interference in their financial and territorial arrangement; for there cannot be a shadow of independence while such a system is tolerated, which, moreover, will not fail to generate hatred and mistrust of the protecting power.

Unless it be intended to introduce, contrary to the faith of our treaties, our *direct* rule into these states, the first and most important point is to fix the rate of tribute, and to fix it as low as possible; since the sacrifice of a lac or two, while it will be a trifle to us, will be a vast benefit to these impoverished princes, whose good-will will be proportioned to the comfort and respectability we ensure to them.

In all those states there exist the materials of government, and the cement that has held them together for a period of from 700 to 1,000 years is still undestroyed, although not perceived by ordinary observers; and it is equally our duty and our interest to foster the principle of regeneration.

Section 2. "What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated on the interests of the protected Princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us, as heretofore acted upon?"

The result of our relations with the princes and people of Central and Western India is a state of perfect security, and the enjoyment of individual property, which they not only never knew, but of which they have not even a traditional record. Not only is the hand of rapine checked from without, but internal exaction, if not altogether withdrawn, is greatly moderated. Commerce is safe, though not unshackled; and with a more liberal and comprehensive system, there is every reason to hope that all the staple articles of export produce, as cotton, indigo, sugar, opium, salt, and metals, may be greatly augmented in quantity. The product of the salt lakes\* in Rajpootana has long since found its way into our provinces, and might be rendered highly beneficial to the allies and the inhabitants of our own provinces, but for our Bengal salt monopoly and our protecting duties. It is the same with opium, the cultivation of which, in consequence of our monopoly, produced an activity, both in Malwa and Lower Rajpootana, quite unexampled, though the policy of this measure was very questionable, whether in a financial or moral point of view. The history of this monopoly† will show the danger with which our alliance encircles these states, and may enable the paramount power to protect them against it according to the spirit of the treaties. It affords another of the too many instances where public faith is lost sight of in the pursuit of financial or mercantile interest.

With the exception of the district of Ajmer, we possess not a foot of land in sovereignty in all the regions under our influence; and although in the treaties we expressly abjured internal interference, hardly had a state of repose succeeded the conflict of 1817-1818, when, discovering that the chief agricultural product of Malwa and Lower Rajpootana was opium, which had progressively improved during the last 40 years, so as to compete with the Patna monopoly in the China market, we at once interposed, invading the rights of the native speculators, in order to appropriate their profits to ourselves. But monopoly in these regions produces a combination of evils; and this procedure was at once unjust, impolitic and inquisitorial: unjust, because we assumed fiscal powers in a country where our duties were simply protective, abolishing the impost and appropriating the transit duties, and depriving the local trader of a lucrative speculation: it was impolitic, because we diverted the efforts of the agricultural classes from the more important branches of husbandry; this in a two-fold sense affecting the financial resources of our allies: it was inquisitorial, because we not only

\* See Annals of Marwar, vol. 2, p. 173; Annals of Rajasthani.

† See Annals of Marwar, vol. 2, p. 173; and Personal Narrative, p. 629.

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only sent circulars to chiefs, calling for a statement of the cultivation of the plant, but despatched agents to the opium districts to make personal inspection and reports. To these political errors we may add the immoral tendency of the measure, which led to every species of fraud. The gambling in opium was not surpassed by that of the London Stock Exchange; it seduced into speculation individuals of all ranks, from the prince to the scavenger, instances of both having come under my personal observation.

If the condition of our alliances warranted interference in the agricultural economy of these states, we might have exercised it more judiciously by following the sumptuary laws already known to them, and which restrict the culture of this pernicious weed. Our Patna monopoly would then have maintained its proper value; we should have benefited instead of deteriorating the rural economy of the protected states, and checked the degeneracy so rapidly spreading over all Northern Asia, from the abuse of this destructive drug. Instead of this, we issued mandates, shutting up all the accustomed outlets, and proclaimed confiscation to all opium that was seized after such notice, fixing our own price upon it, and sending forth *perwanas* (warrants), inviting the growers and speculators to bring the opium to the British head-quarters.

I understand that all these regulations have undergone modification; that the chieftains have been compensated for the loss they sustained in being deprived of the transit duties of the trade; but although the evil may be partially, or even entirely removed, it is not the less necessary that a broad statement of it should be given, in order that a fixed rule of conduct may be adopted and rigidly adhered to, to check for the future all interference on points so purely selfish.

I will adduce another instance of the dangers to which commercial competition subjects our alliances, in order to enforce the necessity of the local authorities being instructed rigidly to respect the established rights of our allies, and to allow no prospect of gain, immediate or remote, to interfere with their punctual fulfilment. Our own interests are best advanced by the prosperity of our allies.

About 18 months after the general pacification, Messrs. Bailly and Rutherford, (under the instructions of the Governor-General of Bengal, though without any ostensible appointment,) proceeded to Rappootana to inquire into the state of its commerce, for the purpose of learning whether further international benefits might not be negotiated. Had this been the extent of their proceedings there would have been no harm, but commercial depôts were at once formed of some of the staple articles of our trade, copper, iron, &c. under the charge of *gomasthas*, or native agents. Mr. Bailly soon returned, but Mr. Rutherford continued his tour through all the capitals of Rajawarra. It is not generally known that nearly all the commercial men of Western India are of the Jain faith, the first tenet of which is the preservation of life. Mr. R., after visiting Jeypoor and Jodpoor, and there exposing samples of his commodities, repaired to Pali, the great entrepôt of Western India; but scarcely had he disclosed his object before the true spirit of commercial jealousy was manifested in a manner which produced a correspondence of no pleasant tendency between the British agent for Jodpoor and its Prince. The native merchant said that his trade was ruined if he did not at once crush this omnipotent competitor; and to effect this, Mr. R. was accused of having, in the very sanctum of Jainism, violated the fundamental principle of their faith, of polluting the great commercial mart, Pali, by the slaughter of goats and sheep for his own food or that of his attendants. Mr. R. denied all cognizance of the affair, and the complainants, on a formal examination before the judgment-seat of Raja Maun at Jodpoor, failed to substantiate the charge: but whether it was proved or not is quite immaterial, the very suspicion worked a kind of excommunication, and no man durst even look upon the goods of the Christian trader. He proceeded by Oodpoor to Kotah, where, though his letters of introduction procured him a very different reception, he was viewed with no less jealousy and mistrust.

If a gentleman, travelling under the passports of the two chief political agents, not only failed in his purpose but created animosity, and even horror, what might not be expected from the unrestricted resort of European adventurers to these regions, whose the blood of man might be made to answer for the blood of goats, and the British Government and its allies be embroiled by even the incautions act of an individual? The merchants of all these marts and towns possess the means of obtaining every article of our commerce without our intervention; and all attempts on our part, under the mask of friendship, to multiply their facilities, will be imputed solely to the desire of enriching, not *them*, but *ourselves*.

The mischief already inflicted by the introduction of British staples is not slight, and operates as a sufficient warning. The looms of Chaudéhi and Runode, so famed for the beauty of their fabrics, are now for the first time made known to the Board only to announce their destruction, together with the more ancient and better known products of Dacca and Boorhanpoor, whose purple *sindones* clad the Roman senator. Even Cashmere itself, whose name is connected with an article of universal luxury, bids fair to lose this distinction, and be itself indebted to Norwich.

When the financial resources of the mother country, on a more enlightened system of commercial inter-communication, will admit of our expending, as we ought, a portion of the wealth we draw from India, for the purposes of its general improvement, and of our abolishing or diminishing the heavy duties at home on her staple products and manufactures, then and then only will they give our Legislature credit for good intentions towards them. But it is said that steam, that agent of destruction to manual labour, which long must, and perhaps always will, be the sole means by which the vast population of India can be employed advantageously to themselves), has already been introduced at two of our Presidencies,

dencies, and that some of our philanthropists calculate on a monopoly of grinding all the flour. Let it be remembered, however, that the sole occupation of the helpless and aged females throughout India is the grinding of flour by hand-mills; and if we deprive them of this, we consign them to certain destruction. It may be urged that many of those evils are inseparable from the age, and the inevitable results of an ever-progressing civilization; but it is a duty to retard the introduction of these innovations of genius into India, until wealth shall be more abundantly diffused by a lighter rate of taxation, and a cheaper system of government, when a taste may be generated for the luxuries so cheaply supplied by this potent substitute for human labour; but till this period arrives, it would be enlarging the circle of misery, and carrying to a most mischievous excess the almost unavoidable vice of our Government, that of enriching a few ephemeral strangers by taxes drawn from India, to open wider the gates of intercourse which, without great checks and limitations, would be the certain precursor of general demoralization.

V. WHAT have been the financial effects of the Conquests, and of the changes or enlargement of our Political Relations which have been made since 1813? to be exhibited under the following heads

1. Increased or decreased Revenue or Tribute.
2. Increased or decreased charge of Civil Administration.
3. Increased or decreased appropriation of Military Force.
4. Increased or decreased risk of external or internal hostility.

An inspection of the accounts of the revenues of Ajmer and the tributes of Rajpootana can alone furnish an answer to the first and second subdivisions of this question. The third must, in like manner, be referred to the returns from the adjutant-general's office of the different Presidencies, which will exhibit the progressive increase in our establishments consequent on the wars of 1813 and 1818.

To the fourth subdivision of this Query, viz. "increased or decreased risk of external or internal danger," I will endeavour to reply.

It may be asserted that danger, whether external or internal, is greatly decreased since 1813, and is now confined to India north of the Nerbudda. Not that the elements of commotion, even in the decrepid states of Hyderabad, Nagpore, Mysore, or Satara; or that the military spirit or resources of the Peishwa's feudatories are extinct, but they present no specific symptom of danger; and the prohibition of all political intercommunication being strictly enforced, their gradual dissolution is inevitable. The same may be said of Sindia's government, in which the seeds of decay have been planted, and likewise of Holcar's, now scarcely meriting the name of government. There are also his ancient subordinates, the mercenary Pathans, whose disjointed and too easily acquired estates are scattered like oases over the face of the country they have ruined. All these are materials which, to a certain degree, constitute a nucleus of danger, which is increased by an invincible hatred of us, personal and political. We have bound down the evil spirits of these regions, not by the bonds of kindness (as some vainly imagine), but by the manacles of fear. They are all, however, approaching the term of their existence, and though it may be wise to watch them, it would be impolitic to hasten their extinction.

To the line of the Indus, including the governments of Sind, Bhawalpoor, and the Sikhs, our utmost vigilance must be directed; nor must we overlook the warlike mountaineers of Nepal.

Of our relations with Sind\* the Board may form a correct opinion from the account of Dr Burne's mission to that country. The slightest attention to its singular government will show that it contains the seeds of destruction, and that it would require little skill to break it into factions. The policy, however, of doing so may be questioned; it is perhaps rather desirable that it should be strong and united under one head, who will have a common interest with ourselves in repelling foreign invasion, which factions always invite.

Bhawalpoor is in too perilous a position to continue long a substantive state, and will either be absorbed by the government of Sind or by the Sikhs. Its existence, of only four generations, sprung out of Jessulmer, which state, but for timely alliance with us, bade fair to be itself eventually annihilated. This constitutes, as far as regards us, the only political importance of Bhawalpoor.

From the Sikh power, and its extraordinary head, Runjeet Sing, we have nothing to apprehend during the term of his life. Although he has cause for dislike in the supremacy over the chieftains of his nation upon our frontier (of whom the Puttala Raja is the chief) being snatched by us from his grasp, he is far too cautious and prudent to risk a rupture, the effects of which must recoil upon himself. He, therefore, restricts his views to the north and west of Lahore, wisely abstaining from a closer connexion with us.

To combine the Rajpoot states in a federal union, of which the British Government constituted itself protector, had long been looked upon by the wisest of our Governors-General, as a desideratum. Such an union was justly regarded as a consolidation of the elements of fixed government against that predatory system which had so long disorganized India, and having achieved this by a policy which secures to us not only their military resources but the

\* Annals of Rajasthan, vol 2, p. 271.



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to

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the control of all their political relations, (and this with the least possible degree of evil,) we have not only checked that system, but have raised a barrier of the most powerful kind against invasion.\* Nothing but impolitic restraints on their rising energies can neutralize the advantages of this grand conception, of recognizing states which are the natural defenders of India, and of identifying their interests with ours. Their annals teem with this kind of warfare, and their columns of victory present durable record, not only of the will but the power to repress invasions.

Danger, both external and internal, is inseparably and permanently connected with Rajpootana: and according to the policy we pursue towards this cluster of petty sovereignties, will its amount be increased or diminished. If the *spirit* of the treaties be upheld, it is no exaggeration to say, that, with a few years of prosperity, we could oppose to any enemy upon this one only vulnerable frontier, at least 50,000 Rajpoots, headed by their respective princes, who would die in our defence. This is asserted from a thorough knowledge of their character and history. The Rajpoots want no change; they only desire the recognition and inviolability of their independence; but we must bear in mind, that mere parchment obligations are good for little in the hour of danger. It is for others to decide whether they will sap the foundation of our rule by a passive indifference to the feelings of this race; or whether, by acts of kindness, generosity, and politic forbearance, they will ensure the exertion of all their moral and physical energies in one common cause with us.

We have of late heard much of Russian invasion. The progressive advance of this colossal power in Central Asia is well known; its influence from Bokhara to Lahore; and it is against this influence that we have to guard. Its constant exercise moves all the purposes of a state of actual hostility, by its operation on our finances. A Russian invasion, however, must be a work of time; the plans of Russia must be matured in Central Asia, where she must establish her power before she can hope for successful aggression; though whether the *Douvanis* could be brought to exchange their barbarous independence for Russian despotism, may be doubted. "We are content with blood, but shall never be content with a master,"† holds out little hope to the autocrat that such men will become the pliant instruments of his ambition. But Russian gold, and promises of plunder, might excite a combination of hordes from this the ancient *officina gentium*, which, united with the more regular armies of the Sikh chief, and the Gorkas, might doubtless embarrass us; for if ever such a contest should take place, we must count upon the hostility of every Mahratta or mercenary Pathan, whose power may survive to this epoch; and that distant frontier would be a rallying point for every discontented individual in India.

This brings me to the consideration of the most important part of the subject, our treaties with the Rajpoots, and how far their alliances increase this external danger, or the possession of their resources may diminish it.

We have only to peruse the initial article of each treaty, which declares that, "the friends and enemies of one party shall be the friends and enemies of the other;" or, as repeated in still more distinct phraseology in the 2d article, "The British government engages to protect the principality and territory of ———;" to see the full extent of our guarantees. With Jessuhner, the most remote of our allies, these articles have been slightly modified, and we are only pledged to aid her "in the event of any serious invasion directed towards her overthrow, or other danger of great magnitude;" and as we stipulate that this aid will only be given when she is not accessory to the aggression, and as it is open to us to put our own construction upon the degree of danger, we may, perhaps, avoid the evils of an alliance which overtly presents no equality of advantage.‡

A clear insight into the causes of the international quarrels of the Rajpoots, as well as those with their neighbours, and a knowledge of the financial and military resources of each State, are essential to the guidance of our judgment as arbitrators, and of the principles which our functionaries should adopt towards this most important portion of our Eastern Empire; but as I have enlarged upon these points in the second volume of my work, I shall here only briefly recapitulate the chief objects to which attention should be directed.

1st. Fixing the tributes, and rendering them as light, and their realization as simple as possible.

2d. The utmost caution to avoid collision between our protective camps and the princes, their chiefs or subjects, in the protected territory.

There is a third consideration arising out of our alliance with the Rajpoots, which has never yet attracted regard. It is well known that a material portion of our native army consists of Rajpoots, but only those of the Gangetic provinces, who, under the Mogul power, had long been deprived of all their old chieftains, by which the spirit of clanishness was destroyed, and they consequently knew no immediate head. The events of 1818 have in some degree altered this state of things. The Rajpoot Sipahis, when quartered in Rajpootana, will become better acquainted with their origin, and renew their sympathies. Prior to 1818 the native soldier was an automaton; in 1820, he was known to give a political opinion, nay, to question the justice of measures. His reasoning was morally correct, while the duty exacted from him was cold and reluctant. Hitherto there had been no community of sentiment between the Sipahis and the upstart families of Bengal, Lucknow, Hyderabad, or the Mahrattas. How widely different the case will be, when the Rajpoot Sipahi

\* Annals of Rajasthan, vol. 1, p. 396; vol. 2, p. 480 & 699.

† Mr. Elphinstone's Account of Canbul.

‡ Annals of Rajasthan, vol. 2, p. 272.

Sipahi is associated with, or called upon to act against, a race with which they claim common origin, and with whose prejudices and associations their own are knit. I will exemplify this important consideration, which, even to those who have long served with the Rajpoots, may appear incomprehensible, by a dialogue I overheard between two of my Sipahis. "The sovereignty of Delhi is ours" (lit. *mine*) said one, which was stoutly denied by his antagonist, who called the other "the usurper of his rights." On inquiry, I found the disputants were a Chohan and a Juar Rajpoot, who were thus contesting the claims of their respective tribes to paramount power in India, which had been settled seven centuries before by Shahbudin. The name of the Chohan was Kulian Sing, that of the Juar, Sri Kishon, both were afterwards promoted by Lord Hastings for one of the most brilliant acts of gallantry that occurred during the Pindarri war.

By such anecdotes we see deeply into the moral tenure by which we hold these distant realms; and may learn better to avail ourselves of the admirable materials (if rightly used) for establishing our rule over them; for the Sipahi, more especially the Hindoo, is the most loyal, devoted, and affectionate soldier in the world. It must appear perfectly anomalous in the history of government that the East India Company should possess a soldiery who feed and clothe themselves (all but their red coat) on 9*l*. of annual pay. One-third of the Bengal army thus paid is calculated to be Rajpoot, all of whom can look back to some period when their ancestry possessed sovereign power; and these are the men now brought into contact for the first time with the Rajpoot tribes, still preserving a slender portion of their ancient independence. It must be obvious that any thing which tends to estrange the affections of such men is most impolitic; and, therefore, any measure of economy which reduces their comforts, and interferes with the mutual sympathy between the Sipahi and his European captain, weakens one of the strongest pillars of our empire.

#### VI. How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

THIS Quere opens a wide field for observation, in which difficulties of no mean kind abound. The term *expediency* has necessarily a wider sense than that of *justice*, in all our transactions with these States; and from the anomalous condition, not only of our own power, but of the governments by which we are surrounded, justice in the abstract can scarcely be a matter of discussion.

Our acts arising out of the war of 1817-18, with regard to the brave chieftains of Kheechiwarra and Gurra-Kotah, certainly violated justice, while they could hardly be defended even on the ground of expediency. Both these states, and more especially Kheechiwarra, which had maintained itself against all the Mahomedan dynasties, and though much reduced, even against Mahatta thraldom, fell victims to our alliance with Sindia in 1818, (though this chief was convicted of treason to our power,) and what he never could effect with all his means, we accomplished for him. Although these acts did not arise out of a subsidiary alliance, it was from a state of things tantamount thereto, having contingents of Sindia under our control. Some excuse may be found in the feverish anxiety to keep this Mahatta from hostilities, but it is one of those transactions in which justice was forgotten. We hunted the remains of this valiant tribe with Sindia's contingent, headed by European officers. The ancestor of the brave Kheechi chief had rendered the British Government essential service in Goddard's hazardous march, and on other occasions of our early contests with Madhu Sindia had served with all his troops; but, instead of reaping the same reward as the chief of Bhopal for the same act, only a book was left to him of all his ancient patrimony.

With regard to Gurra-Kotah the exercise of our power was yet more palpably unjust. This chieftainship (in the south-west corner of Boondelkund) had fought out its independence throughout all the periods of greatest violence until 1816, when Sindia at length obtained possession of it; but, taking advantage of the general hostilities of 1817, when all India was against us, the chief redeemed his possession. When the war was over, and from a policy ever to be lamented, we not only overlooked Sindia's treachery, but consolidated his power, merely on his showing that Gurra-Kotah was his, we loaded the British army with the obloquy of reducing a brave, independent chief, for the sake of ingratiating the treacherous Mahatta.

The case of the minor chief of Amud, the ancient proprietor of Rampoota-Bhampoota, is equally hard. This is an ancient fief of Méwar, belonging to the Chondorawut tribe, a branch of the Rana's family, who had held it for centuries. Rana Juggut Sing had assigned it, as a temporary provision, to his nephew, Madhu Sing, who, through Holcar's aid, contested and obtained the throne of Jeypoor against his elder brother Esau Sing. For this service Madhu Sing made over these districts appertaining to Méwar to Holcar, with whom they have since remained. When Madhu Sing obtained them, the rights of the Chondorawuts, the feudatories of centuries, were re-troited to the subordinate fortress of Amud and some 20 villages; and as the district was chiefly inhabited by this clan, Holcar's government had been compelled to respect this remnant of their power (which a century ago yielded nine lacs annually). Shortly after the events of 1818 the subject of Amud was broached by Holcar's agent to ours, and it was described by the former as a shelter for the enemies of order. Unhappily the Rao was an infant, and, as frequently happens in more civilized countries, the possession of power caused contests and parties. It was not of course deemed expedient by Holcar's government to enter into the history of the rights of this fragment of an ancient fief; disorder must be put down, and our troops went against it. Internal animosities were stopped; the garrison and the young Rao surrendered to our

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authority; and Amud, the last refuge of an ancient family, which had survived Arungzé's tyranny, was blown up by the English! This was Bhurtpore upon a smaller scale, but *here* motives could not be attributed.

In all these cases we were aiding powers whose sole aim was our destruction (which by the most insidious treachery they had recently attempted) against the indigenous princes, who, by their bravery, had dragged on a precarious, but independent existence through centuries of strife.

Again, in the case of Kotah, which must be well known to the Board as involving some nice points, we found ourselves obliged to support expediency and our guarantee against justice in the abstract; but as I have elsewhere fully detailed this case, I beg to refer to it\*, as likewise to the question of accession to the throne of Jeipoor†, where we supported an interloper against the lawful claimant and the established laws of succession, which might have led to serious results but for the birth of a posthumous child.

These are the most prominent cases in which we have departed from the laws of abstract justice, partly from ignorance of their past history, partly from the misrepresentations of parties calling for our support, or from the force of circumstances which scarcely left us free agents. There are others, but as they are adverted to in the reply to Qn. VII., it is unnecessary here to pursue the subject. I will, therefore, merely observe, that upon the degree and nature of our interference with these states, and upon a proper knowledge and estimate of the varied interests that pervade them, which can alone enable the paramount power to unite justice with expediency in its relation with them, must depend the benefits which might accrue to us from these important allies.

VII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian Army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition, with reference to the forces belonging to Native States, on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility we have to guard?

The specific objects contained in this Quere have been efficiently attained as far as regards Central and Western India, both as to the positions selected for our camps, and the numerical allotment of the troops. Two chains have been extended connecting Hindusthan with the Dekhan and with Guzerat, and a conciliatory policy towards the Rajpoots will in time make them powerful and indispensable links. The more eastern chain is from Allahabad and Benares, and consists of posts through Boondelcund to Hosungabad, the passage of the Nerbudda. The western chain connects the stations on the Jumna with Ajmer, Neemutch, and Mhow, to Candeleish. or, by means of the petty subordinate states upon the Myhie, with Guzerat.

To render these permanent camps independent of all auxiliary aid, as well as of each other, is of primary importance. I would therefore suggest, on the score of discipline, efficiency, and economy, the entire abolition of detachments and petty posts; that our armies should be condensed into masses, able, not only to defend themselves against all contingencies, but also, without long preparatory measures, to move on any threatened point, and at once crush revolt. One large central camp in Boondelcund would suffice to communicate between the camps on the Nerbudda, and Allahabad, Benares, and all subordinate posts should be amalgamated with it. So likewise with the western line, where the main camps of Ajmer, Neemutch, and Mhow, may be strengthened by calling in all the petty outposts west of the Jumna, viz.; Goorging, Rewarri, and Hlands (excepting Skinner's horse). Both in a political and military point of view, Ajmer is the key of all our positions, and must be the point of all future operations in Northern India. It should, therefore, be made powerfully independent.

The same principle of a few grand lines, defended by masses, might be extended throughout India. It is a principle in tactics that no force should be detached which cannot sustain itself, yet have we always acted in opposition to this axiom, affording in these multiplied demonstrations of our means, proof only of our weakness. The day for detachment of five companies and six-pounders for the reduction of mud forts is gone by; and the breaking up of inferior posts, which harass the men, destroy discipline, and oppress the country people, by compelling them to provide the means required to move these detachments, should follow. The line of the Ganges indicates the base of our power. The Presidency, and one intermediate station between it and Benares, strong garrisons for Allahabad and Agra, and one station between Agra and Kurnal, (which last claims the greatest importance, and of which Lodhiana is the outpost), appear to be the principal positions in which to concentrate our armies. Agra is more eligible than Mathura, being in the vicinity of the chief fords of the Chumbul, and equally overawing the Jâts. Meerut, (with its strong outposts of Bareilly and Almorâ), Futteghurh and Lucknow, appear the fittest stations for the concentration of our forces, to provide against contingencies. It might be requisite to strengthen the posts upon the Assam frontier; but the great stations of Bhamapore and Cawnpore seem no longer necessary; and the troops allotted to these, with the multiplicity of petty posts, might with advantage be transferred to Benares, Agra, Lucknow, Meerut, and Kurnal. Cuttack would complete the list of stations uniting the Bengal and Coast armies.

It is true that, by this distribution, the stations would be widely apart; but with so

insufficient

\* Annals of Rajasthan, vol. 2, p. 563.

† Annals of Rajasthan, vol. 2, p. 578.

inefficient an army for such extended defence, there is no alternative between separating and weakening, or condensing and strengthening the forces. Each station should be strong enough to fight its way from one end of India to the other. Any two of these armies might unite in three weeks; and in Upper India 30,000 men might congregate in less than a month. Our policy can never be defensive, when that day comes India is lost.

The whole history of our subsidiary alliances has practically illustrated their denationalizing influence upon the princes and the people who have been made to purchase our protection. The principle is immutable, even if it ensure not sudden annihilation, it operates with equal certainty, in a slow process of decay. Where are the States which, a quarter of a century ago, were to enjoy the perpetuity of our friendship? "*Troja fuit!*" and all these camps may therefore be regarded as active agents of evil.

It is a subject of gratulation that the position of the permanent and indispensable camps at Ajmer, Narmuth and Mhow, connecting our Gangetic Provinces with the Dekhan, while they secure the objects of our supremacy, do not remind the Rajpoots of their prostration of independence, as in past times, when placed immediately under the eyes of the protected; nor does the necessity longer exist. The Mahratta was the natural foe of our power; the Rajpoot is its natural ally. Happily for them and for us, the Rajpoots have hitherto regarded these camps only as checks upon their foes, a feeling which, with proper circumspection, we may turn to our mutual advantage; and in so doing, we shall best retard the predicted period when the *maximum* of our possessions will be the *minimum* of our power.

It was well observed by Moro Dekshint, the Mahratta minister of the last Peshwa to Major Ford, "that no native power could, from its habits, conduct itself with that strict fidelity which we seemed to demand;" a remark confirmed to me by one whose penetrating mind had studied all our acts, and whose extended life had embraced nearly the whole history of our power from the battle of Plassy to the subjugation of the Peshwa. I mean Zalim Sing of Kotah. In reply to my assertion, shortly after the opening of our intercourse, that we repudiated all idea of aggrandisement in Rajpootana: "I have no doubt you think what you say; but the period is rapidly approaching when there will be but one *cora* current throughout India."

When such are the impressions of the wisest of the natives, as well as one of the most practical of our own politicians (Sir T. Munro), we may say the object is already half effected. Denials and renunciations are futile, for they appeal to facts—to our position; and if the impression should become general, if no method be devised to convince them that ultimate conquest is not our object, what can we expect but the conversion of our best friends into our bitterest foes? The more we consider the subject, the more difficult appears the mode of extrication. All depends however, as before observed, on the extent and nature of our interference.

Those who look upon the several nations of India as singular in mind as in complexion can perceive no danger in extending our interference throughout the protected states. Such men take their opinions from the resistance hitherto opposed to us by upstart Mahrattas, banditti Pandurms, or rebel victuaries, between whom and their subjects no bond of union exists; but they can form no idea of the identity of interests subsisting with the Rajpoots, of whose history they are ignorant. Others again, on the score of philanthropy, condemn as inhuman and impolitic all who advocate the withdrawal of checks over their independent administration inhuman, inasmuch as if left to themselves they might recommence their old international warfare, and impolitic, because we should relinquish what we have acquired with difficulty. A reference to their history, which will show that they now occupy the same lands where the Mahomedans found them on their conquest of India, by proving the tenacity of Rajpoot institutions and associations, may quiet the fears of the philanthropists, and with regard to the impolicy, our interference cannot for an instant be justified on this ground. The arguments so justly applied to the policy of 1803, when Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow annulled the grand project of Marquis Wellesley, for uniting the fixed governments of Rajpootana in one grand federal union against the predatory states, are now no longer applicable, for the Mahrattas are politically defunct. The evils of *non-interference* may be many. We should hear of border feuds, in which a few hundreds would fall on each side; followed up, if we left them alone, by an intermarriage and pacification; we might sometimes have complaints of obstructions to commerce, requiring our interposition to obtain redress; we might even be made *directly* sensible that there existed in these States men whose occasional excesses required chastisement; but these are evils inescapable from the moral and social condition equally of the Rajpoots and all Asiatic governments, and would cease with the amelioration of that condition. But are we to destroy because we cannot at once amend? or are the necessary checks to such evils, when they *do occur*, to be compared with an interference whose very nature must create such occasions?

The only safe alternative, therefore, is a re-modelling of the alliances, lessening the causes of interference, by diminishing the tributes, and providing for their realization in a manner to prevent the least chance of collision; and rendering the alliance, as far as possible, one of mutual benefit and support.

Already have the evil effects of our alliances received practical illustration, in a variety of ways, in almost every state of Rajpootana. The first effect is the abolition of all those wholesome checks which restrained the passions of their princes; for, applying our own monarchical principles, we recognise only the immediate power with whom we treated, and whom

\* The striking of coin is an act of sovereignty in the East.

whom we engage to support against all enemies, internal and external. Being thus freed from the fear of a re-action amongst his feudatory kinsmen, the prince may pursue the dictates of a blind revenge, assured that no neighbour prince dare give sanctuary to his victims; or, if an insatiate avarice prompt him to visit the merchant and cultivator with contributions or exorbitant taxes on their labour, the sufferers have not even emigration left as a refuge. Marwar and Jessulmer have powerfully exemplified this, our alliance having completely neutralized all the checks that avarice or tyranny had to fear from the hatred of their chiefs or subjects\*. The ancient balance of power, which often ended in the deposal or death of a tyrant, we have thus completely destroyed.

It would seem, indeed, that we do not rightly comprehend the scope of our own policy; for by a strange inconsistency, we turned a deaf ear to the remonstrance of the chief vassals of Marwar when expelled their estates and country by their prince; and the minister of Jessulmer was allowed to pursue the plunder of his subjects with impunity; but no sooner does the Rajah of Bikanér apply to the paramount power to put down disaffection, than the aid denied to his kindred chiefs and subjects is promised to the prince. It never occurs to us that rebellion may be justifiable, it is enough that tumult exists, and that it must be repressed. The whole history of our power shows that we have hitherto acted in ignorance of the mutual relations of the princes and their people. We might plead this ignorance *pro tanto* in mitigation of the wrongs it has produced; but this plea no longer exists; and the history of Bikanér shows us that deposal would be too slight a punishment for the tyranny of this prince to his chieftains and subjects.

It is the same with the confederation of Shékhavati, of whose history our government is profoundly ignorant. Few men in India know even the name of this singular and interesting community, which has rights well defined, and quite distinct from the parent state of Jeypoor, which has never been able entirely to subvert their independence. One of the most characteristic results of these alliances is, that it encourages indolence and injustice to appeal to us to perform what their own energies have hitherto been unequal to. Thus we may send troops into Bikanér and Shékhavati, and upon most inadequate grounds commence disputes in a country where connections are so interwoven, that the first act of hostility may ramify through the whole of Rajpootana.

The natural tendency, as before remarked, of our interference between the Rajpoot Princes and their subjects, will be to bring them all eventually under our direct rule; a consequence which, either as regards these people or ourselves, is to be deprecated. Not only, I conceive, would they not become happier, wiser or wealthier under our sway, but we should confine a mass of elastic discontent that might ultimately explode on our mutual ruin. In substituting for the *rajahs* and *thakors*, judges and collectors, we must go beyond the tyranny of Arungzéib. Rajpootana is studded with fortresses, each of which would prove another Bluthpore, and furnish defenders similar to those whose indomitable spirit destroyed the Mogul power. They should not imagine that, like the Moguls, we desire to subvert either their religion or their power. Let the line of separation between the controlling agent and the Rajpoots be as broad as possible, remove whatever may appear to menace their *guaranteed* independence. By these means alone can we secure in them the barrier we require against any foreign foe. Our local governments of India, which derive half their credit at home from the strength of their treasury, may not be inclined to counsel the lessening of the tributes; but be it remembered that one lac of rupees extorted by force will cost millions in the end.

#### VIII. How far have the Civil Establishments of the several Residences and Agencies been regulated, so as to secure efficiency and economy?

The political residencies and agencies established throughout Central India have undergone several modifications since 1818, in which neither efficiency nor economy has been lost sight of; but it may be doubted whether either of these objects has been attained to the extent which is desirable.

Whatever destroys the unity of end in our political relations with these singular societies, cannot but be prejudicial; they are links in one great chain, though with a variety of often conflicting interests. In order, therefore, to maintain that uniformity which the treaties show to be requisite, unity of action must be secured, by placing the whole of our relations with the Rajpoot States under the control of one person thoroughly acquainted with their character and policy. While it appears advisable that the permanent camps should be strengthened, it is imperative to neutralize the feelings arising from the restraint they impose, so galling to a high-minded people, by a system of conciliation, and by continual efforts for their prosperity.

Ajmer, which is associated in the minds of these princes with all their earliest recollections as the seat of vice-regal government, appears the best adapted for the abode of a "resident" of Rajpootana. There should be no resident agents at the courts of the native princes, each of whom should have a political deputation at Ajmer, consisting of one confidential chief, and a civil minister, the first to be appointed with the full consent of the council of chiefs belonging to each State.

The office of the "resident" being one of supervision and general control, a sufficient number of assistants should be placed under him, to conduct the duties of each State, and to present

\* *Vide* Letters of expatriated Chiefs of Marwar to the British Political Agent, tracing all their sufferings to the alliance. *Annals of Rajasthan*, vol. 1. p. 197.

present an abstract of all proceedings to the resident for his information and decision. *His* instructions should be conveyed to the vakeels through the assistants; while by the resident holding a *darbar* at fixed periods, at which all occurrences would be discussed in the presence of the vakeels and assistants, mutual checks would thus be imposed. As there can be nothing in the present state of our alliances to render secrecy necessary, this publicity would prevent any false reports being made by the vakeels to their masters; while it must increase the confidence of the native courts in our general political relations. To render this plan complete, all correspondence should be carried on in the vernacular dialects of the principalities, by which means the princes would be able to judge for themselves, instead of being at the mercy of some ignorant or unprincipled moonshee expounder of a foreign language. Nothing can be more absurd than that we should continue the use of the Persian language in these regions, in which not a word of it is understood: in fact, this principle should be extended to all countries with which we have transactions.

The assistants should be classed according to their rank and importance, perhaps as follows:

- 1st. Assistant for Méwar.
- 2d. For Marwar and Kishengurh.
- 3d. For Jeipoor and Shekhavati.
- 4th. For Harouti or Boondi-Kotali.
- 5th. For Jessulmér and Bikanér.
- 6th. For Siróhi, Dongerpoor, Bhanswarra, to which Satara might or might not be added.

A seventh might be added for Machheri, Kerowli, and the Ját states of Bhurtpore and Dhalpoor; but as their relations have been so long with Delhi, and their interests have thus become separated from Rajpootana, except on the score of unity, it might be desirable that they should remain distinct. From amongst the assistants the resident might be permitted to select one for the office of secretary, whose salary might be 500 rupees per month additional: which post would be an object of honourable ambition, it being however understood, that the Governor-General should always possess the  *veto*  on such appointment, to prevent its becoming one of favour.

The individuals selected as assistants should be men of talent, acquainted with the languages (more especially the vernacular dialects), and above all, having proper feelings of consideration for the people amongst whom they are to abide. It is essential that they be of an age when the principles and habits are fixed, and not, as is too generally the case, very young men, who obtaining the appointments through interest and favour, would regard them only as steps to advancement. Against this greatest of evils in all governments, but in a tenfold degree in these remote regions, we have especially to guard.

If, in the ordinary judicial or territorial duties, a functionary from incapacity, or want of integrity, betrays his trust, the evil is remediable, as the mischief can only be transient and local; but it is far different in those regions, where the first error may generate evils that would sap the foundation of our power. It therefore behoves the controlling authorities at home to provide checks for such evils. All political officers are subject to the ordeal of an oath to withstand corruption, and to discharge their duties with energy and honesty. But there is no clause against moral unfitness, nor any requiring ability, temper, or taste for the peculiar functions of the office, while the individual is naturally apt to measure his own qualifications by the amount of salary in prospect.

It is the province of the Governor-General to administer the oath on all such occasions; and I would suggest, as a check to the abuse of patronage, that the Governor-General should himself, in the first place, take an oath before his council on every such nomination, that he believed the individual in every point of view qualified for the office.

It would not be possible, according to the present constitution of the civil service in India, to obtain from that branch men with the requisite experience, to whom these appointments would be worth holding, if economy is attended to, since to the highest of these political assistants I should propose 1,500 rupees per month, graduated down to 1,000. In whatever branch of the service, therefore, the necessary qualifications are to be found, from that should selections be made. But it is highly important that there should be few distinctions; and that the individuals holding such appointments should consider them as the  *ne plus ultra* , but the highest of these would not be accepted by a civilian of six year's standing; or, if accepted, he would be looking to something better just as he began to acquire a knowledge of his duties. For these reasons it will be evident that economy and efficiency will be best attained by the election of officers from the military branch of the service; upon which body the incentive to qualify themselves for such situations would act most beneficially. The certainty of general eligibility on the score of talent and character alone, would prove a source of widely-extended emulation. To this day, although military men hold the majority of such appointments, they are considered as trenching upon the exclusive rights of the civilians, and hold them more on sufferance than sanction: but it is matter of record that such nominations arose out of imperative necessity, being in the very face of instructions from home,  *i.e.*  "that military men should not be eligible to such appointments." The cause of the exception must be sought in the constitution of the executive body of the Company: but were the invidious restriction publicly, as it has long since been virtually, renounced, it would act as a spur on the energies of hundreds of men, whose talents lie dormant for want of  *hope*  of ever being enabled to employ them honourably and advantageously.

We now come to an important subdivision of this question, namely, the political control over the Mahrattas, and other protected chiefs, east of the Chumbul.

It appears quite incongruous that a political authority, even of the second order, should be maintained at Holkar's court; and it is the less required from the contiguity of the camp at Mhow. In like manner Bhopál might dispense with any distinct agency. The Court of Sindia is the only one which cannot well be left without a resident agent; but, at the same time, it is not calculated for the residence of an officer having general control over all the interests between Rajpootana and Boondelcund, a combination of authority promising beneficial results. It might be imagined that this power might also be vested in the "resident for Rajpootana;" but the tendency of this course to revive the ancient intercourse between the Rajpoots and Mahrattas, is a powerful argument against it. The barrier of separation cannot be too strong or too wide. I should therefore suggest one superior political authority to superintend the varied interests laying between our Rajpoot allies and Boondelcund, i.e. to include Sindia, Holkar, Bhopál, and the petty Rajpoot subordinates of Khuechiwarra, Omntwarra, Déwas, and the dislocated estates of Meer Khan and Ghuffoor Khau. A resident and three assistants might suffice for these duties, and one of these assistants might reside at the camp at Mhow, which would be sufficiently near to embrace all the duties required at Holkar's petty court. As it would no doubt occasion considerable irritation to Bhopál to have her political relations at all connected with Sindia's court, it might be advisable to transfer these entirely to the Boondelcund division. Bhopál has long been morally, and since 1818 politically, severed from the Mahrattas, and whatever would tend to their reunion must be deprecated. These suggestions are offered as a mere outline of a measure that may be considered worth attention.

#### IX. How far have the Residents and Agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

The checks upon the political acts of residents and agents have been, and are, necessarily slight. There is, in fact, no proximate check; and as instructions are founded upon the representations of the agents themselves, it is scarcely going too far to say that there never have been any adequate checks at all. If the system I have ventured to suggest in answer to the last Query were adopted, a sufficient systematic check would be provided.

On pecuniary disbursements there are the usual checks of audit, as well as the imposition of an oath against corruption, which is administered to residents and to their assistants.

#### X. How far has the existing system of Indian Government, or Home Direction and Control, been successful, or calculated to succeed in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude and unity of purpose in the several gradations of government, direction, control or influence, and (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the Home or of the Indian Government?

That the existing system of Indian government is "calculated" to work well, so as to secure "the requisite vigour, promptitude, and unity of purpose in the several gradations of government, we have demonstration in three of the most tremendous conflicts that have assailed it. The wars of 1803 and 1817 against the Mahrattas, and the Burmese war of 1825, afford the most unequivocal proofs that the system possesses the essential properties of good government. If by "constancy" be implied the probable perpetuity of these properties, it is obvious that this must entirely depend upon the excellence of the subordinate parts, which again rest with those who have to provide for them. With directing minds, such as existed in the eventful epochs just adverted to, of whom it might be said they created whatever was wanting to their purpose, similar results on similar emergencies might reasonably be expected. Even with less commanding talents than were exerted by the governments during the last untoward conflict, material danger might not be apprehended.

The first object of attention is necessarily the *primum mobile*, which involves the consideration of "Home direction and control."

It must not be imagined because our old Mahratta foes, the Peshwa, Bhonsla, Sindia, and Holkar, are either destroyed or humbled; the Nizam paralyzed by our subsidaries; the Rajpoot States bound to us by ties of gratitude; and all the minor predatory hordes dispersed, that ordinary talents may now govern India. This opinion once acted upon must be fatal, for the quenching of the opposition to our power was nothing compared to the difficulty of maintaining it afterwards.

The checks upon the Executive Government are necessarily lodged exclusively with the "Home direction and control," and upon their choice of individuals for the performance of these high functions will the prosperity and stability of our Indian empire depend.

I would urgently suggest the expediency of abolishing all retiring pensions or largesses to our governors at the expiration of their service, however brilliant or useful. The system is fraught with incalculable evil; in illustration of which instances might be cited, where, from the individual being unconsciously biased by such remote expectations, the efficiency of our army was crippled. With a commercial government like that of the East India Company, whose ruling principle must, and ought to be economy, there should neither be a premium in prospect for the fulfilment of duty, nor a penalty on its omission, where considerations of local expediency may induce a governor to postpone commands that might be noxious if fulfilled. The salaries are ample; and beyond them the only stimulant should be the honour which the office confers, and the distinctions from the sovereign, which always follow any extraordinary manifestation of zeal and talent.

Should

Should this immense empire ever fall into the hands of a weak or irresponsible governor, it may be lost for ever. The first evil, indeed, may be in a measure compensated by an able and independent council; but irresponsibility might neutralize this check. Much however depends on the selection of the men who are associated with the supreme power. It may therefore be a subject worthy of consideration whether the council might not include a military man of rank and acknowledged talent, by which means the interests of the army; that main stay of our power, would be better attended to than if the "Home direction" were composed of military men. It would also be placing in the hands of the Court another facility for recompensing extraordinary merit, besides being a distinguished mark of favour to the army at large.

Of the Court of Directors itself it might be embarrassing to speak with the freedom that truth and the public good demand, but that general opinion inclines to great modifications in this body. The main qualification, that of a personal knowledge of India, has been too much neglected; for although a fusion of men of influence, versed in the higher branches of commercial economy, and who have not visited India, may be desirable, it assuredly is not so, that such a class should hold, and for years maintain, the entire executive power, to the exclusion of those possessing the higher qualifications for government. The result of allowing the majority of the Court to consist of commercial men, must be the government of India on narrow commercial principles, instead of that enlarged policy which embraces all the objects of a magnificent empire.

Moreover, in the selection of commercial men, it is essential that they should not possess commercial interests at variance with those which they are bound to protect. It would be monstrous that a man with strong West India interests should impose restraints by his voice and influence, as a director and senator, on East India produce. Neither should any particular class or influence predominate amongst the Directors, yet the Committee to whom, as is well known, belongs the right of initiating, discussing, and I may add, of carrying, every point that involves the government of India, is often composed of individuals who know nothing personally of the country, or the different branches of the service.

It is only requisite to classify the materials of the Court of Directors into Mercantile, Naval, Civil, Military, and Miscellaneous, to perceive the purposes to which their varied experience must be applied, when the faulty construction of the Court at once becomes apparent. We should see the two first classes, *i. e.* the Mercantile and Naval almost entirely composing the chief committee of correspondence, regulating the fate of 200,000 men, while the military men in the direction are attending to the shipping, or disposing of commercial investments! It would be more consistent that men who have passed their lives in political, judicial, revenue and military duties, should be called upon for the aid of their experience when fundamental details of government are discussed; and *vice versa* that the others should be appointed to mechanical functions of trade and shipping, with which they are well acquainted.

Of the Court of Proprietors, in fact the Company, we may say, that it is utterly useless for any purpose save that decreed by the Directors, to whom it is entirely subservient. It is notorious that no subject at all unpalatable may be initiated there with any prospect of being carried, for, to use a vulgar phrase, whatever the proposition, it can at all times be swamped by a snap of the finger. As long as a patronage shall be distributed as at present, so long will this preponderating influence crush every other. There is no part of the whole system more requiring modification than that of the patronage. As a matter of course, the Directors provide their own families and relations with the best appointments. The civil service is accordingly filled and kept up chiefly by the kindred of a party, which must beget irresponsibility, indemnity for inefficiency, and undue influence in the service; for governors and councillors will always be awayed by the common impulses of humanity, and the only mode that seems calculated to restore the equilibrium of independence, is the abrogation of retiring pensions, as before suggested.

There is another point that calls loudly for remedy, resulting from this system of patronage. Officers may have served the Honourable East India Company for half a century, and yet know not how to produce a cadetship for their sons! Whether in future, the patronage is to reside with the Directors, whether it be sold, or however otherwise disposed of, there should be a certain number of appointments reserved for the children or near relatives of those who have served the Company long and faithfully. Neither would this course be impolitic; for the native soldiery, who are creatures of sympathy and strong feeling, would rejoice to see the children of their old officers amongst them, thus keeping up ties of ancient standing.

I have, &c.

James Tod,  
Lieut.-Colonel Bengal Army,  
late Political Agent W. Rajpoot States

38, York-place, Portman-square,  
23 March 1832.



Appendix, No. 14.

Appendix, No. 14.

Letter from  
Sir J. Malcolm  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

LETTER from Sir John Malcolm to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Sir,  
I HAVE received your letter of the 3d of February, requiring me to give any information I can offer to the India Board, on a variety of points connected with our external and internal political relations in the East.

Before I proceed to reply to your specific Queries, I must refer to my Political History of India, and to my work on Central India, as containing the general results of my information, as well as my opinions on such subjects up to the date at which these volumes were published; and I may further state that nothing has since occurred that leads to any change in my general sentiments upon the particular points to which you have drawn my attention.

Query I What new acquisitions of Territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our Political Relations has been effected since 1813?

The wars with the Goorkahs in 1815, and with the Mahrattas and Pindarries in 1817-18, terminated in making the British Government sovereigns of the province of Kemaun and other portions of the Nepaul dominions, and of the wide territories formerly belonging to the Peshwa, and part of those of the Holkar family, and of the Rajah of Nagpore. It also led to our forming treaties and engagements with a variety of princes and chiefs, who had formerly been the real or nominal dependents of the head of the Mahratta state. We contracted a more intimate alliance with the Holkar family, the Rajah of Nagpore, and with Dowlut Row Seindia, while the princes and chiefs of Sagur, of Rajpootana and Malwa, as well as several of those of Western Hindostan, came more directly under our protection as lord paramount of all India, a condition which we had at this period been compelled by irresistible and uncontrollable events to assume, contrary to all the maxims of policy which from the first commencement of our career in India had been impressed upon the attention of those entrusted with the rule of our Eastern empire.

II. What is the actual condition of our relations with the several States?

The actual condition of our alliances with different states is, in only a few cases, materially altered since the publication of the works before alluded to. At Baroda there has been an important change in the mode of maintaining our relations with the Guicowar family. The original causes of this change are very fully detailed in my Minute of the 16th January 1829, and subsequent arrangements are recorded in my Minute in the Political department during the year 1830. These opinions were opposed to many local interests, and were at variance on some essential points with those of my colleagues in government, but they were approved by the Governor-General in Council. Their object was to release the English Government from numerous guarantee engagements to the creditors of the Guicowar state, and thereby to put an end to that constant and vexatious interference in the affairs of our ally, which had tended to lower him in the estimation of his own subjects at his capital of Baroda, and to attract their chief attention to the British resident, and to those who were connected with him, or who had obtained our protection. In order to give full effect to the measures above alluded to, the British representative was removed to Ahmedabad, which was formerly the capital of Guzerat, but is now situated within the English territories, under the designation of Political Commissioner for Guzerat and Kattiwar, his duties have been considerably increased as well his authority; a political agent who acts under him, resides in the latter province, and an assistant at Baroda, which being only 70 miles from this present station, he frequently visits.

The measures adopted by me to settle the affairs of Baroda, met with opposition from the infatuated Syngce, the present ruler of that state, because he desired more power than he possessed, and from my colleagues in government, because they desired he should have less. The line I pursued, was, however, as I have stated, fully approved by the Governor-General in Council, and also by the Indian government in England. It is, I am satisfied, the only one that can save from destruction the ancient family of the Guicowar, from whose friendship we have derived such essential benefits, and at the same time preserve unsullied that faith which has been solemnly, though in some instances, impolitically pledged to individuals. Many difficulties will occur and many obstacles will oppose the successful execution of this plan, but if the ends it is calculated to attain are considered by the government abroad and at home, of the local importance which I attach to them, these difficulties and obstacles will vanish when it is seen that there is a determined resolution not only to maintain, but to carry through the measures which have been adopted. There are objections to all such energetic measures of state policy, and one more complicated and more difficult to disentangle I never encountered than that of which I am writing. It presented a choice of evils and embarrassment. I chose an open intelligible course, and I am very positive that if it is decidedly supported, every good I anticipated will result; but if minor considerations and partial failures in some of its parts have the effect of lessening our zeal and activity to preserve this native state, it will fall as all similarly situated have done.

I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, not to say the security, of our vast Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent upon us for protection: of these the most important are the King of Oude, the Rajah of Nagpore,

VI.  
POLITICAL  
OR  
FOREIGN

Appendix, No 14.

Letter from  
Sir J. Malcolm  
to  
T. H. Vickers, Esq.

Nagpore, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Rajah of Mysore, and the Guicowar. These are all so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits (that I have elsewhere noticed), which we derive from those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a source of political strength the value of which will never be known till it is lost. They show the possibility of a native state subsisting even in the heart of our territories, and their condition mitigates in some degree the bad effects of that too general impression that our sovereignty is incompatible with the maintenance of native princes and chiefs. I shall not stop in this place to examine into the truth or otherwise of the notion that we have sought occasion to reduce our allies to the condition of stipendiaries, after having made use of them to serve our own purposes. It is in many cases untrue and in all exaggerated, but it is very general, and forms one of the leading, most plausible, and most popular grounds of combination against our power. This I have had ample opportunities of knowing to be a fact, and I am further convinced that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. There are now none of the latter who can venture to contend against us in the field. They are incapable, from their actual condition, of any dangerous combination with each other, and they absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion. It is further to be observed on this part of the subject, that the respect which the natives give to men of high birth with claims upon their allegiance, contributes greatly to the preservation of the general peace; such afford an example to their countrymen of submission to the rule of foreigners, they check the rise of those bold military adventurers with which India ever has and ever will abound, but who will never have the field widely opened to their enterprizes until our impolicy has annihilated or suffered to die of their own acts those high princes and chiefs who, though diminished in power, have still the hereditary attachment and obedience of millions of those classes who are from habits and courage, alike suited to maintain or to disturb the public peace.

Lucknow has survived more vicissitudes than any state with which the British Government was ever connected in India. It is about 70 years since our first treaty with its ruler. The same family is still on the throne, and, notwithstanding numberless changes, in full exercise of the internal sovereignty. The date of our alliances with Mysore and Baroda are nearly the same, both being upwards of 30 years. The first is a creation made on the subversion of the power of the family of Hyder Ally, in 1799, and well it has answered the use and politic purposes for which it was formed. I have elsewhere observed upon the benefits we derive from the existence of this principality, but I have added "that it is the misfortune of this connexion that its nature, though excellent, is so delicate as to be more liable perhaps to injury from inattention or from a cessation of active and spirited support, than from a bold and unblushing attack. The Mysore state is, in fact, so actually dependent upon us, and its dependence is so marked by the number of British troops stationed in its territories, that nothing but the English Government being constantly alive to the character and value of the connexion can keep it in that state of elevation and respectability which appear to be absolutely necessary for its existence."

Vol. i. Political  
History of India,  
p. 325 to 326.

The condition of Baroda is perhaps one of not less hazard than Mysore. Both require for their preservation to have every question relating to them judged not only with reference to local circumstances, but to an enlarged policy, which embraces the consideration not of a part, but the whole empire, and it is this consideration which has ever led me to regret that such states should be placed under subordinate governments, which have neither the information nor knowledge which belongs to the Supreme Government, to enable them to judge large questions of policy, and are besides liable to influences that often operate unfortunately to the native dependent states subject to their control. But I must nevertheless state that under the actual shape of our rule in India, it is very difficult, and in some cases almost impossible, to make a different arrangement. This, however, is a subject which I shall again notice when I come to treat of the construction of the local governments of India.

My sentiments in respect to the princes and chiefs of Rajpootana and Malwa, are fully stated in the Memoir on Central India. My more recent opinions of their actual state, and of the measures calculated to give permanent tranquillity to this important quarter of India, you will find upon your records, in my communications to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, and to the President of the Board of Control, previous to my departure for Bombay, in July 1827. It was at that period the intention of the President of the Board that I should, in addition to the charge of the government of Bombay, have the supervision and control of the administration of Central India, under the orders of the Governor-General in Council, but circumstances occurred, on which it is not necessary in this place to observe, to prevent the execution of this plan, and little if any change was made in that important part of our dominions.

Principles nearly similar to those which I recommended for Central India, should govern us in the preservation of our treaties and engagements with the princes and chiefs of Kattywar and Cutch, and I entreat the attention of the Board to my Minutes under date 24th September 1829, and 10th October 1829, on the actual condition of these countries. It is of importance also, as connected with the peace and means of defence of the Western side of India, that we should keep up our amicable relations with the Imaum of Muscat and the numerous petty Arab states of the Gulph. These latter have been till very lately pirates; but by the wise and vigorous policy of Mr Elphinstone, when governor of Bombay, which I have followed, their outrages have been repressed. This has been effected by the constant station of a naval force in the Gulph, combined with the encouragement given to the employment of the vessels of the Arabs in trade, and I am confident we shall, if we persevere,

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eventually change the habits of this race of men, a result which will be of great benefit to the general commerce of India, while it promotes civilization, and adds to our strength in a very vulnerable quarter, for in no part of our territories have we more to guard against from an European enemy than in this; and on the means we prepare, more than on those we could collect at a moment of danger, we must depend for their security against such attack. I shall not here enter upon any detail regarding the nature of the connexion which we have established with Persia and Bagdad; the latter point will be found fully treated in my Minute of the 20th November 1830. I shall only observe that our best guarantee for the continued friendship of such states, is the power we possess of aiding or attacking them on occasions of emergency: but this part of the subject will be noticed in answer to a subsequent Query.

- III. What is the amount of Military Force required in each instance? whether,  
1st. By express stipulation?  
2d. By the ordinary effect of our obligations?  
3d. As a security against extraordinary risks?

The military force required in the countries of allies and protected states is, I believe, chiefly regulated by attention to the best positions for the maintenance of the general peace and the defence of the country: circumstances have sometimes required more troops to be stationed in the territories of states with whom we have engagements than the exact numbers for which we had stipulated. The amount of the force we have agreed to furnish will be found in the treaties. Where fewer men were thought sufficient, either for ordinary service or extraordinary risks, I cannot think there would be any difficulty in obtaining the consent of the native ruler to their diminution, particularly as our subsidized troops are, I believe, in almost every case paid for by a cession of territory.

- IV. What is the character and what the extent of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the Protected States?

- 1st. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to Political Residents and Agents?  
2d. What are the effects that have resulted and those that are to be anticipated on the interests of the protected Princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us as heretofore acted upon?

The character and extent of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of protected states depends so much upon the condition and local circumstances of the state, and the personal characters of their rulers, that without going into the detail of each separate kingdom and principality under our protection, no definite opinion can be given. Regarding those general rules which should regulate our conduct towards such powers, I have stated my sentiments very fully both in the Political History of India and the Memoir on Central India. In the latter work I have observed that,

"It appears of essential importance that the great change which has taken place in the British empire in the East should be fully understood. We have been reluctantly compelled, by events far beyond our power to control, to assume the duties of lord paramount of that great continent, and it is now confessed by all, that our dominion can rest upon no secure basis but the general tranquillity of India.

"Our present condition is one of apparent repose, but full of danger. With the means we had at our command, the work of force was comparatively easy; the liberality of our government gave grace to conquest, and men were for the moment satisfied to be at the feet of generous and humane conquerors. Wearied with a state of continued warfare and anarchy, the loss even of power was hardly regretted; halcyon days were anticipated, and men prostrated themselves in hopes of elevation. All these impressions, made by the combined effects of power, humanity, and fortune, were improved to the utmost by the character of our first measures. The agents of Government were generally individuals who had acquired a name in the scene in which they were employed; they were unfettered by rules, and their acts were adapted to soothe the passions and accord with the habits and prejudices of those whom they had to conciliate, or to reduce to obedience. But there are many causes which operate to make a period like this one of short duration; and the change to a colder system of policy, and the introduction of our laws and regulations into countries immediately dependent upon us, naturally excite agitation and alarm: it is the hour in which men awake from a dream. Disgrat and discontent succeed to terror and admiration; and the princes, the chiefs, and all who had enjoyed rank and influence, see nothing but a system doomng them to immediate decline and ultimate annihilation.

"This view of the subject applies only to the countries under our immediate sway. That government of influence and control which our condition forces us to exercise over many of our allies and dependents, presents more serious difficulties. These may be mitigated, though they cannot be wholly removed, by our adopting the mean between two extremes in our conduct towards the native states which are thus situated. We must alike avoid the minute and vexatious interference which counteracts the purpose for which we maintain them in existence by lessening their power, and consequently their utility, and that more baneful course which, satisfied with their fulfilling the general conditions of their alliance, gives a blind support to their authority, however ruinous its measures to the prosperity of the country and the happiness of its inhabitants. If policy requires that we should govern a considerable

a considerable part of India through the agency of its native princes and chiefs, it is our duty to employ all our moral influence and physical power to strengthen instead of weakening these royal instruments of government. No speculation of comparative improvement or better administration should lead us aside from this path. The general good effected by our strictly following it must always overbalance any local benefit which could be derived from a temporary deviation; if compelled by circumstances to depart from this course, it is wiser to assume and exercise the immediate sovereignty of the country than to leave to such mock and degraded instruments any means of avenging themselves on a power which has rendered them the debased tools of its own misgovernment. Those who are the supporters of a system that leaves a state which our overshadowing friendship has shut out from the sunshine of that splendour which once gave lustre almost to its vices, to die by its own hand, to perish, unaided by us, amid the destruction which has been produced by an internal administration consequent to our alliance, can have no rational argument but that the speediest death of such governments is the best, because it brings them soonest to the point at which we can (on grounds that will be admitted as legitimate both in India and England) assume the country, and give it the benefits of our immediate rule. This result, however, is the very evil against which we have to guard. Increase of territory will, in spite of all our efforts, come too rapidly; but to be at all safe, the march must be gradual towards a crisis which cannot be contemplated without alarm.

"The cause which has compelled, and will continue beyond all others to compel us to increase our dominion, lies deep in the character of our power. We have, whenever our authority is in question, no retreat. Our situation is unlike that of a national government which is associated in language, prejudices, habits, and religion with the people it governs this want of natural root in the soil forces us to adopt a course of action which a state differently circumstanced might avoid. The necessity of not injuring the impression upon which the very foundation of our authority rests, obliges government to carry through, at all hazards, every dispute and contest with the inhabitants of our own provinces, or those of any state which we protect. The measures of a local officer which occasion this necessity may be disapproved of, but our name and ascendancy must be supported, and victory must on any terms be obtained; for we cannot long exist if our strength be even doubted."

I have subsequently, in the same work, observed, "The prostitution of all ranks to our power is at this moment so complete, that the temptations to reform abuses, and to introduce speculative improvement, are almost irresistible to those whose warm and generous impulses are not corrected and restrained by the severe but salutary lessons of experience. Men placed in such scenes are slow to believe that almost every measure tending to produce sudden change, however good it may appear in the abstract, is attended with evil consequences; and that it belongs not to human wisdom subsequently to regulate the impetus of that action which has been precipitately and unseasonably excited in large communities. These observations acquire great importance in their application to our Eastern empire, the population of which comprises all classes, from the most intelligent to the most ignorant, from the most courageous to the most timid; and though these are divided by their separation into tribes and castes, as well as by their various dispositions, pursuits, and qualities, there are some general sympathies associated with their prejudices and religion which give them a disposition to unite, and of such feelings the more instructed part of the society know how to take full advantage whenever it suits their purpose. The Mahomedan priests, the Brahmans, and other civil classes, have for ages been the nominal servants but real masters of the turbulent and bold, but ignorant and superstitious, military races of their countrymen. Their knowledge how to use this dangerous influence has been rendered complete by frequent exercise, and when we consider what they have lost by the introduction and extension of our dominion, it would be folly to expect exemption from their efforts to subvert it, their success will depend on the means we place within their reach.

"We are and must remain, from the construction of the society, completely separated from the natives of India, and we can only defend ourselves against attack by preventive measures, and by keeping weapons from the hands of those who are likely to become our enemies. Our condition does not merely limit the attainment of that knowledge which appears necessary for our safety, but it compels us, after we have attained it, to be most cautious in its application. Our suspicion of danger may be confirmed by signs of its approach, but we must not even then make open preparations against it, for if we ever appear to doubt our own strength, it will be doubted by others; and it is of a character that cannot long survive the general impression of its durability."

This subject is fully treated, with reference to local circumstances, in my instructions to my assistants in Malwa; but the following extract from these is general in its application to all India: "Many questions will occur deeply connected with our reputation for good faith, which cannot be decided by any exact rules; but whenever that is concerned, the tone of our feeling should be very high; it is the point upon which the moral part of our government of this great empire hinges, and in these countries, where our rule and control are new, and in which the inhabitants cannot yet understand any explanations that do not rest upon broad and obvious grounds, the subject requires much attention; there are many cases in which our faith, though not specifically is virtually pledged to individuals. Ministers, for instance, of minor or incompetent princes or chiefs, who have been brought forward or recognized by us in the exercise of authority, have a claim upon our support and consideration, which nothing but bad conduct on their part can forfeit. We should, no doubt, be most careful in any interference that leads to such obligations; they are only to be incurred when a necessity that involves the peace and prosperity of the country calls for them, but they

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they must be sacredly observed; for with a people who look in all questions of government more to persons than systems, the abandonment, except from gross misconduct, of any individual who had been raised or openly protected by us would excite stronger feelings than the breach of an article of a treaty, and locally prove more injurious, as it weakens that reliance upon our faith which is the very foundation of our strength.

"We may rest satisfied, while we pursue the course I have stated, (and it is the one to which our faith is almost in every case either directly or by implication pledged,) that we have, from our paramount power, a very efficient check over states and tribes whose rulers, officers, and chiefs will soon discover that they can only gain our favour and support by good conduct or forfeit it by bad. With such knowledge, and with means comparatively limited, we cannot expect that they will be disposed to incur displeasure, when the terms on which they can gain approbation are so easy; at least no men possessed of common sense and discernment, (qualities in which the natives of India are seldom deficient) can be expected to act in such a manner; but we must not conceal from ourselves that their conduct in this, as in all other particulars, will rest chiefly on the value of that condition in which they are placed, or rather left; and in proportion as we render it one of comfort and dignity, so will their care be to preserve our good opinion, and to merit our confidence. It is, indeed, upon our success in supporting their respectability that the permanence of a system of control over great and small native states, such as we have established in this quarter of India, will depend. We have no choice of means in the performance of this delicate and arduous part of our duty; though the check must be efficient, it should be almost unseen, the effect ought to be produced more by the impression than the exercise of superior power. Our principal object must be to elevate the authorities to whom we have left the administration of their respective territories; we must, in all cases of interference, bring them forward to their own subjects as the prominent objects of respect and obedience; so far from the agent attracting any to himself, he should purposely repel it, that it may be given to the quarter where it is wanted, and to which it belongs. When we aid any prince or chief against his own subjects, his name should be exclusively used, and we should be most careful in making our native agents and servants pay the full measure of respect to every branch of his administration, and continually be on the watch to check that disposition which is inherent in them to slight local authorities, that they may in the name of their master draw that attention to themselves which it is quite essential should belong to the officers of the native government. It is evident that our control can only be supportable to any human being who has the name and appearance of power, so long as it is exercised in a general manner, and regulated by the principles above stated. When it descends to minute checks and interference in the collection of revenue, to administration of justice, listens to the complaints of discontented, or even aggrieved individuals, and allows upon system its own native agents to interfere and act in the name of the paramount state, the continuance of independent power in any shape to either prince or chief, is not only impolitic but dangerous, as his condition must be felt by himself and by all attached to his person or family as a mockery and degradation, and the least effect of such feelings will be the extermination of all motive to good or great actions. For when control is divested of its large and liberal character, and takes a more minute shape, whatever merit belongs to the administration becomes the due of the person by whom it is exercised, or his agents, and the nominal prince or his officers are degraded into suspected and incompetent instruments of rule.

"In this general outline of our interference with the rulers, great and small, of this part of India, I have dwelt much upon the political considerations upon which it is grounded; because I am convinced that there is no part of the subject that requires to be so deeply studied and so fully understood as this should be by every subordinate agent; for there is no point of his duty which is at once so delicate and arduous, or in which success or failure so much depends upon individual exertion. He will be prompted to deviate from the course prescribed by the action of his best feelings, and by hopes of increasing his personal reputation, but he will be kept steady in that course by a knowledge of the importance of those general principles on which the present system rests. It is in the performance of this part of his duty that all which has been said regarding manner and intercourse must be in his memory; for men in the situation in which those are, with whom he must in all cases of interference come in contact, are not to be conciliated to their condition, nor kept in that temper towards the paramount authority which it is necessary for its interest they should be, by mere correctness or strict attention to justice. The native states must be courted and encouraged to good conduct, and the earnest endeavour of the British agent must be to give their rulers a pride in their administration; to effect which object he must win to his side not only the rulers themselves, but the principal and most respectable men of the country. In his efforts to gain the latter, however, he must beware of depriving the local authority of that public opinion which is so essential both as a check to misrule and a reward to good government, but which would cease to be felt as either the moment the ties between prince and subject were seriously injured or broken."

We have long had intimate relations with the Nizam of the Deccan; our interference in the internal rule of that state has within the last 35 years been repeatedly changed, varying with the character of its prince and that of the ministers to whom the immediate administration was confided. It could hardly perhaps have been otherwise, from local circumstances, and the wars which have occurred since the alliance was formed; but its effects upon the country and the inhabitants have been very unhappy; and it is desirable, when we have a prospect of continued peace, that this large state should be governed by principles as settled

settled and defined as the nature of such connexions will admit. The same observations apply to the state of Nagpore, of Lucknow, and to the Government of Scindia; for though the latter is not bound to admit our interference by any treaties, it is so virtually dependent upon the British Government, and so surrounded by princes and chiefs under our protection, that we cannot, however much we may desire to do so, abstain from taking a deep interest in its condition, and in the conduct of its rulers, inasmuch as their acts may lead to the disturbance of the general tranquillity of India.

I was called upon by a private from Lord W. Bentinck to give my opinion on the subject of our interference at the court of the King of Oude, a very short time before I left India. I cannot better give my sentiments upon this subject than by quoting from my reply. Referring to Lucknow, I observed,

"Before entering upon any particular case, it is most essential to look through it to fix our minds at the commencement in a decided manner upon the objects we desire to attain.

"Supposing it to be our object to keep the internal administration under its native princes, you cannot expect that the subjects of such a state will always have equal happiness and security; that will vary with the character of princes and their ministers. But if my experience is correct, we may calculate that, protected as they are from external attacks, and from any very outrageous injustice, by our power and general control, the inhabitants of the territories of our allies have enjoyed and will enjoy, as much content and comfort, particularly the superior classes, as those of our own provinces. This is contrary to common opinion and to recorded statements, but it is my firm belief. Supposing, however, this not to be the case, we must adopt a principle that will go rapidly to the establishment of direct rule all over India, before we can admit that our system of government being better, is a legitimate ground for the establishment of our authority over any countries now governed by native princes: the maintenance of the latter, however, is in my opinion at once politic and just. Deprived of all power to contend with us in war, they still possess (as long as we leave it to them) a sufficient stake in the empire to make them and their adherents take an interest in its tranquillity.

"Their kingdoms and principalities offer an asylum and employment to classes of men who could not yet reconcile themselves to our mode of rule; for these reasons I must dread the too rapid advancement of our power over what remains to natives, as an evil. I am sickened with that manly morality that argues upon the sin and inhumanity of our tolerating abuses and misrule, which we have the power to correct, and in which, from possessing that power and not exercising it, we are said to become in a degree implicated. I neither admit the facts nor the deductions. I could mention provinces in every part of our territories in which over-assessment, the forms of the Adawlut, and inefficient police, have produced more discontent, degradation and suffering to the inhabitants than I ever knew under native governments.

"But supposing this not the case, we cannot admit our right to carry the privilege of giving advice and a modified interference, stipulated by treaty, to go, under any circumstances short of hostilities, extreme public danger, or the violation of faith, to the establishment of a right to assume the government of the country with the prince of which our treaties are contracted. Concluding these to be your Lordship's sentiments as well as mine, the question is narrowed as to the best manner of preserving the native government of Lucknow, of seeing faithfully fulfilled our positive engagements, and of ameliorating the condition, or lessening, as far as we have the power, the sufferings of the subjects of an ally from his weakness or tyranny. We cannot refuse him the aid he is entitled to by treaty, but we have a right, which should be rigidly maintained, not to allow our aid to be used for unjust purposes; we cannot prevent our protection affording him the means of abusing power that he would not otherwise possess, but if his conduct is systematically bad, we may, on good grounds, abstain from granting him aid, our doing so must effect some reform through the distress and embarrassment in which he would be involved. In the event, however, of his not being able to quell disturbances which he had excited, and the general peace of the country becoming disturbed in a degree that affected our own provinces, interference would become unavoidable: such a state of affairs would render a prince incapable of fulfilling the obligations of the alliance. But even in this extreme, I would rather see him deprived of power, and another placed upon the musnud or assume his territories, than attempt to govern them through a Residency and a minister in opposition to the nominal head of the state. Our condition forces us upon many expedients of administration, and this latter has been often tried, but I am quite satisfied that unless in cases of a minor or acknowledged natural imbecility, it is from many causes the very worst species of rule that can be adopted, both as it affects the temper and happiness of the people, and the good name of the British Government."

After detailing the mode of proceeding which appeared to be best adapted to actual circumstances at Lucknow, I concluded by observing, whatever measures are adopted, "will, I think, after all, in a great degree depend upon the agent who has to carry them into execution. If a weak man, the tempting scene will lead all to impose upon his weakness; if able, but not conciliating in his manner or temper, he will, by constantly fretting them, place the king and court in array against him; if difficult of access, and a *Bahader*\*, he will, whatever be his experience and knowledge, certainly fail in doing more than persuading government of the necessity of leaving the crown to the King of Oude, but of making the British representative viceroy over him. If the resident adds to efficiency, from other qualifications, humility of heart, kindness of manner, and is easy at all periods of personal access, he will eventually work reform in the worst of native courts; but he must keep aloof from all

\* This native title, as applied here, means one that is fond of personal power and display.

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intrigue; he must hear no complaints beyond what his duty absolutely requires, of the native ruler and his minister; he must give no private audiences, and be content to make many sacrifices to impart good feelings and confidence. Such a man, if he conducts the intercourse with a ruler and his minister himself, although an assistant, and has great toleration for the deviations of native princes and their ministers from what we deem the right path, may be trusted in close contact with a native court; but in the condition these princes and ministers are, and our altered relations, I should, on the whole, prefer the resident's being at some distance, if that was not attended with a great diminution of his means of performing his indispensable duties; it will afford us better chance of preserving the native state alive. It subjects our reputation to less injury, for where evil measures are adopted that we cannot prevent, it gives us political strength in the contrast instead of mixing our name with misrule."

V. What have been the financial effects of the Conquests, and of the changes or enlargements of our Political Relations which have been made since 1813? to be exhibited under the following heads:

- 1st. Increased or decreased Revenue or Tribute.
- 2d. Increased or decreased charge of Civil Administration.
- 3d. Increased or decreased appropriation of Military Force.
- 4th. Increased or decreased risk of External or Internal Hostility

As a general reply to this Query, which relates to the financial effects of our conquests, I can only state that I know of no war in India, into which we have entered within the period of my experience, (and that extends to nearly 50 years), which we could have avoided, except at the hazard of our safety, or that of the allies whom we were bound to protect; nor could we, while exposed to such hazards, venture on reducing our armies; on the contrary, we have been during peace obliged to fit out and keep in the field large and expensive bodies of men to check and restrain the restless ambition of native princes, and the daring excesses of plunderers. I mean particularly the Mahomedan sovereigns of Mysore, Hyder and Tippoo; the Mahratta states and the Pindarries. The latter were a vast predatory horde generated by former wars, and governed by principles hostile to all civilized or tranquil rule. This great body of plunderers were so intermingled with other governments, upon whose weakness they had usurped, or with whom they were secretly leagued, that their progress (which was that of crime and devastation), could alone have been arrested by the British Government. That Government, nevertheless, in obedience to maxims of policy strongly inculcated from England, wasted millions upon a system of defence which, after a lapse of several years, was found to have all the expenses of war, without any of those benefits which result from its success. When forced into the contest against these lawless freebooters, the combination which had been secretly formed against our power by many of the Mahratta states, was gradually developed; hence the war took a larger scope, and terminated in establishing our supremacy upon a footing which has enabled us recently to make great reductions in our military establishments. In thus expressing myself, I do not mean to blame the Home Government, whose conduct was actuated by the most honourable motives. They were naturally desirous to avert, as long as possible, the necessity of entering upon a course of operations which they foresaw must involve extension of territorial dominion, and the multiplication of our political alliances.

Accurate information on the first, second and third specifications of the fifth Query, must be obtained from your records. With respect to the fourth, I shall state as shortly as I can my sentiments. The hazard of external attack is upon the North-western parts of India. The danger is, I conceive, less from any Asiatic power than from Russia advancing into Tartary, or establishing such an influence over Persia as would enable her to use Asiatic states as aids and instruments in the invasion of India. I do not mean to say that this danger is proximate, but it is one which we should never cease to contemplate as possible; and without incurring unnecessary expense, we should suit our means of defence to those of eventual attack. I have, in my letter to Lord W. Bentinck, which forms a number of my reply to your letter on the military branch of the Indian government, given my opinion as to the military lines of defence which I would recommend to be maintained, and to be connected with roads along our Western frontier. The survey of the Indus by the officer I deputed to Lahore, in conformity with orders from England, adds much to our information on this subject. I have not had access to Captain Burne's report, but from what I have learnt of its contents, I conclude that while it shows that there is more facility than was believed for a Northern enemy reaching the banks of the Indus, it ascertains the perfect practicability of navigating that river with steam to a very great distance, as also the principal rivers of the Punjab. This is a most important fact in every respect, and in none more than our defence of India; besides the easy transport of force from the port of Bombay to every point upon the river, it establishes the facility of rapid communication between the Western extremes of the territories of Bombay and the North-western stations of Bengal, which would enable us to combine, at a period of emergency, in fewer days than it would now take months, our military means of defence.

The period is I hope distant, and may perhaps never arrive, when we shall be called upon to fight for our empire of India on the banks of the Indus; but the navigation of that river will, I hope, in the course of a few years be open, through successful negotiation with those who possess its banks, to commercial enterprise; and in affording protection to this new branch of commerce we shall gradually prepare the means of opposing any such danger as that which has been alluded to, if it should ever occur. I have already drawn your attention to my late Minutes regarding Bagdad and Persia, as well as the Arab tribes of the Gulf and the

Dated 27 November 1830

VI.  
POLITICAL  
OR  
FOREIGN

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to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq

the Red Sea. The importance of maintaining an establishment of steam vessels at Bombay, for the mere purpose of rapid communication with England and other quarters, is not, I believe, disputed; nor is the great benefit which may result from their employment as vessels of war, in suppressing piracy, or other services, doubted. The facility and extent to which the Bussorah river and the Tigris can be navigated by steam, is fully ascertained, and measures have been taken to survey the Euphrates; to these is now added the Indus. No man can look at a map without being satisfied of the importance of our possessing the means of promptly resisting any approaching danger in these quarters; and it appears indispensably necessary to this object that the steam branch of the Indian navy should be (I mean the officers) competent to the duty of engineers\* as well as of sailors: some of them have already qualified themselves to act in that capacity; but the system should be perfect, and it can be made so without increase of expense. A knowledge of the habits, prejudices, and languages of the natives is as essential to the European officers of the Indian navy as to those of our army; and native seamen mixed with Europeans are as necessary for the protection and defence of the Western parts of our Eastern empire, as native troops are for other quarters. I have stated my reasons most fully on this subject in my Minute of the 28th of October 1830, and can only add, with reference to your present question, that if the attempt is made to supply the place of this local and efficient force by His Majesty's ships, it will not only be more expensive and less efficient, but deprive that quarter of India of one of its best means of guarding against external attack. These sentiments, of the correctness of which I am positive, from local experience of more than 30 years, have no reference to the acknowledged superiority of His Majesty's navy, whose services must always, on the occurrence of war, be called for in aid of local means of defence; my opinions refer to the ordinary duties of the Indian navy; to a familiarity with seas, rivers, and shores, where this branch is employed, to that knowledge of the languages of the natives which they are obliged to attain in order to conciliate univertized tribes, prompt to offence and revenge; to that implicit obedience to all orders of the local government, under whom they are wholly placed, to their being inured to the almost insufferable heats to which they are often exposed, and which in so many cases have proved fatal to those unaccustomed to the climate, but above all, to the constant change of commanders and officers of vessels which, from the constitution of His Majesty's navy, must take place. This would of itself be, in my opinion, an insuperable bar to the substitution of the King's for the Indian navy, for the King's officers could never be expected to learn the languages, nor become acquainted with the usages and prejudices of the natives, acquirements indispensable to fit them for their local duties. I need, however, say no more upon this part of our means of defence, being quite satisfied that when the subject undergoes that investigation to which all the establishments of India are now submitted, sufficient facts will appear on record, and sufficient further evidence will be given, if required, to prove the necessity of maintaining and elevating, instead of destroying or lowering, this essential local branch of our force in that country.

With respect to internal hostility, our exemption from it must depend as much upon the shape and character of our rule as upon any military force that our revenues will admit us to support for the general protection of those vast territories now subject to our sway. India ever has and ever will abound in bold and ambitious men, and our danger from these will increase in proportion as our system shall destroy the princes and chiefs about whom many of the elements we have most to fear are now at repose, and it is a conviction of this fact which has made me the constant advocate for maintaining all we can of a native aristocracy. My sentiments upon this subject are very fully stated in the papers on Nuzzerana, which are before the Committee on India Affairs. I however beg leave to subjoin an extract from my Minute of the 12th November 1829

"It is a too common usage (I observe in that document), to abandon in despair our efforts to reform petty princes and chiefs from their idle and lawless habits, and to consider them as irreclaimable from their condition to that of good and attached subjects and dependents. There is no branch of our Indian administration in which I have had more experience or have more studied, and I must affirm my belief that we have failed more from causes on which I shall here only very shortly remark, that from the impossibility or even difficulty of effecting the object. We are generally fixed in the belief of our own superiority, and repose too great confidence in our native servants, to have that patience and forbearance, and to make the allowances that are required for the errors of those we desire to reclaim. We too often expect and enforce a sudden conformity to a system of rule that is opposed to every existing feeling and prejudice of the party from whom it is exacted. Where this is not the case, and a more tolerant system is established, still men's faults and crimes are, from the nature of our government, recorded against them; and men are often, on the statement of an agent who may be inexperienced in such matters or misinformed, driven to acts of contumacy or opposition to government; and these acts, which according to their experience and habits were but venial offences, are, when construed by the more severe maxims of our rule, inexpiable crimes. In this mode I have known chief after chief fall before a general and unbending system."

"I am

\* The necessity of instructing commissioned officers in the duty of engineers of steam vessels is acknowledged, and the system has commenced in His Majesty's navy. In India it is indispensable. The great expense of sending engineers from England; their want of language to instruct or direct others; their loss of health from climate, and the too frequent irregular habits, renders confidence in this class hazardous at all times, and particularly on occurrence of wars.

Para. 28. Min. on  
Nuzzerana,  
12 November 1829



Para. 34.

"I am quite sensible I may be accused by many of mixing, on this and other occasions, too much of feeling for individuals with questions of policy; but if this is a fault, I can only state it is one to which I attribute much of that success that has attended my efforts in the public service; I have endeavoured through life, and shall as long as I am employed, to mitigate what I deem the evil effects produced by a cold and inflexible policy, which, substituting in all cases attention to principles for consideration of persons, runs counter to the feelings and usages of natives."

Para. 39.

I shall conclude this branch of the subject, which is one of the most difficult and important on which you have asked my opinion, by again quoting from the same document to which I have just referred. Alluding to the limited application of the principles calculated to preserve a native aristocracy in the countries recently conquered from the Peishwa, I observed,

"The points agitated in the course of this Minute are much limited as to local effect, but most important principles have become involved in the discussion; these indeed are connected with the considerations of policy that relate to the present and future welfare of the Indian empire. Various opinions prevail as to the mode in which that can be best governed and maintained. Some look to increase of revenue, from its furnishing the means of paying a great and adequate force, as being the simplest and surest mode of preserving our power; but an army chiefly composed of natives of the country we desire to keep in subjection, may prove a two-edged sword; and besides, history informs us that though armies are the sole means of conquering a country, they never were the sole or even the chief means of preserving it. Others look to colonization as a source of great strength. India has benefited, and will benefit still further from the introduction into its ports, and some of its most fruitful provinces, of the capital, enterprise, and science of Europeans; but no sprinkling of our countrymen and their descendants, if allowed to colonize, to which we can ever look, would render them a support upon which we could rely for the preservation of this empire; that must ever depend upon our success in attaching our native subjects, and above all the higher and more influential classes; the task is for many reasons arduous and difficult, but it must be accomplished, or our empire, on its present extended basis, will be weak and insecure; no sacrifices can, in my opinion, be too great to effect this object, and it must be pursued with unremitting perseverance in every quarter of our dominions, varying in its mode according to the actual character and construction of the community."

To those who have only seen part of our vast territories, and who have not personally observed the more turbulent and untractable tribes and natives who are now subject to our general rule, it has appeared that we should best raise an aristocracy by promoting to it natives who had distinguished themselves in the public service. There can be no doubt that the ambition of those we employ should be pointed to objects of such honourable ambition, and they have been so by that admirable institution of the privileged classes of the Deccan which was formed by the wisdom of Mr Elphinstone, my predecessor in the government of Bombay, but this institution would have been a meagre one, and wholly inadequate to the object, had it not included in its several classes the highest and most respectable chiefs of the Deccan, in accordance with whose feelings and wishes it was formed, to protect them from the levelling forms and rules of our courts of law, to which they have a deep and unconquerable repugnance. Treating of the value of their association in this class, I must again refer to the document before noticed.

Para. 42.

"With regard to the effects of this measure upon our local and general interests, it would certainly retard the fulfilment, if it did not altogether destroy those hopes which we now entertain of our being able to preserve a native aristocracy in this part of India. The maintenance of the Jagheers and Sirlars in their present stations, besides other advantages is quite essential to enable us to raise to that rank and consideration we desire, those who distinguish themselves in the public service; for if the representations of the high families who now belong to the first and second classes of the privileged orders of the Deccan, fall one by one before our system of rule, that institution will lose what gives it value and elevation. The Jagheers and Sirlars are, in the estimation of their countrymen, a hereditary nobility, to whom proud ancestry and possession of land for generations, give consequence; and it is the association with them that is prized by those we raise to inferior grades of the same order. Is not this natural? What is the principal claim of the peerage in our own country? Is it not to be of the same order with the Howards and the Percys? Did the wonderful successes of Bonaparte, or the heroic achievements of his generals, raise them above this feeling? Associations and alliances were sought with conquered princes, and impoverished, but noble and ancient families. It was in them an extorted compliance with feelings and prejudices which all the boasted philosophy of the age has, fortunately for society, not been able to eradicate.

Para. 43.

"The feelings and prejudices above stated are much stronger in India than in Europe, and the condition and character of the inhabitants, and the nature of our rule, make it more difficult to conciliate them; but this difficulty may, in a great degree, be overcome. It might have been of comparatively slight consequence to overcome it in the early stages of our power, for those who did not like our rule could go elsewhere; but a few years have worked a wonderful change in the state of India. The wars to which we have been compelled, from

\* I have stated in my Minute of the 3d of October 1825, how strongly this feeling operated on the recent occasion of investing native officers with the rank of Khildar, the senior, who was raised to the third class, and prized it in the highest degree. "I am now, (said Subadar Major Parsaramsing, one of the oldest and bravest soldiers of the army) on a footing with Jagheers and Sirlars."

from our condition, have left us sole sovereigns of that vast country, but they have involved us in great, though not irretrievable, embarrassment. The pressure of financial difficulties recommends every measure which promises immediate relief, but that, to be permanent, must be sought, not in the future annexation of territory, but in the improvement of what we possess, in the reduction of offices, and in the general revision and reduction of our establishments. To enable us to effect these objects we must not cast away one iota of good feeling or motive for allegiance that exists, or which we have a prospect of creating in the minds of our native subjects. We must maintain to the utmost of our power the higher orders of the community, for on their being conciliated to our rule the future peace of this empire must greatly depend, and with it our power to lessen the expenses of its government."

VE How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

In answer to the 6th Query, I must state, that within the scope of my experience I know no instance of the principles of justice being departed from, much less those of expediency. On the contrary, I have known the latter consulted at the hazard of impressions unfavourable to our character, but not in a degree that could be termed injustice. I must, however, add, that such cases have been very rare; and I have seriously regretted their occurring, being satisfied that in a government like India no temporary object can warrant us in weakening impressions which are the foundation of our power.

VII. How far have the strength and distribution of the Indian army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition with reference to the forces belonging to Native States on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard?

As far as my experience enables me to speak on the subject of your 7th Query, I should say that the distribution of our forces has been regulated by every attention to the considerations which you have stated.

VIII. How far have the civil establishments of the several residencies and agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

In answer to the 8th Query, I can state, with full knowledge, that the late regulation of the civil establishments of our residencies has been made with the strictest attention to economy, and I should almost fear that in some instances this principle may operate injuriously to efficiency, but the pressure of financial difficulties required every effort; and should reductions in this branch have been carried too far, a remedy no doubt, will be applied.

IX. How far have the residents and agents been subject to the necessary checks?

In answer to the 9th Query, I can only state that the residents and agents employed in the political branch are selected as persons in whom complete confidence is reposed; they are, however, subject to many checks, though not so minute as those which are applied to officers employed in the ordinary branches of administration. A very salutary effect would in this instance be produced by the proposed change in the shape of our local rule, which I shall explain in my reply to your next Query.

X. How far has the existing system of Government or home direction and control been successful, or calculated to succeed, in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude, and unity of purposes in the several gradations of government, direction, control, or influence; and (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the Home or of the Indian Government.

I have treated the subject of the Government at Home in the second volume of my Political History of India, and I am not at present prepared to offer any additional observations on that branch of your inquiry. With respect to a reconstruction of our local rule in India, I am of opinion that from the complete change in our condition within the last 15 years, such a measure is urgently required; and that the Board may be in full possession of my sentiments on this subject, I transmit copy of a letter\* which I wrote to Lord W. Bentinck immediately previous to my leaving India; and in further illustration of the plan therein proposed, I shall conclude this letter by a quotation from my address to the Chairman of the East India Company, dated 25th April 1827, which has relation to a plan then proposed for the administration of the provinces of Malwa and Rappootana.

This plan, I observed, "is the same in substance and in principle as that which I formerly brought before the Governor-General in Council, and the adoption of which I repeatedly urged upon his Lordship during the last year of my residence in India. My opinions upon the subject coincided at that period with those of the highest public authorities both in India and in England; it is needless to dwell upon the causes which, under such circumstances, led to successive expedients instead of a permanent system. Suffice it to say, that the difficulties of establishing such a system will be increased by delay. We must not, if such be our object, allow any minor obstacles to obstruct its fulfilment; and in our efforts to effect

\* Vide Paper (A.)  
p. 147.

Par. 143. of a Letter  
to the Chairman.

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effect this, we should look more to ultimate than immediate benefits from the measures we adopt. We must, in the prosecution of this policy, view with a wise and liberal toleration the errors, the prejudices, and the vices which belong to native rule in its best shape, and we must not allow ourselves to be hurried by the personal inefficiency or defective institutions of those whom we desire to reform into a substitution of our own agents and establishments; the latter have, no doubt, many excellencies, but they have also serious defects; they are destructive of all native rank and authority. The inherited rights of chiefs, and the cherished allegiance of their followers, are all swept away, and ties and feelings which originally constituted the strongest links of social order and peace being outraged and broken are converted into elements of discontent and rebellion. We must not flatter ourselves that the future operation of this system of government will be attended with as few evils as it has heretofore been. The substitution of our government for the misrule, oppression, and anarchy to which they had been exposed, was hailed by those of our new subjects whose habits were commercial and agricultural; while the warlike and turbulent part of the population found employment and subsistence in the services of princes whose territories had not yet been subdued by our arms. But in the whole peninsula of India there is no longer any escape from subjection to our direct rule, influence, or control.

"The rise of our astonishing power has been so rapid that the great majority of those who are subject to it continue to make favourable comparisons between our government and that of their late masters, but in a very short period none will remain who can derive consolation from such recollections; and we are not warranted by the History of India, nor indeed by that of any other nation in the world, in reckoning upon the possibility of preserving an empire of such a magnitude by a system which excludes, as our does, the natives from every station of high rank and honourable ambition. Least of all would such a system be compatible with the plans now in progress for spreading instruction, for it is certain that if these plans are not associated with the creation of duties that will employ the minds which we enlighten, we shall only prepare elements that will hasten the destruction of our empire. If we do not use the knowledge which we impart, it will be employed against us, and a conviction of this truth should lead to the adoption of every measure which can prepare the way for granting to the natives a greater share than they have yet enjoyed in the government.

"It is not my intention to dwell upon the common-place arguments which have so often been brought forward to prove the necessity of an almost exclusive employment of Europeans in high and respectable stations. The numerous advocates who are (professionally, I might say,) arrayed against every other system, have hitherto, and will, I fear, unless very decided steps are taken to prevent it, continue to beat down the opinion of the few whose opportunities have enabled them to take a more enlarged view of this question, and to consider it as one not of local, but of imperial policy.

"The facts which are so continually reiterated of native pliancy, dishonesty, and corruption, so far from forming objections to their employment, are in my mind only proofs of its necessity. Are we to abandon in despair, on account of their weakness or depravity, the project of their reformation and improvement? And can we think it possible to effect this desirable change, and to attach them to our rule by a series of lessons upon virtue, morality, and good order, given in our schools and repeated in our regulations and proclamations, while at the same time we deny them all opportunities (except upon the most limited scale) of practising what we teach and inculcate?

"We have sufficient examples in all governments, and in none more than our own, to prove that dishonesty and corruption when common to classes cease to be a reproach to individuals; but what wise or liberal statesman, wishing to reclaim men from such habits and feelings, would adopt, as a means, their exclusion from the sphere of high and honourable action? And who that knows the inveteracy of long usage would be deterred by partial failure from steadily and patiently pursuing the only course which can reconcile a government to the people under which they live, and give them that stake in its welfare and reputation which they never can have till these are associated with their own interests and advantages?

"It may perhaps be objected that these observations do not apply to a conquered people. Most assuredly they apply to all mankind: we find in all communities bold, able, and ambitious individuals who exercise an influence and power over the class to which they belong, and these must continue enemies to a government, however just and humane in its general principles, under which they are neither trusted nor employed. There is no country to which this observation applies more forcibly than to India; the multitude are, from their prejudices and superstition, peculiarly exposed to the artifices and designs of such men, and in the territories under our direct rule we can offer nothing to their ambition beyond the most subordinate stations.

"The whole complexion and character of our power in India has altered within the last ten years. Our influence or rule, as before observed, now embraces the whole of that vast country; high and aspiring men can find no spot beyond the limits of our authority, and such must either be systematically watched and repressed as enemies of our power, or cherished and encouraged as the instruments of its exercise; there is no medium; in the first case, the more decidedly we proceed to our object, the better for our immediate safety; but I should, I confess, have little confidence in the success of such a proceeding. As one head of the Hydra was lopped off, another would arise; and as well might we strive to stem the stream of the Ganges, as to repress to the level of our ordinary rule the energies and hopes which must continually arise in so vast and various a population as that of India."

It is perhaps necessary before I conclude to state, that there are several parts of the plan of local rule which I suggested to Lord W. Bentinck which may admit of alterations, provided the principles on which the whole scheme is grounded be not impaired. Of these principles the most important is the authority of the Governor-General: there is no escaping from the necessity of clothing him with almost absolute power. The selection of an individual for this high office will ever be the measure upon which the good administration of our Eastern empire will chiefly depend; the checks upon him and other high authorities must be of a character calculated to prevent the abuse without weakening the exercise of their power; but if our leading object is, as it undoubtedly should be, to rule India more with attention to the feelings, the usages, and the interests of the vast majority of its inhabitants than to European maxims and prejudices, the forms and principles of our government may be made in this as in all its parts simple, intelligible, and efficient.

I have stated in the accompanying letter to Lord W. Bentinck, that the Governor-General and the Governors or Lieut.-Governors will have in each department high officers acting under them, whom they can, according to fixed and prescribed rules, call into Council whenever their aid is necessary for the purpose of framing laws or regulations, or in measures that are meant to effect improvements or changes in the peculiar lines of service to which such functionaries belong, and to the latter a power and responsibility could be assigned that will ensure the good performance of these casual but important duties. This point, however, requires much consideration, and is one upon which I shall not at present say more than that it may, in my opinion, be easily adapted to the principles and objects of the plan I have recommended for the future local administration of our Eastern empire

I am, &c.  
John Malcolm.

My Lord,

Bombay, 2d December 1830.

I HAVE written your Lordship very fully on the subject of the army of India, and my Par 1 Minute under date the 28th of November, copy of which is transmitted, gives a short abstract of the principal measures that have been adopted since I took charge of this government. It also shews their financial results. Though these have exceeded 40 lacs of rupees, from reductions of the army, abolition of offices, diminution of establishments, and revisions of departments, I must consider this reduction as comparatively small in proportion to what will result from the reforms introduced into every branch of this government, the economical effects of which have already been very great, and must, if the measures now in progress be decidedly maintained, be progressively greater. The accounts of the three last years, as relating to all contingencies both in the civil and military departments, show this, as your Lordship will observe, in a very clear manner, but there must be no luxury in enforcing rigorously the principles upon which such reforms rest. Continual representations will be made against the different parts of a system which affects the interests of too many individuals to be unassailed. It will be more difficult to repel such representations from the multiplied distinct authorities which alike exist over departments at the presidency and in the provinces. Many may be adverse to the principles on which recent reforms have been made. Indolence, weakness, or inexperience in their superiors, will all tend to aid subordinate persons in the various establishments, and those connected with them, in their unwearied attempts to revive abuses and increase expenditure. The efforts which have been made to reduce expense have owed their success to causes which, in the ordinary state of affairs, cannot be expected to continue in operation. I came to this government with general knowledge of all parts of our empire, and long residence in India, as well as personal experience in the details of every department, which gave me advantages not likely to combine again in an individual. The pressure of financial difficulties was so great that reductions to a large amount were indispensable. This presidency was measured by a standard which referred (upon what principles I can never understand) to its ability to pay its own expenses, more than to its importance as a part of the general empire of India, and I was called upon by every consideration of duty, as well as by the orders of my superiors in England and in India, to diminish public expenditure. In this work, in which I have personally and unremittingly laboured for three years, I have been greatly aided by the talent and virtue which I found in the public services. But it has not been accomplished without creating discontent and dissatisfaction with measures that affect the present interests and prospects of numbers. This I have not heeded. My knowledge of the subject, my impressions regarding the future benefits to the government and to the public service, have enabled me to pursue an undeviating course; but the obstacles I have met make me quite satisfied that without there are many and serious changes and modifications in the whole shape of the general administration of this presidency, the reforms I have introduced will not be permanent, and these reforms, I am also convinced, are quite essential for the better rule of our extended provinces. I have had a singular opportunity of forming my opinion upon this subject since I came last to India, and as the changes I mean to suggest are associated in principle with the administration of every part of this empire, and can alone be judged by the Supreme Government and the authorities in England, I deem it proper to address your Lordship personally, but so far from having any objection to my sentiments being put on record, I should rather desire it particularly, as I shall send a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors. It is the last communication I shall ever make to a Governor-General upon the subject of the

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Letter from  
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internal government of India. It is made with the full conviction that it contains no suggestion that is not calculated to promote the ends of economy, to give simplicity and efficiency to every department, to maintain and impose checks upon the abuse of power, to raise into more consideration the higher classes of the natives by rendering them useful in the general administration, and above all, though it will lessen the numbers, to elevate the condition of the civil service, and to offer to the competent and distinguished members of that service the highest objects of ambition.

2. The observations I shall now proceed to offer to your Lordship's consideration may be deemed by some innovations and objectionable, as calculated to disturb what may be viewed as a good and established system. But a rapid succession of events have wholly altered our condition in India, and we have, in my opinion, no choice between suiting our rule to the altered state of our power or of incurring hazards of such a nature that may endanger its existence, unless that is protracted at a cost that will render India a burthen on England, for in proportion as we extend our actual system, our civil and military expenses will swell beyond our means of defraying them.

3. I can anticipate no complete success to any one plan I have suggested, nor indeed any essential improvement on the condition of the provinces of this presidency, without still further change than what has been made at my recommendation in the form of their administration. The Supreme Government have recently sanctioned the nomination of a political commissioner in Guzerat, but there appears to me a necessity for an union of power in both that country and the Deccan, which must early overcome every objection to such a change. I can see none that should prevent the early extension of the power of the Commissioner over both the political and judicial branch, which would include the whole direction and control of the magisterial department, or in other words, the maintenance of the general peace of the country. The collection of the revenue and the supervision of the department might remain for a period as at present; but as the principles upon which this branch was regulated became more fixed, it might also be placed under the control of a chief Commissioner, who, aided as he would be by efficient public servants, would find no difficulty in performing his important and responsible duties. This is indeed proved by the complete success of the system now in progress in the Southern Mahratta country, where the revenue, judicial, and political powers have been hitherto united with every success.

4. Such a mode of administering the countries on our western frontier would be found alike essential to provide against foreign danger as to maintain internal peace. Instead of the numerous and almost co-equal authorities with whom it becomes necessary to communicate, and who are to be combined in action on every occurrence of emergency, prompt proceedings would be certain to repress revolt and repel invasion. The natives of the province would no longer have their attention distracted by a variety of civil and political authorities, among whom they often see difference and collision. They would recognise a local head, to whom all owed deference and obedience. There is no part of India which more requires we should preserve that awe and respect for local authority among our native subjects, than the provinces under this presidency. This important impression is now in a great degree lost by the subdivision of power, and it constitutes a strength which, were there no other reasons, would of itself be sufficient to recommend this measure to adoption.

5. Much benefit might be expected to result to the public service from all communication with the military in the province being exclusively with one officer in the civil and political department; this every day's experience shows to be much required.

6. The advantages government would obtain by this modification of its provincial administration would be very great. Its duties would be simplified and facilitated, communications would be received, orders conveyed, and references made to one individual. It would no longer be embarrassed, as it often is at present, with a variety of opinions which embrace local or personal considerations, upon which distance from the scene and want of information of details may make it difficult to judge; these would still be brought forward by officers employed in the provinces: but government would be better enabled to judge such subjects when they come before it in a concentrated shape, and it was aided by the experience and judgment of the Commissioner. There can be no doubt of the economy of the system; that would result from many cases, but from none more than the gradual diminution of European agency; and here I must state my decided opinion that this form of provincial administration is essential to enable us to preserve the privileged classes established in the Deccan and S Mahratta country, and to introduce this order into Guzerat with any prospect of success. It appears to me desirable that employment and means of distinguishing themselves in the public service, should be early afforded to this class; that we cannot do, without they have confidence in support and protection from some high local authority. Their alarm at our regulations, which are few and easy to be understood, will gradually subside; a complete knowledge of them will be acquired, but men of rank and family can only be encouraged to engage in public duties by a belief, grounded on personal feelings, that they are safe in their honour and character, which they never can while the construction of our provincial administration exposes them to the daily hazard of being placed under superiors often changing, and sometimes of comparative junior standing, and at the head of distinct departments.

7. The privileged classes in the Deccan were instituted by Mr. Elphinstone. This order was regarded by him with anxious solicitude till the day of his embarkation, and he went to his native country accompanied by the strongest testimonies of their regard and gratitude. I have, in my treatment of individuals, and in every arrangement connected with this class endeavoured to follow the steps of my predecessor; and my previous knowledge of many

of those who belong to it, and other circumstances have given me many advantages in allaying their fears and confirming their confidence in the permanence of an order to which recent events have shown they attach importance, and are prompt to resist every change of that administration of the laws, which, modified as they are with reference to their feelings and condition, they recognise as the best that could be established.

8. There are other advantages which government would derive from the modification of its provincial rule. The best and ablest public servants who have belonged for any period to the department in which they have been serving, have a bias which leads them to take opposite views of the interests of government in the countries in which they reside. If those in the judicial branch attach, as they may do in many cases, more importance than they should to the forms and processes of their courts, these are often under-valued by officers employed in the political or revenue department. Recent events have destroyed that school in which men rose to stations which compelled them to attain a knowledge of every department, and to aid government in taking a just view of the comparative good or evil that may locally attend its measures; this knowledge must be possessed by the commissioners; and it would be taught in their progress through the service to numbers who might act under their immediate orders. Instead of the answers to circulars now received differing nearly in proportion to the number sent, and referring to local considerations, of which the government can imperfectly judge, all the information that could be collected would be sent, with the advantage of the opinion and judgment, formed on the spot, of one of the highest and most competent officers of the establishment. To the civil services these high stations would be of incalculable value; they would present objects of honourable ambition; their duties would be such as must compel proper selection, and place them beyond the ordinary routine of seniority, for there would always exist a necessity for competence in those who had to perform them. The same causes would put the whole provincial administration of India out of reach of the encroachment of European patronage; and the able discharge of such extensive duties as must devolve upon those that filled such stations would give an opportunity that does not now exist of public servants at this and every presidency where the same system was introduced recommending themselves for further promotion in India as well as to notice and distinction in England.

9. The only stations to which civil servants can now aspire are seats in council, where their duties are optional and undefined, and may be productive of good or evil according to the disposition or character of the President and members of the Board. But under few circumstances can the labour of the most able men in such situations be generally known or appreciated; and though a seat in the council, as associated with rank and local consequence, is coveted by the senior civil servants on the list as a comparatively easy and honourable close to long service, it includes no high and independent charge. Their councils may promote the happiness of millions, or the prosperity of a country, but they seldom receive any adequate share of that applause, and that just fame which form the best reward to past, and the most legitimate and honourable of all incentives to future efforts in the public service. Far different would be the condition of the commissioners of extensive provinces if, in addition to such situations, that of a chief judge might be instituted, who should be nominated from the civil service, to reside in the Court of Sudder Adawlut, and become the head of the provincial judicature. To such officer might be added a fiscal general or chief revenue commissioner. These high stations would give objects of real ambition to the service, particularly if accompanied, which they should be, when men become eminent, with further promotion in India, and honours in England. The whole system would, through such a change, receive life and animation. Pensions and retiring funds, which form now almost the exclusive object of the ablest servants, would become secondary in their minds; and we should derive from their experience, knowledge, and active zeal, an aid without which our empire in India, in its present state, cannot be successfully governed. I do not dwell upon minor considerations, such as the rules on which selection should be made; the qualifications and length of service which would be necessary for candidates to the high constituted stations, or the claims of those who, when not required for the highest offices of government, should cease; these will be easy of arrangement if the principles of this plan are improved.

10. The Governor, under whom these authorities acted, emancipated from the cumbrous and expensive machinery of the actual form of administration, would traverse, as he ought, the countries under his charge; his labours would be lightened, for he would be freed from an overwhelming load of petty details, which would be far better conducted by others; his mind would be solely occupied with the more important duties of a general control and direction of the whole government, and he would act under direct personal responsibility to the supreme authority in India, and to his superiors in England; and when the power vested in high officers, who were at the head of every civil branch, and of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, is considered, it may be positively asserted that he would perform his duties under more real check than he does at present, his authority would be less extended, but its exercise when required would be less embarrassed; and, aided as he would always be by an able secretariat, he would be far more able than he can be under the existing system to fulfil his duties.

11. To give success to such a system as I have suggested, I must plainly state my opinion that the government should remove from Bombay: the character of its inhabitants is essentially different from that of the natives of our provinces. Those of the latter, after remaining a few years at Bombay, adopt many of the usages and all the sentiments of the old residents. Government, within the circle of the island, has neither the power of employing them nor of granting them any particular notice or protection. Their concerns are generally commercial;

their disputes regarding them or their property, which consists of houses and lands, are settled by His Majesty's court of justice, which becomes of course (as far as any authority over them is recognised) the object of their almost exclusive attention and respect. Circumstances considered, it cannot be otherwise; and it is no doubt desirable, that in the principal seat of Western India, which is the residence and resort of so many British subjects, His Majesty's court should command that respect and consideration necessary to its functions; but when the effects produced by the exercise of these are injurious to the good administration of external countries, under a totally different form of rule, the subject demands our most serious attention.

12. The acts of government, as long as it remains at Bombay, will continue liable to be arraigned and attacked. Its principal court of provincial judicature is overshadowed from its position within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and receives little, if any, consideration from the natives at the very seat of its authority; all these results, it may be contended, are of little import, as they refer to Bombay, where the distinction of authorities is well understood; but they are of most serious consequence, when they weaken, as they have done, and will continue to do, the local administration in the provinces.

13. The influx of Europeans to India must be expected to increase, and the liberty of the press, both English and native, will become every day difficult to restrain. It appears to me, and ever has done, of much importance to mitigate, if we cannot wholly guard against, dangers arising out of the extraordinary character and construction of our rule in India. I know no measure that will tend more effectually to this result than making a separation, as far as we are able, between those countries in which all branches and departments are under the rule of the local civil government, and those sea-ports or capitals where it is deemed necessary to have high and independent judicial courts administering the British law.

14. I am not led to offer this suggestion from recent occurrences; it has long been my settled opinion. Circumstances which have occurred at this presidency have no doubt aggravated, but they have not created, the evils I have stated. These are inherent in the present system; and cannot be remedied by any palliative measures. Changes must be made, and among those I know of none in this quarter of India that will be so certain of having good effect, as removing the seat of government. Bombay and Salsette can be well managed by a civil commissioner, with the necessary aids of officers of rank in the marine and other departments. The visits of the Governor to it would be as frequent as required.

15. The removal of the government, while it produced the greatest political benefits, would be attended with a pecuniary gain instead of loss. From the situation of almost all public property at Bombay, what would remain after providing ample accommodation for the Supreme Court, and other offices and store-rooms, by which a rent to a considerable amount would be saved, could be sold to advantage in a port where warehouses near the harbour are always in demand. The product of those buildings would far more than provide for any accommodation that would be required at another seat of government; but if the form of the administration is modified as suggested, that will be on a comparative moderate scale. Considerable financial benefits would ultimately result from much money being circulated in the provinces which is now spent in Bombay. The residence or departure of the government would be attended with little, if any, effect whatever to the permanent and increasing prosperity of that rich and important commercial city.

16. Independent of other effects of the plan I have suggested in regard to the future administration of this presidency, I can speak with confidence of its being far more economical as well as efficient than the present. It would make many immediate reductions: it would eventually require less expensive European agency. But while the number of civil servants was reduced, those that remained, and were competent, would be greatly elevated, and motives of emulation and a desire of distinction would stimulate men to efforts that would gradually tend to improve the resources of the country.

17. Besides the high offices already stated, which would become objects of ambition that must remain exclusive to the civil service, those of this presidency would, like all others, have the appointment of the secretaries of the Governor-General open to them, and when that supreme head of the government was released, as he must be, from the trammels of the present system, and the details with which he is now burthened, would require not only a chief secretary of state but a secretariat, formed of persons practically acquainted with every division of the vast empire subject to his direction and control. The Governor-General should move throughout the countries subject to his authority, but this would be impossible without great inconvenience and increased expense if any council is continued, or if even the Commander-in-Chief of India is associated with him in his civil and political duties. He might, as well as the governors of the great divisions of India subject to his authority, be empowered like the governors of His Majesty's colonies to call, when required, specified persons at the head of the different departments to a council board when he deemed such a proceeding expedient; and this, as it increased his responsibility, would be beneficial.

18. The governors of the different divisions must make continual circuits of the provinces under them. This is indispensable on many grounds. The expense of such should be regulated and reduced as much as possible, but it never can equal the saving that vigilant personal supervision of the chief authority must produce. It is still more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should annually visit his army, yet, from the extent of the territories, even under this presidency, such circuits are incompatible with his duties as a member of the council board; but he cannot, for many reasons, be removed from that, while the government

government is constituted as at present, and while the Governor and he are both absent in the provinces. Though the former he deemed constructively present, the two civil councillors form a majority on any question in which they concur against the Governor, and this may either compel him to return to the presidency, and to request the attendance of the Commander-in-Chief, to the impediment of his military duties, or to give up that weight in the government which its original constitution (formed under circumstances very different) gives him, where he has a casting vote, and can carry any measure he deems expedient, if concurred in by one member of his full council.

19. The Governor, it is true, has, in cases he deems important, a power to act upon his own responsibility, but many reasons must render that rare of exercise. It is a measure that will not be resorted to unless in cases where a governor is very confident in his own experience or judgment. Differently situated, he will generally sacrifice other objects rather than adopt a course which sets at naught the opinions of his colleagues, and has perhaps the effect of losing temper and good feeling in a degree that may be more injurious to the public service than the benefits (however important) that can be derived from any single measure.

20. I have gone far beyond my original design when I commenced this Minute, but in considering the actual condition of the most fruitful and important provinces of this presidency, and of the local administration best suited to maintain their peace and promote their improvement, I have been gradually led to the examination of the whole frame of government. My opinions upon this subject are offered for the consideration of my superiors. They are the unreserved sentiments of one who has passed through almost every grade military, civil, and political, of the service, has had much experience of the actual operation of our system in every quarter of our territories, and will be received, perhaps, with more attention as the last public record I shall ever make connected with a subject in which I have through life taken so deep an interest, from considering it to involve not only the interest and reputation of my country, but the happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants of India.

21. The growth of our territories has been too rapid to admit of those changes and modifications which their good government required, but a period has arrived when we have leisure to consider and introduce such reforms as are more suited to the actual condition of our territories, and to our means of ruling them. The present frame of government had its origin in jealousy and distrust, nor were such feelings and motives at the period it was formed unwise. The scene was distant and little known. Every check was required on individuals; and the Court of Directors desired to have, in the rank and talent of his colleagues, a check against the abuses of power of a Governor. There were no regular departments. The details of the administration were little known to the Court, who avowedly sought, as a source of information and as a guide to their judgment in deciding upon questions as they arose, the dissentient minutes of council. Circumstances have entirely changed: as complete information exists, and as correct opinions are formed upon every subject connected with the administration of this empire in England as in India. The time is past when Governors can be suspected even of abusing their authority, and the means of checking them are so complete, and the quickness of communication with Europe so improved, that no evils can arise from their being invested with the power I have proposed, than will in the slightest degree balance the advantages that must be derived from their being freed from the restraints and impediments to the performance of the most important duties under the present system.

22. It is true that this change would require much attention to the selection of persons for these high offices, but this would be so far good as it increased the responsibility of those who were to nominate them. The evils of a bad selection, however, to such a situation cannot be avoided, though it is here of importance to remark, that a governor without local information or experience, but of good sense and honourable character, would be much more efficiently aided by the heads of distinct departments, the commissioners of provinces, and an able secretariat than he ever can be by a Council, either agreeing or disagreeing in his general views of administration. This arises out of the relative condition of the parties associated in the government, and is incapable of remedy while that is constituted as at present.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 14.

Letter from  
Sir J. Malcolm  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 15.

LETTER from the Honourable *Edward Gardner*, to *T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.*, the Secretary to the Board of Control.

Sir,  
London, 21st February 1832, 20, Bruton-street.  
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th January, apprising me of its being the probable intention of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to propose my being called as a witness before the East India Committee, regarding the state of our political relations in the East, and of the territory acquired there since 1813, and requiring any information which my course of service in any particular quarter may have enabled me to offer on those subjects.

In reply, I beg to observe, that from the period specified in your letter my services have  
(445.—VL.) U 4 been

Appendix, No. 15.

Letter from the  
Hon.  
*Edw. Gardner*  
to  
*T. H. Villiers, Esq.*



Appendix, No. 15.

Letter from the  
Hon.  
Edw. Gardner  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

been entirely confined to the remote and comparatively unimportant state of Nepal, which, being wholly unconnected with the other states and powers of India, excluded me altogether from any participation in those operations which led to the territorial acquisitions and political results in question, and leaving me necessarily unacquainted with any details relating to those transactions, disqualifies me, in fact, from giving any evidence regarding them worthy the Committee's attention. I shall, however, endeavour to answer to such points as may apply to the situation which I filled during this period, having no papers on the subject to refer to.

Extracts from the Secretary's Letter.

Q.—What is the actual condition of our relations with the several states?

A.—Our alliances generally with the native states, whether under subsidiary or protective treaties, involve, I consider, a virtual acknowledgment, on their part, of the British supremacy. They bind themselves to abide by its arbitration in external disputes; to abstain from forming any new connections with other states; and engage to furnish a military force or contingent when required, or to pay a fixed tribute, according to their several resources and conditions; but these relations are of a complicated nature, and the stipulations, of course, various. With the state of Nepal, where only I had any local experience or concern, our connection, consequent to the war of 1814 and 1815, is founded solely on a treaty of amity; that state, as it stood at the termination of hostilities, was treated with as an independent country, and no demand was made on it to furnish either troops or money; neither were we placed under any obligation to aid in its support or defence; consequently no British-Indian force has been employed or moved within that territory; but three or four local corps, embodied during the war, were kept up after its conclusion, and cantoned along the frontier as a measure of precaution. I believe they have been disbanded since I quitted India, early in 1829, and have been replaced by corps from the line; but of this I am not certain.

Q.—What is the amount of military force required in each instance, &c.?

Q.—What new acquisitions of territory have been made, &c.?

A.—By the treaty ratified in 1816, the Nepal Government ceded the district of Kumaon, including the greater portion of the lowland tracts along the borders, and also some petty states within the hills, which were for the most part restored, under British protection, to the chiefs from whom they had been wrested by the Gorkah power; but they were on too insignificant a scale to allow of their paying tribute, or furnishing any quota of troops; and no other territory of any consequence was retained in this quarter.

Q.—What is the character and what the extent of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the protected states?

A.—The interference which it may have been deemed proper to exercise in any state must depend upon the character of our connection with it, and upon other circumstances. I am not aware of the extent to which it may have been carried in any instance. With regard to Nepal, no interference of any description, direct or indirect, was ever resorted to in the management of its affairs, which were wholly and entirely conducted and regulated by the Rajah's government, unaided and uninfluenced by any British agency. The duty of the political resident at that court was restricted to maintaining the friendly relations which had been established, and to the superintendence of the intercourse and communications between the public officers and subjects of both countries; he was expected to keep his government, of course, informed of all occurrences of a political nature, and was authorized, when occasion called for it, to interpose his remonstrances or advice in any proceedings, contrary to the spirit of the alliance, or which might have a tendency to disturb the good understanding, or threaten a rupture.

Q.—What is the real nature of the duties that belong to political residents and agents?

A.—The result, I have reason to believe, has been all that could be expected or desired. The Nepal Government has adhered with steady fidelity to its engagements, and an uncommon degree of tranquillity and quietude has ensued from the connection. Free from wars or internal commotions of any kind, the native government has had leisure, as well as disposition, to apply itself to the care and improvement of its proper affairs, whence its subjects, as well as our own, have no doubt derived benefit (as I conceive the country at large must needs have done from the general extension of the British power and influence throughout India). The intention of our government for preventing future border disputes by  
the

Q.—What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated from these relations, &c.?

the formation of a defined boundary-line along the portion of the frontier, which had before been in a very disordered state, has been fully answered. The Gorkahs themselves, a military tribe, long addicted to warfare, (though they have not, it is true, gone the length of reducing the numbers of their soldiery) have become reconciled, in a great degree, to a connection which has so decidedly limited their power of action, and to the restraints which have been thereby imposed upon their further career of conquest; and under a similar line of conduct to that hitherto observed in our relations with this state, a continuation of such results may, I think, be reasonably anticipated.

Extracts from the Secretary's Letter.

Q.—What have been the financial effects of the conquests, &c.?

Q.—Increased or decreased revenue or tribute?

Q.—Increased or decreased charge of civil administration?

Q.—Increased or decreased risk of external or internal hostility?

Q.—How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

Q.—How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, &c.?

Q.—How far have the civil establishments of the several Residences and Agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

Q.—How far have the Residents and Agents been subjected to the necessary checks.

Q.—How far has the existing system of Indian government, and Home direction and control been successful, &c.?

Q.—And (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the Home or Indian government?

A.—A part of the ceded lowlands, bordering Oude, was transferred to the Nawab of Lucnow, in payment of a loan of a crore of rupees. The only additional revenue derived from the cessions made by Nepaul is drawn from the district of Kumaon. I am not acquainted with the amount, but it must be small in itself, and can afford, I imagine, no surplus above the charges of civil management for that province (whatever they may amount to) and the pay of some local corps that were raised for service in the hills. The possession of this portion of mountain territory, however, has operated materially in diminishing the likelihood of a renewed contest in that quarter; and this I believe may safely be said to have been the effect of the changes and enlargement of our political relations generally since 1813, which, from the commanding position in which they have placed us, would appear to afford an assurance against the repetition of any serious hostility to our established power.

A.—In our late contests, and consequent arrangements, with the powers of India, the principles of justice and expediency, I believe, have not been lost sight of. In regard particularly to the war with Nepaul, it is notorious that it was rendered inevitable by the conduct and unprovoked aggressions of the Gorkah nation, and of their denial of all reparation, and certainly justice warranted the sacrifices they were compelled to make as the price of peace.

A.—It is beyond my province, and I do not feel myself competent to give an opinion, with reference to our actual state and position, of the strength and distribution of the Indian army, with which, indeed, I am not sufficiently acquainted, but my impression is, that they were always regulated with due attention to such considerations.

A.—Where I was employed, I consider the establishments to have been as limited and economical as was consistent with efficiency and respectability, and the resident was subjected to a sufficient variety of checks. In the exercise of the functions entrusted to residents, in some instances where, from the difficulty of defining the duties to be performed, large discretionary powers are necessarily vested in them, these checks I conclude may not have been always so effectual as might have been desired; but of this I cannot speak from my own knowledge, and as far as my experience goes, he was subjected to every salutary control.

A.—My constant absence from the seat of government, and total unacquaintance with the records connected with the degree of control and influence exercised by the Home Authorities, forbid my touching on this point, or offering any opinion whether or not any change might seem advisable in their constitution. As far as I am able to judge from the general effects of the system in India, the existing scheme for the administration of our Eastern dominions would appear, on the whole, to have been successful, and, in its results, creditable to our rule.

I have, &c.

Edward Gardner.

Appendix, No. 16.

Letter from  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

Appendix, No. 16.

LETTER from the Hon. M. Elphinstone to Thomas Hyde Villiers, Esq.

Sir,

London, 5 August 1832

I HAVE now the honour to reply to your Letter dated January 9th, on the subject of the Political Relations of the Government of India.

1. The acquisitions during the period mentioned consist of the conquests from the Gorkas, and the numerous conquests and cessions which resulted from the war with the Pindarries and Mahrattas in 1817 and 1818, together with the conquests from the Burmans.

The greatest change operated on our political relations is that which resulted from the war of 1817 and 1818, in which some of the substantive states of India were extinguished, and others were reduced to such a state of weakness as to remove all serious danger from any future combination of native princes. The same war led to the express recognition of our supremacy by some of the States of India, and the tacit admission of it by most of the rest.

2 When I left India the actual condition of our political relations was as follows the Sikhs beyond the Sutlege were entirely independent of us, and on a friendly footing with our government. The Gorkas were in a similar situation. Sindia had not subjected himself to our control by any treaty, but his situation, surrounded by our territories and dependants, had brought him much under our influence.

The last prince, who had once been an equal and a rival of the British Government, desired on his death-bed that disputes regarding the succession should be settled by our Resident.

The other Mahratta chiefs, together with the Nizam and the King of Oude, are not only subjected to our political control by treaties, but are unable, unless in very peculiar circumstances, to find the means of opposing us, even if they were so inclined.

The Rajpoot princes are bound by their engagements to act in subordinate co-operation with our government. If there are any other chiefs who are not bound to submit their political operations to the control of the British Government, they are too inconsiderable to require attention.

In addition to these changes in our political relation to the different princes of India, I believe our interference in their internal affairs has much increased since the Pindary war.

3. The first two divisions of this question could only be answered by means of papers in the possession of the Board; but in reply to the third, I may observe, that the extension of our territory and influence, instead of diminishing the necessity for troops, as might be expected, has in general an opposite tendency. A treaty which turns an enemy into an ally no doubt removes the necessity for so large an army, but if the connexion be so close as to make us responsible for the safety of our confederate, the whole burthen of protecting him from foreign and domestic enemies is soon thrown upon us.

This obviously requires an additional military force, but still the increase falls much short of what becomes necessary, if the country passes into our own possession. A native prince whose government has once been well established, does not require an army to protect him against internal dangers, unless there be a pretender to his throne. He has nothing to fear from religious or national jealousy, or from the effects of innovation, or the misunderstandings likely to arise between a government and a people differing in principles, manners, and opinions, such a prince also is contented with a far less degree of order in his administration than we are, and can maintain it with a much less force. Establishments paid by lands, and matchlockmen retained on very low pay, are sufficient to keep up something like government under a native prince. The province of Candesh, during the whole of the last Frishwa's reign, was in a state of anarchy almost unexampled even in Asia, the north-eastern part of the Nizam's country was probably never fully conquered till 15 or 20 years after his subsidiary treaty with us, and there is scarcely any native chief who has not predatory bodies within his territories who set his authority at defiance. This state of things cannot be submitted to by us, and the consequence is that troops must be raised to occupy the whole country and maintain peace and order; while there ought still to be some disposable force for foreign service.

4 Our interference in the internal affairs of protected States varies much both in character and extent. In most of our old subsidiary treaties there is a stipulation that we are not to interfere in the internal affairs of the prince; but, even in the cases where interference has been most guarded against on both sides, it has taken place to a considerable extent, and in other instances the article has become entirely nugatory.

This has arisen from the weakness and bad reputation of the native governments. They have often been obliged to request our support against insubordinate chiefs or other subjects (when we necessarily became mediators and guarantors of an agreement between the parties), and they have also been obliged to solicit our guarantee to pecuniary arrangements and other settlements where the other contracting party could not depend on their faith.

In some instances the protected prince has put particular branches of his administration under the representative of our Government, and in some he has given him a general control over the whole.

In addition to these instances of interposition at the request of the protected prince, there have also been cases where the British Government thought itself entitled, by the general spirit of the treaty, to interfere unsolicited in internal affairs which it conceived to endanger the alliance, or to threaten future calls for its intervention, under difficulties which it might not be able to surmount.

The different degrees of interference may be imagined from the two extremes, which are perhaps shown by the instances of the Peishwa and the Gykwar.

In the case of the Peishwa, that prince was bound to enter into no political transactions without our approbation, and carry on no intercourse with foreign States without our knowledge. Ministers from all the principal States of India, however, continued to reside at his court, and, though in ordinary times he sooner or later made known every proposition of importance that was made to him, yet the Resident did not exercise any close inspection of his proceedings, nor receive a detailed report of every interview. All ostensible negotiations, however, and all which led to any open result, were carried on through the British Government, which enforced the Peishwa's claims on other States, urged them on him, and arbitrated all differences between the parties according to the treaty.

In internal affairs it was the anxious wish of both parties to prevent our interference, but as the Peishwa had been driven out of his country, and we had to recover possession for him, we were in some cases obliged to enter into capitulations which we were bound to see observed ever after. In a quarrel between the Peishwa and his younger brother, he requested the intervention of the Resident, and authorized him to guarantee the agreement he brought about. These acts of interference led to little or no discussion after they were once concluded; but it was different with the settlement of the Southern Jageerdars, a body of feudatory chiefs whom the Peishwa was unable to reduce to obedience, and against whom he for many years solicited the aid of the British Government. By its means an adjustment of the claims of both parties was effected, but from their complicated nature they led to perpetual appeals from both parties, and involved continual interference on the part of the British Government. These are the only cases of importance in which the British interfered in the Peishwa's internal government. The ordinary business was conducted without any participation by the Resident, or any knowledge on his part of the measures adopted.

In the opposite case of the Gykwar, one prince of that family was insane, and his successor had a long minority, the British Government was guarantee for their debts, and neither had any near relation capable of administering the government. This state of things led to a council of regency, of which the Resident was the principal member, and thus in a great measure the head of the State.

In the various intermediate shades our interference is sometimes carried on directly, and at other times by means of a minister under the influence of the Resident, which is the most invidious and least successful mode of all.

The Resident's relation to his own government varies according to circumstances. Those at courts near a presidency, and in cases where the business is well understood, take no step without orders from the government, while those in remote countries, or where events are frequently changing, and much depends on the characters of individuals, are left almost entirely to their own discretion, the government only indicating from time to time the general line of policy it wishes to pursue, and noticing any errors into which it conceives the Resident to fall.

2d. No native prince has put himself under our protection until his government was in such a state of decay as to be incapable of subsisting by any other means. The immediate effect of the measure, therefore, has generally been a temporary recovery of vigour and prosperity. The ill effects which afterwards result from subsidiary alliances have often been pointed out. It has been shown that, by rendering the prince's safety independent on his own exertions or good conduct, they destroy his energy, and at the same time increase the arbitrary character of his government. It is also said that our treaties obstruct the natural course of events, by which, when a native government reaches a certain pitch of corruption, it is overturned, and a new and better one raised on its ruins.

There is great truth in these observations, especially the two first; but the effects deduced from them seem to me to have been carried much too far.

The energies of protected princes in war and politics are certainly impaired by our alliance, and as it is in those departments that we require their assistance, their deficiencies are soon discovered and loudly complained of. Even in this respect, however, I think we are wrong to attribute the whole of their decline to the alliance. Scarcely any State that has sprung up in India since the fall of the Mogul empire has retained its vigour after the death of its founder, and not one has failed to sink into complete decay by the third generation. The ephemeral character of Asiatic governments may be observed in countries where our influence certainly never reached. At the time of our first treaty with the Nizam the King of Persia had subdued all his rivals, and was threatening most of his neighbours. The King of Cabul, at a later period, occasioned us great uneasiness for the safety of our Indian empire, yet those two monarchies are now, for their extent, perhaps the feeblest in the world. Some light is likewise thrown by the history of Persia on the supposed renovation of decayed governments in Asia. That kingdom enjoyed a high degree of prosperity for three generations under the first Suffeyves. It then languished for near a century under their successors. An equal period has since elapsed, during which there have been one or two very able usurpers, but the country is still in a condition probably inferior to what it was at the commencement of the Afghan invasion. In India, certainly, there have been one or two striking cases where the powers of the government were revived by a new dynasty, but the greater part of the States which have undergone revolutions have been broken up, or partitioned.

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Letter from  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

partitioned, or have fallen into perfect anarchy. I conceive, therefore, that the States with which we formed alliances, would have lost even their political energy, as they have done, if the English had never landed in India.

With regard to the falling off of their internal government, I must say that it is quite inconsistent with my own observation. I was a year in the Peishwa's country before our treaty with him, and I saw it again nine years after the alliance; during that period it had suffered from a general famine, but the improvement in its condition was, nevertheless, most striking.

The best proof of the fact is afforded by comparing the descriptions given by General Palmer and Sir Barry Close before the treaty with those of the Residents after it. In some of the former it is stated, that the provinces were overrun by banditti, and that no one would rent the lands round the capital, because, being near the seat of government, they were liable to disturbances which the Peishwa was unable to restrain. The dispatches after the treaty represent the Peishwa's territories as not suffering by a comparison with those of any other native prince. The neighbouring territory of the Nizam certainly fell off after our alliance, but I doubt if this was not owing to the inherent vices of a Mahomedan government. With all its disadvantages, it seemed to me in a better condition than Sindia's and Holcar's countries; and, generally speaking, I think the dominions of the protected princes which I have seen were in a better state than those of the independent ones. The most flourishing territory of a native prince I ever saw was the Gykwar's.

The principal cause of the superiority of the territories of protected princes is probably to be found in their immunity from foreign invasion, but the stability of the government also, though it may render the prince more arbitrary in some cases, renders him more moderate in others, and shuts out many great disorders.

The ultimate result of our relation to protected princes may be too easily conjectured. So close a connexion between two powers so unequal and so dissimilar in all respects can scarcely end otherwise than in the subjection of the weaker to the stronger, differences must unavoidably arise, and however moderate the superior power may be, the result of each must advance the inferior a step towards entire subjugation. Even without such disagreement, it is the nature of an Asiatic government to decline, and when they are worn out, their states fall into our hands. How far their subjects are benefited or otherwise by the change will be discussed in another place: I need only observe here, that the subsidiary treaties have prevented formidable combinations and dangerous wars, which, unless they had succeeded in expelling us from India, would have led to the extinction of the native States as certainly as those alliances. It appears to me to be our interest, as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments: it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers; their territories afford a refuge to all those whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours, and the contrast of their government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered. If the existence of independent powers gives occasional employment to our armies, it is far from being a disadvantage.

5. The financial effect of the conquests has doubtless been to add greatly to our resources. The charges, both civil and military, must also have increased in consequence of those acquisitions. Under the Bombay government in particular, the increase of those charges, together with a failure of revenue from a permanent fall in the price of agricultural produce, went far to diminish the profits of the conquest, while other expenses, some temporary and some permanent, unconnected with the new conquests, contributed for a time to leave the deficit of the Bombay presidency nearly as large as it was before the acquisition of the conquered territories.

The risk of external hostility is greatly diminished by our conquests, that of internal hostility is increased by the newness of our government in the conquered countries, by the unsettled character of many parts of them, and by discontent of the chiefs and the soldiers, who were thrown out of power and employment by our conquest. This danger, however, daily diminishes, and is not great as long as we maintain an overwhelming military force. The troops have been judiciously distributed for that purpose, as far as my observation extends.

6. I think the principles of justice have been well observed during the period referred to. There must be differences of opinion about the expediency of some measures during so long a time, but I think the policy of the Indian government has generally been wise. My chief doubts refer to the degree of interference in internal affairs. I must acknowledge that although the plan of abstaining from intervention is the best for the time, yet it is the most hazardous for the native prince, who has the power of running into errors which are not checked until they become irretrievable. The political errors of the Peishwa, and the misgovernment of the Gykwar after his liberation from our control, are strong instances of this fact; but notwithstanding this danger, I think our interference should be sparingly resorted to.

7. The distribution of the Bombay army is the only one that I have had occasion to examine; it appears to me to be regulated by the consideration stated in the question.

8. Great attention has been of late paid to economy at the Residencies, and there was no complaint of want of efficiency when I left India.

9. The great check on a Resident is the necessity of his reporting every particular of his conduct. His omitting to do so in any instance should never be overlooked. He is also open to complaints from individuals, or the court at which he resides; and though in the latter instance the secrecy which natives think necessary, and their disposition to intrigue and

and indirect proceedings, embarrass all inquiries, yet I do not think any misconduct on the part of a Resident could well escape discovery. Occasional visits by the Governor to the Court operate also as a check on the Resident, but none can be advantageously imposed that tend to weaken his influence in ordinary times, or to fetter that full discretion which is necessary in most instances to enable him to attain the objects of his employment.

10. I think the present system of home government has on the whole been successful in attaining the objects for which it is designed.

The quality in which it has been most deficient is promptitude, and perhaps also vigour in enforcing its orders; but I doubt if this deficiency could be removed without greater evils. With more activity there would be more interference, which besides the danger of unenforceable orders, would impair the vigour and diminish the dignity of the local governments. The evils of interference would be increased if promptitude were attained by throwing the home government into fewer hands. In that case there would be less deliberation, and there would be more fluctuations from the greater effect that would be produced by the change of an individual.

The improvements I would suggest in India are chiefly subordinate arrangements. A more extensive change has been contemplated, by abolishing the subordinate presidencies, and bringing all India under the immediate direction of the Governor-General, who is to be exempted from all the minutiae of provincial administration, but in this plan, though suggested by persons for whose opinion I have great deference, I cannot bring myself to concur.

In war and politics there cannot be too much promptitude, nor can the powers of the Governor-General be too unfettered in those departments, but in internal government there cannot be too much deliberation and caution, nor can too much care be taken to guard against sweeping changes and frequent variations of policy. I would therefore rather increase the obstructions to the Governor-General's discretion by depriving him of all interference in the internal affairs of the other presidencies, except a veto on general changes proposed by the subordinate governments.

The facility of introducing uniformity, which is the principal argument for this change, seems to me a very strong objection to it. As India is as extensive and as various as all Europe, except Sweden and Russia, it is probable that uniformity will never be more attainable in the one region than in the other. At present India is very imperfectly known or understood, and even if uniformity should ultimately be practicable, it should not be thought of now. Our government should still be considered as in a great measure experimental, and it is an advantage to have three experiments, and to compare them in their progress with each other. The practice of Bengal led to Lord Cornwallis's system, an opposite course in Madras produced Sir Thomas Munro's; both of which will, I doubt not, be hereafter combined in such a manner as to form a better system than either separately. If the proposed plan had existed in 1792, the permanent zemindary settlement which is now so generally censured would have been irrevocably established in all parts of India.

There are other advantages in local governments: they have more local knowledge, the merits of local officers, civil and military, are better known to them than to a distant government, and they have means of employing and rewarding them which would not exist in the proposed system; they keep up the division of the army, which seems to me advantageous, and they improve the means of intercourse with the native chiefs.

The Governor-General is charged with too much detail at present, and might easily be relieved of part of that at Bengal, but as far as I can judge, he ought on no account to be removed entirely from being engaged in details; I should view with much apprehension a Governor-General who had no practical experience in administration, and whose only occupation was to frame systems which he might instantaneously extend to every part of India, without the obstruction now opposed by the subordinate governments. I should much fear the tendency of such an arrangement to produce hasty innovations and frequent changes of system, things hurtful in all countries, but nowhere so much so as in India.

I have just been informed of another suggested improvement in the Indian government, which I conceive likely to be attended with great advantage. It is for the formation of a separate branch of the council, composed of an English lawyer, a man of general knowledge in everything connected with jurisprudence, and a Company's servant, for the purpose of conducting the business of legislation. This plan is sufficiently supported by the considerations which originally suggested it; but it is further recommended to me by my experience of an arrangement resembling it in some respects, which was temporarily adopted for the formation of the new regulations at Bombay. The members were two Company's servants, (one judicial and one revenue) and a gentleman employed in the supreme court, but selected rather for his general attainments than knowledge of English law. I have some doubts whether this is not a better composition than that first mentioned, since it increases the number of members possessed of practical experience, and only excludes the English lawyer, the advantage of whose presence I think very questionable. There is perhaps a prejudice in India against having English law forced on the natives by the supreme Court, and this may make it appear that there is no danger of that law being too much attended to in a body composed like that suggested, but there is in every man's mind a strong bias to the law under which he has been brought up, and a disposition to consider its rules as identical with those of nature. The secret operation of this feeling, together with the superior skill of a practitioner in the law, and the advantage of his always having something positive to propose, whilst his colleagues are in doubts and difficulties, must always give a lawyer an ascendancy in a small legislative council, and, combined with other circumstances, must lead to unnecessary alteration in the laws of the natives.

A body, such as has been recommended, would render the regulations much more complete  
(446.—VI.) x 3

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Letter from  
the Hon.  
M. Elphinstone  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq

complete, more consistent, and more conformable to fixed principles, than those now passed and as it would not require to be constantly employed, in framing regulations, it might conduct all the long inquiries into the native laws and customs, and into the tenures of land and other rights, a knowledge of which is indispensable towards the formation of a code for India. I should propose such a committee for each presidency; but if the expense be too great, I should think one for Bengal alone would be the means of furnishing an excellent model for the legislation of the other governments.

There was a precaution adopted at Bombay which I think might be used with advantage by the proposed legislative council. It was to send all regulations after they were drafted to the chief court, and to the departments principally concerned, for their remarks on the probable operation of each in practice. The whole was then fully considered by the government, and particular articles were often discussed with the regulation committee before they were finally passed.

The other alterations I would recommend in the Indian government are the following: the governors should have commissions from the King as the commanders in chief have now. This would raise their dignity, especially with the army, and would put an end to the supposition that the supreme court and the governors represent different authorities.

That the powers of the governors while absent from the seat of government, but within the limits of the territory belonging to their presidency, should be explained; it is now far from distinct. The best plan would perhaps be to allow them to act independently, as they now do, or to consult their council, as they thought best in each case. Every facility should be given to them to move often through the country.

The questions connected with the relations between the supreme court and the government are of great importance. They have been so much discussed of late, that I doubt if I ought to enter on the subject.

It might perhaps prevent collision if

1st. It were clearly fixed that the supreme courts had no jurisdiction of any kind beyond the limits of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, except over Europeans, and if the word "inhabitant" were directed to be used in India in the restricted sense usual in common language.

2d. If the government were allowed in all cases to declare whether an act was or was not done with their approbation. At present an order of the government exempts the officer obeying it from all suit in the supreme court, and transfers the responsibility to the government, but it requires that the order should be previous.

3d. The governor should be empowered, in all cases where it appeared to him that the court was exceeding its jurisdiction, to suspend the proceeding until a reference could be made to England. He should be empowered to take the same step in all cases in which he deliberately pronounced that the interference of the court would be dangerous to the State.

4th. The governor should be personally exempt from all jurisdiction of the supreme court, nor should he be liable to serve on juries, or to be summoned as evidence, unless with his own consent. Some alteration should be made in his present liability to arrest for treason and felony: if the present state of things were generally understood, it is difficult to believe that natives, and even foreign princes, would not attempt to intimidate the governor by threatening to procure charges against him, and that they would not even bring such charges. A single charge supported by a false oath would be sufficient to commit the governor to prison, thus transferring the government for a time, perhaps a long one, into other hands, and greatly weakening the powers of the disgraced governor for ever after.

5th. The supreme court should be required to institute a summary inquiry into the question whether an individual complained of is subject to their jurisdiction, and not to issue process at once on the oath of a complainant, by which means process might be issued against independent princes, and has been used to intimidate persons nowise subject to their jurisdiction, or even to the British Government.

I have, &c. &c.

M Elphinstone.

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Appendix, No. 17.

Letter from  
R Jenkins, Esq

to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq

EXTRACT from a LETTER from Richard Jenkins, Esq M.P., to the Secretary of the Board of Control, on the subject of the actual Condition of our Relations with the several States.

THE great body of our allies, as augmented since 1813, being connected with us in relations of a subsidiary nature, a few remarks on the subject may be first made, introductory to an answer to the above question.

Our subsidiary treaties, in 1813 generally contained the following stipulations

After a declaration that the friends and enemies of one party were in future to be the friends and enemies of both the British Government agreed to furnish, and the other party to receive, a subsidiary force of a specific strength, to be stationed in the dominions of its ally for his protection against external and internal enemies, though with regard to the latter subject the independence of the protected state is acknowledged, and the force is not to be so employed

employed without his desire, or on trifling or ordinary occasions. The expenses of this force are provided for either by a money payment or a cession of territory, generally the latter, and to co-operate with the subsidiary force when in the field, a certain contingent of the troops of our ally, also of a specific strength, is stipulated for. It is further agreed that on necessary occasions all the resources of both states are to be put forth to repel aggression, whilst, as our ally agrees not to enter into any negotiation with a foreign power without our knowledge and concurrence, and to submit all points of difference to our arbitration, we are in fact the judges of what shall constitute a ground of war.

Our first subsidiary alliances with the great powers of the Dekhan, the Nizam, and Peshwa, as intended to unite them with the other Mahratta powers, the Gykwar, Semdia, and the Bhosla, in a system of perpetual defensive engagement for the maintenance of general tranquillity, were planned under circumstances, as regarded the relative condition of our power and theirs, and the political state of India generally, which rendered the expression of our superiority as the leading member of the system less decided than they have become in subsequent instruments of the same kind. Moreover the experience we soon had of the inefficient state of the contingents, and the decay of the military power of our allies under their reliance upon our support, the increasing importance of strengthening our general force of cavalry in particular, with relation to the predatory powers of the Pathans and the Pindarees, and the embarrassment attending the want of a provision for the permanent establishment, and of specific sanction to any interference on our part in the regulation of those forces, led to distinct articles on the subject being introduced into our subsequent treaties, and in some cases to the actual transfer of the contingent, with territorial or other funds for its maintenance, to the British Government.

Our late treaties have also (as in the case of Mysore, Nagpore, Holkar, &c) left the amount and stations of our force to our own discretion, and in some cases, from peculiar circumstances, our right to interfere in internal affairs is asserted and recognized. I have omitted to mention a stipulation introduced into all our treaties, prohibiting native states from entertaining in the service any Europeans or Americans without our permission.

With these few leading remarks, I proceed to take a brief view of the general course of political transactions with the several states since 1813, so as to show the actual condition of our relations with them.

#### ALLIES.

##### *The Nizam*

From our first subsidiary alliance with the Nizam, or at least from the death of Nizam Allee Khan, in 1803, to the present time, all the affairs of his government have been conducted by a minister supported by us. The late prince, Sekundur Jali, who died in 1829, was occasionally disposed to alter this system; but he had not the requisite energy or steadiness to act for himself, and he well knew that no minister he might choose could carry on his administration without our countenance. He was thus compelled to fall in with the only course which could ensure his personal ease, and leave him at liberty to pursue those low pleasures which ever led him to dislike the serious occupations of state affairs. The establishment of the military force at present existing under British officers, which took place before 1813, has been consolidated by subsequent arrangements. It was convenient originally to the minister, as enabling him to overcome the old military retainers of the state, who were equally jealous of him and us, but quite inefficient as to actual service of any kind, and it has been found really useful to the interests of the Nizam, as well as those of the Company, however derogatory to the semblance of independent power in the former. It has performed, indeed, essential services to the Nizam's government on various occasions of internal rebellion, and formed a very efficient addition to our means during the Mahratta and Pundarry war. The expenses of this force however, required to be adequately secured, but this was impracticable under the corrupt and oppressive system which prevailed throughout the Hyderabad territories, and these considerations, as well as the financial embarrassments of the government, led to our appointing civil officers over the whole of the country in 1813, by whose superintendence considerable improvement was produced in the condition of the revenues and of the people. These officers, I believe, have since been withdrawn as inconsistent with the general spirit of treaties, and matters have reverted in this respect to their former footing.

The only formal addition to our treaties with the Hyderabad state has been one concluded in 1822, which, as his share of the conquest from the Peshwa, relieves the Nizam from all future demands of choute, and arranges some exchanges between his Highness, ourselves, and the Rajah of Nagpore, whose forts of Gawilghur and Nernalah were also, with sundry other districts, assigned to the Nizam.

Printed Papers.  
Treaty with the  
Nizam, 1800.  
Ditto of 1822.

##### *Sattarah*

The Rajah of Sattarah was elevated to a small principality under our protection, formed out of the dominions of his nominal minister, but real master, the Peshwa. The treaty with him bears date the 25th September 1819. Under its stipulations, the territory, including jaghires to the joint amount of about twenty lacs of rupees per annum, was to remain for some time under the management of British officers, to be gradually transferred to his management; even after the transfer, the jaghires are still to be under our guarantee, and the Rajah is to conform generally to the advice of the resident, and to the British system in the management of his customs. The British Government charged itself with the defence of the Rajah's territories, and the Rajah's military establishment is to be entirely regulated by

Printed Papers.  
Treaty with the  
Rajah of Sattarah  
of 1819.



**POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.**

**Appendix, No. 17.**

Letter from  
*R. Jenkins, Esq*  
to  
*T. H. Villiers, Esq*

Printed Papers.  
Treaty of Nagpore of 1816.  
Preliminary Articles of 1818.  
Definitive Treaty of 1826, not published.  
Supplementary Treaty of 1830, not published, with Correspondence relating to them

See Lord W. Bentinck's Minute, and Treaty of 27th December 1829.

Printed Papers.  
Treaty of Mysore of 1799, and Explanatory Articles of 1807.

Printed Papers.  
Treaties of 1805 and 1817.

See Mr. Elphinstone's Minute, dated 3d April 1820, with Instructions to the Resident.

See Sir John Malcolm's Minutes, dated 1828, and 15th January 1830.

Printed Papers.  
Treaty of 1805

by the Government, with which he is always to act in subordinate co-operation. The renunciation of all intercourse with foreign powers is laid down as a fundamental condition of the agreement, a departure from which is to subject him to the loss of all the advantages he might gain by the treaty.

The territory was made over to the Rajah's management, according to the expressed intention of the British Government, and is now administered by him with credit

*The Bhoosla.*

After various unsuccessful attempts to induce Rajah Raghojee Bhoosla to join the general defensive alliance, his death in 1816 paved the way for their ultimate success under his successor; but on the defection of the Peshwa in 1817, the Bhoosla Appa Sahib joined the Mahratta confederacy, was defeated, made prisoner, and restored with considerable diminution of territory and latitude of action, again broke out, and was finally deposed, in the short period of about four months. In his stead a prince of the same house was set up, during whose minority the affairs of the state were managed by British agents, under the resident, from 1818 to 1826, when, on the Rajah's coming of age, the administration of the best cultivated part of his territory was placed in his hands, and a treaty concluded of the same general nature as that with Sattarah, as to civil arrangements, and the whole military power of the state was declared to be vested in us. Under it, besides, a subsidiary force stationed at Nagpore, the strength and disposal of which was left to our discretion, a force termed the auxiliary force, of regular infantry and of horse, raised out of the old retainers of the state, was maintained under British officers, and subject to the resident, as well to secure internal tranquillity as to form a contingent in external operations. To secure the payment of this force, the remainder of the territory, chiefly occupied by dependent zemindars, was reserved. In 1829, this territory was restored, and the British officers withdrawn from the military establishment, which was also left to the Rajah, on the condition of his paying us eight lacs of rupees per annum, and assisting us with a contingent of 1,000 horse

*Mysore*

Our external relations with Mysore have continued unchanged and the duties of that state with regard to military aid in times of war have been creditably performed. The internal administration of the Rajah it appears, however, has not been so successful as that of his minister Poonnee; and the disorders arising from his bad management have, I believe, recently attained a height which has compelled us to employ a considerable military force to put down the rebellion of his subjects, and to exercise our right under the treaty to assume the management of a part of his territory.

*Gykwar*

Our relations with the Gykwar have been considerably modified since the original subsidiary treaty of 1802

From various causes, as the unbecility of the Prince Anrud Rao, and the confusion introduced into his affairs by Aiah mercenaries and bankers, we had been induced to become guarantors of the public debt, and in concert with Futteh Sing Gykwari, the prince's brother, our resident exercised the general direction of the government. In 1805 a treaty, confirming former engagements, was made, and the subsidiary force increased from 2,000 to 3,000 infantry, for which territory and other funds, amounting 11,70,000 rupees per annum, were assigned. In 1817 a new treaty was concluded, increasing the force we were bound to maintain by an extra battalion of 1,000 men, and two regiments of native cavalry, making the whole four battalions of native infantry of 1,000 each, two regiments of cavalry of the same strength as at Poonah, one company of artillery, with due provision for the same, also fixing the contingent to be maintained and held at the Company's disposal at 3,000 horse, regularly paid, mustered, &c. under the supervision of the British commanding officer. Some exchanges of territory, &c. were made, with other arrangements consequent on the treaty of Poonah.

On the accession of Sanyee new arrangements were made with the Gykwari in 1820, transferring the general management of affairs into his hands from those of the commission who had hitherto exercised it, preserving, however, certain right of interference considered indispensable to discharge our duties of guarantor, both of debts and persons, and to prevent the advantages of our past management being sacrificed. This system it appears, was not found to answer, the debts were increased instead of diminished and everything thrown into such confusion as to induce the Government to take under sequestration such portions of territory as would liquidate the debt and other obligations necessary for us to insist upon. This arrangement took place in 1823, and under it our relations at Baroda are at present regulated.

*Travancore*

The dates of our treaties with Travancore are 1795 and 1805. By the latter the Rajah engaged to pay the expense of a regiment of native infantry in lieu of contingent, and by our former stipulations, as well as occasional extra demands, with a right of resumption of the territory in case of mismanagement, the Rajah being always secured in the amount of one-fifth and two lacs of rupees. From 1810 to 1814, the internal affairs of Travancore were managed by the resident, to enable that state to discharge its debts to the British Government, and in 1814, that object having been accomplished, and the future payment of the subsidy of eight lacs considered secure, the administration was restored to the native government.

*Cochin*

The Rajah of Cochin is in the same condition as the Rajah of Travancore, under the treaty of 1809. He pays a subsidy of 2,76,037 M. rupees, the expense of one battalion, whether employed or not in his territories, as well as extra demands; and in case we resume the management of his territory he is not to receive less than one-fifth and 35,000 rupees per annum.

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Printed Papers.  
Treaty of 1809.

*Holkar.*

Our relations with the Holkar state, up to the Marhatta and Pindaree war of 1817-18, rested on the treaty of peace concluded in 1805, the same as those with Scindia and the Bhonsla, though no resident was stationed at his court. Since the derangement of Jessoont Rao's intellect, and especially after his death in 1811, his government fell into great decay, and Meer Khan, Mahommed Shah Khan, and other retainers, were raising themselves to consequence and independence on the ruins of its fortune. Mulhar Rao, his son, was a minor, under the tutelage of his mother. Scindia in 1815 was active, with the Peshwa's participation, in his intrigues to obtain the direction of his affairs, and to form an union for the re-establishment of the Mahhatta confederacy. In 1817 an attempt was made to bring Holkar into our views for the suppression of the Pindarees, and his mother the regent seemed disposed to accede, but on the Peshwa breaking out she was put to death, hostilities ensued, and the battle of Mahdpoore placed the state at our mercy. By the treaty of Mundisoor in 1818, the state was placed on the footing of other powers connected with us in subsidiary alliances. We agreed by it to support a field force for his external and internal security, whilst he ceded to us his rights over the Rajpoot states, with a large portion of his territories, and agreed to keep no useless troops, but his contingent is fixed at 3,000 horse. A dewan was invested with the government till the prince should come of age, though his dependence in internal affairs is declared. A resident is fixed at his court, and a British force is stationed in his dominions at Mhow, as well as a force composed of the contingents of various dependents at Mahdpoore, under a British officer, to maintain the tranquillity of that part of the country.

Printed Papers.  
Treaties of 1805  
and 1818

*Oude*

Our formal relations with the King of Oude, who assumed the royal title in 1810, are not altered. Some changes in his internal administration, with the view of improving it, were suggested at different times under the conditions of the treaty, which sanction such advice on our part, but not carried into effect owing to the prince's repugnance to them. He assisted us in the Nepal war with a loan of two crores of rupees, for one crore of which we made over to him some districts conquered from the Goorkhas on his frontier.

*Scindia.*

Scindia, though not connected with us by a subsidiary treaty, is yet in reality as much dependent upon us as if he were so connected. By the treaty of Gwalior in 1817, dictated to him by Lord Hastings, he placed his troops at our disposal for the purpose of putting down the Pindarries, and gave up the condition in the former treaty which prevented us from forming engagements with the Rajpoot states, whose tribute for two years, and about two lacs which we paid annually to certain of his family and ministers under the old treaty, were appropriated to pay a contingent of 5,000 horse to be employed under British officers. In 1820 he agreed voluntarily to the permanent appropriation of funds for the maintenance of 2,000 horse employed under British officers, and paid from the resident's treasury. He has on several occasions applied for and obtained the assistance of British troops for the preservation of peace within his territories, and has made the British Government the guarantee and channel of his tributes from the petty chiefs in Western Malwa. I am not aware that any change in the disposition of the court has been caused by the death of Doulet Rao in 1827.

Printed Papers.  
Treaty of 1803;  
Ditto of 1817

*Protected States and Chiefs*

Our relations with the smaller states and dependencies are so multifarious that I should in vain pretend to enter upon them, unless very briefly. The Seikh chiefs between the Sutlej and Jumna are bound to us by the sense of protection they have derived, and still derive through us, from the arms of Runjeet Sing. On the other hand, the presence of a British detachment in their territories is distasteful to some of the most powerful, as it restrains their violence against their weaker brethren. The British Government derives no direct benefit from its dominion over these states, and in consequence has declared its right in 1822, as lord paramount, to the succession of such chiefs as die without legal heirs.

There is another set of petty chiefs inhabiting the hills evacuated by the Ghoozias between the Sutlej and Tounsee, where we keep up some posts to maintain the general peace of the country, with as little interference as possible with the domestic concerns of their wild races.

The Rajah of Bharatpore, after a long course of disloyal conduct, fostered by the remembrance of our defeats in 1805-6, was finally reduced in 1826, by the capture of his fortress. The other chiefs, as the Rajah of Muckree, continue in their former position. In 1811 it had been found necessary to bind the Rajah not to enter into negotiations with  
(445.—VI.)

Appendix, No. 17.

Letter from  
R. Jenkins, Esq.  
to  
T. H. Viliers, Esq.

foreign states without our consent, he having agreed by his former treaty only to submit disputes to our arbitration, as the price of our protection: he pays no tribute, but is to assist us with all his force. These two are the principal chiefs of this class in the neighbourhood of Delhi.

Our relations with the Rajpoot states are of a most important description, and require a more minute knowledge of particulars than I possess, to enter upon them with a view to any practical result. The management of this class of dependants, and of that more numerous body scattered over Central India, is a most delicate subject; and it would be presumption in me to do more than refer to the printed treaties and engagements with native princes and states, and to the work of Sir John Malcolm on Central India, for information as to their original position under our engagements with them, and to later records, which I should feel myself unable to examine to the extent necessary to enable me to answer the question as to the actual state of our relations with them.

With regard to our dependencies in other quarters, the information will also best come from persons locally acquainted with them.

They all acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, renounce all communication with foreign states, agree to submit to our arbitration of their disputes with their neighbours, to maintain no unnecessary troops; and besides acting generally in subordinate co-operation with us to maintain the peace of India both generally and locally, to supply, according to their respective means, a certain contingent of troops.

Appendix, No. 18.

REMARKS OF H. Russell, Esq., referred to in his Evidence, 21 February 1832.

Appendix, No. 18.

Remarks of  
H. Russell, Esq.

I. WHAT new acquisitions of Territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our Political Relations has been effected, since 1813?

NO change has taken place in the principles or character of our political relations towards the native states of India, since 1813, though the sphere of them has necessarily been enlarged. Many of those previously existing have become more intimate, and we have, from time to time, contracted new engagements with states with which we had none before.

In 1815, a treaty of peace was concluded with the Rajah of Nepal, with whom we had no previous relations; and we have since had a minister resident at his court.

In 1816, a defensive alliance, similar to that previously existing with the Nizam and the Peishwa, was contracted with Appah Sahib, then regent, and afterwards Rajah of Berar. He consented to subsidize a body of troops from us, and so great was our anxiety to procure his accession to the subsidiary system, that we consented to furnish the troops on his defraying only the additional charge occasioned by their being placed on a field establishment.

In June 1817, in consequence of the murder of the minister of the Guickwar at the Peishwa's court, the Peishwa was required to execute a treaty, by which much stricter restraints were imposed upon him than those of the previous treaty of Bassem; and the war which immediately followed, terminated in the total extinction of his power.

In November of the same year, a treaty was made with Sindia, for concert in military operations against the Pindarries; and at the same time we contracted with the Guickwar to add a battalion of infantry and two regiments of cavalry to the force already subsidized by him.

In 1818, a treaty of peace was concluded with Holkar, by which he agreed to receive an accredited English minister permanently at his court.

In 1819, the Rajah of Satarah, the adopted descendant of Sevajee, and nominal head of the Mahratta confederation, was established by us, on the reduction of the Peishwa, at the head of an inconsiderable government, and placed in possession of a small territory. A treaty was made with him, by which he was fixed in complete dependence upon us, and an English resident has since been stationed at his court.

In 1822, a treaty for the partition of our conquests from the Peishwa, was concluded with the Nizam.

In 1826, on the present Rajah of Berar's attaining his majority, we concluded a definitive treaty with him, on principles similar to our previous treaty with Mysore. By this treaty we restored to the Rajah a portion of his territory, of which during his minority, we had taken the exclusive management into our own hands, retaining the remainder to pay his military establishment, which was to be entirely under our control.

During this period engagements have been entered into for the adjustment of reciprocal claims with the Rajpoot princes, and other smaller states of Hindoostan; and treaties have been made with the Rajahs of Cutch, Mandavee and Sawuntwaree; with the Arab tribes, and with the Angria family, for the suppression of piracy in the Persian Gulf, and on the western coast of the peninsula below Bombay.

The largest acquisition of territory that we have made since 1813, was that conquered from the Peishwa in 1818. In the only statement that I have seen of its value, the annual produce is estimated at somewhat above a crore of rupees. The cessions made to us by Nepal in 1815, yielded less than two lacs of rupees a year. A portion of them was in 1816,

very

very beneficially transferred to the King of Oude, in discharge of a debt of a crore of rupees, due by us to him; and in 1817, another portion was given to the Rajah of Siceim. By the treaty of 1817, the Guickwar ceded to us the farm of Ahmedabad, valued at 12 lacs of rupees a year.

The various tributes acquired by us from the Rajpoot and other states of Hindoostan, yielded about 20 lacs a year.

In 1819, the Sawantwarce state ceded to us a small tract along the sea above Goa.

By the partition treaty with the Nizam, he received a territory of the annual value of near nine lacs of rupees, and ceded to us the amount of five, the balance in his favour being between three and four lacs.

By the treaty of 1820, the Rajah of Berar ceded to us a portion of territory on both banks of the Nerbudda, the districts of Sirgoonah, Jushpore, and Sumbhulpore, in the direction of Cuttack, and an annual tribute of eight lacs; the whole of our acquisition by this treaty being estimated at about 30 lacs.

The annual value of the territory and tribute acquired by us since 1813, amounts, therefore, to between a million and a half and two millions sterling a year.

The most remarkable political features in the engagements contracted by us during this period, are the dissolution, by the treaty with the Peshwa in 1817, of the Mahratta confederacy, which had lasted about a century and a half, and the extinction of all arrears and future demands of choutie upon the Nizam, by the treaty concluded with him in 1822. By the former, Scindia, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, the Guickwar, and the smaller Mahratta states were rendered separate and independent powers, in form as well as substance: the latter destroyed the last vestige of that vexatious system, by which the Mahrattas had often kept India in arms from Delhi to Cape Comorin, and by which, in the early period of our history, even our own provinces had been subjected to devastation.

The Burmese war did not begin until some time after I had quitted India. Of that, therefore, or of the consequences resulting from it, I have said nothing.

## II. What is the actual condition of our relations with the several States?

Any account that I can give of the condition of our relations with the native states must be subject to such changes as may have taken place in them since I quitted India, 12 years ago. I apprehend, however, that no material changes have been made, and that, in all important respects, our relations are the same now as they were then. They vary according to the various circumstances of the states with which they prevail, and differ generally in degrees of intimacy, as the connexion has been of longer or shorter duration; but they arise, in almost every instance, out of the system of subsidiary alliances; that system was originally introduced by the French in their early transactions with the state of Hyderabad, near a century ago, and the Nabob of Lucknow subsidized a brigade of English troops during the government of Mr. Hastings in 1774; but the adoption of the system by us upon a comprehensive scale as the basis of our Indian policy, may be referred to the engagements contracted by Lord Wellesley, preparatory to the war with Tippon in 1798. A brief summary will be sufficient to trace the steps by which this system has reached its actual height; and it so happens that the single government of Hyderabad will furnish an example of it in every stage of its progress, from its original introduction down to the present time.

In 1749, in the course of the contest between Mozuffer Jung, and his uncle Naeir Jung, for the sovereignty of the Deccan, the French espoused the cause of the former; and M. Dupleix sent a body of 400 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys to join his army. With this force to second his able and energetic views, M. Bussy raised two successive princes to the government of Hyderabad; Mozuffer Jung in 1750, and his uncle Salabut Jung, the great-uncle of the present Nizam, in 1751. It was subsequently increased in amount; the districts near Masulipatam were assigned for its payment; and M. Bussy continued to exercise, until his recall by the infatuated policy of M. Lally, a more absolute and direct control over the Nizam's government than has ever been attempted by us in the plenitude of our influence.

The recall of the French force in 1759 led immediately to our first treaty with the state of Hyderabad, by which Salabut Jung ceded to us Masulipatam and the adjoining districts, which had been assigned to M. Bussy, and bound himself to expel the French from his dominions. In 1766 we made a second treaty with Nizam Ally, the brother and successor of Salabut Jung, by which he ceded to us that tract upon the sea-coast between Ganjam and Masulipatam known by the designation of the Northern Circars, for which we were to pay nine, since reduced to seven lacs of rupees a year; and we agreed, on receiving three months notice, to assist him with a body of troops, "to settle the affairs of his government in everything that is right and proper." In 1768, the Nizam having in the interval joined Hyder Ally in a war against us, peace was concluded in a third treaty, by which the cession of the Northern Circars was confirmed, and the general obligation to afford military aid was converted into a specific engagement to furnish the Nizam with "two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans, whenever he should require them;" but the Nizam never did require them, until the conclusion of the treaty of Paungul with Lord Cornwallis in 1790, when his army, preparatory to its advance against Tippon, was joined, for the first time, by two battalions of our troops. These battalions remained with the Nizam after the war was over, but they remained upon sufferance only; they were subject to be either dismissed by the Nizam or withdrawn by us, at any time, and, in point of fact, the Nizam did dismiss them in resentment of Lord Teigamouth's refusal to assist him in his

Appendix, No. 18.

Remarks of  
H. Russell, Esq.

disastrous campaign against the Mahrattas in 1795, though, in consequence of the rebellion of his eldest son, they were recalled to Hyderabad before they had crossed the frontier, and they have never since quitted his territory.

The treaty which Lord Wellesley concluded with the Nizam in 1798, preparatory to the war with Tippoo, may be considered as the introduction of our subsidiary system as it now prevails in India. By that treaty, the force subsidized from us by the Nizam was not only increased, but made permanent; and the Nizam engaged to disband the corps then in his service under French officers. Even after this treaty, the subsidy still continued to be paid by the Nizam in money; but in October 1800, another treaty of a more intimate character, called "a Treaty of general defensive alliance" was concluded with him, which has served as a model for most of our subsequent treaties, and which may now be considered as the basis of our relations with the native states of India. By that treaty we engaged to protect the Nizam against all enemies, foreign or domestic; a still further increase was made to the subsidiary force, and in exchange for the subsidy in money, a provision was made for its payment by the cession to us, in perpetuity, of all the territories acquired by the Nizam from the government of Mysore by the partition treaties of 1792 and 1799, estimated altogether at about a million sterling a year. The Nizam, on his part, engaged not to enter into any negotiation with any other power without our consent, and to submit any differences that might arise to our arbitration and decision.

In 1802 we entered into a commercial treaty with the Nizam, but that treaty had no influence upon our political relations. The objects of it were merely to facilitate the commercial intercourse between the territories of the two governments, and to establish an uniform scale of duties on goods reciprocally imported and exported.

In 1803 a treaty was executed by the late Nizam, recognizing and confirming all engagements between the English and his father; and in 1804, in consequence of the refusal of the Nizam's commander to receive the wounded of the Duke of Wellington's army, after the battle of Assaye, into the fortress of Dowlatabad, an article was added to the "Treaty of general defensive alliance," providing for the free passage of the troops of either government into the territories and forts of the other.

Treaties for the partition of the conquered territories were also concluded with the Nizam in 1792, 1799, 1804 and 1822, after the wars with Tippoo, the Mahrattas and the Peshwa, respectively.

Since the conclusion of the treaty of 1800 with the Nizam, the leading principles of our engagements with the states of India have been, and still are, to make them dependent for protection exclusively upon us; to prevent their contracting any alliances or engagements with one another, otherwise than through our mediation; and to exclude all foreign Europeans and Americans from their service.

III. What is the amount of Military Force required in each instance; whether,

1. By express stipulation;
2. By the ordinary effect of our obligations; or,
3. As a security against extraordinary risks?

I have not the means of stating what is the precise amount of military force required in the instance of each particular state. Except in cases of accidental and temporary emergency, the force required is confined to that provided for by express stipulation. The strength and composition of the several forces are specified in the treaties with the different states respectively. According to our last subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, that of 1800, the force with which we are bound to furnish him consists of eight battalions of sepoys of 1,000 each, two regiments of native cavalry of 500 each, and a due proportion of artillery; and by a separate engagement, the Nizam subsequently agreed to receive one regiment of European infantry, in the room of two battalions of sepoys.

In all cases short of threatened war, it has been found, I apprehend, that the force provided for by express stipulation has been amply sufficient to meet the ordinary effect of our obligations, as well as to furnish security against extraordinary risks. Indeed, I believe the force actually maintained by us in the Nizam's territory is of even smaller amount than that required by the latter of our engagements. About 1818 or 1819, a reduction having been made in the strength of the Madras regiments, of which the Nizam's subsidiary force is composed, it became a question whether our covenant would be performed by our furnishing the stipulated complement of regiments only, without reference to the number of men composing them; or whether we were not bound to furnish the full complement of men specified in the treaty. The government were of opinion that the force subsidized from us by the Nizam had, by a change of circumstances, acquired the character of a controlling, rather than a protecting force, and that, provided we fulfilled the substance of our contract, we were not bound to furnish the precise number of men stipulated by the letter of it.

We are now also released from a material risk, arising out of these engagements, by the substitution of a body of disciplined troops, commanded by English officers, in the room of a portion of the irregular force previously maintained by the native states in alliance with us.

In the treaty of 1800, the Nizam engaged, in the event of a war, generally, "to employ every effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he might be able to supply from his dominions;" and, specifically, "to provide 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse, of his own troops," to join the English subsidiary force. And a similar covenant was introduced into the treaties afterwards concluded by us with other states. In consequence of the reliance which these states naturally place

upon

upon the protection we are bound to afford them, their own armies have been suffered to dwindle in numbers, and to fall, by gradual neglect, into almost total inefficiency. They have no scager, therefore, the means of rendering us, in time of war, that assistance which we have a right to demand from them. In the war with Tippoo in 1799, the Nizam was unable to afford us any useful co-operation, and at the close of that with the Mahrattas in 1803, Lord Wellesley held that his failure in this particular had been so great, as to forfeit all claim to a share of the conquests: and the share which was given him, was given as a free gift on the part of our government, and not as a satisfaction of any claim he had established. It would have been extremely difficult to restore the Nizam's own army to its former condition, and even if it had been so restored, we could not have relied on its fidelity. In the war against the Pindarries in 1817, the troops of the Peshwa and those of the Rajah of Berar, who ought by treaty to have fought in the same ranks with our own, were all, with the exception of the Peshwa's regular brigade under English officers, employed in open hostility against us; and the troops of our other ally, Scindia, instead of proving auxiliaries, cost us a complete army to keep them in check. Before this war, the Nizam's government had been prevailed on, by our recommendation, to raise a body of, as far as I recollect, about 8,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, with a train of artillery, the greater part organized and disciplined like our own troops, and the whole commanded by English officers. These troops furnished at once an effective military force for the Nizam's own use, and enabled him to perform for himself many internal duties, which, otherwise, we must have incurred the expense of performing for him, and to fulfil his obligations as an efficient auxiliary in the field. They served actively and faithfully during the war of 1817-18, they fought in the same line with our own troops in the battle of Malidpore; and they distinguished themselves so much in the successful siege of Nowah, an operation not of very frequent occurrence in India, that our government ordered a detail of the service, though performed by foreign troops in a foreign territory to be published officially in our own Gazette.

Troops of this description in the service of the native states in alliance with us, are attended with these advantages: they strengthen and support the government they serve, without endangering or weakening us; they help us when we require help; and they cost us nothing.

IV. What is the character and what the extent of the interference exercised by us in the internal affairs of the Protected States?

1. What is the real nature of the duties that belong to Political Residents and Agents?
2. What are the effects that have resulted, and those that are to be anticipated, on the interests of the Protected Princes, of their people, and of our own subjects, from the relation in which they stand to us as heretofore acted upon?

We have in general professed to abstain as far as possible from interference in the internal affairs of the states in alliance with us, but in some of our recent treaties our right to interfere has been provided for by express stipulation, though both the nature and the extent of our interference necessarily vary with circumstances; with the character and views of the state which is the object of it; with the particular policy of our own Government for the time being; and, in a considerable degree, with the temper and opinions of the individual employed as resident. On all occasions affecting the tranquillity or safety of the government, in all questions of foreign policy, and, generally, in all matters in which it may be considered that our own interests or the common interests of the alliance are involved, we always have exercised, and while our relations continue what they now are, we always must exercise, a decided interference. At Hyderabad, to cite particular instances, we interfered to procure the appointment of Meer Allum to be minister in 1804, and that of Chumtloo Loll to the same office in 1809. On the death of Nizam Ally in 1803, I was myself sent with a body of troops into the city, being then assistant to the resident, with orders to place guards at the palace, at the houses of all the princes and of the minister, to take, in fact, military possession of the city, and to prepare for establishing the eldest son in the government on the following morning. On his death again, in 1829, we assumed the right of deciding on the order of succession, and, according to a resolution which had been come to 10 years before, preferred the claim of the present Nizam, who is an illegitimate son, to that of his younger but legitimate brother. But during the whole of the time that I was employed at the Nizam's court, which from first to last exceeded 20 years, the resident did not exercise any interference in what are strictly the domestic concerns of his government. In the administration of justice, such as it is; in the collection and application of his revenues; in the appointment, control and removal of his local officers; and in the constitution and employment of his army, with the exception of that part to which English officers were attached, the resident did not interfere at all. After I quitted India, English officers were appointed by the resident to superintend the conduct of the Nizam's collectors in the management of his revenue, and the administration of justice, and the same course was pursued in the Nagpore territory; but the practice has since been abandoned, the officers have been recalled, and I have understood that of late the prohibition against interference has been more peremptory than ever, and that the native states are left to conduct their own internal affairs according to their own views and inclinations.

Upon this question of interference, a great diversity of opinion has prevailed. Some have been for confining our interference within the narrowest limits possible, and others for exercising

exercising it without concealment or reserve. In fact, however, it is a part only of a system, and cannot be justly considered by itself. For our own interests, that sort and degree of interference I should say were the most beneficial, which were the most calculated to sustain the native princes in the possession of their own governments and territory, and to avert for the longest time the necessity, in the end I fear inevitable, of our assuming the immediate possession of them for ourselves. But the nature of the relations we have established with the native states unfortunately tempts them to pursue a course which often makes it impracticable for us to abstain from interference. We are bound to interfere to arrest a government allied to us, in a course of measures manifestly tending to produce a war, of which, if it did occur, we must bear the brunt. For the same reason, we are justified in interfering to correct a system of internal misrule, which might lead to a total failure in the resources of our ally, transfer to our shoulders the burden of obligations which belong properly to him, or even impose on us the task of suppressing a rebellion of his subjects. But this is a right to be exercised with peculiar circumspection; and the course we have usually tried, that of exercising it through a minister subservient to our views, has been signally unsuccessful. A minister so situated can hardly satisfy us and conciliate his own master. If he acts cordially as we wish him, he is considered by his master as a tool in our hands, and we have to support the minister in a perpetual conflict with the prince. If, on the other hand, he tries to please his master, and conforms less implicitly than we require to our directions, a still closer interference on our part becomes necessary; we set the minister as well as the prince aside, we place officers of our own to superintend the local administration, and thus irritate and estrange those very persons of whose co-operation we are most in need. As long as the country of our ally remains under the ostensible management of his own agents, it must always be in their power to frustrate our views. If we are to work with them as our implements, it is indispensable to success that we conciliate them to our purpose, or at least avert their systematic counteraction. If we carry our interference so far, or exercise it so offensively as to alienate either the government or its local officers, our measures are sure to be defeated. We have tried both these methods in our transactions with the Nizam's government, and have in both cases found these to be the results.

But be the principle resolved upon what it may, be our interference little or be it much, it ought at least to be uniform. Nothing is more to be deprecated than violent and frequent change. Hitherto we have carried our interference sometimes too far, and sometimes not far enough. Either course, if kept within reasonable bounds and steadily adhered to, might be attended with advantage, but a capricious alternation of the two is sure to be prejudicial; and the courts we have to deal with, finding us profess one purpose at one time and another at another, naturally suspect us of being insincere in both. As it is, our system seems to emanate not from the government itself but from those by whom it is administered, and every new governor, or even every new resident, is expected to bring a new set of principles with him.

The duties of a resident or political agent in India, comprise all those duties which belong to a diplomatic agent in Europe, with others for which the circumstances of European governments afford no occasion. It is his duty to conduct all negotiations and intercourse of every kind between his own government and that of the state with which he resides, to keep his government acquainted with the character, views and proceedings of the prince, ministers and principal officers, with the condition and resources of the country, and generally with all those circumstances by which the interests of his government may be in any way affected or its policy influenced, to watch the intrigues which are generally going on under Indian governments, to cultivate a friendly intercourse with all the prominent persons about the court, and to encourage and support the party friendly to English interests.

All political negotiations in India are conducted under the orders of the Governor-General, and all reports on political subjects are made to him only; but on matters of detail, the resident corresponds with the governments of Madras and Bombay, as well as with the officers, both civil and military, in our own districts contiguous to the common frontier; and he conducts the adjustment of any disputes which may arise between the subjects of the two governments. He corresponds also with the other residents and political agents, exchanges with them intelligence of all that is going on at their respective courts, concert with them any measures that may be requisite for mutual assistance, and investigates and settles with them any differences or dissensions that may occur either between the governments or their subjects.

In those states where an English force is subsidized, the duties of the resident partake in some degree of a military character. He is to see that the force is kept complete in numbers, equipment and discipline, and to provide for its regular payment and supply, whether stationary or in movement. He communicates orders to the commanding officer for any service to be executed by the force, or for any detachments to be made from it; and the officers commanding all such detachments act, while absent from the head-quarters, under instructions given to them by the resident.

The resident also has a treasury, which it is his duty to supply either by bills or with specie drawn from the English territory; and he keeps accounts of all receipts and issues which the various purposes of his office require.

He is to see that the army of the native state, particularly that portion of it which is under English officers, is maintained as far as possible in such a condition as will enable it to furnish the stipulated aid in the event of war. He is to take care that no Europeans

English,

English or foreigners, obtain access to the state with which he resides without the permission of his own government; to see that the provisions of the commercial treaty, where there is one, are fulfilled, and to protect all English subjects in their legitimate dealings. The resident has also the care of the various lines of communication by which the mails are conveyed through the territory of his court.

The relation arising out of an alliance with us upon the subsidiary system is one of absolute dependence, and the most striking effect it has produced upon the states which have embraced it, is the condition of premature decrepitude into which it inevitably hurries them. Every faculty that is valuable in a state, every organ that contributes to its wholesome existence, decays under the malignant influence of that system. From the moment that we engage to protect a foreign prince, he ceases to have any inducement to protect himself; by taking away the occasion, we take away, in the end, all power of exertion. The habit of going upon crutches deprives him of the use of his own limbs. Let a prince in this state of tutelage be what he may, his government must progressively decline; he has no longer anything to hope from good measures, or to fear from bad; he has no longer any inducement to strengthen himself against the hostility of foreign powers, or to conciliate the affection of his own subjects. All community of interest or feeling between them is at an end; and having no longer any occasion for their attachment or support, he treats them as if he had none; he exacts, in the shape of revenue, not what they ought to pay, but what his own rapacity desires to receive. Those impediments which his people, if left to themselves would raise against him, are prevented or removed by the dread of the exercise of our power; and he proceeds in his course of injustice, violence and extortion, without any fear of resistance or rebellion. I speak here principally of the Nizam's government, as that with the condition and progress of which I am best acquainted; and perhaps it furnishes the fairest example that could be chosen, as it is the one with which our alliance has been longest in operation. If the Nizam had not been protected as we were bound to protect him, either he must have abstained from the system of misrule he has pursued, or his subjects would have been driven to redress themselves.

This scheme of confederation which we have adopted with the protected states of India, is inevitably progressive in its nature. Every new alliance that we contract brings us into territorial or political contact with other states, which are in their turn involved in the same system, and sink under the same consequences. A state that has once resorted to an alliance with us can no longer remain stationary; by degrees our relations become more intimate; the necessity of support increases with the habit of it; and, in the end, it loses the form as well as the substance of independence. If it is galled by its troubles, and makes an effort, as the Peshwa did to shake them off, it only precipitates its own destruction; if it submits, it declines by degrees from one stage of weakness to another, until, like the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, it expires from exhaustion: the choice is between a violent and a lingering death.

When once we changed the character of our establishments, and relinquished our capacity of merchant for that of sovereign, we entered upon a career, in which it was difficult to check, and impossible to stop ourselves. Our largest and most frequent acquisitions of territory have been made since the declaration of the legislature in 1784, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation." Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786 with this declaration ringing in his ears, and found Sir J. Macpherson engaged in a negotiation with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, in which the object of those powers was to inveigle us into a war with Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis's first act was to break off this negotiation, under a declaration that the English would engage in none but strictly defensive wars. His second act was to propose an alliance to those very powers, for a war, of which the result produced a large accession to our territory. But this was the fault, not of Lord Cornwallis, but of the circumstances in which he was placed; events were no longer under his control, he was controlled by events; and the same has been the case with his successors. When Lord Wellesley entered upon his system of subsidiary alliances, the power of Tippoo and of the Mahrattas was unbroken; Tippoo was actuated by the most vindictive hatred of us, and would certainly have attacked us if we had not attacked him. The Mahrattas were jealous of our progress, and would rather have assisted to overthrow than to support us. Considerable bodies of troops, commanded by French officers and influenced by French feelings, were maintained by both Scindia and the Nizam; and the Nizam, who was afraid of the Mahrattas, was resolved, if he could not obtain support from us, to seek it from the French. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for us either to abstain from acting at all, or to act differently than we did. The state of India made an opening, which, if we had not occupied it ourselves, would have been occupied by the French. Our election lay between the abandonment of what we already had, and the acquisition of more: if we refused to advance, we must have submitted to retrace; our maintaining the position in which we then stood was out of the question. The measures that we did pursue, at least served the purpose designed by them at the time; they prostrated all our enemies, both Indian and European; but if they left us without rivals, they left us also without friends; and, contemplating our system as we now do, in its result, we may say of it, as has been said of that of paper money, that though it was strength in the beginning, it has proved weakness in the end. We had, however, a choice of difficulties; and even now it is hard to say whether we should have fared better by taking a tamer course.

The collection of the Pindarries, and the war we were obliged to undertake for their dispersion, were another consequence of the relations established by us in India. Predatory bands



bands have, in all ages, existed in India; and the name of Pindarry was known, I believe, as long ago as the time of Aurungzebe; but organized bodies, of such magnitude as those which were collected before the war of 1817, permanently occupying tracts of country acknowledged as their own, openly treating with the governments in their neighbourhood, and systematically conducting predatory expeditions, from which even our own territory was latterly not exempt, were unheard of before the extension of our control, and while the principal states retained their independence. But as they declined in power, and entered successively into closer relations with us, they no longer required, nor were able to maintain, the same military establishments as before. Large bodies of cavalry were consequently discharged both in Hindostan and in the Deccan; legitimate service was no longer open to them; they could not, or would not, change their mode of life; and, by degrees, they congregated and established themselves in the districts near the Nerbudda, which were at once the most accessible to them, and the most remote from our reach: but this, though a serious, was a temporary evil. Having once been encountered with decision, it was extinguished; the source in which the Pindaries originated has been stopped; the native states have no longer bodies of cavalry to discharge; and even if they had, there is no longer any secure position in which those bodies could assemble.

The evil of which our subsidiary system has thus been productive is the more to be lamented that it is manifestly irremediable. It is no longer possible for us to retrace our steps; and even if it were, our doing so would not repair the mischief we have occasioned. We could not dissolve our engagements now, without the greatest danger to ourselves, and the grossest injustice to those with whom they have been contracted. It is not easy to say what course events would have taken, if we had not originally introduced our system of interference. In the condition in which India then was, some enterprising leaders might have established independent principalities, and some small states might have risen to consequence at the expense of their neighbours; but the probability is, that the Nizam and other feeble princes would have fallen, and the greater part of the territory would have been divided between Tippoo and the Mahrattas. Strong governments would have been substituted for weak ones; and after a process, which has been of too frequent occurrence in India to be regarded as a very grave calamity, the people generally would have attained a degree of prosperity and happiness greater than we have been able to confer upon them, certainly in the protected territories, and probably even in our own. As far, therefore as the people of India are concerned, they would have fared better without our interference. But injurious as our system has been in its action even to them, it would, if we were to abandon it, be equally so in its cessation. If we were to withdraw our protection now, in what condition should we leave the native states, and in what condition should we place ourselves? Though we may take from them what we have given, can we give them back what we have taken away? Our control has been so long in force, and has been pushed to such an extent, that not a government is left capable of standing by itself. There is neither any single power to take our place, nor any number of powers to contend for it. The native states would fall to pieces from their own weakness, and become the victims of intestine convulsion, or the prey of lawless plunder: every enterprize would be one of rapine, and every leader a leader of banditti. The contagion, once abroad, would spread in every direction; our own possessions would be invaded and distracted by the disorders that surrounded them, and we should find that our change of policy, instead of restoring the power of our allies, had been the destruction of our own. It is now too late for us to recede. The career on which we have entered we must pursue. It is vain to think of relaxing our control, or reviving among the native states that vigour which has been extinguished; their decline is not to be arrested; they must proceed and complete their course. In spite of every thing that we can do to prevent it, they must fall successively into our possession, and partake at last of our downfall, of which, whether it be slow or sudden, the period will probably be hastened by every increase of our territory and subjects.

V. What have been the Financial effects of the Conquests, and of the changes or enlargements of our Political Relations which have been made since 1813? to be exhibited under the following heads:

1. Increased or decreased Revenue or Tribute.
2. Increased or decreased charge of Civil Administration.
3. Increased or decreased appropriation of Military Force.
4. Increased or decreased risk of External or Internal Hostility.

I have never had the means of acquiring any detailed or precise information respecting the financial effects produced by our conquests, or the extension of our political relations. What has been the increase of our revenue or tribute, and what proportion it bears to the increase of our civil and military charges, are questions of figures that can be accurately solved only by examination of documents, to which I have never had access.

With respect to risk of hostility, we have nothing now to fear from external enemies; there is no power left in India that could pretend to cope with us except Runjeet Sing; and even with him, a contest, though expensive, could hardly be of long duration. An European enemy, if he could but reach our frontier, would find us weakened by extension, and by the discordant elements of which our unwieldy empire is composed, and he would be joined by as many of the native states as were not restrained by the immediate presence of a body of our troops; but the danger from that quarter always appeared to me to be illusory,

illusory, unless we facilitate the approach of our enemy by composing the distractions of the intermediate governments, inspiring them with a dread of him, by showing them how much we are afraid of him ourselves, and improving those resources, which, in the event of an invasion, would unquestionably be turned against us. Our security mainly consists in the desert on our frontier, and the poverty and weakness of the countries that lie beyond it.

The danger that we have most to dread in India lies entirely at home. A well concerted rebellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which our power is most likely to be shaken, and the sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an increase, not of our strength, but of our weakness between them and us there never can be a community of feeling. We must always continue foreigners, and the object of that jealousy and dislike which a foreign rule never ceases to excite. The diversities between ourselves and the people of India are so many and so great, that we can never be blended, as in other conquests, into one people. We do not, and cannot mingle or intermarry with them, and even the produce of illicit intercourse is a race differing from the parent stocks, disliked by both, and, in all essential qualities, inferior to either. The half-castes can never render any effectual assistance either to the natives in rising against us, or to us in suppressing their revolt. The distinctions of colour, language, and manners, between us and our native subjects, are insurmountable, and although many sanguine individuals, who have no personal knowledge of India, encourage the belief that the difference of religion may be removed, they who are better informed, and are conversant with the character of the people, on which this question turns, are, I apprehend, more dubious of the event and more fearful of the means by which it is to be compassed. I, for one, entertain great doubts whether the natives of India ever will be converted to Christianity, any attempt for that purpose is more likely to prove injurious to ourselves than beneficial to them, and their conversion, even if they ever do become Christians, will be preceded by an advance in knowledge and power wholly incompatible with their submission to our sway. In the order of events, our expulsion from India will, in all probability, be anterior to a change of religion among the natives.

#### VI. How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to?

I am not sure that I clearly understand the object of this inquiry. If it be meant to ask how far we have adhered to the principles of justice and expediency in the conduct of our relations with the native states, the question is a delicate one to answer. If our engagements have been contracted with a provident care of our own interests, they have been expedient, if they have respected the rights of other states, and have been faithfully fulfilled by us, they have been just. But the circumstances under which our negotiations have of late years been conducted in India have exposed our disinterestedness and love of justice to a severe trial: no native state has stood on a ground of equality with us. We have treated rather as patron and client than as government and government, and have had every thing too much our own way. The last of our negotiations that was attended with any serious difficulty, perhaps the most distinguished of them all for the ability with which it was both conceived and executed, was that which preceded the treaty of Salbey with the Marhattas in 1782: the peace of 1784 we received as supplicants at the hands of Tippoo. Our alliance against the same power in 1790 was effected because the Nizam and the Marhattas were as anxious for it as we were, our treaty with the Nizam, preparatory to the war of 1799, was as much a compliance with his views as an accomplishment of our own, and all our later negotiations have been little less than dictation on our part, and concession on the other. Under these circumstances, it would be too much to expect that the exigency of our own interests should not now and then have absorbed a consideration for those of the other contracting party, but our errors, where we have erred, have been more in the fulfilment than in the formation of our engagements. We have sometimes confined our views too much to the objects immediately before us, and have not looked far enough into ulterior consequences. Satisfied with present success, we have left the future to shift for itself, and while the period of fulfilment was still distant, have promised more than, in the end, we found it convenient to perform. The interpretation of our treaties rested with ourselves, and being both judge and party, it is hardly to be wondered at that we sometimes stretched a point in our own favour. Diplomatic transactions are not, in any country, those in which a very stubborn integrity is to be looked for; and if ours in India were very rigidly scrutinized, it might perhaps be said that we had sometimes contracted engagements as if they were never to be fulfilled, and sometimes fulfilled them as if they had never been contracted.

#### VII. How far have the strength and distribution of the British Indian army been regulated by a due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition, with reference to the forces belonging to native states, on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard?

During the period over which my observation extended, the distribution of our military force appeared to me to be judiciously adapted to the condition of our political relations at the time. Troops were found wherever an exigency arose to require them; and I am not aware that any injury, either to our own interests or to the interests of those states who were entitled to our protection, has arisen out of the misapplication of our military resources:

perhaps the military branch of our government in India is that which has generally been the best administered. With reference to the native states, we have acted upon the secure principle, that we could not implicitly depend upon the aid of any of them, and that it was requisite to be prepared for the hostility of them all. A striking instance of the necessity of this precaution, and of the prudence with which it was observed, occurred in 1817, when operations having been undertaken against the Pindaries, the Peshwa and the Rajah of Berar, instead of lending their aid, as by their engagements they were bound to do, and acting against the common enemy, took the first opportunity of breaking into open hostility against us. The distribution which had been made of our troops was such that we were able to defeat them both, without diverting any portion of our resources from the prosecution of our original design against the Pindaries, or weakening the army of observation upon Scindia, whom, although we had a recent treaty of concert with him, we were obliged to keep in check with as much care as if he had been an open enemy. The Nizam alone was faithful to his engagements, and rendered us effectual co-operation. This distinction between his conduct and that of our other allies arose probably from these causes: a considerable portion of his army was under the control and influence of English officers; there was no confidence or cordiality between him and his minister, and, unlike the case of the Mahattas, where the princes and their people were of one religion, the Nizam was a Mahometan and his people Hindoos. This last circumstance constitutes an essential distinction between many of the native states of India, and has been productive of very important consequences at critical periods of Indian history.

VIII. How far have the civil establishments of the several residencies and agencies been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy?

The civil establishments of the residencies and political agencies were confined, when I was in India, to one, and in some cases two assistants, whose duty it was to assist the resident or agent in the ordinary business of his office, and to conduct such details as he thought fit to confide to them. Their time was amply and sometimes laboriously occupied, and I do not see how that part of the establishment could be improved in either efficiency or economy.

IX. How far have the residents and agents been subjected to the necessary checks?

The residents and political agents are not subjected to any checks beyond the ordinary control exercised by the government over all its subordinate officers, their distance from the seat of government, and the nature of their employment, require that much should be left to their discretion, and an extensive confidence reposed in them, their reports are full and frequent, and minute details are transmitted by them to government, and in many cases to each other, of every thing that is done by them in the various branches of their office. Indeed, neither the scantiness nor infrequency of written reports is to be counted among the defects that may prevail in the administration of our Indian government, if less were written, more would perhaps be read.

X. How far has the existing system of Indian government, or home direction and control, been successful, or calculated to succeed in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude and unity of purpose, in the several gradations of government, direction, control or influence, and (if any) what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the Home, or of the Indian government?

This question embraces so many considerations which lie beyond the ordinary range of Indian topics, and on which it would be presumptuous in me to offer an opinion, that I enter upon it with diffidence. In examining our Indian government, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between what it is and what it professes to be. The machinery by which we have for the last century conducted the government of India from home never was nor ever could be designed for the purpose to which it is now applied. A commercial enterprise has grown by degrees into a large empire; a body of private individuals, originally associated for the management of a trading venture, have been called upon to discharge the office of sovereign, yet this system, incongruous as it is in terms and inadequate as it seems to be to its end, has varied with circumstances as they have arisen, and adapted itself to the sphere in which it has been called upon to act. The establishment of the Board of Control has operated both as a check, and, where it was wanted, as a support to the Directors; at the same time that it has given the ministers of the Crown that share which they ought to have in the superintendence of the Indian government. A seat in the East India direction is eagerly sought after, on account of the power and patronage which it confers; and the Court has, for many years past, been composed of precisely that description of persons of whom it is most desirable that such a body should be composed—of some among the most eminent merchants of England, and some of the most distinguished officers of the civil and military branches of the government abroad. I doubt whether it would be possible to substitute, in the room of the Court of Directors, any single man, or any body of men, by whom the details of the government would be directed with greater diligence and integrity, or with a more honest solicitude for the welfare of the people of India; and the advantages of large and enlightened views in framing measures, and of promptitude and vigour in executing them, are secured by the concentration of all the higher powers of government in a single individual,

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individual, chosen, in effect by the minister of the Crown, from that class in which, from education and habits, the best qualities of a statesman are likely to be found

The principal defects in the Court of Directors are, perhaps, the want of an effective responsibility, which is inherent in the constitution of all large bodies, and the unsteadiness and change of purpose arising from the frequent change of chairman. The answer to the orders sent out by one chairman has hardly been received when he has been replaced by another, entertaining probably different opinions, and endeavouring to reverse, instead of prosecuting the measures of his predecessor. It would perhaps be better if the Directors were fewer in number, and if the chairman were to remain longer in office

It has been suggested that the members of the Court should be distributed into the different committees, not, as at present, by seniority alone, but according to their respective qualifications. But how is the process of distribution to be conducted? Who is to make it, and even if it were competently made, with what temper would it be received by those who were the objects of it? How would a new Director be reconciled to the sentence which excluded him from the exercise of real power, and condemned him to the drudgery of warehousing and shipping? The dissatisfaction that would be excited in those who were degraded to the lower stations, and the jealousy that would pervade the whole body, would more than counterbalance any benefit that could arise from even the most judicious and successful exercise of the principle of distribution. As it is, every individual Director passes in rotation through the whole range of committees from the lowest to the highest, he acquires by experience a knowledge of the details of each successive department, his opinion and vote are received in the consideration of every measure that is brought for final decision before the Court at large, and he is at what part of the scale he may, he knows that he is there by right, and that he neither does any prejudice to the claims of others, nor suffers any in his own

The patronage of India was placed in the hands of the Directors, to prevent its giving an undue influence to the Crown, and it is the more important to inquire how it has been administered, because the local governments can take their civil and military agents only out of the writers and cadets appointed from England. The appointments are made by the Directors individually, with no other restriction on their choice than that of age, they must not be less than 15, nor more than 22, and one of the best securities that the choice will fall on proper persons is, that it is an object with proper persons to be chosen. No appointments are more eagerly sought after than those to India. There is hardly a respectable family in England that has not a relation employed there, and no class in the kingdom receives a better moral and intellectual education than that from which the writers and cadets are drawn. Among so large a number there is no doubt a fair average of talent, and any difference that may appear in after life between English and Indian functionaries, arises not from any original superiority in the former, or any imperfection in the method of selecting the latter, but from the difference of circumstances in which they have respectively been placed. In England the man of business lives in the world, in personal intercourse and collision with other men, in India the greater part of his life is passed at a retired station, his business is mostly done in writing, and his education may be said to be begun and finished at the desk. If it is admitted that the public servants in India perform all the duties that belong to them ably and efficiently, it can be no just ground of objection that they do not possess qualifications which they have had no means of acquiring, and which they never can be called upon to exercise

But although it is not pretended that the appointments to India are ill made, as it is, it is said that they might be better made. It has therefore been proposed that they should be declared objects of competition, and that candidates for them should be tried by the test of examination. If any new test be necessary, an examination may be the only one that can be had; but after all, is it adequate to its purpose? In how many instances does a confident temper give the advantage in an examination, over superior knowledge, and what changes take place in the relation of practical ability after the age at which appointments are made to India. When men's talents have expanded and they have been tried in the business of life, how different an order do they take among themselves from that in which they stood at leaving school. The examination of the boy is a very inadequate test of the proficiency of the man

If there be any feature of the present system of education for India that is objectionable, it is the Colleges at Haileybury and at Calcutta. The professors and those by whom they are nominated are the only persons that derive any real benefit from them. The College at Haileybury, as it is called, is in fact, neither a college nor a school; it has not the discipline of either, and partakes of the disadvantages of both. The mischiefs of the College at Calcutta is, that it collects together a large number of young men at a very critical age, and under circumstances of great temptation, and thus encourages those habits of early extravagance and debt which constitute the besetting evil of India. It is a mistake to suppose that young men are better fitted for India by a peculiar education. The best education they can have is the same that would fit them for the liberal professions at home. Let them go first to a public school, and afterwards to the University. Then not going out so young as they now do, would, in all respects be an advantage; they would fare better if they were not to go till after 20, their constitution would be more likely to stand the climate, and they would acquire by that time a greater steadiness of character to resist temptation. Give them as much classical and general knowledge as you can, and leave Oriental literature alone. If the question were put in India, many more would be found to lament the want of Greek and Latin, than that of Persian and Hindostanee. Each country will best teach that which is proper to itself. Let the candidate for Indian employment be taught in England what an

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English gentleman is expected to know, and he will learn in India all that the business of India requires.

But if the Home government is found to answer a purpose to which in its construction it seems inadequate, the government abroad, on the contrary, does less in practice than it promises in principle, and disappoints the expectations which in appearance it is calculated to excite. It is a system too essentially English, it has little or nothing Indian in it, and does not accord either with the original institutions of the country, or with the habits and opinions of its inhabitants. Those by whom the scheme of our Indian government was framed, seem to have thought that what suited us in England would therefore suit the people of India. They overlooked the wide difference in the condition of the two countries, and forgot that an elaborate system, which might be admirably calculated for the artificial state which we had reached through a long course of progressive improvement, was wholly unsuited to the homely manner which had prevailed for ages, without any change, in India. The original institutions of every country, in whatever light they may be regarded by foreigners, have in them almost always something that peculiarly adapts them to the wants and circumstances of the people to whom they belong. Whether it be that the people are fitted to the institutions, or the institutions to the people, they have existed in India from time immemorial together, and an accordance has grown up between them which cannot be violated without injury. The people of India have no confidence in our system, they abhor its cumbrous forms, its endless delays, its grievous expenses. Cheap and summary justice is what they were accustomed to, and what they want, but what from us they have never had. We have endeavoured to remove what we thought evils in the native system, but in many instances those evils were rather apparent than real, and the same may be said of many of the advantages which we intended to substitute for them. With all our power to protect our subjects from external violence, with all our honest desire to secure them in their rights, and all our costly establishments to administer justice to them, still our Government has no sympathy with their opinions, nor any hold upon their attachment. The subjects of other states who possess none of these advantages, and seem to have no security for either person or property but what they owe to their superiors, would still look upon a transfer to our rule as the greatest calamity that could befall them. Bishop Heber relates a striking anecdote on this subject, where a Lucknow horseman having complained loudly of the wickedness of his own government, and being asked whether he desired to be transferred to that of the English, exclaimed with great fervency, "Miseable as we are, of all miseries keep us from that!" It is vain to talk of the opinions which the natives of India ought to entertain of our system, this is the opinion which, in point of fact, they do entertain of it. They are of a vindictive and litigious character, and there is no purpose, I fear, to which our tribunals are more frequently applied, or to which unfortunately they are more easily applicable, than that of enabling a rich man to destroy a poor one by protracted litigation. Our system had approached nearest to what it ought to be under the government of Mr Hastings. It had before been improving, it has since declined. The fault of this has been neither in the design nor in the administration. It was framed by very upright and very able men, actuated by the most earnest desire to promote the happiness of our Indian subjects; and it has been administered by a body exemplary in the discharge of their public duties. But the authors of the system, eminent as their other qualifications may have been, were deficient in local experience, and the utmost degree of zeal and ability in those by whom it is administered is insufficient to overcome its inherent unsuitness for its end, and to wrest a whole people from the immemorial usages of their country.

But no consequence perhaps of the introduction of our system has been more prejudicial than the utter extinction it has occasioned of the upper class of society among the natives. Not a single individual can now be found among them answering to our description of a gentleman. Every avenue to creditable employment is closed against them, and whether in civil or military service, they are equally excluded from distinction. No native of India can attain to a civil office of sufficient rank to admit of his sitting down without permission in the presence of the youngest writer that has arrived from England, and in the army he must enlist as a private soldier, and can never rise to a rank that will place him above being commanded by an English sergeant. The distance between us and our Indian subjects has been said to be "immeasurable." Why has that distance always been so great? Why are we still so ignorant of their real views and opinions? Why have we acquired so little of the very information which it most imports us to possess? Not for want of a knowledge of their language, not for want of diligence or curiosity, but partly from the reserve of our national character, and still more from the prevalence of a system which precludes the possibility of confidential intercourse, and rigidly severs those whom it ought to be its object to draw together. We hold no other relation with them than that of master and servant. Other European people have kept themselves much less apart from the natives of India; the French, in particular, live on more friendly terms and treat them with more familiarity than we do; they are consequently more popular, and wherever they have been known are still considered with more kindness than the English. The common people at Hyderabad think that they do honour to an European by addressing him as "Monsieur Bussy," though it is upwards of 70 years since M. Bussy left the place; and the tomb of M. Raymond is still illuminated by a contribution from the corps which he commanded, though it is between 30 and 40 years since any Frenchman was attached to it.

It may now be difficult for us to retrace our steps, but I am satisfied that it will be wise in us to do so. We should simplify our system, and make it cheaper, more expeditious, and more summary. As we cannot make the people conform to our institutions, we should make

make our institutions conform to the people. We can accustom ourselves to the Indian laws and customs more easily than we can reconcile the Indian people to those of England. Laws are meant for the people they are to govern, not for those by whom they are to be administered. We should take care not to admit, under the plausible semblance of improvement, changes that might by degrees unpair the efficacy of a system that it ought to be our object to maintain. It is from the very desire to improve, that most of our errors have arisen. Above all, we ought to find respectable employment for the natives, to acquire some hold upon their interests if we have none upon their affections. Native agents would be infinitely cheaper than European, and there is hardly a branch of the government in which they might not be extensively employed with advantage to us as well as to themselves. In the collection of the revenue, if their own method be adopted, as it ought to be, they must be more at home than we are, the details of commerce they understand, and conduct quite as well as ourselves, as diplomatists they are eminently skilful, and in the administration of justice, their superior knowledge of the language and manners of one another gives them a decided advantage over us. We often complain of the difficulty of eliciting the truth from the testimony of native witnesses, the reason is, not that the natives will not tell the truth, but that they tell it in their own way, in a conventional manner, which they themselves understand, and we do not. We certainly should not find among the natives now the same integrity that we consider essential among ourselves, but if bad example and bad habits have degraded, good example and good habits, might, by degrees, restore them, at all events we should hold out some inducement to them to behave well, and if we desire them to become deserving of confidence, should show that we are willing to place confidence in them. Our native army is the most important branch of our government, it is at once that to which we must look for the support of our power, and from which I fear we have most to apprehend the subversion of it. Yet even there I cannot but think that we might employ the natives in higher ranks and with more authority than we now do. Indeed, if we raise them in some branches of the service, we must raise them in others also. We should endeavour to give them, if possible, an interest in the maintenance of our whole system, and although there will be greater risk in confiding military than civil authority, a time must come when it will be a question, not whether it will be safe to trust, but whether it will be possible to exclude them.

But if our institutions are simplified, and especially if the natives are more extensively employed in the administration of them, might not our own officers be reduced in number? Might not the judicial and revenue branches of the service be consolidated? Might not even the civil and military be combined? Why should not all the young men who are sent to India be appointed originally to the army, and employed afterwards, according to their capacity and acquirements, in civil as well as military duties? This would be an adoption of the usage of India, and, in a certain degree, a return to our own early practice. Under the native governments, all ranks, titles and distinctions are military in their origin, all estates are held by military tenure, and all authority is exercised according to military forms. In Europe, if every soldier is a gentleman, in India every gentleman is a soldier. Our own army in India has at all times been remarkable for the number of able men it has produced, and some of our most gifted revenue and political officers have been bred in the military profession. There would be ample time for the young officers to learn and discharge all their duties, and I am satisfied that a much smaller number than that now employed, would be equal to the performance of all that really requires to be done. The amount of business generally keeps pace with the number of hands there are to do it. Few as they may be, nothing that is essential will be neglected, and where they are many, they make work as fast as they despatch it. All the forms of business in India would be improved by being shortened.

The diminution of numbers would occasion a diminution of expense to the government, at the same time that it would admit of an increase of salary to their officers. Whatever portion of their revenue they can afford to allot to the executive branch of the service had better be divided into a few liberal, than into many small salaries. Officers employed, as those in India are, or ought to be, deserve to be liberally paid. This principle was long acted upon with incontestable advantage, and no good has been done by the recent departure from it.

It has been the fashion to call our government in India a government of opinion. This is one of those plausible phrases which impose upon us by pretending to solve in terms questions of which they do not touch the substance. Our government in India is no more a government of opinion than any other government where the many are necessarily controlled by the few. The natives are not held in subjection by any opinion that we are wiser or better than they are, or that we govern them better than they would be governed by one of their own colour and religion. Our strength consists, not in any mysterious or unseen power, but in an organized government and a well appointed army. Our Indian subjects see, and, as often as the occasion has arisen, they have felt, that we have the substantial power to constrain them. Few as we are, they know that we should prove too many for them if they rebelled, and in that opinion, and in no other, consists the tenure by which we hold the government.

Even with the alterations which I have suggested in the executive branch of our government in India, I shall perhaps be thought to have taken a very narrow view of this subject. But before we inquire what change it may be best to make in the structure of the government, we must satisfy ourselves whether any such change is necessary. I cannot help thinking, that all projects founded on the substitution of a new, rather than the

**VI.  
POLITICAL  
OR  
FOREIGN.**

Appendix, No. 18.

Remarks of  
H. Russell, Esq.

174 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE [VI. Political.

amendment of the old system, will prove visionary. There are no defects in the present government of so glaring a character as to require that it should be utterly extinguished; none that a prudent and careful process might not remove; and surely the abolition of a government that is not bad would not be warranted by the mere possibility that the one to be substituted for it might prove better. We see all the defects of a system that is in action, and only the virtues of those that are projected. Our business is to give India the best practicable government we can find, not the best possible one we can conceive: we have no right to indulge our fondness for speculation at her expense, and to make her a subject for our experiments. Hitherto our measures have been too much in advance of the condition of the people, and have been calculated for a state of circumstances, which they may reach at some future time, but which they are as yet far from having attained. In whatever alterations we project, we had better look back rather than forward. We cannot hope to do more for the prosperity and happiness of the country than has been already accomplished by those who have gone before us. Neither we nor our subjects should have any reason to complain, if we could govern India as well as it was governed in the time of Akber

(signed) H Russell.

Appendix, No. 19.

Appendix, No. 19

Letter from  
Capt. J. G. Duff  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

LETTER from Captain J. G. Duff to T. Hyde Villiers, Esq.

I ACQUISITIONS from 1813 to 1823.

I HAVE had access to no official correspondence relative to this question since 1823. The acquisitions of most importance since 1813 are the cessions of 1817 by the Peshwa, in Ouzerat, the Northern Concan and the Carnatic, the conquests of 1818 from Hinkar and the Rajah of Nagpoor, but principally that of the whole of the Peshwa's dominions, with the exception of the territory reserved for the Rajah of Sattarah.

Very material changes in our political relations have also been effected in the period under review, extending to a complete revision of our treaties with the Rajpoot, as well as the Mahratta states, besides the settlement with the Nabob of Bhopaul, with Uncei Khan, and the treaty with Nepal, consequent upon the Cooorkha war.

II Political relations.

The alliances formerly subsisting with the Nizam, the Guikwar and the King of Oude, continue in force. Some alterations have of course been requisite in all of them, owing to some share of the recent acquisitions from the Peshwa and Napautes, of which they received portions; but the treaty with the Guikwar underwent considerable revision in order to consolidate our respective territories, and to obtain from him a more adequate proportion of the military charges of the province.

Sonda's territory and resources remain nearly the same as left by the treaties of 1803 and 1807, but, by our reserving the power of collecting his acknowledged tribute from the Rajpoot states, and completely insulating his army by our military positions, his power to injure the British Government is greatly diminished. All the other native princes, from Cape Comorin to the Sutlege, and from Kutch-Booj to Calcutta, hold their territory in subordinate co-operation to British power, our Government taking upon itself the external protection of their territories, and they becoming bound to assist us with all their disposable troops, if required. I do not now recollect the provisions of all the treaties, but I think in most of those concluded by the Marquis of Hastings there is no particular stipulation as to the numerical strength of the military force to be so granted, we are left in that respect to act as we may deem expedient.

Q. III.

IV Duties of Residents and Political Agents

The nature of the duties belonging to political residents and agents, when not charged with any extraordinary powers, either of directing military measures, or of guiding internal administration, is simply that of envoys plenipotentiary, to follow whatever instructions may be sent by the authority which they represent, to guard against any infringement of treaties, to extend all proper protection to subjects of their own government, to report all events of importance, and from time to time, the general state of the country whose their mission may be, and, in short, every object of their instructions, whether as to men or things.

I believe it will be found, invariably, that if the agents have not exceeded their instructions, the effects of their presence, since our political power attained its present elevation, have been beneficial to the interests of the princes exactly in proportion as they have been induced or constrained to follow the recommendations of the British Government.

Effects of their  
presence.

V. Financial effects. Political consequences.

I have no very correct means of replying to this question for the reasons already stated.

The

The finances, after paying the many claims devolving upon us after the conquest, were not, in the first instance, greatly augmented, but much was immediately gained by strengthening and securing the rest of our empire. The income, however, during the few years that I afterwards remained in the country, increased progressively, and if seasons had continued favourable, there was every apparent hope that this prosperity would continue both by increase and saving, the one resulting from extended cultivation and improved management, and the other from a reduction of expenses and the lapse of lives of pensioners.

I think the revenues of the Peishwa's territory acquired in 1817-18, including the cessions by the treaty of Poonah, and deducting the sovereignty assigned to the Rajah of Sattarah, scarcely amounted to a crore of rupees. The increased charges of the civil administration of Bombay became of course considerable, but in consequence of the augmentation which took place by the revision of arrangements with the Guikwar, there was very little increase to the regular army, and two-thirds of the irregular horse were gradually discharged; some of them also were transferred to the service of the Rajah of Sattarah.

In the Peishwa's territories, in the Deccan, the risk of internal disturbance became considerable. A vast body of unemployed soldiery were thrown upon the country, not only of those who had composed the Peishwa's army, both Mahantas and foreigners, but those of the disbanded armies of Holkar, Scindia, and the Rajah of Bear, many of whom being natives of the Deccan, returned home when the superfluous troops of those princes were disbanded. Although much was done to render the conquest as palatable as possible to our new subjects, it was not to be expected that those who had lost their livelihood or their possessions could become favourable to our government. On the contrary, we knew that many were ready to join, not merely in any feasible attempt to overturn our power, but in any scheme which promised present plunder and anarchy. Vigilance quashed the very few attempts it did not prevent, and every month passed added to their habits of peace and our chances of security. The Peishwa had been the secret instigator or abettor of every plot formed against our power in India for a series of years, and the mere deposit of that infatuated being was in itself a measure which contributed in an essential degree to remove the dread of external hostility.

#### VI Subsidiary Alliances

The system of subsidiary alliances, as planned by the genius of the Marquis Wellesley, was formed on a clear view of what our situation rendered expedient. His removal from India left his great design unfinished. The expansive arch, with its base resting on Calcutta and Bombay, which he had so nearly completed, was left without driving the key-stone. But the wavering policy which dictated the measures of the succeeding administration in India, and of which so many dreadful scenes of human misery were the consequence, is not more chargeable to the Court of Directors than to the British Cabinet of that period, a policy, the secret springs of which may be traced to the very virtues of our constitution, which have a tendency, under every popular government, to embarrass distant or prolonged political enterprises, and to cramp a nation's energies in foreign war.

The necessity for completing the Marquis Wellesley's plan, which was clearly foretold and recorded by Lord Lake in 1801, soon became apparent, but it was not until 12 years afterwards that the determination of our government to suppress the power of the Pindarees led to proofs of the political confederacy which was in a manner forced to declare itself before the parties were fully prepared, or rather before the East India Company was sufficiently exhausted for their purpose. More complete evidence of what the Marquis Wellesley proposed could not have been adduced than the events which led to the war of 1817 and the deposit of the Peishwa.

#### VII Distribution of the Army

On the side of India with which I am acquainted, I should say that the strength and distribution of the army had been well regulated, and with attention to our political position internally and externally. As far as regards internal tranquillity, there is, in that respect, a political advantage in the very defect that arises from the dispersed state of our military body in numerous garrisons and stations. With one very great disadvantage in a military point of view, that of allowing few opportunities of having the troops exercised together in large bodies, and in so far less efficient for the purpose of exterior defence, it affords considerable advantages, particularly in such countries as the Deccan and Kattywar, where small parties of plunderers would have greater facilities of manning if the troops were collected. Their neighbourhood gives confidence to the peaceful, and overawes those who are otherwise disposed. Their own supplies are more easily and cheaply obtained than if they were in masses. They circulate some money in the different districts, and of course facilitate operations in the civil department by the countenance which a military body in India as yet affords.

#### VIII Residencies.

Within my limited knowledge, the establishments of the residencies and agencies are regulated with economy, and on a footing of respectability which should render them perfectly efficient.



IX. Checks upon the Diplomatic Department

Appendix, No. 19.

Letter from  
Capt. J. G. Duff  
to  
T. H. Villiers, Esq.

I am not aware of any particular checks in the diplomatic department, excepting the prohibition as to presents; nor do I very well see how they could be imposed, as it is impossible to foresee the circumstances against which we have to guard. A dishonest envoy is the worst of traitors, as a foolish one is a calamity and a reproach. If he be so weak or so unprincipled as to fall into the power of a native court, either by flattery or corruption, he might sometimes do much mischief by misrepresentation, or by supineness. However, I do believe, the servants of the East India Company are fully as pure, public-spirited and honourable a body as exist, and although there are delinquents or doubtful persons every where, individual character is so well known, from youth to manhood, that the ruling authorities ought, in general, to be able to prevent an improper person from being placed in such a situation. In short, the best check is to be found in the agent's character, and in the words of Henri Quatre, "*Mitte sapientem et nihil dicas*"

X. India Company, constitution of

Character of the  
Directors.

The growth and present constitution of the East India Company from the most extraordinary history of polity in the universe A vast dominion thriving, or at all events expanding, under a system of apparent meagreness

The characteristic feature in the conduct of the Directors, and the quality, which has perhaps been of more importance to their stability than rare talent, is their prudence Their general letters, and their political correspondence with India, of which I have read the greater part since the earliest period, are, on the whole, a wonderful record of caution and discernment, and, with few exceptions, I am bound to add of justice and honour.

The exercise of sovereignty, and the interests of their trade, occasionally present the strangest anomalies. At one time we see them generous and enterprising as the English, at another wary and selfish as their rivals the Dutch Parental as a government, grasping as merchants; covetous of gain, yet scrupulously dispensing justice, even when involving their own loss.

The question.

If the nation persevere in demanding the sacrifice of all exclusive privilege, the difficulty probably will be, in what manner to afford such equitable compensation as may not occasion a stop or derangement in the machine of government As far as regards this view of the subject, if there be a deficiency, whether the charter be renewed or not, whether the government be King's or Company's, the nation must grant some equivalent in lieu of what the one yields and the other obtains Engrafting more of the Indian debt on that of England, although not so unreasonable as many people suppose, will not be permitted. An enhanced tax on British imports into India, or such encouragement to the admission of produce as must improve the resources of that territory, are ideas deeply at issue with angry interests. But let the legislative assembly of our country recollect, that these considerations are the mere balancing of our own selfish interests. Their motives for ameliorating the minds and condition of the natives of India, must spring from a higher source; and regardless of the grovelling question of who wins and who loses, let them look to that one grand and worthy object, the improvement and happiness of a hundred millions of human beings, whom Providence has committed to the charge of Great Britain, and, be it remembered, to her responsibility.

Direction and control at home,

I believe the present system of direction and control to be as good as any that could be devised for India. There may be anomalies and difficulties in managing the details of business, where the opposing authorities take different views, and if one had practical experience of those difficulties, remedies might, in the multitude even of humble counsel, be suggested. But they are wisely kept private, if such there be; and judging simply from the effects on every branch of the service, a more explicit definition of the powers of the authorities at home, or a stricter control over the actions of the Governor-General abroad, might not be attended with the same practical benefits to the British nation.

and abroad.

The Parliamentary enactment, which put an end to the divided nature of authority in India, and vested a controlling power in the Governor-General in Council over the other presidencies, was attended, we know, with consequences in the highest degree salutary, although the first exercise of that power was one of the few arbitrary proceedings justly chargeable to Warren Hastings, whilst his subsequent endeavour to make amends was a noble instance of his candour and magnanimity.

Appendix, No. 20.

Appendix, No. 20

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to the Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

LETTER from B. S. Jones, Esq. to the Right honourable Charles Grant, Chairman of the Select Committee on East India Affairs.

Sir,

IN consequence of the permission which I received from you as President of the India Board, I have the honour to transmit to you the under-mentioned papers, in the hope that they may be of some use to the East India Committee in the prosecution of that branch of their

their inquiry which relates to the political administration of the Company's affairs I am quite aware that for the accuracy, both of the statements and of the observations contained in these papers, the responsibility rests solely with me

1. A Summary Statement, explanatory of the Progress of the Territorial Dominion and Political Connexions of the British Government in India, from the year 1765 to the present time.
2. A Statement, showing the Nature of the Relations at present subsisting with the several States and Chiefs of India.
3. A Review of the System of Subsidiary Alliance, with reference to its subserviency to British Interests, and to its operation on the Character and Condition of the Native States in which it has been established.

I have the honour, &c.  
(signed) B. S. Jones.

India Board, 1 August 1832.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

1. A Summary STATEMENT, explanatory of the Progress of the Territorial Dominion and Political Connexions of the British Government in India, from the year 1765 to the present time.\*

Previously to the acquisition of the Dewanny, the East India Company possessed in Bengal, Factories at Calcutta, Cosimbazar and Dacca, and a district in the vicinity of Calcutta denominated the 24 Pergunnahs, which had been ceded by the Nabob of Bengal (Mr. Jaffer) in the year 1759. On the Eastern coast of the peninsula they possessed Maras, Fort St. David, some settlements in the Northern Circars, and a district denominated the Seven Magans situated near to Madras, which district had been ceded to them in 1763 by Mahomed Ali, then Nabob of the Carnatic, and on the Western coast of India their possessions consisted of the fort and island of Bombay and the town and castle of Surat.

On the 12th August 1765, the Mogul Shah Allum, granted to the East India Company the Dewanny, or collection of the revenue of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. He also granted, "by way of inam or fee gift, without the least participation of any person whatever in the same," the Northern Circars, to which latter grant the Nizam or Subahdar of the Deccan acceded on the 12th November of the following year. One of these districts called the Guntour Circar, was, at the date of the grant, held as a jaghire for life by Bazault Jung, the Nizam's brother, by an agreement with whom, dated 27th April 1779, the government of Fort St. George rented that Circar, and it did not come into their actual possession until after the death of Bazault Jung, which took place in September 1788. For the whole of the Northern Circars the Company paid to the Nizam an annual peshch or tribute of seven lacs of rupees, which was redeemed in the year 1823 by the payment of the sum of rupees 1,16,66,666 for the purpose of enabling the Nizam to liquidate his debts.

In virtue of that payment the Circars are now held in full sovereignty by the British Government.

The acquisitions above enumerated laid the foundations of the political power of Great Britain in India. They were the result of contests with the native princes, in some of which the French took an active part.

In the year 1775, Asoph-ud-Dowlah, the Vizier of Oude, ceded the province of Benares to the East India Company, by whose aid in the preceding year he had been enabled to reduce to subjection the tributary chief of the Rohillas, a warlike and turbulent tribe. It is to be noted, that the policy of this proceeding was questioned at home.

A war broke out between the Marhattas and the Company in the year 1775, and in the year 1780 Hyder Ali, the ruler of Mysore, commenced hostilities, which, after his death, were prosecuted by his son and successor Tippoo Sultan. Peace was concluded with the Marhattas in 1782, and with Tippoo Sultan in 1784. By the treaty of Salbey, which is dated 17th May 1782, the Marhattas ceded to the Company the island of Salsette, in the vicinity of Bombay, an acquisition of considerable value.

In the year 1789 the peace of India was again disturbed by an act of aggression committed by Tippoo Sultan on the Rajah of Travancore, an ally of the British Government. In the war which ensued, both the Nizam and the Peshwa took part against the Sultan, who, on the 18th March 1792, was compelled, when the combined forces had advanced to Seringapatam, to subscribe a treaty by which he gave up the half of his dominions. The territory thus wrested from Tippoo was divided by Lord Cornwallis, in equal portions, between the Company, the Nizam and the Peshwa.

In the interval between the peace of Seringapatam and the Mysore war of 1799, a dispute arose between the Marhattas and the Nizam in which the Governor-General, Sir John Shore, actuated by a strict regard to the pacific principles which had been constantly enjoined from home, refused to interfere.

The power of the Nizam was materially reduced by the cessions and pecuniary sacrifices which were exacted from him by his successful opponents, and he would probably have fallen entirely under their dominant influence, but for the untimely death of the young Peshwa

Madarow

\* This paper was prepared for the purpose of affording a general view of the course of events to those who had not previously paid much attention to Indian affairs.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

Madarow on the 27th October 1795. This event occasioned serious divisions amongst the Mahratte chiefs. Nana Furnavese, the principal minister at Poonah, with a view to strengthen his party, endeavoured to gain the support of the Nizam's government, and resigned on the part of the Poonah state the territorial cessions which had been wrested from his Highness.

During Sir John Shore's administration the British troops, under Sir Robert Abercromby, were employed to put down a formidable rebellion of the Rohillas, a tribe subject to the supremacy of the Vizier of Oude. They were with some difficulty reduced to subjection in the year 1794.

The approach of a hostile army under Zemaun Shah, the King of the Afghans, and the utter inefficiency of the Vizier's troops, rendered it necessary to adopt precautions for the security of the Oude frontier. Among other measures, Sir John Shore, in the beginning of the year 1797 prevailed upon the Vizier Asoph-ud-Dowlah, to agree to an increase of the subsidiary force by the addition of a regiment of European and one of native cavalry.

In the month of September 1797, Asoph-ud-Dowlah died, and his reputed son, Vizier Ali, was permitted to ascend the vacant musnud; but on discovering the spuriousness of Vizier Ali's birth, Sir John Shore deposed him, and conferred the government upon Suadut Ali, the brother of the late Vizier. By a treaty with him, dated February 21, 1798, the subsidiary force was further increased, and Suadut Ali ceded to the British Government the strong fortress of Allahabad, situated at the confluence of the rivers Jumna and Ganges.

In addition to the foregoing transactions, it may be proper to mention, that the Dutch settlements on the continent of India and on the island of Ceylon were during the time that Sir John Shore was at the head of affairs in India, taken possession of by expeditions fitted out from Madras by Lord Hobart, the governor of that Presidency. On the return of Sir John Shore to England he was created an Irish peer, with the title of Baron Teignmouth.

Lord Teignmouth was succeeded in the office of Governor-General by the Earl of Mornington, now Marquis Wellesley.

Tippoo Sultan, although greatly reduced by the result of his last contest, had never ceased to cherish the design of renewing hostilities at the first favourable opportunity, and when Lord Wellesley reached India, 26th April 1798, Tippoo was preparing for war.

Whatever were the advantages of the neutral system which had been observed by the late Governor-General, they were obtained by the loss of a considerable portion of the influence which the British Government had formerly enjoyed at the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, at both of which a strong French party existed. Indeed, the most efficient portion of the Nizam's army was officered and commanded by Frenchmen.

It was a primary object of Lord Wellesley to recover the ground which had thus been lost. By an admirable stroke of policy his Lordship prevailed upon the Nizam to disband the French corps and to substitute for them a British subsidiary force. The negotiations at Poonah, for the revival of the triple alliance of 1790, failed of success, and Lord Wellesley was forced to proceed in his operations against Tippoo Sultan without any satisfactory settlement with either the Peishwa or Scindia, who were strongly suspected to be much more inclined to take part with than against the enemy.

Tippoo Sultan had, in the early part of the year 1798, deputed ambassadors to the government of Mauritius, for the purpose of forming an alliance with the French Government, and of obtaining military assistance. In the proclamation published at Mauritius, it was distinctly stated, that Tippoo only waited for the succour of France to declare war against the English, and that it was his ardent desire to expel them from India. The invasion of Egypt by the French, if it had not been originally planned with a view to the assistance of Tippoo, might, it was evident, be converted to that purpose, and Lord Wellesley was therefore determined to frustrate such a design by the immediate adoption of the most vigorous measures. His Lordship, however, tried the effect of negotiation, and it was not until the month of February 1799 that he was compelled to abandon all hopes of averting war. The armies of Bombay and of Madras, the latter of which had been joined by the Nizam's contingent, entered the territories of Mysore, and advanced to Seringapatam, which, on the 4th of May, was taken by assault. Tippoo Sultan fell; and the dominion of the house of Hyder passed away.

After bestowing a portion of the late Sultan's territories upon a youth descended from the former Rajahs of Mysore, Lord Wellesley divided the remainder between the Company and the Nizam.

The conquest of Mysore required, in Lord Wellesley's opinion, a revision of our political relations with the principal powers of the Deccan. The restless character of the Mahratte nation, the advantages presented by the local position of some of the states of India to the future intrigues of the French, and the actual establishment of many French officers in the service of Scindia, concurred in his Lordship's opinion, to render it a measure of indispensable precaution either to acquire an ascendancy in the councils of the Mahratte chieftains, or to unite ourselves in a defensive alliance with the powers which formed a barrier between our territories and those of the Mahratte. Actuated by these motives, Lord Wellesley concluded a new treaty with the Nizam, dated the 12th October 1800, in terms which not only provided for a considerable augmentation of the subsidiary force, but substituted territorial cessions in place of the pecuniary subsidy payable under the treaty of 1798. By this last arrangement we obtained complete possession of the districts which had been

allotted

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

allotted to the Nizam as his share of the countries obtained from Tippoo Sultan in the wars of 1792 and 1799; and the Nizam became entitled to the full protection of the Company against any power that should attack him. His highness on his part bound himself to submit to our arbitration all disputes with other states.

Previously to noticing the transactions which ensued with the Mahrattas, it is proper to advert to the affairs of Oude and of the Carnatic.

The north-western frontier of India had for three or four successive years been menaced with invasion by Zemaun Shah, the King of the Affghans, whose avowed object it was to restore the power of the Mogul. The apprehensions excited in the mind of the Vizier by this threat, obliged the British Government to maintain a considerable force in the Upper Provinces. So inefficient and licentious were the Vizier's troops, that he feared to entrust his own person to their protection, and requested that a British detachment should be retained at Lucknow. The whole system of his administration was indeed so extremely defective as to require immediate reform. Lord Wellesley felt the necessity of strengthening the frontier of Oude, which was exposed to danger not only from an irruption of the Affghans, but more especially from the vicinity of corps officered by the French in the service of Scindia. The French commander had the custody of the Mogul's person, the use of whose name might, under some circumstances, have had an unfavourable influence on the fidelity of our Mahomedan subjects. His Lordship, after a long and very difficult negotiation, prevailed upon the Vizier Saadut Ali to subscribe a treaty, dated the 10th November, 1801, in virtue of which he, after the example of the Nizam, ceded a large portion of his territories as an equivalent for pecuniary subsidy, the subsidiary force was considerably increased; and his Excellency bound himself to conform to the advice of the British Government in the administration of his internal affairs.

With a view to withdraw the attention of Zemaun Shah from India, Lord Wellesley deputed Sir John Malcolm to Persia, by whose address, the Persian Monarch was induced to support the pretensions of certain competitors for the throne of Caubul, in consequence of which Zemaun Shah was recalled to the defence of his own dominions. He subsequently lost his throne and his eyes, which were put out by a successful rival. Treaties of alliance and of commerce were concluded in January 1801, by Sir John Malcolm, with the Shah of Persia.

Among the archives of Seringapatam was found a correspondence which had taken place between the Nabob of the Carnatic and Tippoo Sultan, of a nature decidedly hostile to our interests. On making this discovery, Lord Wellesley judged it necessary to deprive the Nabob of all political power, and accordingly an arrangement was concluded on the 31st July 1801, in virtue of which the civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred to the Company, the Nabob receiving a certain portion of the revenues for his maintenance in a style suited to his rank and dignity. It is to be observed, that at the date of the discovery the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah was in a bad state of health, and that no decisive steps were taken until after the death of that prince. The arrangement was, in the first instance, proposed to Ali Hussein, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah, but though the negotiation was continued several days, it entirely failed. It was subsequently concluded with Azeem-u-Nowlah, the brother of the late Nabob.

An arrangement of a similar nature, though upon different grounds, had been effected in the year 1799 with the Rajah of Tanjore.

In former wars in India the attention of the British Government was chiefly directed to the Coromandel coast, where by the possession of Pondicherry, the French had the means of introducing large bodies of troops which, as opportunity offered, joined the ranks of hostile native powers. But after the glorious achievements of the British navy had removed all apprehensions of danger by sea, it was only by the advance of an army by land that the security of our power could be affected by an European enemy, and hence it became a point of policy to guard against the intrigues of the French with the native states on our north-western frontier.

The Guicowar, a Mahratta chief, who possessed the province of Guzerat and the Kattywar peninsula, had in the year 1800 manifested a disposition to cultivate the friendship of the British Government. It was not, however, until 1802 that the reigning chief, having been deprived of power by an ambitious relative, solicited our interference. This was accorded, and a subsidiary alliance formed, which led to the acquisition of several districts in that quarter of India.

To return to the Mahrattas. As an inducement to the Peishwa to enter into an intimate alliance with the British Government, Lord Wellesley had offered to him a portion of the Mysore territory, although, as before observed, he had taken no part in the last war. On the Peishwa's rejection of our overtures, this territory was divided between the Nizam and the British Government. The Peishwa's council's had for a long time been swayed by Dowlat Rao Semdia, but in 1802 the ascendancy of that chief at Poonah was supplanted by an enterprising rival, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who, after defeating the combined forces of Scindia and of the Peishwa, advanced upon Poonah. On the approach of Holkar's forces, the Peishwa fled to Bassein, a Mahratta town in the vicinity of Bombay. In this extremity the Peishwa, Beejee Row, was disposed to accept of our aid. By a rapid march the Duke of Wellington, then General Wellesley, reached Poonah just in time to save it from destruction. The Peishwa having been forced by adversity to seek the protection of the British Government, concluded, at Bassein, on the 31st December 1802, a treaty of a nature similar to that which in 1800 had been entered into with the Nizam. By the

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supplementary treaty of 16th December 1803, the Peishwa made over to the British Government his possessions and rights in the rich province of Bundelound.

Having thus formed an intimate connexion with the nominal head of the Mahratta confederacy, the influence of the chiefs who had so lately rendered the Peishwa's authority subservient to their own designs, was materially weakened.

Scindia and the Rajah of Berar were not slow to perceive the effect which our alliance was calculated to produce; but although for a time they pretended to acquiesce in the propriety of the course which the Peishwa had adopted, it soon became apparent, that they were not disposed to relinquish their hold upon him without a struggle.

The armies of Scindia and of the Rajah of Berar (or Nagpore) assumed a station menacing to the Nizam's dominions. The resident at Poonah, Colonel Collins, who had been deputed to the camp of the confederated chiefs, at an interview with Scindia (27th May 1803), communicated to him the treaty of Bassein. After a careful perusal of every article, Scindia and his minister declared that it contained nothing in the slightest degree injurious to his legitimate authority. But though he made this declaration, he would not explain to the resident what were his intentions, and upon being much pressed upon this point, Scindia broke up the conference, saying, "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar you shall be informed whether we will have peace or war." War was, in fact, already decided, and Lord Wellesley was well prepared for that extremity. His Lordship's plan of operations was speedily arranged, and the best instruments selected for carrying it into effect. Having nominated Lord Lake to command the army in Hindostan, and General Wellesley to command the army in the Deccan, Lord Wellesley furnished those officers with instructions admirably adapted to meet every case which was likely to arise. His Lordship at the same time, with a degree of confidence which was most wisely bestowed, invested them with full powers to alter or modify any part of those instructions as circumstances might demand. After a short but arduous contest, the power of the confederates was completely broken, and, as the price of peace, they were constrained to alienate a large portion of their territories. From the Rajah of Berar we acquired, by the treaty of Duggaum, 17th December 1803, the province of Outtack, including the port of Balasore. These cessions served to connect the Bengal provinces with the Northern Circars (subject to Madras), an object which had long been regarded as desirable. The Rajah also ceded the provinces of Sumbulpore and Patna, which were subsequently restored to him. He also ceded some districts on the Nizam's frontier, which were made over to his Highness, although he had but ill performed the duty of an ally.

From Scindia, by the treaty of Surge Aunggaum, 30 Dec. 1803, we acquired a valuable tract of territory in the Doab\*, situated between the rivers Jumna and Ganges, which, added to the districts formerly ceded by the Vizier of Oude, served materially to improve our frontier in that quarter. Scindia also ceded the fort of Broach with its dependent district, and some territory in the Deccan, which was conferred partly upon the Nizam and partly upon the Peishwa.

A very important result of the war with Scindia, was the annihilation of the French interest at his court. His regular battalions were officered partly by Frenchmen and partly by other Europeans, some of them English. These latter were induced to abandon Scindia's service in consequence of a proclamation issued by Lord Wellesley previously to the commencement of hostilities: many other individuals followed their example, and accepted of the liberal provision which was offered to them. The effect of this wise stroke of policy was to weaken the confidence of Scindia, and of other native chiefs, in the fidelity of European adventurers.

Another important event arising out of the war, was the emancipation of the Mogul, Shah Allum, from the power of Scindia, by whom, (or rather by the French commander of his regular infantry,) that unfortunate monarch, had been kept in a painful state of restraint. A handsome provision was made by Lord Wellesley for the support of the representative of the once powerful house of Timur.

By the result of this memorable war the British possessions in Hindostan were extended to Delhi, and their military reputation exalted by many splendid victories, of which it may suffice to specify the battles of Assye and Argaum in the Deccan, and of Deig, Lasswaree, and Delhi in Hindostan.

Among the political arrangements adopted by Lord Wellesley at the period above alluded to, alliances were formed with the Rajpoot chief of Jypore, and with the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurtore.

In the prosecution of his plan of acquiring an ascendancy in the councils of the Mahratta chiefs, Lord Wellesley had prevailed upon Scindia to agree to a treaty of alliance and mutual defence, dated 27 Feb. 1804: but it soon became evident that Scindia had not entered cordially into that alliance.

Jeswant Rao Holkar, although he had promised Scindia and the Rajah of Berar to join the confederacy against the British Government, took no part in the contest; his conduct, in thus keeping aloof, has been attributed to jealousy of Scindia, with whom he had previously quarrelled. But before the treaties of peace were concluded he had advanced towards Hindostan as far as to the frontier of the Rajah of Jypore, who was then under British protection. From this position he deputed agents to Lord Lake, to whom they submitted

\* Doab, like Mesopotamia, signifies a country lying between two rivers.

† A treaty was also concluded with the Vaksels of the Joudpore chief, which, however, he refused to ratify.

mitted several extravagant demands, which were of course rejected; Holkar at the same time wrote a letter to General Wellesley, demanding the cession of several provinces of the Deccan, originally, as he affirmed, the property of the Holkar family. His letter concluded as follows:—"Countries of many hundred miles shall be overrun and plundered, Lord Lake shall not have leisure to breathe for a moment, and calamities will fall on lacs of human beings in continual war, by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea."

This threat was followed by an invasion into the Jyepore territories. The war with Holkar, which commenced in the month of April 1804, lasted till Dec. 1805. His regular infantry and artillery were utterly defeated at the battle of Deeg, and the action at Futtyghur entirely broke the spirit of his cavalry; his fortresses, and the strongholds of his family were also captured. Against these successes are to be placed the disastrous retreat of a corps commanded by Colonel Monson; and the severe losses sustained by Lord Lake, in five successive attempts to capture the fort of the Rajah of Bhimpore, who had broken his treaty with the British Government and espoused the cause of the enemy. Scindia had also manifested a disposition favourable to the enemy. A strong party in Holkar's interest, headed by Serjee Row Ghautka, the father-in-law of Scindia, endeavoured by every means to involve that chief in active hostility with the British Government. The party went so far as to attack the escort and plunder the baggage of Mr Jenkins, the acting resident, who was for some time detained a prisoner in Scindia's camp.

The system of policy pursued by Lord Wellesley was regarded at home with feelings of alarm, as tending to impose upon the British Government the serious and inconvenient obligation of establishing and preserving order among chiefs prone to war and plunder. Lord Cornwallis, then far advanced in years, and in an infirm state of health, was prevailed upon for the second time to undertake the supreme government of India. That venerable nobleman reached India in July 1805, fully fraught with a determination to revert to the neutral and moderate system which distinguished his former administration. His lordship lost no time in instructing Lord Lake to open negotiations with Scindia, and communicated to him his intention to dissolve the alliance with Jyepore, and to confer the conquered territories southward and westward of Delhi upon certain military chieftains on condition of their not claiming our protection. Lord Cornwallis left Fort William to join the army, and had reached Ghazepore near Benares, when his progress was arrested by the hand of death, on the 5th October 1805. In consequence of this event, Sir George Barlow succeeded, in virtue of a provisional appointment, to the office of Governor-general. In conformity to the line of policy which had been determined upon by Lord Cornwallis, Sir George Barlow proceeded to relinquish all connexion with the petty states west of the Jumna, and to conclude peace with Holkar: this was effected by a treaty, dated the 24th December 1805. An arrangement of our differences with Scindia was also effected on the 22d November.

By the treaties above alluded to, the Company voluntarily engaged to refrain from forming political connexions with the Rajpoot Chiefs, and from interfering in any shape with the settlements which Scindia might make with them. At the date of these treaties the alliance with the Rajpoot chief of Jyepore still subsisted, and might have been preserved without any breach of faith to Scindia or Holkar; but, in his anxiety to escape from any probable cause of embarrassment in that quarter, Sir George Barlow took the earliest opportunity to relinquish the connexion with Jyepore, though contrary to the wish of the Rajah.

Lord Cornwallis had intended to modify the treaties which Lord Wellesley had contracted with the Nizam and the Peshwa, with a view to relax the control which had been exercised over their actions; but although Sir G. Barlow was well inclined to adopt all the suggestions of his illustrious predecessor, he was induced, on mature reflection, to preserve those alliances in full force.

The Court of Directors were so well satisfied with the principles and conduct of Sir George Barlow, as to have led them to express a strong wish for his continuance in the high office of Governor-general. The new administration, at the head of which was Lord Grenville, had, however, destined for that office the Earl of Lauderdale. The court having peremptorily refused to appoint his lordship, or to displace Sir George Barlow, the King was advised, for the first time, to exercise the power of removing a Company's servant. A warrant was accordingly issued, under the sign manual, removing Sir George Barlow from the chair of the Supreme Government, and the court were, eventually, prevailed upon to acquiesce in the nomination to that important station of Lord Minto, who then presided at the India Board. Sir George Barlow was appointed to the subordinate government of Fort St. George.

Lord Minto reached India in the month of July 1807. During the short period of time that he was at the head of the Board of Control, his lordship manifested a disposition to contract the sphere of our political relations. He had not, however, long occupied the seat of supreme authority before he found it necessary to interpose the power of his government for the protection of the Rajah of Berar or Nagpore, whose dominions were invaded by Ameer Khan, a Patan chief, at the head of a numerous body of licentious troops. The Rajah was not an ally of the British Government, and therefore had no conventional claim to its protection, but from the lawless and aspiring character of the assailant, who had already acquired a dominant influence in Holkar's councils, Lord Minto felt, that considerations deeply affecting our own interests imperatively called upon us to arrest the further progress of an ambitious leader, who had collected under his standard a large number of military adventurers, by whom he was regarded as the probable successor of the Mogul. Under these

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these circumstances, it would have been highly impolitic to have allowed him to establish his power on the ruins of a state which was comparatively inoffensive. Lord Minto accordingly (in the year 1809) despatched two detachments, the principal of which was entrusted to the command of Major-general Sir Barry Close, and the other to Major-general Martindale, who was instructed to co-operate with the main force. As the British troops advanced Ameer Khan retired, and subsequently proceeded to Hindostan, where for a considerable time he ravaged and plundered the Rajpoot states, which were then beyond the pale of our alliances.

After Ameer Khan had withdrawn from the frontiers of Berar, a negotiation was entered into with the chief of that state for the formation of an arrangement, which would entitle the Rajah to the permanent aid of a body of British troops; but although, whilst under an apprehension of returning danger he listened to the proposal, he cooled as his fears subsided; and it was not until after his death, in the year 1816, that a subsidiary alliance was contracted between the two states.

In the year 1808 (the present Lord Melville being then at the head of the India Board), there being good reason to believe that Buonaparte, in conjunction with the Emperor of Russia, meditated the invasion of India, instructions were issued to the Supreme Government directing them to adopt measures of precaution, with reference to such a contingency. The French had, in fact, sent a splendid embassy to Persia, at which court they for a while supplanted British influence. With a view to recover that influence, Sir Harford Jones was deputed to Tehran from England as His Majesty's envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary. Circumstances arose to favour his efforts, and he succeeded in concluding a treaty of alliance in virtue of which the King of Persia dismissed the French embassy. We engaged on our part to supply the Persian King with arms and ammunition, and to pay to him 120,000 tomanas annually so long as he should continue at war with Russia. Some embarrassment arose during Sir H. Jones's residence at the Persian Court by the mission of Sir John Malcolm as envoy from Lord Minto, who had disapproved of Sir H. Jones's conduct. On a review of these discordant proceedings, His Majesty's Government deputed Sir Gore Ouseley in the character of ambassador to the Court of Persia, by this minister a new treaty was concluded, and the payment to Persia was increased to 200,000 tomanas per annum.

With a view to awaken the apprehensions of the powers situated on the north-western frontier of India to a sense of the danger to which they were exposed from the hostile designs of the French and Russians, Lord Minto despatched envoys to the courts of Lahore, Caubul, and Scind. The mission to Lahore was entrusted to Mr. now Sir Charles Metcalfe; that to Caubul to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone; and that to Scind to Mr. Nathaniel Hankey Smith.

Sir Charles Metcalfe found Runjeet Sing, the chief of *Lahore*, engaged in active operations for extending his authority over the petty Sikh chiefs inhabiting the country situated between the rivers Sutlege and Jumna. Intent upon such a purpose, he was little disposed to entertain propositions having for their object the adoption of arrangements to ward off a remote danger. The supremacy which Scindia once held over the petty states above alluded to, had rightfully devolved upon the British Government after the peace of 1803; this right had not however been exercised; but neither had it been formally relinquished. When, therefore, Runjeet Sing avowed a design to establish his authority in that region, Lord Minto judged it expedient to interdict its execution, if permitted, it would have brought a powerful military chief in close contact with a vulnerable part of our frontier. Runjeet Sing at first showed a disposition to persist, in spite of the warning which he had received; but after a detachment of our troops under Sir David (then Colonel) Ochterlony, had advanced to Lodhiana, on the left bank of the Sutlege, Runjeet Sing listened to terms, and entered into an engagement by which he was permitted to retain his hold upon the chiefs whom he had subjugated previously to the arrival of the British envoy at his camp, on condition however that he should withdraw his troops to his own side of the river. A proclamation was then issued by the British Government, apprising the rest of the Sikh chiefs that they were entitled to its protection, and they have ever since continued to acknowledge its supremacy. Less embarrassment than might have been expected has arisen from the intermixture of our rule in this quarter with that of Runjeet Sing, who from that time forward has maintained an amicable intercourse with the British Government, although on more than one occasion he has been strongly urged to take the part of its enemies.

Mr. Elphinstone was upon the whole favourably received at the Court of *Caubul*. Syef-ool-Moolk, who was then upon the throne, subscribed a treaty, of which the principal article stipulated, that neither the French nor any other foreign Europeans should be permitted to have a footing in his dominions. Syef-ool-Moolk was soon afterwards deprived of power by his brother Shah Mahmood, but the state of *Caubul* has been for many years distracted by civil contests, of which circumstance Runjeet Sing taking advantage, has effected the conquest of *Cashmere*, and established his influence, if not his authority, over some other places formerly dependent on the Afghaan monarchy.

Little impression was made by Mr. Smith's embassy upon the *Scind* government, which was then in the hands of a triumvirate, denominated the *Ameers*; their behaviour to our envoy was the reverse of courteous, but, with some difficulty, they were at length induced to engage that "the government of *Scind* would not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in *Scind*."

About

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to  
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About the same time that the above mentioned transactions took place, a connexion was formed with the government of *Cutch*, a state bordering upon Guzerat. The alliance has subsequently undergone various modifications. The chief advantage of the connexion consists in its subservieney to the main object of excluding any foreign influence from a quarter which would afford facilities for carrying on intrigues with our allies and tributaries.

During the latter years of Lord Minto's administration, the growing power of the predatory forces in Central India and in Hindostan, was the subject of much anxious discussion. Ameer Khan and his Patan troops continued to make heavy exactions on the Rajpoot states, whose countries lay at the mercy of his lawless bands. While in Central India a horde of plunderers, known by the name of Pindarries, made frequent incursions into the territories of our allies between the Patans and the Pindarries there appeared to exist an understanding which tended to give a more important character to both than would otherwise have belonged to them. The attention of the Government at home was repeatedly called to this evil, which, it was predicted, would at no distant period require for its suppression the active exertion of our power. What, added to the difficulty of adopting any other than defensive measures, was the probability that Scindia and Holkar would resent any energetic attempt on our part to exterminate a set of freebooters, whose leaders professed to be the servants of those chiefs. There was reason to believe that, both Scindia and Holkar, although they occasionally suffered from the inroads of the Pindarries, regarded them as available auxiliaries in any future war with the British Government.

As respected the Patans.—Although the Rajpoot chiefs reproached the British Government with its apathy in permitting their countries to be ravaged and plundered, without opposition, yet, disposed as the local government was to abate so great a nuisance, the right of interference in Rajpootana had been barred by the stipulations of Sir George Barlow's treaties with Scindia and Holkar. With one of the Rajpoot states, indeed, namely, that of Jyepore, the supreme government were still at liberty to renew a connexion, because, as before observed, the former alliance had not been dissolved until after the above-mentioned treaties had been finally concluded.

Adverting to this circumstance, and influenced by the representations of the Supreme Government, the authorities at home, in a secret despatch, dated December 1813, authorized the Governor-general to renew the alliance with the Rajah of Jyepore, this despatch, however, did not reach India until after Lord Minto had quitted it.

Some other events and transactions which took place during the course of Lord Minto's administration ought not to be entirely passed over.

In the latter end of the year 1808, Meer Allum, the Nizam's minister died. As this nobleman had always favoured the alliance with the British Government, although strongly opposed by an adverse party, his death was much regretted by Lord Minto. Unwilling to resort to dictation in the appointment of a successor, his Lordship left the Nizam to choose one of the candidates for the office of minister. The Nizam selected Moncer-ool-Moolk, a Mahomedan of rank, whose talents and habits were quite unsuited for that station. The Nizam himself took little concern in public business, and was moreover known to be dissatisfied with his dependent condition. Under these circumstances, it became necessary to devise some arrangement which should prevent the alliance from falling to decay. The expedient resorted to, was, the nomination of Rajah Chundoo Loll to the office of Peshcar, or deputy minister, with an understanding, that Moncer-ool-Moolk should leave the government entirely in his hands. To this individual the resident was authorized to afford his support, and Chundoo Loll appears for many years to have enjoyed the confidence of the resident, who had but little intercourse with either the Nizam or the nominal minister. A reformation was effected in the constitution of the Nizam's regular infantry, to the command of which Europeans, not in the Company's service, were appointed. The reform was subsequently extended to the cavalry.

In order to strengthen the authority of the Peishwa over the Southern Jabeardars, a class of chiefs who held their lands on the tenure of military service, (an obligation which they had very imperfectly fulfilled,) an arrangement was entered into between the Peishwa and those chiefs, which bound them to bring forward, when required, the whole of their contingents, and at all times to keep up a third part of that force.

The Peishwa, also, at the suggestion of the British Government, formed a regular brigade, officered by Europeans, and commanded by the late Major Ford, a Company's officer. Although somewhat out of place, it may be here mentioned, that when the Peishwa broke with us in the year 1817, this corps adhered to our interests.

About the end of the year 1808, the Rajahs of Travancore and Cochin, after having committed acts of violent outrage upon the British residency, and attempted the life of the resident, (General Macaulay,) proceeded to open hostility. They were speedily obliged to submit to terms dictated by the British Government.

In the year 1812, the Pindarries having penetrated the Company's province of Mirzapore, and carried off their plunder through passes in the territories of the Rajah of Rewah, a petty chief whose dominions are situated on the Mirzapore frontier, Lord Minto, with a view to prevent future incursions, prevailed upon the Rajah to place himself under British protection. He undertook to guard those passes, and agreed to allow our troops to occupy such stations as might be necessary for defensive purposes. The first treaty with Rewah (445.—VI.)



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is dated 12 October 1812. Some differences subsequently took place between the Rajah and the British Government, which were finally adjusted by a treaty dated June 2, 1813.

An arrangement of a similar nature was also concluded with the chief of Tehree, which is situated in the neighbourhood of Rewah. The treaty bears date December 23, 1812.

That part of the Malabar coast which lies between the Portuguese settlement of Goa and the British possession of Malwan, belongs to a petty state generally known by the name of Sawuntwarree. To the northward of Malwan is another small state, belonging to the Rajah of Colapore. Both of these states were addicted to piracy, which the Bombay government had for several years endeavoured to check by an annual blockade of the ports, which however failed in its object. The evil having at length become serious, Lord Minto judged it necessary to adopt more effectual measures for its suppression, and, accordingly, in the year 1812, the parties were compelled to enter into treaties, in virtue of which we obtained from the Ranees of Sawuntwarree the fort of Vingoria, and from the Rajah of Colapore the island of Soonderdroog, or Malwan, with the three dependent forts of Puddumgurl, Rajcote, and Sirjicote.

An expedition was also sent against the junatical ports on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, of which the principal was Ru-ul-Khyma. The naval force was commanded by Captain Wainwright, of His Majesty's ship Fox, and the troops by — Smith. A great number of pirate vessels was destroyed, and the chiefs were for some time deterred from carrying on their accustomed depredations. But occasion arose a few years afterwards to undertake further operations, with a view to ensure the security of the Gulf trade.

The administration of Lord Minto was distinguished by the capture of the French islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, and of the Dutch settlements in the island of Java. The arrangements against which places were fitted out under the direction of his Lordship, who accompanied the expedition to Java. As a reward for his Lordship's services, the Prince Regent was pleased to elevate Lord Minto to the dignity of an Earl of the United Kingdom.

The Earl of Moira, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, assumed the supreme government on the 4th October 1813. His predecessor, Lord Minto, had been obliged to remonstrate with the government of Nepal, in consequence of some encroachments which had been made by its officers upon our frontier. The hereditary ruler of Nepal had been set aside by a Gorkah chieftain. The Gorkahs were a more energetic race than the Nepalese, and for a series of years had extended their conquests over a large tract of country, which, in its north-western direction, approximated to the territories belonging to the protected Sikh chiefs. In the year 1814, Lord Hastings followed up the remonstrances of his predecessor by a peremptory demand for the evacuation of the villages and districts of which the Gorkahs had unjustly possessed themselves on various parts of the British frontier. At length a violent outrage, committed by a party of Gorkahs upon one of our posts, involved us in a war, which extended to two campaigns, the last of which was conducted by Sir David Ochterlony to a successful termination. From the mountainous nature of the country, our troops had to encounter very appalling difficulties, and the Gorkahs manifested, on many occasions, the most determined bravery, and no mean degree of military skill. In spite, however, of these obstructions, their hill fortresses were carried by assault, and the British troops penetrated into the heart of the Nepal territories.

By the result of this war we acquired the provinces of Kumaon and Gurwal, and a tract of territory at the foot of the Nepal hills, called the Terraer, and the Rajah of Siceam, a chief whose country is situated on the northern frontier of Bengal, transferred his allegiance from the Gorkah to the British Government. Several petty hill chiefs in the neighbourhood of the river Sutlege, also became our vassals.

For several years the Pindarries, whose numbers in 1812 were estimated at 25,000, continued to carry on their predatory operations with much profit to themselves, and with little resistance from the affrighted inhabitants of the villages which were exposed to this dreadful scourge. Being lightly equipped, their movements were very rapid, and it was but seldom that any notice of their approach preceded their actual arrival. The Pindarries having with impunity violated the territories of our allies, were at length emboldened to extend their excursions to our own provinces.

A disunion to menar the risk of a Mahratta war induced the authorities both at home and abroad to try, as long as possible, the effect of defensive measures. Military posts were accordingly stationed in various places where it was most likely that the Pindarries might be intercepted either in going upon or returning from their predatory excursions. But these precautions, though attended with considerable expense, proved utterly inefficient. On more than one occasion parties of Pindarries earned off their booty within a short distance of our posts, by obscure and intricate passes known only to themselves. Immediately after the peace with Nepal, these freebooters invaded and devastated part of the Madras territories.

In January 1817, a large body of Pindarries entered the district of Kimmery, sacked and burnt the town and the adjacent villages, and, about the same time, another body had waste nearly the whole of the Ganjam district, and plundered the town of Ganjam. The nature and effect of these irruptions, as stated in the report of a commission which had been appointed by the Madras government to inquire into the cases of the sufferers, is as follows. 269 houses burnt; 6,203 houses plundered; 183 persons were either killed or destroyed them-

selves

selves in consequence of the ill treatment which they had received; 505 persons wounded; 3,603 persons subjected to torture; and the value of the property which had been lost or destroyed was estimated at about 250,000, an enormous sum, considering the value of money in India.

The evil had now arisen to a height which could no longer be endured. Orders from home authorizing active operations were dated 16th September 1816, and reached Lord Hastings at the end of March 1817. His Lordship immediately proceeded to adopt the most vigorous measures for rooting up the haunts of this mercenary horde of plunderers; and it was considered by Lord Hastings to be also the duty of the British Government (whose power alone was equal to the task) to put an end to the licentious proceedings and cruel exactions of the Patana, who had so long ravaged and oppressed the countries of the Rajpoot chiefs. These had constantly implored our interference, and in return for our protection were quite willing to acknowledge our supremacy.

When Lord Hastings received the instructions from home of December 1813 (already alluded to), authorizing the renewal of the alliance with Jyepoor, he was of opinion that it would be better to defer the adoption of that measure until the proper time should arrive for effecting a general arrangement, embracing the whole of the Rajpoot states. On further consideration, however, his Lordship determined to begin with Jyepoor; but the Rajah received with coldness the proffered alliance which he had but lately so sedulously courted. He was, therefore, for a time left to pursue his own course.

Whilst measures were in preparation for the prosecution of active operations against the Pindarries, circumstances occurred at the court of Poonah which disclosed the Peshwa's dissatisfaction with the restraints under which he had been placed by his alliance with the British Government, and his impatience to emancipate himself from that alliance.

By our treaties with the Peshwa and the Guicowar we had undertaken to arbitrate certain claims of long standing which the former possessed upon the latter. As a preparatory measure the Guicowar deputed to Poonah, under our guarantee, his minister Gungadhar Shastry, as the individual best qualified to adjust the account between the two states. From some cause or other the Shastry was obnoxious to the Peshwa. At the urgent invitation of the Peshwa, Gungadhar Shastry attended a religious ceremony at a celebrated shrine. When prayers were ended, some assassins rushed out of the temple and murdered the Shastry. The guilt of this atrocious and perfidious outrage was traced to Trimbuckjee Danglia, an unworthy favourite of the Peshwa, who, there was reason to believe, was himself privy to the act.

On receiving intelligence of this affair, and of the ascertained disaffection of Bajee Row, Lord Hastings instructed the resident, Mr. Elphinstone, to demand the surrender of Trimbuckjee, and to insist upon various other concessions which need not be particularized, as in consequence of his subsequent conduct the whole of Bajee Row's territories were forfeited to the British Government. Trimbuckjee Danglia was given up and confined as a close prisoner in the fort of Thanna, from which he found means to effect his escape.

There is good ground to believe that Bajee Row was at no time cordially reconciled to the intimate connection which, under circumstances of extreme depression, he had formed with the British Government. It is no wise surprising that he should have retained his Maharratta predilections, or that the other members of the confederacy should have found means to flatter him with the hope of recovering his station as the ministerial head of that confederacy, and when the hour of trial came, it was evident that a feeling of respect for the office of Peshwa survived in great strength among the Maharratta confederates. They followed his fortunes, and although they did not share his fate, came out of the contest with loss of power.

That Scindia contemplated a rupture with the British Government was a fact fully established by the tenor of a correspondence between him and the Rajah of Nepal, which fell into Lord Hastings' hands, and was by his Lordship communicated to Scindia. Thus apprized of Scindia's views and designs, Lord Hastings adopted measures which served to defeat them. For the suppression of the predatory powers his Lordship assembled two large armies, one on the line of the Jumna, denominated the grand army, of which he himself took the command, the other on the line of the Nerbudda, denominated the army of the Deccan, of which the command was entrusted to Sir Thomas Havelock. By seizing a position which barred Scindia's movements, that chief was compelled to act at the dictation of the Governor-General. The terms imposed upon him were, essentially, unequalled submission, though so coloured as to avoid making him feel public humiliation. In a treaty, dated 5th November 1817, it was settled that Scindia should contribute his best efforts to destroy the Pindarries, that he should furnish a specific contingent to act under the direction of a British officer, in concert with the British troops, that British garrisons should be admitted into his principal forts of Aaseerghur and Hindia, and that the British Government should be at liberty to conclude treaties with the Rajpoot states. Added to these important stipulations, he agreed to certain arrangements of a pecuniary nature.

Amcer Khan, whose military enterprise was at one time highly estimated (and whose ambition, as before stated, was said to aim at the sceptre of the Moguls), enfeebled by age, gladly acceded to a proposition which ensured to him the possession of the territory which he actually occupied, upon the condition of his surrendering his artillery.

An attempt was made by Lord Hastings to establish the British influence at the court of Holkar; but the councils of the young prince, who, in his minority, had succeeded the late Jewwant Row, were then controlled by an hostile faction.

During the progress of these arrangements, events occurred both at Poonah and at Nagpore, (446.—VI.)

**Appendix, No. 20.**

*Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.*

which involved the Peishwa and the Rajah in open hostilities with us. The principal part of the British subsidiary force having been removed from Poonah, Bajee Row, on the 6th November 1817, seized the opportunity of bursting his bonds. He burnt the British residency, and attacked the small British force stationed at Kirkee, which, however, gallantly repulsed the attack. Upon this and upon subsequent occasions, the resident Mr. Elphinstone manifested the skill of an able general.

The same praise belongs to Mr Jenkins, the resident at Nagpore, whose presence of mind and characteristic energy rescued from destruction the small force of British troops which had been retained at the Rajah's capital. Holkar's power was effectually destroyed at the battle of Mahaidpore, by a division of the army of the Deccan, under the personal command of Sir John Malcolm, after a severe struggle, in which Holkar's artillery was admirably served.

Sir Thomas Munro was not, on the opening of the campaign, invested with a brigadier-general's commission; the omission, however, was afterwards supplied; but the force placed at his disposal was very inconsiderable in point of numbers, and ill-suited for offensive operations. The genius of this great man, nevertheless, enabled him to surmount the difficulties which impeded his onward movements. Availing himself of the happy art which he possessed of acquiring the confidence and good-will of the natives, he determined to arm the inhabitants of a province which had but lately belonged to the Peishwa, and which was over-run by his troops, and having placed the new levies under revenue amildars of his own selection, he brought them to act against their legitimate sovereign. Thus strengthened, Sir Thomas Munro found means to capture strong forts, and "emerged from a country heretofore hostile to British interest, with an accession instead of a diminution of force, leaving everything secure and tranquil behind him."

The names of Elphinstone and Jenkins, of Munro and Malcolm, were immortalized in the speech of Mr Canning, on whose motion, when President of the Board of Control, the thanks of the House of Commons were unanimously voted to the brave troops and their distinguished leaders, by whom were achieved victories which have rendered the British power dominant over the whole of India.

The results of the war may be stated in few words. The Pindarries, for whose suppression it had been waged, being pressed by British detachments in every direction, were defeated and dispersed. To such as submitted, lands were assigned for their maintenance, in the cultivation of which they have since become useful members of the society of which they had formerly been the scourge.

Bajee Row, driven from his country and hemmed in by the troops which pursued him, came over to Sir John Malcolm's camp, and consented to take up his abode at Pithoor, or Bittoor (a place of Hindoo pilgrimage only a few miles distant from the British cantonment of Cawnpore), with a stipend of eight lacs of rupees per annum. Out of his former dominions, the British Government constructed a principality, which was generously conferred upon the Rajah of Satarah, a descendant of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, which disputed the ascendancy with Aurunzebe, and, in after times, bid fair to become the paramount power of India. Sevajee's successors, however, debased by inglorious ease and voluptuous indulgences, lost their energies, and degenerated at last into mere pageants, who were on special occasions exhibited by the Peishwa (or minister) to gratify the curiosity of the people.

Appa Sahib, the Rajah of Nagpore, became a fugitive, and after wandering about from place to place, has recently taken up his quarters in Joudpore. His successor, a minor, ceded a large portion of his territories to the British Government, by whom the whole were, until very lately, administered. The affairs of Nagpore will be again noticed in the sequel.

Holkar's force having, as already stated, been greatly reduced at the battle of Mahaidpore, he was constrained to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the British Government.

With the several Rajpoot chiefs treaties have been concluded, which afford to them the benefit of protection, and to us tribute and military service. They all acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, and are bound to refer to its arbitration any disputes which may arise among them.

It may be proper to add, that the late Guicowar Futty Sing, owing to the personal influence and skilful management of Major Carmac, then resident at his Court, was, though not without difficulty, restrained from espousing the cause of the Peishwa. Futty Sing had profited most materially by the arrangements which were made by us with Bajee Row in June 1817, after the murder of Gungadhur Shastry, upon which occasion we obtained the cession of the Peishwa's share of the tribute payable by the chiefs of Kattywar, and the town and district of Ahmedabad, in Guzerat. The arrangements here alluded to preceded by a few months only the final rupture with Bajee Row.

On the whole, the people of central India have had good reason to hail, as an invaluable benefit, the suppression of the predatory powers, and the extension of British rule over tracts of country which had for many years been constantly disturbed and ravaged by the Pindarries and Patana. The husbandman securely reaps the fields which he has cultivated, and the merchant now traverses, without fear of interruption, excellent roads which have been opened through wastes but lately the coverts of wild beasts, and the haunts of banditti.

On the termination of the Pindarry and Mahratta war, Lord Hastings did not hesitate to assert that political supremacy which had been fairly won by the progress of our arms. Our right, as lords paramount, to maintain the peace of India is not likely to be disputed by

by the various states which have been taken under our protection. This description comprehends, either positively or constructively, every principality from the banks of the river Sutlege to Cape Comorin.

Nor were the exertions of Lord Hastings in the cause of good order and civilization restricted to the continent of India. The piratical chiefs who possessed forts and harbours on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, and whose vessels had been destroyed by a naval and military force despatched from Bombay by order of Lord Minto, found means to recruit their strength and to carry on their piratical operations with a degree of activity and success which proved extremely detrimental to the trade of the Gulf. The ordinary efforts of the Company's cruisers having failed to ensure the safety of navigation, it became necessary to concert more effectual measures for eradicating the evil. An expedition was fitted out at Bombay by Sir Evan Nepean, with the sanction of the supreme government, in the year 1819. The military force was entrusted to the command of Sir William Grant Kier; the naval, consisting of His Majesty's ships *Liverpool*, *Eden*, and *Curlew*, and of some of the Company's cruisers, under the orders of Captain Collier, of the Royal Navy, proceeded in the first instance against the principal fort of Ras ul Khyma, which was taken by assault, and its fortifications and the piratical craft in the harbour destroyed. The command afterwards visited the ports of other chiefs addicted to piracy, and after depriving them of the means of renewing their nefarious practices, treaties were concluded with all the patias, restraining them from constructing and equipping armed vessels, and from rebuilding forts. A detachment was, for some time, maintained at the island of Kishine, situated near to the entrance of the Gulf, but owing to the unhealthiness of the place the troops were subsequently withdrawn, and experience has shown that the vigilance of the Indian navy is a sufficient check upon the revival of piracy. There is indeed reason to hope that the parties have betaken themselves to a better course of life.

Among the principal features of Lord Hastings' administration, it is proper to advert summarily to his transactions with the Vizier of Oude and with the state of Hyderabad. On his accession to power his Lordship saw reason to disapprove of the tone in which Saadat Ali had been pressed to effect a reformation in the management of his country, and some other matters. His Lordship could not question the necessity of introducing a better system into the vizier's reserved dominions, with a view to exonerate the British Government from the painful duty of suppressing insurrections occasioned by oppressive exactions; but he hoped to effect this object by means of persuasion and personal influence. Saadat Ali appeared to yield, and promised freely, he, however, at his death, which occurred in the year 1814, left things much as they were. His son and successor also listened with apparent complacency to the proposed plan of reform, but whenever it was brought forward, he always coupled with his consent some stipulation which destroyed its efficacy. During the Nepal war he materially relieved our financial difficulties by the loan of upwards of two crores of rupees (above two millions sterling). In liquidation of the first crore, a tract of land conquered from the Nepaules, together with a district belonging to us, was annexed to his dominions, and for the remaining crore, we engaged to pay stipends to individuals nominated by him, equal in amount to interest at the rate then payable on public securities, namely, six per cent.

In the year 1819, the Vizier, with the entire approbation of Lord Hastings, assumed the style and title of King of Oude, a proceeding which dissolved his nominal subordination to the Mogul, and caused a separation of interests, which will probably operate to prevent the revival of Mahomedan ascendancy in India.

The pecuniary affairs of the Nizam having become embarrassed at a time when he was required to aid us in carrying on the Pindarry war, Lord Hastings was induced to permit a mercantile firm, of which Mr. William Palmer was the head, to advance large sums of money to his Highness's government. Sir Charles Metcalfe, who superseded Mr. Henry Russell as resident at Hyderabad, conceiving that the money-dealings of that house were calculated rather to aggravate than to relieve the Nizam's pecuniary embarrassments, strongly urged the supreme government to put an end to their interference, and to emancipate the Nizam from the trammels of his engagements with them. The Government at home also highly disapproved of the favour which had been shown to the house. A considerable difference of opinion divided and distracted the supreme councils; and it was not until after his Lordship's departure, that, by the redemption of the peashuk payable by the British Government for the Northern Circars, the Nizam was enabled to repay the advances which had been made by William Palmer & Co, who soon afterwards became insolvent.

The Nizam, whose troops afforded considerable assistance during the Pindarry and Maharratta war, obtained a share of the advantages which were acquired by that contest.

Sir Charles Metcalfe was much dissatisfied with the administration of Chundoo Loll, and strove to correct its evils by a degree of interference which was deemed objectionable, both by Lord Hastings and by the Government at home. British officers were employed to superintend the collection of the revenues. It is very probable that, under this system, many abuses were checked and corrected; but its advantages were gained by a temporary diminution of the Nizam's authority. There will be occasion hereafter to resume this subject.

Lord Hastings, on the 9th January 1823, departed from Calcutta for England, having for more than eight years filled the station of Governor-General. Mr. Adam, the senior member of Council, took charge of the government during the interval between Lord Hastings's departure, and the arrival of a successor appointed from England.

In the years 1797 and 1798, a number of persons, called *Mughas*, inhabitants of Arracan, and subjects of the King of Ava, sought refuge in our neighbouring province of Chittagong from the cruel oppressions which they had experienced from the Burmans who had then recently effected the conquest of the country. It was not without much hesitation, that Sir John Shore afforded an asylum to the fugitives, but feelings of humanity triumphed over the dictates of prudence. Having thus obtained a settlement within sight of their former homes, these irritated people availed themselves of every opportunity which presented itself of endeavouring to regain the country from which they had emigrated. These attempts,—which we used our utmost endeavours to check,—produced, as might have been expected, remonstrances from the government of Ava, and from its officers on the frontier, who sometimes threatened to cross the British frontier in pursuit of the aggressors.

Discussions of an irritating nature arose between the two governments. Embassies were deputed to Ava for the purpose of explaining the principles of our conduct, and of exculpating ourselves from the charge of countenancing the irregularities which had been committed by the *Mughas*, whom, upon many occasions, we strove, by coercive measures, to keep under due restraint. The King of Ava was proud, imperious, and ignorant of the character of the British Government, and of the extent of its dominions. He and his predecessors had been accustomed to victory, and the recent conquests of the Burmese had brought under their subjection the countries of Munneepore and Assam, which last acquisition placed them in contact with our north-eastern frontier. Flushed with success, they committed inroads upon our border villages, and, in an arrogant tone, demanded the surrender of the *Assamese*, as they had previously demanded that of the *Mugh* fugitives.

Discussions regarding this act of aggression had arisen before Lord Hastings quitted India, at which period his Lordship did not entertain the remotest “apprehension of a rupture.” Mr. Adam, however, regarded the conduct of the Burmese in a more serious light, and deemed it expedient to form alliances with the chiefs of Cachar and Jynta, whose countries contain passes which afforded an easy access to our provinces. Mr. Adam proceeded from Calcutta, in an ill state of health, to Bombay, where he died.

Lord Amherst assumed the office of Governor-general on the 1st August 1823. Almost immediately after he had taken his seat in council, his Lordship received a letter from the Rajah of Arracan, claiming the island of Shapuree in the river Naaf, which divides the provinces of Chittagong and Arracan. As our right to the place was undoubted, the claim was of course rejected.

The Burmese nevertheless seized upon Shapuree, and slaughtered the sepoy guard which had been stationed there. It was speedily re-occupied by our troops, but owing to the unhealthiness of the station, they were withdrawn.

The Burmese took advantage of their absence, to hoist their standard on the island, and avowed a determination to retain possession of it. Lord Amherst afforded to the court of Ava an opportunity of disavowing the outrage which had been committed at Shapuree, but as no notice was taken of his lordship’s remonstrance, and as the Burmese were evidently preparing to invade Chittagong, he issued a declaration of war, dated the 24th February 1824.

The plan of the operations projected by Lord Amherst was to emancipate the *Assamese*, and the other tribes on our north-eastern frontier from the Burman yoke, to wrest from them their maritime possessions, and, if after these privations, the enemy should still hold out, to advance upon his capital.

An expedition composed of Bengal and Madras troops was accordingly fitted out, and placed under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell. On the 11th April 1824, the expedition reached Rangoon, which was occupied without opposition, the inhabitants having evacuated the town, and taken refuge in the neighbouring jungles. About the same time detachments of our troops captured the island of Ucheduba, and, at a later period, the provinces of Martaban, Tavoy, and Mergui, and the island of Ramree. The conquest of Arracan was effected in the month of March 1825, by a division commanded by Brigadier-general Morrison, whose troops suffered severely from the insalubrity of the climate.

Rangoon, the capital of Assam, surrendered on the 2d February 1825, (after a battle fought in its vicinity,) to a detachment commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Richards.

From the province of Munneepore the enemy was expelled by Rajah Gumber Sing, the rightful sovereign, aided by British officers.

Sir Archibald Campbell was for a considerable time detained in the neighbourhood of Rangoon for want of provisions, draught cattle, water carriages and boatmen. Added to these embarrassments sickness carried off about 1,000 of his European troops. He nevertheless obtained many signal advantages over the enemy, who, in their several attempts, with overwhelming numbers to dislodge him from his positions, were uniformly discomfited. Having at length obtained the requisite supplies, Sir Archibald Campbell advanced upon Donabew, a strongly fortified place, which fell on 2d April 1825. Promie, the capital of Pegue, was occupied on the 25th of the same month. In September a truce was agreed upon, at the solicitation of the enemy, which, having been broken by them, the British general, after various actions, seized their stockaded position at Sinbuke, and put them to the rout.

At Patan-agoh, preliminaries of peace were signed on the 2d January 1826; but as the king withheld his ratification, Sir A. Campbell proceeded to Malloon, a strong place, which was captured by assault on the 9th January 1826. In this affair the enemy lost a large number of guns and war-boats, and a considerable quantity of military stores and grain. On the 9th February 1826, the Burmese sustained an entire defeat at Pagan-nhew. On

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reaching Yandaboo, within four marches of the capital, the Birmanese sued earnestly for peace; and a treaty was finally concluded on the 24th February 1826, exactly two years after the declaration of war. Besides relinquishing the several provinces and islands which we had captured, and acknowledging the independence of the chiefs with whom we had formed alliances, the King of Ava agreed to pay a crore of rupees (about a million sterling) towards the expenses incurred by us in the war, which, owing to the necessity of transporting cattle, provisions, and stores by sea, were enormously great.

It is proper to observe, that most important assistance was derived by Sir Archibald Campbell from the active exertions of the Royal Navy, under Commodores Grant and Sir James Brisbane, and Captains Chadds, Alexander, and Marryatt, and that the Company's marine, under Commodore Hayes, rendered valuable service.

After the termination of the war a military post was established at Moalmue, and a settlement was formed at a place, which, in compliment to the Governor-general was named "Amherst Town," at which such of the Birmanese as dreaded the resentment of their government, on account of their conduct during the war, were offered an asylum.

In a pecuniary point of view, the Tenasserim provinces, which include Tavoy and Mergui, have hitherto proved but an unprofitable acquisition, but there is reason to hope, that the impulse given by our government to productive industry, and the security afforded by our institutions to life and property, will eventually tend to draw forth many hidden resources, and, consequently, have a favourable effect on the revenue.

During the war with Ava, some negotiations were entered into with the government of Siam, which appeared disposed to co-operate with us against the Birmanese; but no assistance was obtained from the Siamese troops. Captain Burney, who was deputed upon a mission to Bangkok, the capital of Siam, concluded a commercial treaty, which has probably placed our trade with Siam upon an improved footing. The military resources of the Siamese are too insignificant to render that state of much importance, either as a friend or a foe.

Pending the war with Ava occasion arose to proceed against Bhurtpore. On the death of the late Rajah, his throne was usurped by Doorjun Saul, a cousin of the legitimate heir Bulwunt Sing, who applied for aid to Sir David Ochterlony, the resident at Delhi. That gallant officer, considering the faith of the British Government to have been pledged to the predecessor of the young Rajah, prepared with much promptitude to enforce his claim. Lord Amherst's government, however, from various considerations (including the unfavourable season of the year and the inadequacy of Sir David Ochterlony's means to ensure success), interdicted the enterprise. At a more favourable opportunity, however, Lord Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief in India, was ordered to march upon the city and expel the usurper. His Lordship, at the head of 25,000 men, and an ample train of artillery set down before the formidable fortress of Bhurtpore, on the 23d December 1825. It was, however, only by means of mining that a practicable breach could be effected in walls 60 feet in thickness; and on the morning of the 18th January 1826, after a gallant resistance of two hours, the place was carried by assault, and Bulwunt Sing established in his just rights. The munitions of Bhurtpore having been demolished, the city was delivered up to the Regent, Bulwunt Sing being then a minor.

There can be no doubt that the reputed impregnability of Bhurtpore, which had repulsed five assaults of the army of Lord Lake, encouraged Doorjun Saul to set the authority of the British Government at defiance. And if Lord Combermere had failed of success, there is good reason to believe that the whole country westward of the Jumna would have risen in arms, and divided the attention of the British Government from the prosecution of its operations against the Birmanese. The capture of Bhurtpore unquestionably enhanced the reputation of the British arms, and left no ground for hope that any other fortress of India could resist the bravery, science, and skill of British troops.

Subsequently to the date of the abovementioned transactions, no occasion has arisen for the exertion of our force, at least not of sufficient consequence to deserve specific notice in a paper of which the professed object is to give a mere summary of important events. There are, however, some arrangements of a political nature, which, as materially affecting the condition of two of our allies, ought not to be omitted.

The origin of our connexion with the late Anund Row Guicowar in the year 1802, has been already explained. At that time the embarrassed state of his finances, and the general disorganization which pervaded every branch of his affairs, were such as to induce us, at his solicitation, to assist him with loans from our treasury, and also to guarantee other loans of considerable magnitude obtained from native bankers. By the long continued and skilful exertions of Brigadier-general Walker, who held the office of resident at Baroda, many excellent measures of reform were effected, and were afterwards ably followed up by his successor, Major Carnac. In consequence of the imbecile character of Anund Row, the government was carried on by a council of regency, of which the heir apparent, Futteh Sing, was president; but the British resident, who was a member of that council, directed its proceedings, in conjunction with the minister of the state. During the continuance of this system the country advanced in prosperity. Futteh Sing died a short time before his father, and was succeeded as president of the council by his brother Syajee, who, on the death of Anund Row, ascended the musnud.

After the money advanced by the British Government had been repaid, in the month of April 1820, Mr. Elphinstone, (acting in conformity to the desire expressed on more than one occasion by the home authorities,) gave up the reins of government to Syajee, reserving, however, the right of interference whenever occasion should arise to require it. Although

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the debt to the British Government had been discharged, large sums still remained due to native bankers, to whom, and to some other individuals, our blandary had been granted. This is a species of guarantee which bound us to see that the Guicowar's revenues were duly applied to the liquidation of the loans : but did not involve pecuniary responsibility. As applied to those who were not creditors, the blandary entitled the party to the protection of his person and property. By these engagements we were still entangled in the Guicowar's affairs, and could not therefore wholly extricate ourselves from a concern in their administration. He was told distinctly that he ought to make the resident acquainted with all his proceedings, and be guided by his recommendations.

Eagerly intent upon augmenting his private hoard, Syajee paid little regard to the just demands of the public creditors or to the welfare of his people. A revenue settlement had been made by the resident, Mr Williams, with the avowed approbation of Syajee, on equitable principles ; and arrangements were at the same time adopted with a view to a gradual liquidation of the debt to the bankers.

In the year 1828, Syajee's passion for the accumulation of money induced him, by means of intimidation, to compel the bankers to substitute, for the loans guaranteed by the British Government, other loans at a lower rate of interest, without any security. The bankers having complained to the resident, strong remonstrances were addressed both by him and by the Governor of Bombay to Syajee, who totally disregarded them. He not only persisted in endeavouring to force the bankers to advance their money, but proceeded to oppress and ill-treat several persons who had a claim upon our protection. Every attempt to prevail upon this infuriated prince to perform his engagements, having utterly failed, Sir John Malcolm, the Governor of Bombay, was reluctantly compelled to sequester districts belonging to the Guicowar State, the revenues of which are to be appropriated, under our own management, to the payment of the guaranteed loans : it was expected that these would be liquidated in the course of a few years. As soon as that object shall have been attained the sequestered districts are to be restored to the Guicowar. Some further sequestrations were subsequently made with a view to provide funds for the regular payment of the contingent horse, which the Guicowar is bound by treaty to hold at our requisition\*.

After the flight of Appah Sahib in the year 1817, the next heir to the musnud of Nagpore being a minor, the administration of his affairs was conducted by the resident, Mr. Jenkins, in concert with the principal personages of the Nagpore state. European officers were employed in the revenue and other departments, and in the command of the Rajah's troops. When the young prince had attained to years of discretion (1 Dec. 1826,) the supreme government felt it proper to entrust him with the administration of a considerable portion of his dominions, the remainder was reserved under our management, for the payment of his contingent under British officers, a measure which received the approbation of the home authorities. The Governor-general in Council subsequently restored to the Rajah the reserved districts above-mentioned, the contingent has been disbanded ; the British officers withdrawn, and the Rajah is to substitute a force of a different description, in the organization of which we are to have no concern. By an article of the new treaty, dated 27 Dec. 1829, the Rajah agrees to pay a tribute of eight lacs of rupees per annum. Although the policy of employing European officers to discipline and command the troops of our allies has been questioned at home, the sudden relinquishment of control over the Nagpore force, after it had been for a long time steadily exercised, was considered a hazardous experiment.

Having in the foregoing pages adverted to the most important political transactions which have occurred in India, it only remains to explain the state of our relations with the court of Persia.

The treaty of alliance at present subsisting with the Shah was entered into in 1811, at a time when both states were at war with Russia. In contemplation of the possible continuance of hostilities between Persia and Russia, after we should have made peace, it was agreed, that in such case, the King of England should endeavour to effect the renewal of amicable relations between the belligerents, and that if His Majesty's efforts were unsuccessful, the subsidy of 200,000 tomanas, payable by the British Government, should be continued so long as the war between Russia and Persia should last. In point of fact, Persia did not make peace until some time after our differences with the Emperor Alexander had been accommodated, and accordingly the subsidy was paid up to the date of the treaty of Gulistan between Persia and Russia. By the 3d and 4th articles of our treaty with Persia it was stipulated, that in the event of an unprovoked attack by Russia the subsidy should be again allowed. Differences respecting the adjustment of the boundaries prescribed by the treaty of Gulistan, arose soon after that treaty had been concluded, and discussions of an irritating nature ensued. At length the Persian court, indignant at the continued occupation by the Russians of certain places which ought to have been given up, committed a violent act of aggression upon a Russian post, and thus plunged into a war which has proved most disastrous to Persia. Hostilities had no sooner recommenced than an application was made to the British envoy for the renewal of the subsidy. The demand being referred home, was rejected on the ground that Persia had unquestionably forfeited her claim by commencing hostilities. Notwithstanding which, the late Sir John Macdonald the Governor-general's

\* Since this paper was prepared, intelligence has been received, in an unofficial form, of the conclusion of an agreement between Lord Clare and Syajee, in virtue of which His Lordship has restored to Syajee the sequestered districts.

general's envoy at Tehraun) by extreme good management under very trying circumstances, maintained the influence of the British mission at the Persian court

On reviewing the state of our relations with Persia, the Government at home perceived that much embarrassment might in future arise out of the stipulations contained in the 3d and 4th articles above alluded to, for although in the late instance Persia was clearly the aggressor, yet it could not be denied that much provocation had been given by the pertinacious retention on the part of Russia of places to which Persia attached the greater value, inasmuch as their occupation by Russia afforded to that power facilities for making further encroachments upon the Persian frontier. It was very possible that on some future occasion the proceedings of the Russian local authorities might be of a character so unequivocally menacing as to warrant Persia, in self defence, to strike the first blow. Between the extremes of wanton aggression and justifiable precaution so many cases of an equivocal hue might arise, as to render it extremely difficult to decide whether or not the subsidy could be withheld without violating the spirit if not the letter of our engagements. In this view of the question, it appeared to be desirable to get quit of a positive pledge, so that Persia might have no pretence to accuse us of breach of faith, if on any future occasion we should refuse to come forward with pecuniary assistance for carrying on a war with Russia. Sir John Macdonald was accordingly instructed to enter into a negotiation with the Persian government for the abrogation of the 3d and 4th articles of the treaty. The envoy, before he received these instructions, had himself suggested a similar arrangement. Reduced to great distress by the pecuniary fine which had been imposed upon him by Russia, the Shah, though with evident reluctance, consented to abrogate the articles on the payment by us of the sum of 200,000 tomanas, and they have been accordingly expunged from the treaty

India Board, July 1830

(signed) B S Jones.

Appendix, No. 20

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

2 STATEMENT explanatory of the Nature of the Relations subsisting between the British Government and the several States and Chiefs of India \*

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I.—STIPENDIARY PRINCES.

THE principal of these are the Nabob of Bengal, the Rajah of Benares, the Rajah of Tanjore, the families of the late Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sultan, formerly princes of

\* For the particulars contained in this document, I am mainly indebted to Mr. Cabell, the head of the Political Department. I am also indebted to Mr. John Stuart Mill, of the India House, for having taken the trouble to revise it.—*B.S.J.*



Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

Mysore, the Nabob of the Carnatic, the Nabob of Surat, the Nabob of Furruckabad, the King of Delhi, formerly the Great Mogul, Benaick Rao, son of Amrut Rao, brother of the late Feishwa, and Bajee Rao the late Feishwa, and his brother Chinnagee Appa.

*Nabob of Bengal.*

The possessions of the Nabob of Bengal were secured to the Company by the grant from the Mogul of 12th August 1765. The Nabob himself (Syed-ul-Dowlah) acceded to the transfer (19th May 1766) stipulating for the payment annually of rupees 17,73,854 for his "house, servants, and other expenses indispensably necessary," and rupees 24,07,277 "for the support of such sepoy, peons, and berkundasses as might be thought proper for asawarry only." These sums were reduced by a treaty with his successor, Mobarek-ul-Dowlah (21st March 1770) to rupees 15,81,991 on the former, and rupees 16,00,000 on the latter account. The whole stipend of this family was shortly after fixed at rupees 16,00,000, at which rate it has remained ever since.

*Rajah of Benares.*

The possessions of the Rajah of Benares were transferred by the Vizier Asoph-ul-Dowlah to the East India Company (21st May 1775) and granted by a sunnud to Rajah Cheyt Sing of Benares (15th April 1776), on certain conditions, which were not fulfilled, and the districts are now administered by the East India Company.

The present Rajah receives a stipend, which in 1827-28 amounted to 1,11,317 rupees, and the family of the late Cheyt Sing have pensions which in the same year amounted to 22,965 rupees.

*Rajah of Tanjore*

The territories of the Rajah of Tanjore, by a treaty with Serfojee, dated 25th October 1799, were transferred to the British Government, who stipulated to allow him one lac of star pagodas annually, in addition to one-fifth of the net revenues. The payments to his highness on this account amounted in 1828-29 to 9,31,182 rupees.

*Mysore Princes.*

On the conquest of Mysore in 1799, the Company engaged in the treaty with the Nizam (of 13th July 1799) "to provide effectually out of the revenues of the districts" which fell to their share, "for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Ali Khan, and of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and to apply to this purpose an annual sum of not less than two lacs of star pagodas, or 80,000*l*. The payments on these accounts in 1827-28 amounted to 6,39,549 rupees, or about 64,000*l*."

*Nabob of the Carnatic.*

The civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred to the East India Company by the Nabob Azeem-ul-Dowlah. By the terms of the treaty concluded with the Nabob (31 July 1801), the Company engaged to pay him annually one-fifth of the net revenue of the Carnatic, in monthly instalments of not less than 12,000 star pagodas. A provision was also made for the families of the late Nabobs of the Carnatic, and the principal officers of the Nabob's late government.

The palace of the Nabob of the Carnatic, at Chepnauk, being situated within the jurisdiction of the supreme court at Madras, questions have frequently arisen regarding his rights, as a sovereign prince, to be exempted from its jurisdiction.

*Nabob of Surat*

The civil and military government of Surat, was by a treaty with the Nabob Nasur-ud-Deen (13th May 1830) vested in the East India Company, and a stipend of one lac of rupees per annum was secured to the Nabob and his heirs, in addition to one-fifth of the net revenues.

*Nabob of Furruckabad.*

The province of Furruckabad was ceded by the Nabob Imdad Hoosain Khan, in sovereignty to the Company, by a treaty dated 24th June 1802, and a stipend of 1,08,000 rupees was secured to the Nabob, his heirs and successors, together with certain specified payments to his relations and dependants.

*King of Delhi.*

The Mogul came under the protection of the British Government in 1803, when a jaghire was assigned for his maintenance at Delhi. The lands composing this jaghire are administered by British officers in the name of the King of Delhi, by which title the descendants of the late Mogul are now designated. Stipends out of the proceeds of this jaghire are appropriated to the maintenance of the royal family. During the year 1827-28 these payments amounted to 13,40,983 rupees.\*

Royal Family Rs.  
at Delhi - 11,48,379  
Do. Benares 1,95,604

Rs.13,40,983

\* It has recently been proposed by the Court to increase the payments, on account of the royal family at Delhi, to 15 lacs of rupees per annum.

*Benack Rao, Son of Amrut Rao*

Appendix, No. 20

The late Amrut Rao was the adoptive brother of Bajee Rao, the late Peishwa. During the Mahratta campaign of 1803, Amrut Rao separated himself from the interests of the confederated chiefs, D. R. Scindia and Ragjee Bhooslah, on the promise of a provision for himself, and his son after his decease, of a revenue of seven lacs of rupees, which, according to the terms of the treaty concluded with him on the 14th August 1803, was either to be "granted in territory or in cash." A further provision was to be made for his "friends and adherents." For this purpose the Bengal government appropriated the sum of a lac of rupees per annum, but in consequence of the death of many of the parties, the payments on this account have been reduced to 58,050 rupees per annum.

Amrut Rao is dead, and his son Benack Rao is now in receipt of the stipend of seven lacs, which had been enjoyed by his late father.

*The late Peishwa Bajee Rao*

The late Peishwa Bajee Rao became a stipendiary on the 3d June 1818, when he gave in his submission and recognized the disposition made of his territories by the British Government. Eight lacs of rupees per annum (at 2s 6d 100,000l) was the amount of the stipend to Bajee Rao. Provision was also made for his brother, Chinnagee Appa, and several of his adherents, the amount of which is specified in the subjoined statement (No 1), which also specifies the payments on account of the whole of the stipendiary princes above-mentioned, from 1817-18 to 1827-28, the date of the latest accounts. Communications between the British Government and these stipendiary princes are made by means of commissioners or agents appointed to reside with them, or superintend the distribution of their stipends. The discussions with them relate principally to their pecuniary affairs.

Table, No. 1

With the King of Delhi there have been frequent communications, regarding pretensions founded on the claims of the late Mogul.

II.--PROTECTED STATES

THE native princes under British protection are of several classes. Generally speaking, such protection is provided for by an express stipulation, but, in a few instances, states nominally without such guarantee are effectually secured by the interposition of British and protected territory between them and states to whose hostile attacks they might otherwise have been exposed. Scindia and the Rajah of Dholapore, Baree, and Rajah Kerahi, (formerly called the Rana of Gohnd), belong to this latter class.

Some of the protected states pay a subsidy or tribute, and some have ceded territory in lieu of subsidy. The Vizier, (now the King of Oude), the Nizam, the Guicowar, and the Rajah of Nagpore, belong to the latter class. The Rajahs of Travancore, Cochin and Mysore, and the Rao of Cutch, pay subsidies. Tribute is exacted from several of the chiefs of Rajpootana and Central India, the amount of which will be stated in its proper place.

The existing subsidary and defensive alliances will be adverted to in the following order:—

Those with the King of Oude, the Nizam and the Guicowar, the Rajahs of Travancore, Cochin and Mysore, all of which were formed previously to the Mahratta war of 1803, those with Shimpoor and Macherry, and the Bundella and Seik chiefs, which were a consequence of that war, or of the engagements into which we then entered, those with the Rajahs of Rewah and Tehree, the object of which was to secure our frontier against the inroads of the Pindarries; those with the Rajah of Colapoor and with the Dessee of Sawuntwarree, which arose out of our engagements with the late Peishwa, those with the Hill Chiefs and the Rajah of Secum, consequent upon the war with Nepal in 1814-15, those with the Rao of Cutch, in 1816, with the Rajah of Nagpore, Mrhar, Rao Holkar and the chiefs of Rajpootana and Malwa, connected with the suppression of predatory associations in Central India, and finally, those with the Rajahs of Jynta and Cachia, which were contracted on the occurrence of war with the Burmese in 1824.

*Oude*

The Vizier, now the King of Oude, is one of our most ancient allies. His territory was guaranteed by the British Government as early as the year 1765, and he obtained the districts of Corah and Allahabad from the Mogul, through our interposition in 1773. He received a subsidary force in 1775, when he ceded the district of Benares to us. In 1787 his subsidy was fixed at 50 lacs, liable to augmentation or diminution in proportion to the amount of force maintained by us in his territories. In 1798 the subsidy was increased to 76 lacs, and in 1801 it was commuted for a cession of territory estimated to yield a gross revenue of 1,37,23,47+ rupees per annum.

By this last treaty the Vizier is restricted from retaining in his pay more than four battalions of infantry, one battalion of nujeebs and muwalluces, two thousand

*Treaties.*

- 16 August 1765, Art. 1.
- 7 Sept 1773, Art. 1.
- 21 May 1775, Art. 6.
- Ditto, Art. 5.
- 15 April 1787, Art.
- 21 Feb 1798, Art. 2.
- 10 November 1801, Art. 1.

Ditto, Art. 3.

Treaty, 10 Nov.  
1801, Art. 6  
Ditto, Art. 7.

thousand horsemen, and "such number of armed peons as shall be deemed necessary for the purposes of the collections, and a few horsemen and nujeebs to attend the persons of the amila."

Possession of the reserved territory was guaranteed to the Vizier; but in the administration of it he was bound to attend to our advice. Under this provision of the treaty of 1801, many attempts have been made with Suadut Ali and his successors to introduce an improved system of administration into the reserved territories of Oude, but they have hitherto failed of success; and there is reason to fear that our troops have frequently been employed to enforce exactions of an oppressive nature. The evils existing in Oude have at length become so great as to have attracted the serious attention of the Governor-general in Council, who appears by the last advices to have felt the necessity of adopting some decided measure with a view to the effectual correction of those evils.

Treaty, 1 May  
1816.

During the Nepal war of 1814, 1815, and 1816, the Vizier of Oude assisted us with two loans of a crore of rupees each. The interest of one of these loans was appropriated to the payment of certain stipends, which had been guaranteed by the British Government. The other loan was liquidated by a cession of territory chiefly acquired from Nepal on the Oude frontier.

In 1819 the Vizier of Oude assumed the title of king, and was crowned in the following year. By this act he threw off the nominal allegiance which he owed to the King of Delhi, as holding the office of vizier and soubahdar of the province of Oude under the Great Mogul. This transaction appears to have excited an extraordinary sensation among the Mahomedans, and must be regarded as an obstacle in the way of a re-union of the Mahomedan states in any confederacy against our power in India.

During the Birmess war the King of Oude advanced, in 1825, a third crore of rupees on loan, the interest of which was also appropriated to the payment of stipends. The pensioners on this, as well as on the former occasion, were, by the King's desire, placed under the guarantee of the British Government. There is a third class of pensioners under British guarantee; namely, the legatees under the will of the Bhow Begum, mother of the late Nabob, Asaf-ul-Dowlah. The Company were guarantee to an engagement between her and the Nabob Suadat Ali on his accession in 1798, and she afterwards, by a will dated 29th October 1813, constituted the Company heir to her property, which at her death (28th December 1815) was estimated to amount to 89,48,916 rupees. The condition attached to this bequest was, that the company should guarantee the payment of certain specified stipends to her relations and dependents, and take them under their protection. The British Government, though they consented to carry the provisions of the will into effect, declined to take advantage of the pecuniary bequest in their favour, and accordingly have received no more of the property than was sufficient to enable them to pay the pensions. The residue was paid over to the late King of Oude.

A further loan of 50 lacs, or half a crore of rupees, was also made by the late King of Oude during the Birmess war, and the present king has been very desirous of appropriating the interest which he receives (six per cent) as a provision in favour of three of his wives and a daughter, whom he much wished to place under our guarantee. The inconvenience experienced from the former engagements of this nature disinclined Government to accede to the proposition; they however consented to a less exceptionable arrangement in regard to the pensions. The time and attention of the British resident is much occupied with personal cases of this description.

Treaties :  
14 May 1769.  
12 Nov. 1766,  
Art. 2.

#### Nizam.

Our relations with the Nizam commenced at a very early period. In 1759 we engaged to assist him in expelling the French from his territories, and in 1766 we engaged "to have a body of troops ready to settle the affairs of his highness's government."

Ditto, Art. 3.

In the year last mentioned the Nizam consented to the cession of the Northern Circars, (which had been granted to us by the Mogul,) on the payment of an annual peshcush of five lacs for Rajah Mundy, Ellore and Mustaphanagur, two lacs for Sicoacole, and two for Moortezanagur, or Guntoor. The latter Circar did not come into our possession till 1788, and the payment to the Nizam, on account of the Circars, was finally limited to seven lacs annually.

Treaty, 12 Sept.  
1788.

The Circar peshcush or tribute, was redeemed in 1823 by a payment to the Nizam's government of 1,16,66,666 rupees, the object of which arrangement was, to relieve the Nizam from his pecuniary embarrassments.

Deed, dated 4 Nov.  
1823.

The Nizam co-operated with us in the war of 1790-92 against Tippoo, and received a portion of the Mysore conquests. In 1793, on the eve of the last war with Tippoo, a powerful French party had established itself at Hyderabad, and a considerable portion of the Nizam's infantry was officered by the French. Lord Wellesley prevailed upon his Highness to dismiss the French officers from his service, and to subsidize a British force, and he became a useful ally in the campaign of the following year, and participated in the conquests.

Treaty, 1 Sept.  
1798.

In 1800, he ceded in lieu of subsidy, the Mysore provinces, which he had acquired in the war of 1790, and in that of 1799. The estimated value of the cession was 13,13,188 pagodas per annum. By the treaty entered into with the Nizam in 1800, he was restricted from negotiating with other powers without the consent of the Company, and engaged to receive a subsidiary force of eight battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, and to provide a contingent of 12,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

Treaty, 22 June,  
1799.

Treaty, 12 Oct.  
1800, Art. 5.

Ditto, Art. 15.

Nizam Ally with whom this treaty was concluded, died in 1803; his successor, Secunder Jah,

Jah, was not so favourable to the British interests. He afforded little or no assistance during the Mahratta campaign of 1803, but was, notwithstanding, allowed to participate in the conquests. In the Pindarry war of 1817-18 his troops took an active part, and behaved well. Treaty, 10 Jan 1804.

#### Guicowar.

The Guicowar is also an ancient ally of the Company, an agreement having been made with Futty Sing as early as 1778, and in 1780 this chief was taken under British protection, with a view to exclude the government of Poonah from the country. We then failed in this object, and the cessions which we had obtained from the Guicowar were relinquished by us in the treaty with the Mahrattas, concluded at Salbey, 17th May 1782. 12 January, 1778.  
Treaty, 26 Jan. 1780, Art. 1.

—(Articles 5, 8, & 17.)

In 1802 the alliance was renewed with Anund Rao Guicowar, and funds were assigned for the maintenance of a British force, which was augmented in 1803, and again in 1817, and territory ceded in lieu of subsidy of the value altogether of 24,31,969 rupees. The subsidiary force which we are bound to furnish to the Guicowar amounts to 4,000 infantry and two regiments of native cavalry, and a company of European artillery, the Guicowar engaged to furnish at our requisition a contingent force of 3,000 horse, and in case of war to bring forward the rest of "his military resources." Convention, 15 Mar. 1802.  
Treaty, 6 June 1802.  
Agreement, 29 July 1802.  
Treaty, 21 April 1805.  
Ditto, 6 November 1817.  
Ditto, 28 Nov. 1818.

The Guicowar received an increase of territory, when the Peishwa, by his conduct in 1817, had been required to cede to us his rights in Guzerat, part of which we still retain. These rights consist of payments from dependent chiefs in Kattywar, in the western frontier; and the Myhee Caunta, Rajpeemla, and other small states on the eastern frontier. British officers are appointed as agents for the realization of these payments, and to exercise a political supervision over the affairs of these chiefs, these officers are subject to the authority of the resident at Baroda, to whom their proceedings are reported. He has also to maintain the engagements which have been made under our bhandarry. Syajee Rao Guicowar having, by his misconduct, deprived us of the means of fulfilling our engagements as guarantee of certain pecuniary obligations, we were compelled, in 1828, to sequester a portion of his territories, the revenues of which are to be applied to the payment of those debts, and after this shall have been effected, the sequestered districts are to be restored to him." Treaty, 6 Nov. 1817.

#### Travancore and Cochin

Our alliance with Travancore commenced in 1788, when an agreement was made with the Rajah (on the 12th August) for the protection of his country against Tippoo. The Rajah was then assisted with a subsidiary force of two battalions, which was augmented in 1805 to three battalions. The dread of the power of Tippoo Sultan also operated with the Rajah of Cochin, and induced him to accede to the alliance which was proffered to him in 1791. Until the destruction of the power of the late Tippoo Sultan in 1799, these states had a common interest with us in maintaining alliances which were essential to their existence. The case then became altered. In 1805 and 1809 hostile factions were formed, which were only suppressed by the decided interposition of our authority; thus led to the formation of a new treaty with Travancore in 1805, and with Cochin in 1809, by which the subsidiary force with Travancore was fixed at three battalions, and with Cochin at one battalion of native infantry. The subsidy paid by Travancore is equivalent to the expense of those three battalions, and the subsidy from Cochin amounts to 2,76,037 rupees. A power is reserved to us of assuming the revenues of these countries in case of a failure of funds to pay the stipulated amount of subsidy, a proportion of the revenues, however, being in each instance secured to the Rajahs, for their maintenance. This power has not been called into exercise, but it was thought necessary to interfere very minutely in the affairs of Travancore after the death of the Rajah in 1812. This was continued during the minority of his successor, who attained his 16th year on the 20th April 1829, and was then permitted to assume the government agreeably to the tenor of a proclamation which was issued at his birth. Agreement, 12 Aug. 1788.  
Treaty, 12 Jan. 1805, Art. 3.  
Treaty with Cochin, 6 Jan. 1791.

It is in contemplation to withdraw the residency and the British troops from these countries, under orders which were issued by the Court of Directors on the 18th Feb. 1829.

The subsidiary force, with the exception of one regiment, has already been withdrawn from Travancore, with the Rajah's entire consent. Regarding the policy of altogether withdrawing the residency and troops, some difference of opinion exists between the local authorities of Bengal and Madras. The revenues of Travancore in 1826-27 amounted to 40,42,645 rupees, and the expenditure, including subsidy, to 37,68,392 rupees. Treaty, 6 May 1809.

#### Mysore.

The present Rajah of Mysore is a descendant of the ancient Hindoo princes of that country; and on the destruction of Tippoo's power in the year 1799, a principality was set apart for Kistna Rajah Oodiyar, then a minor, with whom a treaty was concluded on the 8th July 1779. The amount of subsidy, which the Rajah under this treaty is bound to pay to us, amounts to seven lacs of pagodas; and he is also bound to furnish a contingent of 4,000 cavalry. To secure the regular payment of the subsidy, the British Government have

\* Vide Note on p. 190.

† Rajah of Travancore, two lacs of rupees per annum, together with one-fifth of the net revenue. Rajah of Cochin, 80,000 rupees per annum, together with one-fifth of the net revenues.

(445.—VI.)

**Appendix, No. 20.**

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

Statement, No. 2.

have the option, in case of failure of funds, to assume an adequate portion of the territory, reserving to the Rajah an annual income of one lac of pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenues. During the minority of the Rajah the government was administered by Purneah, his dewan, with great success. Purneah died soon after the Rajah had attained his majority; and, under the management of that prince, the affairs of Mysore have gradually fallen into disorder. In the course of the year 1831 an extensive insurrection broke out, for the suppression of which the British troops have been employed, and the Governor-general in Council has judged it necessary that the Rajah's country should be placed under British management.

Very efficient assistance was derived from the Mysore sallahs in the campaigns of 1803, 1804, and 1805, and 1817-18.

The sums which have been received from Travancore, Cochin, and Mysore, under the head of subsidy since 1817-18, are exhibited in the accompanying Statement (No. 2.)

*Bhurlpore and Macherry.*

Our alliances with Bhurlpore and Macherry were formed during the war with Scindia and the Rajah of Bejar in 1803.

A treaty was concluded with the former on the 29th September, and with the latter on the 14th November of that year, by which treaties, these states were respectively taken under our protection, and they engaged to assist us against the common enemy. The Rajah of Bhurlpore was expressly exempted from the payment of tribute. At the close of the campaign of 1803 both states were remunerated for the aid which they had afforded, by an assignment of a portion of our territorial acquisitions.

In the hostilities which ensued in 1804 with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the Rajah of Bhurlpore disregarded his obligations, and when Holkar approached the Junna, on the retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment, the Rajah united his forces with those of Holkar. Five unsuccessful attempts were made by the army under Lord Lake to carry the fort of Bhurlpore by assault, but the Rajah, dreading the consequences of further resistance, submitted, on the 17th April 1805, to the terms which were offered to him, and agreed to pay, in five years, the sum of 20 lacs of rupees, and to refrain from correspondence with other states without our knowledge and consent.

Rajah Rhunder Sing of Bhurlpore died childless on the 7th October 1823, and his elder brother Buldeo Sing was recognized as his successor. Buldeo Sing died on 26th February 1825, leaving a son named Bulwunt Sing, about six years of age. His succession was opposed by his uncle Dooryan Lall, who assumed the sovereignty of Bhurlpore. Bulwunt Sing having been previously recognized as the rightful sovereign, the Governor-general (Lord Amherst) in Council determined to enforce his rights. A British force, under the personal command of Lord Combermere, accordingly proceeded against Bhurlpore, which, (although heretofore deemed impregnable,) was carried by assault on the 18th January 1826; and the young Rajah Bulwunt Sing was duly installed on the 5th February following. The state of Bhurlpore was charged with the extra expense of these operations, amounting to 24,39,173 rupees.

Rajah Bukhtowar Sing, of Macherry, (the capital of which is Ulwar,) died in 1815, leaving a nephew named Benay Sing, and a son named Bulwunt Sing, both minors. In the year 1824, the former had attained the age of 17, and the latter that of 10 years. The leading authorities at Ulwar had agreed, on the death of the late Rajah, to associate the nephew, and the son, as joint rulers of the country. In the year last mentioned, the nephew, Benay Sing attempted to get the entire power into his own hands; but after the capture of Bhurlpore he made his submission to Lord Combermere, and the territory was divided between him and his cousin, conformably to the arrangement previously adopted. The revenues of Macherry before this division amounted to 16 lacs of rupees. It is proper to state, that in consequence of some inconvenience occasioned by the interference of the late Rajah in the disputes of his neighbours, in the year 1811, he was restricted from carrying on correspondence with other states without our knowledge and consent.

*Boondela Chiefs.*

Our connexion with the chiefs of Bundelcund had its origin in an arrangement which was concluded with the late Feishwa on the 16th December 1803, by which he ceded territory to us in that province of a certain value, which we were at liberty to select from those quarters of the province most contiguous to our own possessions, and the best suited to our convenience.

In carrying the provisions of the treaty into effect, it was deemed expedient to enter into arrangements with several chiefs on the frontier of the province, who were allowed to retain possession of the lands which they held, or which were assigned, on certain specified conditions. With some of these chiefs, (in particular, the Soubahdar of Jhanse, the Nana of Jaloun, the Rajah of Dutteah, and the Rajah of Sumpthur,) treaties still exist, similar to those with the other protected states, except that they contain no stipulation for the payment of tribute: but the far greater number of Bundelcund chiefs having been considered subjects of the Feishwa are now considered our own subjects. These chiefs have obtained from us sunnuds, granting to them their possessions; and in return for those sunnuds, they have subscribed engagements of allegiance and subjection to us. Our interference has practically been little greater with this class of chiefs than with the former; they have been allowed to govern their territory

territory as they pleased: except that, during the minority of the chief, or when his excessive misgovernment had thrown the country into disorder, the Bengal government has occasionally exercised its right of sovereignty by the temporary appointment of a manager.

Arrangements similar to those with this last class of Boondela chiefs exist likewise with the Rajahs of Sirgouah, Sumbulpore, and other petty principalities, formerly dependent upon the Rajah of Nagpore, the only material difference is, that these chiefs usually pay a small tribute to the British Government.

*Seik Chiefs South of the Sutlege.*

In 1809 the approach of Runjeet Sing of Lahore to the Sutlege, for the avowed purpose of extending his authority over the Seik Chiefs inhabiting the country situated between that river and the river Jumna, induced the Bengal government to assert the seignorial rights which had been acquired by the treaty of peace with Scindia of 1803 in that quarter. Those chiefs were accordingly declared to be under our protection.

That declaration being supported by the advance of an adequate force, Runjeet Sing relinquished his scheme, and recognized our right in a treaty concluded with him on the 25th April 1809. He has not since attempted to disturb the arrangement then agreed upon.

On this occasion engagements were framed with the chiefs, by which we agreed not to exact any tribute, and they bound themselves to assist us with their troops in repelling a foreign invader. It is stipulated that their rights and authority within their own possessions shall remain the same as before they were taken under our protection. Our interference in their affairs is accordingly limited to the arbitration of their differences with one another and with foreign states, and to the decision of questions regarding the succession to estates on failure of all rightful heirs.

In such cases the British Government always considers the territory to have lapsed to the protecting power, and incorporates it therewith with the British possessions. The petty states of Umbela, Belaspore, and several smaller districts have in this manner been added to our territories.

*Rewah—Tehree*

An eruption of the Pindaries into the province of Mirzapore in 1812, gave rise to engagements which were concluded with the Rajah of Rewah on the 5th October, and with the Rajah of Tehree on the 23d December of that year, the object of which was to engage those chiefs to defend the passes through which the Pindaries could gain access into our territories, and to establish the right of the British Government to station its troops in whatever part of the country they might select for purposes of defence. The Rajah of Rewah having swerved from the obligations of his engagements, further treaties were concluded with him in June 1813 and March 1814, which supplied the defects of the first treaty.

*Colapore.—Sawuntwarree.*

In 1812 we were called upon to interfere between the Peishwa and his dependants the chiefs of Colapore and Sawuntwarree, and engagements were concluded with both chiefs in October of that year, in order to adjust their respective rights. The conduct of the government of Sawuntwarree, having obliged us to resort to coercive measures, further treaties were concluded with that petty state in 1819 and 1820, and it now stands in the same relations to us as it formerly did to the late Peishwa.

The Rajah of Colapore having in 1825, 1826, and 1827 committed aggressions on the territories of some of the Maliratta jagherdars dependent upon us, his territory was occupied by our troops, the powers of government were temporarily placed in the hands of a minister supported by the Bombay government, and the state of Colapore was deprived of the districts of Chickeroo and Manowlee, which had been added to it by us after the fall of the Peishwa.

*State of Angria, or Colabba.*

The petty state of Colabba (situated near to Bombay), is subject to a chief of the Angria family, and was subordinate to the Peishwa. After the fall of Bajee Row, the British Government having succeeded to his rights, concluded a treaty with the Angria chief, dated August 16th 1822. In return for British protection he engaged to abstain from entering into any negotiations with other chiefs or states, or to entertain foreigners in his service without the knowledge and consent of the British Government, who, on their part, promised not to interfere in the internal concerns of the state of Angria.

Stipulations were made for an adjustment of the boundary, and the British Government undertook to guarantee the payment of a pension to a member of the Angria family resident at Bombay, on the condition that the amount of the pension should be chargeable to the state of Angria.

*Hill Chiefs on the North-west of Nepal, and Rajah of Siocim.*

The war with Nepal of 1814-15, and the treaty concluded with that state on the 2d December 1815, gave rise to a system of defensive arrangements with the Hill Chiefs  
(445.—VI.) c o 3 on

on the north-west extremity of Nepaul, and with the Rajah of Siocim on the opposite extremity of Nepaul.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

Cutch.

Engagements of amity were entered into with the government of Cutch in 1809, with a view to the suppression of piracy and to the exclusion of foreign Europeans and Americans from that country. This measure was adopted in anticipation of a projected invasion of India by the French.

In 1815, in consequence of depredations committed by the subjects of Cutch, on the territories of our ally the Guicowar, an expedition was sent into Cutch, and a new Rao placed on the throne, who engaged to receive a British subsidiary force; the Rao whom we thus elevated having subsequently thrown the country into disorder by his misgovernment, he was deposed, and a treaty concluded with his infant son, Mirza Rao Sree Desuljee, on the 13th October 1819, in which a provision was made for the deposed Rao Bismuljee of 36,000 cowries, (about 12,000 rupees), and a regency established during the minority of his son. The British resident is a member of the regency, and the administration of the country is in effect in our hands.

On the 21st May 1822 a treaty was concluded restoring Anjar to Cutch, which place had been ceded to us in 1816. In return for this cession the government of Cutch was required to pay to us 88,000 rupees per annum. Considerable improvements have been introduced by our influence into the administration of Cutch, but the necessity which has frequently occurred of remitting a portion of the subsidy, has led to the belief that it is higher than is compatible with a considerate regard to the financial resources of the state.

Nagpore.

Treaty, 27 May  
1816.

The alliance which was concluded with Nagpore in 1816, formed part of the system then adopted for the suppression of the predatory powers. The Rajah was taken under our protection, and a subsidiary force established for his defence of not less than one regiment of native cavalry, six battalions of native infantry, one company of artillery, and one company of pioneers. The contingent to be supplied by the Rajah was fixed at 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot, and his subsidy at 7,50,000 rupees per annum.

The Rajah Appa Saheb, seduced by the late Peishwa Rajee Row, attacked the British detachment at Nagpore in November 1817, which, but for the prompt and energetic measures of the resident, Mr Jenkins, would have been overpowered and destroyed. Appa Saheb was sent under a military escort to Bengal, but while on the march he effected his escape, and wandered about for years. He, of course, forfeited his throne. The government was established in the person of Ragojee Boosla, then a minor. A portion of the country was retained by us in lieu of a pecuniary subsidy, the remainder, during the Rajah's minority, was administered by British officers, under the superintendence of Mr. Jenkins. On his coming of age the Rajah was, on the 1st December 1826, put in possession of territory of the estimated value of 26,00,000 rupees, a portion yielding about 17,00,000 being retained under our management as security for the payment of that part of the Rajah's army which was disciplined and officered by British officers.

These districts have, however, been given up to the Rajah, under an arrangement concluded with him on the 27th December 1829, in virtue of which, instead of furnishing a contingent of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot, he is bound only to maintain a force of 1,000 sallahar horse and to pay a tribute of 8,00,000 rupees per annum. The troops in the Rajah's service which have been disbanded under the operation of this arrangement, appear to consist of two battalions of regular infantry, with three corps of horse and three provincial battalions. The British officers have been withdrawn from his service.

Mulhar Rao Holkar.

The treaty concluded with Jeevunt Rao Holkar on the 24th December 1803, left us merely in relations of amity with that chief.

His affairs fell, shortly after, into confusion. In consequence of his mental derangement a struggle ensued between contending factions, and that which gained the ascendancy being adverse to our interests, the state became committed in hostilities with us at the period when we had taken the field against the Pindarries. The successful issue of the battle of Mahaidpore (fought on the 21st December 1817) enabled us to dictate the terms of the treaty which was concluded with Mulhar Rao Holkar, the son of the late Jeevunt Rao, on the 6th January 1818, and deprived him of a considerable portion of his territories. By this engagement we are bound to maintain a subsidiary force of such strength as may be judged by us to be adequate to the protection of the state, for which no pecuniary subsidy, or further territorial cession was demanded; and Holkar is bound to furnish a contingent of not less than 3,000 horse. One of his dependent chiefs Guffoor Khan, was confirmed in his jagheer, on the condition of maintaining a contingent of 600 select horse. Europeans and Americans are by this treaty excluded from the service of Holkar. The revenue of Holkar in 1819 was 17,96,183 rupees, and his military force 3,465 horse, and 200 foot, with 1,000 sebandies.

*Sattarah.*

On the rupture with the late Peshwa Bajee Rao and the resolution to dethrone him, it was determined to liberate the Rajah of Sattarah, (the descendant of the ancient head of the Mahrattas) from the state of seclusion in which he had been kept by the Peshwa, and to confer upon him the sovereignty of a portion of Bajee Row's territories. The young Rajah being then a minor, the country was, in the first instance, administered by the British Resident. A treaty was concluded with the state of Sattarah on the 25th of September 1819, stipulating that the districts then ceded should be held in subordination to the British Government, and that the Rajah should assist us in war, and not correspond with other states without our knowledge and consent. On these terms the territory so assigned was guaranteed to the Rajah.

Sir John Malcolm, who visited the Rajah early in 1829, speaks very favourably of his character and conduct since he had been allowed to take the administration of affairs into his hands. His army consists of 200 cavalry, 575 infantry, 218 irregulars, 307 sildars, 3,125 sepulchies, and 800 gorkum or garrison sepulchies. Speaking of this arrangement, Sir J. Malcolm in his minute of the 22d February 1829, remarks, "the mere loss of revenue that has attended" the establishment of the principality of Sattarah, "is compensated tenfold by the reputation we derive from the act, and by the scope we have afforded to the exercise of talent and the attainment of rank and consideration to a large and prosperous population."

*Rajpootana, Malwa, &c.*

Engagements were, at the same time, concluded with several of the states of Rajpootana and Central India, the object of which was to secure their co-operation in the suppression of the predatory associations, and to prevent the revival of those associations. The states with whom alliances have been formed, with this view, are the following —

Kerwlee, on the 9th November 1817	Jypore - - - 2d April 1818
Ameer Khan - - - November - -	Banswarra - - 16th September - -
Kotah - - - 26th December - -	Dowleah and
Joudpore - - 6th January 1818	Purtaubghur } - 5th October - -
Oudeypore - - 13th January - -	Doongerpore - 11th December - -
Boondee - - 10th February - -	Ju-sulmere - - } 12th December - -
Bhopaul - - 26th February - -	Dewass - - - }
Buckaneer - - 9th March - -	Dhar, et - - - 10th January 1819
Kushenghur - 28th March - -	Serwee - - - 31st Oct 1823

The general feature of these engagements is protection and guarantee of their territory on our part, and acknowledgment of the British supremacy on theirs. Some of the states are bound to furnish contingents of a specified amount, and with others the obligation is to place the whole of their resources at our disposal. Some pay a tribute to the British Government, viz

Kotah, the tribute which it formerly paid to the Mahrattas, Joudpore, the tribute which it paid to Scindia, Oudeypore, one-fourth of its revenues for five years from the date of the treaty, and three-eighths afterwards; Boondee, the amount of its tribute to Scindia; Jypore, eight lacs of rupees per annum, together with 5-16ths of any excess of the revenues above 40 lacs of rupees, Banswarra, three-eighths of its revenues, Dowleah and Purtaubghur, 72,000 rupees per annum, Doongerpore, three-eighths of its revenues, Dhar, its tribute from Banswarra and Doongerpore, and Serwee, three-eighths of its revenues. The sums realized under the head of tribute from these states to 1827-28 are exhibited in Sir John Malcolm's Central India, vol. II p. 375.

In 1819, the revenues of the under-mentioned Chiefs and States amounted to the sums stated against their respective names:—

	Rs		Rs
Ameer Khan - - - -	6,00,000	Banswarra - - - -	2,49,438
Kotah - - - -	47,25,000	Purtaubghur - - - -	2,84,313
Oudeypore - - - -	not stated.	Doongerpore - - - -	2,43,580
Boondee - - - -	9,00,000	Dewass - - - -	1,09,375
Bhopaul - - - -	not stated	Dhar - - - -	2,67,004
Jypore - - - -		And Ghuffoor Khan - - - -	5,00,000

The military force of those States is estimated to be as follows —

	HORSE	FOOT
Dhar - - - -	140	200
Kotah - - - -	4,200	20,700
Bhopaul - - - -	2,000	4,000
Doongerpore - - - -	278	853
Banswarra - - - -	302	1,087
Purtaubghur - - - -	156	790
Ghuffoor Khan - - - -	100	158
<b>TOTAL - - - -</b>	<b>7,676</b>	<b>27,788</b>



Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
H. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

*Jyntiah and Cachar.*

Our alliances with Jyntiah and Cachar were contracted, with the former on the 10th, and with the latter on the 6th March 1824. They both then acknowledged allegiance to the British Government, and were taken under its protection. The chief of Jyntia engages to bring forward "all his forces" when required, and the Rajah of Cachar to pay a tribute of 10,000 rupees per annum. The dependence of these states on the British Government has been recognized by the King of Ava in his treaty with us of 24th February 1826.

The stipulated amount of subsidiary forces and contingents, where they are specified in the treaties, are as follows:

	BRITISH SUBSIDIARY FORCES		CONTINGENTS OF NATIVE CHIEFS	
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Oude - - - - -	Not less than 10,000 men		—	—
Nizam - - - - -	2 regiments	3 battalions	10,000	12,000
Guzowar - - - - -	2 regiments	4,000 sepoy's	3,000	—
Rajah of Nagpore - - - - -	Not stipulated		1,000	—
Mulhar Rao Holkar - - - - -	Of such strength as shall be judged adequate by the British Government		3,000	—
Travancore - - - - -	- - -	3 battalions	—	—
Cochin - - - - -	- - -	1 battalion	—	—
Rajah of Mysore - - - - -	Amount not specified.		4,000	—
Rao of Cutch - - - - -	Amount not specified		Amount not specified.	
Central India :	Ghuffoonkhan - - - - -	- - - - -	600	—
	Joudpoie - - - - -	- - - - -	1,300	—
	Bhopaul - - - - -	- - - - -	600	400
	Dowleah and Pertaubghur - - - - -	- - - - -	50	200
Dewass - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	100	100

And the following Chiefs, not included in the preceding list, are pledged to bring forward troops to the extent of their means: the Rajahs of Bhimpore, and Machery and most of the Boondela chiefs, and of the chiefs of Rajpootana and Malwa, not enumerated above, and also the Rajah of Sattaiah.

III STATES IN RELATIONS OF AMITY.

These are Scindia, the Rajah of Nepal, the King of Ava, the King of Siam, the Raja h of Lahore, the Ameers of Scind, and the Affghana.

*Scindia.*

Our relations with the state of Scindia are of long standing. A treaty was concluded with Madjee Scindia on the 13th October 1781, by which he engaged to mediate a peace between us and the Mahrattas, and Hyder Ally of Mysore. This was accomplished, in respect to the Mahrattas, by the treaty of Salbey, dated the 17th May 1782.

The war with Dowlut Rao Scindia in 1803, terminated in the treaty of Surjee Anjungaum, of 17th December 1803. By this treaty considerable tracts of territory were ceded to us, a portion of which was restored to him on the 22d November 1805.

The treaty with Dowlut Rao Scindia, of 5th November 1817, had in view the suppression of predatory associations, and although Scindia did not act up to the obligations which he then contracted with us, it was deemed politic to leave him in the undisturbed possession of his territories, which were estimated by Sir J. Malcolm in 1819 to yield a revenue of 1,27,68,459 rupees per annum. His military force, according to the same authority, is 9,471 horse and 13,700 foot, together with 6,435 sepulchies and garrisons of forts.

Since

Since the death of Dowlat Rao Scindia, the administration of affairs is in the hands of Bazea Bhye, Scindia's widow, as regent during the minority of her adopted son, the present Maharajah

VI.  
POLITICAL  
OR  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon  
Charles Grant

*Nepaul.*

Our relations with Nepaul commenced in 1792, when a commercial treaty was concluded on the 1st March, stipulating for a duty of two and a half per cent. being reciprocally taken on goods. Our relations were strengthened in 1801 by the conclusion of a treaty on the 30th October, which contained a provision for the adjustment of boundary disputes, and also for the mutual surrender of refugees. The treaty, however, does not appear to have been of much avail in these respects, as these border disputes were a main cause of the war in which we were involved in 1814, and which terminated in the conclusion of a treaty of peace and amity with that state on the 2d December 1815. Considerable cessions of territory, including the province of Kumaon, were obtained from the Nepaulese on this occasion, and the Rajah of Succim transferred his alliance to us, and certain Hill Chiefs on the north-western extremity of Nepaul became subject to our supremacy. By these arrangements we have gained a ready access into the Nepaul territories from several quarters, but no disposition has been manifested on the part of that government, since the conclusion of peace, to renew hostilities with us. The Hill Chiefs, although regarded as our subjects, are allowed to govern their own territories with little interference from us, and their government appears on the whole to be just and moderate

*Ava.*

A commercial treaty was concluded with Ava in September 1795. During many years, disputes of an irritating nature prevailed between the Burmese and the British local authorities on the frontier of Chittagong, having reference to the people called Mughs, subjects of the King, who had sought refuge from oppression in the province of Chittagong. These disputes led to frequent remonstrances, and the mission of envoys from Calcutta to Rangoon and to the Burmese capital. At length, in the year 1823, an act of aggression having been committed by the Burmese on a small detachment of British sepoy, stationed at the islet of Shapoorie, and the King of Ava having refused, when called upon, to disavow that outrage, war was declared against him by the British Government on the 24th February 1824. After our main army, under Sir Archibald Campbell, had advanced within a short distance of the capital, terms of peace were dictated by the British general at Yamikoon on the 24th February 1826. The King of Ava ceded the provinces of Arracan and Teasserin, and the islands of Cheduba and Ramree. He also agreed to pay a crore of rupees to the British Government as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The greater part of this indemnity has been paid, but a balance remained due at the date of the last advices

*Siam.*

A treaty was concluded by Major Burney with the King of Siam on the 20th of June 1826, by which the relations of friendship were recognized as existing between the two countries, and the contracting parties mutually agreed to refrain from committing aggression on each other's territories. Freedom of trade was established generally between the two countries, the duties levied upon which to be regulated by the custom of each country. Stores and provisions, however, purchased at Quoda for the use of Prince of Wales' Island, were not to be subject to any duty.

A further agreement was concluded by Major Burney on the 17th January 1827, to regulate the mode in which English vessels were to be allowed to trade with the port of Bangkok, and to define the amount of duty payable by British vessels at that particular port, 1,700 tons on each Siamese fathom in breadth being chargeable upon a vessel if loaded with an import cargo, and 1,500 tons on each Siamese fathom in breadth if the ship entered without an import cargo. "No import, export or other duty," being afterwards levied "upon the buyers or sellers from or to English subjects."

*Lahore.*

Our relations with Runjeet Sing of Lahore are those of simple amity. By the treaty concluded on the 25th April 1809, the Rajah is not to interfere with the Sikh chiefs south of the Sutledge. On the whole, a friendly intercourse has since the date of that treaty subsisted between the two states. In the course of the past year (1831) visits were interchanged between the Governor-general and the Rajah on the banks of the Indus, on which occasion much pomp and splendour were displayed in his camp. (See also, Sikh Chiefs, ante, p. 197)

*Affghaun, King of Cabul.*

A treaty was, on the 17th June 1809, concluded with Syah-ool Moolk, the King of the Affghauns, in view to an expected invasion of India by the French. Syah-ool-Moolk was soon afterwards deprived of power by his brother Mahmood, and he is now a pensioner on the British Government.

Nothing has arisen, since the date of the treaty to bring us into collision with the Affghauns, with whom indeed we have had little intercourse. The country has for many years been distracted by the contests of competitors for the throne, of which the chief of Lahore has taken advantage, by seizing upon Cashmere, and establishing his influence in Mooltan.

*Scind.*

Appendix, No. 20

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq  
to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant.

A treaty was concluded with the Ameers of Scind on the 22d August 1809, and another on the 9th November 1820, which, besides the exclusion of Europeans and Americans, contained stipulations to check the depredations of Khosas and others, who had ravaged the territories of Cutch. A negotiation has been recently entered upon with the Ameers, of which the object is, to secure the free navigation of the river Indus

In most of the treaties with the native states, articles have been inserted, stipulating for the exclusion of Europeans and Americans from their service, and also inhibiting the residence of persons of that description in the countries of the respective states, if objected to by

—No. 1.—

STIPENDS paid to NATIVE PRINCES, their Relatives and Dependents,  
to other Families,

	1817-18	1818-19.	1819-20.	1820-21.
	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>
The Nabob of Bengal - -	17,70,400	17,12,803	17,13,797	16,57,600
Rajah of Benares, family of the late } King Sing - - - - - }	73,679	1,59,798	98,234	1,30,135
King of Delhi, pensions paid at Be- } nares - - - - - }	13,60,121	13,43,354	13,56,260	13,20,923
His Highness Benaick Rao, son of } Amrut Rao - - - - - }	3,88,491	9,62,616	5,83,607	9,62,616
The Nabob of Arcot - -	17,89,851	17,88,815	17,80,247	17,79,898
Rajah of Tanjore - -	11,11,288	9,53,872	8,67,549	9,56,235
Nawaub of Masulipatam - -	53,756	50,024	47,193	44,662
Families of the late Hyder Ally and } Tippoo Saib, Sultan of Mysore - }	5,26,673	5,29,177	5,25,376	5,26,320
The late Peishwa, Bajee Rao, and } Chimnajee Appa - - - }	- - -	- - -	- - -	9,73,525
The Nabob of Surat, including 50,000 } rupees paid - - - - }	1,59,522	1,59,930	1,62,932	1,62,856
TOTAL - - - <i>Rs.</i>	73,33,781	76,60,889	71,87,195	83,14,770

—No. 2.—

AMOUNT received on Account of SUBSIDIES

	1817-18	1818-19	1819-20.	1820-21
	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>
Rajah of Mysore - -	24,50,000	23,96,539	24,50,000	24,50,000
Rajah of Travancore - -	7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111
Rajah of Cochin - -	4,39,040	2,76,037	1,87,988	2,00,000
TOTAL - - - <i>M Rs.</i>	36,72,151	34,55,707	34,21,099	34,33,111

by us. Americans, as well as Europeans, are so excluded in our treaties with the Guicowar, Holkar, Cutch, Scind, Scindia, Nepal and Sicim, "Europeans" only are expressly excluded from Oude, Travancore, Cochin, Mysore, Bhurt-pore, Telree, Jhansi, Duttanah, and Simphur, and the "French," from the country of the Nizam and the Affghans. Europeans are not mentioned in the treaties with the chiefs of Rappootana and Malwa, but these all acknowledge the British supremacy, and must be considered as bound to attend to any requisition we might deem it expedient to make for the exclusion of such persons.

India Board, March 1832.

(signed) B. S. Jones

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant.

—No. 1—

whose Territories are incorporated with the *British Possessions*, or transferred  
1817-18 to 1827-28

1821-22	1822-23.	1823-24	1824-25.	1825-26.	1826-27	1827-28
<i>Rs</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs</i>
17,12,453	22,80,600	16,83,000	15,45,933	16,77,150	21,56,830	22,40,350
22,965	2,14,340	1,18,653	1,47,359	1,13,548	89,946	1,34,282
13,61,078	13,69,235	13,50,553	13,34,286	13,58,925	13,46,007	13,40,983
5,79,866	9,62,616	7,71,241	9,62,616	7,71,241	1,97,116	5,79,866
18,84,395	19,19,381	15,92,247	17,38,406	17,67,759	17,44,223	17,53,965
10,16,733	9,73,653	10,36,123	11,66,998	13,36,692	12,52,759	10,47,389
48,644	73,754	52,725	22,126	44,776	46,049	52,671
5,28,847	5,39,971	5,43,531	5,52,941	5,78,090	5,52,536	6,38,858
11,00,000	11,00,000	11,00,000	11,00,000	8,56,812	2,19,785	22,42,023
1,62,788	1,62,788	1,62,779	1,62,728	1,62,690	1,62,680	1,62,675
84,17,769	95,96,338	84,10,852	86,73,393	86,67,683	77,67,931	1,01,92,557

—No. 2.

from NATIVE PRINCES, from 1817-18 to 1827-28.

1821-22	1822-23	1823-24	1824-25	1825-26	1826-27	1827-28
<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>	<i>M Rs.</i>
24,50,000	24,50,000	24,50,000	24,50,000	24,50,000	24,50,000	24,50,000
7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111	7,83,111
1,86,667	2,00,000	1,82,208	2,17,792	2,00,000	2,00,000	2,00,000
34,19,778	34,33,111	34,15,319	34,50,903	34,33,111	34,33,111	34,33,111

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant.

—No. 3.—

AMOUNT OF TRIBUTE received from the NATIVE PRINCES of Central India, from 1817-18 to 1827-8

	1817-18	1818-19	1819-20	1820-21	1821-22	1822-23	1823-24	1824-25	1825-26	1826-27.	1827-28.
	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>	<i>St. Rs.</i>
Jypore -	-	2,00,000	2,54,004	2,50,000	5,50,000	12,50,000	5,00,000	7,76,622	8,00,000	7,38,000	*2,62,000
Kotah and Seven Kotries -	-	2,58,653	2,64,720	2,64,720	2,64,720	2,64,720	2,64,720	1,32,360	5,29,440	1,32,360	1,32,360
Jodhpore -	-	-	54,000	1,08,000	1,08,000	1,62,000	1,08,000	1,08,000	1,08,000	1,08,000	1,08,000
Boondee, inclusive of Paton	-	-	-	80,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	-	80,000	-	80,000
Banswarrah -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51,072	40,695	1,30,764
Pertaulghur -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	74,550	71,307	76,547
Oudypore and Kachar	-	-	-	-	-	-	49,427	2,91,254	2,19,471	2,99,218	*14,000
Rathlam, Salans, and Allernohun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,15,750	1,16,062	64,289	1,72,853
Beekaneer -	-	75,203	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total - - - Sonat Rs.	-	5,33,756	5,72,724	7,02,720	9,62,720	17,16,720	9,62,147	14,23,986	20,23,595	14,53,869	9,76,524
Or - - - Sicea Rs	-	5,10,738	5,48,035	6,72,415	9,21,203	16,45,686	9,20,654	13,62,576	19,36,326	13,91,171	9,34,411
Paid Maha Rajah D. R. Scindia, Mulhar Rao Holkar and Rajah of Dhar - }	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,25,448	1,81,796	1,33,430	4,99,582
Net Tribute - Sicea Rs.	-	5,10,738	5,48,025	6,72,415	9,21,203	16,45,686	9,20,654	12,37,128	17,54,530	12,57,741	4,34,829

\* The Decrease under these heads arises from the arrears of Tribute outstanding

EXPLANATION of the VARIATIONS in the Several Sums paid at Bengal for STIPENDS and ALLOWANCES to the Native Princes, as exhibited in the Statement, No 1, p 202.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq  
to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant

	1817-18.	1818-19.	
The Nabob of Bengal	17,70,400	17,12,803	-- In 1817-18 certain arrears were paid as due to the late Munny Begum
Rajah of Benares - -	73,679	1,59,798	-- On payment of two quarters' stipends to the Rajah in 1817-18 The allowance to the family of the late Rajah was in that year for 11 months, and the full amount paid in 1818-19
King of Delhi - -	13,60,121	13,48,854	-- In 1817-18 a charge was incurred of 17,000 rupees, properly applicable to the preceding year.
H. H. Benaick Rao -	3,88,491	9,62,616	-- Two quarters' stipend not charged in 1817-18.
	1819-20.	1820-21.	
The Nabob of Bengal	17,12,803	17,13,797	-- A small increase made in the allowance to Syed Ahmed Ali Khaww
Rajah of Benares - -	1,59,798	98,234	-- In 1819-20, three quarters' allowance only charged
King of Delhi - -	13,48,854	13,56,260	-- In 1819-20 an extra charge was incurred of 30,000 rupees, at the rate of 15,000 per month, which was partly met by the allowance to the Rajah having been drawn for 11 months instead of the full period, as charged to 1818-19
H. H. Benaick Rao -	9,62,616	5,85,607	-- Arrears paid in 1818-19, and three quarters only charged in the succeeding year.
	1819-20.	1820-21.	
The Nabob of Bengal	17,13,797	16,57,600	-- In 1820-21 the monthly allowance of 11,200 rupees to Nawab Delawar Jung, was charged for seven months only
Rajah of Benares - -	98,234	1,30,135	-- Arrears paid the Rajah in 1820-21, and 13 months' allowance to the family of the late Rajah.
King of Delhi - -	13,56,260	13,20,923	-- In 1819-20 that portion of the allowance paid at Benares, was charged at the rate of 17,000 rupees per month, which in the following year was reduced to 15,000 rupees. The extra charge adverted to in the remark against the year 1819-20, was paid for one month only in 1820-21.
H. H. Benaick Rao -	5,85,607	9,62,616	-- One quarter's stipend unpaid in 1819-20, and added to the charges of the following year
	1820-21.	1821-22.	
The Nabob of Bengal	16,57,600	17,12,453	-- In 1821-22 an allowance was granted to Nawab Sulut Jung, of rupees 8,333 5 4, per month, commencing 19 Nov 1820
Rajah of Benares - -	1,30,135	22,965	-- Occasioned by the Rajah of Benares not having drawn his allowance of one lac in 1821-22.
King of Delhi - -	13,20,923	13,61,078	-- In 1821-22 a payment was made in part of the accumulating stipend of the late Jehanabady Begum, amounting to 42,000 rupees.
H. H. Benaick Rao -	9,62,616	5,79,866	-- Five quarters' pension paid in 1820-21 and only three quarters in 1821-22

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

206 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE. [VI. Political

Appendix, No. 20. The Nabob of Bengal Letter from B. S. Jones, Esq. to The Right Hon. Charles Grant		1821-22.	1822-23.	
		17,12,453	22,80,600	
	Rajah of Benares - -	22,965	2,14,340	<p>-- Caused by an arrear of pension to Munney Begum of six lacs of rupees. The death of Newaib Delawar Jung, occasioned a reduction of charge in 1822-23 of 34,400 rupees.</p> <p>-- The Rajah of Benares drew for two years' arrears of pension in 1822-23.</p> <p>-- A small increase of donation to the Royal Family of Delhi.</p> <p>-- In 1821-22 the pension was paid for only three quarters, and in the following year five quarters were paid.</p>
	King of Delhi - - -	13,61,078	13,69,235	
	H H Benaick Rao - -	5,79,866	9,62,616	
		1822-23.	1823-24.	<p>-- The arrears of pension to Munney Begum in 1822-23, explains this difference</p> <p>-- Arrears charged in 1822-23</p> <p>-- - - - - Ditto</p> <p>-- - - - - Ditto.</p>
	The Nabob of Bengal	22,80,600	16,83,000	
	Rajah of Benares - -	2,14,340	1,18,653	
	King of Delhi - - -	13,69,235	13,50,553	
	H. H. Benaick Rao - -	9,62,616	7,71,241	
		1823-24.	1824-25.	<p>-- This decrease is occasioned by the allowances not having been drawn for the full period of a year</p> <p>-- Caused by the payment of an arrear in 1824-25</p> <p>-- A part allowed to remain in arrear in 1824-25</p> <p>-- One quarter's arrears added to the annual payment in 1824-25.</p>
	The Nabob of Bengal	16,83,000	15,45,933	
	Rajah of Benares - -	1,18,653	1,47,359	
	King of Delhi - - -	13,50,553	13,34,286	
	H H Benaick Rao - -	7,71,241	9,62,616	
		1824-25.	1825-26.	<p>-- Twelve months' stipend paid in 1825-26, and eleven months only in the preceding year</p> <p>-- Arrears paid in 1824-25</p> <p>-- An arrear paid up in 1825-26</p> <p>-- In 1824-25 five quarters' pension were paid.</p>
	The Nabob of Bengal	15,45,933	16,77,150	
	Rajah of Benares - -	1,47,359	1,13,548	
	King of Delhi - - -	13,34,286	13,58,925	
	H. H. Benaick Rao - -	9,62,616	7,71,241	
		1825-26.	1826-27.	<p>-- The increase was occasioned by the transfer to Nizamut deposit fund of 5,82,254 rupees, on account of Begum's pension. There was also a decrease of charge caused by the stipends not having been drawn for equal periods in the two years</p> <p>-- The Rajah of Benares allowed 30,000 rupees of his pension to remain undrawn.</p> <p>-- A part allowed to remain in arrear</p> <p>-- The Rajah omitted to draw three quarters of his pension amounting to six lacs of rupees.</p>
	The Nabob of Bengal	16,77,150	21,56,800	
	Rajah of Benares - -	1,13,548	89,946	
	King of Delhi - - -	13,58,925	13,46,007	
	H. H. Benaick Rao - -	7,71,241	1,97,116	
		1826-27.	1827-28.	<p>-- Caused by an increase in the periods of payment not only to his Highness the Nawab, but also to the several members of his family.</p> <p>-- Arrears paid by the Rajah in 1827-28</p> <p>-- Arrears charged at Delhi in 1826-27</p> <p>-- Difference of charge for three and nine months.</p>
	The Nabob of Bengal	21,56,830	22,40,350	
	Rajah of Benares - -	89,946	1,34,282	
	King of Delhi - - -	13,46,007	13,40,983	
	H. H. Benaick Rao - -	1,97,116	5,79,866	

EXPLANATION of the VARIATIONS in the several Sums paid at *Madras* for STIPENDS to Native Princes, as exhibited in the Statement, No. 1, p 202

Appendix No. 20

*Nabob of Arcot*.—The sums paid in each year under this item, comprise the allowance of one fifth share of the net revenues of the Carnatic to the Nabob, and the stipends to the families and dependents of former Nabobs.

The amount consequently varies, the Nabob being credited in the general books for his share of revenue up to July in each year.

*Rajah of Tanjore*.—The allowance to the Rajah of one-fifth of the net revenues of Tanjore, and a lac of pagodas, together with 87,500 rupees paid to the family of Ameer Sing, make up the amount under the item, which of course varies in each year.

*Nabob of Masulipatam*.—Carried to account in general books, under the head of "Masulipatam Stipends." The variations in the sum paid on this account in each year seem to be occasioned by arrears and casualties.

*Families of the late Hyder Ally and Tippoo Saib*.—The payments made at *Madras* for this purpose are debited to Bengal, in consequence of seven lacs of rupees being set apart for the support of the Mysore princes, and credited to Bengal.

Letter from  
B S Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant

EXPLANATION of the VARIATIONS in the Sums paid at *Bombay* on account of STIPENDS, as exhibited in the Statement No 1, p 202

*The late Peishwa Bajee Rao and Chimnagjee Appa*.—The variations apparent in the charges of 1825-26, and two following years on account of these persons, were not occasioned by any irregularity of payment by the commissioner at *Bittoon*, the persons having been issued by him monthly, but from an irregularity in keeping the *Bombay* Government advised of the payments actually made, which precluded then being charged in the *Bombay* accounts in a regular manner.

The fixed amount payable is 11 lacs per annum, eight lacs to the late Peishwa, and three lacs to his brother, *Chimnagjee Appa*.

*Nabob of Surat*.—These charges do not appear to require any remark.

EXPLANATIONS of the VARIATIONS in Sums received on account of SUBSIDIES from Native Princes, as exhibited in the Statement No 2, p 202.

*Rajah of Mysore*.—The only difference in the peishchush occurs in the year 1818-19, on account of adjustments made for supplies to the Mysore horse.

*Rajah of Travancore*.—No differences.

*Rajah of Cochin*.—In 1817-18, the sum paid was £39,040 rupees, being the subsidy of the current year, at the old rate of 2,76,037 rupees, and the amount of arrears 1,63,303 rupees. In 1818-19, the old rate was erroneously charged in books to the whole official year, instead of the 1st January 1819, on which the reduced rate of two lacs commenced. The difference, 25,346 rupees, is carried to account in the following years, but does not seem finally deducted till 1821-22.

Taking the aggregate of the payments since 1817-18, the sums are correctly given in the account, viz

Arrears in 1817-18, paid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs	1,63,003
Old rate	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,76,037
Ditto to December 1818	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs	1,84,025	
New rate to April 1819	-	-	-	-	-	-	66,667		
									2,70,692
New rate to 1827-28, nine years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,00,000
							Rupees	-	24,89,732

EXPLANATIONS of the VARIATIONS in Sums received on account of TRIBUTE from the Native Princes of *Central India*, as exhibited in Statement No 3, p 204

*Jypore*.—The tribute from the Rajah of Jypore was to commence from the beginning of the 2d year, 1818-19, and its amount, two lacs, was to increase yearly, at the rate of one lac to the sixth year, and then to be rated at eight lacs till the revenues exceeded 40 lacs, when 5-16ths of the excess was to be paid to Government. The great increase in the amount of tribute received in 1822-23, arises from the arrears of former years having at that period been brought to account.

(448.—VI)

D D 4

Kotah



Appendix, No. 20.

Letter From  
B. S. Jones, Esq  
to  
The Right Hon  
Charles Grant.

*Kotah and Seven Kotries* :—In 1825-26, the arrears due in the preceding year were paid up; there was also an advance on account the following year. In 1827-28, the tribute again fell into arrear

*Joudpore* :—In 1822-23 was paid an arrear of six months, due in 1819-20

*Boondee* :—Two years' tribute brought to account in the years 1820-21, 1825-26, and 1827-28

*Banswarrah* :—In 1827-28, the arrears of the two preceding years were realized.

*Pettaubghur* :—An arrear of 1826-27, charged in 1827-28

*Oodeypore* :—Contingent upon the revenue collected.

*Ruttaum, &c* :—Arrears of 1826-27, brought to account in 1827-28

(3.) A REVIEW of the System of SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE, with reference to its subser-  
vency to British Interests, and to its operation on the Character and Condition of  
the Native States in which it has been established

By the successful termination of the Pindarry and Mahratta war of 1817 to 1819, our  
power has become ostensibly paramount over every native state from the Indus to Cape  
Comorin. No dispute can arise among any of those states which we are not by treaty  
authorized to arbitrate

If the most positive and repeated inhibition of all measures having a tendency to increase  
our territorial dominion, or to extend our political connections, could have served to restrict  
the British power in the East to definite bounds, we certainly should not have passed the  
limits of the Bengal provinces, of the jaghire of Madras, and of the island of Bombay

At a period so early as the year 1768, the Court of Directors observed, "if we once pass  
these bounds, we shall be led from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security  
but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose us the whole,  
and end in our extirpation from Hindostan

"Much has been wrote from you, and from our servants in Bengal, on the necessity of  
checking the Mahrattas, which may in some degree be proper; but it is not for the Com-  
pany to take the part of umpires of Hindostan. If it had not been for the imprudent  
measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power among  
themselves, and their divisions would have left you in peace"

See Fort St George,  
Fifth Secret  
Report, Appen-  
dix, No 6.  
Letter to Bengal,  
15 Dec 1775.

At a later period the same authority (then uncontrolled) observed, "we utterly dis-  
approve and condemn offensive wars, distinguishing, however, between offensive measures  
unnecessarily undertaken with a view to pecuniary advantages, and those which the pre-  
servation of our honour, or the safety or protection of our possessions, may render abso-  
lutely necessary"

The same principles were strenuously advocated by Clavering, Monson, and Francis,  
whose opposition to the measures of Mr Hastings occasioned many able discussions upon  
questions of Indian policy. In a letter addressed by them to the Court of Directors, on  
the 30th November 1774, when they constituted the majority of the Supreme Council,  
they thus express themselves. "The general principle on which we have acted, and which  
we mean to make the rule of our future policy and conduct, is no other than that which  
your authority and that of the Legislature have equally prescribed to us, to *maintain  
peace in India*. The preservation of peace necessarily includes the vigorous defence of  
your own possessions, with such parts of the dominions of your allies as are guaranteed  
by treaty, on the other hand, it excludes every idea of conquest, either for yourselves or  
others. Adhering to this system, we never can engage your aims in any offensive opera-  
tions for the aggrandizement of one Indian state at the expense of another much less  
could we have suffered the little states, which at the same time formed your barrier, and  
looked up to you for protection, to be swallowed up by the great ones."

Remarks on the  
System of Govern-  
ment in India, 1773,  
p. 59.

The late Mr. Nathaniel Smith, who filled the chair of the East India Company, and was  
thoroughly conversant with their affairs, having weighed the arguments which had been  
adduced against the extension of our dominion, observes, "I allow it might be better upon  
the whole for this country if we could stop from all further extension of our power or  
pursuit after riches, or still better if we could go back to our original commercial establish-  
ments, either would probably ensure longer duration to our constitution provided we could  
at the same time be secure from any future attacks from our neighbours; but that is im-  
possible. The field which we must in such case leave open to them, would increase their  
strength and power to the endangering our own safety, therefore whilst we continue to  
exist, we must follow the current which impels us; we must make the best advantage of  
whatever is in our grasp, and that is all human wisdom can do for the benefit of any state.

"Let us relinquish our possessions whenever we will, other Europeans are in readiness to  
lay hold on whatever we leave; or if they could possibly be restored to the princes of the  
country, the memory of former conquests would naturally infuse such a reasonable dread of  
future attacks into the minds of these princes, that they would never rest till they had totally  
exterminated the English out of India. Nor would treaties or engagements be of any  
avail

\* The measures of the Bombay government in support of Ragobah, who had murdered his nephew,  
in order to secure for himself the office of Peshwa, involved the Company in a war with the Mahrattas,

avail with princes who have no other principles of government but what spring from those powerful passions, fear and hatred, and have no idea of national faith and honour

"It was not ambition that first tempted the Company to embark in those wars: necessity led the way, and conquest has now brought them to the choice of dominion or expulsion, self-preservation first awakened us, and conquest gained us the great advantages we enjoy, force only can preserve them, we must be all or nothing, and surely it is better to die at once, than waste away by inches."

The Act of 1784, by which a Board of Control was first established, denounced, as contrary to the wish, the honour, and the policy of Great Britain, the pursuit of schemes of conquest, and extension of dominion in India, and from that period to the present time, the same sentiment has been expressed again and again by the home authorities

Lord Cornwallis, who was the first Governor-general appointed from home after the institution of the India Board, had the entire confidence of His Majesty's Government, and proceeded to India with a full determination to act in strict conformity to the principles enjoined by the Legislature. His Lordship's administration has always been referred to as affording an example of the just and moderate system of rule which befit a British Governor. His Lordship, however, desirous as he was to preserve peace, became involved in hostilities with the Sultan of Mysore, a portion of whose territories was, at the termination of the contest, added to our dominions.

In truth the progress of our power has for its justification the exceptions which the advocates of the neutral system have themselves made to the observance of neutrality. According to Clavering, Monson, and Francis, as already quoted, "The preservation of peace necessarily includes the vigorous defence of our own dominions, with such parts of the dominions of our allies as are guaranteed by treaty."

"We must not (say they) suffer the little states which form our barrier, and look up to us for protection, to be swallowed up by the great ones"

Surrounded as we were by restless military chiefs, who maintained large bodies of irregular troops, and were always prepared to start in quest of plunder, we could not possibly have avoided war, otherwise than by permitting aggressions to be committed with impunity upon our own subjects, and upon those of allies for whose protection we had become responsible.

It was however scarcely possible, for an exotic government like ours, to maintain at all times that attitude of composure which characterizes an indigenous power whose strength is founded upon the broad basis of national sympathy and attachment. Such a power can proportion its exertion precisely to the necessity of the case which requires it, and seems as strong in its forbearance as in the full manifestation of its strength. But in our case the passive endurance of insult and injury was always liable to be attributed to a sense of weakness and fear

In tracing the progress of our territorial acquisitions, and of our political ascendancy, in India, it will appear, that to the production of this result, the subsidiary system of alliances has greatly contributed

The circumstances under which the subsidiary alliances were contracted are now to be explained

#### 1 Of the Alliances formed previously to Lord Wellesley's Administration Oude

By the decisive victory gained at Calpy, in the year 1765, we effected the entire conquest of the Vizier's dominions three days after which action, Sujah-ul-Dowlah surrendered at discretion, and from the month of May to the month of August continued a prisoner at Allahabad. Lord Clive, conceiving that the establishment of a permanent political authority in Hindostan would, upon the whole, be preferable to an extension of territory in that quarter, reinstated Sujah-ul-Dowlah in his dominions, and a treaty was concluded on the 3d August 1765, wherein it was stipulated, amongst other things, that the Company should protect the territory of Oude from all enemies by whom it might be attacked, he paying the expense of the force requisite for that purpose.

In the year 1773, Sujah-ul-Dowlah having applied for the aid of the Company's troops, a brigade, consisting of two battalions of Europeans, six battalions of sepoys, and one company of artillery, was sent to Oude, for which he was to pay at the rate of 25,20,000 rupees per annum. The expenses of the troops were to be defrayed by the Vizier from the time that they should have passed the borders of his dominions, and until they should return within those of the Company

Upon the death of Sujah-ul-Dowlah, in 1775, a new treaty was made with his son Asaph-ul-Dowlah, by which the subsidy was raised to 31,20,000 rupees per annum

The subsidiary force having been found unequal to the performance of the duties required of it, other troops were, from time to time, introduced, the expense of which pressed too heavily on the Vizier's finances. In the year 1781, it was agreed to withdraw all but the brigade, which, however, was augmented by an additional regiment of sepoys, and the subsidy raised to 34,20,000 rupees per annum.

In the year 1787, Lord Cornwallis entered into an agreement with the Vizier, which fixed the subsidy at 50 lacs, including the expense of the Residency

Lord Teignmouth (then Sir John Shore) judged it necessary, in March 1797, to add a regiment of European and one of native cavalry, to the Oude force: in consequence of which the subsidy was increased to 55,50,000 per annum; and

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

In the following year, February 1798, on the elevation of Soudut Ali to the Musnud of Oude, Lord Teignmouth finding it necessary to make a further augmentation of the subsidiary force, the Vizier was required to pay 76 lacs of rupees per annum. In order to enable Soudut Ali to defray that charge, he engaged to effect reductions in his civil and military establishments.

In this state affairs stood when Lord Wellesley acceded to the office of Governor-general.

It is to be observed, that the progressive augmentation of the subsidiary force, in Lord Teignmouth's time, was occasioned chiefly by the danger of an invasion by Zemaun Shah.

*Carnatic*

With the Nabob of Arcot our connexion originated in the disputes which took place, on the death of Unwer-ud-Deen, in the year 1749, between Chunda Saheb, and Mahomed Ali, more commonly called Walla-jah. The French took the part of Chunda Saheb, and the English that of Walla-jah, by whose exertions he was eventually established in the office of Nabob of the Carnatic, his right to which was recognised in the treaty of Paris, 1763; and also in the treaty of Versailles, 1783.

Under the Moguls, the Nabob was merely a military officer, removable at pleasure, but after the invasion of Nadir Shah, the power of the Mogul having been greatly reduced, the subordinate officers threw off their dependence on the Court of Delhi.

Walla-jah was a man of an ambitious spirit, he aspired to the Soubahdarry of the Deccan, and would gladly have cast off his dependence upon the English, with whom, however, he continued in the relation of a subsidiary ally during his life. In the war with Mysore and the Malirattas, which commenced in the year 1780, the Madras government had assumed the management of the Nabob's territories. The attention of the India Board was, soon after its first institution, directed to the state of the relations then subsisting with the Nabob, and with his tributary the Rajah of Tanjore. In a despatch proposed by the Court of Directors to be sent to the government of Madras, dated 9th December 1784, the Board introduced paragraphs explanatory of the principles on which the contributions of those princes towards the defence of the Carnatic should be regulated. With reference to the assignment of the Nabob's country, it was observed, "although we might contend that the agreement should subsist till we are fully reimbursed his Highness's proportion of the expenses of the war, yet from a principle of moderation and personal attachment to our old ally, his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic, for whose dignity and happiness we are ever solicitous, and to cement more strongly, if possible, that mutual harmony and confidence which our connexion makes so essentially necessary for our reciprocal safety and welfare, and for removing from his mind every idea of secret design on our part to lessen his authority over the internal government of the Carnatic, and the collection and administration of its revenues, we have resolved that the assignment should be surrendered, and we do accordingly direct our President, in whose name the assignment was taken, without delay to surrender the same to his Highness. But while we have adopted this resolution, we repose entire confidence in his Highness, that, actuated by the same motives of liberality, and feelings of old friendship and alliance, he will cheerfully and instantly accede to such arrangements as are necessary to be adopted for our common safety, and for preserving the respective rights and interests we enjoy in the Carnatic."

"As the administration of the British interests and connexions in India has in some respects assumed a new shape by the late Act of Parliament, and a general peace in India has been happily accomplished, the present appears to us to be the proper period, and which cannot, without great imprudence, be omitted, to settle and arrange, by a just and equitable treaty, a plan for the future defence and protection of the Carnatic, both in time of peace and war, on a solid and lasting foundation."

"For the accomplishment of this great and necessary object, we direct you, in the name of the Company, to use your utmost endeavours to impress the expediency of, and the good effects to be derived from, this measure, so strongly upon the minds of the Nabob, and the Rajah of Tanjore, as to prevail upon them, jointly or separately, to enter into one or more treaty or treaties with the Company, grounded on this principle of equity, that all the contracting parties shall be bound to contribute jointly to the support of the military force and garrisons as well in peace as in war."

"That the military peace establishment shall be forthwith settled and adjusted by the Company, in pursuance of the authorities and directions given to them by the late Act of Parliament."

"As the payment of the troops and garrisons, occasional expenses in the repairs and improvements of fortifications, and other services incidental to a military establishment, must of necessity be punctual and accurate, no latitude of personal assurance, or reciprocal confidence of either of the parties on the other, must be accepted or required. but the Nabob and the Rajah must of necessity specify particular districts and revenues for securing the due and regular payment of their contributions into the treasury of the Company, with whom the charge of the defence of the coast, and of course the power of the sword, must be exclusively entrusted, with power for the Company, in case of failure or default of such payments at the stipulated times and seasons, to enter upon and possess such districts, and to let the same to renters, to be confirmed by the Nabob and the Rajah respectively; but trusting that, in the execution of this part of the arrangement, no undue obstruction will be given

Letter from  
N. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
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given by either of those powers, we direct that this part of the treaty be coupled with a most positive assurance on our part, of our determination to support the dignity and authority of the Nabob and Rajah in the exclusive administration of the civil government and revenues of their respective countries; and further, that in case of any hostility committed against the territories of either of the contracting parties on the coast of Coromandel, the whole revenues of their said respective territories shall be considered as one common stock, to be appropriated in the common cause of their defence. That the Company, on their part, shall engage to refrain, during the war, from the application of any part of their revenues to any commercial purposes whatsoever, but apply the whole, save only the ordinary charges of their civil government, to the purposes of the war, that the Nabob and the Rajah shall, in like manner, engage, on their parts, to refrain during the war from the application of any part of their revenues, save only what shall be actually necessary for the support of themselves and the civil government of their respective countries, to any other purposes than that of defraying the expenses of such military operations as the Company may find it necessary to carry on for the common safety of the interests on the coast of Coromandel.

"And to obviate any difficulties or misunderstanding which might arise from leaving undetermined the sum necessary to be appropriated for the civil establishment of each of the respective powers, that the sum be now ascertained which is indispensably necessary to be applied to those purposes, and which is to be held sacred under every emergency, and set apart, previous to the application of the rest of the revenues, as hereby stipulated for the purposes of mutual or common defence against any enemy, for clearing the incumbrances which may have been necessarily incurred, in addition to the expenditure of those revenues, which must always be deemed part of the war establishment. Thus we think absolutely necessary, as nothing can tend so much to the preservation of peace and to prevent the renewal of hostilities, as the early putting the finances of the several powers upon a clear footing, and the showing to all other powers, that the Company, the Nabob and the Rajah, are firmly united in one common cause, and combined in one system of permanent and vigorous defence for the preservation of their respective territories and the general tranquillity.

"That the whole aggregate revenue of the contracting parties shall, during the war, be under the application of the Company, and shall continue as long after the war as shall be necessary to discharge the liabilities contracted by it: but it must be declared, that this provision shall in no respect extend to deprive either the Nabob or the Rajah of the substantial authority necessary to the collection of the revenues of their respective countries. But it is meant that they should faithfully perform the conditions of this arrangement, and if a diversion of any part of the revenues to any other than the stipulated purposes shall take place, the Company shall be entitled to take upon themselves the collection of the revenues.

"The Company are to engage, during the time they shall administer the revenues, to produce to the other contracting parties regular accounts of the application thereof to the purposes stipulated by the treaty, and faithfully apply them in support of the war.

"And, lastly as the defence of the Carnatic is thus to rest with the Company, the Nabob will be satisfied of the propriety of avoiding all unnecessary expense, and will therefore agree not to maintain a greater number of troops than shall be necessary for the support of his dignity and the splendour of the Durbar, which number shall be specified in the treaty, and if any military aid is requisite for the security and collection of his revenues, other than the fixed establishment employed to enforce the ordinary collections, and preserve the police of the country, the Company must be bound to furnish him with such aid: the Rajah of Tanjore must likewise become bound by similar engagements, and be entitled to similar aid."

In obedience to the orders above recited, the assignment was surrendered to the Nabob in the month of June 1785, and an agreement entered into with his Highness, preparatory to a permanent treaty. The Nabob agreed to pay a subsidy of four lacs of pagodas per annum, and to appropriate 12 lacs annually to the liquidation of his debts: territorial security was given for the due payment of the subsidy.

It was not until the 24th February 1787, that the definitive treaty was concluded by Sir Archibald Campbell, the new Governor of Madras. The subsidy was then fixed at nine lacs of pagodas per annum, including the Tanjore peshcush or tribute of 2,20,000 pagodas, which the Rajah was to pay to the Company instead of to the Nabob, who was to make good the balance of the nine lacs, viz, 6,80,000 pagodas.

The terms of the treaty were, in other respects, conformable to the general principles laid down in the Court's orders of 9 December 1784.

By the 15th Article, the Nabob was to be made acquainted with any negotiations in which the Madras government might be engaged relative to the interests of the Carnatic, and his Highness's name was to be inserted in all treaties relating to the Carnatic. This latter stipulation was introduced in consequence of a complaint which the Nabob had made, as to the omission of his name in the treaty concluded at Mangalore with Tippoo Sultan in the year 1784. His Highness, on his part, engaged not to enter into any political negotiations or controversies with any state or person without the approbation of the Madras government. About October 1786, the Nabob, without the privity of the Madras government, had offered to lend the Peshwa 13,500 sepoy for the purpose of enabling the Maharrattas to enforce certain demands upon Tippoo Sultan; and, although the proposed measure was not actually completed, it was highly expedient to restrain the Nabob from a repetition of conduct which might involve the Company in disputes contrary to their intentions.

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Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

The treaty with Tanjore is dated the 10th April 1787. The Rajah's subsidy was fixed at four lacs of pagodas per annum. The 16th Article of the Treaty is as follows:—  
“And whereas his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic has, by a solemn deed, assigned over to the United East India Company, the arrears of peshcush due, and the annual peshcush which shall henceforth become due to his Highness, in part payment of his debt to the Company, his Excellency the Rajah of Tanjore, willing to manifest his regard to the Company, and upright intention towards the Nabob of the Carnatic, does hereby cheerfully agree to pay into the hands of the India Company, for the account of the Nabob of the Carnatic, the whole annual appropriations to his Highness, specified in the 14th Article, upon the President and Council of Fort St George, indemnifying his Excellency for the amount of all such monies as they shall receive on that account. In like manner the Company shall be accountable to his Excellency on account of the money received on behalf of the creditors.”

The payments stipulated by the 14th Article were On account of

						<i>Pagodas</i>	
Arrears of Peshcush	-	-	-	-	-	1,05,775	per annum.
Peshcush	-	-	-	-	-	1,14,225	
						<hr/>	
						2,20,000	
For the European creditors	-	-	-	-	-	80,000	per ditto
						<hr/>	
						<i>Pgs</i> 3,00,000	

Early in the year 1790, the Company became involved in a war with Tippoo Sultan, who had made an attack upon their ally the Rajah of Travancore.

The Nabob having failed in his payments, Lord Cornwallis determined to assume the management of the country and to employ Company's servants to make the collections under the inspection of the Nabob's officers. The Carnatic was accordingly assumed on the 7th August 1790, as was also the country of the Rajah of Tanjore.

Lord Cornwallis stated it as his opinion, that it would be a happy event for all parties, if the Nabob could be prevailed upon to surrender his country to the Company, and to retire upon a pension, as the only means of putting an end to the evils of divided government.

After the conclusion of the Mysore war in 1792, the territories of the Nabob and of the Rajah were restored to them, and new treaties entered into.

The Nabob's subsidy was continued at nine lacs of pagodas per annum, in part payment of which the Company were to collect the peshcush of certain poligars, estimated at 2,64,70½ pagodas per annum.

The Rajah of Tanjore's subsidy was reduced from four to three and a half lacs of pagodas besides which, however, he was to continue to pay a further sum of 1,14,285 pagodas for peshcush, which the Nabob had relinquished to the Company. It was not without considerable reluctance that the Nabob transferred to the Company his seignioral authority over Tanjore.

By the treaties of 1792 provision was made for the security of the subsidiary and other payments due from the respective parties, certain districts were rendered liable to be entered upon in case of failure, and, in the event of war, the whole of the territories were to be assumed by the Company, a suitable allowance being reserved for the maintenance of the Nabob and the Rajah.

#### Travancore.

The alliance with the Rajah of Travancore was of an early date. In the articles of pacification with Hyder Ali in 1769, the Rajah of Travancore was included as an ally of the Company. The same care was taken of his interests in the treaty of peace made with Tippoo Sultan in 1784. To these treaties the Travancore state owed its security for a series of years, from the very unequal power and inordinate ambition of those rulers of the Mysore country; and when, at length, Tippoo, disregarding the articles of the treaty made with him in 1784, attacked the territory of Travancore in the year 1790, the Company entered into a war with that prince in defence of their ally, whose safety was again secured by the peace made with Tippoo in 1790.

In the year 1795, an engagement entered into with the Rajah of Travancore, stipulated, that a British force should always be ready for his defence against any war of aggression made upon him. This had particular respect to the danger to which he still stood exposed from the more powerful neighbouring state of Mysore, which rendered the protection of the Company essential to him, and to that protection he owed the continuance of his independence.

The preliminary engagement above alluded to was, in the year 1797, followed by a definitive treaty. The Rajah agreed to pay annually, both in peace and war, a sum equivalent to the expense of three battalions of sepoys, together with a company of European artillery, and two companies of lascars; which force was at the Rajah's option, to be stationed either in his country, or within the Company's possessions, and if that force should at any time prove to be unequal to the protection of the Rajah's country, additional troops were to be supplied without any extra charge to the Rajah.

In time of war, the Rajah engaged to furnish such aid in infantry and cavalry as he could

could afford, which, whilst employed by the Company (within specified limits), were to be maintained at their expense.

The 5th Article was as follows:—"As the Company do only engage to defend and protect the country dependent on the Rajah of Travancore against unprovoked attacks, it is therefore to be clearly and distinctly understood between the parties, that the rajahs, present and future, are not to commit any hostile aggression towards any other state, whether Indian or European, and in the event of the Rajah or his successors having any disputes of a political nature or tendency, it is necessary that the same shall be transmitted by the latter to the honourable Company's Government, who will determine thereon according to justice and policy and mutual concert

*The Nizam.*

When Nizam-ool-Moolk, the founder of the state of Hyderabad, died, in the year 1748, his authority extended from the Nerbudda to Trichinopoly, and from Masulpatnam to Bejjapoor. But his death was immediately followed by domestic dissensions, and by the destructions in the Carnatic, in which the French and English were engaged as supporters of the rival nabobs. Nazir Jung was assassinated at Arcot in 1750, and Mozuffur Jung, his successor, who was murdered in the following year, had already become so conscious of his inability to maintain himself with the resources of his own government, that he had subsidized a body of French troops. The Musnud was then contested between Ghazee-ood-Deen and Salabut Jung, Ghazee-ood-Deen was poisoned by the mother of his rival, and Salabut Jung succeeded to the government. He was supported, however, entirely by the French party at his court, which exercised a more decided control than has been attempted by us, and when M. Bussy was recalled to the Carnatic by M. Lally, Salabut Jung foresaw the ruin of his affairs, and actually shed tears when he parted with him. The government was almost immediately usurped by Nizam Ali, and Salabut Jung, after several ineffectual attempts to escape from the confinement in which he had been placed, was at length put to death in 1763. In the short space of thirteen years, therefore, three reigning princes, and one competitor for the Musnud, had successively died violent deaths. The long reign of Nizam Ali, though less disastrous to the prince, was even more injurious to the country than the stormy period which had preceded it. The government of Hyderabad had been worsted in every war in which it had been engaged between the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk and the treaty of Paungul, 1790, with the single exception of a short campaign against the Mahrattas, which Nizam Ali conducted with some success in 1761, the result had in every instance been attended with a loss of territory or of revenue.

The foregoing statement is taken from a letter addressed by Mr Russell, then Resident at Hyderabad, to Lord Hastings, dated November 24, 1819.

In the beginning of the year 1765, the English, and their ally the Nabob of the Carnatic, were summoned to action by the irruption of Nizam Ali into the Carnatic, which he plundered and laid waste, he, however, felt no desire to fight, and, on the appearance of the allied forces, hastily retreated to his own country.

At this time the British Government had acquired from the Mogul the grant of the Northern Circars, a country which fell within the government of the Nizam, and was managed by a deputy or commissioner of his appointment. To take possession of the Circars, General Calliaud marched with the troops of the Carnatic, expelled the French who had been stationed there by Salabut Jung, and found little opposition on the part of the rajahs and polygars. The Nizam, who was then making head against the Mahrattas, no sooner heard of these operations than he returned to his capital and prepared to invade the Carnatic. To avert a war, the Madras government deputed Calliaud to Hyderabad with full power to negotiate, and a treaty was concluded on the 12th Nov 1766, by which the Company agreed to pay to the Nizam an annual pesheush or tribute for the Circars. The Company further engaged to hold a body of troops in readiness "to settle, in every thing right and proper, the affairs of his Highness's government." The exploit in which these troops were first to be employed was the reduction of the fort of Bangalore, belonging to Hyder Ali, with whom the English were upon hostile terms. But Hyder found means to draw off the Nizam, and to conclude with him an alliance, in consequence of which they united their forces at Bangalore, and in August 1767, began to make incursions into the Carnatic. Lieut.-Colonel Smith, who commanded the detachment which, in virtue of the treaty of 1766, had been supplied to the Nizam, was attacked by the joint forces of his Highness and Hyder, and compelled to retreat to Tinomalee, whence, however, the Colonel subsequently sallied forth and gained some advantage over the enemy. Nizam Ali, whose resources could ill endure a protracted contest, grew heartily sick of the war and, during the rains, signified his desire to negotiate. As a security against deception, Colonel Smith insisted that he should first separate his troops from those of Hyder. But in the mean time the fair season returned, and the Colonel having received reinforcements, attacked and defeated the enemy between Amboor and Wanumbaddy, when Hyder and his ally fled to Caverypatnam. This disaster quickened the decision of the Nizam, who now promptly separated his troops from the Mysoreans, and commenced a negotiation, which terminated in a treaty dated the 26 February 1768. The Nabob of the Carnatic was a party in this treaty, which, among other provisions, fixed the tribute payable for the Circars at seven lacs of rupees per annum, and stipulated that two battalions of sepoys, and six pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans, should be supplied to the Nizam, whenever he might require them, the expense of which was to be borne by his Highness so long as they should be employed in his service.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right. hon.  
Charles Grant.

The Presidency of Madras held up to the Directors the necessity of supporting the Nizam as a barrier against the Mahrattas; a policy of which the Directors entirely disapproved, wishing "to see the Indian princes remain as a check upon one another, without our interfering."

In the year 1779, the Government of Madras prevailed upon Bazelet Jung, the Nizam's brother, to dismiss some French troops which he had taken into his service, and to replace them by a British detachment. He was, moreover, induced to grant to the English the Guntoor Circar in lease. Guntoor is one of the Northern Circars; but the Company were not to have possession of it during the life of Bazelet Jung. These proceedings were taken without consulting the Nizam, who was seriously offended, and charged the Madras Council with having violated the treaty of 1768. The Government of Bengal severely condemned the conduct of Madras, and, for this and other offences, the Court of Directors dismissed the governor, Sir William Rumbold, and part of the council.

The Nizam, now connected with Hyder, threatened to attack Bazelet Jung unless he annulled his engagement with the English, and towards the end of the year 1780, Nizam Ali acceded to a treaty between Hyder and the Mahrattas for a system of combined hostilities against the English, who had espoused the cause of Ragobah, who, in opposition to the decision of the Mahratta chiefs, endeavoured to obtain the vacant office of Peshwa.

The Supreme Government made restitution of the Guntoor Circar, and tried to conciliate the Nizam, who, partly from poverty and weakness, partly from jealousy of Hyder, and partly from the assurances which he had received from Bengal, had refrained from taking an active part in the war. Towards its close in the year 1784, Mr Hastings had entered into a negotiation with Nizam Ali for obtaining from that prince a body of his horse, and for ceding to him in return the Northern Circars; but having submitted the scheme to Lord Macartney, who had arrived at Madras before the arrangements were concluded, that nobleman's reasonings induced Mr Hastings to abandon the scheme.

Among the instructions with which Lord Cornwallis was furnished in 1786, for his guidance as Governor-general, was an explicit order to demand the surrender of the Guntoor Circar. Bazelet Jung had died in 1782, but Nizam Ali retained possession of the Circar, and the English had withheld the payment of the peshchaw.

On his arrival in India, Lord Cornwallis was deterred from obeying immediately, the peremptory order which he had received, respecting the Guntoor Circar. His Lordship saw reason to believe that the agitation of the subject would offend the Nizam, and that Tippoo would take advantage of the dispute to establish his influence at the Court of Hyderabad. Moreover, apprehensions were at that time entertained of a rupture with France. In 1788, however, the state of affairs being apparently more favourable, the question was brought forward. The Nizam, preferring the friendship of the English to a connexion with either Tippoo or the Mahrattas, (to one or other of whom he appeared likely to fall a prey,) manifested an unexpected readiness to comply with the Governor-general's demand, and the Guntoor Circar was accordingly surrendered in the month of September 1788.

From contracting a more intimate connexion with the Nizam, Lord Cornwallis felt himself restrained, not only by the legislative enactment which inhibited the formation of new alliances except in the event of war, but also by the fear of exciting the jealousy of the Mahrattas, with whom his Lordship wished to keep upon good terms. An expedient, however, was resorted to, which was intended to meet the Nizam's wishes without violating the law, or risking the enmity of the Mahrattas. This was, to consider the old treaty of 1768 as being still in force, and to give to the clauses of that treaty such an extent of meaning as would satisfy the demands of the Nizam. In the treaty of 1768, it was stipulated, that the battalions and cannon should be lent to his Highness "whenever the necessity of the Company's affairs would permit." It was now agreed that they should be furnished when applied for, under one limitation, namely, that they should not be employed against the Company's allies, among whom were specifically mentioned the Mahratta chiefs, the Nabobs of Oude and Aroor, and the Rajahs of Travancore and Tanjore. As Tippoo Sultan was not named in this exceptive list, he might justly have taken alarm at the implied discretion of employing the force eventually against him.

7 July 1789.

The engagement thus contracted with the Nizam was contained in a letter from Lord Cornwallis to his Highness, which, however, was declared to be equal to a treaty.

Towards the close of the year 1789, Tippoo Sultan having attacked the lines of our ally the Rajah of Travancore, Lord Cornwallis made immediate preparations for war; and being now actually relieved from all restraints with regard to new connexions, his Lordship proceeded to negotiate both with the Nizam and with the Mahrattas. The Nizam was anxious that the treaty should contain an article for the unlimited guaranty of his country, from an apprehension that while engaged against Tippoo the Mahrattas might make an attack upon him. Lord Cornwallis did not see fit to comply with the Nizam's request, but assured his Highness that he would find the British Government well disposed, at a proper opportunity, to take such further steps for drawing the connexion closer between the two states, as might be consistent with good faith and a due attention to subsisting engagements with its other allies.

The treaty with the Nizam was signed on the 4th of July, and that with the Poonas Durbar on the 1st June 1790. The contracting parties bound themselves vigorously to prosecute the war, not to make peace except with mutual consent, and to make an equal partition of their conquests. Tippoo having been compelled, by the treaty of peace, dictated under the walls of Seringapatam, to cede the half of his dominions, a partition of them was accordingly made between the allies in three equal shares.

The

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

The force supplied by Lord Cornwallis to the Peshwa was two battalions of sepoy, to serve during the war. By the separate agreement with the Nizam, a detachment of from four to six battalions was to be sent to his Highness. The fourth Article of the agreement was as follows.

"Whenever a letter from Lord Cornwallis, requiring the dismissal of the said detachment, shall arrive, provided it is at leisure from service, and also whenever his Highness shall think proper to dismiss it, there shall be no hesitation on either side."

In the letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam above alluded to, as equivalent to a treaty, it was "agreed that in future either party, without a breach of treaty, should be at liberty to receive or send vakeels, to correspond with any powers in the Deckan, in such manner as might be expedient for the benefit of their own affairs, under the condition that the object of such intercourse or correspondence be not hostile to either of the governments."

After the termination of the Mysore war, two battalions continued with the Nizam. Upon the peace of Seringapatam, Hurry Punt, one of the Mahratta generals, pressed Lord Cornwallis to let the Peshwa subsidize in future a corps of British troops, in like manner as the Nizam then did. Whether he was so authorized by the Peshwa is not known.

Lord Cornwallis, although the Mahratta general urged it strongly, declined the proposal, thinking it hazardous to mix up his government in the unsettled policy of the Mahratta states.

It has been already stated, that the Nizam had manifested an anxiety that the treaty of 1790 should contain an article for the unlimited guaranty of his country, from an apprehension of the future hostility of the Mahrattas. Soon after Lord Teignmouth's accession to power, circumstances occurred which justified that apprehension. The seeds of rupture existed in the nature of the political relations between the Nizam and the Mahrattas. An unsettled account was always pending, consisting partly of arrears of choute, and partly of portions of the revenues of territory situated within the Nizam's boundary, but which the Mahrattas claimed the right of collecting through their own officers. The mixed nature of this connection had afforded to the Mahrattas the means of establishing a powerful ascendancy over the government of Hyderabad, which had been with much difficulty shaken off when the Nizam renewed the alliance with the English in the year 1788.

When, in the year 1794, the Mahrattas prepared to enforce their claims upon the Nizam, Lord Teignmouth proffered his mediation, which, having been rejected by the Poonia Durbar, hostilities ensued. In February 1795, a corps, under the command of Dowlat Rao Scindia, marched towards the Nizam's camp. On the 11th of March he was attacked, and a general action ensued, in which both parties were thrown into some confusion, and neither obtained any decided advantage. The Nizam, influenced by the fears of his women, who attended him in the action, retreated during the night, and took shelter in the small fort of Kurdlah, which is surrounded with hills except in one part, this part the Mahrattas immediately occupied, and thus completely hemmed in the Nizam's army, and cut off his supplies. After remaining for some weeks in this situation, his Highness was obliged to make peace on very humiliating conditions. He bound himself to discharge annually the choute of Adoni and Kurnoul, to pay three crore and 10 lacs of rupees in money, and to cede territory yielding an annual revenue of 34½ lacs of rupees. His minister, Meer Allum, was delivered up as a hostage, and carried to Poona.

When encamped at Beder, prior to the action, the Nizam earnestly solicited that the two battalions of our sepoy should join his camp, but the Governor general refused to comply with his request, fearing to offend the Mahrattas. It was, however, so arranged, that while the Nizam was at war, the Company's battalions should be employed in preserving the tranquillity of his Highness's dominions.

After the convention of Kurdlah was settled, Nizam Ali returned to Hyderabad, and the Mahrattas to their own country, which they had hardly reached when the Peshwa's palace became vacant by the death of Madhoo Row, who was killed by a fall from the top of his palace. This accident occurred on the 27th October 1795.

The Nizam, on his arrival at Hyderabad, dismissed the Company's battalions, and proceeded to augment certain corps commanded by French officers, which had been some time in his service. The battalions, however, had scarcely retired from the Nizam's capital when he pressed their instant return, in consequence of the flight and rebellion of his son Ally Jah, whose capture and death took place before the battalions reached Hyderabad. But although the danger which occasioned their recall had, thus, passed away, the Nizam thought proper to retain the Company's battalions in his service.

The untimely death of Madhoo Row gave rise to party disputes respecting a successor to the office of Peshwa. The two sons of the late Ragobah, Bajee Row and Chinnajee Appah, stood in the line of succession; but Nana Furnavese, who had for many years been at the head of affairs at Poona, kept these youths in a state of confinement, intending to set them aside, and to procure the adoption, by Madhoo Row's widow, of a Brahmin infant, during whose minority he hoped to exercise the power of regent. The Governor-general preserved the strictest neutrality upon this occasion; but Azim-ul-Omrak, the Nizam's minister, sided with the Nana Furnavese, and, during the time that his party predominated obtained a remission of the pecuniary fine which had been imposed upon the Nizam by the convention of Kurdlah, and also a promise that the territory ceded on that occasion should be restored, and that the payment of the Bider choute should be suspended, at least during the life of Nizam Ali. Such were the concessions granted to the state of Hyderabad by the Treaty of Mhar. The parties opposed to the scheme of the Nana Furnavese



vease, however, succeeded in establishing Bajee Row in the Peshwaship, and when he became settled in power, the Mahratta Durbar repented of the liberal price which they had agreed to pay for services which altered circumstances had rendered useless. Arinul-Omrâh was detained at Poona until June 1797, when a new arrangement was made, according to which one-fourth of the cessions, territorial and pecuniary, as settled by the convention of Kurlah was to be made good by the Nizam.

The foregoing \* narrative will serve to exhibit the rise and progress of our subsidiary alliances with the several native states of India to the commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration. Previously to which period of time, it will have appeared, that the subsidiary system existed in full force in Oude and in the Carnatic, and also in Travancore. The connexion with the Nizam, as existing in the year 1794, cannot be regarded as properly coming within that class of alliances, since it left him at full liberty to form political relations without consulting us; and did not impose upon us the general obligation of defending him from all external and internal enemies.

## 2. Of the Alliances formed during the Administration of Lord Wellesley. Nizam

REDUCED in reputation as well as in real strength, the Nizam no longer placed that confidence which he had formerly reposed in the friendship of the British Government; and when, in April 1798, Lord Wellesley assumed the supreme government of British India, the Nizam had, in despair, thrown himself into the hands of a French adventurer named Raymond, who, with others of the same nation, commanded the largest and most efficient part of his Highness's military force. The hostile designs of Tippoo Sultan were now ripe for execution, and Lord Wellesley felt the necessity of adopting prompt measures for recovering our lost influence at the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad. Azem-ul-Omrâh the Nizam's minister, who enjoyed a plentitude of power, was fully disposed to listen to his Lordship's overtures for a more intimate connexion, and, although the Nizam anticipated that such an alliance would eventually involve the loss of political independence, he nevertheless became convinced that even this result, however unpalatable, was preferable to a constant exposure to the treacherous intrigues and unlimited demands of the Mahrattas, and the undisguised ambition of Tippoo Sultan. He was therefore induced to give his consent to the dismissal of the French corps and the increase of the British subsidiary force. A treaty was accordingly concluded on the 1st September 1798, by which the subsidiary force was augmented by the addition of four to the two battalions fixed by the former treaty. The subsidy to be paid by the Nizam for the support of the whole was increased from 57,713 rupees to 2,01,425 rupees per month, or per annum 24,17,100 rupees.

The Nizam engaged to disband the French corps, to the command of which a M. Perron had succeeded on the death of Raymond.

The British Government undertook to arbitrate the points in dispute between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona.

A corps of four battalions of sepoy, under the command of Colonel Roberts, which with their guns had been stationed on the Nizam's frontier, marched, as soon as the treaty was concluded, to Hyderabad, where, on the 10th October, 1798, it joined the two battalions formerly stationed there. Some hesitation was manifested on the part of the Nizam and his minister to break up the French corps, but a movement of the British troops which menaced an attack on the French camp induced the Nizam's government to issue a proclamation, informing the native troops of Perron's corps that his Highness had dismissed their European officers from his service. A violent mutiny ensued, of which immediate advantage was taken to surround their cantonments; and, in the course of a few hours, a corps, whose numbers amounted to nearly 14,000 men, and who had in their possession a train of artillery, and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores, was completely disarmed without one life having been lost. The French officers were not treated as prisoners of war, but were sent to England and thence to France†.

By measures thus wisely adopted by Lord Wellesley, and skillfully executed under his Lordship's instructions, the Nizam was enabled to perform the duties of an ally in the memorable war which terminated in the entire conquest of Mysore, and in the death of Tippoo Sultan. As a reward for his exertions, the Nizam obtained a considerable share of the conquered territory.

Lord Wellesley's endeavours to restore the alliance with the Peshwa were not so successful. Sindia, who had acquired a dominant influence in the councils of Poona, was supposed to be more inclined to take part with than against Tippoo.

As the Nizam's country now constituted the only barrier between the British possessions and the Mahratta empire on the side of Mysore and the Carnatic, Lord Wellesley deemed it necessary to draw still closer the bonds of the alliance with his Highness. A regiment of cavalry had, in the year 1799, been added to the subsidiary force. By a treaty concluded on the 12th October 1800 the subsidiary force was again augmented by the addition of two battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, making in the whole 8,000 infantry and 1,000 horse: but by an arrangement made 29 May 1803, a regiment of European was substituted

\* Drawn from Mill's History of India; Sir John Malcolm's Political History; Treaties, and manuscript documents.

† Sir J. Malcolm's Political History.

stituted for two battalions of native infantry. In order to prevent discussions upon pecuniary matters, and to place the alliance upon a firm and durable basis, Lord Wellesley prevailed upon the Nizam to cede in perpetuity, and in full sovereignty, all the territory which he had acquired by the Mysore wars of 1769 and 1799, which cession was regarded as an equivalent for subsidy. His Highness also consented to such exchanges of districts as serve to constitute a more definite line of demarcation between the territories of the two states.

By the treaty of 1800, the British Government engaged to defend the state of Hyderabad against foreign aggression, and to enforce the claims of the Nizam upon the zemindars of Shorapore and Gurdwall, and any other of his Highness's subjects who might revolt from their allegiance. In the event of war the subsidiary force (with the exception of two battalions to be kept near the Nizam's person) was to be employed against the enemy, and his Highness was to furnish a contingent of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse, and to afford all further aid which might be necessary, to the extent of his means. He was restricted from entering into negotiations with other states, and from committing hostilities, without the knowledge and consent of the British Government, and in the event of differences arising between his Highness and another power, to refer the matter to the British Government, and to abide by its decision. It was agreed on the part of the British Government, that they would in no instance interfere with the Nizam's children, relations, or subjects, with respect to whom they would always consider him absolute.

The foregoing arrangement with the Nizam has been often more particularly described, as it was intended by Lord Wellesley to serve as a model for the alliances which it was his Lordship's purpose to extend to the principal Mahatta states.

As an isolated measure the alliance of 1800 with the Nizam was entirely approved at home, because it was manifestly expedient to substitute British for French influence in the councils of a state which was incapable, without foreign aid, of preserving its territories against the continual incursions of the Mahrattas.

#### Mysore.

In deliberating upon the disposal of the conquered territory of Mysore, Lord Wellesley took into consideration the schemes of an equal division of it between either the English and the Nizam, or between the English, the Nizam and the Mahrattas. His Letter to the Court of Directors, dated the 3d August 1799, assigns the reasons which induced his Lordship to reject both of these schemes.

"The war" (observes his Lordship) "had not been undertaken in pursuit of schemes of conquest, aggrandizement of territory or augmentation of revenue. In proportion to the magnitude and lustre of our success, it became a more urgent duty to remember, that a power, founded in the gratification of any ambitious or inordinate view, could neither be advantageous, honourable nor secure."

"The approved policy, interests, and honour of the British nation, required that the settlement of the extensive kingdom subjected to our disposal should be founded on principles acceptable to the inhabitants of the conquered territories, just and conciliatory towards the contiguous native states, and indulgent to every party in any degree affected by the consequences of our success."

Upon these principles Lord Wellesley determined to establish a central and separate government of Mysore, under British protection, and to confer this new principality upon the surviving head of the ancient Hindoo family, whose authority had been usurped by Hyder Ali.

The rest of the territory, with the exception of a share reserved for the Peshwa,\* was immediately divided between the Company and Nizam Ali.

Kistna Raj Oodhaver, a child three years of age, was raised to the throne of his ancestors, and Purneah, a Brahmin of great ability and high reputation, who had been the chief financial minister of Tippoo, was appointed dewan or minister to the young prince.

With the newly constituted government of Mysore, a treaty was concluded on the 8th July 1799, of which the following are the principal stipulations:—

The Company were bound to maintain a military force for the defence of the kingdom of Mysore; the Rajah to pay an annual *subsidy* of nine lacs of pagodas (about 360,000*l.*) for the support of this force. In the event of extraordinary expenses being incurred for the defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or in preparations for hostilities against any enemy of the two states, the Rajah of Mysore was to contribute towards the expenditure in such proportion as should appear to the Governor-general of India, after an attentive consideration of his means, to be just and equitable.

Under the declared resolution of providing against the possibility of the Company's government suffering by any failure of the funds appropriated for the support of the subsidiary force, it was stipulated, that on such an event appearing probable, the British Government should have a right to introduce such regulations and ordinances as it might think fit to prescribe for the management of the Rajah's revenues, or to assume the direct management of such parts of the Mysore country as might be necessary to render the funds fixed for the maintenance of the troops efficient and available. On the part of the British Government,

\* The Peshwa having pertinaciously refused to agree to Lord Wellesley's overtures of alliance, the reserved territory was divided between the Company and the Nizam.

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ment, it was agreed to render to the Rajah a true and faithful account of the revenues so assumed; and it was stipulated, that, under no possible circumstances, should the annual receipts of the Rajah be less than one lac of pagodas, territorial revenue (40,000*l.*), and one fifth of the produce of the territories ceded to him by the treaty of Mysore.

In this treaty the Rajah agreed to refrain from all communication or correspondence with any foreign state, and to admit no European foreigners into his country or service. He also agreed to permit the British Government to garrison with its own troops such fortresses in the country of Mysore as it might think necessary to the fulfilment of its engagements for protecting and defending that kingdom.

*Oude.*

In order of time, the next change in our political relations effected by Lord Wellesley was with Saadut Ali, the Nabob Vizier of Oude. As already observed, the character of the alliance, as concluded by Lord Teignmouth in the year 1798, was strictly subsidiary. The Vizier placed his entire dependence upon the British Government for protection against both external and internal danger, and consequently relinquished his right to treat with other powers except in concurrence with the will of the protecting state. His Excellency indeed confessed that he could not trust even his personal security, to his own troops; and at a time when, owing to a threatened invasion of India by Zemaun Shah, it was necessary to move the subsidiary force to the north-western frontier of Oude, Saadut Ali earnestly requested that a portion of that force should be retained at Lucknow.

Sir James Craig, the Commander-in-chief, who had placed himself at the head of the troops which had been assembled for the defence of the frontier, wrote in the following terms to Lord Wellesley:

"I know not what to say with respect to the Nabob's troops. I would be content that they should be useless, but I dread their being dangerous. Unless some step is taken with regard to them, I should be almost as unwilling to leave them behind me as I should be to leave a fortress of the enemy. The Nabob is highly unpopular, and of all his subjects, I believe he would least expect attachment from his army. Your Lordship judges most rightly, that, in its present shape, no sort of service can be expected from the Nabob's army, and I am confident that without a total change in the policy of the government, and in the manners of the people, there exist no possible means by which it can be rendered such as can merit that the smallest degree of confidence should be placed in it. The money now expended on the Nabob's army is thrown away, and can only be rendered subservient to the object of general defence by being appropriated to the increase of the Company's army. The Nabob has repeatedly declared to me that we must not reckon on deriving the smallest assistance from his troops. He said that their arms in general were scarcely serviceable, that there was no subordination amongst them, and that no reliance was to be placed on their fidelity. He expressed considerable apprehensions with respect to the Rohillas, who, he repeatedly said, he had no doubt would take up arms the moment they could make themselves sure of support by Zemaun Shah's approach. He was extremely pressing to have some of the Company's troops left for his own protection; indeed he almost made it a condition."

Lord Wellesley's anxiety to correct the evils prevalent in the civil and military administration of Oude was increased by the existence, in the Doonab, of a powerful force in the service of Sindia, which had been disciplined by French officers, and was then commanded by M. Peron.

With reference to the report which Lord Wellesley had received from Sir James Craig, his Lordship, in a letter to the resident at Lucknow, dated January 1799, observed, that the inference to be drawn from that statement was, that the defence of the Vizier's dominions against foreign attack, as well as their internal tranquillity, could only be secured by a reduction of his own useless, if not dangerous troops, and by a proportionate augmentation of the British force in his pay. "I am convinced," said his Lordship, "that this measure might be effected with a degree of advantage to his Excellency's finances, little inferior to that which it promises to his military establishments, and that his Excellency might obtain from the Company a force of real efficiency at an expense far below that which he now incurs in maintaining his own army in its present defective condition."

After a protracted negotiation, in the course of which the urgent importunities of the Governor-general were resisted to the utmost by Saadut Ali, he at length gave way, and subscribed to the terms of the treaty of 10th November 1801. By this treaty the Vizier ceded, in lieu of subsidy, a portion of territory yielding *agross* revenue of 1,35,23,474 rupees, the *net* revenue being taken at 1,30,12,529 rupees. Of this amount 76 lacs were for the subsidy, as settled by Lord Teignmouth's arrangement of 1798, and 54,12,929 rupees to cover the expense of the addition force.

The Vizier's troops formerly consisted of 10,800 horse, 55 battalions of infantry, a considerable body of artillery, and 10,000 armed peons.

By the 3d article of the treaty of 1801, he was to retain only four battalions of infantry, one battalion of mughals and muwatees, 2,000 horse, 300 golundazees, such numbers of armed peons as should be deemed necessary for revenue purposes, and a few horsemen and subjects to attend the persons of the amirs.

The authority of the British Government over the remainder of the Vizier's country was provided for in the following terms:

"And the Honourable the East India Company hereby guarantee to his Excellency the Vizier, and to his heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain to his

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his Excellency after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of his and *their* authority within the said dominions. His Excellency engages that he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and prosperity of the inhabitants; and his Excellency will always advise with, and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company."

A Board of Commissioners was immediately appointed (at the head of which the Honourable Henry Wellesley was placed) for the provisional settlement and administration of the Ceded Districts.

Lord Wellesley himself visited Lucnow in January 1802, and endeavoured to reconcile the Vizier to the new arrangements, and to persuade him to make the necessary reductions in his military establishments, and to correct the abuses prevalent in his civil administration.

Among the cessions obtained from the Vizier was the tribute from the Nabob of Furruckabad, a petty state inhabited chiefly by Patans, whose turbulence had impaired the resources of the country. The Nabob of Furruckabad was prevailed upon (20 June 1802) to transfer the province in perpetual sovereignty to the Company, on the conditions that a stipend of 1,08,000 rupees per annum should be settled upon him and his heirs for ever; that he should be treated with the respect and honour due to his rank, that the houses, gardens, villages, and all other property which had belonged exclusively to his father, should be secured to him; and that certain allowances, amounting in the whole to 18,000 rupees per annum, should be made to the different members of his family, and to his dependents.

In a despatch, dated the 19th November 1803, the Commissioners for the Affairs of India (Lord Castlereagh being President) expressed, through the Secret Committee, their approbation of the treaty of 1801. From that despatch the following is an extract:

"The Company being now bound to the defence and protection of his Highness's dominions against all enemies, foreign or domestic, without further charge to the Vizier, the ample revenue which remains to his Highness, entirely applicable to the expenses of his civil government, will, we trust, place him beyond the reach of pecuniary embarrassment, and enable his Highness to put his just debts in a course of progressive liquidation.

"We also entertain a sanguine hope that the Vizier, relieved from the embarrassment as well as the charge of a licentious, and worse than useless army, and rescued, by the dissolution of the greater proportion of that force, from the most abject dependence on his own powerful subjects, at whose disposal those mutinous and disaffected troops chiefly were, will now, supported and defended by a disciplined and orderly force, apply himself with energy to the internal administration of his affairs. His Highness is well aware of the wretched condition to which his country has been reduced by the inefficiency and vices of its government. He has now the means of remedying these defects, and of providing for his own ease, and for the happiness of his subjects. We trust his Highness will avail himself of so favourable an occasion of doing himself honour, and we rely with confidence that our Supreme Government will, at all times, afford to his Highness their utmost countenance and support in the prosecution of so laudable a purpose."

The Court of Directors formed a judgment very different from that of the Board upon the merits of Lord Wellesley's arrangement with the Vizier, but their proposed strictures were not forwarded to India, the Board having withheld their sanction from the Court's paragraphs.

#### Guzerat.

The rise of the Guicowar's power in Guzerat was nearly contemporaneous with that of the Peshwa in the Deccan. Pillajee Guicowar was patel, or managing proprietor of a village, and afterwards an officer under the Mahatta governor of Guzerat, A.D. 1731. After many struggles and intrigues, he established his own power in that province. Pillajee was succeeded, in 1747, by his son Durnajee, who was compelled by the Peshwa Bullajee Rao, to cede one half of his territories, and to hold the other half in dependence on the state of Poona. Durnajee died in the year 1768. The succession was disputed, but Futteh Sing having agreed to pay a large sum to the Peshwa, was established in the government. He was assisted by British troops in expelling his rival. At the peace of 1782 with the Mahattas, concluded through the mediation of Mahadajee Sindia, it was stipulated that the jaghite of Futteh Sing should be guaranteed to him by the Company, he paying the same obedience to the Peshwa as had before that transaction been customary. Futteh Sing died in 1789; his successor, Manajee, died in 1792. To him succeeded Govind Rao, on whose death, in September 1800, the government devolved upon his eldest legitimate son, Anund Rao.

Anund Rao was a prince of weak intellects. His brother Canojee exercised the power of the state in the ostensible capacity of dewau, from which station, however, he was specially ejected by Rowba, one of the late Rajah's ministers. The partizans of Canojee and of Rowba, respectively solicited the support of the British Government. Pending that reference Mulhar Rao, first cousin of the late Govind Rao, advanced with a considerable force in aid of Canojee. Mr Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, deeming it politic to prevent the subversion of Anund Rao's authority, detached Major Walker with about 1,200 men to the scene of action. The mere appearance of this force checked the career of Mulhar Rao, who professed himself willing to submit his claims to the decision of Mr. Duncan. Major Walker advanced upon Mulhar's Rao's fort of Kurro, where, at a conference, that chief agreed to relinquish his conquests, and to defray part of the expense which had been

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incurred in the expedition against him. Whilst this negotiation was proceeding with apparent sincerity, Mulhar Rao opened a heavy fire upon Major Walker's detachment, which sustained a loss of three officers and 40 privates. The enemy was, however, repulsed; and on the arrival of Colonel Sir Wm. Clarke with reinforcements Mulhar Rao was reduced to submission. His fort of Kurree came into the possession of the British troops on the 5th May 1802.

During the progress of these operations, Governor Duncan negotiated with Rowba, the Guicowar minister, who, on the 15th March 1802, subscribed an agreement, by which it was stipulated that the district of Attaveesy, in the neighbourhood of Surat, yielding six and a half lacs of rupees per annum, should be assigned over to the British Government, as a security for the payment of the expenses incurred in the campaign against Mulhar Rao.

Rowba also engaged, on behalf of his master, to subsidize a force consisting of 2,000 sepoys, and a company of European artillery, which was to be provided for by a territorial cession; and, in the last place, he agreed to relinquish the Guicowar's share of the choute of Surat, and to cede the pergunnah of Chourassy which surrounds that city.

By a subsequent agreement, (dated 6th June 1802,) the pergunnah of Chicky, situated about 30 miles south of Surat, was transferred to the British Government.

On the 29th July 1802, Anund Row Guicowar signed an instrument, by which he not only confirmed the above-mentioned agreements, but added other stipulations, tending to establish the British influence in Guzerat. The treaty was concluded through the agency of Major Walker, who had been appointed to the office of resident at the Guicowar's court.

With a view to enable the Rajah to bear the expense of the subsidiary force, it became a primary object of Major Walker's attention to effect the disbandment of the Arab corps, which formed a principal part of the Rajah's military establishment. These turbulent mercenaries held possession of the Rajah's person, and were not brought to terms until a practicable breach had been effected in the fort of Baroda, when they agreed to liberate the Rajah, and to quit the province of Guzerat, on receiving the arrears of pay due to them.

In return for the services thus rendered to him, Anund Row ceded the fort of Kaira, with its adjoining domain.

The subsidy, which in July 1802 amounted to 7,80,000 rupees per annum, was, in June 1803, raised to 10,70,000, in consequence of 1,000 sepoys having been added to the British force. The attention of the Supreme Government having been absorbed by the conflict with the Mahrrattas, which commenced in the year 1803, it was not until the month of April 1805 that the alliance with the Guicowar was consolidated by the conclusion of a definitive treaty.

At the time when the British Government took the Guicowar under its protection, the Rajah's affairs were in a deplorable state. Major Walker ascertained, that while the receipts amounted to no more than 55 lacs, the disbursements were not less than 82 lacs. In reporting these facts to Government, he supposes an indifferent person to ask the following questions.

1 What necessity is there for the Company to be so interested about the internal welfare of the Guicowar state?

2 What is their right of interference? and

3 Where is the advantage which they will derive by so much trouble?

1. The first question, he observes, may be answered by referring to the state of the Guicowar finances. A dissolution of the government must be the inevitable consequence of the present exorbitant expenditure. A few years more would plunge the administration into an irretrievable state of distress. the Company would then be obliged to assist the Guicowar at a hazard, or to assume the government of his dominions.

2 'The right of the British Government to interfere is founded on the express request of the sovereign of the Guicowar state, in a letter under his own hand and seal, bearing date the 29th July 1802. The obligations of express covenants, no less than the sacred rights of friendship, impressively call on the British Government to save the Guicowar state before it reaches that point where its incumbrances may be irreparable.

3. The advantages which the British Government will derive from granting the requisite aid will be exemplified very speedily in the flourishing state of the resources of its ally, which will be at the sole disposal of the Company. An obedient and well paid ally will be ready to yield its assistance, and pay the debt of gratitude or duty in serving against the enemies of the Company.

With reference to the foregoing statement, the Supreme Government, in a letter to that of Bombay, dated 31st July 1806, observed as follows:—"The question of our right to interfere, and of the absolute necessity of our active interference for the accomplishment of a radical reform of the expenditure of the state of the Guicowar, has been so fully and ably discussed by Major Walker, that little remains to be added on that subject. 'The peculiar situation of the affairs of the Guicowar, and the circumstances under which our connexion with the state has been established, and has become in a manner interwoven with its internal concerns, distinguish our relations with that state from those which subsist with the great states of India, although the general political relations and obligations are the same. 'The interference therefore which we are called upon to exercise cannot be considered to constitute a deviation from those principles of policy which, in our intercourse with other allies, precludes our interference in the management of their internal concerns. It is evident  
that

that the alternative of our interference for the reform of the affairs of the Guicowar is not merely the loss of the advantages to be derived from the efficiency of the alliance, but the positive dangers to which the certain ruin of the state would expose our most essential interests in that quarter of the peninsula."

With the sanction thus obtained to the policy of interference, Major Walker addressed himself with the utmost energy and zeal to the arduous task of bringing the expenditure of the Baroda state within its income. The army having a claim for arrears of pay amounting to upwards of 41 lacs of rupees, it became necessary to provide funds to that extent, in order to disband superfluous troops, the most disorderly and troublesome of which consisted of the Arab mercenaries. Of the funds thus required, the British Government advanced on loan, at different times, 19,37,683 rupees, and a further sum of 21,78,601 rupees was, by the use of their influence, obtained from the shroffs, at a comparatively low rate of interest.

For the repayment of these loans, and of the interest thereon, certain districts, yielding an annual revenue of 12,95,000 rupees were assigned by the Guicowar.

Some of the transactions above stated took place subsequently to the departure of the Marquis Wellesley, to whose political measures in other quarters of India it is now proper to advert.

#### *Peshwa.*

To the treaty with the Nizam, of October 1800, were subjoined three separate and secret articles, which provided for the admission of the Peshwa, and of the Rajah of Bicar (Nagpore) to the benefits of the general defensive alliance, on certain conditions therein specified. The instrument above alluded to contains the following declaration:—"The contracting parties entertain no views of conquest, or extension of their respective dominions, nor any intention of proceeding to hostilities, unless in the case of unjustified or unprovoked aggression, and after the failure of their joint endeavours to obtain reasonable satisfaction, through the channel of pacific negotiation, according to the tenor of the preceding treaty. It is, however, declared, that in the event of war, and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties, his Highness the Nabob Asaph Jah (the Nizam) shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms, provided his Highness the Nabob Asaph Jah shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the preceding treaty, especially those contained in the 12th and 13th articles thereof," which stipulated that his Highness should bring forward all his resources, collect his armies, and store grain in his frontier garrisons."

Although Lord Wellesley used every endeavour to induce the Peshwa to become a party to the league, of which the treaty of Hyderabad was in fact the basis, it was not until he had sought refuge at Bassem, from the hostility of Holkar, (who had obtained possession of Poona), that his Highness consented to place himself under the protection of the British Government. By the treaty of Bassem, which was concluded on the 31st December 1802, his Highness agreed to entertain a permanent subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular Native infantry, with the usual proportion of field pieces and European artillerymen, which force was to be "stationed in perpetuity in his and Highness's territories." For the regular pay of this force his Highness provided by a territorial cession. He agreed to refer to the arbitration of the British Government his claims upon the Nizam and the Guicowar, and neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever, without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation with the British Government, on whose part it was declared, that they had no manner of concern with his Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom he was held to be absolute.

The Duke of Wellington (then General Wellesley) having by a rapid march rescued the Peshwa's capital from the destruction with which it was menaced by Holkar, Bajee Rao was escorted thither by a detachment of British troops, and re-established in his authority.

The treaty of Bassem, by separating the Peshwa from the great Mahatta chieftains, virtually broke up the confederacy of which he had been the nominal head. But for that stroke of policy he would probably have degenerated into a mere pageant, like the Rajah of Sattarah, and have subverted the purposes of Sindia or of Holkar, between whom a contest had been carried on for dominancy in the Peshwa's councils.

Although Sindia and the Rajah of Berni must have perceived that the tendency of the British alliance was to destroy their influence at the court of Poona, they at first professed to entertain no objection to the stipulations of the treaty of Bassem; a short time, however, served to disclose the insincerity of their professions. The war in which they engaged terminated in their entire discomfiture and humiliation.

On receiving intelligence of the conclusion of the treaty of Bassem, the late Lord Londonderry (then Viscount Castlereagh), who presided at the India Board, entered at considerable length into a consideration of the policy of that measure. From that able paper the following are extracts.

"In considering this question it is material to ascertain precisely what the nature of the connexion is at which we have aimed.

"The professed end in view is a *defensive alliance and guarantee* connecting the Mahrattas with the Nizam and the Company, and through that league *preserving the peace of India.*

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"Although the apprehension of remote danger from French influence, acting through the Mahratta confederacy, is stated as a collateral object to be thus provided against, yet the main policy of the system, as relied upon, is its *pacific tendency*.

"On this ground it must principally be tried. The British power in India is too firmly consolidated at this moment, and the prospect of attack from any quarter too remote to justify us in prudence in risking a war with the view of providing against a danger merely speculative.

"The British empire in India may be considered (including allies and dependants) as comprehending nearly everything in Hindostan, the Mahratta possessions excepted. In addition to our old possessions in Bengal and on the coast, recently strengthened by the treaties which have placed the whole of the Carnatic and a large proportion of Oude under our immediate administration, we have by two wars, equally just and successful, bound up the entire of Mysore in our dominions, and by a negotiation, conducted with great ability and wisely undertaken, expelled French influence from Hyderabad, and connected the Nizam indissolubly with our interests.

"Whatever questions may have been hitherto raised on the justice of our conduct towards certain dependant states, upon the *policy* of our measures (always assuming them to be founded in justice), so far as concerns the consolidation of our authority in the Carnatic, in Tanjore, and in Oude, the reduction of the power of Tippoo, and the intimate connexion established with the Nizam, no well-founded doubt can be entertained.

"Considering this as the well established sphere at this day of the British power in India, the next step towards a close connexion with another power, and that power necessarily involved in the complicated relations of the Mahratta confederacy, is a question of critical and delicate policy.

"The idea upon which the treaty of Bassein was concluded seems originally to have arisen out of, and to have been founded upon, the connexion subsisting previously to the conquest of Mysore between the Company, the Mahrattas and the Nizam, by the treaty concluded in 1790 at Poona.

"The object of this league was to watch and guard against the power of Tippoo. The treaty was defective, in as much as it did not specify, except with respect to the war then existing, the amount of force which the allies were bound to furnish to each other; nor did it, in terms, bind their heirs and successors, which led to cavils on the part of the Peshwa.

"We find that previously to the war of 1798-99 against Tippoo, both the Peshwa and the Nizam were so reduced in authority, the former by the ascendancy of Sindia, the latter by a strong French faction in his army, as to render it very little probable that the Company, in the event of a rupture with Tippoo, could hope to derive any efficient aid from the alliance.

"The object of the Company was then to strengthen its allies, in order that they might be in a situation to fulfil their engagements. Sindia's purpose was to weaken the Peshwa, and to get the power at Poona into his own hands. Hence arose a jealousy between Sindia and the Company, which produced a proportionate union of interest between him and Tippoo. The number of French officers in the armies of Sindia, of Tippoo, and of the Nizam, rendered the danger very serious of a formidable combination of the Native powers against us, supported by France.

"In this state of things, Lord Wellesley wisely determined to use every expedient to revive our influence and authority both at the courts of Poona and Hyderabad. A British force was offered to the Peshwa to protect his person and re-establish his Government, and an augmentation of the subsidiary force was proposed to the Nizam.

"Under a variety of pretences, evidently resulting from a jealousy of our power, as well as that of Sindia, our offer was declined by the Peshwa. What then occurred is noticed here principally to mark the jealousy which even then disinclined the Peshwa to place himself in our hands, as well as to point out the strong defensive policy which warranted us to risk much for the purpose of giving vigour and consistency to the only alliance on which we could reckon against the hostile confederacy with which we were threatened.

"The result was, that we derived no support from the Mahrattas in the last Mysore war. Our connexion with the Nizam was improved, the French force in his Highness's service finally destroyed, and a commanding British corps established in its room.

"The termination of the war in the conquest of Mysore, and the absolute extinction of French influence in that quarter of India, as well as at Hyderabad, placed the Mahratta question entirely on new grounds.

"Hitherto a connexion with the Mahrattas had been sought as a defence against Tippoo and the French influence generally. The fall of Tippoo and the extinction of the French party in Mysore and Hyderabad, leaving only what was to be found in Sindia's army as any object of jealousy, put an end to the importance, as a means of necessary and immediate security, of a connexion with the Mahrattas.

"From this time it could not be argued to be of pressing necessity. The most that could be contended for was its being desirable on grounds of general expediency; and as, tending to guard against remote and contingent dangers, we were certainly justified in risking less to accomplish it.

"It was reasonable also to suppose, that in proportion as our power had been increased and consolidated, and as that of Tippoo was absolutely extinguished, the Mahrattas would entertain additional jealousy of any subsidiary connexion with us.

"We find accordingly, after the peace, that upon the Peshwa being invited to accede to the treaty of Hyderabad, upon which condition we should have deemed him entitled to a certain

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certain share in the conquered territories, he declined the proposal, evidently from indisposition to receive a British force within his dominions

"Between that period and the treaty of Bassein several attempts were made by us to induce him to enter into subsidiary engagements with us. The same was proposed to the Rajah of Berar, and an opening left in the treaty of Hyderabad of 1800 for Sindia\* to accede on certain terms, but the connexion was declined by all

"The Peshwa, when most oppressed and in danger from Sindia, proceeded considerable lengths in entertaining the proposition of a subsidiary alliance, but always resisted the idea of the subsidiary force being stationed *within his dominions*. Even with this qualification, our connexion was an alternative which the Peshwa never latterly showed any disposition to adopt but under the pressure of extreme embarrassment, and it is even doubtful whether he was ever really sincere in the propositions he made, as his system invariably was to play off Sindia and us against each other, and his overtures were generally accompanied by some stipulation which he had reason to suppose would not be acceded to by the Governor-general.

"If the connexion after the fall of Tippoo became of less pressing necessity, doubts may be entertained of the policy of appearing to pursue the object with such unrelenting anxiety.

"The eagerness with which we appeared to press our connexion upon all the leading states in succession might naturally lead them to apprehend that we meant more than we avowed, that our object was ultimately to be master instead of allies; and that having obtained either possession or of absolute influence over every state except the Mahattas, with whom we had been in connexion, our object was to obtain a similar influence over *their* councils

"Under whatever estimate of our views it may have been formed, the fact is indisputable that a general repugnance to the British connexion, on the terms proposed, universally prevailed amongst the great Mahratta powers. It was avoided by all as long as they had any choice. It was only embraced by the Peshwa when an exile from his dominions, and the jealousy of it was such as to have since led Holkar and Sindia to forget their animosities, and to appear disposed to league with the Rajah of Berar against the Company and the Peshwa.† How long the Peshwa will continue faithful to engagements which were contracted from necessity and not from choice, in opposition to the other Mahratta states, is yet to be seen‡

"The practical question to be considered is, whether an alliance formed under such circumstances can rest upon any other foundation than mere force, and, if not, whether the means by which it is to be upheld are not destructive of its professed advantages

"Supposing Holkar, Sindia, and the Rajah of Berar adverse, and the Peshwa acquiescent, but not cordially satisfied, can we expect that the subsidiary force alone will enable us to maintain our influence at Poona?

"If such be the unqualified feeling of the Mahratta states to a connexion with us, upon the principles on which the present has been formed, unless we are prepared to establish ourselves by conquest in that quarter of India, it seems necessary either to abandon the connexion (if it can be abandoned consistently with a due regard to our engagements) or to modify it (should such be practicable), so as to reconcile at least a proportion of the Mahratta states

"Whatever we may hold out to reconcile the Peshwa to the alliance, and however we may profess to respect his independence in the management of his own internal affairs, we cannot deny that, in fact as well as in appearance, whilst a British army is at Poona he can be considered in no other light than as politically dependent on us.

"The Mahratta contentions between the leading states have been chiefly for influence at Poona. To obtain this, Holkar attacked Sindia. Having been deprived of this, Sindia abandoned the Peshwa, and seems prepared to join his greatest enemy. The same motives which before opposed them to each other now oppose them both to us, and the Berar Rajah, perhaps with views to supplant the Peshwa, and with common feelings of jealousy, joins the confederacy.

"What will reconcile them to a different course? To talk to them of the advantage of our guarantee for preserving the peace of Hindostan assumes that the genius of their government is industrious and pacific, instead of being predatory and warlike, nor is it to be expected that independent states, especially of the description in question, can feel any disposition to make us, or any other great power, an arbiter of their destiny

"We not only place the Peshwa as a prey out of their reach, but we declare our purpose is to prevent them from plundering each other. They wish to be unrestrained in carrying their arms wherever they can derive advantage. Temporary distress may make them, in their turn, accept our support. Were it given as a temporary assistance it would frequently be sought for, and, as far as their means would go, paid for; but when it is to be given permanently, or not at all, it will only be accepted when no other resource remains. It will be avoided by each state exempt from the pressure. When the danger is gone by, it will be disrelieved by the state which has submitted to it, and ultimately we must either alter the genius of the various states, or rely upon our arms alone for the preservation of our authority.

"To

\* This appears to be a mistake. No mention is made of Sindia in the secret and separate articles.

† Lord Castlereagh was not then apprized of the actual occurrence of hostilities

‡ About 14 years; but, during a part of that time, he was evidently impatient of the restraint, under which the connexion with us had placed him.



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"To aim at a connexion with the Mahratta powers on those grounds is, to say the least, extremely hazardous. It is evidently against the grain. It may be difficult and expensive to be established, not less so to be maintained; and as it must, when accomplished, rest on our authority and arms, rather than on the disposition of our allies, it must practically operate as an extension of our own dominions.

"Such a result we disavow as our object; in principle, as well as in policy, we are bound by the laws of the land to abstain from it, and it certainly would be a hazardous project to embark in the management of this half-civilized people, in addition to the widely-extended empire of which we are now possessed. If we are not prepared to contemplate such a purpose, we should avoid being gradually led into a course of measures, the tendency of which leads to such a result as their natural consequence."

Lord Castlereagh proceeded to state his opinions as to the course which might have been adopted under the circumstances existing at the period when the treaty of Bassein was concluded. He conceived that we should have endeavoured to secure the co-operation of Sindia in the restoration of the Peshwa, instead of taking him out of the hands of that chief. His Lordship furthermore suggested a modification of the treaty, and pointed out the objects which it would be desirable to obtain in the event of the war with the confederated Mahratta chiefs being brought to a successful issue.

A despatch founded upon Lord Castlereagh's minute was transmitted by the Board, through the Secret Committee, in March 1804; of this despatch the following are extracts:

"The success with which the campaign has been opened by the immediate reduction of Ahmednugger and Broach, in a manner so highly creditable to the British arms, and to the officers who directed those operations, could not fail to afford us the highest satisfaction. But as it was always our wish to avoid a connexion with the Mahrattas at the expense, or even at the serious risk of a war with any of the leading members of that confederacy, we deeply regret that such has been the result of the treaty concluded with the Peshwa at Bassein.

"Whilst we are prepared to make every exertion which is due to good faith, and which the character and honour of our government may require, we do not, as a measure of policy, attach that value to the provisions of the treaty in question, which would lead us to wish that it should be maintained, at all hazards, in its present form, if by any modifications of the stipulations therein contained, our connexion with the state of Poona can be rendered a measure of less alarm and jealousy to the other Mahratta powers; being firmly persuaded that no alliance with a Mahratta power, but more especially with one in military rank, not standing higher than the third or fourth in the empire, can, in the long run, be consistent with our interests, unless the preponderating majority of the confederacy can be reconciled to that connexion.

"The most prominent grounds of jealousy entertained by the Mahratta states of the late treaty appear to arise out of the 3d and 17th articles; the former introducing and permanently stationing a commanding British force in the Peshwa's dominions, the latter binding his Highness (without the stipulation being reciprocal) not to commence any negotiation with any other power, without previous communication with the Company's Government, which two stipulations they consider as tending to place under our control and guidance the legitimate head of their empire.

"Under a strong conviction of the embarrassment which must arise from our mixing ourselves too intimately in the complicated politics of this distracted empire, our wish is to confine the purposes of the treaty strictly to the support and defence of the Peshwa in the quiet possession of his own immediate dominions, and to avoid, not only in fact, but in appearance, everything which can be construed to affect the independence of the Mahratta confederacy, through its legitimate head, or which can excite mistrust and jealousy between the Peshwa and the other great powers of the empire; we are therefore desirous, whilst the support to which his Highness is entitled under the treaty of Bassein (so long as he shall remain faithful to his engagements) be afforded to him in the fullest manner, that you should not hesitate to relax in such stipulations as were introduced into that treaty rather for our than for his Highness's accommodation."

The despatch authorized the abrogation not only of the 3d & 17th, but also of the 12th article, which gave to the British Government the right of arbitrating all differences subsisting between the Nizam and the Peshwa.

The despatch proceeds—"In thus conveying our instructions upon this important subject, we think it due to the Governor general in Council to state, that the objections which attach upon the treaty of Bassein in its present form did not when this subject was last under consideration, in the months of September and December 1800, as circumstances then stood, impress themselves upon our minds with equal force.

"We therefore desire to be understood as not attaching blame to the conduct of our government abroad, with respect to the *frame of the treaty* itself, however subsequent events may have convinced us of the hazard of aiming at so close a connexion with the court of Poona.

"We cannot avoid noticing the deceitful and disingenuous conduct pursued by Sindia, and the Rajah of Berar previous to the rupture. Instead of openly avowing their sentiments, and endeavouring by amicable explanation to obtain relief from any stipulations of the treaty which could be supposed to affect their interests, they, in terms, disclaimed any ground of objection, and disavowed any intention of obstructing its execution. Whilst such was their language, it appears they were intent only upon gaining time, and of acting hostilely against the Company and its allies as soon as their measures were ripe for execution."

"Such having been the conduct of these chiefs, the Company are clearly entitled to consider them as aggressors, and (as far as prudential considerations will justify them in asserting the claim) to demand from the enemy a reasonable indemnity for the expenses of the war. But you are to understand, however indispensible this claim in strictness may be, that it is our positive direction the war may by no means be protracted in pursuit of such an object.

"Should the success of our arms be such as, under all the circumstances, appear to you, in prudence, to warrant a demand of some concession from our opponents, we desire that the demand be framed upon principles of moderation, and with a view to the improved military security rather than the extension of our present dominions."

*Sindia.*

At the date of the foregoing orders, not only had the war with Sindia and the Rajah of Berar been brought to a triumphant close, but Sindia had been prevailed upon to contract a subsidiary alliance with the British Government. The treaty of Boorhanpoor, which is dated the 27th February 1804, although subsidiary, differed in some particulars from that of Bassein. In consideration of the large cessions of territory made by Sindia in the treaty of peace, he was exempted from liability to any charge on account of the British force, and it was stipulated that the said force should be stationed at such place near the frontier of Dowlat Row Sindia as might be deemed most eligible by the British Government, there to be held in readiness to proceed, as soon as possible, for the execution of any service on which it was liable to be employed by the conditions of the treaty.

Lord Wellesley's scheme for the establishment of a general system of peace and good order throughout India involved not merely the extension of subsidiary alliances to all the principal Mahratta states, but a connexion with the several Rajpoot and other petty chieftains of Hindostan, on the principle of affording to them the protection of the British Government as Lord Paramount, and of receiving from them a certain amount of tribute. They were moreover to hold a contingent force at the disposal of the British Government, and to submit any differences which might arise amongst them to its arbitration.

Treaties of this description were concluded with the Rajahs of Bhurtpore and Macherry, and also with the Rajpoot Chief of Jyepore. Negotiations were in progress at the courts of the other Rajpoot princes, but had not been brought to a successful issue, when the conduct of Jeswant Rao Holkar, who had not joined the late Mahratta confederacy, obliged the British Government to enter into hostilities with him. The Rajah of Bhurtpore took a decided part with Holkar, and although Sindia did not actually form a junction with the enemy, his proceedings indicated a spirit so much at variance with the obligations which he had recently contracted, as to render it obvious that he was prepared to resort to extremities: he indeed permitted an attack to be made upon the quarters of the acting resident, Mr Jenkins, and placed that gentleman under restraint. Sindia's councils were at this period directed by his father-in-law, Sanjee Rao Ghautka, who was inveterately hostile to the English.

The war with Holkar was not brought to a close until after Lord Wellesley had been superseded by Lord Cornwallis, who reached India in the month of July 1805. No official reply was returned by Lord Wellesley's Government to the strictures contained in the secret despatch of March 1804. A justification of the measures therein objected to, will be found in Sir John Malcolm's Political History of India, Vol. I. p. 246, and 310 to 320. The following observations are taken from a paper which appeared in the Asiatic Annual Register for the year 1807, and which is understood to have been inserted with Lord Wellesley's sanction:—

"The interests of the British Government and of the Nizam had become so far identified by the war in Mysore, that no doubt remained that it would be incumbent on the British Government, on every principle of sound policy, to defend and assist the Nizam in the most effectual manner, in the event of any attack on his Highness by the Mahrattas, having for its object either the material reduction of his Highness's resources and power, or the attainment of a preponderant influence in his councils.

"The state of the Mahratta empire at that period of time rendered it nearly certain that the tranquillity and safety of the Nizam's dominions would be menaced by Dowlat Rao Sindia. That chieftain had for a long period of time continued to commit various acts of hostility against the possessions of his Highness the Nizam, and by the success of his unwarrantable attacks upon the authority of his Highness the Peshwah had acquired additional means of prosecuting his manifest designs against the Nizam, and against the general tranquillity of India. The aggrandizement of Sindia, in whatever form, must always have been prejudicial to our interests and to those of the Nizam. It would have been particularly injurious to us whenever it tended to weaken any of the barriers which were placed between us and the Mahrattas, and it would have been dangerous to us in an imminent degree if it ever had involved the actual removal of any of those barriers. The British Government therefore was particularly interested in frustrating any hostile designs of Sindia upon the government of Hyderabad; and on this ground Lord Wellesley was willing, in April 1806, to concert with the court of Hyderabad the means of providing, in the most effectual manner, against the danger to be apprehended from Sindia, and for that purpose, to enter into a defensive alliance with his Highness the Nizam, for the mutual guarantee of his Highness's and of the Company's territories against any attack which might be made by Dowlat Rao Sindia on the possessions of either.

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"But the same considerations which claimed our protection of the Nizam against the meditated designs of Dowlut Rao Sindia upon his Highness's territory and power suggested also the expediency of extending that protection to a general guarantee of his Highness's dominions against every hostile and unprovoked attack, from whatever quarter it might be made. If the interests of the Company and of the Nizam were become so far identified as to render it incumbent on us to defend his Highness from the ambitious or violent projects of Sindia or of the Mahratta power, the security of those interests equally required that we should counteract every attempt, whether secret or open, from any other quarter, to destroy the power of the Nizam, or to acquire the direction of it.

"In this view of the subject, the British Government felt no hesitation in agreeing to make the guarantee of the Nizam's dominions general, instead of confining it to the designs of Dowlut Rao Sindia. The expediency of such an arrangement was the more obvious as the Peshwa was completely in the power of Sindia, who might at any time have compelled the Peshwa to take up arms against the Nizam without appearing himself to be any further concerned in the contest than in his character of a feudatory of the Mahratta empire, bound to obey the commands of his superior, the Peshwa.

"But although, for the reasons stated, Lord Wellesley was entirely prepared to make the proposed guarantee general, he did not think proper to proceed to that extent in the first instance, without obtaining from the Nizam a suitable return for so important a concession.

"It has been constantly an object of the utmost solicitude at the court of Hyderabad to obtain a general guarantee from the British Government, and to secure the full benefits of the Company's efficient protection. That court has evidently a deeper interest in such an alliance than the British Government; it was therefore reasonable to expect that his Highness the Nizam should make suitable concessions to the Company on this important occasion. The result of this arrangement has produced a considerable augmentation of the subsidiary force serving in the Nizam's dominions; a commutation of the whole amount of subsidy for territory assigned to the Nizam in perpetuity, and in complete sovereignty, to the Company; and lastly, the effectual removal of all the existing restraints on the commercial intercourse between the two states, and the regulation of that intercourse on principles mutually beneficial to the subjects of both."

#### Travancore.

It remains to notice a change, effected under the orders of Lord Wellesley, in the character of our alliance with the state of Travancore.

The treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth between the British Government and the Rajah of Travancore in the year 1795, which stipulated that a British force should always be ready for his defence against any war of aggression made upon him, had particular respect to the danger to which he still stood exposed from the more powerful neighbouring state of Mysore, which rendered the protection of the Company essential to him: to that protection he owed the continuance of his independence.

Things remained in this state during the lifetime of the old Rajah, who was himself, as there is reason to believe, a prudent man, attached to the British connexion, and was served by a dewan of uncommon ability and worth. The Rajah died in the year 1798, and his death appears to have been followed by various circumstances unfavourable to the maintenance of the cordial friendship that had long subsisted between his state and the Company's Government.

The old Rajah was succeeded by his nephew, a young man whose character seems to have been marked by imbecility, caprice, and other qualities which show him to be wholly unequal to the task of government. The old and faithful dewan of his uncle was supplanted by low vicious persons, who soon gained an ascendancy over the Rajah, and influenced the conduct of affairs.

The fall of Tippoo, in 1799, placed the Travancore state in circumstances entirely new. The formidable danger to which it had been long exposed from a more powerful neighbour, headed by a restless chief, was now removed. Mysore came under the control of the Company, who had been the best friend of Travancore, and from whom, as it probably feared no injustice, so it might seem no longer to need active support or protection. Such a material alteration in the external relations of the Travancore state, may reasonably be supposed to have influenced its policy in respect to the British Government, whose friendship would not hence appear an object of so much solicitude as it was before. In point of fact, the British resident, Colonel Macaulay, who was appointed to that Durbar in 1800, soon thought that he perceived in it a coolness or diminution of regard towards the British connexion.

Lord Wellesley had instructed the resident, on receiving his appointment, to prevail, if possible, on the Rajah to agree to a new modification of the treaty with the Company. Of this modification, the principal conditions to be proposed were, that no Europeans should be permitted to reside in the territory of Travancore without the consent of the British Government; that in lieu of the military aid which the Rajah was bound by the former treaty to furnish to the Company when engaged in war, he should defray the expense of an additional battalion of Company's troops; that he should confide the defence of his territory to the Company; and that he should receive their advice in the more important concerns of his civil administration.

It was observed by the Governor-general, in his instructions to the resident, that the accessibility of Travancore by a long line of sea-coast renders it a country through which  
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the British possessions may become vulnerable to an European enemy; to which, it may be added, that the strong military positions which the territory of Travancore affords increases the importance of that consideration. The British Government, therefore, after having saved Travancore from being overwhelmed by the Mahomedan state of Mysore, though in this acting also with a fair view to British interests, had a right to expect, not only that it would be willing to prevent to the utmost of its power the enemies of Britain from availing themselves of its ports and strongholds, but would permit the British Government to employ for that purpose the necessary force which Travancore could not itself furnish.

In 1801, the Rajah, after repeated representations from the resident of the disordered state of the country, and the necessity of rescuing the management of affairs from those whom he had permitted to possess themselves of it, appointed a new dewan, named Vallay Tomby. This person had been at the head of an insurrection in 1799, but being repented a man of ability and firmness, the resident, in the great want of persons of that description, approved of his appointment, and had reason to expect that he would be friendly to the connexion with the British Government. His subsequent conduct, however, did not justify this expectation. The resident, after some absence from his station, on returning to it in December 1801, found that all the relations of the old and respectable dewan, who himself had suffered a violent death, had also been murdered, and that a person named the Sumpredy, the Rajah's former favourite, had been disgraced and imprisoned by the new dewan, Vallay Tomby.

After the peace of Amiens became known in India, towards the end of 1802, the resident found increased difficulty in negotiating with the Travancore Durbar for the exclusion of Europeans from his territory. The Rajah had virtually given a qualified assent to a proposition of this nature in 1800, but never could be persuaded to reduce it to writing, and the return of peace seems to have led him to desire and expect some intercourse with the French and Dutch. Under this apprehension, the resident, between the months of August 1802 and March 1803, repeatedly represented to the Supreme Government the necessity of measures to check the symptoms of disaffection in the minds of the Rajah's evil counsellors, stating that he had reason to apprehend that the Rajah was disposed to the French, and that a political negotiation had been opened with him by a French agent who landed there. On the renewal of the war with France, the subjects of that country were removed from Travancore.

Before the end of the year 1804 a formidable revolt took place among the Nair battalions in the service of the Rajah. The original cause of their dissatisfaction appears to have been a reduction in their allowances. These the Rajah restored, and a short calm succeeded, but the revolt burst forth again with increased violence, the ringleaders liberated the conspirators in the former plot, increased their numbers to 10,000 men, and, as was asserted by the Rajah himself, at length extended their views to the subversion of the British power and influence in Travancore, and the assassination both of the dewan and the British resident. Intelligence was also received by the resident before this dangerous revolt was entirely suppressed of a projected expedition from the French islands against one of the ports of Travancore. It was only by the judicious, active conduct of the resident, and the resolution of the British officer commanding the Carnatic brigade in the service of the Rajah, joined to the firmness of the dewan, who had fled to the resident for protection, that this rebellion was put down. The treaty of 1795 did not specifically stipulate the aid of the British power in suppressing internal commotions in Travancore, but this was agreeable to the spirit of it, and became highly expedient on such an occasion; and the march of three of our battalions to the confines of Travancore confirmed the tranquillity which had been before restored there.

The Rajah, who had shown great alarm in this crisis, was highly gratified by the mission of British troops for his support, and then professed an entire devotion to British interests, and the dewan pledged himself to adhere to his latest breath to that system of measures which should receive and merit the approbation of the Governor-general. Thus what had before been steadily resisted, both publicly and privately, for five years, namely, a new treaty of subsidiary and defensive alliance, both the Rajah and the dewan at length consented to, and concluded in January 1805.

The articles in which this treaty varied from that of 1795 were chiefly these: the Rajah, who, by the treaty of 1795, stood engaged to furnish the Company, when involved in war, with such part of his military force as he could spare with safety to his own country, was, by the treaty of 1805, relieved from that obligation; and, in lieu of it, he stipulated to pay annually, in addition to the subsidy payment under the former treaty, a sum equivalent to the expense of one regiment of native infantry, estimated to amount to 4,01,655 rupees; and the disposal of the whole subsidiary force, either within the country of Travancore, or the limits of the Company's dominions, was left to the option of the British Government. The Rajah also became bound by the new treaty to pay a due proportion of the expense of any troops, additional to the subsidiary force, which it might eventually be necessary to employ for the protection of his dominions. It was expressly provided that whenever the Governor-general in Council should have reason to apprehend a failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military forces in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses in time of war, he should have full power to introduce regulations for the management and collection of the revenues, or to assume, on behalf of the Company, the direct management of a part of the territorial possessions of the Rajah, as he might deem most expedient. And whereas the treaty of 1795 had respect chiefly to the external defence of Travancore, the Rajah promised, by the new treaty, to pay at all times the utmost attention

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to such advice as the British Government should occasionally judge it necessary to offer him, in respect to all the objects connected with the advancement of the internal interests of his Highness, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states.

The ratification of the new treaty by the Supreme Government arrived at the Rajah's capital in July 1805, and he and his whole court gave public demonstration of joy on that occasion.

3. *Of the state of our Subsidiary Alliances subsequently to the close of Lord Wellesley's Administration.*

AFTER Lord Cornwallis had a second time assumed the supreme administration of affairs, his Lordship, in a letter addressed to the Secret Committee, and dated the 28th August 1805, thus expressed himself regarding the policy which had been adopted by his predecessor.

"One of the most important, and, in my opinion, not the least unfortunate consequences of the subsisting state of our alliances, has been the gradual increasing ascendancy of the British influence and authority exercised through the medium of our residents at the courts of Poona and Hyderabad. The weak and wretched state of the Peshwa's internal government cannot be more forcibly described than in the enclosed despatch recently received from Colonel Clowe; and I have reason to believe that the authority of the soubahdar of the Deekan over his dominions is approaching fast to the same state of inefficiency and weakness. The evils likely to ensue from the above statement are sufficiently obvious, but the remedy to be applied to them is, unhappily, not so apparent. The positive obligations of existing treaties provide in the most express terms for the uncontrolled exercise of the internal government of both states being left in the hands of the respective chiefs; but accustomed as they have been to the very limited exertion of their own authority, and dependent, as the ministers of the Nizam, in particular, has felt himself on the aid and support of our resident to retain his office, it might hazard perhaps the immediate destruction of both powers (the Nizam's and the Peshwa's) if I was suddenly to act upon the strict principle which the obligations of those treaties impose upon us.

"I have endeavored to call the attention of the powers above mentioned, to that article in the treaties which so immediately concerns themselves; and I have forcibly impressed upon the minds of the residents the necessity of strengthening my representations by encouraging a more active exertion of that authority and control on which the prosperity of their dominions, and the security of their subjects so greatly depend.

"With these views, and in the hope that by degrees we shall be able to withdraw ourselves from the disagreeable participation in which we should be involved by mixing ourselves in all the intrigues, oppression, and chicanery of the native management of distracted and desolated provinces, I have ordered those letters to be addressed to the residents at the courts of Hyderabad and Poona, of which copies are enclosed, and to which I beg leave to refer your Honourable Committee for an explanation of the footing to which I wish to restore the character of the British alliance, as most consonant to the interest, as well as to the laws of our country."

The venerable nobleman whose sentiments are above expressed did not long survive the date of his despatch. On his death, which took place at Ghazepore, on the 10th October 1805, the Supreme Government devolved upon Sir George Barlow.

Sir George Barlow, although well disposed to carry into effect the projected measures of the late Governor-general, was deterred from attempting to afford a greater latitude of independent action to the Nizam, having ascertained that the relaxation of our control, as then exercised by the resident at Hyderabad, would be followed by consequences destructive of our interests at his Highness's court. The recital of Sir George Barlow's reasoning upon this subject is reserved for a subsequent part of this Memoir, in which the question as to the practicability and expediency of abandoning the subsidiary system will be adverted to. His attention was primarily directed to the conclusion of peace.

In arranging the terms of pacification with Holkar and Sindia, Sir George Barlow endeavoured to avoid as much as possible a liability to become entangled in Maharratta politics, by withdrawing from those quarters of Hindostan in which they had been accustomed to levy tribute, and to make predatory incursions. On this principle he proposed to renounce all right, on the part of the British Government, to form political connexions with the petty Rajpoot states situated to the northward of the river Chumbul; and, with the same view, he was anxious to take advantage of the past misconduct of the Jypore Rajah to dissolve the alliance which Lord Wellesley had contracted with that chief.

The negotiation of the treaties with Sindia and Holkar was conducted under the immediate superintendence of Lord Lake, who, as Commander-in-chief, had directed the military operations which had broken the power of Holkar, and had rendered him quite willing to consent to a cessation of hostilities on any reasonable conditions that the British Government should offer.

Sindia had seen cause to repent of the error which, under the influence of evil counsellors, he had committed in countenancing the hostile proceedings of Holkar; and in order to detach him effectually from all further connexion with his associate, Lord Lake made overtures of reconciliation to Sindia.

According to the terms of the treaty with Sindia, as concluded by Sir John Malcolm, under the orders of Lord Lake, 22d November 1805, the river Chumbul was to form the boundary between the two states, from the city of Kotah, on the west, to the limits of the territories of Gohud to the east. Sindia was to have no claims whatever to the northward

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of that river, and the Company, in like manner, to have no claims to the southward of that extent of its course. Sindia resigned all claims and pretensions on the countries of Boondee, Samerde, Dholpore, Barree, and Rajah-Kerrah. The Company also engaged to enter into no treaties with the Rajahs of Oodpore and Joudpore, and Kotah, or other chiefs, tributaries to Sindia, in Malwa, Mewar, or Marwar, and in no shape to interfere with the settlement which Sindia might make with those chiefs.

As Sir John Malcolm was actively employed (in his capacity of agent to the Governor-general) in carrying on the negotiations with Sindia and Holkar, his observations\* upon the course of policy which was then adopted by the Governor-general are well entitled to attention. They are as follow:

"Sir George Barlow did not altogether approve of this treaty (that with Sindia); and though he expressed his high satisfaction at the readiness with which Dowlut Rao Sindia had consented to withdraw from any concern in the affairs of Hindostan to the northward of the Chumbul, he stated his most decided conviction, that the actual condition of our affairs confirmed the policy and expediency of the principles upon which he had it in contemplation to effect a final arrangement with the chieftains, and of the territories west of the Jumna. He was fully satisfied that when these arrangements should be carried into execution, they would constitute a degree of security against all hostile attempts, which could not be augmented, though it might be impaired, by the preservation of our alliances with the petty states west of the Jumna.

"Sir George Barlow thought that, with the exception of the defensive alliances subsisting between the British Government and the great powers of India, it was for the interest and security of the Company to limit all relations with the surrounding states to those of general amity, and to trust the safety of its territorial possessions to the supremacy of our power, a well-regulated system of defence, and a revival of those contests and commotions which formerly prevailed among the states of Hindostan.

"Under such impressions, the Governor-general conceived that the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty might preclude the accomplishment of this general system, as they imposed upon us an obligation to protect from Sindia's encroachments all the states and chieftains to the north of the Chumbul from Kotah to the Jumna.

"In order to remedy the inconvenience which the Governor-general apprehended from this arrangement, he transmitted declaratory articles to the following purport, to be annexed to the treaty.

"1. That Sindia ceded to the Honourable Company all the territory north of the river Chumbul, which was ceded to him by the 7th article of the treaty of Surajpore, and the Company gave up all claim to any rule, tribute, or possessions on the south bank of that river.

"2. That the Company, from friendship to Sindia, agreed to pay him the annual sum of four lacs of rupees. Also that they assigned within their territories in Hindostan, a jagheer, amounting to a revenue of two lacs of rupees per annum, to Hazeah Biye, the wife of Sindia; and a jagheer, amounting to one lac of rupees per annum, to Chummal Biye, the daughter of that chief.

"The intention of these articles was to supersede the operation of the 5th, 6th, and 7th articles of the treaty.

"The Governor-general was also desirous of ceding the districts of Tonk-Rampoorah to Sindia, in lieu of the four lacs of rupees per annum, to which that chief became personally entitled by the treaty; and he conceived this cession more desirable, as the territory in question was formerly possessed by Holkar, and its cession to Sindia would tend to confirm and perpetuate an opposition of interests between those chieftains.

"The remaining parts of the treaty were entirely approved by the Governor-general, who stated in his despatch, that after the maturest deliberation, he was satisfied of the policy and expediency of dissolving the alliance with the state of Jyepore; but would defer to a subsequent despatch the communication of the mode in which this arrangement ought to be carried into execution.

"Lord Lake immediately communicated the declaratory articles to Moonshie Kavel Nyne, (Sindia's minister), and proposed the exchange of Tonk-Rampoorah for the annual pecuniary stipend. To this proposition, however, Sindia would not agree. Kavel Nyne said, and added his own conviction, that his master would not accept the district of Tonk-Rampoorah, if given gratis, as such an act would form an insurmountable bar to any reconciliation between him and Holkar. Kavel Nyne earnestly recommended that the declaratory articles should not be sent to Dowlut Rao Sindia till a British resident had reached the court of that chief, who could furnish the requisite explanations, and satisfy Sindia's mind with regard to the policy which had dictated them. As there appeared much good sense in this opinion, Lord Lake informed the Governor-general that he had delayed their transmission; and took this opportunity of again urging to Sir George Barlow the necessity of some modification of the general principles laid down for his guidance. Lord Lake, in this letter, dwelt upon the grounds which had led him to insist upon the Chumbul being the line of demarcation between the two states; and observed that the territories of the Boondee Rajah, which were immediately to the northward of the Chumbul (opposite to Kotah), though small, both in revenue and extent, were very important, as they commanded a principal pass into Hindostan; and that the Company was, in his opinion, bound to defend and protect that Rajah for his uniform friendly conduct, and particularly for the great aid which he had the courage

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to give Colonel Monson during his retreat; by which conduct he had exposed himself to the vengeance of Jeswant Rao Holkar, who was known to cherish the most inveterate hostility against this petty chief. From this fact, Lord Lake observed that he had always imagined that under any arrangement which might eventually be made with Jeswant Rao Holkar, it would be difficult, consistently with a due regard for the honour and reputation of the British Government, to give the Boondee Rajah over to the resentment of that chief; and he had therefore thought it would be desirable to release him altogether from Mahratta power and influence.

"Lord Lake stated in his despatch, that he had viewed the assent given by Sindia to retire altogether from Hindostan, northward of the Chumbul, as an unequivocal and complete acknowledgment of our established power and superiority; and gave it as his opinion, that no secure or honourable peace could be concluded with Holkar without a similar concession; for though it was possible that the British territories might experience an increased security from the remote contests of the principal Mahratta chiefs, he was satisfied that if Sindia and Holkar were allowed to renew their claims upon any of the states immediately west of the Jumna, and to mix in their disputes, there would be serious danger of reviving ambitious hopes which were now completely extinguished, and of causing another contest for that supremacy which was now so fully acknowledged.

"These opinions had no effect whatever in changing, or even modifying the resolutions of the Governor-general; who, though he admitted the great attention which was due to the local experience of Lord Lake, deemed it his duty to adhere to the general principles by which he had determined to regulate his conduct in this proceeding; and the declaratory articles were forwarded from Sir George Barlow to Dowlut Rao Sindia, with a letter explanatory of their nature and object."

In the pacification with Holkar, which ensued shortly after that with Sindia, he agreed to renounce all right to the districts of Tonk-Rampoora, Boondee, and to places north of the Chumbul.

"Sir George Barlow had instructed the Commander-in-chief to insist upon the cession of Tonk-Rampoora, with a view to an arrangement with Sindia respecting those provinces; but as he found that impossible, and that no state or chief would venture to take them without a guaranty, we were, he conceived, reduced to the necessity of either consenting to such guaranty, or of keeping them ourselves; and as neither of these measures were consistent with those general principles of policy which he had resolved to pursue, he determined to annul the provisions of the second article of the treaty, and restore them to Holkar; and for that purpose he returned the treaty, with a declaratory article annexed, by which a re-cession of these valuable provinces was made to him; and the Boondee Rajah was also abandoned. Lord Lake endeavoured, but in vain, to alter the sentiments of the Governor-general relative to this principle of concession to Sindia and Holkar, and to prevail upon him not to withdraw our protection from those petty chiefs, whom he thought entitled to it by their conduct and attachment."

His Lordship's objections to the dissolution of the alliance with the Rajah of Jypore were freely and fully stated. He observed that although there might be sufficient grounds for opening a negotiation to new-model the alliance with the Jypore state, or even to effect a dissolution of all engagements between the two states, he doubted how far we had a right, after what had passed, to dissolve it in a peremptory manner; because as such a proceeding would expose the Rajah of Jypore to an instant attack from both Sindia and Holkar, it would, unless it rested upon clear and undisputed grounds, make an impression among the states of India highly unfavourable to the reputation of the British Government.

Lord Lake's arguments, however, made no impression upon the mind of the Governor-general, and the alliance was accordingly dissolved, but not until after pacific arrangements were concluded with Sindia and Holkar, who were, therefore, precluded from objecting to the renewal of that connexion, if at any future period the British Government should see fit to adopt that measure.

Sir George Barlow was equally anxious to dissolve the defensive alliances which had been contracted with the minor states of Bhurtpoor and Mucherry, but from so doing he was dissuaded.

It might have been expected that the disposition which characterized Sir George Barlow's government would have induced him to modify the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, in conformity to the views of the home Government, as explained in the secret letter of March 1804. He, however, did not deem it safe to make any attempt to alter the provisions of that treaty. His reasons for maintaining the alliance with the Peshwa were explained in a despatch to the Secret Committee, dated 1st June 1806. He did not believe that the Peshwa was dissatisfied with any of the stipulations of the treaty, or that the modifications suggested from home would tend to reconcile the Mahratta chiefs to our connexion with his Highness. He observed, that nothing short of the entire abandonment of the alliance would satisfy those chiefs. "But," he added, "in the dissolution of the alliance with the state of Poona, the question of our public faith is involved, not only with the Peshwa, but with his Highness the Subahdar of the Deccan, the treaty of Bassein, containing stipulations in favour of his Highness, of which the foundation was laid in the treaty of Hydrabad, concluded in October 1800, and which, by anticipation, are confirmed by the provisions of the secret and separate articles of that treaty."

Lord Minto, who had held the office of President of the Board of Control from February to July 1806, was appointed to the Government of India, which he reached in the month of July 1807.

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His Lordship entered upon the performance of his high duties with a resolution to preserve the alliances at that time subsisting, but not to entangle himself in new connexions. His attention was called in the following year (1808) to the state of affairs at Hyderabad, where a powerful faction, unfriendly to the English had grown up. To counteract the proceedings of this faction, it had been necessary for the British Government to come forward in support of the minister, Meer Allum, who had been instrumental to the formation of the alliance. Meer Allum died in 1804, and as there was the strongest reason to apprehend, that if the Nizam were left uncontrolled in the selection of a successor, the advantages of the alliance could not be preserved, Lord Minto determined to exert his utmost endeavours with a view to rescue the management of the Nizam's affairs from falling into the hands of the party above alluded to. After a troublesome negotiation, the Nizam was permitted to appoint Mooneer-ool-Moolk, a nobleman of high rank, but unused to business, to the office of minister. Mooneer-ool-Moolk, however, was placed under such restrictions as deprived him of all authority. He entered into a written engagement, in virtue of which the Nizam's affairs were left to the sole charge of Chundoo-Loll, with the title of Peshcar, or deputy. This person was entirely dependent upon the support of the British resident for his continuance in power: and although such an arrangement was theoretically, and, in some respects, practically, objectionable and inconvenient, it probably served to prevent the alliance from falling into decay. By means of the influence which the resident possessed, he was enabled to effect such a reformation of that part of the Nizam's army which formed his contingent, as rendered it of efficient service when its exertions were required in the Pindarry and Mahratta war.

Lord Minto having approved of the measures which had been adopted for disciplining the Nizam's force, was desirous of extending the same system to the Peshwa's troops; and, under instructions from Bengal, the resident at Poona prevailed upon his Highness to form a brigade of regular infantry, which he placed under the command of Major Ford, a Company's officer. His Lordship also effected an arrangement by which the Peshwa's southern jaggeedars, a class of chiefs who hold their lands upon the condition of military service, were constrained to pay more respect than they had previously paid to his Highness's requisitions.

In the Memoir, No. 1, the causes have been explained which led to the extension of British protection to the Seik chiefs inhabiting the territory situated between the rivers Suteleje and Jumna. This measure was founded upon a right acquired by the British Government in virtue of the treaty with Sindia, 1803, but it had not been exercised until it became necessary to prevent the extension of Runjeet Sing's authority in that part of Hindostan.

The employment of a large British force in defending the Rajah of Berar (Nagpure) against an attack made upon him by Ameer Khan, at the head of a licentious body of predatory troops\*, was regarded by the Government at home as a measure of defensive policy. With respect to the operations against Meer Khan it was observed, that Colonel Close, who commanded the British force, ought to have been authorized to pursue the invader. This opinion is contained in a secret letter, dated 10th September 1811, prepared at the Board during the presidency of Lord Melville, of which letter the following is an extract:

"However averse we may have been, and still are, from policy, as well as the positive declarations of the Legislature, to any schemes of conquest, or any wars undertaken for that object, even though it should not be distinctly avowed, we never can admit the expediency of abstaining from disabling any power, against whom we may have been compelled to take up arms, from renewing its aggressions. We are willing to allow, that the question of expense likely to be incurred in these ulterior operations was necessarily to be taken into consideration; but, on the other hand, our original expenditure might possibly be, in some measure, compensated by the acquisition of territory, and our own frontier, and that of our ally, might be rendered more secure, and might be guarded at less expense. It is, perhaps, unnecessary for us to add our opinion, that the permanent security of the British interests in India does not depend on any supposed balance of power among the native states. It is like the naval supremacy of this country: our power ought never to be exerted for the purposes of oppression or injustice; but it ought to be paramount over all, even if all should be combined against, or it will probably cease to exist."

When it became evident, that without the constant repetition of the same precautionary efforts, the Rajah of Berar could not have maintained his political independence, Lord Minto very justly conceived, that the Rajah ought to bear a part of the expense attendant upon the employment of a field force on his frontier. His Lordship accordingly pressed the Rajah to enter into a subsidiary treaty; but although the amount of the proposed subsidy was very moderate, the Rajah could not be prevailed upon to close with the proffered terms, and it was not until after the death of the Rajah, in the year 1816, that an alliance was formed with the state of Nagpure. This arrangement took place during the administration of Lord Hastings.

Before Lord Minto quitted India the power of the Pindarries and other predatory bodies had become very formidable. The subject was frequently brought by his Lordship under the notice of the home authorities; and although he was deterred by prudential considerations from adopting active operations on an extensive scale against these freebooters, apprehensive as he was that such a course of proceeding might involve the British Government in a war with the Mahratta chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, his Lordship, nevertheless, distinctly stated, in



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in his despatches to the Secret Committee, that defensive measures were mere palliatives\*, and that it would inevitably become necessary, at no very distant period of time, to strike at the root of this growing evil.

The Marquis of Hastings (then Earl of Moira) assumed the government of British India on the October 1813. His Lordship was almost immediately impressed with the conviction that a change in the system of our policy was requisite in order to ensure the tranquillity and security of our dominions. In a letter, dated the 3d March 1814, he gave it as his opinion that our affairs could not prosper until we should become the head of a league, to which every power in India should be a party, and which should constitute the British Government the arbitrator between all, and give to it the direction of the strength of all, against any disturber of the public peace.

The policy thus recommended by Lord Hastings was virtually the same as that which distinguished the administration of the Marquis Wellesley, and which had been disapproved at home, on the ground of its tendency to extend our dominions, and to entangle us in the complicated affairs of the Mahratta empire. Lord Hastings' proposal did not meet with the concurrence of his Council; and in a letter prepared at the India Board, and transmitted through the Secret Committee on the 3d January 1815, the Supreme Government were directed to refrain from making any material change in our subsisting engagements, excepting under circumstances of urgent necessity, without the previous sanction and authority of the Government at home.

Questions regarding the predatory powers continued to be discussed in the Supreme Council, whose deliberations were urgently recommended to the serious attention of the Secret Committee. In a despatch, dated September 9th 1815, to the Governor-general in Council, the Board, through the Secret Committee, observed as follows:

"We do not disapprove of your having added to your resolution, to confine yourselves to defensive measures, a resolution not to exclude from your contemplation the opportunity of striking a blow at the Pindarries, which might not involve the necessity of prematurely engaging in an extensive system of operations.

"Yet if we could entertain a hope that, by any military or political operations on our part, the Pindarries could be suppressed or expelled from Hindostan, *without incurring us with the Mahrattas*, we should willingly, for the sake of the general tranquillity, approve of such an operation, but we are not willing to incur the risk of a general war for the uncertain purpose of reducing or removing those predatory bands.

"Upon the subject of the confederacy, which the Governor-general is desirous to establish, notwithstanding the talents he has manifested, and the arguments with which he has supported his opinion, we must acknowledge that we cannot concur with his Lordship. We are apprehensive that such a confederacy would prove rather a source of weakness than of strength; that it might hazard the dissolution of our existing alliances, without substituting anything substantial in their place; that the attempt, however unlikely to succeed, upon the principles proposed, would excite jealousies with respect to our policy that might be attended with the most dangerous consequences, and might lead to a combination amongst the native powers, by which we might be involved in a contest more extensive than any in which the British Government has ever been engaged in India. We certainly do not recognise, from any circumstances within our knowledge, the embarrassment alleged by the Governor-general to arise from contradictory engagements, although an apprehension of such embarrassment is among the causes which induce us to be cautious in the extension of our connexions. We believe, with Mr. Edmonstone, that our power, and not the abuse of it, is our offence against the native princes; and although we are much disposed to discourage that system of minute interference in their internal affairs, of which his Lordship complains, we cannot ascribe to it the extensive effects which he apprehends. Any specific proposition for giving strength or simplicity to our existing alliances will be received by us with due regard; but, satisfied that the system which was consolidated at the close of the last Mahratta war is one as conducive to the public welfare as the very peculiar nature of the case admits, we are chiefly desirous, that by prudent management, our affairs should be maintained in the same relative state under which our possessions have now, for ten years, continued in a state of tranquillity."

With respect to the alleged contrariety of the engagements subsisting at the date of Lord Hastings' arrival in India, it is to be observed, that nearly the whole of those engagements had been either contracted or revised and modified by Lord Wellesley, of whose policy it was a fundamental principle to constitute the British Government the arbiter of all disputes which might arise between the states with which it was connected by treaties either of subsidiary alliance or of mere protection. All were restricted from carrying on any political correspondence except with the knowledge and sanction of the British Government, at whose disposal they were respectively bound to place their military resources when occasion should arise requiring a combined exertion of force against a common enemy. Such being the tenor of Lord Wellesley's treaties, it is difficult to perceive the need of any further provisions in order to effect the purposes contemplated by Lord Hastings.

It is, indeed, true that the right of thus calling forth and directing the resources of the native powers did not extend to the great Mahratta chieftains. The prosecution of the grand scheme of persuading Sindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Nagpore to become parties to the league, of which the basis was laid by the treaty of Hyderabad (October 1800) had been

\* On his return to England in the year 1813, Lord Minto observed to the writer of this Paper, that defensive measures would be just as effectual as to attempt to fence out the cuckoo.

been interdicted by the home authorities, in obedience to whose orders Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow had strenuously resisted all temptations to enlarge the sphere of our alliances. Lord Minto was well disposed to follow in the same course; but there is good reason to believe, that while he was fully aware of the embarrassments attendant upon a departure from that course, he foresaw that the neutral and merely defensive system of policy could not be much longer preserved, consistently with the maintenance of the peace and security of our own dominions and those of our allies.

The same conviction was occasionally expressed by other members of the Supreme Council, including Mr Edmonstone, between whom and Lord Hastings, however, there existed a difference of opinion upon a most material point. Mr Edmonstone regarded the further extension of our political alliances as an evil to be avoided as long as possible; whilst, on the other hand, Lord Hastings appeared from the first to have entertained the notion, that the suppression of the great evil of predatory warfare could not be effected by any measure short of the establishment of a league, which should comprehend all the states south of the river Indus, the minor states of Hindostan and Central India being required to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government in return for their deliverance from the irroads and extortions of the Patans and Pindarries.

It is due to Lord Hastings to state, that his opinion as to the necessity of forming connections with the chiefs of Rajpootana was founded upon testimony entitled to a high degree of respect.

The political agents of government in different parts of India had all concurred in representing the danger of allowing the upstart power of Meer Khan and his associates to acquire stability and consistence by the subjugation of the petty chieftains of Hindostan. Mr. (now Sir Charles) Metcalfe, who held the office of resident at Delhi, in a despatch, dated June 20, 1811, advertent to the urgent applications of those chieftains for the interposition of our authority in their behalf, observed as follows: "When I reply to these various applications, I find it difficult to obtain even a confession that the modern policy of Government is just. People do not scruple to assert that they have a right to the protection of the British Government. They say, that there always has existed some power in India to which peaceable states submitted, and, in return, obtained its protection, that then their governments were maintained in respectability, and they were secure against the ravages of upstart chiefs, and armies of lawless banditti; that the British Government now occupies the place of the great protecting power, and natural guardian of the peaceable and weak; but that owing to its refusal to use its influence for their protection, the peaceable and weak states are continually exposed to the oppressions and cruelties of robbers and plunderers, the most heinous and abandoned of mankind.

"It is impossible to live in this part of India and to see the scenes which pass before our eyes, without regretting that the Rajpoot states are not under our protection. A confederation of the Rajpoot states under the protection of the British Government must be a favorite object with every man who has any charge of political duties in this quarter. Perhaps no event could take place in India that would be attended with so many great advantages. It would connect the Bengal and Bombay territories, by a country that might then be considered, for all political and military purposes, one own. Lying between Agra and Guzerat, it would deprive the vagabond armies of India of their principal resource for ravage and plunder; and as there are scarcely any but such armies in India that are not under the control of the British Government, it would tend more than any other practicable event to establish finally the permanent peace of India.

"The intervention of Rajpootana under our influence would prevent any co-operation between those northern and southern powers, whom we have reason to suppose all affected towards us, and we should always have for neighbours and allies princes by nature and habit contented with their own countries, free from the spirit of aggression and encroachment, and delighting in the arts of peace and agriculture. The value of such neighbours will perhaps be forcibly felt, should we have in their stead a Patan or Mahatta government."

Mr. Jenkins, the resident at Nagpore, in a Letter to Lord Minto, dated December 30, 1811, took an able and comprehensive view of the several lines of policy which might be pursued with relation to the rising power of the Patans and Pindarries. He limited our option to one of the three following courses:—

1. To remain neutral spectators of the convulsions of the neighbouring states, confining ourselves to measures purely defensive.
2. To unite with other states of India in an effort to reduce the power of the Patans and Pindarries, without, however, extending our subsidiary relations beyond their present bounds.
3. To adopt a decided system for the entire suppression of the predatory powers, and to combine with it the extension of our subsidiary alliances to the Rajas of Nagpore, Holkar, Sindia and the Rajpoots.

He showed, that the first-mentioned course could not be permanently pursued, and would only defer the danger, not only without any adequate object, but with a moral certainty of increased difficulty in meeting the crisis when it occurred.

To the second course of proceeding Mr Jenkins objected, that we should not have it in our option to direct the confederated forces in the mode best calculated to attain the end in view, clogged as our exertions would be by the obstinacy, weakness, jealousy and shortsightedness of the powers on whom we should rely for co-operation, but over whose measures we could exercise no legitimate or salutary control; and that, therefore, our exertions

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would not be rewarded by that permanent security, which should alone induce us to put them forth.

The *third* course was that which, in Mr. Jenkins's opinion, ought to be adopted. The Rajah of Nagpore was then, he conceived, well disposed to connect himself with us; the Rajpoot states called aloud for our protection; the *family* of Holkar would gladly have accepted our aid in rescuing the resources of that state from the grasp of Meer Khan, whose domineering conduct had disgusted the ministers and principal persons at Holkar's court; and Mr. Jenkins did not apprehend any insuperable difficulty in bringing Sindia himself within the circle of our alliances.

On the 1st December 1815, Lord Hastings recorded an elaborate minute, in which he took a general view of the political state of India, and detailed the measures to which he was desirous of obtaining the sanction of the Government at home. His Lordship had not then received the secret instructions of September 1815, of which the tenor has been stated in a preceding page.

In Lord Hastings's view, the danger arising from the Patan and Pindarry troops was imminent and serious, and intimately connected with that which he apprehended from the latent hostility of the Mahratta chiefs, who (his Lordship supposed) were favourable in disposition to the existence of the predatory system. He therefore conceived that no steps for the suppression of the predatory hordes would be effectual without "a settlement of the dominions" of the Mahratta powers. Thus assuming that the Mahratta chiefs waited only for a favourable opportunity to attack us, and that no policy could long avert a war, Lord Hastings did not think that we ought to be deterred by the fear of a rupture with them, from proceeding forthwith in the most effectual course for putting an end to the irregularities by which the peace of India had been so much disturbed.

With reference to the supposed sentiments of the Mahratta chiefs, his Lordship thus expressed himself:—"The native princes would not remain merely indifferent to the increasing power of the predatory bands, but placing reliance on its magnitude and consistency, they would argue that the shock it might happen to give to us would present the felicitous moment for wreaking their own revenge, through which hope they would both encourage and sustain the freebooters in their hostile proceedings."

Under this impression, Lord Hastings observed that a revision of our political system was essentially necessary for the establishment of our security. "We have," said his Lordship, "no complete system. Our first plan was to avoid meddling with the native powers, the second was to control them all: and we have since attempted partially to recur to the first, after having taken one half of the powers of India under our protection, and made the other half our enemies. By protecting the pacific states, we have deprived the predatory of the usual sources of their subsistence, and consequently have engaged in a war with the latter, which can never really terminate until we have made them alter their habits. We are already attacked by one of them, and the connexion between the whole is so intimate, that we cannot make any exertion against that one without the hazard of our being in with the rest."

The conclusions which Lord Hastings deduced from his review of our political situation, were—

1. That we did not enjoy the advantages we had a right to expect from the relations understood to subsist between us and the other powers of India;
2. That the existing evils demanded a decided step for removing them;
3. That the powers whose duty it was to apply the remedy, were unable or unwilling to apply it;
4. That the remedy could only be found in a course of action which should lead to a settlement of the dominions of the Mahratta powers, and destroy or provide for the numerous bodies of irregular horse who subsisted principally on plunder;
5. That these objects could not be accomplished without a change in our political relations;
6. That in the pursuit of these objects we might be involved in a war with the Mahratta powers, but that it was also likely, that by pursuing a different policy, we should not in the end escape that misfortune; and,
7. That should there be no option left us but the choice between an immediate war, for which we should be fully prepared, and an expensive system of defence against a consuming predatory warfare carried on clandestinely by the Mahratta powers, and wasting our resources until they might see a practicable opportunity of coming to an open rupture, we could not, in common sense, hesitate in preferring the former alternative.

Lord Hastings conceived that the extension of our influence in central India, till the whole should acknowledge our guaranty and suzerainty, was the legitimate and proper object of our policy, and that to the accomplishment of that object, by all just and lawful means, our views ought to be systematically directed.

Although in the greater part of his Minute Lord Hastings appeared to contemplate a war with the Mahrattas as a temporary evil, with little hazard, and likely to be eventually productive of lasting benefits, his Lordship, towards the conclusion of his Minute, expressed a hope that the objects which he deemed necessary might be gained without the risk of a serious war.

"Our military force is," said his Lordship, "competent, were matters to come to a struggle; an issue, however, which I cannot too often observe, is so far from being necessary in my plan, that I consider war as a material retardant to its completion. I look to influence and opinion as our instruments, and both are now in the height of efficacy."

"The

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"The prostration of the Gorkah power, of which such an exaggerated notion was once entertained, will occasion beneficial apprehension of coping with us. There is thence a probability of making the arrangement with little hazard of conflict and little disbursement. The advantages of such an arrangement are confessed by Mr. Edmonstone to have attracted the desires of Government; but he remarks that they were not to be gratuitously pursued, as I recommended, but only to be sought in the event of war being forced upon us. In other words, they were to be enjoyed after the completion of the mischief they were designed to prevent. To me it has seemed wiser to achieve the end by pacific management, in time to preclude the waste and the chances of extensive contest. No man, I imagine, will be found to say that the trial upon one or other of the conditions can be long delayed; prudence is thence called upon to decide whether it be more eligible to fashion the experiment according to our own sense of convenience and probabilities, or to undertake it on such terms as the future power and the matured plans of our enemies may happen to impose."

Mr. Canning had, in consequence of the death of the Earl of Buckinghamshire, in the year 1816, been placed at the head of the India Board, and it became the duty of this eminent statesman to prescribe the course which should be pursued in an important and perplexing crisis of affairs. In a very able and interesting memoir, Mr. Canning reviewed all the material circumstances of the political state of India, and proceeded to frame instructions for the guidance of the conduct of the Supreme Government.

Mr. Canning, in common with Mr. Edmonstone, was disinclined to admit that the Mahratta chiefs entertained those hostile designs against our power which were attributed to them by Lord Hastings; and although he recognised the necessity of striking a blow at the Pindary and other predatory associations, whose numbers and audacity were on the increase, he concurred in the opinion expressed by the late Board, in their despatch of September 29, 1815, as to the inexpediency of undertaking expensive operations with the view of extirpating the Pindarries, and of remodelling our political relations and extending our influence or control.

The subjoined extracts from the instructions above alluded to (which are dated September 5th 1816), will best explain Mr. Canning's sentiments.

"In regard to the Pindarries, we adhere to the opinion declared in our letter of the 29th September 1815; we are unwilling to incur the risk of a general war for the uncertain purpose of extirpating altogether these predatory bands. Extended political and military combinations, therefore, for that purpose, we cannot at the present moment sanction or approve.

"To protect ourselves and our allies against specific incursions, and to punish the aggressors, in all that is either demanded by duty or dictated by prudence. In the occasional expeditions which such attacks may render necessary, you have a right to call for the assistance of those powers with whom you are connected by alliance, and we do not think it improbable that, even from Sindia, you may derive assistance in enterprises against separate bodies of the Pindarries who may have committed depredations in our territories, or in those which we are bound to protect, although you have no ground to demand or expect his concurrence in a general league with a view to their complete extirpation.

"If, instead of declaring general war against all predatory associations, you avail yourselves of the advantage to be derived from the discordant elements of which they are composed, and of the dissensions which prevail among their leaders, it appears to us not unreasonable to expect that any project for uniting all the freebooters against you under the banners of the Mahratta chiefs may be defeated, but also that you may from time to time obtain a partial co-operation from one or other of those chiefs, according to the degree in which the pecuniary interests of each may be affected by any incursion of the Pindarries.

"In issuing these instructions for your guidance as well in your diplomatic arrangements as in your proceedings with respect to the predatory hordes, we have not been regardless of the information recently received from you as to the suspicious behaviour of certain of the Mahratta chieftains, and the daring movements of the Pindarries. But we entertain a strong hope that the dangers which arise from both these causes, and which must, perhaps, always exist in a greater or less degree, may by a judicious management of our existing relations be prevented from coming upon us in any very formidable force, while, on the other hand, any attempt at this moment to establish a new system of policy, tending to a wider diffusion of our power, must necessarily interfere with those economical regulations which it is more than ever incumbent upon us to recommend as indispensable to the maintenance of our present ascendancy, and by exciting the jealousy and suspicion of other states, may too probably produce or mature those very projects of hostile confederacy which constitute the chief object of your apprehension."

A few days after these instructions had been dispatched, intelligence was received from the Madras Government of an incursion of the Pindarries into the Northern Circars, exceeding in audacity and cruelty all their former incursions. These ruthless plunderers had on this occasion successfully eluded the vigilance of our out-posts, and carried off through obscure and difficult passes the booty which they had acquired.

It now became obvious that vigorous effort was indispensably necessary for the effectual reduction of the Pindarries, and under that conviction no time was lost in issuing fresh instructions adapted to the exigency of the case. In a secret letter, which is dated September 29th 1816, are the following passages: "On former occasions parties of Pindarries have extended their incursions with temporary success into the British dominions, but we

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have not before had to notice an invasion so systematically directed against our provinces, so disastrous in its effects, and perpetrated with such entire impunity.

"That an enterprise so daring and so injurious should not have been defeated in a manner calculated to deter its leaders from a repetition of the attempt, but that, on the contrary, the richness of the booty carried off must probably dispose them again to visit our most flourishing possessions, is to us, as it doubtless has been to your Lordship, a source of great mortification.

"The measures adopted by the Governor of Fort St. George for protecting the territories under his government, and for punishing the invaders, appear to have been disappointed by those peculiar circumstances which create the chief difficulty in all operations against these predatory hordes.

"Our instructions of 29th September 1815, as well as those which we have recently issued, discouraged plans of general confederacy and of offensive operations against the Pindarries, either with a view to their utter extirpation, or in anticipation of an apprehended danger; but they were not intended to restrain your Lordship in the exercise of your judgment and discretion upon any occasion when actual war upon our territories might be commenced by any body of marauders, and where the lives and properties of British subjects might call for efficient protection.

"We think it, however, due to your Lordship not to lose an instant in conveying to you an explicit assurance of our approbation of any measures which you may have authorized or undertaken, *not only for repelling invasion, but for pursuing and chastising the invaders.*

"Such an invasion obviously constitutes a case in which we have a right to call for the co-operation of our allies.

"We have as clearly a right to require of any native powers through whose territories the invaders may have forced their way, either an engagement (supported by adequate preparation) to oppose an effectual resistance to any such incursion in future, or a permission to take such positions within their territories as may be temporarily necessary for our own defence.

"No such demand could by any possible perversion, be construed into a design upon the independence of the state to which it was addressed, or into an appetency for enlarged dominion; it would be a measure of the strictest self-defence.

"Your language to Sindia and Holkar will be guided by the view which you may take, first, of the degree in which either of them may be suspected of having assisted or countenanced the Pindarries in any measures hostile to us or our allies; and, secondly, of the necessity or advantage of a passage through his territories, or of the occupation of a post in them, for the success of your operations.

"An avowed co-operation with the Pindarries against us or our allies on the part of Sindia or of Holkar, would of course place you in a state of direct hostility with the offending chief.

"Such a connexion, known though not avowed, would furnish the same ground of right. But in acting, or forbearing to act on this ground, you would be guided by considerations of prudence. It might be politic to attempt to divide such confederacy by disembling your knowledge of its existence.

"While we rely confidently on your constantly keeping in mind our general system of abstention from any avoidable hostilities, we wish that you should understand us as distinguishing between a plan of policy essentially alike, or directed to objects of remote and contingent advantage, and a vigorous exertion of military power in vindication of the honour of the British name, and in defence of subjects who look up to us for protection."

A letter from the Governor-general in Council, dated the 12th December 1816, and received in England the 6th May 1817, after alluding to a fresh incursion of the Pindarries, and to the movements of a detachment under Colonel Walker in pursuit of them, proceeds as follows:-

"It is manifest that no defensive precautions can be of avail against an enemy like the Pindarries, while they occasion an annual expenditure exceeding the most extravagant calculations of the cost of a vigorous and decided system of measures which would destroy the evil effectually. The inability of Colonel Walker's force to defend the extended line of frontier committed to his charge, has already been made manifest, notwithstanding the activity and exertion of that officer and the troops under his command, by a large body of Pindarries having actually turned one of his largest detachments so close to its position as to have been partially engaged with the British troops, which, being composed entirely of infantry, was unable to offer any effectual obstruction to the rapid movements of the enemy. We have endeavoured to improve Colonel Walker's means of defence, by placing at his disposal two of the battalions intended to form a part of the [Nagpore] subsidiary force, and two squadrons of cavalry, which have been assembled at Lohargony for that purpose; and we hope that with this addition his line will be considerably more secure, though, for reasons that need not be detailed, we can entertain no hopes that any system of measures founded on defensive principles will oppose an effectual barrier to the incursions of the Pindarries."

Notwithstanding the strong impression which Lord Hastings entertained and repeatedly avowed of the impolicy of the restrictive system which opposed the adoption of measures calculated, according to his views, to place the interests of the British Government in India on a secure basis, it is due to his Lordship to remark, that he refrained from acting upon his own plans pending a reference to England. On the receipt of the instructions of September 1816, Lord Hastings proceeded forthwith to prepare for action. The subjoined

extract

extract from his Lordship's letter of the 1st October 1817 to the Secret Committee is important and interesting.

"All the preparations which I had ordered were completed with so little attraction of notice, that when I reached this place (Cawnpore), I found reason to be convinced that the native powers did not at all comprehend the extent or forwardness of our equipment.

"I was anxious to get into the field earlier than what the period of the season (especially in this year, the hottest ever known in India) would otherwise have recommended, lest their apprehension of what impended over them might induce the Pindarries to attempt some desperate inroad into our provinces with the hope of distracting our plans against them. The dangerous illness of Lieut.-general Sir Thomas Hislop, from which his Excellency is happily recovered, threw some retardment on the advance of the troops from the Deccan to the Nerbudda, and I was obliged to delay correspondently my movements, that I might not discover too early the mode in which they were destined to give facilitation to the operations from the southward. Hence, instead of assembling the principal part of our force on the 10th, I do not bring it together till the 20th instant.

"I have intimated my unalterable determination to expulate the Pindaries from their present haunts, and to take measures against their re-establishment in any part of India.

"This point, Honourable Sirs, brings me to an explanation of peculiar delay. Growing circumstances will speedily exhibit the entire impossibility of my adhering to the injunction of the Honourable Court \* against making any new treaty without their previous sanction. I am not presuming to state any opposition of my own judgment to that of my honourable employers; I am pleading a case of positive and unequivocal necessity. We have gained such advantages of position over those who were inclined to resistance, that those powers are comparatively defenceless. It is my fondest hope that the moderation of your government will be proudly displayed in forbearing to exercise its superiority in the extent which would be fully justified by the detected treachery of those with whom it has to deal. Still, whether I shall carry my point without bloodshed by at once overawing and concluding, or whether I shall be forced through the miscalculation of our neighbours to employ our strength, I am at this moment essentially engaged in war, and in a war the influence of which is unavoidably vast in scope. There can be no termination of such a state of things, but by treaties, unless all the expense incurred and all the points hitherto gained shall be rendered fruitless, by our leaving affairs to return to that anterior condition of which our experience was so baneful. The preventing the re-union of the Pindarries, or the formation of new predatory confederacies, can only be achieved by binding in efficient engagements to us such states as may have, from situation, the means of precluding those associations; were such a precaution neglected, all prospect of being able to reduce our ordinary military expenditure (the object which has dictated the present effort) must pass away. And I am not at liberty to sacrifice so inconsistently your interests, in order to forge a merit for myself by a parade of obedience. I therefore conjure you, Honourable Sirs, to do me justice in looking forward to the exigency which I point out. I feel that there is no indifference to your orders, much less any self-sufficient notion of following a system of my own in the proceeding to which I shall be compelled; but that, standing in the case where I must act for you, without the possibility of reference to your will, I simply discharge my duty to you by so profiting of circumstances as may in my humble conception best secure the future tranquillity of your possessions and the uninterrupted affluence of your revenue. The spirit of your commands will nevertheless be so present to me in whatsoever I may meditate, that I trust the tenor of every arrangement will prove the solicitude I feel to make your pleasure the leading principle.

It would be foreign from the purpose of this memoir to advert to the military operations and political arrangements which were devised by Lord Hastings with a view to the extinction of the predatory powers. The success of his Lordship's measures was such as might have been expected from the wisdom and energy of the mind that projected them, and from the gallantry and skill of the officers and the bravery of the troops by whom his plans were carried into execution. The field of operations was considerably extended in consequence of the treachery of the Peshwa and of the Rajah of Nagpore, mid of the hostility of the other principal Mahratta chiefs. Lord Hastings, indeed, by an admirable stroke of policy, not only restrained Sindia from taking part against us, but obliged him, contrary to his will, to place a portion of his troops at our disposal, and to surrender his principal strongholds. The Guicowar was also dissuaded by the resident, Major Carnac (who had acquired a salutary influence over him), from joining the confederacy.

It has been deemed by high authorities, that in forming the last combination against us the Mahratta chiefs were actuated by a desire to screen the Pindaries from the vengeance of the British Government. Their hostility is supposed to have been excited by a feeling of sympathy for the humbled condition to which their former nominal head, the Peshwa, had been reduced by the restrictive terms of his alliance with us. By the stipulations of the treaty of Bassoon, he was debarred from carrying on political correspondence with the other Mahratta chiefs. It was, indeed, the object of Lord Wellesley's policy to break the ties which bound those chiefs together in a species of confederation. The relative powers and respective duties of the members of that confederation had been shaped rather by usage than by constitutional regulations. The bonds of their union were so lax as to afford no

undefined

\* The injunction was not issued by the Court of Directors, but by the Board of Control, through the Secret Committee.

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undefined latitude of action to the several chiefs, who, generally speaking, appear to have prosecuted their individual views and separate interests without mutual concert or reference to the will of the Peshwa. Lord Wellesley accordingly intended to convert the principal Mahratta chiefs into independent sovereigns; that is to say, to render them independent of each other, and utterly to dissolve their connexion with the Court of Poonah. This plan was, however, but partially accomplished. Early associations and deep-rooted sympathies survived the treaty of Bassem, and intrigues but ill disguised were for many years carried on by Sindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar (or Nagpore) with the Peshwa, who probably had never been wholly reconciled to his intimate connexion with our government. His dissatisfaction was at length unequivocally manifested by overt acts, and the Governor-general felt obliged to place him under a more strict and rigorous control, and at the same time to deprive him of a portion of his territories with a view to weaken his power. The treaty of June 1817 also exacted from the Peshwa the formal renunciation of his character of chief of the Mahratta federation, and the cession of all his rights, interests and pretensions, in Bundelcund, Malwa, Rajpootana and Hindostan.

From the date of that treaty Bajee Rao became but the more impatient to break the trammels which galled him, and secret communications between him and the Mahratta chiefs were carried on with increased activity. In the beginning of November 1817, conceiving that the hour of emancipation had arrived, he attacked and set fire to the British residency, and thus entered into a contest which terminated in the loss of his dominions. His example was speedily followed by the treacherous defection of the Nagpore Rajah. Most assuredly Sindia would have joined the confederacy had not Lord Hastings taken effectual means to place a seal upon him, so as to render it impracticable for him to move a single step beyond the limits of his own territories. Holkar gave battle and was crushed at Mahedpore.

It is difficult even to hint at those splendid events without being betrayed into an historical recital; but this, as already observed, is here out of place. The foregoing narrative will, however, serve to explain the circumstances which paved the way for the formation of the subsisting treaties which were concluded during the administration of the Marquis of Hastings.

#### Nagpore.

That Lord Minto perceived the expediency if not the necessity of an alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore cannot admit of a doubt, although his Lordship was deterred by the jealousy of Ragojee Bhoosla, and by other circumstances, from pressing upon him a measure to which he had manifested a strong aversion. It was not until after the death of Ragojee, on the 22d March 1816, that the projected alliance was formed. Ragojee's son and legitimate successor, Purasjee Bhoosla, was nowise capable of conducting the government that had devolved upon him. He had been all his life reputed to be of a disposition flighty and impatient of control, but a recent sickness had deprived him of sight, and he had lost the use of one of his arms by a stroke of the palsy, which had also affected his mind. The next heir to the late Rajah was Moodajee Bhoosla, commonly called Appa Sahib, who, in the month of April, was declared to be vested, by the young Rajah himself, with the sole and entire conduct of public affairs, under the title of Naeerb-o-Mokhum, i. e. Deputy with full powers. Anxious to secure the countenance and support of the British Government, Appa Sahib made overtures for an alliance, which were readily met by the resident, Mr Jenkins, and a subsidiary treaty was accordingly concluded on the 27th May 1816. It contained the usual stipulations restrictive of political negotiations or correspondence with other states, and constituting the British Government the arbiter of disputes. The strength of the subsidiary force was fixed at six battalions of sepoy and a regiment of cavalry. Two of the battalions were to be cantoned at Nagpore. The subsidy demanded was an equivalent to the field charges of the force, which was estimated at eight lacs of rupees. A territorial cession had been fixed upon; but Mr Jenkins having ascertained that money payments at Nagpore were to be preferred, an abatement of half a lac of rupees was made in the amount; and it was stipulated that the expediency of commuting this for a territorial cession at a subsequent period, should be considered and determined by mutual consent, but that the British Government should be entitled to demand such cession in the event of any irregularity in the payments. The contingent was fixed at 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot, in the regulation of the discipline and internal management of which the resident was to have the right of offering advice.

This was the first instance, subsequently to Lord Wellesley's departure from India, of the formation of a subsidiary alliance. It was hoped that it would have the effect of entirely detaching the state of Nagpore from the other members of the Mahratta confederation, at the same time that it gave us the advantage of occupying the stations best suited for the commencement of military operations against the Pindarries.

Appa Sahib disappointed the expectations which had been formed of his character and conduct. He had not been long established in the regency before he caused Purasjee Bhoosla to be strangled in the night. This crime, which was perpetrated on the 1st February 1817, was not brought to light until after Appa Sahib had been recognized by the British Government as the legitimate successor of the murdered prince.

No sooner were the hostile designs of Bajee Rao (the Peshwa) towards the English made known at Nagpore, than Appa Sahib, who had previously carried on a secret correspondence with Poonah, came at once to the resolution of making common cause with the head of the Mahratta nation. His attack upon the British residency, and the frustration of his treacherous designs by the courage and presence of mind of Mr. Jenkins, and the gal-

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lantry of the few \* British troops stationed at Seetabuldee, and facts which have been briefly mentioned in the Memoir, No. 1. Immediately after the action, Appa Sahib tendered his submission, which was conditionally accepted; but his troops were not reduced without a serious effort by the army under Brigadier-general Doveton, who, on hearing of the Rajah's outrage, had hastened to Nagpore.

After what had thus passed, it was quite evident that no confidence could be placed in Appa Sahib; he was, however, permitted to retain nominal sovereignty. By an arrangement concluded in the month of January 1818, Appa Sahib ceded territory yielding a net revenue of about 22 and a half lacs of rupees; the British Government was vested with a right to control every branch of his internal and external administration; to impose a ministry of its own selection from the natives of Nagpore, and to introduce British garrisons into the forts of the country.

No sooner, however, was his personal danger at an end, than Appa Sahib thought only of regaining his lost authority. In the interval between the attack on the residency and the arrival of Brigadier-general Doveton, secret orders had been issued by Appa Sahib to the several Gaonds, and other jungle and mountain Rajahs, to call out their followers and offer every annoyance in their power to the British authorities, especially to cut off detachments in charge of convoys, and prevent the country from furnishing supplies to the different armies in the field. These and other measures of a like hostile nature were for some time concealed from the knowledge of Mr. Jenkins, who, on discovering the Rajah's designs, seized and brought to the residency Appa Sahib and his two confidential ministers. On the 3d of May 1818, they were conveyed from Nagpore, under charge of a wing of the 22d Bengal native infantry, under the conduct of Captain Brown. It was intended to lodge these persons in the fort of Allahabad. On the morning of the 13th, Appa Sahib, disguised as a sepoy, joined the guard, and under semblance of a relief, marched without interruption completely out of the camp. Relays of horses were in readiness to carry him to a distance before the alarm should be given. It is conjectured that the plan of Appa Sahib's escape was contrived by a Bhalmin who accompanied the party from Nagpore, but after a few marches left them on some pretence or other. Several sepoys deserted along with the prisoner, and their example was soon afterwards followed by others.

The extensive sacrifices which had been demanded upon Appa Sahib's restoration to the guddle, left it inexpedient to exact any further concessions from the new Rajah. Lord Hastings therefore determined to grant to Appa Sahib's successor the same terms as had been agreed upon in the arrangement made in the preceding January. Bayce Rao Bhoosla, the grandson of Ragoojee Bhoosla, was placed on the guddle in the month of June 1818. Being a minor, Baka Baeo was constituted regent of the state until he should come of age. The country reserved for the young Rajah was during his minority administered by British officers, under the superintendence of Mr. Jenkins. This arrangement continued in operation for eight years and a half, namely, until the 1st December 1816, when the country was made over to the Rajah, with the exception of a portion yielding about 17 lacs of rupees per annum, which was retained by us as a security for the payment of that part of the Rajah's army which was disciplined and officered by British officers.

These districts have, however, been given up to the Rajah, under an arrangement concluded with him on the 27th December 1820, in virtue of which, instead of furnishing a contingent of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot, he is bound to maintain a force of only 1,000 Sillada horse, and to pay a tribute of eight lacs of rupees per annum. The troops disbanded under this last arrangement consisted of two battalions of regular infantry, three corps of horse and three provincial battalions; the British officers attached to which corps have been withdrawn from the Rajah's service.

#### Holkar.

Mulhar Rao, the son and successor of Jeswant Rao Holkar, made common cause with the Peshwa, and took the field soon after Bayce Rao's defection. After the decisive battle of Mahedpore, 21 December 1817, Holkar agreed to a treaty which placed him on the footing of other powers connected with us in subsidiary alliance. We are bound to maintain a force of such strength as may be judged by us to be adequate to the protection of the state. In consideration of the large territorial cessions demanded from Holkar as the price of peace, he was exempted from any further cession or pecuniary payment on account of subsidy. By one of the stipulations of the treaty, Holkar is bound to furnish a contingent of 3,000 horse.

The only remaining treaty of a subsidiary nature which has been concluded subsequently to the close of Lord Wellesley's administration, is with the state of

#### Cutch.

The attention of Government was directed to that quarter of India at a time when it was judged expedient to adopt measures of precaution against the designs of France and Russia, to advance an army towards our north-western frontier; but after the apprehension of that danger had subsided, our policy in respect to Cutch had for its object the defence of that petty state against the ambitious designs of the Ameers of Sind, who, if permitted to effect its conquest, would have come in close contact with the province of Guzerat, and have proved to us a restless and troublesome neighbour.

The

\* Between 1,300 and 1,400 men. The Rajah's force consisted of upwards 10,000 infantry, and the like number of horse.  
(445.—V.L.)



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The state of Cutch had for several years been distracted by internal dissensions, and at length, owing to the laxity of the Government, various acts of aggression were committed by the people of Cutch on the territories of our ally the Guicowar. It now became necessary to exert our power in defence of that ally, and in the year 1815 an expedition was sent against Cutch: the reigning Rao or prince was set aside, and a new Rao placed upon the throne, with whom a subsidiary treaty was concluded in 1816. Some further changes in our relations with this state have subsequently taken place; a brief explanation of which will be found on page 198.

The results of the wars with the state of Nepal in the year 1816, and of that with the King of Ava in 1826, although they added several provinces to the British dominions, and brought several petty chiefs and states within the pale of our protection, did not increase the number of our political alliances.

II. Having, in the foregoing pages, traced the origin and progress of our subsidiary alliances, it now remains to state the principal objections which have been urged against the subsidiary system, as well as the arguments that are used in its defence, and afterwards to consider whether (admitting the full force of the objections) it be practicable to abandon those alliances; and if not, whether any effectual means can be devised for mitigating the ill effects of the system.

1. *Of the Objections to the Subsidiary System.*

The author\* of an interesting work, published in the year 1822, and entitled "Considerations on the State of British India," having given a sketch of the military operations and political arrangements of Lord Hastings, observes, that a chain of subsidiary alliances with the native states had been established throughout the continent of India, in consequence of which the whole had been reduced to an entire dependence on our power. His opinion as to the policy which produced this state of things is thus expressed—

"The anomalous and divided system of authority which these subsidiary alliances create, can only operate as a fertile source of disorder. Altogether discordant in views and dissimilar in character, it would be a rare and unexpected occurrence in political history, if the separate action of the rival powers which are united in this heterogeneous alliance should combine so as to produce a harmonious result. The attempt to control the actions of princes who have been educated in the school of Asiatic misgovernment, by the more enlightened maxims of European policy, has rarely succeeded.

"Possessing a real superiority, but affecting inferiority, the British Government can ill brook the slightest opposition to its will. Decked out in a nominal superiority, but conscious of a real inferiority, and irritated the more by this ostentatious mockery, the native ruler is apt to regard the enlightened interposition of British authority as a direct violation of his rights, the remembrance of which he cherishes with a rankling animosity, which frequently breaks out in rebellion. In such a state of political union, the chance of any tolerable compromise between these rival authorities, which might promote the prosperity of the interior states, must principally depend upon the character of the residents at the native courts. If the British representative should be a man of enlightened views, with a character distinguished for moderation, and whose interference in the internal affairs of the state was marked by a due regard for Asiatic opinions and prejudices, it is possible that he might mitigate the exercise of this authority so as to render the galling chain of his dependence less noxious to the native ruler, and thus ultimately reconcile him to the British dominion. But this can rarely happen. The entire opposition of interests which exists must inevitably engender discord. It must be the interest of the resident to restrain the native prince in those exactions which would impoverish his subjects, and thus ultimately disable the state from fulfilling its engagements to the British Government, whilst the selfish policy of an Asiatic ruler prompts him to extort the utmost from the means of his subjects. Thus checked in his daring propensity, his spirit revolts at this humiliating subjection, and he embraces with eagerness the first opportunity of throwing it off.

"Should the British resident be a man of a different stamp, arbitrary and domineering in conduct, what a vast field is open for misgovernment, from there being no efficient check or control over his conduct. Possessing the confidence of Government, which derives its information through him only, he can manage to colour his actions so as to receive their support. Fortified by this power, and determined to make his will the law, by interposing his authority in behalf of those who oppose their native prince, he succeeds in erecting a superior authority within his dominions.

"Again, the agent of the British Government may be a man of an entirely different character, soft and flexible, averse to the trouble of ruling, and accessible to flattery. These moral weaknesses are quickly perceptible by the discerning Asiatic. Skilled in the art of insinuation, by the most delicate attentions, he insensibly gains his confidence, and wins him to his purposes. Thus strengthened he proceeds unrestrained in his career of exaction. A prince of this stamp must inflict incalculable injury on his country. Possessing the entire command of the British subsidiary force, he can subvert all opposition. Unsupported by this power, the resistance of his subjects would compel him to desist: but this, the only efficient check to Asiatic misgovernment, is rendered altogether nugatory by the overwhelming superiority of our arms. Thus British protection is felt as a grievous and intolerable

\* Lieutenant, now Captain Adam White, of the Bengal native infantry.

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intolerable calamity. There can be no spectacle more melancholy and humiliating than this, where the knowledge and strength of civilization are prostituted to the support of an unhalloved career of rapacity and oppression. These two last exemplifications of British misrule may be regarded as extreme cases, and I am inclined to think that the first example is the mode in which our power generally operates. But those who are acquainted with Asiatic history will acknowledge that the latter cases are not without a parallel.

"These particular evils are aggravated by more general causes. Conscious of our superiority, and thoroughly impressed with the belief that it will be exercised at a convenient period for the purpose of aggrandizement, they regard our power with fear and distrust. Impelled by these feelings, and convinced that their reign is altogether transitory, they exert every energy in collecting a treasure which may serve as a resource in the hour of need. The expense of the subsidiary force is likewise felt as a severe burthen on the resources of the state. From various causes, the forces of the native prince are little diminished. From a feeling of personal pride, a regard to the interests of the military class, and as a security against oppression, an Asiatic ruler feels a manifest reluctance to reduce his army. Thus the country is saddled with an enormous military force, and those funds which were destined for the reproduction of wealth are altogether lost to the community."

Although Captain White's description of the nature of the subsidiary system comprehends nearly all that has been urged against that description of alliance, it may nevertheless be proper to adduce the recorded opinions of persons who have held high situations in the service of the East India Company.

In the instructions issued to the resident at Poonah, on the 1st of November 1811 (prepared by Mr. Edmonstone, at the period when Lord Minto was at the head of affairs in India), it was observed, that the Peshwa was evidently disposed to interpret the treaty of Bassau as imposing upon the British Government the exclusive burthen of protecting his dominions, and of rendering the British force the instrument of those exertions which it is the duty of every state to employ for its internal security.

"Such, however, (says Mr. Edmonstone) is the natural tendency of all subsidiary alliances which originate in the energy of one party and the weakness of the other. The latter, relieved from its danger and its apprehensions, and withheld from the contemplation of projects of aggrandizement and ambition, ceases to be actuated by any motives of exertion. The prince reposes in indolent security under the assured protection of his ally; his military establishment is neglected, and his attention is directed to the accumulation of those resources which, under other circumstances, would necessarily be applied to the support of an efficient army.

"The protecting power, on the other hand, loses all but the negative advantages of the original compact, and is exposed to immediate evils and prospective dangers, the necessary consequence of this change in the character of the alliance. It is burthened with the control of disorder and insubordination, arising from the decay of energy in the governing power, without possessing the means of exercising the restraints of local authority. The sphere of its protection is extended without deriving from the alliance that accession of strength which it was intended, and, in its original condition, was calculated to afford. It retains only the negative, although certainly most essential benefit, of being no longer exposed to the disquietude or the danger arising from the existence of an independent dominion left at liberty to take advantage of any circumstances favourable to the prosecution of hostile or ambitious designs, or susceptible of being added to the power of other hostile states; it incurs a danger of considerable magnitude, the danger arising from the eventual aversion of the present or future head of the state to an alliance which, while it protects his dominions, controls his power and wounds his pride; from the weakness, the folly, or the vice of his character, and from the intrigues and machinations of his ministers, advisers, or feudatory chiefs, who have no natural interest in the preservation of the alliance, and have ends to answer by aiming at the subversion of it. Under the operation of these causes, a main object of the alliance is not only lost, but prevented; the expected source of additional strength becomes an instrument of peril, and must operate most injuriously under the occurrence of the very contingencies against which it was intended to provide."

Observations of the same tenor were made by Mr. Russell, the late resident at Hyderabad, in an interesting and able report upon the affairs of that state, addressed to Lord Hastings, and dated the 24th of November 1819.

"In some degree, (says Mr. Russell) the weakness and disorders of the Nizam's Government are the necessary consequence of his political situation. An alliance with us upon the subsidiary system, however it may contribute to the advancement of our own power, leads inevitably to the ultimate destruction of the state which embraces it. Diversities of national character and political circumstances will affect the manner and period of its action, but cannot prevent the result itself. The Mahometans have survived the Mahattas; the Nizam is dying comatose, while the Peshwa has expired in convulsions; but the destiny of both originated in the same cause, and necessarily tended to the same termination. If we owe the foundation of our empire in this country to the weakness in which we found the native powers, we ought not to complain of the evils which that weakness necessarily produces. If we have reaped the benefits, we must submit to witness the inconveniences which are its inseparable attendants. Yet evils may be palliated, though they cannot be radically cured. The crisis may be retarded, although it cannot be altogether averted. And if it be true that a part of the mischief has arisen from the pre-dominance of our power, it is, for that reason, the more incumbent upon us that we should endeavour to apply the remedy."

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Letter from  
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to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant.

Upon the subject of subsidiary alliances, the following observations are extracted from a letter addressed by Sir Thomas Munro to Lord Hastings, dated the 12th of August 1817; at which time his Lordship was about to undertake active operations against the predatory powers.

"The situation of the British Government with regard to the native powers is entirely changed within the last twenty years. It formerly brought very small armies into the field, with hardly any cavalry; and the issue of any war in which it engaged was extremely uncertain. It now brings armies into the field superior to those of the enemy, not only in infantry but also in cavalry, both in quality and in number. The superiority is so great, that the event of any struggle in which it may be engaged is no longer doubtful. It has only to bring forward its armies, and dictate what terms it pleases, either without war, or after a short and fruitless resistance. It may, however, be doubted whether, after the settlement of the Pindaries, it ought to avail itself of its predominant power, in order to extend the system of subsidiary alliances, by stationing a force in Bhopal, or in any other foreign territory. While the military power of Mysore and the Marhatta chiefs was yet in its vigour, subsidiary alliances were in some degree necessary for its safety, but that time is now past; and when, therefore, the evils which a subsidiary force entails upon every country in which it is established are considered, it appears advisable that future security against the Pindaries should be sought by their reduction, and by compelling Sindia, for his conduct in supporting them, to cede the districts restored to him in 1805-8, rather than by stationing a subsidiary force in Bhopal.

"There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists weak and oppressive; to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion, or foreign conquest. But the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security, and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Wherever the subsidiary force is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Peshwa and the Nizam, and is now beginning to be seen in Mysore. The talents of Purneah, while he acted as Dewan, saved that country from the usual effects of the system; but the rajah is likely to let them have their full operation. He is indolent and profligate, and has already, besides the current revenue, dissipated about sixty lacs of pagodas of the treasure laid up by the late Dewan.

"A subsidiary force would be a most useful establishment, if it could be directed solely to the support of our ascendancy, without nourishing all the vices of a bad government; but this seems to be almost impossible. The only way in which this object has ever, in any degree, been attained, is by the appointment of a *Dewan*. This measure is, no doubt, liable to numerous objections, but still it is the only one by which any amendment can be made to the people of the country for the miseries brought upon them by the subsidiary force, in giving stability to a vicious government. The great difficulty is to prevent the prince from counteracting the Dewan, and the Resident from meddling too much, but when this is avoided, the Dewan may be made a most useful instrument of government.

"There is, however, another view under which the subsidiary system should be considered; I mean that of its inevitable tendency to bring every native state into which it is introduced, sooner or later, under the exclusive dominion of the British Government. It has already done this completely, in the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic. It has made some progress in that of the Peshwa and the Nizam; and the whole of the territory of these princes will unquestionably snuff the same fate as the Carnatic. The observation of Moro Dakhlat, in speaking of the late treaty to Major Ford, 'that no native power could, from its habits, conduct itself with such strict fidelity as we seemed to demand,' is perfectly just. This very Peshwa will probably again commit a breach of the alliance. The Nizam will do the same, and the same consequences, a further reduction of their power for our own safety, must again follow. Even if the prince himself were disposed to adhere rigidly to the alliance, there will always be some amongst his principal officers who will urge him to break it. As long as there remains in the country any high-minded independence, which seeks to throw off the control of strangers, such counsellors will be found. I have a better opinion of the natives of India than to think that this spirit will ever be completely extinguished: and I can, therefore, have no doubt that the subsidiary system must everywhere run its full course, and destroy every government which it undertakes to protect."

It is not necessary to adduce any other evidence in proof of the injurious operation of the subsidiary system on the government of the native princes.

#### *The Advantages of the Subsidiary System.*

As respects the interests of the British Government, it can scarcely be doubted that the subsidiary alliances have added most materially to our power and resources. The allied states have contributed to the maintenance of troops which must, at all events, have been kept on foot with a view to the security of our own territories.

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It may perhaps be questioned whether, if we were relieved from the specific engagements into which we have entered with our several allies, it would be judged expedient to distribute them at the stations where they are now placed. Possibly if we were under no restrictions in this respect, the general defence and tranquillity of India might be ensured with a smaller aggregate force than is now maintained. But if an increase of our military establishments has been occasioned by our subsidiary engagements, it must not be forgotten, that if the states in alliance with us had been left loose, some of them would, in all likelihood, have formed combinations against us, or have fallen a prey to then more powerful neighbours, in which case their population and territorial revenues would have served to the resources of states inimical to our Government, instead of being, as they now are, held at our disposal.

By the general extension of the subsidiary and protective system, we have been enabled to put an end to the fluctuations and revolutions which formerly prevailed in India, and which served to keep aloft large bodies of irregular troops who depended to their subsistence upon the fruits of their predatory incursions. By defining the limits of each state and restricting it within those limits, we have virtually accomplished an object which has been considered as most desirable, namely, the establishment of a balance of power in India. It has, indeed, been constructed by us, and it must remain in our hands, or the equilibrium will soon be destroyed.

As respects the *interests of the native states*, the subsidiary system has, most assuredly, had the effect of placing them in a state of security against external danger. Relieved from the anxieties arising from that source, it is their own fault that the allied princes have not availed themselves of the opportunities which they enjoyed of so administering their internal affairs as to promote the happiness and prosperity of their subjects. It may be confidently asserted, that the advice and influence of the British Government have never been interposed except for the purpose of exciting our allies to regulate their proceedings by the principles of justice, equity, and liberality. It has been always a cause of pain to us to witness the prevalence of oppression, and the disaffection and disorder consequent upon the misrule of those with whom we are intimately connected.

As respects, therefore, the *interests of the people themselves*, if the authority of our allies has been so strengthened by their connexion with us, as to have removed all danger of its subversion, however much that authority may have been abused, such a result of the subsidiary system is, no doubt, much to be lamented, but if our power has been exerted for the suppression of insurrections occasioned by over exactions, it should not be forgotten that the voice of the British resident has always been raised in behalf of the oppressed; and it is more than probable that much evil has been prevented by the check which his presence has imposed upon the conduct of the allied Government.

It is scarcely possible that greater exertions could have been made than were actually made by that able and public spirited officer, Colonel Baillie, at the Court of the Nabob Vizier of Oude, to effect a thorough reformation of the vicious system of internal government which had long prevailed, and unfortunately still continues to prevail in that quarter of India.

The various modes in which our interference has been exercised in the affairs of allied and protected states will be explained in the sequel.

III. But if the subsidiary system be essentially productive of so many evils as have been charged upon it, it may be well to inquire

*Whether it be practicable to abandon the system of Subsidiary Alliance.*

In a preceding page (228), it has been stated that Lord Cornwallis had it in contemplation to liberate our allies, the Peshwa and the Nizam, from some of the restraints under which they had been placed by Lord Wellesley, and that Sir George Barlow, although well disposed to carry into effect the arrangements projected by his venerable predecessor, was deterred from relaxing the control which had been exercised over the proceedings of the Nizam.

Letters received by Sir George Barlow from Captain Thomas Sydenham, the resident at Hyderabad, dated in August and September 1806, stated, that the Nizam had admitted to his confidence certain individuals who were actuated by feeling decidedly hostile to the British Government, and that the Nizam himself was evidently disaffected to the alliance. His Highness's new confidants, who were low people of vulgar manners and dissolute habits, indulged in his presence then wit in ridiculing the English, and at the same time, endeavoured to alarm his Highness by representations of our ambitious views, and to excite his hopes of expelling us from the Deccan. The minister, Meer Allum, assured the resident that Secunder Juh came to the throne with a predetermination to extirpate himself from the controlling influence of the British Government, and that it still remained the prevailing and favourite object of his most anxious desire.

This unwelcome intelligence obliged Sir George Barlow to deliberate seriously upon the course of policy which it was his duty to pursue under the circumstances above described. In a Minute, dated October 22d, 1806, he observed, that the alternative presented to him was, either to abandon the alliance, or to make an effort to replace it on its just and proper foundation, by a direct and decided interposition of that weight and influence which our relative situation enabled us to command. He showed that, by a dissolution of the alliance, the very foundations of our power and ascendancy in the political scale of India would be subverted; that it would be the signal and the instrument for the downfall of the remaining

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fabric of our political relations; that the power and resources which we had a right to command would be turned against us; that the hopes and ambition of the turbulent and discontented would be excited and animated by such a dereliction of our strength and influence; and that the territorial cessions acquired under the treaty of Hyderabad, for the maintenance of the subsidiary force, must necessarily be relinquished if the force itself were withdrawn.

On these and other considerations, Sir George Barlow determined to replace the alliance on its just and proper foundation. "I am aware," he observed, "that the adoption of such measures involves a deviation from that system of non-interference in the internal concerns of his Highness's administration, which has been established as a principle of wise and equitable policy; but the adoption of that system necessarily presupposed a just conception on the part of his Highness of the true principles and solid advantages of the alliance, and a sincere disposition to maintain it. It presupposed a degree of firmness, discernment, and dignity on his part, which would lead him to reject the councils of profligate and interested advisers, who would endeavour to persuade him that the obligations of the alliance were obligations of dependence and degradation, and would urge him to renounce it. Unsupported by these just and reasonable presumptions, that system is deprived of its sole foundation, and the change is adopted not from choice, but from necessity."

Instructions were issued to the resident, directing him to inform the Nizam, that although strongly disinclined to abridge his independence or to limit his rights, the British Government found it to be then bounden duty to oppose the machinations which were employed to dissolve the bonds of confidence between his Highness and those faithful servants whose conduct had uniformly been regulated by the true principles of the alliance. The resident was also instructed to insist upon the removal of Mohput Ram, the most active and powerful member of the anti-British faction, from all authority under the state of Hyderabad. Without entering into particulars, suffice it to say, that the resident's pointed remonstrances and authoritative demands had a salutary effect upon the Nizam's mind, and that his Highness removed the above-named obnoxious individual, who afterwards broke out in rebellion, but was defeated. He fled to Holkar's camp, and finally lost his life in resisting an order of that chief to quit his camp.

Some of those who regard the subsidiary system as a deviation from the course of policy which ought to have been pursued by the British Government, have expressed the opinion, that if we had limited our views to the maintenance of the relations of simple amity with our neighbours, and had steadfastly refrained from mixing ourselves up as parties in their contests, they would have formed a *balance of power* which we might easily have preserved as mediators between the belligerents, and by the occasional interposition of our power in aid of the weaker states. It has been argued that it might have been practicable to act upon this plan even after we had become entangled in subsidiary alliances. Lieut.-colonel Walker, when holding the office of resident at Baroda, had, in one of his despatches to the Government of Bombay, suggested the idea of re-transferring to the Guicowar, for a pecuniary equivalent, the territorial cessions which we had obtained from that prince. This proposal excited a discussion in the Bombay council, in the course of which one of the members strongly advocated the policy of establishing a balance of power in India, and without previous reference to the Supreme Government, the subject was brought to the notice of the home authorities. Lord Minto conceived that, in so doing, the Bombay Government had strayed from their province. His Lordship, in a letter to the Secret Committee, dated September 22d, 1810, pointed out the numerous difficulties and inconveniences which the adoption of such a scheme must necessarily involve. Among other considerations, he adverted to the inhumanity of handing over to native misrule a large population which had long enjoyed the blessings of tranquillity, and security of life and property, as subjects of the British Government. Lord Minto then proceeded to make the following observations. "As an abstract proposition, all opinions will agree, that a balance of the power of states, united in political or commercial intercourse, affords the best, if not the only security which human ingenuity can devise against the projects of ambition, or the ruinous effects of reciprocal enmity. But a balance of power, to be efficient, must be formed upon principles of convention, such as those under which it subsisted on the continent of Europe before the French revolution. It must arise out of a consensual submission to a system of public law, and a recognition of reciprocal rights, as they respect the several states individually, and of reciprocal duties, as they relate to the imposition of restraints upon their own ambition, or on the ambition of their neighbours. It must be founded at least upon a declared renunciation of views of conquest as a principle of government, and it must operate by the apprehended, and, as the occasion may require, by the actual association of several states to resist the endeavours which any one state may employ to aggrandize its power at the expense of another.

"At no period of the history of India do we recognize the existence of any such system of federation or balance of the power of states, nor, indeed, is it compatible with the character, principles, and constitution of the states which have been established on the continent of India. With them, war, rapine, and conquest constitute an avowed principle of action, a just and legitimate pursuit, and the chief source of public glory, sanctioned and even recommended by the ordinances of religion, and prosecuted without the semblance or pretext of justice, with a savage disregard of every obligation of humanity and public faith, and restrained alone by the power of resistance.

"Under the successful impulse of these principles, the vast empire of the Mahomedans was established over more than the continent of India. On its ruins arose the power of the Mahratta state, which subsequently branched out into a confederation of chiefs professedly directed

directed to objects of conquest and universal exaction, the fruits of which, by regular convention, were to be divided in specific proportions. The same views and principles animated and extended the usurpations of Hyder Ally and his successor. The checks which the Mahrattas and the rulers of Mysore occasionally received from the power of the Nizam, and from different combinations among these three states, were the result, not of a pre-established federation and balance of power, but of the prevalence of a system of conquest, violence and usurpation. The efforts of the contending parties were directed, not to the just limitation, but to the subversion of each other's power, and the aggrandisement of their own; and it is unnecessary to refer to the testimony of specific facts, with a view to demonstrate the self-evident proposition, that the permanent existence of a balance of power is incompatible with reciprocal views of conquest and ambition.

"The period of time when it is said that a balance of power existed in India, has been referred to that which immediately preceded the conclusion of the treaty of alliance with the state of Hyderabad in the year 1800; because from that date must be considered to have commenced that system of supposed oppressive connexion to which, and to its consequences, are ascribed the evils so feelingly deplored. At that time we discern no traces of a balance of the power of states. Five years before, the dominion of the Nizam had been laid at the feet of the Mahrattas, and he was compelled to purchase their lenity by enormous sacrifices. His dominions were subsequently invaded by the troops, and his government insulted and menaced by the power of Sindia, and he continued in this degraded state of dependance and control until relieved by the complete consolidation of the general defensive alliance concluded with the British Government. The Mahratta power extended in the north of Hindostan from the Ganges to the Jumna, and from the Jumna to the Indus; to the north and south, from Sirhind to the Nerbudda; to the east and west, from Bundelcund to Guzerat. In the Deccan, it extended from the Nerhudda, on one side of the Nizam's dominions, to the confines of Mysore, and on the other to the Northern Circars. The several Raypoot states, and the various petty chiefships interspersed throughout that vast extent of country, unable to oppose, yielded their contributions to the predatory armies of the Mahrattas. It will not be contended that this description of the political state of Hindostan and the Deccan exhibits any features of a balance of power. But it may perhaps be alleged, that this enormous extent of dominion, although comprehended under the general denomination of the Mahratta empire, and united by a species of confederation, consisted in fact of four distinct powers counterbalancing each other.

"That this bond of association might induce them to protect each other from the attacks of a foreign power, may, it is said, be admitted; but it involved no restraint upon their own projects of conquest and rapacity, nor provided against the ambitious designs of one to control or absorb the power of another. Accordingly, at the period alluded to, we have seen Sindia at the head of a powerful army, domineering over the state of Poona; at another, we have seen him exacting contribution from the state of Nagpore. We have seen him contending for the supremacy with Holkar, and the latter usurping the government of Poona, and expelling the Peshwa from his capital: while, in the midst of this collision, they were all ready to unite in the prosecution of foreign conquests, eager to extend their general dominion, but careful to provide for their separate interests by a division of the spoil.

"We are at a loss to discover in this representation of facts any improved knowledge or practical application of the principles of a balance of power among the states of India.

"But it may perhaps be intended to maintain, that the power of the Mahratta state was counterbalanced by that of the British Government, and the former was withheld by a dread of the latter from prosecuting against it any hostile designs. Admitting this fact, still the solid principles of a balance of power, founded on political and commercial intercourse, are not to be traced in such a situation of affairs. Such a counterpoise of power must momentarily be subject to destruction, when tranquillity and self-defence are the sole objects of one party, and war, rapine, and conquest constitute the governing principle of the other. It then behoves the former to combine every means of additional security that justice may warrant and circumstances may render attainable.

"We shall not adduce in proof of the existence of that spirit of insatiable conquest which we have ascribed to the Native states without distinction, the various efforts which they have employed to subvert the power of the British Government in India since the period of its establishment. The existence of it as the actuating principle of every Indian power requires no demonstration, and we found upon it this undeniable conclusion, that no extent of concession and of territorial restitution on our part would have the effect of establishing any real and effectual balance of power in India, or would purchase forbearance on the part of other states when the means of aggrandisement should be placed in their hands. Your Honourable Committee has indeed justly remarked in your letter of the 30th October 1805, that 'to recede is often more hazardous than to advance;' adding, that this observation is peculiarly applicable to India, where there is little probability that concession would be attributed by the Native powers to any other motives than weakness and fear.

"To enter more deeply into this discussion would require a laborious review of transactions and events during a long course of years, and an inquiry into the views, character, disposition and relative condition of the present states of India, the necessity of which is superseded both by the knowledge which your Honourable Committee already possesses on these subjects, and by the conviction which we entertain that no argument can be requisite to demonstrate how vain would be the expectation of augmenting our security by diminishing our power and political ascendancy in the continent of India."

In the opinions above stated, the Secret Committee expressed their entire concurrence. 18th Feb. 1819.

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Letter from  
R. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right Hon.  
Charles Grant.

Bangal Secret Letter,  
10 March 1817.

But although the Government at home were not disposed to relinquish any of the rights and advantages which had resulted from the subsidiary alliances then existing, they were unwilling to sanction the further extension of that system. With reference to the projected connexion with the state of Berar, Mr. Canning, when at the head of the Board of Control, prepared a secret despatch to Bengal, dated the 5th September 1816, which contained the following instructions:

"From our despatch of the 18th November 1814, you will have collected our disinclination to press our alliance too urgently upon the Rajah of Berar, and our particular anxiety that our willingness to form that alliance should not be attributed to a desire for the further aggrandisement of our own power, at the same time that we regarded the connexion, carrying with it a liberty to occupy a station in the Berar dominions, as very desirable with a view to the defence of the Deccan, and especially to any extensive system of operations against the Pindaries.

"A consideration of all the circumstances of the present moment, as compared with those which originally induced us to encourage the suggestion of a subsidiary alliance with Berar, induces us now to desire that the negotiation of that object should not be renewed upon the footing of annual subsidy, or of the permanent establishment of a body of troops in the Rajah's dominions.

"In this, and in fact all similar cases, we should prefer an ordinary defensive alliance, the British troops to be employed according to the exigency of each occasion, and the payment to be proportionate to the extraordinary expense incurred.

"In return for our engagement to defend the Rajah when attacked, he should undertake to maintain a body of force, specifically applicable, at our demand, and under our direction, to operations against the Pindaries."

Before the despatch of the Secret Committee reached Calcutta, a subsidiary alliance had actually been contracted with the state of Nagpore. The answer returned to that despatch, referred to minutes of council, in which the several points of instruction from home were fully discussed. They do not enter upon the general policy of subsidiary alliances, but confine their observations to the single measure of the connexion which had been formed with Nagpore. Upon this subject Lord Hastings expressed himself as follows:

"I lament to perceive that the alliance with Nagpore will not merely be regarded by the Honourable Committee as devoid of that importance which I attached to it, but will have been altogether unacceptable. To remove what seems to me to be a misconception of the quality of that alliance, I may be allowed to say, that every day gives me a more distinct view of the advantageous change effected in our political position by that treaty. The present comparative feebleness of Sindia, and the phancy which he manifests, are the immediate consequences of that arrangement. But it operates much further. It has shown the impracticability of any efficient confederacy of the Mahrattas, and it has rified a variety of intrigues that tended to that object. The recent frank explanations of the Peshwa, after the awkward appearances of vacillation and indirect practice which had marked his conduct for some time, are indisputably to be ascribed to the deductions he forms from the establishment of our influence in Nagpore. And the example of so large a state ranging itself voluntarily under our banners, is a proud as well as useful testimony of the reliance placed in our moderation and justice. With regard to the particular conditions of the treaty, I believe them to be beneficial, as they have secured to us many advantages, while every additional charge is paid by the subsidy. On the other hand, I beg leave to profess my conviction that such terms of alliance as appeared to the Honourable Committee preferable, would infallibly be delusive. We should be bound to answer unlimited demands for the protection of the Nagpore territories, and the use of the cavalry which was to compensate for so burdensome an engagement, would to a certainty fail in every hour of exigency. On this point, I speak from the experienced result of corresponding instances. Had the alliance been framed on such principles, there is every probability we should have had war to wage. Had not the subsidiary force actually fixed itself in the country while the negotiation was yet scarcely suspected, an adverse party, strong in both treasure and troops, would undoubtedly have solicited the intervention of Sindia, and there is reason to be convinced he would not have disregarded an invitation so pointedly addressed to all his passions and all his interests."

Mr. Edmonstone expressed his entire concurrence in the Governor-general's opinion, that the terms of defensive alliance, which the Secret Committee recommended, could not possibly be efficient, and that the subsidiary form of alliance was that alone by which the just and legitimate purposes of such a connexion could be accomplished.

Mr. Seton observed as follows: "On the subject of the plan of concluding a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore, the Honourable Committee expresses itself in a tone of lukewarmness, nay of dissuasion, which plainly shows that it did not contemplate those very beneficial consequences from the adoption of the measure which were here so confidently anticipated, and which have in every respect been so fully realized as completely to justify that anticipation. But for the advance of our detachments consequently to that arrangement, what, and how miserable must have been the plight of the wretched inhabitants of the countries through which the Pindaries, in their late incursions, would then have had a sweeping range of almost unresisted slaughter! To me, it appears difficult to consider with attention the situation of the Nagpore territory, contiguous to the Nerbudda, with relation to the positions of the Pindaries, and to the usual direction of their predatory incursions, without being made fully sensible of the advantage which we must necessarily derive from our having in that quarter a respectable military force connected with the state of Nagpore by

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by engagements of a subsidiary nature. The superior benefit in a political as well as in a military point of view, which accrues to the British interests from that species of connexion, when compared with the more loose and general description of alliance preferred by the Honourable Committee, is so forcibly, and in my judgment so satisfactorily, pointed out by the Governor-general, in his Lordship's Minute of the 13th April 1816, that to enlarge upon it in this place were superfluous.

*Of Interference in the Affairs of Allied and Protected States.*

When the ruler of a state has been induced, from whatever cause, to rely upon a foreign power for protection, not only against external enemies, but also against the dangers which may arise from the turbulence and disaffection of his own subjects, it is only in a very qualified sense, that the term independent can with propriety be applied to him. The act of entrusting the security of his country, and the maintenance of his authority, to the keeping of another, implies the loss of substantive character.

Of the above description are the engagements into which we have entered with our subsidiary allies. As every obligation involves a corresponding right, it might, on that principle alone, be affirmed that no Government which had the least regard to its own honour and reputation, could voluntarily render itself liable to become the blind instrument of enforcing whatever measures of injustice or oppression the protected prince might adopt.

In all our subsidiary alliances, our allies are restricted from carrying on political negotiations with other states, without our previous knowledge and consent. This precaution is obviously necessary in order to prevent our being rendered parties in disputes occasioned by the misconduct of our allies.

The obligation to maintain the authority of our allies within their respective dominions, is, in some of the treaties, distinctly expressed, and in all cases it has been considered as an essential part of the subsidiary system. On the principle above stated, it would follow, that wherever the obligation has been incurred, we have the right to exercise a certain degree of supervision and controul over the domestic administration of our allies. In the treaties with the states of Oude, Mysore and Travancore, the right of this interfering to prevent or to correct the evils arising from mal-administration, is expressly reserved to the British Government.

But although this right of interfering would appear of necessity to belong to the protecting power, the Government at home has uniformly prescribed non-interference as the rule of action, and has on all occasions manifested the utmost anxiety to respect and preserve whatever degree of independence can, by a liberal interpretation of the terms of treaties, be claimed for our respective allies. It is also due to the governments in India to admit that they have recognised the justice and propriety of this rule, and that when they have judged it expedient to depart from it, it has been with apparent reluctance.

It is scarcely possible to prescribe with much exactness, rules of conduct adapted to the various cases which may arise at the several Native courts. Much must necessarily be left to the discretion of our residents and political agents. Although it is quite proper that they should be restricted from intermeddling officiously and needlessly in the affairs of the prince to whom they are accredited, they would ill discharge their duty, if for want of timely interposition, they were to permit disorder and disaffection to ripen into revolt. It would, indeed, be the reverse of kindness to an ally, tacitly to witness his perseverance in the course of measures, which, if unchecked, must terminate in the dissolution of the alliance.

The foregoing observations are intended as a brief introduction to examples which will serve to explain the modes in which we have interfered in the affairs of our allies.

We have interfered, 1st, to support the rightful heir to a vacant throne; 2d, to select and to support a fit and proper person in the office of dewan or minister, in cases when the ability or fidelity of the prince was doubtful; 3d, to reform that portion of the military establishment of our allies which constitutes the contingent which they are bound to hold at our disposal; and, 4th, to effect the reformation not only of the military, but also of the civil administration of our allies.

1. *Interference in cases of disputed Succession.*

Lord Hastings, soon after he had assumed the government of India, gave it as his opinion, that "we ought not to insist on hereditary succession, but exact, that the rule of succession should be laid down in each state, according to what had been the custom of the realm; that no objection should be advanced on the general principle of Mahomedan or Hindoo law, to the claim of any prince to select from among his sons a successor without regard to primogeniture, if such claim were countenanced by the usage of the country, and by the assent of the leading men of the state. All that Lord Hastings would have required, was the public designation of an heir-apparent, in default of which right of promogeniture would be acknowledged."

Minute, 3 April  
1814.

On the death of Nussur Mohammud Khan, the Nabob of *Bhopal*, on the 11th Nov. 1819, the Supreme Government (Lord Hastings being Governor-general) judged it expedient that the succession should continue in the direct line of Vizer Mohammud, the father of the deceased, and as Nussur Mohammud left no male issue, an arrangement was made by which the Nabob's brother, Ameer Mohammud, a man of dissolute character, was set aside, and the chiefship conferred upon his eldest son Mansur Mohammud Khan, a boy of 19 years of age. After some slight opposition, Ameer Mohammud acquiesced in the arrangement, and the

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young chief was adopted by the widow, and affianced to the daughter of the late Nabob. An attempt having been made by one of the members of the family to appropriate to himself certain districts, Major Henley, the political agent, determined to prevent the dismemberment of the Bhopaul principality, and obliged the usurper to relinquish those districts. Both the political agent and the Supreme Government conceived that the interference, which had been exercised in regard to the succession of Moner Mohummud, was justified by the dependant relation in which the petty state of Bhopaul stood towards the British Government. The authorities at home, however, did not agree in that opinion. In a despatch to Bengal, dated in the year 1824, the proceedings regarding Bhopaul are noticed in the following terms: "It does not appear to us that the treaty with Bhopaul affords a warrant for all this interference. It is not provided by that treaty that you shall have either the power of interfering with the appointment of a Nabob, that of choosing a minister, or that of dismissing any of the Nabob's attendants."

The question as to the policy of interfering in cases of disputed succession, underwent much discussion in respect to the principality of Kurnool, the chiefs of which are of an ancient family of the Afghan nation, and were tributary to the Nizam, who, in the year 1800, transferred Kurnool together with other districts to the British Government. The rights of sovereignty, which had been exercised by the Nizam, thus became vested in us. The Nabob was most desirous to secure the succession for his fifth son, Gholaum Russool; but Lord Minto refused his sanction to that measure, and under instructions from the Supreme Government, Sir John Abercromby, Governor of Fort St. George, interfered authoritatively in behalf of the eldest son, Moonowur Khan, who was accordingly placed upon the musnud.

In the year 1821, the state of Moonowur Khan's health being such as to threaten his sudden demise, Sir Thomas Munro entered into a consideration of the course which ought to be pursued on the occurrence of such an event. The following is an extract of his Minute, dated 4th January 1821:

"Whatever may be the rule of inheritance among private persons, it is certain that priority of birth, in claims to dominion, has never in India been much attended to, except among sons of the same mother. The elder son is frequently excluded by the choice of the father falling upon a younger son by a mother of higher birth than that of the elder, and the choice in such cases is usually supported by the principal officers; and I think that, it will, in general, be our best course to adopt this choice. Were an adventurer to set up his standard, and endeavour to get possession of Kurnool by force of arms, our interference might then be proper, but this is not a case ever likely to occur. In all cases when the dispute is between the different members of the family, I think that we ought to confirm the choice of the father and of the leading men of the country. I see no good, but much evil, in following any other course. It may be asked, what useful object is to be attained by our interference. If we wish to establish a prince who is disagreeable to the leading men of Kurnool, we must do it by force, at an expense probably of eight or ten lacs of rupees. This is as much as the whole peshcush is worth, for it amounts only to a lac of Hydrabad rupees yearly. If we wish to reimburse ourselves, we can do it only by taking possession of the country, and collecting the revenue for ourselves; but as it amounts only to about eight lacs of rupees, and as a great part of it is mortgaged to creditors, or assigned to military followers, it would require several years to liquidate our demand, during which time we should, in fact, set aside the prince whom we had undertaken to protect. Could it be shown that any material advantage, either immediate or distant, is likely to result from the interference, either to the people of Kurnool, or to those of our own provinces, there might be some reason for incurring the expense with which it is always attended; but so far from doing good, we always do mischief by it. The Nabob whom we set up, will, from his confidence of our support, commit many acts of oppression which we would not otherwise have thought of, because we remove the salutary check which the fear of his own followers and people imposes upon him. If we expected to make him act right by giving him advice, we should only make him worse. He would become jealous and suspicious, and would punish every person, either openly or secretly, whom he suspected of having complained against him. We know perfectly that there can be no middle course in such interference; that if we seek to interfere effectually in the internal affairs of Kurnool, or any other Indian principality connected with this presidency, we must go on from step to step, on the specious plan of protecting the inhabitants, until we have usurped the whole government of the country and deposed the prince. Unless, therefore, we are beforehand determined to go to this extremity, we ought cautiously to abstain from entering upon a line of measures which must inevitably lead to it. As I think that we have no right to meddle in the affairs of Kurnool, on the pretence of mal-administration, of the sufferings of the people, or on any other grounds than those of securing our own rights of peshcush and military service, and the peace of our own districts; I think that we ought to wait quietly for the Nabob's death, and to acknowledge as his successor the person of his family who, by his choice and the support of his officers, may be enabled to assume the government."

"Gholaum Russool, who was destined for the succession by his father, the late Nabob, is said to be the favourite of the present Nabob and the people, and would probably succeed without opposition, and in that case, we could not do better than to acknowledge his title. It is of no importance to us whether he or any other person of the family ascends the musnud; whoever does, will always be punctual in the discharge of his duties to the British Government. The Nabobs of Kurnool are too dependant ever to act otherwise. They have always been regular in the discharge of their tribute, and zealous in their endeavours

to apprehend and deliver up all disturbers of the peace. Had no former reference been made to the Supreme Government, I should on the present occasion have proposed that the Nabob should have been called upon to declare whom he intended for his successor, and that we should have acknowledged the person named by him, if no material objection appeared to his right. But as the Bengal Government have already said that they are disposed to give the preference to the claims of Daoud Khan, it seems advisable that a letter should be written to them, stating our views of the question, and strongly recommending the policy of abstaining from interference, unless in cases of urgent necessity, and that we should take no steps in the business until we receive their answer."

The late Mr. Thackeray concurred in the opinions of the Governor. In the concluding part of his Minute, he observes as follows:

"The Company supported Mahomet Ali, and made him Nabob of the Carnatic, because he was their friend, and because his antagonist, Clunder Sahib, was the friend of the French, and they have put up and put down many other princes for their own existence, security, and defence; but Kurnool is almost the first instance I recollect of their having volunteered in favour of an individual of whose right they could not be certain, of whose qualifications they were ignorant, from whom they had nothing to hope or to fear, from whose virtues they could derive no advantage, but for whose faults they might be considered responsible. When Government appoint a collector, they are in some measure responsible to the people for his conduct, which they have some means of controlling; but when they go out of their way to make a Nabob, they are much more responsible for his conduct, which they have no means of controlling."

The question was accordingly referred to the Governor-general (Lord Hastings) in Council, whose reply, dated the 17th February 1821, expressed entire acquiescence in the sentiments of Sir Thomas Munro and Mr. Thackeray.

On the actual occurrence of the death of Moonowar Khan, Sir Thomas Munro, in a Minute dated 28th Sept. 1823, observed, that as there appeared to be no cause to apprehend any immediate disturbance in Kurnool, the question of succession should be referred without delay for the final decision of the Bengal Government. He proceeds to say, "the Supreme Government were at one time disposed to favour the claims of Mozuffur Khan, but on learning the murder of the slave by Mozuffur, they thought that this act, and the rancorous impression of supposed injustice which would remain, might determine the question against him; and they directed that he should in no event be acknowledged without sanction. *This Government have uniformly declared it to be their resolution, in the event of a vacancy in the chieftainship of Kurnool, to support the pretensions of the eldest legitimate son.* Daoud Khan is not legitimate, and his priority of birth is doubtful. Mozuffur Khan is, no doubt, a man of a violent and cruel disposition, but not more so than is usual among the Patan chiefs, certainly not more so than his brother the late Nabob, who murdered one of his wives and three of her attendants. Daoud Khan is a man of no character at all, and would probably be a tool in the hands of some of his violent chiefs. On the whole, it seems to be most advisable that we should refer the matter to the Supreme Government, whose decision, whatever it may be, will set the question at rest, because there can be no appeal from it, an advantage which an acknowledgment by this Government of either party would not possess."

In his subsequent Minute of 4th October 1823, Sir Thomas Munro observes as follows:

"In January 1821, when the death of the late Nabob was daily expected, it was proposed to wait and acknowledge for his successor the person of his family, who, by his choice and the support of his officers, may be enabled to assume the government. The Nabob, as far as is yet known, had appointed no successor, but left the choice to the Company, nor had any of the competitors assumed the government. Gholam Russool Khan was with Mr. Campbell at Turpatty, on the 29th September, and though formerly destined for the musnud by his father, he seems now to be solicitous only about the continuance of the jagher formerly settled upon him. Mozuffur Khan was also with Mr. Campbell, and Daoud Khan \* at Kurnool, and should both these chiefs remain quiet, we shall then have an occurrence which was not contemplated, namely, that of all parties waiting for the decision of the British Government. Should things continue in this state, there will not be much difficulty in placing on the musnud the person on whom the choice of the Bengal Government may fall. But, instead of waiting, should either Mozuffur Khan or Daoud Khan seize the Government with the consent of the leading men, and the other by the person selected by the Supreme Government, we ought to be prepared for such a contingency, and ascertain by a reference to Bengal, whether in such an event we are to confirm the chief who may have obtained possession, or to displace him by force."

"It is possible that even if all parties wait peaceably for the decision of the British Government, some opposition may be given to it when made known. The collector of Bellary should be directed to endeavour to discover how far such an event is likely to happen, and whether it is likely to be of a nature to give way to the authority of the Nabob, or to require a military force from the Company's territories for its suppression."

"The future Nabob, previous to his being confirmed, should be required to engage to continue the jagher granted by the late Nabob to Gholam Russool Khan, under the sanction of Government; and also, perhaps, to make a suitable provision for his daughter; and as the Honourable Court of Directors have disapproved of interference with the internal administration of Kurnool, unless under very extraordinary circumstances, it may be expedient to caution the new Nabob, that, if by outrageous conduct towards his brothers and relations, or

\* He and three of his brothers came afterwards to Mr. Campbell.

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the people of the country, he excite opposition to his authority, he is not to expect the support of the British Government."

Mr. Campbell, in a letter to Sir Thomas Munro, dated the 7th Oct. 1823, described Daood Khan as a man by no means deficient in intellect, but of a mild, easy, or rather soft disposition. While Daood asserted his seniority to Mozuffur and the rest of his brothers, he admitted that his mother never had been married to his father. "As to his seniority," says Mr. Campbell, "it is supported not only by the testimony of Mahomed Daood Khan, of Hyderabad, but by the younger brother, Gholaum Russool Khan. Mozuffur Khan himself lately admitted as much to me, though he refused to grant to me any written document to that effect."

Alluding to the declaration of the late Sir John Abercromby, when Governor of Fort St. George, to the late Nabob Ali Khan, in November 1818, *of the irrevocable determination of the British Government to recognise him only as heir whom the Mussulman law would recognise, by which legitimacy and primogeniture are universally respected in establishing the order of succession to hereditary dignities*—Mr. Campbell observes, "If this pledge can be got over, there is no doubt that the old custom of the family was very different. Ali Khan himself and many of his predecessors are said to have been both younger brothers, and illegitimate children; but the whole tenor of General Abercromby's letter is one continued argument against the undefined custom of the Patan tribe, in favour of the irrevocable determination of the British Government to regulate the succession in strict conformity with the Mussulman law as above explained."

In a subsequent letter, dated the 13th October 1823, Mr. Campbell forwarded letters from four of the brothers, representing that Mozuffur Khan was exceedingly unpopular amongst his family on account of "the malpractices, the deeds of blood, the violation of individual honour, of which he had been guilty." The parties alluded to at the same time urged the seniority of Daood Khan, his good disposition, and consequent fitness for the musnud. Mr. Campbell, however, stated that Daood had few supporters, that the moral character of nearly all the brothers of the late Nabob was equally bad, and that every party at Kurnool, whatever might be its own bias, would quietly acquiesce in the support of any of the brothers whose right might be recognised by the British Government.

A battalion of native infantry, and the flank companies of two other battalions, were held in readiness to escort the successor of the late Nabob, so soon as the decision of the Supreme Government should be known.

On the 3d November 1823, Mr. Campbell stated that nearly all the Nabob's family, though they might neither dispute Mozuffur Khan's title, nor refuse to acknowledge him, would nevertheless decline to remain under his authority. "The cause of this general aversion of the major part of the family to Mozuffur Khan, may be traced to the females principally, and is to be attributed to the circumstance reported in Mr. Chaplin's letter of the 4th Oct. 1815, viz., Mozuffur Khan having formerly appropriated to himself several of his father's concubines. This circumstance, with the other accusations against him, since reported by me, of similar misconduct to his foster sister, and to the wife of his spiritual guide, have excited such apprehensions among the female part of the family, that neither the widows of the late Nabob, nor the widows and childless concubines of his father deem themselves safe in his hands."

The answer of the Supreme Government to the reference which had been made to them, is dated 24th October 1823, and was consequently written before they were apprised of the circumstances stated in Mr. Campbell's Reports of 7th and 13th October and 3d November. The following is the tenor of the answer:—

"Under all the circumstances of the case, we entirely concur in the view which has been taken of the question in the Minute of the Honourable the Governor, and by your Honourable Board. If, therefore, the parties of Daood Khan and Mozuffur Khan seem to be equally balanced, and still more, if the claims of Mozuffur Khan meet with better support than those of Daood Khan, or supposing both parties to have remained quiet, without putting forth their pretensions, and to have left the decision of the question entirely to the British Government, your Honourable Board is requested to proclaim Mozuffur Khan Nabob of Kurnool, and to support his succession, if necessary, by force of arms. But if Daood Khan should, by the universal consent of the leading men in the country, have assumed the government, and appear to be firmly seated on the musnud, we do not think that his title is so much weaker than that of his opponent to make it incumbent on the British Government to interfere in favour of Mozuffur Khan. We desire, at the same time, to leave to your Honourable Board the amplest discretion to act according to your own view of expediency, and the actual state of affairs on your receipt of this letter, and we shall be prepared to ratify and confirm whatever decision your Honourable Board shall pronounce. The precautions suggested in the concluding paragraph of Sir Thomas Munro's Minute (of the 4th October), seem to us to be highly proper."

On the receipt of the letter from the Supreme Government, Sir Thomas Munro recorded a Minute, of which the following is an extract:—

"We recommended the selection of Mozuffur Khan, on the grounds that he was the eldest legitimate son of the former Nabob Ali Khan; that this Government had already declared that seniority, combined with legitimacy, ought to be the rule of succession; that his party was the strongest; and that there was likely to be no opposition. We know that Mozuffur Khan is the eldest legitimate son, and that Daood Khan, by his own acknowledgment, is illegitimate; that the parties are nearly balanced, and that both the candidates are now with the collector, waiting the decision of the British Government. I therefore propose that we direct Mozuffur Khan to be placed on the musnud of Kurnool."

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Before this decision could be acted upon, Mozuffer Khan committed an atrocious crime\* which made apparent his entire unworthiness of the station for which he had been selected. He murdered his wife, whilst residing within a short distance of Mr. Campbell's tent. He was accordingly set aside; and after some further inquiry, Gholam Russol was placed on the musnud, as the eldest *legitimate* son of Alif Khan.

And thus, notwithstanding all the objections which had been raised against the policy of interfering in cases of disputed succession, the Bengal government not only determined to adopt the order of legitimacy combined with primogeniture, but was prepared to support the succession, if necessary, by force of arms.

It would appear from the tenor of Sir Thomas Munro's and Mr. Thackeray's Minutes, recorded in the year 1821, that they must have been then ignorant of the pledge contained in Sir John Abercromby's declaration of November 1813. This is somewhat extraordinary. If they had been aware of it, however much they might have questioned the propriety of such a declaration, they would scarcely have expressed themselves in a style which led both the Supreme Government and the home authorities to suppose, that on the occurrence of the expected vacancy in the chieftship of Kurnool, it was the intention of the Madras Government to take little or no concern in the nomination of a successor.

But with due deference to the high authority of Sir Thomas Munro, it really appears very doubtful whether, even on the principles recommended in his Minute of January 1821, the British Government could have escaped from the trouble and inconvenience arising out of the former practice of supporting the lawful heir.

The inconvenience had its source, not in the prescription of a certain order of succession, but in the obligation to support the individual who should be recognised as Nabob of Kurnool, whether such individual combined legitimacy of birth with seniority of age, or had been designated by his predecessor as heir to the musnud, or had the suffrages of the influential personages of the principality. Sir Thomas Munro evidently contemplated the recognition of the individual who should obtain possession of the musnud in any of these modes, and it is to be presumed that he must have attached some degree of weight and importance to the recognition of a new chief. Indeed, he appears in some\* parts of his Minute to speak of recognition as entitling the party recognised to the countenance and support of the British Government, and consequently we should be liable to be called upon for military aid in case the authority of the recognised chief should be disputed by a rival claimant. If the act of recognition were essential to the validity of the title of the reigning chief, that act would impose as great a degree of responsibility upon the British Government, to the people of Kurnool, as would attach to a more direct selection—and therefore nothing would be gained by such an expedient.

The only effectual mode of emancipating ourselves from the duty of maintaining peace and good order in a tributary state like that of Kurnool, would be to relinquish all claim to tribute and military service, the exaction of which equitably entails upon us the obligation of protecting the chief from external enemies and internal revolt, and of ensuring to the people, if not the blessing of good government, at least a security from tyranny and oppression.

There is another case of disputed succession, in regard to which serious discussions took place in the Supreme Council in the year 1825.

In a letter dated 27th August 1824, Sir David Ochterlony mentioned that he had received from Rajah Buldeo Sing, of *Bhurtpore*, an application requesting the grant of a khelant, or honorary dress, to Bulwant Sing, a boy then about six years old. It was not distinctly stated whether he was the son or the nephew of the reigning Rajah. In communicating this request to the Supreme Government, Sir David Ochterlony observed: "Every day's experience tends so clearly to show the important benefit derivable from measures calculated to obviate the commotions and other evils incident to a disputed succession, that I most willingly, sincerely, and urgently recommend a compliance with the Bhurtpore Rajah's request, and am the more solicitous for an early communication on this subject, as I am informed he labours under some complaints, which though perhaps not dangerous in themselves, have suggested the apprehensions which induce the present application. It would afford an opportunity of gratifying an ally, and at the same time of meditating and exemplifying principles of succession, on which the peace and good order not only of the reigning family of Bhurtpore, but of every other state in Hindostan so mainly depends."

Sir David Ochterlony was informed in reply, that the Governor-general (Lord Amherst) in Council readily admitted the advantages of settling the succession to the Indian principalities, under the protection of the British Government, in all cases where any doubts exist. It was observed, that before the paramount state committed itself by the acknowledgment of

\* "The eldest son is frequently excluded by the choice of the father falling upon a younger son by a mother of higher birth than that of the elder, and the choice in such cases is usually supported by the principal officers. I think that it will in general be our best course to adopt this choice."

"In all cases when the dispute is between the different members of the family, I think that we ought to confirm the choice of the father and of the leading men of the country."

"Had no former reference been made to the Supreme Government, I should on the present occasion have proposed that the Nabob should have been called upon to declare whom he intended for his successor, and that we should have acknowledged the person named by him, if no material objection appeared to his right."

In each of the above passages the acknowledgment, confirmation or adoption, by the British Government, of a particular individual, is regarded as necessary, in order to give validity to his title.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
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of a successor, it was indispensable that it should possess full information on the subject, and be satisfied of the justice of the arrangement which it was called upon to support.

The instructions to Sir David Ochterlony, which are dated 1st October 1824, concluded by saying, "It must be superfluous to add, that if Bulwunt Sing is the Rajah's son and heir-apparent, no doubt can exist of the course to be adopted by the Governor-general in Council."

Sir David Ochterlony does not appear to have returned an official answer to the foregoing instructions; but in a private letter to Mr. Swinton, the secretary to Government, dated 5th November, he mentioned that the boy whom Rajah Buldeo Sing wished to instal as the heir-apparent was his own and only son, born about the year 1818. And in a despatch dated 26th January 1825, which had more immediate relation to the affairs of Jypore, there is the following passage: "I have the honour to acquaint you, that I marched from Jypore yesterday, in progress to Bhurtpore, where, in obedience to the commands of his Lordship in Council, I shall comply with the wishes of the Rajah, by acknowledging his son as the heir-apparent. The necessary presents, with the exception of a palkee, for which I have written to Agra, will be furnished by those received at Jypore."

On the 6th March 1825, Sir David Ochterlony reported the death of Rajah Buldeo Sing to have taken place on the 26th February. This report was followed on the 16th March by a despatch forwarding a letter from the young prince, Bulwunt Sing, announcing his accession to the throne of Bhurtpore, and stating, that 20 days prior to the death of the late Rajah, Sir David Ochterlony arrived at Bhurtpore, and honoured him with the khelaut of investiture.

The next despatches from Sir David Ochterlony which were dated the 18th and 20th March 1825, reported, that serious disturbances, attended with the loss of many lives, had broken out at Bhurtpore, under the direction of Doorjun Saul, the nephew of the late Rajah; that Doorjun Saul had gained over to his party several battalions of the Bhurtpore troops, and had seized the fort. Sir David Ochterlony stated, that he had felt it his duty to order the assemblage, without a moment's delay, of the largest disposable force, with the most formidable battering and bombarding train, to support the intentions of Bulwunt Sing; that he had issued proclamations, calling upon the Jaat population to rise in defence of their lawful sovereign; denouncing Doorjun Saul, in direct terms, as a murderer and usurper; and setting forth, that British troops were advancing to rescue Bulwunt Sing from his hands; and, lastly, that he had deemed it necessary to repair in person to Muttra, for the purpose of urging on and superintending military operations.

Another letter from Sir David Ochterlony, dated 24th March 1825, stated, "that Doorjun Saul had then disclaimed all intention to usurp the throne, and professed to have been driven to extremities by the repeated indignities offered to him by the maternal uncle of the minor prince, who had assumed the office of guardian and prime minister. Doorjun Saul affirmed that he had acted throughout in concert with a very large party of his tribe, who disapproved of the administration which he had overthrown, and had invited him to form a new one. With reference to these proceedings, Sir David Ochterlony expressed it as his opinion, that Doorjun Saul had originally aimed at the throne, but had been persuaded to alter his views, as more likely to be attainable with the consent of the British Government. Sir David, however, conceived, that, under such circumstances, to obtain the mookhtarree, or regency, was in effect to obtain the throne, and that Doorjun Saul, already stained with crime, would not scruple to rid himself, in a secret way, of the young prince.

At the moment when the foregoing intelligence reached Calcutta, instructions were under preparation for Sir D. Ochterlony. These are dated the 2d and 3d April 1825. The Governor-general in Council expressed extreme regret and dissatisfaction at the course which had been adopted. His Lordship complained of the defective information afforded by Sir D. Ochterlony's despatches, observing, that it was only from the young Rajah's letter that Government had learnt the fact of his having been invested with a khelaut; that we were not bound by treaty to repress internal disturbances, or to maintain the rights of the lawful successor to the throne of Bhurtpore; and that it was not expedient to do so, except under very special circumstances. The letter of instructions observes as follows:

"The chief considerations which induced the British Government to gratify Rajah Buldeo Sing by the recognition of his son as his heir-apparent and future successor, were, first, to conciliate the friendship of that prince, by acceding to his earnest wish, which appeared to injure the rights of no one; and, secondly, the natural hope and expectation, that such avowed countenance of the British Government towards the lawful successor to the throne, would conduce to repress faction and intrigue on the demise of the Rajah, and thereby prevent any disturbance of the general tranquillity by attempts on the part of other competitors to seize the throne. But the case is entirely altered, when, notwithstanding such countenance of the British Government, the succession to the throne is disputed, and the acknowledged heir is actually deposed by a successful rival, supported by a party in the state. It becomes then, if no positive stipulation to guarantee the succession in the regular line exists, a mere question of political expediency, whether the British Government shall or shall not embroil itself in the quarrels of the several competitors, and take up arms to compel the ruler *de facto* to vacate the throne in favour of that claimant whose title may be unquestionably the best, but who has of himself been unable to maintain his right.

"As the case of the minor Rajah, Bulwunt Sing, now stands, the Governor-general in Council must ever regret that you did not refer the question of enforcing his succession for the

the decision of Government, before calling out our troops, or issuing proclamations to the Jaut chiefs and population of Bhurtpore.

"In the judgment of the Governor-general in Council, the obvious course to be pursued in the first instance, is, to call on Doorjun Saul to account for his apparently outrageous proceedings, and to hear what he has to offer in justification of such violent measures. It may appear after all, that he only claims to exercise the regency during the minority of Bulwunt Sing; and, if such be the case, the Governor-general in Council would not consider that we are warranted in opposing the arrangement by force of arms, however violent and irregular his mode of assuming that authority may be. The Governor-general in Council by no means desires to say that he is indifferent to the interests and welfare of the legitimate heir to the throne of Bhurtpore, or that the British Government can view with unconcern the prevalence of a state of civil war, and serious internal commotion in that country, from whatever cause arising, and a disposition to set the declared sentiments of the British Government in favour of the legitimate heir at defiance; but he wishes you distinctly to understand, that he does not consider himself to be necessarily called upon to interfere in the internal disputes of the several protected and dependent allies of the Honourable Company, and to regulate and control the line of succession in those states, unless under very special circumstances."

In a postscript, dated April 3d, it was added, that the circumstances reported in Sir D. Ochterlony's despatch of March 24, strongly confirmed the view of the case already taken. He was, therefore, directed to remand the troops to their stations, and to recall his proclamations, or to neutralize their effect by an additional proclamation, declaring that as Doorjun Saul had disavowed all intention of seizing the gurduee (or throne), the advance of the British troops had been countermanded, and that an inquiry would be held by Sir D. Ochterlony into the causes of the commotion, which, it was hoped, would be satisfactorily settled. Sir D. Ochterlony was at the same time directed, in his communications with Doorjun Saul, to refrain from threats, to limit himself to a demand of explanation, to be cautious in receiving representations from the partisans of the minor Rajah, and, finally, to adopt no measure likely to commit the Government to any particular course of policy involving an appeal to arms.

After the instructions above described had been closed and forwarded, official despatches and private letters, dated from the 16th to the 31st March 1825, were received from Sir D. Ochterlony. From these sources of information it appeared that he had, with a degree of energy, zeal and exertion highly creditable to his military character, assembled a large force in readiness to undertake the siege of Bhurtpore. In one of his private letters to Mr. Swinton, he says, "the desperate game which has been played at Bhurtpore, and the wanton murders which have been perpetrated, render it highly improbable that anything can be done in the way of negotiation. The season is certainly unfortunate, but as we have not our choice of events, we must make the best of circumstances. I trust we shall be able to convince them that we are not so powerless in this quarter as reports have stated; and I hope when this reaches you the corps will have marched from Meerut on this station."

The Governor-general in Council, in further instructions, dated April 15, 1825, observed, that they could not designate as otherwise than precipitate and unjustifiable measures which he reduced them to the cruel dilemma of either disavowing the acts of their representative or of plunging into hostilities at a season peculiarly unfavourable to military operations, independently of objections arising out of the state of the war with Ava.

With respect to military preparations, the instructions proceeded as follows: "As those continued hostile demonstrations on our part will compel Doorjun Saul to make every exertion for assembling the largest possible force to resist our expected attack, it may not now be safe to disperse entirely the troops which you were directed by the instructions of the 3d instant to break up and remand to their several stations. Then departure from the vicinity of the Bhurtpore territory, might, it is to be feared, tend to embolden the licentious soldiery, which the Bhurtpore chief is now, in all probability, collecting from every quarter; and independently of the discredit of failing to act up to the terms of your proclamation, and retiring in the face of a determined foe, our frontier might thus be exposed to their incursions, and agriculture and commerce be materially injured."

"In such a state of uncertainty with respect to the views and intentions of Doorjun Saul, and the force which he may have collected, it becomes indispensably necessary to vest you with a discretion to act according to circumstances. You will therefore consider yourself empowered to deviate from the orders already issued to you, so far as to keep together a part of the British force now assembled and assembling at Agra and Muttra, should you and the local military authorities be decidedly of opinion that the return of our troops to their usual stations would be likely to produce the evils above alluded to."

"You will distinctly understand, however, that the discretion now conveyed to you to keep the British force on the frontier, by no means authorizes you to engage in offensive operations in the Bhurtpore territory; but that you are to remain wholly on the defensive, unless attacked, until you receive positive and explicit orders to the contrary."

On the 15th April 1825, Sir D. Ochterlony replied to the instructions of the 3d of that month. In a private letter to Mr. Swinton of the 14th April, he says, "Having erred so egregiously in what I conceived to be the proper and dignified course to pursue, I cannot longer conceal from myself my unfitness for the situation I hold, and as soon as I have carried his Lordship's orders into effect, I shall consider it incumbent on me to retire from a station in which it is so dangerous to draw inferences or incur responsibility."

Sir D. Ochterlony's resignation of the office of resident in Malwa and Rajpootana was  
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accepted by the Governor-general in Council, who intended to recommend to the Court of Directors the grant of a pecuniary allowance proportioned to his long and able services. His career, was, however, closed by death, before that intention could be carried into effect. He died at Meerut on the 15th July 1825, to which place he had proceeded for change of air, after suffering two severe attacks of a fever which had proved fatal to many of his household at Delhi.

In contemplation of Sir D. Ochterlony's retirement, Sir Charles Metcalfe, then resident at Hyderabad, was invited to accept the situation, with the duties of which he was already familiar, having for many years filled the office of resident at Delhi. Sir Charles accepted the invitation, and repaired to Calcutta.

In the earlier discussions which took place in the Supreme Council, the prevalent opinion was, that the British Government was not bound to maintain, by force of arms, the claim of the legitimate heir to the throne of Bhurtpore: but that it would nevertheless be expedient to adopt precautionary measures, with a view to the tranquillity of our own territory.

After his arrival at Calcutta, Sir Charles Metcalfe having perused the correspondence with the late Sir David Ochterlony, prepared a memorandum explaining his opinions as to the course of policy which ought to be adopted under the circumstances then existing at Bhurtpore.

He observed, that although the principle of non-interference had been so long and so uniformly enjoined by the authorities in England, those in India were continually compelled to deviate from it; that as the paramount power, it was at once our duty and our wisest policy to put down anarchy and misrule, and, as the best preventive of those evils, to maintain legitimate succession. Sir Charles Metcalfe conceived that even if we had not been pledged to Bulwant Sing, by the grant of a khelaut, we ought nevertheless to support him as the rightful heir; and that Doojun Saul should be banished from Bhurtpore with an adequate provision. The capture of Bhurtpore, he observed, would, if effected in a glorious manner, do us more honour throughout India, by the removal of the hitherto unfaded unpressions, caused by our former failure, than any other event that could be conceived. "It does not," (says Sir Charles,) seem to be necessary to assemble our force in a field army, until it be proper to make use of it in consequence of the failure of our negotiation; for although the proximity of an army in the field would give great weight to our demands, it might also excite unfounded alarms, and cause hostile preparations, which would most probably terminate in war, from restlessness on both sides, and impatience on our part. We may try the effect of negotiation first, and if this should fail, we may consult our own convenience as to the time at which we are to enforce our demands, with reference to season, the facility of bringing together our means, and any other important considerations; but if no sufficient cause for delay intervene, it is undoubtedly desirable that the failure of our negotiations should be speedily followed by the enforcement of our demands."

Lord Amherst candidly avowed that his opinion had been materially altered by Sir Charles Metcalfe's reasoning. His Lordship admitted that it might be hazardous to relax the exercise of that paramount authority which had been established by the result of the Mahratta war of 1817-18, and as the tranquillity of Upper India would be endangered by the commotions occasioned by the disputed succession at Bhurtpore, his Lordship was prepared to support the rights of Bulwant Sing, if necessary, by force of arms; but he did not deem it expedient absolutely to shut the door against Doojun Saul's claim to the office of Mookhtar.

The collective judgment of the Supreme Government was, on the 16th September 1825, embodied in a resolution founded upon the following considerations. It was observed that since the date of the instructions of the 3d and 15th April, to the late Sir D. Ochterlony the state of affairs at Bhurtpore had undergone a most material alteration in two different points of view.

1st. The uncertainty which then prevailed regarding the ulterior views and intentions of Doojun Saul had been completely set at rest by his unequivocal usurpation of the style and title as well as the authority of Maha Raja, or sovereign of Bhurtpore.

2d. A schism had taken place among the people of the country, who before appeared to be united in favour of Doojun Saul. The party of the usurper was now opposed by that of his brother Madhoo Sing, who had seized the fort of Deeg, and a considerable part of the territory. Hence had resulted the most serious internal anarchy, bloodshed and commotion.

The tranquillity of our adjoining district of Agra had become exposed to immediate hazard Doojun Saul had called upon all the chiefs and leading men of his tribe whether residing within the British territory or that of Bhurtpore, to take part in the quarrel, many of our subjects had, in consequence, flocked to his standard, and it had been ascertained, from various sources of information, that parties of armed men were continually pouring in from the neighbouring states of Almur, Jyepore and Gwalior, with the probable intention of taking part in the quarrel.

"Impressed with a full conviction that the existing disturbances at Bhurtpore, if not speedily quieted, would produce general commotion and interruption of the public tranquillity in Upper India, and feeling convinced that it is our solemn duty, no less than our right, as the paramount power, and conservators of the general peace, to interfere for the prevention of these evils; and that these evils will be best prevented by the maintenance of the succession of the rightful heir of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, whilst such a course will be in strict consistency with the uniform practice and policy of the British Government in all analogous cases, the Governor-general in Council resolves, that authority be conveyed to Sir C. T.

Metcalfe

Metcalf to accomplish the above objects, if practicable, by exhortation and remonstrance; and should these fail, by a resort to measures of force.

In conformity to the foregoing resolution, a force was ordered to be held in readiness to undertake the siege of Bhurtpore, whence Doorjun Saul was to be expelled, with a suitable allowance. The case of Madhoo Sing was to be reserved for future consideration.

It would be here out of place to detail the negotiations and military operations which ensued after the Governor-general in Council had resolved to espouse the cause of Bulwant Sing; suffice it to say that the formidable fort of Bhurtpore was captured on 18 January 1826 by the army headed by Lord Combermere, as Commander-in-chief in India: that the fortifications were demolished; and that the young Rajah was established on the throne, a regency having been appointed to conduct the affairs of the state during his minority.

And thus, as in the instance of Kurnool, the attempt to avoid the trouble, the risk, and the responsibility attendant on interference for the purpose of maintaining the succession of the rightful heir to a dependent principality, proved utterly unavailing; and notwithstanding all the reasoning which has been employed in order to point out the impolicy and inexpediency of such interference, it is evident that we must now consider it to be an established rule, that the British Government shall not in future withhold its support from the legitimate heir to a throne, when a vacancy takes place in any state which acknowledges our supremacy.

Other instances might be adduced of interference in cases of disputed succession; but the foregoing examples will serve to explain the grounds upon which the policy of that description of interference has been founded.

## 2. Of Interference in the Choice of a Deewan or Minister.

It appears that Lord Cornwallis afforded his countenance and protection to Hyder Beg Khan, the principal minister of Asoph-ud-Dowlah, the Nabob Vizier of Oude. On the death of Hyder Beg, in the year 1792, Lord Cornwallis being then with the army in Mysore, the Vizier, as a temporary measure, nominated Hussein Reza as principal, and Ticket Roy as deputy minister. His Lordship's confirmation of these appointments was solicited by the Vizier. In a letter to the Court of Directors, dated 26th August 1792, Lord Cornwallis thus expresses himself on this subject:—"Although Hussein Reza does not possess all the qualifications I could wish for a minister, yet as I have an exceedingly good opinion both of his principles and of his disposition to promote cordiality between his master and the Company, I did not see that a better choice could be made; and accordingly I signified to the Vizier my entire approbation of Hussein Reza and Ticket Roy being permanently appointed."

When the appointment of these ministers had been thus confirmed by the approbation of the Governor-general, his Lordship addressed to them a letter of instructions for the guidance of their conduct in the execution of their official functions. In that letter he informed them that he had written his sentiments very fully to the Vizier on the necessity of effecting an immediate reformation in the domestic affairs of his Government. "I refer you," says his Lordship, "to my letter to the Vizier; and I desire that you will urge such arguments in support of it as shall appear to you most conducive to the accomplishment of my wishes, which have his prosperity for their object. From you," he adds, "I expect every necessary exertion in such matters, responsible as you are to both governments for restoring the country to a flourishing state."

Although Lord Teignmouth afforded his countenance and support to these ministers, on the presumption that they were faithful to their master, his Lordship nevertheless judged it necessary to remove Mr Cherry from the office of resident at Lucknow, because that gentleman had given offence to the Vizier by an injudicious attempt to force the continuance of Ticket Roy in power, after that minister had lost the confidence of his master. But although Lord Teignmouth did not quite go the length of dictating to Asoph-ud-Dowlah the choice of a minister, he certainly did exert his utmost influence to effect the removal from his Excellency's councils of Rajah Joo Loll, a man of a most corrupt and disreputable character, and this object he effected, notwithstanding the strong attachment of Asoph-ud-Dowlah to that unworthy favorite.

It is obviously the interest of the British Government to secure in office an individual who is known to be friendly to a subsisting alliance, and this was the more important in the case of Oude, because at the periods of time above alluded to, the maladministration of the Vizier's affairs would probably have impaired his ability to discharge with punctuality the pecuniary subsidy which he was bound to pay for our troops.

The Nizam's minister, Meer Allum, had been for many years steadily supported in office by the influence of the British Government, to which he had a fair claim on account of his attachment to British interests, and the opposition which he made to the intrigues of a faction which was active in its endeavours to detach the Nizam from his connexion with us.

In the month of December 1808, Meer Allum died. The Nizam, on this occasion, expressed himself in terms which induced the Governor-general, Lord Minto, to suppose that he was willing to conform to his Lordship's wishes in the selection of a new minister. Lord Minto accordingly named Shums-ul-Omrah, a nobleman of excellent character, as a fit and proper person for that office. The Nizam, however, refused to appoint him, and it was not until after a long and troublesome discussion that an expedient was devised which promised at once to gratify the Nizam's predilection, and to ensure a due attention to the security of British interests at his Highness's court. Moneer-ool-Moolk, the object of the Nizam's choice, was to hold the office of minister, but upon the somewhat extraordinary

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condition, that he should not attempt to exercise the authority properly belonging to that station. To this condition he bound himself by a formal engagement, and agreed to commit the entire conduct of affairs to the hands of a Peshcar, or deputy, named Chundoo Loll, to whom the British Government pledged its support. This arrangement can only be justified by a reference to the characters and dispositions of the Nizam and of his nominal minister. The one was so infirm in mind, and so liable to be hurried away by his passions to the commission of the most extravagant and ridiculous acts, as to warrant a suspicion that he was occasionally insane. The minister had no capacity for business, and was said to have maintained in his house an establishment of soothsayers, by whose predictions all his movements, down to the auspicious moments for eating and drinking, were directed. Under these circumstances, to have entrusted the maintenance of the subsisting relations to such a master, and such a minister, must necessarily have placed them in the utmost jeopardy.

For several years the intercourse between the British resident and Rajah Chundoo Loll appeared to have been carried on in a satisfactory manner.

In a letter to Lord Hastings, dated the 24th November 1819, the resident, Mr. Russell, gives the following account of the character and administration of Chundoo Loll:

"When Rajah Chundoo Loll came into office in 1809, every department of the government was tending rapidly to decay. The administration under him has necessarily been one of expedients; but far from thinking that the present difficulties are to be imputed to his mismanagement, it appears to me a matter of astonishment, that affairs have been administered as they have been. During the late war (the Maharrata and Pindarry) he contrived to raise and equip a most respectable and useful body of troops, and furnished in every particular, an active and efficient co-operation, without making any demand upon the Nizam's coffers, or receiving any extraordinary assistance from any other quarter. To those who compare what he has done with the means he had of doing it, his exertions must appear astonishing. Either the resources of the government must have been improved, or they must have been applied with greater judgment. In either case, Chundoo Loll's merit as a minister is conspicuous.

"Chundoo Loll is a most respectable man in his private character. He has great industry, patience, and aptitude in all the practical branches of the government. He is indefatigable in his application, clear in his views, as far as they extend, and, as a man of business, I hardly ever knew his superior. His long experience has given him an intimate acquaintance with all the affairs of every department, and rendered him perfectly familiar with the manner of transacting them. Whatever is done is done by himself, and even the bodily labour he undergoes is astonishing. He has great kindness of disposition, is easy of access, affable in his manners towards the lowest persons, and never, I believe, knowingly authorized a measure of unjust severity. But he is too indulgent and compliant to those who are employed under him, and he is certainly deficient in that resolution, energy and firmness, without which it is impossible to preside with complete effect over the affairs of a government."

After noticing the profusion with which Chundoo Loll was in the practice of distributing alms indiscriminately to all applicants, Mr. Russell thus sums up his review of Chundoo Loll's official qualities.

"The safest mode of estimating the practical utility of a public officer is to consider how his place could be supplied. If any accident were to happen to Chundoo Loll, no individual, I am persuaded, could be found, under the Nizam's government, capable of conducting the duties which are now discharged by him.

"With our support Chundoo Loll is qualified to make a better minister than any one that could be chosen, but he could not stand by himself. Those very qualities which constitute his principal recommendation with us, would be laid hold of by his and our enemies as the readiest means of effecting his ruin.

"The Nizam's government cannot be upheld at all, if it is not upheld by us. To give effect to measures of reform, the authority of the executive minister must be strengthened, not impaired, and the vigour of that authority now consists in our support."

Mr. now Sir Charles Metcalfe, who succeeded Mr. Russell as resident at Hyderabad, in his despatch dated February 2, 1821, observed, that no minister could be more attentive to our interests than Chundoo Loll, or more disposed to place at our command all the resources of his master's dominions.

In this view he appeared to Mr. Metcalfe admirably qualified to promote the object of Lord Hastings in improving the condition of the Nizam's affairs; but on the other hand, he was represented as improvident, extravagant and rapacious. "One of the worst features of his rule," says Mr. Metcalfe, "is the total want of faith which prevails with regard to revenue engagements. In order to induce the villages to cultivate, the managers of districts grant engagements on fair terms; but these are given with the fixed intention of violating them, and when the effect designed is produced, and the cultivation on the ground, the engagement is no longer thought of, and whatever can be obtained by force or fraud is levied.

"When such is the general system with regard to revenue, it is not to be supposed that justice or police can be in a flourishing state. There does not appear to be a shadow of either, and that the country is not in a much worse state than it is, proves wonderfully how long a country may go on without both."

"The picture herein drawn of Chundoo Loll's administration and its effects, would make it appear that he is a very unfit man to be entrusted with government. But I look round for a better in vain; there is not an individual here from whom I should expect more or so much. He is an able and indefatigable man of business, and with all his faults, I have

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better hopes of effecting an improvement of the country through Chundoo Loll than through any other person. On his submission and ready attention I rely more than I could on the untired character of any man who would take office for his own aggrandizement, without experience, without ability, with more avarice and less good-will than Chundoo Loll. I stay with more avarice, because, with all his means and opportunities, Chundoo Loll is not supposed to have amassed any wealth. He traces the ruin of the country to the acts of his predecessors, and promises strictly to attend to the resident's recommendations for reform. Whatever one may hear elsewhere, one rises from a personal conference with Chundoo Loll strongly impressed with a belief that he is the man at this court most able and most willing to promote the good of the country."

In a letter dated June 20, 1822, Mr Metcalfe says, "Unfortunately there is such a propensity in the officers of Government towards extortion, and so little effort on the part of the minister to repress it in others, with so decided an inclination to exercise it himself, that incessant vigilance is necessary, even to preserve an adherence to the settlements which have been concluded by his authority, and with his sanction. He generally applies the remedy when a particular evil is pointed out, but without an undiminished care there would be such a general relaxation and counteraction as might lead to worse oppressions than those which have been subdued; for such I have little doubt would be the effect of a reaction.

"Another chief object is the preservation of the integrity of the Nizam's sovereignty. His ministers unfortunately think less of their master's interests than of their own, and to protect him against their usurpations has become a part of the anomalous duties of the British resident at this court.

"His Highness continues abstracted from public business, and I have as yet made no progress in dispelling the cloud of mystery in which he is enveloped. In our personal intercourse, which has been rare, his manner is civil, and even kind; but he evidently labours under restraint, and I fear that people interested in preventing a more unembarrassed communication, contrive to keep alive his jealousies and apprehensions. It is not clear to me, whether his abstraction from public business, which is of long standing, proceeds from natural indolence and love of ease, or from disgust at the control exercised by his minister, with our support. Whatever may have been the cause, he has so long withdrawn himself from the affairs of government, that much as one would naturally desire to see the legitimate sovereign of the country in the exercise of his proper functions, there must be considerable risk, if ever he takes up the reins of actual rule, that much mismanagement will arise from his inexperience and want of habit. He is said to be perfectly sensible of the evils produced by the maladministration of his minister.

"It is generally supposed that his Highness has nothing so much at heart as the removal of Chundoo Loll, but he has never conveyed to me any expression of dissatisfaction at his minister's conduct. I am inclined to think that the Nizam must be aware that whatever Chundoo Loll may be in other respects, he is undoubtedly the cleverest man at his court, and that desirable as it may be to displace him on account of his extortion, and his unprincipled waste of the public resources, for selfish, corrupt purposes, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to find a substitute equal to him as a man of business.

"Nuwab Mooneer-ool-Moolk, the nominal chief minister, seems to enjoy the enormous portion which he receives of the state revenue, and the ostensible preference evinced by his prince, without making any hazardous struggle to acquire the proper power of his office.

Mr. Metcalfe proceeds to notice the extravagant disbursements of Chundoo Loll, and the difficulty of obtaining a clear understanding of his financial proceedings.

"Interference in the internal concerns of states under our protection is neither desirable nor generous, when it can be avoided, and should only then be resorted to when it is clearly necessary for the protection of the people from the misery and destruction which must ever attend oppression and misrule.

"On the other hand, if interposition be a duty, when clearly necessary for the relief of the people, it would seem to be so in a more than ordinary degree when a country is governed by a minister supported by our influence, and absolute in his power.

"In every case where we support the ruling power, but more especially in such a case as that last described, we become responsible in great measure, for the acts of the Government; and if they are hurtful to the people, we aid in inflicting the injury.

"At present the state of our relations with the Nizam's government, on the subject of reform, is as follows.—We interpose avowedly for the protection of the people from extortion and depredation, and for the security of the Nizam's revenue against destruction. We adopt the least degree of interference that can be of any avail for these purposes, and we leave other reforms to work their own way, or to be adopted when the Nizam's government may be convinced of their propriety. We are not precluded from offering our advice on any measure that recommends itself; but we do not urge it unless it be necessary for the important objects above mentioned. We leave untouched the form and course of the native administration, and can withdraw at any time without decomposing its machinery, when we have any assurance that the engagements entered into by the Government will be maintained, and the people protected from oppression and undue exaction.

"Any interference whatever, in the affairs of a foreign government, being, in my opinion, objectionable, if it can be avoided; I have often considered anxiously what course could be pursued other than that which has been adopted.

(445.—VI.)

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Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

"The following are the several plans which occur to me; but all of them seem to be replete with objections.

"1. Either we might continue to support Chundoo Loll, as minister, and endeavour to act on him by general advice, without employing any more effectual means to check extortion and oppression.

"2. Or we might select a better man for the ministerial office, and support him in a similar way.

"3. Or we might leave the Nizam unbiassed in the choice of his minister, and abstain from any interference whatever in his affairs, beyond general exhortations.

"The first of these plans appears to me to be the worst, because it is proved entirely to my own conviction, that Chundoo Loll, unchecked and uncontrolled, cannot be other than a reckless, unprincipled extortioner. On this plan, therefore, in addition to consigning the people to the oppressions which they would suffer, we should be in a manner the promoters of these oppressions by supporting their author.

"The second scheme would be of very doubtful issue. I do not know what man could be selected as a fit minister. On whomsoever the choice might fall, he might be as unprincipled and oppressive as Chundoo Loll, without his talent and experience, and without his subserviency to our Government.

"The third scheme of leaving the government under the nomination of ministers exclusively in the hands of the Nizam, uncontrolled and unbiassed, without interposition of any kind on our part, appears to me to be decidedly the best, because it is free from the objections which appertain to the other two. But, nevertheless, its effect on the happiness of the people would be quite uncertain. I am not sure that the Nizam, if left to himself, would dismiss Chundoo Loll. The ability of the latter might uphold him in all his present power, in which case extortion and ruin would rage as before. Of an opposite arrangement the effect would be entirely doubtful. The successor might be as bad, and, from inability or inexperience, the general result of his administration might be worse. Nor could any great good be reasonably expected from the Nizam taking an active part, in his own person, in the management of his affairs, beyond the satisfaction attendant on his holding and exercising his own rights.

"The reaction which would take place if our protection were withdrawn from the people, would be desolating in an extreme degree. Vindictive and rancorous feelings on the part of those whose extortions had been checked, would add fresh stimulus to the ordinary motives of exaction, and wretched indeed would be the lot of the miserable people thus thrown back into the devouring fire from which they have been but so recently rescued."

Mr Metcalfe, in conclusion, submits his opinions as to the policy of supporting any minister for the time being, or of interfering in the election of his successor. He admits that when we were struggling with rival powers for safety or supremacy, it was natural that we should endeavour to strengthen ourselves at each court by connexions with individuals of influence. But under our present circumstances, he conceives that our wisest course will be to court the good-will of the prince himself, in preference to that of any of his servants; to act cordially with any minister of his selection, and to fix our attention on measures rather than on men.

He puts the question, whether if the Nizam were to express an inclination to dismiss Chundoo Loll, the resident would be authorized to oppose that inclination. But in his letter of the 6th Sept 1822, Mr. Metcalfe apologises for having proposed that question, as he had subsequently discovered (what had escaped his recollection) that the instructions to Mr Russell, of the 22d January 1820, had directed him to assure Chundoo Loll of the continued protection of the British Government, on condition of his agreeing to the measures of reform then projected.

From the foregoing extracts, it would appear that Sir Charles Metcalfe's opinion of Chundoo Loll did not unprove upon acquaintance; Sir Charles's aversion to the scheme of supporting a dewan or minister was strongly expressed on occasions which arose after he had left Hyderabad. In that opinion he is borne out by other high authorities; among others, a gentleman who held a secretarial office under the Bengal government, speaking upon that subject says, "The measure adopted at Hyderabad, of setting up and maintaining a minister against the will of the sovereign, I regard as infinitely worse than the formal deposition of the latter. It is a measure only to be justified by a necessity which would justify revolution."

On the death of the prince who was on the throne when Sir Charles Metcalfe resided at Hyderabad, his son and successor was left at full liberty to select his ministers: but although there was an expectation, at the time, that his Highness would remove Chundoo Loll from the situation which he had so long held, he still continues to discharge the duties of minister.

Other instances might be adduced of our interference, either to procure the appointment of a fit and proper person to the office of Dewan, or to effect the removal of one whose character and conduct appeared to be objectionable: but to advert specifically to every case of this nature would add greatly and unnecessarily to the length of this memoir.

Admitting the force of the objections which have been urged against the measure of selecting and supporting a minister against the will of the sovereign, it is to be recollected, that this expedient was not resorted to at Hyderabad until it appeared to be the only means of preserving from utter decay an alliance essential to the stability of our subsidiary system.

It must ever be a paramount object with us to secure the political advantages which have been acquired by our past efforts, and the best apology that can be offered for an arrangement such as that which was adopted in favour of Chundoo Loll, is, that however unpalatable it may have proved to the Nizam, it was less severe than the formal deposition of the sovereign. This last is a measure which can be justified only in cases when the sovereign has committed overt acts of hostility. The appointment of a minister friendly to our interests is an experiment that may be fairly tried, not only when we have reason to suspect the fidelity of the prince, but also when he is known to be deficient in the qualifications requisite for his station. Perhaps, however, in either of these cases it might be better to establish a regency than to set up and support a minister obnoxious to his nominal master.

3. *Of interference with a view to ensure the Efficiency of the Contingent Force which our Allies are respectively bound to hold at our disposal*

It is quite reasonable to suppose that the Native princes who were induced by a sense of their own weakness to solicit or to accept of our protection, would gradually become indifferent to the maintenance of their military establishments, and wish to cast upon us the entire burthen of preserving the peace and safety of their dominions. The only motive calculated to counteract such a tendency, would be a latent design on the part of the protected chief to shake off dependence upon us at a convenient opportunity, but although it is more than probable that such a design may have been cherished by some of our allies, they nevertheless appear, almost without exception, to have neglected the means of keeping on foot a well-disciplined and efficient force.

As our subsidiary allies are respectively bound by treaty to hold a specified number of horse and foot in readiness to come forward at our request, it became a matter of importance to assure ourselves that we could obtain, in time of need, the benefit of such a stipulation.

At an early period of our connexion with the state of Oude, an attempt was made to induce the Vizier to establish corps of regular infantry, disciplined and commanded by Company's officers, but the plan, after it had been for a few years in operation, was abandoned.

After the French officers in the service of the Nizam had been dismissed, in the year 1798, the corps still continued to wear the French uniform, to practise the French exercise, and to employ the French words of command. They were chiefly managed by one Clementi, a Spaniard, who was notoriously hostile to British interests.

The resident, Captain Thomas Sydenham, having ascertained that several Europeans, of different nations, had obtained commissions in the Nizam's army, determined to effect their removal, to supply their place by a better class of men, and to commence a thorough reformation of that portion of the Nizam's regular infantry which constituted his contingent, and was stationed in the province of Berar.\* With a view to the accomplishment of this project, a detachment of the subsidiary force, under the command of Lieut-colonel Doveton, was sent to that province. It was arranged that 50 of the Nizam's infantry should be sent every day to the British lines, to be instructed in the manual and platoon exercises, and that those should be afterwards employed in drilling the remainder of the corps. Care was taken, in selecting the European officers, to ascertain that they were attached to British interests.

From a return of the Nizam's regular infantry,† dated January 1, 1813, it appears to have stood as follows :

European commissioned officers	-	-	-	-	-	17	} 86
non-commissioned	-	-	-	-	-	69	
Native officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	267
Rank and file	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,418
Artillery and artificers	-	-	-	-	-	-	236
							4,007

The whole of this force was commanded by Captain George Sydenham, brother of the late resident, on whose resignation, in 1810, Mr. Henry Russell was appointed to that office.

In the year 1813, the plan of discipline which had been established in the corps stationed in Berar, was extended to two battalions at Hyderabad, which were brigaded, and named after the resident, "the Russell brigade." A captain, a lieutenant and an adjutant were appointed to each of the battalions, and the brigade was commanded by a Mr. Beckett, a gentleman of birth and education, who had been several years in the military profession. Neither Mr. Beckett nor the other officers were at that time in the Company's service. The pay of the brigade was issued by the resident, and the amount deducted from the peshwah or tribute payable by the British Government to the Nizam for the Northern Circars.

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\* The province of Berar is partly subject to the Nizam and partly to the Rajah of Nagpore.

† The Nizam's contingent, as stipulated by the 12th October 1800, was 10,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.  
(445.—VI.)

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

1 April 1816.

Some of the Company's officers, and of the King's on half-pay, were at a subsequent period allowed by the local government to enter into the service of our allies; but the home authorities issued orders, directing that none but Company's officers should be so employed.

When the above-mentioned arrangement was first adopted, the Nizam's cavalry was said to be so totally ill-constituted and inefficient as to preclude all hope of reformation. An attempt, however, was made, and with success, in the year 1816, to correct the evils which prevailed in that branch of his Highness's army. The cavalry was of two descriptions, namely, Sircar and Jaghiredar. The Sircar horse were in the pay of the Nizam's government, the Jaghiredar were supplied by certain high officers as the condition upon which they held their jaghires, or estates.

Mr. Russell, adverting to the state of the Nizam's cavalry, observed, that in proposing to his Highness any measures for the reform of this part of the army, it would be desirable, in the first instance, to avoid as much as possible every degree of innovation which might not be absolutely necessary for the effectual attainment of the object in view. "There are, however (he adds), two measures, which, before all others, would be fundamentally necessary to the proper constitution of this force—the provision of funds for its regular payment, and the placing it under the direction of European officers. Any plan of reform which might be undertaken would, I am persuaded, be found totally nugatory, without the security of these two measures."

Captain George Sydenham, the political agent in Berar, had recommended that British officers should be attached to each division of the cavalry, not to command, but to watch, and occasionally to report upon the internal state of the several divisions, and to stimulate the Native commanders both by example and exhortation, to the active performance of their duty.

27 July 1816.

Mr. Russell, however, conceived that the cavalry could not be employed with judgment, promptitude or effect, in any case whatever, unless it was commanded and led by European officers. With reference to this proposition, Lord Hastings in Council observed as follows: "Although sirdars of eminence feel no wound to their pride when they serve under a British officer, their corps forming a part of the combined division commanded by him, yet it may be different to their feelings, should they who have been accustomed to head their own dependants, find a British officer of moderate rank placed above them in their own immediate spheres. The success which has attended the efficiency of the Nizam's regular infantry is not conclusive, since the character and habits of the persons composing that force are believed to be essentially different from the mass of those of whom the cavalry will be formed."

The Supreme Government nevertheless sanctioned the appointment of Captain Davies, of the Bombay Native Infantry, to the command of the Nizam's reformed horse. The arrangement, as finally agreed upon, was stated in a letter from the resident to Captain G. Sydenham, dated September 15th 1816. Mr. Russell observed, that in the formation of the new establishment, it was intended to conform as much as possible to the rules and principles which had prevailed under the Nizam's government, and to abstain from any innovation which was not absolutely necessary to its efficiency; that although the general superintendence and direction of the whole would be in Captain Davies's hands, the command of the separate parties and their internal regulations and economy must be left, as far as possible, to their own leaders; that, in conformity to the recommendation of Captain Sydenham, the Sircar cavalry should be divided into parties of 1,000 each. "In order," says Mr. Russell, "to assist you in the execution of your duty, I have recommended that a certain number of European officers of our own army should be placed at your disposal. This number, I think, ought not to be less than five, of whom one might act as a staff-officer with you, and assist you in keeping the registers and conducting the other laborious details of the establishment, and the remaining four might be employed as circumstances may require, with the separate detached divisions. The Governor-general has been pleased to leave the selection of those officers to you, subject, of course, to his approval, and, at your suggestion, I shall therefore submit to his Excellency the names of

"Lieutenant H. B. Smith, 8th Madras Light Cavalry.

Cornet Hamilton - - - Ditto.

Captain Pedlar - - - 9th Bombay Infantry.

Lieutenant Wells - - 7th Ditto.

Lieutenant Sutherland 4th Ditto.

"Your knowledge of the character, temper, and prejudices of the Natives will point out to you the absolute necessity of practising every possible degree of conciliation in the exercise of the charge you are about to assume. The cavalry of the Native powers of India are of a proud and lofty character, and an authority over them is neither to be acquired with the same facility nor exercised with the same rigour as over a body of infantry. It will be of primary importance, therefore, that you endeavour to appease their jealousy by kindness and conciliation, and to acquire their confidence by letting them see, that it is your object not to interfere with any of the substantial parts of the system to which they have been accustomed, or to subject them to the severe rules of European discipline; but, on the contrary, to secure to them the enjoyment of their just rights, to protect them from the imposition of the subordinate officers of the Government, and to encourage and direct them in  
the

the execution of the service on which they may be employed. When there shall have been time for them to feel the operation of the measures which it is intended to introduce, and to become personally well acquainted with you, I have little doubt of their being reconciled to the change, and disposed to follow you with cheerfulness and alacrity, but this desirable result must be the work of time and patience, and I cannot recommend too much caution and conciliation in the commencement of your undertaking."

The pay of the European officers attached to the Nizam's cavalry was :

Commandant, about 3,000*l*. per annum.  
2 Commanders, each 1,800*l*.  
2 Adjutants, each 1,200*l*.

To the command of the Nizam's regular infantry, Major Pitman was appointed, in the year 1817, as a measure preparatory to the commencement of active operations against the Pindarries

The Supreme Government stated, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated 1st October 1819, that throughout the late military operations, the discipline and steadiness of the Nizam's reformed horse, no less than their uniformly conspicuous gallantry and perseverance, had rendered them a body of highly useful and efficient auxiliaries; the merit of which is attributed to the exertions and bravery of Captain Davies and the other officers attached to the corps.

On the 3d October 1811, the Honourable Mr Elphinstone, resident at Poona, acquainted the Supreme Government of Bengal, that the Peishwa had lately spoken much of raising a body of infantry; that his plan was to form six strong battalions, and to apply to the British Government for officers to command them; but that he proposed to commence by raising two battalions, consisting in the whole of 2,400 men.

The resident was authorized to encourage the Peishwa to carry his intention into effect, and to promise the assistance of the Company's officers in laying the foundation of the new system, and in bringing it to perfection. It was, however, intimated to Mr. Elphinstone, that it would be advisable eventually to replace the officers by other British subjects not in the Company's service

Major (then Captain) Ford, of the Madras Native infantry, was selected by the Peishwa to command the brigade; and the Bombay Government supplied two officers for each battalion, an officer of artillery and a proportion of sergeants and privates, to proceed to Poona, and to place themselves under the orders of the resident

When Major Ford received his appointment from the Peishwa, his Highness manifested considerable anxiety to secure his fidelity. He was repeatedly told that the Peishwa would do nothing except in concert with the British Government, but that he would be expected to obey his Highness, and, above all, that he must abstain from intrigues, and recognize no authority in the Mahratta state but that of his Highness. On being asked whether he had any reluctance to serve his Highness with the same zeal and fidelity as he did the Company, Major Ford replied, "Certainly not;" upon which his Highness left his seat, came to the place where Major Ford was sitting, and requested him to give him his hand as a proof of his promise. The Major immediately rose up, placed his hand in his Highness's, and promised as he had asked

The following account of the Poona brigade is contained in a letter from Mr. Elphinstone, dated November 20, 1815 "Two-thirds of the men of this corps are Natives of the British provinces in Hindostan, the rest are Mahrattas they are uncommonly fine men, and are under excellent battalion officers, who have made up by their zeal and attention for the smallness of their number. Major Ford was the Peishwa's own choice, and has been successful in gaining a certain degree of his Highness's confidence, the brigade has, in consequence, been regularly paid and well equipped, and attended to without any interference on my part. The late disputes with the British Government might have given reason to apprehend that his Highness would cease to have any reliance on a corps commanded by British officers, and that the brigade would suffer by the change in his sentiments; but the advantage he has derived from Major Ford's advice, and the disposition he still shows to consult and employ him, seem to secure the success of the brigade, for the present at least. The part Major Ford performs is very useful in removing the Peishwa's alarms, and explaining to him the true ground of affairs that are agitated between him and the British Government; but it will require some address in him to prevent his being involved in the parties of the Durbar to the injury of his own interests and those of his brigade. The Peishwa's brigade is paid in the presence of officers from his Highness: it is also mustered by his officers, and its accounts are carefully scrutinized by his people. All the authority, in other respects, is in the hands of Major Ford and his officers."

After the surrender of Triumuckjee Dainglia, the murderer of the Guicowar's minister, Gungadbur Shastra, the criminal was, in the first instance, made over to a party of Major Ford's brigade, and by it conducted to the British lines.

At the battle of Kirkee, 5th November 1817, Major Ford's brigade acted with the force under Lieutenant-colonel Burr, who expressed himself in the following terms regarding its services :

"To Major Ford, and the officers and men of his fine brigade, I feel the greatest obligation, for the cheerfulness and activity they evinced to contribute to the general success of the day."

The same system which had been thus acted upon with regard to the troops of the Nizam (445.—VI.)

# VI. POLITICAL or FOREIGN.

## Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

Mr Elphinstone  
to Lord Minto,  
27 December 1812.

Appendix No. 20

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

and the Peishwa, was extended, after the flight of Appah Sahob, to the army of the Nagpore Rajah. The circumstances connected with this arrangement will be best explained by an extract from Lord Hastings' Letter to the Secret Committee, dated August 21, 1820 :

"Although," says his Lordship, "it seemed indispensable that the military branch of the Rajah's establishment should be virtually a British force, I deemed it desirable both to confine the extent to which this principle was to apply within the narrowest limits consistent with the attainment of the object, and with respect to the horse at least, to allow them to retain as much of their original character as a regard to their efficiency would permit, so as to render their return under the command of their native chiefs more easily manageable, whenever circumstances should permit.

"It is not necessary that I should, in this despatch, offer to you notice any details regarding the organization of the regular infantry, and the select body of horse raised for the service of the Rajah. It is sufficient to state, that the latter was formed on the model of the reformed horse of the Nizam, whose service had been found highly valuable and exemplary throughout the campaign. Besides this force of a regular description, it was necessary to keep a body of sebundies for the services of the more remote provinces, and for the duties of realizing the revenues and the tribute of the dependant rajahs. I pointed out to Mr. Jenkins, in forming this force, the advantages of giving employment to such a number of the military classes as might attach them to the new order of things.

"With this object in view, it also seemed desirable to endeavour to compose the horse of the contingents of the different military chiefs of the state, whom the revolution had unavoidably deprived of their natural consequence in the country, and whose interests in the success of the new arrangement I wished to secure, by rendering it a means of giving employment to a portion of their followers. Though I was fully satisfied of the advantage and policy of attaching British officers to the force at Nagpore, the plan is not unattended with inconvenience. The intrinsic power and respectability of every native state, and its self-respect and confidence, mainly repose on the character, attachment, and just weight in its councils of its military chiefs, which it is the tendency of the present system to undermine. The necessity of its adoption, however, is one of the embarrassing though unavoidable results of the contest into which we were forced by the treacherous hostility of the late ruler of Nagpore. No other system could have been adopted with equal promise of security to our interests, and advantage to those of the other party. Events had destroyed the military strength of the Government, and had rendered it incapable of any well-directed effort if left to itself. The army of Nagpore never possessed a high military character, and to me it seemed obviously expedient to seize the opportunity of improving that part of its establishment, by restricting its amount and increasing its efficiency. I did not perceive therefore any objection to the introduction in the fullest extent of the plan already tried at Hyderabad, on a proportionably smaller scale, while, on the contrary, its positive advantage to our security and interests was manifest."

The peace establishment of the Rajah of Mysore, in the year 1804, consisted of the following troops.

Col Wilks's Report,  
5 Dec 1804, p. 48.

Horse	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Regular Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	4,000
Peons	-	-	-	-	-	2,500
Candahar Peons	-	-	-	-	-	12,000
						<hr/> 20,500

The regular infantry were composed of the sepoys, who were formerly in the service of Tippoo Sultan, they were paid at the same rates, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the British sepoys, but commanded by native sirdars.\*

In April 1815, Mr. Cole, the resident at Mysore, stated that the regular infantry consisted of 9,000 men, exclusive of nearly 500 artillerymen; that they were badly clothed and accoutred, but tolerably well drilled, that the men were of a good description, and their officers as efficient as could be expected in a native service which had not been employed in war for many years.

By an agreement dated the 9th January 1807, the Rajah of Mysore engaged to maintain at all times fit for service and subject to muster, 4,000 sallahdar horse; of these 1,500 were attached to the irregular cavalry destined for the defence of the Nizam's territory of Berar in the year 1816. With reference to this force, Mr. Russell observed: "The Mysore horse are already regularly paid by occasional advances made to them by the paymaster of Colonel Doveton's force; besides which, it is only for a time that they will form a part of the proposed establishment, so that no particular measures of reform will require to be applied to them."

A brigade of gallopers and a squadron of Native cavalry were attached by Colonel Doveton to the Mysore sallahdar horse serving under him, and placed under the command of

\* An European officer was appointed to give them general instruction as to the formation and discipline of the corps but when he had done so he was withdrawn.—Sir J. MALCOLM.

of Captain James Grant, of the 5th Madras Light Cavalry but this was probably only a temporary arrangement.

A British officer was appointed in the year 1817 to drill the Mysore regular infantry.

Previously to the commencement of military operations against the Pindarries, Sir John Malcolm, who visited Mysore and the other states in the Deccan, in order to ascertain the amount of force which they could respectively bring into the field, addressed the following Report to Sir Thomas Havelock :

"With respect to the 500 stable horse stationed at Closepettah, whose services we have a right to call for, the resident thinks, and I perfectly agree in opinion with him, that though both men and horses are good, they are, from want of discipline, inefficient. He intends to recommend to Government, and I hope his recommendations will be attended to, that he should be authorized to suggest to the Rajah a reform of this party, which should include their more regular payment and the nomination of an European officer of respectability for the command of them, who should be assisted by an officer of inferior rank as adjutant. Mr. Cole seems to think, and according to my view of the subject on very just grounds, that this arrangement, if it can be effected, will give this Government a very efficient corps of regular cavalry, at a very little additional expense to that which it now incurs, and it is obvious we might derive benefit at the present crisis from such an alteration in the character of this body of men.

"I feel it necessary to explain to your Excellency that I take quite a different view of the formation of the stable horse at Closepettah, and the sallahdars in the service of the Mysore government. The former are already approximated to our system, the horses they ride are the property of the Rajah, they are divided into the same ranks of Native officers and troopers as our regiments; their clothing and pay are nearly similar, and they want, in short, nothing but that order and efficiency which European officers alone can give to natives under this formation. It is, as far as the corps is concerned, the completion, not the alteration of a system, which is proposed; and if the nomination of European officers is not approved, it would, in my opinion, be better to advise the Rajah to change the shape of this corps, as they would be more useful both to him and to us as a regular horse than they ever can be in their present form.

"With respect to the sallahdars in the service of the Mysore state, who act under their own chiefs, and find their own horses, and are paid an average monthly sum for their subsistence, I consider that the appointment of any European officers to this class (unless in cases where bodies of men are acting with our armies, and such officers are required as a medium of communication, and for the general purpose of superintending and directing their movements) to be at variance with those principles of pride and energy in their leaders, and subordination and attachment in their followers, which have hitherto combined to give value to this description of troops. My opinion upon this subject, however, is to be understood with particular reference to the irregular horse of Mysore, and to the principles upon which the government of that country is constituted.

"There are many minor points connected with the efficiency of the Mysore horse in the Deccan, such as the regular payment for horses killed in action, and the employment of a greater number of inferior officers to each musallah, which the resident desires me to assure your Excellency he is quite confident the Rajah will readily settle according to your wishes. He is also satisfied that prince's acquiescence in any measures that may occur to you, when in the field, as necessary to render more useful the services of his troops.

"The resident desires me to state, that there are at the present moment 1,000 of the Rajah's regular infantry at the town of Mysore, any part or the whole of whom are ready to march to the frontier, or to any other quarter where the Right Honourable the Governor in Council may command their services."

The objections to the system of appointing European officers to discipline and command the troops of our allies appear to be, first, that it is highly impolitic to communicate to the Native powers that military science, to the superiority of which over their own mode of discipline we owe our past successes and our present political supremacy.

Second, That it is unjust to our allies, by thus taking their armies into our hands, to deprive them of every vestige of military power.

Third, That by displacing the native rulers, we render a class of men who possess considerable influence in the government of our allies disaffected to our power.

Fourth, That British officers thus employed are in a great measure placed beyond the control of their own Government; that they may therefore practise peculation with impunity, and that the high emoluments which they enjoy are calculated to render the officers serving with our own battalions dissatisfied with their condition.

Lastly, That in the event of mutiny in our own armies, the Native officers might find in the regular corps of our allies a corresponding spirit, which might serve to aggravate and spread the evil.

1. "As to the danger of communicating to the Native powers a knowledge of our military system." The following are the sentiments of the late Earl of Buckinghamshire :

"Principles of impartial justice, humanity, and a liberal policy ought at all times to influence the internal regulations of the State; every thing should be done, and much has been

\* Otherwise the owner of the horse would be tempted to keep him as much as possible out of danger.



Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

been effected, to attach the inhabitants to our Government; but we must rest our confidence upon our military strength, as the main stay of our permanent authority.

"To conquer and to maintain an empire in countries so distant from Great Britain, and with so numerous a population, would have been impossible by the European soldiers exclusively; it therefore became necessary to avail ourselves of the aid of the natives, to incorporate them in our armies, to instruct them in the military art, and to afford them the advantages of European discipline in all its several regulations and detail.

"Under these impressions, it is my deliberate opinion that it would be a more safe proceeding to withdraw every European from the armies of our Native allies, than to increase their number in order to extend European discipline. If ever a dominion was originally won, and is still maintained by superior military knowledge, it is the British Indian Empire. In the diffusion of that knowledge, I should conceive that its greatest danger is to be apprehended."

Instructions were sent through the Secret Committee to the Supreme Government, on the 3d April 1815, framed in accordance with the sentiments expressed by Lord Buckinghamshire.

"It appears to us (say the Committee) that the proposed plan without its advantages, is liable to all the objections which can be urged against the subsidiary system; and whatever weight may be due to the opinions that have been brought forward in its support, the possible consequences of its establishment we deem of a magnitude sufficient to deter us from authorizing its further encouragement, particularly with reference to the artillery, an arm in which it ought to be our policy not to extend the knowledge of the natives."

Judging from the statements contained in Lord Hastings' political Minute of December 1815, it would appear that some of the Native powers had made a considerable advance in military knowledge, and that their regular battalions and even their artillery were in a very efficient condition.

"It is," says his Lordship, "a common and not unnatural question in England, How can we require so large an army as we now have in India? Tipoo is conquered; the Mahratta power is broken; we had a smaller army when these enemies were in full force. We have now no enemies to fear. For what can we require so large an army?"

"This will continue to be a subject of wonder in England until the real cause of the progressive increase of our army be properly understood.

"The truth is, that a prodigious difference has gradually taken place in the state of military knowledge in India. In our fresh contests with the natives, the consciousness of superiority gave irresistible confidence to our troops. The natives, on the other hand, were confounded at our courage, our discipline, our success, and our means. Resistance seemed to be impossible, and the largest Native armies fled in dismay from the smallest British detachments.

"Hyder and Tipoo, however, were near to showing us how much could be effected by Native troops against us; but our discipline and superior means prevailed.

"The Mahrattas acquired a formidable infantry force, but this force was under the command of European officers, who believed our means to be superior, and in some instances from patriotism, in others from want of confidence, or from a desire to seize an opportunity for bringing off their wealth, came over to us, according to our summons, at the breaking out of the last war, leaving their troops without commanders.

"Nevertheless, the troops thus deserted by their leaders fought well, as many a hard contested battle in the Mahratta war can testify.

"Their artillery was not then contemptible; they have paid peculiar attention to it since that period, and its improvement is reported to be material.

"The infantry now in the service of the native powers is perhaps inferior in discipline and efficiency to the infantry formerly in Sindia's service, under European officers, but there is this material difference since that time, that Natives are now the movers of the machine. It was formerly thought that only Europeans could discipline troops; but now the formation of battalions is perfectly well understood in the Native armies. The battalions are deficient, no doubt, in many respects, but they have now all the requisite materials for efficiency within themselves. From the general commanding a brigade, down to the drill-sergeant, there is now no want of Native officers in the Native armies, experienced in the management of Native battalions. This is a very important fact, which may be attended with as important consequences.

"The change in the military character of the troops in the service of the Native powers, as compared with that of those in our service, is not, however, confined to the preceding particulars.

"The increase of confidence in the Native troops when opposed to us, whether regular or irregular, is evident and progressive.

"Victory still for the most parts attends our arms, but not so invariably as in former times.

"Our assaults on forts are frequently unsuccessful, not from any decrease in our science and means, which must be in an improved state, and not, it may be asserted, from any degeneracy in the British troops, but from an increase of confidence on the part of those who oppose us.

"In the Goorkah war there have been instances of the enemy charging us and driving our troops, European as well as Native, before them, a circumstance against which, unpleasant as is the contemplation, it is impossible for us to shut our eyes. With this fact so prominent and so recent, it is extraordinary that any well-informed person should consider the natives of the present day exactly the same description of enemy as that with which we had

to

to cope 10 years ago. A very false estimate has been made of the inhabitants of the upper country, if they are not understood to be a vigorous, active, and gallant race. I am disposed to think that I have never seen a more innate spirit of soldiery in any people.

"It ought to be understood that the natives have advanced very seriously in military knowledge. The Gorkhas 30 or 40 years ago did not dare to show themselves to Major Kinloch's weak and sickly detachment of Natives. The change in their conduct speaks for itself. The charm which overawed the Natives in former days is dissolved through their greater facility of observing us, and we must make up by increase of numbers and real efficiency, for the difference which the dissolution of that charm occasions."

With respect to the Native artillery, Sir Samuel Auchmuty observed as follows. "In all our wars, I have either observed or been informed from qualified judges, that at a distance the enemy's artillery has been as well served as our own. If in close action and with grape it has been inferior, I impute it more to our superior equipments and the active strength and nerve of the Europeans, than to superiority of skill. Any instruction they may solicit in this branch can be of little detriment to us, and I conceive of little use to them.

"In mortar practice they are greatly inferior to us, and from the science required, they will probably continue so."

With reference to the foregoing opinion, the Supreme Government, in a letter to the Government of Fort St. George, dated 25th June 1812, stated that they entirely concurred in the justice of Sir S. Auchmuty's observations, and that they had no hesitation in determining, that whatever exception might be made in favour of corps under the command of Europeans serving with the Nizam, from the general principle of withholding the means of improving the tactics of Native states, the chance of the evils which might arise from instructing the former in the mortar practice, more than counterbalanced any advantages to be expected from their expertness in the use of that machine.

In his minute of the 1st of September 1818, Lord Hastings adverts to the knowledge possessed by the Natives in the use of ordnance. "They are," says his Lordship, "as expert as ourselves in the mere mechanical management of a single piece of ordnance. They do not owe this skill to our tuition, as the Honourable Court imagine, though I do believe they received a temporary improvement in it from an improvident discharge of a large body of our gholundauze at a particular period. European gunners and artificers of all nations have served in the artillery of the Indian powers from the days of Aurungzebe up to the more recent epochs of our Mysore and Mahratta wars; and in the struggle of 1803, the previous introduction of French officers had even given a certain degree of scientific perfection to this part of the military art. Since that period the artillery of Native armies have perhaps been on the decline, from the difficulty of keeping up their imported foreign knowledge. But I desire to take this opportunity of incidentally recording my opinion, that it is not for our interest to discourage altogether that fashion for setting up establishments of artillery and regular infantry among the Native powers; an error which within the last 30 or 40 years has to a great degree superseded that species of force, and that description of warfare in which lies the real strength of our half civilized opponents. The evil is, therefore, after all, imaginary, even if it were admitted as incontrovertible, that to our gholundauze the Marhattas and Nepalese owed all their dexterity in the mechanical use of ordnance.

"Ever since the necessary introduction of Natives to assist European artillerymen in this climate, unfavourable to the continued and laborious exertions of the whites, the contact has existed in full force. Several companies of lascars have been invariably attached to a company of European artillery since the days of Lord Clive, as Sir John Horsford's memoir proves. They have paraded, exercised, fought together at the same gun; they have been cantoned at the same place, and in immediate vicinity to each other. From 1798 till 1806, one component third part of each company of artillery, or more, consisted of gholundauze. But there is not, nor ever was, any domestic contact, as it may be termed.

On another occasion the Supreme Government wrote as follows: "Knowing, as we well do, the anxiety of your Honourable Court at all times to have the fullest information before you on all points which are presented to your discussion, we request your indulgence while we very briefly enumerate the arguments in favour of an establishment of regular Native artillery, and respectfully refer you at the same time, to the article 'Gholundauze,' in Sir John Horsford's memoir, for a more ample elucidation of this interesting subject: we are not aware that these considerations and arguments have ever before been brought at one view under your notice.

"Gholundauze, like the infantry sepoy, are infinitely cheaper than Europeans; in fact, they cost the State only their pay and clothing, and may be raised in any number and at any time.

"In the eyes of the Natives it is a service *d'élite* compared with that of the infantry, and men of the highest caste, the greatest courage and bodily vigour, are always ready to enlist in this corps. The Gholundauze battalion of this establishment is not surpassed by any regiment in your service, and the devoted bravery and martial appearance of the Mahratta Gholundauze, during the war of 1803-4-5, will long be remembered in this army.

"In the routine of ordinary duty in these provinces, small parties of artillery are in perpetual requisition, for detachment duty in the hot season and rains with sepoy corps, and many similar detachments are stationed constantly with one or two guns, at frontier and outposts. All the European troops, except on occasions of indispensable necessity, are carefully kept in comfortable barracks at such seasons, because experience has shown that

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the climate is then fatal to their health, and the expense and difficulty of replacing them are so great. We confess that we are not aware of any sufficient reason why this system, at once humane and economical, should not prevail as well with artillery as with infantry; and it seems at least evident that any supposed superiority of courage in a detachment of European over Native artillery could be of no use where they act with Native infantry or cavalry only, inasmuch as the steadiness of the European could be of little avail, if the Native troops are supposed to fly: but experience has uniformly shown that the Gولundauze of the Marhatta armies stood to their guns to the last, and were there cut down, long after their infantry had left the field. Yet both these classes were of the same materials as our own Native soldiery, and the difference notoriously observed on the occasions above stated, arose from the Gولundauze being the flower of their armies, and from the romantic extent to which they pushed the point of honour of not abandoning their guns to the last extremity.

"In truth it may be observed, that as mere practical artillerymen, these men have nothing to learn from us, and that if it ever had been possible for us to have prevented the natives from learning the use of artillery, it is, at least in the present day, wholly out of the question. The practical part of the profession of an artilleryman has always been especially cultivated in the Native armies, their ordnance is cast with equal elegance and skill to our own; and all the Native states of the smallest note cast their cannon. The efficient state of Ameer Khan's train of horse artillery, as reported to the Commander-in-chief by an able officer of the Royal artillery, stands on our records. Such was the vigour and imitative skill of the Nepalese ordnance department, that during the short period of our hostility, they found time to fabricate carriages of patterns till then novel to ourselves, in a manner not to be distinguished, as it is said, from the produce of our old establishment at Cossipore. The resident at Catmandhoo was invited to witness there a practice (which he describes as having been very good) with mortars of their own casting. With such matters in proof before us, your Honourable Court will not be surprised at the conviction we solemnly express, that, in the mere practical part of the art there is little, if anything, left for the European artilleryman to communicate to the Native. It is in the higher branches of the profession, in the theoretic and scientific parts alone, that our superiority consists, and must ever continue to be found, so long as a mathematical and philosophical education continues unknown to and unappreciated by the inhabitants of these countries, and so long as the scientific inquiry and discoveries in the arts are confined to the European nations. But we appeal to your Honourable Court, whether every thing of this sort be not as much a dead letter to the ordinary European soldier as to the Rajpoot, and if this position be granted, we may be allowed to doubt of the superiority of the former over the latter, as an artilleryman, excepting in those qualities of bodily energy and vigour which are not communicable.

"If these notions be well founded, the only superiority which your artillery possesses, will be found to consist in the education and ability of your officers, and the sole defect of the Gولundauze establishment is this, that the frugality of your successive Governments has caused them hitherto to deny to the excellent materials of which that corps is formed, the advantage of a regular and adequate body of officers. Judging by the experience of more than 40 years, during which Gولundauze establishments have been constantly in a progression of successive enlistments and abolition, we feel inclined to express to your Honourable Court our firm conviction, that the nature and demands of this service will render it quite as impossible to dispense with this description of force in future, as it has proved to be heretofore; and we accordingly are most solicitous to call the attention of your Honourable Court to that which, under all the circumstances of the case, appears to us the most politic and desirable step in the present day, to modify the Gولundauze system by such a judicious admixture of European artillery, and above all of European officers, as shall insure to the united mass all the good of which either branch is susceptible, and shall leave no room for apprehended evils."

Sir T. H. Slope to  
Lord Hastings,  
23 December 1817.

It is unnecessary to adduce any additional evidence of the proficiency of the Native powers in the management of ordnance. but we have an instance in the battle of Mahedipore, where the fire of Holkar's artillery "was most destructive," and "the enemy served their guns till they were bayonneted."

2 With respect to the "injustice of depriving our allies of every vestige of military power."—This argument was urged by General Clavering in the year 1777, when Mr. Hastings appointed officers to the Vizier's troops. "The depriving a prince of his army, (said the General) is, in other words, dethroning him; his consent can never be voluntarily obtained for it, though he may be under such circumstances as to be obliged to say so."

In a despatch from the Court of Directors, it is observed, "It is no less desirable that our character for justice and moderation should be upheld, and that we should avoid every measure tending to excite jealousy and irritation in the Native states not subject to our rule. But when, in addition to the paramount establishment of a subsidiary force within the dominions of a foreign prince, we appoint European officers to command the troops which he raises and maintains, and which are employed principally in the performance of municipal duties, it is hardly possible that both prince and people should not take offence at our pretensions, and entertain suspicions of our designs."

"The strongest objections to the subsidiary system are founded on its tendency to paralyse the useful energies of the Native governments, to encourage them in misrule, to lower them in the estimation of their subjects, to degrade the national character, to subvert the independence, and eventually to lead to the subjugation of those states into which it is introduced; and in proportion as our interference in their internal affairs becomes more frequent and minute, will all those evils be aggravated and accelerated."

3. "As to the impolicy of displacing the Native sirdars, and of thereby exciting a feeling of hostility to our political influence."

This objection applies chiefly to the cavalry officers; and as the observations of the Supreme Government with relation to it have been already given in a former part of this paper (p. 262), it is not necessary to repeat them.

It is reasonable to suppose that the appointment of European officers to command the regular infantry battalions, must be regarded with jealousy by the military population of the state, since it precludes those who enter into that line of the service from acquiring a rank superior to that of a subaltern. It has been suggested not only that the Native ruler should be permitted, as in the case of the Peshwa, to select the officer to be placed at the head of the infantry establishment, but that it might be advisable to revive the rank of Native commandant, appointing one to each brigade: this was a rank formerly attainable in our own army, but which was abolished many years ago.

It would appear from Lord Hastings's Minute already quoted, that the regular infantry in the service of Sindia, from the general to the drill-serjeant, was wholly officered by Natives; and it may therefore be inferred, that the officers in the service of our allies might deem themselves entitled to aspire to the highest rank even in this line of the military profession.

4. It is objected "that British officers employed in the service of our allies are in a great measure placed beyond the control of their own Government; that they may therefore practise peculation with impunity; and that the high emoluments which they enjoy are calculated to render the officers serving with our own battalions dissatisfied with their condition."

Mr. Hastings himself, although the system introduced into the Vizier's army originated with him, appears eventually to have felt the force of this objection.

"I have observed (says he) some evils growing out of the system, which in my opinion more than counterbalanced its expected advantages, had they been realized in their fullest extent. The remote stations of these troops, placing the commanding officers beyond the notice and control of the Board, afforded too much opportunity and temptation for unwarrantable emoluments, and excited the contagion of peculation and rapacity throughout the whole army."

"The numbers, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions, and emoluments of the Company's servants, civil and military, in the Vizier's service, had become an intolerable burthen on the revenue and authority of his Excellency, and exposed us to the envy and resentment of the whole country, by excluding the Native servants and adherents of the Vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment."

The officers so employed are placed in a situation of difficulty; they owe indefeasible allegiance to the British Government, and they owe service to the prince from whom they receive pay. In case of a rupture between the British Government and the prince by whom they are employed, they must either abandon their allegiance or desert the power which pays them. It is not a satisfactory answer to this objection to say that the prince by whom they are employed knows that he must lose their services in the contingency alluded to, for, in point of fact, they receive their appointment not from his government but from ours.

5 The last objection which has been stated is, "that in the event of mutiny in our own armies, the Native (and even the European officers, if they should be implicated) might find in the regular corps of our allies a corresponding spirit, which might serve to aggravate and spread the evil."

Amongst the various subjects involved in this discussion, we must not entirely overlook the difficulties which have occasionally occurred from the temper and disposition of the European officers in the Company's service. Removed at an early period of life from their native country, their attachment to their homes, their families and connexions, these attachments are unavoidably weakened, and they are consequently more liable to the operation of feelings of discontent and dissatisfaction than persons otherwise instructed.

On the 8th August 1814, the resident at Hyderabad having applied for certain European and Native non-commissioned officers and privates to assist in drilling the Russell brigade, Sir Thomas Munlop recorded his reasons for objecting to the measure, in the following terms:—

"Because the nature of that duty renders the individuals employed upon it liable to contract habits and to imbibe hopes of advancement, which tend to make them unsettled and disaffected in their subsequent progress through our own service, when they find that such hopes are not realized.

"Because the intimacies which they naturally form with Natives in the Nizam's service too often lead to the forming and disseminating of prejudices and opinions hostile to the interests of the Honourable Company, and expose their allegiance to be corrupted by the intrigues of designing persons, of whom there cannot be a doubt that many exist at the court and in the city of Hyderabad.

"Returning to their regular duties, these men may become the means of traitorous communication between the Nizam's subjects and the soldiers of the Company. Their fidelity has been shaken, and a fitter medium than them for the machinations of treason cannot well be imagined.

"These arguments are founded as much on actual experience as on principles of political precaution; for it is well understood that, on a former occasion (in 1806), when the

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fidelity of our Native troops at Hyderabad was, and with good reason, questioned, many of the individuals whose tour of duty led them to the interior of the city, were found to be the principal instigators of disaffection.

"The Commander-in-chief has not at present the remotest suspicion of the attachment of our Native army, on the contrary, he feels an implicit reliance upon it; but his Excellency cannot, even with this impression, divest himself of the idea, that it is our imperative duty to guard the troops from temptation, by keeping them as much as possible from being placed in the way of listening to opinions and of imbibing sentiments, the encouragement of which may by possibility lead to the most disastrous results.

"The mere act of training the troops of the Native powers to the European discipline does not constitute one of the Commander-in-chief's objections to the measure under consideration, it has indeed been virtually recognized as innocuous by superior authority, and his Excellency is of opinion, that although it may render our allies useful and our enemies presumptuous, it will have no farther pernicious effect than in the collateral operation of corrupting the instruments of their instruction."

Lord Hastings, in a letter to the Governor of Fort St. George, dated 28th February 1815, observed that Sir Thomas Hislop's objection was founded upon the mistaken supposition, that our sepoy employed in drilling and disciplining the Nizam's troops were in the habit of frequent and uncontrolled intercourse with the subjects and soldiers of his Highness, but that, in fact, no such extended intercourse does exist; the intercourse between our sepoy and the natives in the service of the Nizam being extremely limited, and wholly confined to the soldiers composing the regular brigade of his Highness.

"These corps (observes his Lordship) form a body entirely distinct in every particular from the troops forming the remainder of the Nizam's army. They are three in number, and are placed under the command of officers of experience and respectability. Two brigades are stationed in Berar, and have reached such an advanced state of discipline as not to require the assistance of men from our army. The only brigade which does require that assistance is the Russell brigade, stationed in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. Since the original formation of this corps great pains have been taken to place it on such a footing as to obviate, as far as possible, the objections which have been occasionally urged against the policy of encouraging any improvement in the military establishments of our Native allies. It is placed under the command of Lieutenant Hare, of the Bombay army, an officer lately appointed by myself to that situation. The officers who act under him are represented to be gentlemen of unquestionable character and fidelity. The men are chiefly recruited from the British territories, and are not in any instance received from the other corps in the Nizam's service. The brigade is cantoned on the opposite side of the residency from the city. It furnishes no guards, nor, unless when on actual service, does any duty whatever out of its own line. It is paid every month from the resident's treasury by an order on the Peshcar. It is armed, dressed, disciplined, and equipped in every respect like one of our own corps. The men composing it have no more intercourse with the natives of Hyderabad, or with any of the Nizam's subjects, than the sepoy of our own army have; and adverting to the authority by which their officers are nominated, and the source from which they immediately receive their pay, two circumstances which have more influence than any other over the mind of a native soldier, they certainly may be supposed to consider themselves as being more the troops of the Honourable Company than of the Nizam. Both their pride and their interest bind them to us, and far from exciting disaffection in the minds of our sepoy who are employed in drilling them, there can be no suspicion of their ever feeling it themselves.

"With respect to the hopes of advancement, which Sir Thomas Hislop is of opinion may be entertained by the men of our army employed upon this duty, and which may tend to make them unsettled and dissatisfied in their subsequent progress through our own service when they find that such hopes are not realized, I have to observe, that whenever a party of our sepoy return to their own corps from the duty in question, they uniformly receive a present in money from the officer commanding the Nizam's brigade, and that the party by whom they are relieved will scarcely expect a reward different from that which they know to have been given to those who have preceded them."

4 *Of Interference having for its object the Reformation of the Civil and Military Administration of our Allies.*

*Oude.*

In a preceding page it has been stated, that some of the subsidiary treaties contain a stipulation empowering the British Government, in certain cases, to interfere in the internal administration of allied states.

By the treaty concluded in the year 1798, with Saadut Ali, the subsidy was increased from 55,50,000 rupees, to 76,00,000 rupees per annum, in consequence of the necessity which had then arisen of augmenting the number of British troops stationed in Oude. On this occasion Lord Teignmouth introduced into the treaty an article, which stipulated that the Vizier should, in concert with the British Government, retrench the superfluous charges of his public establishments. At this period of time the Vizier's military establishments are said to have consisted, in the whole, of 10,800 horse, 55 battalions of infantry, a considerable body of artillerymen, and 10,000 peons, or armed attendants: the maintenance of this force cost nearly 70 lacs of rupees per annum, which the collectors or amils deducted from the revenues paid to government; but of this large sum a part only was received by the troops, who were constantly kept in arrears. This circumstance produced and fostered that spirit

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spirit of mutiny and passion for plunder which rendered them more formidable to the inhabitants than to a foreign enemy. The amils, in order to appease that spirit of mutiny, annually granted to the troops assignments on those districts in which the land-rents were with the greatest difficulty collected; namely, those held by powerful zemindars, who, being disaffected to the Government, both from the oppressive exactions to which they had been subjected, and from their own turbulent and rebellious disposition, had not for many years paid any rent beyond the amount which could be levied by military force. To enable them to resist the revenue collectors, as well as to coerce their own peasantry, and to commit depredations on their weaker neighbours, these zemindars retained in their service from 10,000 to 20,000 men each, and had erected small forts, many of which were of sufficient strength to withstand for several weeks a siege of the Vizier's troops, and sometimes to set their utmost efforts at complete defiance.

With reference to this state of things, the Government at home, in a letter dated 15th May 1799, observed, "The large, useless, and expensive military establishment within the Oude dominions, appears to us to be one of the principal objects of economical reform, and we have much satisfaction in finding that the subject has already come under your consideration."

The evil, however, remained uncorrected, at the period when Lord Wellesley opened with Saadut Ali the negotiation which terminated in the treaty of November 1801.

Writing to the resident at Lucnow, on the 23rd of December 1798, Lord Wellesley thus expressed himself: "The state of the Vizier's own troops is a most pressing evil. To you I need not enlarge on their inefficiency and insubordination. My intention is, to persuade his Excellency, at a proper season, to disband the whole of his own army, with the exception of such part of it as may be necessary for the purpose of state, or of collection of revenue. In the place of the armed rabble, which now alarms the Vizier and invites his enemies, I propose to substitute an increased number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry."

The additional force destined for the Vizier's service was—

- 4 Regiments of Native Cavalry
- 6 Regiments (12 battalions) of Native Infantry
- 1 Battalion of artillery

Of which the first division entered the Oude territories on the 15th of January 1800.

Before the end of February 1800, orders were issued by the Vizier for commencing the discharge of his own battalions, a measure which, by extreme good management, was, to a great extent, carried into effect without bloodshed or much commotion.

In a letter to the resident, dated the 22d January 1801, Lord Wellesley says, "The Vizier is already apprized that I have long lamented the various defects of the system by which the affairs of his Excellency's government are administered. Conscious of the same defects, his Excellency has repeatedly expressed a wish to correct them by the assistance of the British Government. The continuance of the present system will exhaust the country to such a degree, as to preclude the possibility of realizing the subsidy. In place of inveterate and growing abuses, must be substituted a wise and benevolent plan of government, calculated to inspire the people with confidence in the security of property and of life, to encourage industry, and to establish order and submission to the just authority of the state, on the solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received, and expectation of continued security. Having maturely considered these circumstances with the attention and deliberation which the importance of the subject requires, I am satisfied that no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province of Oude, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country shall be transferred to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of his Excellency and of his family. No other remedy can effect any considerable improvement in the resources of the state, or can ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace."

More than 30 years have elapsed since this opinion was delivered, during which time the evils of misrule have subsisted in Oude; and there is now but too much reason to fear, that the remedy projected by Lord Wellesley must be resorted to. On further reflection, his Lordship was restrained by the force of circumstances to adopt an arrangement which appeared to be calculated to mitigate, if not to remove the evils of which he complained, and at all events to contract the limits within which those evils operated.

By the treaty of 1801, the security of the subsidy was provided for by the cession of about one half of the Vizier's territories. The exercise of the authority of the British Government over the remainder of his country was provided for in the following terms: "And the Honourable the East India Company hereby guaranty to his Excellency the Vizier, and to his heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain to his Excellency after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of his and their authority within the said dominions. His Excellency engages that he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and his Excellency will always advise with, and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company."

The frequency with which the Vizier's government required the aid of our troops in coercing refractory zemindars and demolishing their forts, at length induced the Governor-general, Lord Minto, to call upon Saadut Ali to correct those vices in the system of his administration, to which the rebellious conduct of his subjects was attributable. Captain (now Lieutenant-colonel) Baillie was instructed, in a letter dated 23th December 1810, to

bring under his Excellency's notice the stipulation above recited. Lord Minto at the same time addressed a letter to Saadut Ali, suggesting the outline of a plan of reform. This proposal having been disregarded, the resident declared, that "the future assistance or support of a single soldier of the British army, to the (then) present baneful system of assessment and collection, or to any of its instruments in the persons of his Excellency's amils, was totally out of the question, and that under all these circumstances, it behoved his Excellency to consider under what so beneficial arrangement as the plan suggested by the British Government, the resources of his country would be realized, and the internal tranquillity of his dominions secured against the probable insurrection of the landholders, the effect of oppression and despair."

In his despatch reporting his proceedings, the resident says: "A firm and decided refusal of the future assistance of our troops to support the proceedings of the amils, or to coerce the defaulting zemindars, must of necessity have the desired effect in a very limited time; and a declaration of this resolution on the part of the Government, in a direct address to the Vizier, would, I humbly conceive, be of use in accelerating the accomplishment of the object."

The Vice-president in Council (Lord Minto being then absent) was of opinion that the course recommended by the resident would bring into immediate question the continuance or dissolution of the relations established by treaty; an extremity which it was desirable to avoid. He was, therefore, directed to suspend the negotiation; but to intimate to his Excellency, that the British Government was much disappointed at his opposition to the salutary measures which had been recommended to his adoption.

The progress and unsuccessful result of the negotiation was reported to the Court of Directors, in a letter dated the 15th October 1811\*, of which the following are the concluding paragraphs.

"Where the lands are let in farm, they are leased on exorbitant terms. The farmer, with a view both to fulfil his engagements and to secure a profit to himself during the limited period of his tenure, naturally exercises rigour and oppression within the limits of his authority. When the lands are held aushanee (which is the case with at least a moiety of the Vizier's dominions), that is, placed under the charge of an officer of the government appointed to collect the revenue, that officer is rendered responsible for the realization of the imposed jumma, and the excess of the assessment is generally such as cannot be levied without extortion, violence and injustice. When a compliance with such demands is refused, the farmer, amil or officer, represents the zemindar to be a defaulter and rebel, and urges the necessity of employing troops for his coercion. Thus the Vizier employs the British troops as the instrument of those wide-extended exactions, while their presence, and the knowledge of the obligations imposed on the British Government to suppress disorders within his Excellency's country, precludes that natural remedy which overstrained and unprotected oppression carries within itself.

"Disappointed in our endeavours to relieve the British Government from the necessity of supporting the activity of a system of rapacity and injustice, without assuming a degree of interference in the internal concerns of the Vizier's dominions, which would amount to the absolute control of his Excellency's authority, no alternative seems left but the establishment of and exercise of that right of investigation and arbitration which is described in our last instructions to the resident. This course of proceeding, however, supposing it to be unobstructed by the perverted interests and artifices of the Vizier, can only be expected to remedy the evils complained of in a very partial degree. The abuses of a system radically vicious must continue to exist, and, under the most favourable operation of the proposed arrangement, we can only hope in some cases to be the means of preventing specific acts of injustice, and to avoid the pain and discredit of enforcing exactions by the British arms."

The Government at home (18th February 1814) deeply regretted that the negotiation so ably and zealously conducted by Colonel Baillie had failed of success. They were of opinion, that the refusal of the Vizier to accede to a specific plan of reform could not be deemed such a violation of the treaty as to warrant the British Government in refusing the aid of its troops to suppress insurrections: but at the same time, they fully recognized the right of arbitration in all cases when the troops were required to enforce the demands of the Vizier's officers.

A pointed remonstrance from Lord Minto, dated 8th May 1812, drew from Saadut Ali a reluctant acknowledgment of the necessity of reform. but he evaded the adoption of the plan proposed by his Lordship, whose final address to Saadut Ali, dated 2d July 1813, warned him not to expect that the British Government, by whatever hands it might be administered, would shrink from the performance of its duty, however painful it might be to discharge it. The Vizier's reply expressed acquiescence in the Governor-general's propositions, but in a tone of sullen reluctance and discontent, that left no hope of his cordial adoption of the measures of reform to which he had given his consent.

When the Vizier's letter reached Calcutta, the Marquis of Hastings (then Earl of Moira) had assumed the combined offices of Governor-general and Commander-in-chief. Conceiving that the feelings of Saadut Ali had been irritated by the tone in which the reform and many points of minor importance had been pressed upon his attention, Lord Hastings instructed Colonel Baillie to confine his negotiations to the main question. His Lordship, in a letter dated 7th January 1814, assured the Vizier that it was his anxious desire, and that of his colleagues, to uphold his Excellency's dignity, but that his interests and ours were so inseparably interwoven, that it would be criminal in us did we not offer him our best advice in any conjuncture which we might think pregnant with evil; that on this ground

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ground we had urged him to adopt arrangements of reform, as the only mode of avoiding a convulsion not to be quelled but by applications of our force that would be discreditable to us, and which we consequently could not make for his support; that it was dishonourable to the British arms to be employed in enforcing acts of injustice. Lord Hastings therefore entreated the Vizier to co-operate with him in manly confidence to maintain the united interests of the two governments firm and unshaken, promising that it should be his study to forbear, as far as his duty would permit, from agitating any minor questions which might be unpalatable to his Excellency. His Lordship, in conclusion, informed the Vizier, that Colonel (then Major) Baillie had his entire confidence, and entreated him to attend to the communications of that officer.

This temperate appeal elicited from Saadut Ali a profusion of complimentary expressions and assurances of attachment to the British Government, but the Vizier carefully avoided any promise of adopting the arrangements which had been so often recommended to him.

Under these untoward circumstances, Lord Hastings ceased to press upon the Vizier any specific plan, but called upon him to propose a plan to his own. In a letter to the Secret Committee, dated 3rd March 1814, Lord Hastings says, "I have succeeded in bringing the Nabob Vizier into perfect good temper, and he now cheerfully engages to do all which has long been matter of fretful contest between the two Governments. I do not speak of this as a light advantage. We are now on such terms, that I could, with confidence of success, apply to him for a loan to the Company in case of sudden emergency, a step from which shame would have debarred me had our bickering continued. It is an eventual resource of no common importance, when you consider that from no other quarter was such aid attainable. Add to this, that the sneers of war which the Vizier might have withheld from us, would have been secretly furnished to those whom he might have regarded as wreaking a vengeance in which he had his share."

On the night of the 11th July 1814, Saadut Ali, who had for some weeks complained of ill-health, was suddenly taken ill, and expired before medical assistance could be brought. By the prompt and judicious measures of Colonel Baillie, Ghuzee-oo-Dien Khan, the eldest son of the deceased, was placed upon the musnud, without the smallest interruption of the public tranquillity; and the supposed design of Shums-oo-Dowlah, the late Vizier's second son, to possess himself of the vacant throne, under the assumed nomination of his father, was frustrated. Ghuzee-oo-Dien took the name or title of Refaat-oo-Dowlah.

The early acts of the new Vizier's government afforded the farthest promise that all pending questions with the state of Oude would be satisfactorily arranged. He agreed to advance a crore and eight lacs of rupees on loan to the British Government. There was at that time (October 1814) a near prospect of a war with Nepal, and in the course of that contest a further loan of a crore was obtained from his Excellency.

He inherited from his father treasure amounting to 14 crores of rupees, and on the death of the Bhow-Begum, the widow of Sujah-ad-Dowlah, which took place in December 1815, Ghuzee-oo-Dien Khan obtained a further accession of property, valued at more than a million sterling, besides jaghires, which, under her ill-regulated management, had yielded a net revenue of eight lacs of rupees, about 100,000*l.* per annum.

In the year 1819, Refaat-oo-Dowlah, with the entire approbation of Lord Hastings, cast off his nominal dependence on the court of Delhi, by substituting for the title of Vizier, the style and title of King of Oude.

Some propositions submitted by Refaat-oo-Dowlah, in the year 1815, including, among other subjects, that of reform, drew from Lord Hastings a paper of observations on the nature and extent of the authority which the Vizier was entitled by treaty to exercise within his dominions. His Lordship conceived, that the most liberal and comprehensive meaning should be given to such articles as were in favour of that party whose weakness presented no security for him but on that good faith on which he had relied; that the reservation by treaty of a right to interfere with advice or remonstrance upon any management of affairs within his reserved dominions, which might injuriously affect British interests, clearly implied, that in all other respects his administration was to be free; and that in all public observance he should be treated as an independent prince. "Essentially (says his Lordship), he must be subservient to the British Government; but in proportion as that point is secure, personal attentions to him involve no inconvenience, and, on the other hand, they cannot but be productive of advantage. In all intercourse the resident should consider himself as the ambassador from the British Government to an acknowledged sovereign. A respectful urbanity, and a strict fulfilment of established ceremonials should thence be preserved by the resident towards his Excellency. The latter must be conscious of the power of the resident to exercise influence over him: so that any parade of that influence, in the eyes of others, must be no less useless than revolting."

Lord Hastings was of opinion that nothing short of the discovery that the Vizier had leagued himself with our enemies, could justify the substitution of our Government for his.

Refaat-oo-Dowlah signified to Colonel Baillie his perfect acquiescence in the plan of reform recommended by the British Government, and instructed his ministers to proceed in the execution of that work, in concert with the resident. An unfortunate change, however, in the Vizier's disposition and counsels, put an end to the progress of the reform.

In the year 1816, circumstances arose which deprived the Supreme Government of the able services of Colonel Baillie at the Court of Lucknow, to whose lot had fallen the painful and unthankful task of remonstrating for years against acts of oppression and injustice, the enforcement of which by our troops was abhorrent to his sense of honour, as well as to his conception of what was due to the reputation of the British Government. He was



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succeeded by Mr. Richard Strachey, who, after retaining the office about a twelvemonth, was replaced by Mr. Monckton.

The despatches from Lucnow abounded in representations of the disorders prevalent in Oude, and of the constant applications which were made for the assistance of our troops to coerce refractory zemindars. Nor was this the whole extent of the evil; the laxity of the police in the Oude country afforded a safe shelter to organized bands of robbers, who issuing from their secret haunts, intercepted our treasure convoys, and carried off their plunder with impunity. Such was the unaccommodating temper of the King, that he started all manner of difficulties in opposition to the request of the British Government for permission to cross his border in pursuit of these bold depredators.

A boat coming from Calcutta with treasure was plundered at a place called Mukrah, near Monghyr, and about 12,000*l.* carried clear off. It had been ascertained, that a person named Miharban-Sing, the son of one of the King of Oude's subjects, planned and executed this robbery. He had stationed himself in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, and having watched the departure of the treasure, never lost sight of it until it reached the place where the robbery was committed. The magistrate ascertained and pointed out the places where the plunder had been deposited, and named the village in the neighbourhood of which Miharban Sing, with a gang of about 200 matchlock-men, resided. A party of the subsidiary force proceeded to the place, but was obliged to retire without effecting the seizure of any of the gang, or recovering any part of the plundered property. Miharban Sing had himself proceeded on a new plundering expedition, in the character of a Rajah performing a journey, and escorted by his men in the uniform of the Company's sepoy. Captain Anquetil, who commanded the party above mentioned, stated that the robbers knew of the march of his detachment, and watched its motions, even from the moment it quitted cantonments. He added, "I am credibly informed that the robbers never retain any part of their plunder in or near their residence; but that Miharban distributes it by portions among the surrounding zemindars, who return it on application. If he chances to be in want, he is sure of receiving sums of considerable amount, promising (which he faithfully performs) to reimburse them with double the amount of their loan, on the return of himself and party from their plundering excursions. His emissaries extend to Calcutta, Benares, Poonah, Agra, Delhi and Lahore, and it is generally from the vicinity of these remote cities that he returns with large booty. Travelling (as already observed) with all the etiquette of a Rajah, escorted by sepoy, the plunder is carried off not only with safety, but without the risk of incurring suspicion." He played the trick, however, once too often: he and his party were discovered and apprehended.

From a return of serious decoities (or gang robberies) committed in the Western Provinces by gangs from Oude, from 1815 to 1820, it appears that 40 individuals had been killed, and 174 wounded by robbers, and that property to the value of 1,14,835 rupees had been carried off.

For several successive seasons large detachments of the subsidiary troops were constantly in the field, and employed in quelling insurrections and capturing forts. From the tenor of the correspondence of the acting resident, Major Raper, and the officers commanding detachments, no doubt appeared to have suggested itself as to the justice and equity of the several demands which they had been required to enforce, except in the instance of Captain Andree, who pointed out some apparently gross instances of oppression, and expressed in very free terms the disgust which he felt in being engaged in such a service.

On the receipt of a letter from Major Raper, dated 5th January 1823, pointing out the necessity of again putting our troops in motion to support the authority of the aumils, Mr. Adam, who in the interval between Lord Hastings's departure and the arrival of Lord Amherst, exercised the functions of Governor-general, proceeded to frame instructions to Mr. Ricketts, who had then been appointed to the office of resident at Lucnow. After recapitulating former transactions, it was observed, that on no occasion had the entire reliance of the aumils on the British troops for the realization of their revenues, and the length to which armed interference was carried in the ordinary business of the country been more pointedly evinced, than in the acting resident's above-mentioned despatch. To explain the particular directions which were given to Mr. Ricketts for the guidance of his conduct would involve too much detail. The following extracts must suffice. "Adverting to the total extinction of all confidence, and to the highly refractory and contumacious spirit fostered in the numerous large talookdars of Oude, during a long series of years, by the vices and mismanagement of the government, we confessed our apprehension, that even the equitable object of a settlement adjusted on fair and moderate principles, for a term of years, might not, in the first instance, be effectible by his Majesty's officers, without direct and active interference on the part of the resident and officers appointed to aid him in that duty. We directed the resident, therefore, in the conferences which he would hold with the King on the important subject of our instructions, to sound his Majesty on the latter point, whilst distinctly and unreservedly urging upon him, under our orders, the absolute necessity of his undertaking to effect some such settlement as that above recommended, at least through the medium of his own officers. The objections to be anticipated were, that his dignity, authority, and consequence, would be lessened in the eyes of his subjects and of others, by any co-operation of the resident. In reply, we observed, it might fairly be asked, which state of things was the least likely to injure the credit of his Majesty's government, and to affect his personal consequence in the eyes of his subjects and of foreign states; viz., the continuance of the existing anarchy, and contempt of and resistance to authority, which can be kept down only by the constant employment of the troops of his ally,

ally, who, acting under the general orders of the resident, of necessity exercise the right of judging between his Majesty's officers and his people, in questions relating purely to the ordinary business of the country; or, his consenting to avail himself of the aid of that ally, for the more noble and benign purpose of restoring confidence to his subjects, of laying the foundation of their future prosperity, and of striking at the root of the perpetual interference now exercised in his affairs, in the shape of military coercion, by the formation of a just and moderate settlement? We begged, further, that the resident would earnestly assure his Majesty, that he could not more anxiously desire the maintenance of his just authority throughout his dominions than the British Government did, and principally for this reason; that neither could they be well governed, nor could the necessity for the frequent employment of the British troops be removed, until such should be the case.

"Referring to what formerly passed, when the question of reform was agitated at the court of Lucknow, we remarked, that it might be advisable to explain distinctly, that the British Government, far from wishing to force upon his Majesty a system closely analogous to that established in its adjoining provinces, desired only that he should revert to the usages and institutions of his own country in better times, and that should his Majesty, therefore, be pleased to tender from himself a well-digested plan of reformed administration, founded on a careful and advised reference to those points, it would be welcomed with much satisfaction by us, as likely to prove both more effectual, and more popular, than any system which we could devise."

The negotiation, which was conducted by Mr. Ricketts in conformity to the tenor of the foregoing instructions, failed in its main object, and left uncorrected those deep-rooted evils whose removal appears to be nearly hopeless, unless the British Government should resort to the extreme measure of assuming the direct management of the King's affairs. The actual state of those affairs, according to the latest advices, will appear on reference to a minute of Lord William Bentinck's, which forms a number of the Appendix.

*Mysore.*

The right of the British Government to interfere, in certain cases, in the internal government of the state of Mysore, is founded on the 4th and 5th Articles of the subsidiary treaty of 8th July 1799\*.

During the minority of the Rajah, Purneah, fulfilling the office of regent, exercised not only a supervision, but a searching control over the conduct of each department, and all orders emanated from him. At the age of 17 (1800), the Rajah assumed the reins of government, under the tutelage of the resident, and a council of three members was appointed, which relieved the prince from the details of management, but left to him the general supervision of his own concerns. He succeeded to a well-organized government, filled with men of ability and character; and to a treasury containing 75 lacs of *Canton* pagodas, or about 2,500,000*l.*, a sum nearly equal to the net income of three years' revenue. The novelty of his situation, the freedom from restraint, the exercise of an authority

\* Art. 4. And whereas it is indispensably necessary, that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the 3rd Article of the present treaty: it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-general in Council of Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-general in Council shall be at liberty and shall have full power and right either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Krishna, Rajah Oodavver Behauder, as shall appear to him, the said Governor-general in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available, either in time of peace or war.

Art. 5. And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor-general in Council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah Mysore Krishna, Rajah Oodavver Behauder, that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the 4th Article, his said Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Krishna, Rajah Oodavver Behauder, shall immediately issue orders to his aumils or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances according to the tenor of the 4th Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the English Company Behauder; and in case his Highness shall not issue such orders within 10 days from the time when the application shall have been formerly made to him, then the said Governor-general in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient, for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country, and the welfare of the people. Provided always, that whenever and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the said East India Company, the Governor-general in Council shall render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed: provided also, that in no case whatever shall his Highness's actual receipt or annual income arising out of his territorial revenue, be less than the sum of one lac of star pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him by the 5th Article of the treaty of Mysore; which sum of one lac of star pagodas, together with the amount of one fifth of the said net revenue, the East India Company engages at all times, and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

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authority to which he had been unaccustomed, had charms for the Rajah at first, and it is said, that before he had attained the age of 21, he gave promise, from his attention to public affairs, and the ability he displayed in conducting business, together with the urbanity of his manners, of becoming a blessing to the country. At that age, however, his mind became sated with the possession of power, the proper exercise of which he regarded as irksome, in proportion as it encroached on his time, and interfered with those pleasures to which he was addicted. He gradually relinquished his authority, and giving himself up wholly to his passions, lavished his vast treasures upon his favourites. Purneah did not long survive the privation of the power which belonged to his former station of regent, and on the death of that distinguished Native statesman, there remained no one to whom the Rajah was disposed to confide the charge of his government. Since that time, the ministers of the day, under the title of dewan, attempted to perform the task which the regent Purneah imposed on himself, of a personal supervision of every department; but each had successively failed; and the influence exercised by the private associates of the prince and the followers of his court, left the minister to shape his course between his duty or his interest on the one hand, and the conciliation of his sovereign and the courtiers on the other.

As long as the treasures accumulated by Purneah lasted, the people only suffered from the neglect of the public officers, since a supply still remained to purchase the gratification of the sensual appetites of the Rajah, and to allay the cupidity of his favourites.

When at length the treasures were exhausted, the courtiers were suffered to sell all the offices of government, from that of foudjar, which brought the price of 10,000 rupees, to that of sheikdar, at 100 rupees. The repetition of these sales, and the frequent removal of these officers, which became the fertile source of wealth to the courtiers, induced others to withhold payment for a lengthened period, so that the prices, instead of being paid at once, were discharged by instalments, and were eventually rented at a fixed sum annually, made payable to the patrons of each. Thus every incumbent was suffered to hold his office till some one else made a more advantageous offer, and then the renter was expelled, on the plea of complaints against his administration, of which it was not difficult to produce many whenever it suited the convenience of the courtiers to bring them forward.

The court of justice established by Purneah was early changed for another system, approaching in form that of our provincial courts many years ago, before the introduction of the modern project of grafting on it the practice of the best native governments. This innovation failed, and for many years there was scarcely a shadow of justice throughout the land.

Purneah's court resembled very closely that of the Hindoo Sabbah, in which the king sat either in person or by delegate. It accompanied him whenever he went on his tours throughout his dominions, and was ever at hand for the administration of justice under the king's eye. In ancient times, as a civil court, it was merely a court of appeal from other courts, or else tried causes of very great amount or interest. In the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, it was the court into which alone capital crimes could be brought for trial.

In the time of Purneah the country was divided into departments, of which there were four, each under charge of a subedar, a title which has been changed to that of foudjar, and comprised from 20 to 30 districts or talooks, at the head of each of which was an amil. A talook contains several villages, and at the head of each village was a gowr or chief.

The gowr, the amil and the subedar, were within their respective spheres competent to seize and confine offenders, as well as to try and order the trial of civil suits. These courts were in use at an early period of Purneah's administration, and the judicial system owed much of its success to the continued exertions of an extraordinarily vigorous mind, supported by the exercise of absolute power.\*

The effects which might have been anticipated as likely to result from the laxity of the Rajah's supervision, and from the venality of the instruments employed in the administration of his government, were brought to light in the year 1830, by the resident's communications to the Governor in Council at Fort St. George. Insurrections of an extensive and serious nature had broken out in various parts of Mysore: for their suppression, the Rajah's troops having been found to be inadequate, the aid of the subsidiary force became requisite. The government of Fort St. George appear to have been for a considerable period ill-informed of the state of affairs in Mysore, and to have been surprised at the arrival of a crisis, which it is evident must end in the temporary supersession of the Rajah's authority.

#### Travancore.

The right of the British Government to introduce regulations and ordinances for the internal management and collection of the revenues of Travancore is founded upon the 5th and 6th Articles of the treaty of 1805†. The circumstances which led to the conclusion of that treaty have been explained in a preceding part of this memoir.

About

\* The foregoing particulars are derived from an historical statement by Col. Briggs.

† Art. 5. Whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military

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About the close of the year 1808 the state of Travancore committed itself in hostilities with the British Government, under the pretext of its inability to endure the burthen of its pecuniary obligations. The Rajah himself was by no means well-affected to the alliance; but his authority had been nearly superseded by the dewan, a man of a profligate and ambitious character, who attempted to destroy the lives of the resident, Colonel Macaulay, and of the officers of the subsidiary force; a design which was providentially frustrated. In the war which ensued, the Rajah of Cochin took part with Travancore. A few months of vigorous exertion effected the entire reduction of the enemy's power, and re-established the authority of the British Government on a secure basis.

In the month of October 1810, Colonel John Munro entered upon the duties of resident at Travancore and Cochin. The expence incurred by our military operations, amounting to 15,99,000 rupees, was charged to the Rajahs who had provoked the war. Travancore was required to pay two-thirds (10,66,000 rupees), and Cochin one-third (5,33,000 rupees) of that sum.

Colonel Munro found the country of Travancore in a state of the utmost anarchy and confusion. No progress had been made, nor any disposition manifested to secure by a system of economy and retrenchment the means of retrieving the Rajah's affairs. The dewan, grossly ignorant of the resources of the country, could suggest no plan of finance or improvement to meet the demands of the British Government. On the death of the Rajah, which occurred on the 7th of November 1810, the Rannce, conformably to the usages of the country, was placed on the throne. There was no person in the country qualified to undertake the management of affairs: and, under these circumstances, the alternative presented to the British Government was either to assume the entire administration of affairs, or to permit the resident, as a temporary arrangement, to hold the office of dewan to the Rannce.

With reference to the events which had taken place in the year 1809, Lord Minto recorded a minute dated November 20th, containing his opinion as to the course of policy which it was expedient to adopt in this particular case, from which minute the following are extracts:—

"We are at this moment entitled to exercise provisional rights described in the 5th Article of the treaty: that is to say, 'author to introduce such regulations and ordinances as the Governor-general in Council shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Travancore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the Company, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness the Maha Rajao, Ram Rajah, as shall appear to him, the said Governor-general in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available either in time of peace or war,' and, as it is explained in the succeeding article, to place 'the territories acquired, under the exclusive authority and control of the Company,' in other words, to assume the entire administration of the territory so to be assigned.

"It only remains, therefore, to consider, whether it is expedient at once to exercise either of the rights above described, or to adopt some intermediate and experimental measure, which may appear calculated to obtain the payment of our just demands upon the government of Travancore.

"After

20 Nov 1809.

military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the preceding article of the present treaty: it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-general in Council at Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-general in Council shall be at liberty and shall have full power and right either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Travancore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness the Maha Rajah, Ram Rajah Behauder, as shall appear to him, the said Governor-general in Council, necessary to render the said funds sufficient and available either in time of peace or war.

Art. 6. And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor-general in Council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah, Ram Rajah Behauder, that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the 5th Article, his said Highness Maha Rajah, Ram Rajah Behauder, shall immediately issue orders to his amils or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, according to the tenor of the 5th Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the English Company Behauder, and in case his Highness shall not issue orders within 10 days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor-general in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge expedient, for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country and welfare of the people. Provided always, that whenever and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the East India Company, the Governor-general in Council shall render to his Excellency a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed, provided also, that in no case whatever his Highness's actual receipt or annual income arising out of his territorial revenues be less than the sum of two lacs of rupees, together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of his territories, which sum of two lacs of rupees, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said revenues, the East India Company engages, at all times and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

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"After much reflection, I am decidedly of opinion that it is, on various accounts, unavoidable to assume the immediate management of the country.

"If that measure were founded exclusively on those stipulations in the treaty which relate to the realization of the Company's pecuniary demands, the Rajah would have some ground for requiring that we should renounce the administration as soon as the arrears are liquidated; and unless the retention of the authority assumed should appear to be clearly necessary for securing the future payment of the subsidy, it might be difficult to resist that claim. I consider a temporary occupation of the government as subject to many objections, the principal of which may be deemed the necessity of delivering back the people of Travancore to the oppressions of the Native system of government, after they should have experienced the security and benefit of a British administration, and of abandoning all those who should have served us with fidelity during the period of our authority, to the resentment of the Rajah and the private enmity of individuals, whose pride or interest might have suffered by a just exercise of power. I am, therefore, disinclined to take the direct administration of the country into our hands, except under circumstances which would justify and require the permanent and final establishment of our authority in Travancore.

"I am sensible, that notwithstanding these objections, the measure may become indispensable, as the only practicable means of recovering the arrears of our demand; but the objections appear to me of sufficient weight to require that, before the step is taken, every effort should be made to accomplish in some other way the legitimate objects of this government.

"I feel, at the same time, a strong repugnance, upon grounds more general than those already stated, to assume the government of Travancore, either as a temporary or a permanent measure. So radical a change in the nature of our relation to that country, and so total a revolution in its own political state and constitution, must be deemed by that people, and by every other Native government, equivalent to a conquest, as it would in truth be. It would be classed amongst those events which have created and still justify the jealousy so prevalent in Asia of the views with which we form our alliances, and would especially be regarded as a new example of the consequences to be apprehended from a subsidiary engagement with the British Government.

"It is not necessary to contend that those considerations are so conclusive as to forbid the adoption of the measure in question in every possible conjuncture; it may, indeed, be admitted, that an absolute necessity may arise to supersede, both for the security of our own empire and for the protection and happiness of the people, a treacherous, oppressive, and vicious government, by substituting the direct sovereignty of the Company in the room of that influence and control, generally more offensive than efficient, which we exercise over our dependant allies. Such, indeed, may be esteemed, if we consult either principle or experience, the natural and inherent tendency of our subsidiary connections in India."

With the entire approbation of his own government, and the consent of the Rannce, Colonel Munro exercised the functions of dewan in addition to those of resident. It appears from a Report prepared by Colonel Munro, that the affairs of Travancore had been conducted by a gradation of officers, the principal of whom were designated *karigars*\*, who exercised in their several stations the fiscal, magisterial, judicial, and military functions, in professed subordination to the chief authorities of the state, whose control, however, was seldom felt.

"No description," says Colonel Munro, "can produce an adequate impression of the tyranny, corruption, and abuses of this system, full of activity and energy in every thing mischievous, oppressive, and infamous, but slow and dilatory to effect any purpose of humanity, mercy, and justice. This body of public officers, united with each other on fixed principles of combination and mutual support, resented a complaint against one of their number, as an attack upon the whole. Their pay was very small, and never issued from the treasury, but supplied from several authorized exactions made by themselves. They offered, on receiving their appointments, large nuzzers to the Rajah, and had afterwards to make presents, on days of public solemnity, that exceeded the half of their pay. They realized, in the course of two or three years, large sums of money, and were generally subjected to a complete confiscation of their property for the benefit of the state. The Rajah, therefore, imposed no restraint on their rapacity, aware that their plunder would be transferred to his own treasury. Nor does it appear that this consideration had any effect in checking their extortions: they calculated upon being able to conceal their property during their lives, and felt little concern as to the mode of its disposal on their death. On the part of the people, complaint was useless, redress hopeless; they had only one remedy, and that was bribery. This practice was universal, and it was one of the melancholy circumstances in the situation of the people, that one of the greatest evils was necessarily resorted to as a good, to mitigate the still more intolerable grievances of injustice and oppression. Innocence was protected, justice obtained, and rights secured by bribes. These were also a still more efficacious means of injury, and their universal use produced an extraordinary spirit of avarice in the country; for every man endeavoured to have a secret hoard of money, as the best protection of his liberty, property, and life. Attached to the *karigars* there was a regular gradation of accountants who managed the revenue accounts, and in general surpassed even the *karigars* themselves in extortion and plunder."

The

\* 1. The Wallce-Survaddy *karigars*; 2. The Survaddy *karigars*; 3. The *karigars*; 4. The *portocarras*.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

The former dewan had attempted to establish courts of justice, which failed to answer the intended purpose. To remedy the confusion which had been occasioned by a mixture of authorities, Colonel Munro introduced a system in some measure analogous to that which existed in the Company's territories. He deprived the karigars of their judicial and magisterial, leaving them possessed of their fiscal and military functions; he instituted five subordinate courts, each having three judges, from whose decisions an appeal lay to a principal court at the seat of government, consisting of four judges including the dewan.

Colonel Munro also appointed darogahs of police with a competent number of peons; and he revised the code of laws, continuing the Hindoo as the basis, but modifying it so as to adapt it to the various classes of subjects, including Christians and Mahomedans, and to render it more conformable to local immemorial usages.

The home authorities by no means approved of the union of the offices of dewan and resident in the same individual, and were apprehensive that the measure of depriving the karigars of their magisterial and judicial functions would have the effect of rendering that large body of officers disaffected to the British Government. They were moreover of opinion, that an attempt to assimilate the judicial and revenue system of administration in Travancore to that of the Company's territories, was little calculated to suit the habits of a people, to whom it was presumed that the ancient and simple forms to which they were accustomed must be more agreeable than the artificial and oporose proceedings of regular courts of law. The despatch containing these observations was dated 10th August 1814. Before it reached India, Colonel Munro had ceased to act in the capacity of dewan, which office had been conferred upon a native.

The government of Fort St George desired Colonel Munro to report the result of his several arrangements, and particularly to state whether the changes which he had introduced were viewed with satisfaction by the government and people of Travancore. In compliance with this requisition, Colonel Munro, in an elaborate, able, and interesting report, afforded a full and clear explanation of all his proceedings.

Regarding the conduct proper to be observed towards states connected with us by subsidiary alliances, Colonel Munro expresses himself as follows; "It would seem to be conformable to the designs of Providence, and to the principles of humanity and true policy, that our influence and power should be rendered to the utmost practicable extent conducive to the happiness of those states, including both the sovereigns and their subjects. A system of proceeding founded on the principle, that our engagements are contracted with the sovereigns only, without reference to the conduct or the welfare of the people, will, there is reason to apprehend, be productive of consequences unsuitable to the benevolent and generous views of the British Government. The history of India, indeed of Asia, presents a series of incessant rebellions, revolutions and changes of dynasty, arising both from the tyranny, incapacity and crimes of rulers, and the ambition or corruption of the people, and our own experience of the Indian sovereigns and ministers does not encourage a supposition that any material improvement of their principles and talents has taken place in later times. Their government, left to itself, will exhibit both oppression and relaxation, but its excesses will be restrained within bounds of comparative moderation by a fear of the people, and of the ambition of powerful chiefs ready to avail themselves of their discontent. But our alliance, and the presence of a British subsidiary force, removing that fear, leaves them at liberty to gratify, without alarm, their passions of avarice and injustice. The minds of the sovereigns, labouring under a certain consciousness of inferiority and degradation from the political restraints of alliance, often sink into a state of apathy or of sensual indulgence that incapacitates them for the duties of government. The evils suffered by the people are imputed to their alliance with strangers, a measure in itself sufficiently obnoxious to their prejudices to be regarded with aversion: they become our enemies, anxious to relieve their country from what they consider to be the principal source of its calamities. The weakness of a government among a people obedient to force rather than to the laws, and destitute of those motives and habits of attachment to legitimate authority, and the general good, which are produced by religious and moral instruction, is usually attended with insubordination and anarchy. The excesses of the prince may have occasioned a degree of desolation in his country that renders its entire assumption necessary in order to prevent its absolute ruin. The history of Oude, for the last 30 years, may perhaps illustrate these observations. Although in India the rulers are the sole depositaries of the majesty and authority of their states, still our alliances can scarcely be considered as concluded with them alone, but with the states collectively which they govern; and we ought perhaps, on principles of justice, to endeavour rather to advance the happiness of the whole, than consult only the personal claims and pretensions of the rulers, to watch and guide the conduct both of the prince and the people, and lead them in the way most conducive to their mutual security and happiness. The prince will gradually learn to appreciate the benefits of our friendship; the people, grateful for the advantageous effects of our influence, will be desirous of its permanency; and a result will be obtained worthy of the superiority in knowledge, morals and virtue of the British nation. The degree in which our influence and interposition should be exerted must be determined entirely by circumstances, and it would be equally unadvisable to urge them too far, as to adopt a system of withholding them entirely. But in Travancore, the positive stipulations of the treaty authorized us to interpose our power for the amelioration of its internal administration; and the Right honourable the late Governor-general, in his instructions to the resident, dated the 22d November 1809, stated, with reference to the considerations which appear to the Governor-general to render undesirable the assumption of the management of the revenues and the administration of any part of the country of

Letter from  
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Travancore, 'his Lordship desires that you will submit to the deliberation of government, as provided for in the treaty, any regulations and ordinances for the internal management and collection of the revenues, which, in your judgment, would tend to secure the application of the real resources of the country to the payment of outstanding and current demands.' I certainly was not induced to take charge of the office of dewan by any prospect of facility in the execution of its duties, for I saw that they would be laborious, arduous and difficult. The principle of my proceedings was to conciliate both the Rajah and the people, and this could be accomplished only by conferring benefits on them. To please the Rajah, it was necessary that his authority, dignity, and revenues should be maintained unimpaired, and especially that the burdens of the country should be speedily removed; and to please the people, it was requisite that the oppressions, the onerous imposts and ruinous monopolies under which they laboured should be abolished, measures which would of course decrease the revenues and the means of paying the debt. I however cherished a hope, that by a system of activity, order, and justice, I might succeed in accomplishing those objects, apparently irreconcilable. My expectations were not disappointed; in less than three years, although I encountered far greater difficulties than I had anticipated, I succeeded in paying, besides the current subsidy, debts of 18 lacs of rupees to the Company, and nearly six lacs to individuals; in abolishing the most oppressive monopolies and taxes; in settling the affairs of the country on principles of justice and humanity; and I restored the management of the state to a native dewan, delivered from its burdens, with a greatly augmented revenue, and in a situation of complete internal tranquillity."

In justification of the innovations introduced by him, Colonel Munro states that the land revenue system, though excellent in theory, was in practice oppressive and unjust, and that the Government was cheated by fictitious remissions, the amount of which went into the pockets of the officers."

"The ryots being almost universally unable to read or write, depended upon the accountants for a knowledge of their annual rents and balances, and seldom obtained receipts for their payments. The Rajah was the general merchant of his country, and the royal commerce and monopolies destroyed its prosperity. Nearly the whole produce of the soil was in one shape or another engrossed by the government, while a most inadequate share of its value was accorded to the cultivator. Custom-houses were established at every eight or 10 miles, and duties exacted upon the transit of goods.

"The severe and oppressive character of the government appears to have arisen as much from the confederacy and bold iniquity of the public servants as from the tyranny of the Rajah. The officers, as before observed, were organized more on principles of military subordination than of civil polity, and were able with impunity to defraud their sovereign and to oppress his subjects. Thus actuated by uniform maxims of interest and combination, there was little prospect of their renouncing the system of conduct which they had pursued, while they should retain the same constitution.

"It was extremely desirable," adds Colonel Munro, "to communicate a pacific disposition to the government and the people of Travancore, the strict gradation of authority established among the karigars, and the entire command which they possessed over the services of the people, contributed to perpetuate military feelings in the country, and to facilitate the means of commotion and insurrection. They were, in fact, at once military and civil governors, exercising absolute power in their districts. The investiture of their office was given by the Rajah with a sword, and this weapon, together with the ensigns of their office, were carefully displayed wherever they appeared. The unlimited powers exercised by the karigars were peculiarly liable to abuse in their capacity of revenue servants. In absolute governments the conduct of the revenue servants requires generally to be observed with more jealousy and vigilance than that of the other public functionaries. The constant and authoritative intercourse which they have with the people, touching their property and interests, gives them an influence, which, if strengthened by the power of a magistrate or judge, will assuredly be perverted by the natives of India to purposes of corruption and injustice. The authority of the karigars enabled them to prosecute the system of rapine, fraud and coercion, which I have described, and it was essential to the purity of the revenue administration of the country, that they should be divested of the magisterial functions which they possessed. But the views which I have stated could not be accomplished by any half-measures; they could be accomplished only by reducing the karigars merely to the office of revenue servants, and depriving them of all direct authority over the persons or property of the people. It was in vain to hope that the karigars would relinquish their habits of command and control while they possessed the means of pursuing them. Persons hereafter appointed to that office would always aspire to follow the example of their predecessors; and there was no method of preventing the undue exercise of the karigars' powers, but by depriving them of that power altogether. The gradations of rank among the karigars opposed considerable obstacles to the efficient execution of their duties. An order disagreeable to the karigars was seldom enforced; it was sent from the *vallesuvaddy* karigars with a private intimation to disobey it, and it was conveyed from the *survaddy* karigars to the karigars, and from the karigars to the *prohwoteccars* with a similar request. If called to account, these officers asserted that they had transmitted the order, and laid the blame of disobedience or their inferiors, and it was difficult to examine, 200 or 300 *prohwoteccars*. But any order favourable to the feelings or wishes of the karigars was carried into effect with the promptitude of military obedience. In fact, responsibility could not be fixed; they had a kind of military constitution, without the laws, sanction and discipline which prevent it from degenerating into anarchy and misrule. In pursuance of these considerations, the karigars have been gradually deprived of all direct authority over the people, and reduced to the situation of collectors, or rather receivers of the

the revenues; the officers of wallee-survaddy karigars and survaddy karigars have been abolished, together with their correspondent accountants; a karigar, under the title of tasadar, has been retained at the head of every mundaputwail or district, with an accountant denominated sumpreddy pillah, and having a certain number of pro-wortecars under him. This plan admits of no evasion in complying with orders; and the duties of tasadars being confined to the collection of the land revenue, are executed with more efficiency. The influence of names is considerable, and the discontinuance of the title of karigars will be attended with advantage.

For the administration of justice a court of appeal, and eight zillah courts were formed. The judicial establishments were composed of the most learned and respectable Nairs, Brahmin and Christians in the country, they had liberal salaries, and their proceedings were to be regulated according to the Hindoo shasters and usages, and such fixed rules (not inconsistent with the shasters) as the Rajah might prescribe.

The courts consisted of a Nair, or first judge; a Christian, or second judge, and a Shastra. The nomination of a Christian judge, which was an after-thought, was received with satisfaction by the Brahmins and Nairs, from its tendency to ensure just and impartial decisions; and Colonel Munro is of opinion, that if some gentlemen who came out as missionaries could be induced to act as judges, it would confer more solid, substantial, and important benefits on Travancore than any other measure.

The people received the courts with marked demonstrations of satisfaction and joy, and crowded to them for justice with an impatience proportionate to the delays and vexations which they had hitherto experienced in seeking it. The courts had given security of person and property, and confidence to the mass of the people. The Rajah lost a cause to one of his subjects to the amount of 30,000 rupees, which was immediately paid. Great crimes, before frequent, had almost ceased; and several Nairs of rank, sentenced to death for atrocious and cruel murders, had been executed. Colonel Munro allows, however, that delays are complained of, which he attributes to the multiplicity of causes.

The police duties were, under the former government, executed by the militia, the suppression of which body rendered it necessary to raise police corps, who are independent of the revenue and judicial department, and act under the immediate order of the dewan.

Having described the constitutional alterations which he introduced into the government of Travancore, Colonel Munro next proceeds to explain the nature of the reforms which he effected in the revenue system of the country.

He abolished the fines, the tax on the inheritance of property, the capitation tax, the forced labour, and a variety of other vexatious imposts. He entered into a detailed examination and settlement of the ryot's accounts, put an end to the practice of granting remissions of rent, for which, with reference to the low rate at which they were fixed, and to the regularity of the seasons in Travancore, no just pretence could exist. The revenues of the pagodas having been diverted from their proper uses, by the officers entrusted with their management, and even the idols of the temples having been in many instances stolen by the Nairs and Brahmins, Colonel Munro, at the recommendation of a committee of learned Brahmins, allotted, upon a large and liberal scale, allowances for the due performance of religious and other ceremonies at all the pagodas, and secured to the people adequate prices for the articles supplied for the use of those establishments, in place of the arbitrary exactions to which they had formerly been subjected on that score. On the same principle, it was ordered by Colonel Munro that the people should in no instance be required to serve or supply the state on cheaper terms than they demanded from private individuals.

The former system of farming the land and sea customs, and all the high duties connected with it, were abolished; and a limited number of custom-houses placed under the direct management of public officers.

The exclusive sale of pepper, tobacco, and salt, was reserved to the government, but under such regulations as were beneficial to the people, while they tended to increase the revenue; that from salt was raised from 25,000 to 30,000 rupees, and that from tobacco, from 5 to 11 lacs.

A new survey of the plantations brought to light a mass of oppression and corruption. The claims of private individuals were ascertained with the utmost care, and an augmentation of revenue to the extent of 1½ lacs obtained by this measure.

"The result of all these arrangements," says Colonel Munro, "has not disappointed my expectations. In the course of my proceedings, the relief of the people and the benefit of the state were equally studied and pursued. Concessions were made gradually, and in proportion to the improvement of other resources; and a progressive augmentation of revenue has taken place."

"In consequence of the abolition of a number of harassing and burdensome imposts, the revenues have been reduced to five or six heads, moderate in their application to the people, and susceptible of increase with the growing prosperity of the country."

"The revenue from land and gardens, which formerly yielded 9 lacs, is now 15 lacs.

Tobacco	-	-	-	5	-	11,00,000
Salt	-	-	-	30,000	-	2,30,000
Land and sea customs	-	-	-	2,30,000	-	2,30,000
Pepper	-	-	-	-	-	3,00,000
Timber	-	-	-	50,000	-	1,50,000
Extraordinaries	-	-	-	-	-	2,00,000

37,10,000

To the exclusion of contracts, monopolies, capitation taxes, fines, &c. &c.  
(445.—VI.)

N N 4

Measures



Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
H. S. Jones, Esq.

to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

"Measures of coercion for the recovery of arrears are pursued, when necessary, by the authority of the courts. The rents are generally so very low, that they are readily paid by the people on their accounts being settled. But in cases of delay or contumacy, the tasildar makes an application to the public officer of the district, who immediately imprisons the defaulter. If he resists the validity of the demand, the police officer is required to report the circumstance immediately to the dewan, who either calls on the tasildar for an explanation, or desires the matter to be referred to the courts. If the ryot should acknowledge the justice of the demand, and refuse to satisfy it, he is transferred, after a few days confinement, to the circar vakeel at the court, who institutes a process for the recovery of the arrears, by a sale of his property. This mode, though apparently slow and circuitous, was necessary to counteract the tendency of the former system, which was that of violence and precipitate injustice."

On the subject of punchayets, Colonel Munro observes, that the people of Travancore have no confidence in that mode of determination; and that the very few cases which had been referred to arbitration, fell to the ground from the irreconcilable contrariety in the opinions of the members of the punchayets. The parties in choosing their arbitrators, will (he says) select persons determined, right or wrong, to support their cause: the umpire, whatever may be the merits of his decision, is accused of bribery, and the whole proceeding is involved in suspicion. If the circar officer appoints the whole punchayet, their decision will be conformable to his wishes, and his wishes too often, to the interest of the person who offers the highest bribe. If the head men of villages constitute the punchayets, there is very little difference betwixt these fixed judges and the judges appointed by the sovereign, excepting that the former are generally more deficient in knowledge, character, principle, ability, and impartiality. The natives of Travancore want that confidence in each other's probity, which is necessary to qualify them for composing or obeying punchayets. The superior education, knowledge, rank, and ability of the judges in a court, together with the solemnity of the proceedings, awe a native, conscious of having a bad cause, into submission: but before a punchayet, consisting of his equals, he will litigate without bounds. The judicial regulations published on the formation of the courts offered the inhabitants a choice of trial by punchayet, but their general disinclination to adopt that mode of decision, and its inefficiency in most cases wherein it was adopted, prevented its extended use, and rendered it necessary that suits in general should be tried by the courts. Colonel Munro, indeed, adduces reasons to show that the punchayet is not a Hindoo institution, and that punchayets were not known in Hindoo communities until after the Mahomedan conquests, when the Mussulman judges having little inclination to trouble themselves with the investigation of suits among the Hindoos, and these as little to refer their disputes to the decision of the Koran, they resorted to a system of arbitration, as a substitute for a more authoritative and perfect mode of jurisprudence.

The foregoing observations accord with those which are offered by Major Carnac, the late resident at Baroda, in a letter dated 27th June 1816, where he says, "that punchayets were seldom resorted to in Guzerat without the intervention of government." He adds, "there is a wide difference between a punchayet and an English jury. The juries sit under the responsibility of an oath, they hear evidence sifted by able counsel, which is afterwards summed up by the judge, and they give their award before the public. A respectable Hindoo would deem himself degraded if desired to swear, and a native government would not tender him an oath. The punchayets sit separate, and request evidence at their own option: none but themselves are competent to judge of the grounds on which they give their awards; the consequence is, that discontent with their decision prevails to such an extent as sometimes to warrant a mistrust of the purity of their proceedings."

Major Carnac asserts, that the institutions of courts of justice were not foreign to the practice of the best times in Guzerat; and that they existed both under the Hindoo government and during the rule of the Moguls.

Of the character of the Travancoreans, Colonel Munro draws but an unfavourable picture. He represents them as ignorant in the extreme, and as indolent as they are ignorant; these qualities, he says, render them restless, credulous, and suspicious, easily misled by the bad and designing men among them. Their degradation in character and morals he attributes to a long course of despotism and tyranny. With a view to their improvement Colonel Munro established schools at the public expense in all the districts, which, he says, are numerously attended, and he recommends that tracts upon ethics and morals should be translated into Malayalam, and furnished for the use of the seminaries.

The system of administration introduced by Colonel Munro into the Travancore dominions was extended to those of Cochin, under the more immediate management of Captain Blacker, the assistant resident. The financial affairs of both countries were greatly improved.

On the departure of Captain Blacker from Cochin in the year 1817, Colonel Munro took upon himself the duties which had been assigned to that officer. At the commencement of the year 1818, the Rajah's debt to the Company having been paid off, Colonel Munro urged him to appoint a dewan. The Rajah with great earnestness begged that this measure might be postponed, observing, that his country and himself had enjoyed a degree of tranquillity, comfort, and happiness, since the resident had conducted his affairs, which they had never before experienced, and would not be likely to experience with a native dewan. The resident replied, that the exigency which had justified the assumption of the management of his country no longer existed, and that it was the desire of the British Government that the former system of administration should be restored.

The

The Rannas of Travancore also bore the strongest testimony to the benefits conferred upon her country by the exertions of Colonel Munro, who embarked on Quilon for England on the 24th January 1819. The foregoing account of proceedings in Travancore contains, perhaps, too much of detail. But the case is singular of a British officer acting in the double capacity of resident and dewan, and it appeared desirable to show how the experiment had operated.

*Guicowar.*

The treaties with the Guicowar do not (as in the case of Oude, Mysore, and Travancore,) contain any stipulation conferring upon the British Government a right to interfere in the internal administration of his Highness's affairs; but the necessity of that interference arose out of the peculiar nature of our engagements, and was virtually invited by the Guicowar, Rajah Anund Row, who, in a letter under his own hand and seal, dated the 29th July 1802, wrote as follows: "As it seems impossible that I can retrieve myself or my country from present embarrassments, without reforming and reducing the expense in every department, I do hereby promise and agree to make the necessary reductions by degrees."

The pecuniary difficulties of the Baroda state were such as to threaten its entire ruin, which would have exposed our most essential interests in that quarter to serious injury. In order to avert this evil, the British Government advanced from its own treasury the sum of 19,37,683 rupees; and a further sum of 21,78,601 was, by the use of its influence and credit, obtained on loan from the shroffs, at a comparatively low rate of interest. This timely aid enabled the Guicowar to pay off and to disband the Arab mercenaries, whose mutinous and domineering conduct had rendered them an object of dread to the Rajah.

Lieutenant-colonel Walker addressed himself with the zeal and ability which distinguished his character, to the reformation of the civil and military establishments, and to the correction of the abuses then existing in the Rajah's dominions. Anund Row's imbecility being such as totally to disqualify him for the management of state affairs, a council of government was established, which acted under the control of the resident. To explain the various arrangements that were introduced by Lieut.-colonel Walker, would require more space than can be afforded in this paper. The Reports which he transmitted from time to time to the Governor in Council of Bombay are very voluminous, and abound in matter of a highly interesting nature. The publication of these valuable documents would serve to show that the respect in which his authority is held in India rests on a broad and durable basis. It is due to his worthy successor, Major Carnac, to state that the good work which had been begun by Colonel Walker, was, by the major, prosecuted with vigour, ability, and success.

At the period of Colonel Walker's resignation of the office of resident at Baroda, the affairs of the Guicowar had been so far improved, as to afford a prospect of the entire extinction of the guaranteed debt in the course of a few years. In a letter dated the 10th January 1809, he expressed it as his opinion, that it might "be prudent and consistent with policy gradually to detach ourselves from that intimate and internal interference in the details of the Guicowar affairs which necessity had hitherto rendered expedient." In this opinion the home authorities entirely concurred. When, however, there appeared a probability that the debt would soon be liquidated, the Supreme Government expressed the greatest reluctance to expose to hazard the good that had been accomplished by the labour and perseverance of a course of years, by withdrawing all the experienced advantages of our supervision, counsel, and control, and leaving the state of the Guicowar to the narrow policy, lax habits, and unenlightened and improvident management of a native administration; they therefore referred the question to the reconsideration of the Court of Directors. The Bombay Government were also averse to a change of the system then existing.

The Court replied (19th March 1815), "We can have no hesitation in declaring, that at least the time of our ceasing to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baroda state, should be extended to the period when the debt should be liquidated." Owing to a variety of untoward circumstances, the guaranteed portion of the debt still continues to exist.

On the accession of Syajee Row to the sovereignty of the Baroda state in October 1819, the Bombay Government did not deem it expedient to continue the commission of government which, as before mentioned, had been established in consequence of Anund Row's incapacity; but the control of the resident was not withdrawn.

In the month of April 1820, the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, then governor of Bombay, proceeded to Baroda, and after having had several conferences with Syajee Row, agreed to an arrangement for the future conduct of his affairs, the substance of which was as follows:—

1. All foreign affairs to remain, as formerly, under the exclusive management of the British Government.
2. His Highness to be unrestrained in the management of his internal affairs, provided he fulfil his engagements to the bankers, of which the British Government is the guarantee. The resident, however, is to be made acquainted with the plan of finance which the Guicowar shall determine on at the commencement of each year; to have access to the accounts whenever he may require it; and is to be consulted whenever a new expense of any magnitude is to be incurred.
3. The guarantee of the British Government to ministers and other individuals to be scrupulously observed.
4. His Highness to choose his own minister, but to consult the resident before he appoints him.
5. The identity of the interests of the two states will render it necessary for the British Government to offer its advice whenever any emergency occurs.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

No material deviation in the scale of expense, as fixed by Mr. Elphinstone, seems to have taken place until the year 1823-4, when, from various causes, the finances became so seriously embarrassed as to require the prompt adoption of remedial measures, in order to enable the Guicowar to fulfil his engagements with the creditors of the state who possessed the guarantee of the British Government.

Among the measures which were adopted was that of farming the districts for seven years to respectable bankers, under such regulations as should ensure the ryots from oppression. This arrangement operated as a check upon Syajee's secret profits. Like most Eastern princes, he was desirous of amassing a treasure, and for that purpose had not scrupled to draw to his own hoard funds which ought to have been applied to the payment of the guaranteed debts of the state.

Dissatisfied with his condition, Syajee entered upon a line of conduct which placed him at direct issue with the government of Bombay: he paid no regard to the guarantee which we had afforded to the state creditors, and oppressed individuals for whose protection we stood pledged.

It was not until after Sir John Malcolm, in Council, had exhausted every effort to persuade Syajee to act in a manner more conformable to his obligations, that he determined to sequester such a portion of the Guicowar territories as would enable him to provide for the gradual liquidation of the guaranteed debt, and accordingly, districts yielding a gross revenue of 27,36,044 rupees per annum, were assumed by the Bombay government.

A further sequestration of territory was subsequently made, in order to ensure the maintenance of the contingent horse which the Guicowar was bound by treaty to hold at our disposal, but which he had failed to do.

These were unquestionably measures of a severe character. The home authorities admitted that the first sequestration had been rendered necessary by the obstinate persistence of Syajee in a course of misconduct, which in its consequences involved the violation of the guarantee of the British Government to the creditors of the Guicowar state, and to other individuals who had a claim to protection against the violent and oppressive acts of this infatuated prince.

Sir John Malcolm greatly preferred the temporary alienation of a portion of the Guicowar dominions, to the assumption of the direct administration of Syajee's affairs, because he apprehended that the last-mentioned proceeding might have led to the entire and final extinction of the authority of the prince: whereas, so soon as the guaranteed debts should be liquidated from the revenues of the sequestered districts, their restoration would again place the Guicowar in that condition of respectability, in which it was desirable that a family so long and so intimately connected with us should stand\*.

#### Nagpore.

After the defection of Appah Sahib in the year 1817, the nature of our relations with the state of Nagpore underwent a considerable change. Instead of a pecuniary subsidy, territory was ceded for the maintenance of the British troops; the military force of the state was taken out of the Rajah's hands, and disciplined and officered by Company's officers. For the regular payment of the Nagpore military establishments, lands yielding a clear revenue of 17 lacs of rupees, were placed under the management of European superintendents. The remainder of the Nagpore territories were, during the young Rajah's minority, administered by the resident Mr. Jenkins, who in an able and comprehensive Report dated the 27th July 1826 (and printed at Calcutta by order of the Supreme Government), has not only explained the nature of the arrangements which he adopted, but has afforded much valuable and interesting information relative to the nature of the country, the character of the people, the state of agriculture, trade, manufactures, and commerce, and various other particulars, including a sketch of the history of the Nagpore state.

Mr. Jenkins tried the experiment of governing by means of a minister placed under check by British officers, but he soon perceived the necessity of taking into his own hands the direct administration of affairs. The reasons by which he was induced to adopt this measure are stated in his Report, page 304 to 308. The unlimited choice of British officers, both for the civil and military branches, gave to Mr. Jenkins the means of bringing every kind of talent required for his purposes into action; and it appears that by their cordial co-operation those purposes were effectually accomplished.

The system thus established was to terminate as soon as it should be ascertained that the Rajah was competent to undertake the management of his own affairs. "The objections," observes Mr. Jenkins, "to vesting the powers of a Native government in the hands of British officers, and the fear of rendering it difficult to revert to that government, the longer its functions might be suspended, are reasons for fixing as early a date as possible for the restoration of the Native administration. On the other hand, the little prospect that existed at the time of placing the present Rajah on the musnud, of rendering his government either secure or respectable, by leaving the administration to native functionaries, was the cause of the assumption of the government by the British resident, and that on which

\* The delay has which unavoidably taken place in printing the Appendix to the Committee's Report, affords an opportunity of stating, that by advices received from Bombay, it appears that Lord Clare had prevailed upon Syajee to grant such terms to the bankers, as induced them to release the British Government from its guarantee of the debt due to them; and that Syajee had also afforded good security for the maintenance of the contingent in a state of efficiency. The sequestered districts and accordingly been restored to him.

which his arrangements received the sanction of the Supreme Government. The effects of these arrangements have, in every respect, been beneficial, nor has there been any material innovation introduced into the Native system, calculated to obstruct the restoration of the Native government, except the spirit in which it has been administered; a spirit of purity and justice which must be preserved, if such a restoration is intended as a real benefit either to the prince or his people. The revenue is improved and is improving; it is collected with facility, and the amount of it does not burthen the people to a degree that would check their industry, or prevent the accumulation of capital. It is also collected at an expense not exceeding the authorized charges of the Mahratta management, and much below what was annually extracted from the people by bribery and extortion; and it may safely be asserted, that in no part of the Company's dominions is there a greater degree of security both to person and property, of purity in the Native officers of revenue, justice and police, or of freedom from all kinds of oppression and exaction, than in the Nagpore territories.

On the Rajah's coming of age, the administration of the best cultivated part of his territory was made over to him; but the whole military force of the state was declared to be vested in us; for the payment of which as before observed, territory was reserved. But in the year 1829, the reserved districts were also given up to the Rajah on the condition of his paying an annual subsidy of eight lacs of Sonaut rupees; the auxiliary force, which had been placed under the command of European officers, was to be gradually disbanded, and a national force raised in its stead, for the performance of internal duties. The Rajah was, however, still bound to maintain, at all times in a state of efficiency, a body of not less than 1,000 of the best description of irregular horse, commanded by his own officers.

The powers of almost unlimited interference in the internal affairs of Nagpore, which had been exercised by Mr. Jenkins, and which were expressly reserved to the British Government by the treaty of 1826, were modified by that of 1829, but in case of gross misrule and oppression on the part of the Rajah, the British Government is still empowered by treaty to resume the management, through its own officers, of districts in which disorders may have been produced by harsh and oppressive acts.\*

#### *Sattarah*

The treaty with the Rajah of Sattarah, dated September 1819,† provided, that his territories, which yield a revenue of about 20 lacs of rupees per annum, should at first be placed in the management of the British Government, and be gradually transferred to that of the Rajah. After the country had been properly settled under the superintendence of the resident, it was accordingly made over to the Rajah, of whose disposition and fitness to govern a favourable account has been given. The military force of Sattarah is entirely regulated by the British Government, to whose advice in all important matters the Rajah is bound to conform.

#### *Holkar.*

By the treaty of Mundiesoor in 1818, the Holkar state was placed on the footing of other powers connected with us in subsidiary alliances. Mulhar Row Holkar being then a minor, the government was carried on by a dewan, under the superintendence of the resident, until the young prince came of age.

#### *Nizam.*

Although the British subsidiary force was liable to be employed in suppressing disorders within the Nizam's dominions, we were not authorized by any article of the treaty to interfere for the correction of any errors of government to which those disorders might be traced. The interference, therefore, which was actually exercised in the Nizam's affairs is to be justified, in so far as it admits of justification, on the general principle, that an obligation to support the authority of an ally involves a right to restrain him from exciting insurrections by acts of oppression and injustice.

In

\* Revised Engagement.—Nagpore, 26 December 1829.—Art 3

Articles 10, 12 and 13 of the existing treaty are hereby cancelled, and the following modified provisions substituted in lieu thereof. It shall be competent to the British Government, through its local representative, to offer advice to the Maharajah, his heirs and successors, on all important matters, whether relating to the internal administration of the Nagpore territory or to external concerns, and his Highness shall be bound to act in conformity thereto. If, which God forbid, gross and systematic oppression, anarchy and misrule should hereafter at any time prevail, in neglect of repeated advice and remonstrance, seriously endangering the public tranquillity, and placing in jeopardy the stability of the resources whence his Highness discharges his obligations to the Honourable Company, the British Government reserves to itself the right of re-appointing its own officers to the management of such district or districts of the Nagpore territory in his Highness's name, and for so long a period as it may deem necessary; the surplus receipts in such case, after defraying charges, to be paid in the Rajah's treasury.

† The Rajah shall ultimately have the entire arrangement of the country now ceded to him; but as it is necessary, on account of the recent conquests of the country, that it should at first be governed with particular care and prudence, the administration will for the present remain in the hands of the British political agent. That officer will, however, conduct the government in the Rajah's name, and in consultation with his Highness, and in proportion as his Highness and his officers shall acquire experience and evince their ability to govern the country, the British Government will gradually transfer the whole administration into their hands. He will, however, at all times attend, as above agreed, to the advice which the British political agent shall offer him for the good of his state and for the maintenance of general tranquillity.

Appendix, No. 20.

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

In the year 1810, about 10 years after our intimate connexion with the state of Hyderabad had been formed, the resident, Captain Thomas Sydenham,\* expressed his conviction, that no improvement could be expected in the state of the Nizam's affairs, unless the administration of the country were placed under the control of the resident. "The defects (he adds) of the present government are too deeply rooted and too widely extended to admit of any partial reform, and it is therefore unfortunate that the only effectual remedy that can be applied should be so much at variance with our views and policy." Of the like purport were the opinions expressed by Mr. Russell.† "The disorders (said he) of the Nizam's government are those more of the system itself, than of the agents by whom it is administered. They are not, therefore, to be corrected by any partial measures. Particular complaints are easily redressed, and particular abuses removed, but any plan of reform to do effectual good must be general and comprehensive. Such a plan, under the present circumstances of the Nizam's court, can proceed from no other source than the supreme authority of the British Government, and must have its foundation either in the diminution or in the increase of our interference.

"If there was any individual among the Nizam's own servants qualified by his character and talents to exercise the functions of government without control, it would certainly be desirable that he should be made minister, and that the correction of the evil should be left to the spontaneous efforts of his judgment and activity. But there is no person to be found; nor in the present condition of the government would it be reasonable to expect that such a person should be found. It is among the necessary consequences of the dependence of one state upon another, that men of that description are not produced. There is no field in which they can either form or exercise their talents, and it is with faculties as with commodities, that the production depends upon the demand."

Moved by the representations of Mr. Russell, Lord Hastings, in a letter of instructions dated 23d January 1820, authorized him to interpose his advice and influence in order to establish a salutary control over the internal administration of the country. With this view, he was directed to obtain accurate accounts of all establishments, receipts and expenditures; to endeavour to effect the reduction of expence, a proper distribution of justice, the improvement of the revenue system, the reduction of debt, and the efficiency of the troops. And as these objects were to be effected through the instrumentality of Rajah Chundoo Loll, Mr. Russell was to assure him, that on the condition of his affording his faithful and zealous assistance, he might rely upon the protection and support of the Governor-general in Council.

In a letter dated 1st September 1820, Mr. Russell reported the proceedings which he had adopted, in concert with Rajah Chundoo Loll, with a view to the reformation of existing abuses.

The minister summoned the several talookdars to the capital, and intimated to them his determination to punish signally any acts of violence and oppression which should be in future committed. Each talookdar was required to execute a separate instrument binding him to abstain from undue exactions, to seize all disturbers of the public peace, and to deal with them according to the orders which should be issued by government, and to make regular reports of all persons in confinement in the district, specifying their offences.

In almost every instance talookdars, instead of farmers, were constituted collectors of the revenue, the advantage of which change was, that it destroyed inducements to practise extortion, and gave them a direct interest in the prosperity of the country.

The police throughout the Nizam's country was in a very inefficient state. Every district and village had its proper officers, holding their offices by hereditary tenure, and responsible in their property and persons for the discharge of their duty. But owing to the weakness or negligence of the government, those who ought to have been the guardians became the disturbers of the peace, and many leaders of gangs of robbers proved to be persons who had belonged to the police. Of these some were punished capitally; but the general course which the ministers pursued was to restore the individuals to the enjoyment of their hereditary rights, taking security for the future fulfilment of their duty. In some districts, however, where large gangs of banditti had acquired strength, it was found necessary to employ a military force.

The ordinary administration of justice was combined with the collection of the revenue, in the person of the talookdar, and was again delegated by him to subordinate officers. The minister ordained, that in cases where the talookdars or other officers were parties, an appeal should lie to him.

All points relating to the Mahomedan law were referred to the principal causes of the city. Complaints against public officers of any description were investigated before the minister himself, and questions of ordinary litigation were submitted to a new tribunal, which sat every day except Friday (the Mahomedan sabbath) in a public apartment in the minister's house. The proceedings before this tribunal were conducted without any expence to the parties. "I have had occasion," says Mr. Russell, "to examine, and have found reason to be satisfied with its decisions." "I make a point of receiving and communicating with the minister every petition that is offered to me. The consequence is, that complaints are now brought in from all parts of the country; justice is to be had by calling for it; oppression can no longer be concealed, and the punishment and dismissal of some of the talookdars, have arisen out of the investigation of complaints preferred in this manner. In all cases which admit of it, reference is encouraged to the punchayet,‡ a method of trial

which

\* To Lord Minto, 29 May 1810. † To Lord Hastings, 24 Nov. 1819.

‡ Compare this with p. 280.

which is the most congenial to the habits and opinions of the people, and which seems always to be most highly thought of by those who have had the best means of estimating its merits."

A tribunal similar to that at the capital, was established at Aurangabad, in the province of Berar.

The minister had to contend against the disadvantages arising from the peculiarity of the Nizam's character, and to encounter at every step the opposition not only of individuals who had an interest in the maintenance of abuses, but of a faction personally and politically inimical to his administration.

"I have," says Mr. Russell, "confined my advice to the minister on every occasion, to the correction of abuses, and have been careful to avoid recommending any measure in the shape of innovation. We have not done justice, in our own system, to the original institutions of the country. As strangers, we are hasty in condemning what we do not understand, and have often defeated our good intentions by establishing our own arbitrary rules and methods to the exclusion of those which have grown out of the circumstances of the people, and are inseparably blended with their manners and opinions."

Mr. Russell adduced the testimony of respectable British officers to the improved state of the country, consequent upon the introduction of the measures above described.

On the 1st December 1820, Mr. Russell retired from office, and was succeeded by Sir Charles (then Mr.) Metcalf. In his earliest report on the state of affairs at the court of Hyderabad, which is dated 2d February 1821, he says, "It will be gratifying to the Governor-general in Council to learn that much good undoubtedly has been done in the Nizam's country by the measures authorized by his Lordship, and carried into effect by Mr. Russell. The habit of receiving petitions of complainants, and transmitting them to the minister for redress, has been beneficial, by giving hopes to the injured, and alarming the unjust. It has been continued and extended since I took charge of the residency."

Sir Charles Metcalf, however, conceived that much remained to be done. He had ascertained that the expenditure of the Nizam's government exceeded the income by about 10 lacs annually. Every branch of the administration appeared to require investigation, but the points to which his attention was more immediately directed, were—

1st. The reduction of the expenditure of the government within its income; and

2d. A general settlement of the land revenue for a term of years, in the mode of village settlement, including arrangements with the heads of villages for the introduction of a system of police.

The reduction of the expenditure would, he observed, affect numbers of idle and worthless persons who devoured the resources of the state.

A settlement of the land revenue, such as was proposed, would be a dire blow to the host of contractors who plundered the cultivators.

"I can hardly reckon," says Sir Charles, "on the zealous support of the minister in either scheme, but I do not despair of his acquiescence, and if he will only acquiesce, I am ready to take on myself the labour and odium of the task."

"To insist on good faith being kept by government and its agents with the cultivators, with regard to all engagements; to take care that the government and its agents do not exceed the acknowledged rights of the government: these are objects, the successful accomplishment of which would go far towards the restoration of prosperity, and for which I shall never hesitate to exercise direct interference in every part of the country, for without it they would never be accomplished."

"The most effectual, and perhaps the only sure mode of introducing a reform into the country, would be by the appointment of European managers in the several districts, but this I consider to be prohibited by my instructions, and not desirable if it can be avoided, inasmuch as it would be tantamount to taking the government out of the hands of the Nizam and his ministers. I do not think, therefore, of submitting any recommendation to that effect, unless I should find, after a fair trial, that my own efforts, with such aid as I can procure from the servants of the Nizam's government, prove unavailing."

"The occasional interference, however, of the European officers of the Nizam's service, for the prevention of oppression and breach of faith on the part of local authorities, in the vicinity of their respective posts, is indispensable, and I shall, without scruple, have recourse to their assistance, whenever it may seem necessary. Indeed, I have already acted upon this principle in several instances."

To Sir Charles Metcalf's despatch the reply was, that the information which it contained was considered by the Governor-general "to be extremely interesting," expressions which gave him no reason to suppose that his proceedings were regarded with disapprobation, and consequently left him at liberty to follow the course on which he had entered.

In his next letter, dated 20th March 1821, the resident stated that the Nizam's government had agreed to make a general settlement of the land revenue for a term of years, that in the southern division of the country the settlement was to be effected by the minister, in concert with the resident; while, in the northern parts, that duty was entrusted to Captain Seyer, and Lieutenants Sutherland and Clarke. "I have received," says Sir Charles Metcalf, "a report from Lieutenant Clarke of the recent re-peopling of 90 villages in one district, by returned emigrants, in consequence of general assurances of protection which he was authorized by me to convey to the people."

He proceeds to say—"It is a delightful part of my present situation, that I find in the Nizam's service an ample supply of British officers able and willing to render the greatest assistance in establishing the prosperity of the country. The services which they perform

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beyond the limits of their military duty, are undertaken with the greatest zeal and public spirit, without any incitement from additional emoluments. As yet, therefore, (whatever may hereafter be judged proper), these services are performed without any consequent charge to the Nizam's government.

Sir Charles regretted that he was not able to employ the same instruments in the rest of the Nizam's territories; but observed, that he could not decently object to the minister's proposal, that he, in concert with the resident, should superintend a great part of the work. He, however, added, "there is a facility of assent on the part of Chundoo Loll, and a practical counteraction of whatever is right, arising out of the inveteracy of bad habits, which, both together, form a singular character."

The terms in which the foregoing communication was noticed by the Governor-general in Council were those of approbation: the plan of revenue settlement was considered by his Lordship to be "extremely judicious."

On referring to what passed in Council, it would, however, appear, that a feeling of dissatisfaction existed in the mind of Lord Hastings, in respect to the resident's proceedings. On the 27th May 1821, his Lordship recorded a minute, wherein he says, "A zeal prompted by the purest humanity has led Mr. Metcalfe considerably beyond the line which I had proposed for our relations with the Hyderabad state. I do not mention this in censure, because I am myself so aware of the disorganization existing in that country, and of the difficulty of applying efficient remedies, that I cannot say whether Mr. Metcalfe would have had a prospect of permanently meliorating the condition of the inhabitants by procedures less decisive than those which he has adopted; on that account I have not interrupted what he has undertaken. At the same time, it is obvious that Mr. Metcalfe has, in effect, taken upon himself the whole government of the country, not by working secretly upon the devotion of the minister to us, but by a direct and avowed superintendence of the territorial settlements, with all the concomitant arrangements now in progress. The result I have no doubt, will be equally beneficial to the Nizam, and to his people, yet it will cause exterior irritation and dislike among the better classes. This erroneous course cannot be upheld, though after having embarked so overtly in it, I fear there will be embarrassment in our withdrawing ourselves. A system of ostentatious sway over the concerns of an ally, is so irreconcilable to the maxims reiterated impressed upon us by the Honourable Court, and so little accordant with my notions of justice or policy, that I must see with jealousy anything which tends to prop its silent operation, after we shall have professedly retired from the interference." Of these sentiments the resident would appear to have been, for a long time, left in ignorance.

In a despatch, dated 7th November 1821, the resident complained bitterly of the underhand counteraction practised by Chundoo Loll. "I am not only convinced," says he, "that less than the interposition authorized by his Excellency the Governor-general in Council," (alluding, it is presumed, to the instructions of January 1820, to Mr. Russell), "would have been ineffectual, but I am also apprehensive, that for some time unceasing vigilance will be required to prevent the violation of the engagements to which the Nizam's government is pledged, and to eradicate the extortion and oppression to which its native officers, from the highest to the lowest, are deeply, senselessly, and insatiably addicted." Again, writing, on the 20th June 1822, he says, "There never, I suppose, was elsewhere a territory so entirely abandoned to the pillage of extortioners, seeking no end but their own illicit gain. There never can have been an administration of government less paternal, or more careless of the good of the people, and the interests of the sovereign. As affairs were going on, I know not how long the country could have avoided utter desolation. The crisis seemed near at hand, if the Governor-general had not interposed the saving shield of British protection." Sir Charles Metcalfe proceeds as follows: "In exercising the powers entrusted to me, one of the objects most carefully kept in view, is to avoid all unnecessary interference. All instructions to the gentlemen employed on the part of the Nizam's government are accordingly framed in conformity with this view. They are not allowed to issue orders; they inquire and report; they aid and advise local authorities; they are to remonstrate in the event of oppression or violation of engagements on the part of government; but their functions are not authoritative, and though, as checks on oppression, they may sometimes be in collision with local powers, they are enjoined in every other respect to co-operate with them, and to uphold the Nizam's government by all means in their power.

"Another object of equal importance, which is secured by the same means, is to keep entire and unimpaired the whole system and machinery of the Native government, so that when the time shall come when our intervention may be withdrawn without detriment to the people, that measure may be adopted without any derangement or obstruction to the movements of the government."

The resident declared that he had not interfered in the nomination of Native officers of any grade.

Shortly after the date of the letter from which the foregoing passages have been taken, Chundoo Loll, at the alleged instigation of the house of William Palmer and Co., of Hyderabad, forwarded to Calcutta, through Mr. John Palmer of that city, an address to Lord Hastings, complaining of the interference exercised by the resident in the Nizam's government.

Lord Hastings reprovved Chundoo Loll for having sent his representation clandestinely through an irregular and improper channel; but at the same time called upon the resident for explanations regarding some of his proceedings. Sir Charles Metcalfe, previously to the receipt of the Governor-general's letter, had discovered the intrigue which was intended to effect his removal from office; and in a despatch dated 31st August 1822, explained the

conceptions with which he had apprehended, and the mode in which he had endeavoured to execute the Governor-general's instructions for the interposition of the resident's advice and influence, with a view to the benefit of the Nizam and his subjects.

"I suppose," says Sir Charles, "our interference in his Highness's affairs to be not merely a right, but also a duty, arising out of our supremacy in India, which imposes upon us the obligation of maintaining the tranquillity of all countries connected with us, and consequently of protecting the people from oppression, as no less necessary than the guaranteeing of their rulers against revolution. The only refuge of a people intolerably vexed, is in emigration or insurrection; and as we secure the Nizam's government against rebellion, it seems to be incumbent on us to save his subjects from grievous oppression.

"If the Nizam ruled his subjects with equity and prudence, our interposition between them, I presume, would be neither necessary, nor expedient, nor just. In like manner we should be excluded from interference by propriety, policy, and inclination, if his minister ruled for him in a wise and becoming manner.

"Interference in the internal concerns of states under our protection, is neither desirable nor generous, when it can be avoided, and should only then be resorted to when it is clearly necessary for the preservation of the people from the misery and destruction which must ever attend oppression and misrule.

"On the other hand, if interposition be a duty when clearly necessary for the relief of the people, it would seem to be so in a more than ordinary degree, when a country is governed by a minister supported by our influence, and absolute in power.

"In every case where we support the ruling power, but more especially in such a case as that last described, we become responsible in great measure for the acts of the government, and if they are hurtful to the people, we aid in inflicting the injury.

"A native government is little else than a great landlord; and if its tenants and cultivators be not cherished, the estate must soon be ruined."

Sir Charles Metcalfe proceeds to say, that in order to defeat the shifts resorted to by Chundoo Loll, to evade the provisions of the revenue settlement, he was led to nominate officers charged with the general duty of receiving the complaints of cultivators or others oppressed by the government, and obtaining redress for them, either by application to local authorities, or by representation through the resident to the Nizam's government. The exception to this general rule had reference to the seizure of banditti or other criminals where injury to the community might result from the delay in their apprehension; in which case the officers were empowered to seize, for the purpose of delivery to the local authorities. These measures, he says, had already produced much good. He adds, "Were I to attempt to define briefly the nature of our present interference, I should describe it as a healing of the wounds inflicted by misrule, and a nursing of the country for the benefit of the people and the sovereign, under a temporary necessity caused by the peculiar character of the prince and the ruling minister, and by the peculiar predicament of the latter relatively to his own sovereign and our government."

The majority of the Council having differed in opinion from Lord Hastings, as to the merits of the resident's proceedings and the force of the reasoning by which he had endeavoured to justify those proceedings, his Lordship exercised the right with which he was by law invested, of giving effect to his own views, in opposition to the votes of the Council. He accordingly issued in his own name, instructions, dated 25th October 1822, to Sir Charles Metcalfe. Lord Hastings denied that, in virtue of our supremacy, we are obliged to protect the subjects of our allies from oppression as well as to guaranty the princes against revolution; an obligation which applies only to those states which have by particular engagements rendered themselves professedly feudatory. Our treaties, observed his Lordship, characterise the Nizam as an independent sovereign, a distinction of which we appeared to have lost sight; hence those sudden starts of dictation which had been in use. He admitted that, for the common interest of the two governments, it was requisite that his Highness's territories should be restored to prosperity; "yet," says his Lordship, "even that excuse would be insufficient, were not our influence to be managed with decency and to be unavowed. Such is the distinct nature of our relations with the Nizam, and a disregard of its terms would be no less repugnant to general principles than to the orders of this government."

"The fact of mal-administration is unquestionable. Does that, however, decide the mode in which alteration is to be effected? Where is our right to determine that the amount of the evil is such as to demand our taking the remedy into our own hands? The necessity stated is altogether constructive. Were such a pretence allowable, a powerful state would never want a colour for subjugating a weak neighbour. The consequence is so obvious, that no principle in the law of nations leaves room for acting on such a presumption. It is admitted that if convulsions rage so violently in one state, as clearly to threaten the excitation of ferment in a bordering one, the latter may be justified in reducing to order the nation by which its tranquillity was menaced. This, however, is an extreme case, at the same time that it is of a description strictly defined. No analogy exists between indisputable exigency and an asserted convenience, where vague arbitrary charges, if tolerated as a ground of procedure, would furnish ready pretext for the foulest usurpations."

Lord Hastings gave Sir Charles Metcalfe full credit for zeal and rectitude of intention, but observed, that under the erroneous supposition of our right of supremacy, his measures in behalf of the people had been carried to an undesirable length, and that it was natural for Chundoo Loll to be staggered by the tone of authority assumed by the resident after he had been apprised that we disclaimed any arbitrary sway, and should only point out to his judgment the measures which appeared the most efficacious for his master's benefit.



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Charles Grant.

The empowering British officers to receive appeals against the undue exactions of the native functionaries, was, Lord Hastings conceived, of itself a delicate trust; but the act of investing them with authority to suppress depredations, and such crimes as affected the safety of the community, constituted an ostentatious assumption of the government. His Lordship felt that the system upon which the resident had acted could not be suddenly abandoned without inconvenience; but he instructed Sir Charles Metcalfe gradually to substitute influence for dictation, and to afford his support to Chundoo Loll.

Minutes of dissent from the judgment of Lord Hastings were recorded by the other members of Council; that of Mr. Adam was dated the 1st November 1822. He observed, that, from the tenor of former communications, the resident must have been led to suppose that his measures were approved. The general principle stated in Lord Hastings's letter of October 1822, to Sir Charles Metcalfe, as precluding our right of interference, Mr. Adam admitted to be, in the abstract, incontrovertibly true; "but," he added, "I venture, with every deference for the authority from which it proceeds, to doubt its applicability to the actual condition of the Nizam's government, and our relations with that prince. If the state of Hyderabad retained anything of its pristine strength, ever, as much as remained to it when it engaged in the alliance, I should hold the principles on which the treaties were formed, as the unerring guide of our procedure in all matters between the two states. I have always seen cause to regret the departure from those principles evinced in our interference to direct the Nizam's choice of a minister, and in other cases, and in none more flagrantly than in that arrangement which established Chundoo Loll in his absolute authority. Tempting as was the immediate advantage, it was dearly purchased by an assumption of power on our part, which, though not so intended, was regarded both by the Nizam and his people as proclaiming that the independence of his Highness was a mere name. Even before this transaction, the spirit of the original alliance had fallen into decay, from the natural operation of a subsidiary alliance, when proper counteracting measures are not applied to check the tendency of the subsidising state to rest on its ally, and neglect the sources of its own stability and internal independence. It is impossible to disguise from ourselves, that for some years past the state of Hyderabad has been in a condition of absolute dependence on us; that its own power has been a mere shadow; that it has been prevented solely by our support from crumbling to pieces, and becoming the prey of internal anarchy; that the minister has been avowedly the creature of our will, that every political measure has been dictated by us; and that our abstinence from taking an equally decided part in the internal administration, combined with the proper causes of decay, had brought it to the condition in which it was, when we found the reform forced upon us.

"I profess my inability to perceive in a government and country so situated, any semblance of that independence with regard to internal concerns, which the theory of the alliance recognizes. I do not draw from these facts any inference favourable to our assuming a despotic rule over this broken down, effete government. Justice and policy alike claim for us an endeavour to replace it in something like the exercise of an independent authority, to restore its prosperity, and to re-invigorate its resources. But this obligation imposes on us the corresponding one of taking effectual measures for the purpose, and I see nothing revolting, but everything encouraging, in the exercise of the degree of interference necessary for those admitted beneficial purposes to a state incapable of recovering itself by its own energies."

The opinions of the other members of Council, though differing from his upon some minor points, were, in the main, accordant with those of Mr. Adam.

To these minutes Lord Hastings replied on the 19th December 1822. "If," said his Lordship, "accidental and even constructive interference with the just prerogatives of Native princes have constantly awakened the humane jealousy of the Honourable Council of Directors, what must the sensation be, when an inherent right in this government to exercise such invasions is pointedly vindicated? That the right is so asserted will be indisputable on a perusal of the minutes. It was not to be imagined that the members of Council would defend in its nakedness an odious principle, which had been exposed and arraigned: they have tried to disguise by clothing its essential deformity. The attempt is vain. Were it admitted that an infraction of the first notions of immutable justice could be divested of its immoral quality by whatever excuse any perpetrators of such violence might think fit to offer, all land-marks of right and wrong would be at once destroyed. The plea put forward on the present occasion would be invalid were its particulars accurately represented; but they are portrayed with extraordinary incorrectness."

With reference to Mr. Adam's observation, that Sir Charles Metcalfe had not been furnished with specific instructions, Lord Hastings stated, that in that gentleman's former capacity of private secretary to the Governor-general, he had abundant opportunities of becoming intimately acquainted with his Lordship's wishes and intentions, and must have been aware that the reformation he had in view was to be accomplished through the medium of the minister, and by the exercise of advice and influence.

In reply to the remark, that the resident was allowed to proceed in his course without any intimation of the Governor-general's displeasure, Lord Hastings observed, that on receiving a notification of the appointment of European officers to effect a settlement of the revenues, he was embarrassed how to decide. "I was dissatisfied," says his Lordship, "not so much from the inattention shown to my injunctions, as from anticipation of the consequences. Yet, on the other hand, the measure was actually in process, nay, was far advanced in execution, so that interruption of it would discredit the resident, if it had no other bad effect. I thence thought it best to compound with what had been done. Trusting that there would be no farther aberration, the plan was approved."

rather

Neither Mr. Adam nor the other members of Council judged it necessary to continue the discussion

But Sir Charles Metcalfe, in respectful though forcible terms, explained the grounds upon which he relied for the justification of his conduct. From his letter to the Governor-general, which is dated 29th November 1822, it is due to that distinguished public functionary to subjoin some extracts, viz :

"In speaking of our supremacy in India, I did not mean to assert a formal supremacy, established in all cases by written compact. I alluded to the real supremacy which we now universally, and, I did suppose, avowedly exercise. This I consider to have been established beyond dispute by the last war, which subdued all those states who previously might have denied it. This supremacy of the British power, exercised, as I trust it always will be for the happiness of India, I conceive to be the grand political result, if I may take the liberty of expressing the sentiment, which will confer everlasting honour on the administration by which it was accomplished, and entitle it to the gratitude of both countries. I am sorry to see this supremacy questioned, in any degree, by the high authority of the very government which confirmed it. But disavow it as we may, it in reality exists, and we daily in all quarters exercise the rights which it confers, and submit to the duties which it imposes

"The states of India want the materials for a constitution founded on the basis of a balance of power; that towards which they have latterly tended, which seems necessary for their tranquillity and safety, and appears now to be consummated under the patronage of the British Government, is the supremacy of one great state overawing and protecting all the others. This is a favourable modification of the imperial monarchy which before prevailed, and terrible has been the anarchy which between the downfall of the one, and the elevation of the other, has scourged the plains of India

"Power at all times is liable to abuse, but that which is exercised under avowed political supremacy need not be more so than power under any other shape or name. Nay, when it is acknowledged to be attended by duties of a paternal kind, it might be hoped that a sense of those duties might rather tend to mitigate the selfishness of human nature, and qualify the tendency of might towards oppression. If it be true that we exercise supremacy, avowedly or unavowedly, throughout India, it is not less so that we do it, and have long done it, in the particular case of our ally the Nizam" (Sir Charles here notices the restriction placed on his foreign policy, but this is common to all our subsidiary allies) "Even with respect to internal affairs, we stipulate (I allude to past events) that the minister of his choice shall have no share in the administration, and that the subordinate minister of our selection shall exercise exclusive power in the state. Our troops occupy his Highness's country and the vicinity of his capital, while another army, nominally his, is officiated by gentlemen recommended by our representative. Internally as well as externally, his Highness's government is under our protection. If this be not undisguised supremacy, in what does it consist? It is also most probable, and seems certain, that without our support, his country must have fallen a prey to Tippoo, or the Marhattas, or the Pindares, or some successful adventurer, and it appears from the records of this readiness, that the grant of a subsidiary force for the protection of this state against such dangers, was assiduously sought for a considerable time before we acceded to the proposition. The unavoidable consequence of such complete dependence on the one hand, would seem to be acknowledged supremacy on the other

"Supposing this condition of relative supremacy and dependence to be in undoubted existence, it did appear to me to be a legitimate conclusion, that the people were entitled to our protection against grievous oppression, on two grounds—first, because the balance between prince and people usually existing in independent states, was destroyed by the intervention of our foreign army; and, secondly, because the country was despotically governed by a creature of our will, supported by our power

"The conclusion has been overruled by his Excellency the Governor-general in Council, and of course I bow with submission to the decision

"A system of non-interference, founded on regard for the rights of an independent sovereign, if practicable, under the circumstances of our intimate connexion with the Nizam's government, would have great and decided advantages, and is that, I conceive, which we ought to endeavour to establish; provided always, that the irresistible strength which our protection affords to the government be not converted to the oppression of the people

"A system of interference for the protection of the people against oppression, confined to that object, and founded on necessity and political supremacy, which is in fact the system on which I have been acting, under the supposition of its being the one adopted by his Excellency the Governor-general in Council, has also great advantages in the good which it effects; it is the application of paramount power for the relief of suffering humanity. This system embraces the welfare of the people, as well as the welfare of the state and of its rulers. If it be objectionable on the ground of its invading the independence of the sovereign, it is surely less so in a case wherein his independence has been already destroyed

"The measures pursued by me were not proposed authoritatively, nor otherwise than in the most conciliatory manner.

"The authority granted to British officers acting under the Nizam's government, through the intervention of the British resident, to give their attention to the suppression of depredations, robberies, and such crimes as affect the safety of the community, is especially objected to as an ostentatious assumption of the government, and as calculated to agitate the minister by inspiring doubts of our sincerity, and by exposing him to the probable indignation of his master, in consequence of his acquiescence in the exercise of such unqualified power. On this particular point I have to submit the following observations:

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Letter from  
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Charles Grant.

First, that the same authority was exercised before my arrival, in a more direct and ostentatious manner than at present; and it is a remarkable fact, that one of the first acts of my residency was to check the exercise of such authority, which has since been restrained within defined limits. Second, that, however desirable for the peace of the country and the happiness of the people, it forms no essential part of those measures which are peculiarly of my suggestion. Third, that it might, therefore, be discontinued without destroying what I deem most indispensable, if this would reconcile the most noble the Governor-general in Council to the rest of my measures, or if such should be his Lordship's pleasure. Fourth, that this is, however, the least objectionable part of our interference in the eyes of Chundoo Loll, and that its cessation would not be considered as a boon, if the means of checking extortion were retained. It may indeed be said, that in such matters, he frequently requires our assistance.

"I am deeply sensible of the value of the concession which authorizes the continuance of my measures as long as they may be really necessary. By this concession, much as I suffer from the remarks by which it is accompanied, the good effects of our interposition will be maintained and improved."

Lord Hastings took his departure from Calcutta for Europe on the 9th January 1823, leaving Mr. Adam in charge of the government.

It has been stated in a preceding part of this paper, that in the year 1825, Sir Charles Metcalfe was summoned from Hyderabad to Calcutta, and appointed to succeed Sir David Ochterlony at Delhi.

The Court of Directors having disapproved of the degree of interference which had been exercised by Sir Charles Metcalfe in the Nizam's affairs, the system has been subsequently modified; and on the death of the late Nizam, his successor (as already stated) was left at liberty to choose his own minister. He appears, however, to have retained the services of Rajah Chundoo Loll; but from the tenor of the acting resident's (Mr. Ravenshaw's) despatches, it is to be feared that the evils which Mr. Russell and Sir Charles Metcalfe were at so much pains to eradicate, are likely to re-appear and to mar the good work upon which those gentlemen had entered with so much zeal and energy.

*With respect to the Protected States, that is to say, States which are entitled to our protection, but which do not stand to us in the relation of Subsidiary Allies.*

It has been shown in a former part of this paper, that in two notable cases (those of Kurnool and Bhurtপুর) we judged it necessary to interfere authoritatively in the settlement of disputed succession.

In the year 1816, the government of Fort St. George brought to the notice of the Governor-general in Council the state of disorder prevalent in the principality of Kurnool, and recommended certain arrangements which had been suggested by Mr. Chaplin, with a view to retrieve the Nabob's affairs.

The following is the substance of the observations of Lord Hastings in Council, in reply to the reference which had been made to him.—(21st Sept. 1816.)

The wretched condition of the country, the urgent expediency of a reform in its administration, and the inefficiency of any measures but those of a decisive character to remove the evils of the existing system, could not be denied. But the Supreme Government conceived, nevertheless, that they were not only precluded from assuming the administration of Kurnool, but even from imposing those restraints upon the independent exercise of the Nabob's authority, which formed the basis of the arrangement projected by Mr. Chaplin, and recommended by the government of Fort St. George.

It could not be presumed that in giving his assent to the introduction of an improved system of administration into his country, or the reception of a British garrison into his forts, the Nabob meant to surrender any portion of his independent authority, or that he agreed to more than that he himself should introduce a reform in his own administration, and listen to the advice and recommendation of the British Government and its officers in carrying that reform into effect.

With reference to the conditions implied in the Nabob's acquiescence in the above-mentioned arrangement, the Supreme Government saw nothing to justify the imposition of terms which would in reality destroy that independence in the internal management of his country which they considered to be his undoubted right; nor did they think it would be proper to exercise the influence derived from our power, our position, and from past transactions, to such an extent as virtually to bar the Nabob's free agency.

Mr. Chaplin having stated that the British Government, as the paramount authority, possesses the right of legislating for its feudatory, the Supreme Government observed, that "this principle of the feudal institutions of Europe (even if it were of universal and unquestionable application there) cannot be admitted as a rule for determining questions of this nature in a country where, however analogous the general outline of the relation between the paramount and the feudatory state may be to the corresponding connection which anciently existed in Europe, they are attended with the most marked discriminations when pursued into the details."

The Supreme Government were disposed to regard the Nabob as entirely independent of all control in the exercise of his internal government, so long as his capacity of performing his feudal services, or fulfilling his tributary obligations was not destroyed, or at least seriously endangered by his mal administration. The exact limits of non-interference, it was observed, cannot be defined, and must therefore be determined according to the nature of the case, by the paramount state, which must of necessity be the judge. This very circumstance

stance, however, of its being the judge in its own cause, imposes on it the obligation of exercising its right with peculiar delicacy and consideration towards its feudatory, and it must always require a strong case and the most undoubted evidence of delinquency or disability, as well as the proof of every effort having been unsuccessfully employed by the paramount power to correct the evil without resorting to extremity, in order to justify it to the world, and to its own sense of moral right, in visiting the feudatory with the consequences of his failure.

These principles are recommended no less by considerations of expediency and practical convenience, than by a regard to the dictates of political justice. No system of administration resting on the forced or reluctant consent, and exposed to the secret counteraction of the nominal chief of the state, on the one hand, and on the obtrusive and harassing interposition of another power on the other, can offer any fair prospect of promoting the advantage of the country where it prevails, or of fulfilling, in any respect, the expectations with which it may be established. The constant tendency of the government, as far as it is left to be administered by the Native chief and his agents, to degenerate into corruption and oppression, would require the perpetual application of the superior energy and purity of a British administration to correct evils for which the latter would be rendered responsible, by a possession of a share in the government, or the power of interposing at all. To effect this purpose, it would very soon become necessary to assume a degree of authority which would speedily subvert the Native administration, and transfer the direct and exclusive authority of the state to the British Government. We should thus arrive, by a circuitous and indirect course, at the same result, which, if at all to be desired, should be attained by open and decided measures, founded on clear and unambiguous public principles, and justifiable on its own grounds. Experience has shown the embarrassment and inefficiency of this species of mixed government.

The appointment of a dewan, subject to the approbation and control of the British Government, would constitute the worst and most obnoxious species of interference, and would lay the foundation of interminable dissension.

The basis then of an arrangement with the Nabob of Kurnool should be, the exact definition of his feudal and tributary obligations, and the entire independence of his authority in the exercise of the internal administration of his country. This, however, does not exclude our unlimited right of advice, representation and remonstrance; our counsel, however, should be reserved for cases of real consequence; the British agent should study to gain the confidence of the Nabob by manifesting an interest in his affairs, and a desire that they should in all cases appear to be conducted by the direct authority of the chief himself. and although ready to suggest the precise measures of reform which may seem expedient, our agent must not deem it necessary pertinaciously to urge the Nabob to a punctual compliance even with advice which he himself may seek.

Such were the sentiments then expressed by the Supreme Government on a question of interference in the affairs of a state of very minor importance, as compared with some of our subsidiary allies, in whose internal concerns we have not scrupled to exercise a controlling authority. The great principle upon which all are agreed, is, that this species of interference is an evil, and that it is not to be extended beyond the point of necessity. This cannot be ascertained by mere abstract reasoning, but must be determined by a full consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case. The advantage of prescribing non-interference as a general rule, is, that it very properly imposes upon the local government the obligation of showing that, in every instance in which they have departed from it, they have had just cause for so doing.

In the affairs of the *Rajpoot chiefs*, our interference, although it has been exercised on various occasions and in various degrees, has not hitherto extended to the entire management of their affairs, except, perhaps, for a short time at *Oodipore*. No part of India suffered more than this principality from the usurpations of the Mahrattas. Though first in rank, it had been so long and so completely desolated by external and internal enemies, that at the period of time when we became connected with it, it was reduced to the utmost degree of weakness, and appeared to be wholly destitute of the means of forming from among its own subjects an efficient administration. Assistance, both pecuniary and military, was required and afforded with a view to accelerate the restoration of *Oodipore* to a state of prosperity. In the accomplishment of this object considerable difficulties arose out of the predatory habits of some of the inhabitants, and the total incompetence of the reigning prince to conduct the government. The British agent, while he peremptorily urged a change, as alike necessary for the interests of the protecting and protected state, became of necessity the chief instrument by which that change was to be effected; and this necessity appears to have been generally acknowledged by all classes of the people. The success of his endeavours was shown by the realization of an increased amount of revenue, and by the gradual liquidation of the arrears of tribute to the British Government. The prince with whom the treaty was formed died in the year 1828.

"The only thing to lament," says Sir John Malcolm, "in the condition of Mewar (*Oodipore*) is, that necessity which has compelled us to so minute an interference with its collections and internal arrangements. This interference must be gradually withdrawn, or the objects of the alliance will be lost. This country, however, will always require our peculiar care and attention; and in every measure which a regard for our interest and security forces us to adopt, we should mix as much of consideration as is possible for the usages, the pride, and the fallen fortunes of the prince and the dependent Rajahs and Thakours of Mewar."

Appendix, No. 20

Letter from  
B. S. Jones, Esq  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

The authority of the chief of *Joudpore* had, previously to the date of our connexion with him, been seriously affected by the insubordinate conduct of his thakours or barons. The first use he made of the power which he derived from our protection, was to adopt some violent proceedings against them; but in consequence of our mediation, he was induced to treat them with more lenity. We also found it necessary to interpose in behalf of the petty chief of *Serohee* (one of the *Rajpoot* states), against whom the *Rajah* of *Joudpore* had preferred claims to tribute and superiority, which on examination proved to be unfounded. In other respects we have not been called upon to interfere much in the concerns of the *Joudpore* chief.

On the death of the *Rajah* of *Jypore* a good deal of discussion took place in regard to the rightful successor. The regent *Rannee*, by withdrawing her confidence from *Rawul Bhyres Saul*, who was favourable to British interests, occasioned numerous remonstrances, and the exercise of some degree of authority, in order to prevent her from falling under the entire influence of persons who were disaffected to us. Of these, a man named *Jhota Ram*, and *Roopa Badharu*, a female slave, were the most active. We obliged the *Rannee* to banish *Jhota Ram* from *Jypore*, but afterwards permitted him to return, and to be employed as minister. Our proceedings at this court have been of a vacillating character; but it must be admitted that the political agents have had to contend with many local difficulties, and that their conduct is therefore entitled to indulgent consideration. Among those difficulties is to be noted the claims of the thakours, who were accustomed, if not entitled, to exercise a preponderant influence in state affairs.

At the time when disturbances broke out at *Blurtpore*, the Supreme Government were apprehensive, that in case of any failure in our military operations against that fortress, the people of *Jypore*, and of other contiguous states, would have risen up against us. This danger was happily averted by the capture of *Blurtpore*, and the expulsion of *Doorjun Saul*.

The engagements into which we entered with the state of *Kotah*, have proved a source of considerable embarrassment to us. "Our treaty with the late *Rajah* guaranteed by a secret article, the real power of this principality to the Regent *Zalim Sing*, who had for more than 40 years governed *Kotah*. The prince (his uncle) had indeed abandoned to him the exclusive possession of all authority, and appeared through life contented with the respect he received, and at seeing his territories enlarged and ruled in a manner which preserved them, amidst surrounding anarchy, in a state of the highest prosperity.

The treaty with the state of *Kotah* is in the name of the late *Rajah* *Omed Sing*, and the inheritance is guaranteed to his heirs for ever. The name of the Regent *Zalim Sing*, with whom the treaty was concluded, is mentioned only in the supplementary article, by which, however, the entire administration of affairs is vested in him and his heirs for ever.

Both *Zalim Sing* and *Omed Sing* are dead, and their sons succeeded respectively to the authority of regent, and to the station of *Rajah*. Such anomalies are not uncommon in India. A notable instance is found in the power which was exercised by the *Peshwas* for several generations, whilst the legitimate head of the *Mahratta* empire, who had dwindled into a mere pageant, was shut up as a state prisoner, and only occasionally exhibited to the people.

The successor of *Omed Sing* did not inherit his indifference to the exercise of the power properly belonging to him as sovereign.

On the death of *Zalim Sing* the Supreme Government endeavoured to form a separate principality for his family, to consist almost wholly of countries which had been acquired by *Zalim Sing* during his regency. This proposition was, however, peremptorily rejected by the son of *Zalim Sing*. "It was," he said, "calculated to consign his name to eternal infamy as a faithless and treacherous servant, who for his personal aggrandizement, had consented to dismember the principality of which he has charge. This feeling, strange as it may appear in one who reconciles himself to exercise all the power of his discontented prince, is yet quite consonant to the sentiments of the *Rajpoots* upon such subjects, and those of his tribe who regard with approbation *Madhoo Sing's* tenacity of the power bequeathed to him by his father, but would consider him as disgraced for ever, if he consented to such an alienation of the *Kotah* territories."

See Sir John Malcolm's Central India.

As we cannot, with a due regard to our reputation, become parties to any arrangement that shall reduce the son of the chief in whose name our treaty was concluded, to the condition of a state prisoner, we must expect to be called upon from time to time to interpose, in order to effect such arrangements as may tend to reconcile the differences which may arise between the prince and his nominal servant. In process of time it may probably happen that the talent for governing may quit the line of *Zalim Sing*, and attach to that of the prince. In such case the prince may recover the full exercise of power, while the descendant of an able minister may enjoy merely the name, without the authority of that office.

The foregoing narrative affords but a very slight and imperfect sketch of our transactions with the *Rajpoot* states. To do justice to the subject would require a lengthened statement. Some differences of opinion have arisen between the governing authorities as to the policy which should be adopted towards the high-spirited chieftains of *Rajpootana*. Individuals who from the high official stations they have held, as well as from their talents and experience, are well competent to judge of this matter, have strongly recommended that we should withdraw our agents from the courts of those princes, reduce the amount of the tribute which they are bound by treaty to pay to us, and take little or no cognizance of their disputes with each other. It is said that there is no danger of their becoming addicted to predatory

datory courses, and that, as they have been always accustomed to acknowledge a superior, there is little probability of their ceasing to respect the paramount authority of the British Government. The subject is still under consideration at home.

### *Concluding Remarks.*

The foregoing review of our subsidiary alliances affords (it must be confessed) too much ground for the unfavourable opinion which is generally entertained respecting them. The instances have been but rare, in which the prince who acquired a right to our support has manifested much anxiety so to govern as to promote the happiness and prosperity of his subjects. It must also be admitted, that the obligation to support the authority of the prince, when menaced by serious insurrections, has sometimes involved us as parties to measures of which we could not approve, and that, in so doing, we have tarnished the reputation of our government.

Those who have fixed their attention on this feature of the subsidiary system, scruple not to say, that instead of striving to prop up the tottering edifice of Native rule, the sooner it falls the better it will be for the cause of civilization, and that it is highly desirable that our allies should be relieved altogether from the cares and duties of government, and placed upon the pension list.

The sentiment above expressed is evidently based on a conviction of the superior fitness of the British Government to administer the affairs of the allied states beneficially for the people. One may, however, be permitted to doubt whether all the considerations which bear upon this subject have been duly weighed by the advocates for a wider extension of our direct authority.

The mere consciousness of our ability to govern better than our allies cannot for a moment be urged as a reason for setting them aside. We must, therefore, necessarily wait, until by some overt act they forfeit their right and title to our protection and support. The case, moreover, should be such as to render it evident to the people of India that the assumption of the power of the offending state was absolutely forced upon us. Having by the successful issue of arduous contests with warlike nations, secured ourselves from the danger of formidable combinations, it would be discreditable to us to seek pretences for abridging the independence which still remains to states in our neighbourhood.

Granting that our allies have given us too much cause to be displeased with their conduct, it should not be forgotten, that when our connexion was formed with them respectively, they were fast hastening to decay, and that their subjects had not been much accustomed to good government. If our troops have prevented the people from seeking a remedy in revolution, it is not less certain that our residents have constantly endeavoured, by every effort of persuasion, and occasionally by authoritative interference, to correct the vices of the prince's rule, and to protect the people from oppression. It is highly probable that we have prevented at least as much evil as we have unwillingly inflicted upon the subjects of our allies. One great source of evil has been wholly removed by the progress of our power; namely, that which arose from the incursions of cruel predatory bands, and from the frequent wars between the Native princes.

Nor ought we to despair of being able to excite our allies to imitate our example in so far as it is applicable to their respective countries. It may, indeed, be difficult to obliterate in the minds of princes who have once possessed absolute power the recollections of former greatness, but the case ought to be different as respects their successors; these it is to be hoped may be so educated as to become reconciled to the more subordinate stations which they are destined to fill, and the influence of the British residents ought to be exerted to the utmost, with a view to that object. If, under the guise of moderate principles, we cherished a secret desire to subvert the authority of our allies, our acts would falsify all assurances of a contrary tenor, but as the Government both at home and in India desire nothing so much as to be relieved from the necessity of intermeddling with the internal affairs of allied states, there ought to be no great difficulty in impressing our allies with a conviction of this fact, and in making them perceive that it rests with themselves to avoid the humiliation to which they have been occasionally exposed by our interference. Much must necessarily depend upon the character and disposition of our representative at a native court.

The number and variety of political residences and agencies which are required to watch over our interests at the courts of the chiefs with whom we have formed connexions since the date of the Pindary and Mahratta war, must form an excellent school of diplomacy, as it affords the means of ascertaining, by a trial at a minor court, the fitness of an individual for a more important charge.

In reference to the farther extension of our direct authority, it behoves us to bear in mind, that with the purest intentions we have in too many instances failed to effect the good at which we aimed. Our knowledge is still very defective. We have much to learn and much to do in order to repair the evils which have resulted from our well-intentioned innovations.

Among the individuals who have advocated the policy of preserving in existence our subsidiary allies and the tributary states, Sir John Malcolm stands prominently forward, and his opinions are entitled to the utmost deference, from his long experience and acknowledged talents. The following observations have more immediate reference to our tributaries, but the principles here inculcated are also applicable to our subsidiary allies.

"We should," says Sir J. Malcolm, "view with a liberal toleration the errors, the prejudices and abuses which belong to Native rule in its best shape, and we must not allow ourselves to be hurried by the personal inefficiency or defective institutions of those whom

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B. S. Jones, Esq.  
to  
The Right hon.  
Charles Grant.

we desire to reform, into a substitution of our own agents and establishments. The latter have, no doubt, many excellencies, but they have also serious defects; they are destructive of all native rank and authority; the inherent rights of chiefs and the cherished allegiance of their followers, are all swept away, and ties and feelings which originally constituted the strongest links of social order and peace, being outraged and broken, are converted into elements of discontent and rebellion. We must not flatter ourselves that the future operation of this system of government will be attended with as few evils as it has heretofore been. The substitution of our government for the misrule, oppression and anarchy to which they had been exposed, was hailed by those of our new subjects whose habits were commercial and agricultural, while the warlike and turbulent part of the population found employment and subsistence in the service of princes whose territories had not yet been subdued by our arms: but in the whole peninsula of India, there is no longer any escape from subjection to our direct rule, influence or control.

"The rise of our astonishing power has been so rapid, that the great majority of those who are subject to it continue to make favourable comparisons between our government and that of their late masters, but in a very short period, none will remain who can derive consolation from such recollections, and we are not warranted by the history of India, nor indeed of any other nation in the world, in reckoning on the possibility of preserving an empire of such a magnitude, by a system which excludes, as ours does, the natives from every station of high rank and honourable ambition. Least of all would such a system be compatible with the plans now in progress for spreading instruction; for it is certain, that if these plans are not associated with the creation of duties that will employ the minds which we enlighten, we shall only prepare elements that will hasten the destruction of our empire. If we do not use the knowledge we impart, it will be employed against us, and a conviction of this truth should lead to the adoption of every measure which can prepare the way for granting to the natives a greater share than they have yet enjoyed in the government.

"It is not my intention to dwell upon the common-place arguments which have so often been brought forward to prove the necessity of an almost exclusive employment of Europeans in high and respectable stations. The numerous advocates who are (professionally, I might say,) arrayed against every other system, have hitherto, and will, I fear, unless very decided steps are taken to prevent it, continue to beat down the opinion of the few whose opportunities have enabled them to take a more enlarged view of this question, and to consider it as one not of local but of imperial policy.

"The whole complexion and character of our power in India has altered within the last few years. Our influence or rule, as before observed, now embraces the whole of that vast country. High and aspiring men can find no spot beyond the limits of our authority, and such must either be systematically watched and repressed as enemies of our power, or cherished and encouraged as the instruments of its exercise. The petty states can cherish no hope of resisting the power of the British Government, of which they are tributaries and dependents; and if we can succeed in placing their minds at repose as to the continuance of their power over their respective tribes and territories, I have no doubt but that by their gradual reform we may establish a system, calculated beyond any we have yet adopted, to give permanence to our power, and to reconcile the higher as well as the lower ranks of society to our government."

Sentiments of the like tenor will be found in the instructions issued by Sir J. Malcolm, to the officers who acted under him in Central India, which form Appendix No. 8 to the last edition of his Political History, and in his other writings.

If, notwithstanding all our efforts, the inveteracy of misrule should be such as to impose upon us the necessity of interfering to the extent which we have done in the case of the Nizam, it would probably be better to assume ostensibly the entire management of the country, after the example of Travancore, or to appoint a regency, than to profess to administer its affairs in the name of the prince. The suspension of his authority until the evils of his misgovernment shall have been removed, would be likely to have a salutary effect on the minds of princes who have fallen under the influence of evil counsellors. The right reserved in many of our treaties of thus assuming the direct management of the countries of our allies, was evidently designed to facilitate the restoration of the power of which we might for a time judge it necessary to deprive them.

The object of this memoir was to adduce the opinions of the highest authorities upon some of the most important questions which have come under discussion in the administration of the political branch of India affairs. The writer is aware that the method which he has adopted of giving the opinions of those authorities in their own words, has tended to lengthen his narrative, and that it is not free from repetitions: but he trusts that, upon the whole, this compilation from official documents may afford to those who may wish to acquire a knowledge of our political transactions, the means of forming a correct judgment upon the merits of those transactions.

He has ventured to subjoin a correspondence which took place several years ago, between himself and the late Brigadier-General Walker, upon a question of speculative policy. The observations of so distinguished a public officer are far too valuable to be reserved as private papers.

B. S. Jones.

Letter to the  
Chairman and  
Deputy Chairman  
of the E. I. Com-  
pany, dated 25  
April 1827.

LETTER from *B. S. Jones, Esq.* to *Lieut-colonel Alexander Walker*, dated  
India Board, December 5, 1817.

My dear Sir,

I AVAIL myself of a period of leisure to write to you upon a subject which I know has occupied your thoughts. The question which I wish to submit to you is, Whether it be practicable, without endangering the safety of our Indian empire, to arrest its progress towards further extension, or even to contract its present limits? When I held the situation of private secretary to Lord Melville, I perused a paper of yours, in which you gave an affirmative answer to this question. I will candidly acknowledge that I was not converted to your opinion. This was probably owing to the impression which had been previously made upon my mind by the representations of our political agents in various parts of India, who all concurred in pointing out the necessity of a great exertion of our power for the suppression of an intolerable nuisance; namely the rapid growth of predatory bodies, who invaded and plundered with impunity not only the territories of our allies, but our own provinces. This evil is attributed to the neutral system of policy which had been adopted by the successors of Lord Wellesley, and the remedy recommended is, to follow up the system projected by his Lordship, which, as you are aware, had for its object the establishment of our supremacy, by constituting the British Government the arbiter of all disputes which might arise among the states and chiefs of India.

Such an enlargement of our dominion and political influence appears to have been regarded by the diplomatic gentlemen above alluded to, not as an evil to be deprecated and avoided, but as a consummation devoutly to be wished. The home authorities, however, are quite free from any such passion; they have uniformly discouraged the multiplication of our political connexions, and were seriously alarmed at the magnitude of Lord Wellesley's scheme.

Lord Cornwallis, during the few months that he survived his second arrival in India, had determined, among other measures of a moderate and pacific tendency, to emancipate the Nizam, and eventually our other allies, from that strict control which his predecessor had exercised over their proceedings; and Sir George Barlow very earnestly prepared to carry his Lordship's intentions into effect. He, however, soon perceived that the certain effect of any relaxation of the control established at the court of Hyderabad, would be to encourage a faction decidedly hostile to British interests, and that the only chance of preserving the alliance of the Nizam was to continue those restraints which had been imposed upon him. The dissolution of the alliance with the Rajah of Jyepore, which was one of Sir George Barlow's measures, proved no boon to Simla. The country, soon after our resident withdrew, was overrun by the licentious troops of Meer Khan, and the Rajah never ceased to accuse us of having wantonly delivered him up as a prey to an upstart adventurer, who was known to entertain the most rancorous hostility against our government. Lord Minto found it expedient to extend our protection to the Seik chiefs south of the river Sutlege, though at the hazard of a war with Runjeet Sing. To have tacitly permitted him to subjugate the country which separated him from our frontier in the northern part of Hindostan, would undoubtedly have increased the chances of collision with Runjeet Sing.

Another of Lord Minto's measures also very nearly involved us in extensive hostility. I allude to his determination to defend the Rajah of Nagpore, when his country was invaded by Meer Khan with a numerous army of Patanas and Pindaries. This, although an arrangement strictly defensive, nevertheless constituted a literal infraction of the legislative enactment which prohibits the governments in India from going to war, except in cases when the British dominions, or those of its allies, are attacked or seriously threatened. The Rajah of Nagpore was not an ally. You recollect that a numerous army took the field upon this occasion under Sir Barry Close, and that a considerable detachment, commanded by General Martindell, co-operated with him on the side of Bundelcund. I should think that the force thus assembled was little short of 30,000 men, and if Sir Barry Close had been empowered by Lord Minto to pursue the invader, and to destroy or disperse his predatory host, it is extremely probable that our political relations might have been placed nearly upon the footing on which they stood when Lord Wellesley left India. Thus, then, it would appear, that circumstances have arisen to oblige us, in some degree, to revert to the policy of Lord Wellesley. I should add that, with a view to prevent such a chief as Meer Khan from establishing his power on the ruins of the comparatively pacific Hindoo principality of Nagpore, Lord Minto sought an alliance with the Rajah, in whose territories it was proposed to station a British force. Owing to the jealousy of the Rajah's character, the negotiation proved abortive. On the death of that prince, in the course of the last year, however, a disputed succession afforded Lord Hastings an opportunity of effecting this object, and thus, out of the five principal members of the Mahratta confederation, three have actually subscribed to the general defensive alliance projected by Lord Wellesley; that is to say, they have resigned their political independence.

The present state of India portends the near approach of a crisis long foreseen by those, both at home and abroad, who have watched the progress of events; and I am prepared to expect, that whether it arrives this year or a year or two hence, we shall be forced to resort to measures which will not only extend our dominions, but establish our political supremacy. The description of marauders, known by the name of Pindaries, who, time immemorial, attended the Mahratta armies in their expeditions (and whose employment was to go out with foraging parties, and to perform the other services of a plundering body), have, of late years, increased very considerably in numbers; they are still the professed servants of Sindia and Holkar, but are under little subordination to their nominal masters. One of the con-

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to  
*Lt. Col Walker*  
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sequences of the Mahratta war was to let loose a large proportion of the military population, which the diminished resources of the humbled enemy could no longer support : many of these have become associated with the Pindarries, whose usual stations upon the northern banks of the Nerbudda afford the best facilities for those predatory incursions which they are in the practice of making annually into the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwa and the Rajah of Nagpore. Having as already stated, long carried on this species of warfare with impunity, and probably finding it difficult to satisfy their growing wants with the plunder obtained within that limited range, they have lately burst into the richer provinces subject to British rule, and not only carried off an immense booty, but, as usual, destroyed nearly as much property as they captured, and perpetrated the most horrid cruelties upon the defenceless inhabitants, and thus in spite of expensive military arrangements, which had for several seasons been made for the protection of our frontier. We should certainly have been justified, long ago, in entering upon a course of active hostility, in order to suppress so great an evil ; and this would probably have been done had there not been reason to believe that Sindia and Holkar, and some other states, would, covertly, if not openly, have opposed a systematic attempt to extirpate a body of men upon whose co-operation they might reasonably calculate, in the event of a future war with the British power. The danger of precipitating a war of that nature has hitherto deterred the British Government from extending its operations in the mode alluded to, but the outrage which has been committed in the territories subject to the Madras Government must necessarily compel us to make a vigorous effort to destroy such an abominable pest.

I have said in a former part of this letter, that the approach of the present crisis has been long foreseen by persons both abroad and at home. I beg your permission to subjoin an extract from a paper which I wrote in the beginning of the year 1813, upon the subject of the predatory associations. Having, in the course of that paper, stated most of the facts explanatory of the political state of India as affected by the proceedings of the Pindarries, but more especially of Meer Khan (whose talents and ambition were then highly estimated) and having adverted to many of the arguments which had been urged in favour of a prompt and strenuous exertion of our power for the establishment of a better order of things, the paper proceeded as follows : " But it will be proper to consider the objections which may be made to such a decision. These have reference to the injunctions of the Legislature, and the corresponding principles hitherto recognized and avowed by the Government at home, to the obligations of existing treaties ; to the state of our finances, and to the dangers and evils attendant on extended empire. It will be said that the Legislature has not merely interdicted aggressive warfare, having territorial acquisition for its avowed or concealed object, but that the spirit of the law is adverse even to the legitimate exercise of our power and influence beyond the degree which self-defence absolutely requires, and that to adopt the course of policy now proposed, when viewed in connexion with its probable consequences, would constitute not a partial deviation, but a total departure from those principles which the Legislature has enjoined, and which the Government at home has avowed and enforced. It must be remembered, however, that our situation in India at the present moment is essentially different from what it was when the legislative enactment above alluded to was passed. By the prowess of our arms, by the success of our negotiations, and by the unresisted exertion of our authority,\* our territorial dominion has been vastly extended. Some of the measures which produced this state of things have indeed excited discussion in Parliament, but they have not been condemned by that high tribunal. In the year 1784 we were a preponderating state, in the midst of many other considerable states ; but there is now scarcely a single state that deserves to be reckoned as a power, for that term could not with propriety be applied to the few native chiefs, who, though still retaining the name of independent, having been crippled and degraded in their recent struggle with the British Government, are rapidly falling to decay. There is now a regular government in one scale, and little else than predatory hordes and prostrate states in the other. The latter of these (namely, the Rajpoots) implore us to save them from becoming a prey to the former. It is certain that the predatory chiefs (especially Meer Khan) are actuated by a rancorous enmity to the British power, and the dictates of humanity concur with those of prudence in recommending the policy of extending our protection to the minor states of India. But here arises an objection founded on the obligations of existing treaties with Sindia and Holkar, which restrict us from having any concern with the Rajpoot states, with the single exception of the Rajah of Jyepore. But as the renewal of the alliance with that chief would but partially effect the object in view, it might be proper to call peremptorily upon Sindia and Holkar to repress those tumults and disorders which menace the tranquillity of our frontier provinces ; to tender our assistance in obliging Meer Khan in returning to his jaghere ; and our mediation, in adjusting the tributary claims of Sindia and Holkar on the Rajpoot chiefs. Whatever might be the tenor of Sindia's answer to such a demand, that of Holkar, whose counsels are guided by Meer Khan, would at the best be evasive. But there is reason to believe that the family of the late Jeswant Row Holkar would gladly accept of the assistance of the British Government to rid themselves of the domineering authority which Meer Khan has usurped at Holkar's durbur. If, however, we come forward for the purpose of repressing disorder, we must be prepared for the contingency of encountering the opposition of both Sindia and Holkar. Happily, our military force is in a high state of efficiency. In the last place, we must not shut our eyes to the probable consequence of a successful attempt to suppress the predatory armies. It

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\* As in the case of the Carnatic and Tanjore.

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is quite evident that the principle upon which our interference would proceed, must eventually lead to the formation of alliances with Sindia and Holkar of a nature similar to those which exist with the Nizam and the Peshwa, and with the Rajah of Berar.\* The avowed object of these alliances is to confine each state within well defined limits, and to constitute the British Government the judge in all their national claims and disputes. If we once assume the character of conservators of the peace of India, we must have the power of stationing our troops in the most advantageous positions; and for all military purposes our dominions in the east would be united to those on the west of India. A political change of this magnitude and extent must necessarily have its peculiar dangers and disadvantages. We should, indeed, incur a heavy responsibility; and it will not be one of the least of our difficulties to provide for the numerous natives of rank who would be displaced by European agency. The army too, when no longer excited by occasions worthy of its exertion, may either lose its ardour, or become licentious and uncontrollable. Many other sources of danger present themselves to our view when we contemplate the acquisition of an extensive empire, embracing a complexity of discordant materials. In the present state of our dominion, however, these dangers already exist in a very considerable degree. We have, therefore, a choice of evils, and in making that choice, it behoves us to consider, whether by accepting, we shall incur a greater evil than by declining the sceptre of the Moguls."

You will perceive in the foregoing observations an evident bias towards the more adventurous course of policy. But supposing the actual establishment of a federal supremacy over all the states of India south of the river Indus, there is still much reason to doubt whether we could stop at that point. Our allies, melt in our hands. Exonerated from the duty of providing against external danger, and, consequently, losing the pride of independence, they either become addicted to sensual indulgencies, or are seized with the passion of hoarding up money in their private treasuries. The errors of their administration become our reproach, and we are thence urged on from one degree of interference to another, until at length we relieve them from the cares of government, and place them on the list of stipendiaries.

Nor can we be certain that even the Indus would permanently remain our boundary. A new vicinity begets a new enmity. Neither rivers, nor mountains, nor the ocean itself can restrain the progress of an ambitious power, or afford permanent security to a pacific state. It was, and perhaps is still, a proverbial saying, that Cabul and Candahar are the gates of Hindostan. I recollect that, in recommending the policy of contracting our limits, you referred to the example of Hadrian, who abandoned the Eastern conquests of Trajan. Hadrian's successors, however, repaired the bounds which he had prescribed: whether, in so doing, they were actuated by a mere lust of dominion, or by an apparent necessity of correcting some evils which had grown up on the eastern frontier of the empire, I have not, at hand, the means of ascertaining. But it is time to recall you to the question proposed, namely, How is a continental nation, surrounded by warlike and aggressive neighbours, to fix a permanent limit to its dominion? In discussing it, I do not require you to deal with the existing state of our political affairs, which I should consider as probably less favourable than almost any past period of our history to the adoption of your scheme. I will, for the sake of argument, concede to you that our boundaries are adjusted upon the wisest military and political principles, such as you yourself would recommend, and that the relative power of the neighbouring states is fairly balanced. Offences will nevertheless arise; and how are we to act in cases of aggression, so as to avoid the deadly evil of extending our boundaries? It appears to me that our choice of measures must be limited to the following courses: 1st, Simply to repel the aggressor, 2dly, To repel him, and to exact a pecuniary penalty proportioned to the expense which we may have incurred in the war, 3dly, To dethrone him, and to raise up a ruler of a more pacific character, 4th, To dismember his territories, taking however no share of them for ourselves, finally (if all these expedients should fail), to resort to the barbarous expedient of ravaging and desolating his territory, expelling or destroying the inhabitants, and thereby establishing a desert on our frontier. I will not pretend to say that I may not have overlooked some other mode of effecting the desired purpose of remaining stationary, without impairing our security or compromising our honour; but they do not occur to me. It would, however, afford me much satisfaction if you should be able to prove from historical examples, from the general principles of human action, or from the peculiar character and circumstances of our Eastern dominion, that it will be possible to arrest the career of our power, or even to retrace our steps. It would not, however, be fair to withhold from you some observations which I submitted a few years ago to the President of the India Board, with reference to a proposal which had been brought forward by a member of one of the subordinate governments in India for relinquishing the territories which we had acquired in commutation of pecuniary subsidies. The gentleman alluded to, whose talents rendered him well worthy of attention, conceived it practicable to establish a balance of power in India. My observations were to the following effect:

"That there are dangers attendant upon extensive dominion, and that an addition of territory operates not unfrequently as a subtraction from real power, cannot be denied. There are, also, circumstances peculiar to our Eastern empire which render obvious the impolicy

\* The subsidiary treaty with the Rajah of Berar, or Nagpore, was concluded 27th May 1816.  
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impolicy of spreading over a wide surface that ingredient of our military strength, of which the supply is always costly, and sometimes (as during an extensive war in Europe) deficient. But it is by no means certain that our situation would be at all improved by a voluntary contraction of our territorial limits. Setting aside all the embarrassing questions which would arise between us and our allies, the inconveniences to the numerous civil and military officers who must be thrown out of employ, and the inhumanity of handing over to Native rapacity and murder a large population, now enjoying security of life and property under our Government; supposing, in short, the scheme to be as easy of execution as its most strenuous advocates can desire, it is far from evident that it would ensure the beneficial consequences which they anticipate from the scheme. These are said to be, the establishment of a balance of power, the extinction of those feelings of jealousy and of secret enmity which have been engendered in the minds of Native princes by our conquests and domination, and the comparative security and tranquillity which would be derived from the conversion of that jealousy and secret enmity into a feeling of cordial amity, to which is to be added the advantage that would result from the concentration of our military force.

"Now, in order to place the Native states in the situation indicated by the term 'balance of power,' (a state of affairs which is said to have existed antecedently to the conquest of the Mysore,) it would be necessary to give up not merely the cessions obtained from our allies for the maintenance of the British subsidiary troops, but also the territories wrested from the late Tippoo Sultan and from the Marhattas, in our wars with those powers. But is it certain that even such a voluntary sacrifice of territorial and political resources would ensure the friendship of the Native states? The policy of such unprecedented acts of generosity could scarcely be apprehended by chiefs of warlike and predatory habits. The probability is, that they would regard the abandonment of so large and valuable a portion of our possessions as a certain sign of our inability to retain them, and that they would confidently reckon upon the declension of our power, and unless, in establishing this balance of power in India, we could eradicate from the minds of the Native governments that lust of conquest, and those irregular habits which are inherent in their political system, and at the same time inspire them with those just and moderate principles which are professed, but not always practised, even by the Christian states that constitute the Commonwealth of Europe, nothing is more likely than that the balance would be destroyed in a shorter space of time than had been occupied in its adjustment. But can it be intended, that after having bestowed such elaborate pains, and made such costly sacrifices for the sake of establishing this balance of power, we should thenceforward confine our attention exclusively to the internal concerns of our own dominions, and leave the balance to take care of itself? The supposition is absurd. The balance must be preserved by the power that formed it; and if the movements of any of the other states should disturb its equipoise, the weight of our influence, and that failing, the force of our arms must be exerted for the purpose of restoring the equipoise. We might thus again be involved in extensive warfare, and if our military exertions were crowned with the same degree of success as heretofore, we should, at the best, be gradually reconducted to the elevated position which we now occupy. It would hence appear to be the part of wisdom, strenuously to maintain that ascendancy which accident or necessity, rather than design or choice, have conferred on the British power in the East, an ascendancy which affords the best hope of preserving the general peace of India, and of giving permanence to the dominion which we have acquired in that quarter of the globe."

To adopt the emphatical words of the late Mr. Nathaniel Smith, I would say, that "self-preservation first awakened us, and conquest gained us the great advantages we enjoy; that force only can preserve them, that we must be all or nothing, that it is better to die at once, than to waste away by inches."

With sentiments of sincere esteem and respect, I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours most faithfully,  
(signed) B. S. Jones.

(Enclosure, No. 1.)

(Enclosure No. 1.) LETTER from Lieut.-colonel Alexander Walker, to B. S. Jones, Esq., dated Bowland, January 31, 1818.

Letter from  
Lt.-Col Walker  
to  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
Jan. 31, 1818.

My dear Sir,

THE relaxations of Christmas are at last over; and I may now sit down, without the fear of interruption, to reply to the important query contained in your letter of the 5th ultimo. I shall endeavour to acquit myself of my promise by delivering my sentiments with freedom and candour; but the subject is of the most momentous nature, and surrounded by uncommon difficulties. The conflicting passions of ambition, and a violent collision of public with private interests, which must be deeply affected by the decision of the question, are powerful impediments against an impartial judgment. It would be impossible for the mere effort of argument and reason to reconcile so many clashing views. Such an attempt would be hopeless; and I shall be satisfied if I can convince you that it is practicable to fix a limit to our territorial dominion in India.

The acquisition to Britain of territory in India was not an object which entered at all into the contemplation of the early adventurers. The views of the British Government differed

in this respect from those of the nations who first followed the newly discovered tract by the Cape of Good Hope. The armaments of the Portuguese were fitted out by an active and warlike monarch, who united the ambition of conquest with the desire of extending the commerce of his country. The Portuguese navigators shared with the Spaniards the habit of taking possession, in the name of their sovereign, of every lately discovered territory. The countries which they visited in the Eastern quarter of the world were too populous, powerful, and regularly governed, to afford any pretence for the exercise of such a lawless conduct. The impression, however, derived from former habits had doubtless a great share in prompting that spirit of daring aggression which characterised the proceedings of the Portuguese in India.

The Dutch were a nation with habits more purely mercantile; but the hopes of a lucrative commerce were not the sole motive that led them to venture into the Indian seas. The very hostile relations which subsisted between them and Philip II., then master of Portugal, made them feel that a footing in those regions could only be maintained by force of arms. They made it therefore from the first an object to acquire fortified settlements. Their ambitious and distrustful policy would admit no rivals. The progress of the Dutch was marked by every kind of secret and open violence, against whoever attempted to share with them advantages, which they wished to render exclusively their own.

From the above causes both those nations had frequent recourse to arms, and both sought to acquire an influence in the political affairs of India. Their dominion, however, was confined to the sea coast, and to insular situations. Neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch obtained the possession of any extensive tract of territory in the interior of the country, but they acquired great opulence, splendour and power.

Their ambition was amply gratified with overawing the sovereigns of India, with directing their councils and controlling their commerce, while their chief pecuniary advantages were derived from trade and piracy. In pursuing this career, those nations acquired a great political preponderance in India; but they were universally the objects among the Native powers of hatred, distrust and jealousy; they were almost continually in a state of war, their finances became embarrassed, and their commerce declined. This happened during a magnificent period of their government, and of successful military achievements.

The early intercourse of England with India was guided by different principles; it was sanctioned by the Government, but did not owe its origin to this source, the concern was private, and the public took no share in its management. The first intercourse with India was entirely the work of an association of mercantile adventurers, who had trade and profit alone in view. If the vessels were armed, such a precaution was rendered absolutely necessary by the uncertain encounters of a long voyage, by the habits of piracy which were indulged in by almost every European nation who at that time frequented the Indian seas, and by the prevalence of the same habit among the maritime nations of Asia. At the period in question, also, we were at open war with Portugal, whose power prevailed throughout the whole course of the navigation which led to these new sources of wealth and aggrandizement. The letter of Queen Elizabeth to the different sovereigns of India, sent out with the first fleet, merely entreats that her subjects may be allowed to do business in their ports, and to leave a few factors who may learn the language and the mode of conducting trade, but does not express any wish for permission to erect fortifications. In this pacific and dependant state was the trade for a short time conducted. It was soon found, however, that such a situation gave rise to many inconveniences. Although the sovereigns of India were everywhere disposed to receive Europeans with cordiality, and to facilitate their commercial operations, yet the fluctuating state of their power, the caprices to which they were liable, and the misrepresentations which could easily be made to them, rendered the protection which they afforded by no means effectual. Even where the prince was well disposed, many opportunities of plunder and imposition were within the reach of his inferior and distant agents, who seldom scrupled to enjoy them. A still more urgent danger, and one which could be stated without reserve to the Native governments, arose from the enmity of other European nations, who all sought with the most eager hostility to extirpate every rival establishment.

Upon these principles the agents of the Company early began their applications to the different governments of India for leave to fortify their factories, and we do not find that any difficulty was in general experienced. It may be observed, indeed, that the behaviour of the Indian states towards mercantile adventurers from all the European nations was uniformly friendly and encouraging. The rich and varied products of their territories rendered the favourable reception of strangers a peculiar part of their policy. Most of the chiefs and princes too had either commercial transactions of their own, or levied high customs on those of their subjects. These formed in some instances, no inconsiderable sources of their revenue. The arrival of European navigators, therefore, was not only welcomed, but sometimes the event was celebrated with pomp and magnificence. Gama, in writing an account to Europe of his first reception at Calicut, says, "They little think in Portugal what honours are done us here." Cabral, in the same manner, was received not only favourably, but with the warmest expressions of joy. In both cases, it is true, this harmony was soon interrupted, but this was owing, according to their own statement, entirely to the misrepresentations of the Arab merchants, who were jealous of being supplanted by them. Are we sure that the Arabs misrepresented them, and that these accusations had no foundation? Certainly some of the measures which they took, admitting them, as they say, to have been adopted in their own redress, were of a very violent nature, and such as might reasonably have excited the suspicion and enmity of the Native governments. From the beginning of their appearance in India, the proceedings of the Portuguese were of a descrip-

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tion to cause the most unfavourable impressions of European nations. Subsequently, the attack upon Ormuz by their celebrated commander Albuquerque, without the slightest alleged ground of quarrel, his capture of a ship of Calicut, immediately after the conclusion of peace with the Zamorin, and the regular system of piracy which he carried on, seizing every vessel he met, exhibit a systematic violation of all the rights of nations to which it would be difficult to find a parallel. By these and other means not much more justifiable, the Portuguese succeeded in establishing an extensive dominion. It would however have been wonderful if that nation had not become, under such circumstances, the object of general dread and aversion among the powers of India.

The Dutch give accounts no less flattering of the favourable reception which they experienced from the Native sovereigns. This was indeed influenced by the general disgust which the violence and injustice of the Portuguese had inspired. They found no obstacle, it appears, to the erection of forts, except the unwillingness of the natives to work at them, but if they chose to erect fortifications themselves, full permission was given. It does not appear that this nation, in their conduct to the natives, ever proceeded to such extremities of violence as the Portuguese. For a long time weak, and struggling at home for their independence, they were obliged to exhibit at least a show of moderation, and to consult the favour of the inhabitants. The outrages by which their conduct in India was marked were committed chiefly against the rival European nations. It is worthy of remark, that the Dutch established their power in India by forming alliances with the Native princes, by serving as auxiliaries, and by subsidiary engagements, resembling in their principle and their result those which have since been pursued with much greater success by the English Company.

If we search the narrations of the early British adventurers, we shall find that they had equal cause to be satisfied with their reception from the sovereigns of India. Lancaster was received at Acheen with the same pomp of rejoicing and of respect which Gama had experienced at Calicut, nor was his reception at Bantam less cordial. All the complaints which are made of the treatment which the English experienced in those islands are directed against the Dutch only, never against the natives. In like manner all the embassies to the Mogul were successful, though the court of that monarch was filled with the enemies of the English. The utmost exertions of these persons were only able to obstruct or retard, not finally to intercept, the bounties of the monarch. Repeated instances may be given in which the English were not only permitted, but asked and entreated to establish factories, and sometimes even when they were seen sailing along the coast, vessels were sent out for the purpose of inviting them. A factory, with the English, did not originally mean anything more than the mere settlement of a few agents in any particular place, but without any provision made for their defence. I have noticed the reasons that made the Company soon sensible of the inconvenience of this dependent situation. So early as the year 1611, an offer was made to Middleton of a place and harbour to fortify. At Surat the English were permitted, by successive firmans from the Mogul emperors, to erect fortifications, and they were able to resist the whole force of Savani, Aragon, Madias, Calcutta, Anjengo, and other places on the coast of Bengal, Coromandel and Malabar, were in like manner granted by the local governments, with full liberty to erect fortifications. The Native sovereigns were sensible that the trade could not otherwise be carried on with any security against European rivals, and they never, at this time, dreaded that these consciousness could ultimately prove fatal to themselves.

Upon this system the Company acted for a very long period, using their fortified stations not as sources of power or revenge, but merely as places of security and commercial depôts. The first time that they appear to have been inspired with any desire of conquest was in 1687, when Governor Child was at the head of the administration of affairs in India. This man's ambition was excited by the instructions of the Company to their agents, in which they merely however pointed out Salsette and Bassein as useful appendages to Bombay, to which they wished to add Chittagong, on the eastern frontier of Bengal. Child, with more confidence and courage than the event or his resources justified, entered into a war with the Mogul empire. The disastrous result of this contest seems to have withdrawn the views of the Company from schemes of conquest; and having succeeded in restoring an amicable intercourse with the Mogul, they reverted to their ancient system of rendering their possessions subservient only to the purposes of commerce. It was not till the middle of the eighteenth century that this system was permanently abandoned.

The French began to establish themselves on the coast of Coromandel towards the end of the seventeenth century. Pondicherry became the rival of Madras. Whenever a war broke out in Europe between the two nations the flame extended to India. A great political interest was now attached to the events which took place in that distant part of the world, and the Company, while they extended their own power, conceived that they were promoting the interest and glory of their country.

In the prosecution of this contest it was natural to seek auxiliaries among the princes of the country. Accordingly, by espousing respectively the opposite pretensions of two rivals, each secured an ally and confederate. This connexion furnished them with the means of supporting war, and with arguments for carrying it on. Under the character of auxiliaries, they were sometimes engaged in hostilities in India, while the nations remained at peace in Europe. Under the plea of maintaining the claims of their allies, they pursued insensibly schemes of ambition and aggrandizement for themselves. From these transactions, however, a natural but unforeseen consequence arose. The native troops co-operating on both sides with Europeans, were necessarily committed against European armies, and the fatal secret was then disclosed of their utter inability to contend with such adversaries. It appeared

appeared that while the troops of the two rival nations engaged, those of their allies were little more than spectators; that vast armies fled before a handful of Europeans, and that a British or French army of a few thousand men would find nothing in Hindostan that could stand before it. This discovery of the utter weakness of so opulent and renowned an empire, opened prospects, almost boundless, to the avarice and ambition of Europeans. It was not in human nature to resist so brilliant a prize. The rivalry, however, and the nearly equal power of Britain and France in the Carnatic, formed a balance which preserved for some time longer its independence.

The first origin of war in Bengal cannot, as in the Carnatic, be traced to European ambition. The ambition of Surajah Dowlah was unprompted and atrocious. A just cause of war was afforded, and we re-established ourselves in that celebrated region by a series of splendid victories. The same effect, when hostilities commenced, followed, as in the Carnatic, and in a manner still more conspicuous. At the memorable battle of Plassey, a numerous army fled before a handful of British troops, and fully established their superiority over the armies of India. The French settlement in Bengal soon yielded to this ascendancy. They were reduced, and the field was left entirely open to the progress of the British arms. The resistance made by the Native powers was overcome without delay, and in the course of a few years Bengal, Behar and Orissa were added to our dominion, or placed under our protection. These operations produced another very extraordinary result, which formed a new era in the military annals of India, and the consequences of which we have not yet perhaps seen in all their extent. From its abundant population we have created soldiers. By training its inhabitants to arms, and by introducing amongst them our military regulations, they have been made to rival and oppose the armies of Europe. By means of discipline and subordination they have become the principal instruments of our power and influence in India. By carefully attending to their wants and prejudices, we have given them new habits of life, and have finally employed them successfully in foreign conquests. But we must not forget that these are the same men who were defeated with ease, and almost without resistance, at Plassey. The change has been produced by means not very difficult, and which others may resort to. In fact, the example has not been lost, and every subsequent war in India has been more arduous and obstinately disputed.

It was the opinion of Lord Clive and of Mr. Hastings, certainly very competent judges, that the acquisition of territory in India might have stopped with the possession of the Bengal provinces, and that any further addition would become a burden, instead of a benefit to the British nation: this too either was, or soon became, the general opinion at home. The Court of Directors never ceased inculcating upon their servants abroad the expediency of a defensive system, of a regard to the rights of the Native princes, and a strict adherence to the treaties concluded with them. This mode of proceeding was warmly approved by Parliament, in the course of the inquiries which that assembly instituted into the affairs of the Company. They passed on the 9th of April 1782, a series of resolutions, expressing their sense and approbation of the policy as well as justice by which the orders of the Court of Directors were dictated, but lamented that they should have been so little observed. Both in the Act of 1784 and in that of 1793, which placed the concerns of the Company under new regulations, a preamble was introduced to this effect, "To pursue schemes of conquest and of extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of this nation." Yet with this impression, strong in the minds both of the Company and of Parliament, schemes of conquest were prosecuted without interruption, and provinces after provinces were added to the British dominion. The prohibition of the Legislature has been uniformly disregarded by every succeeding Government in India, and the violation has been uniformly sanctioned by the thanks of Parliament: the law therefore has ceased to exist.

It would however be unjust to conclude that the wars of the Company in India have been always produced by ambition and the desire of dominion: nothing would be more erroneous than this conclusion. They have been produced by those natural causes which force nations into hostility in every period of society, and which have a continual operation in the direction of human affairs. The situation of the Company, in the character and station of an independent power, rendered a recurrence to war unavoidable.

It would be wrong, for example, to say that the war with Tippoo was solely prompted by ambition. The hostile disposition of that prince, and the intimate alliance which he had formed with France, gave him the character of an open and decided enemy. His power was dangerous to our existence, and it was absolutely necessary for our safety that it should be reduced: the result was his destruction, and the extension of our dominion, an event the inseparable attendant of success. It was equally incompatible with our security in India to allow the French brigades at Hyderabad, and those under the banners of the same nation, in the service of Sindia, to remain.

Even the interference in the affairs of the Mahrattas, and the wars which have resulted from it, originated in views of safety: they ended, however, in magnificent schemes of policy and of pure ambition. From this period we have aimed at becoming the sole arbiters of India: from this time at least the system of our government has been deeply coloured with the spirit of conquest. The vast accumulation of territory which we take every means of increasing, by war and by negotiation, is a proof of this spirit. By means of subsidiary alliances and by the dominion actually in our possession, the Company control or influence a far greater extent of country than the empire of Darius contained. We imagine, however, that our power is not complete while Sindia and Holkar maintain their independence. We have, perhaps, already succeeded in compelling them to submit to our yoke; but shall we then have succeeded in establishing peace and tranquillity in India? The con-

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federate system may be complete, but will this secure the co-operation of the chiefs for the general defence and security of Hindostan, or will it render them, on the contrary, the associates, avowed or secret, of the first enemy? The losses which these chiefs have sustained, will make them less able and more unwilling to contribute their aid. In forming those arrangements, too little or too much has been done; the means of resistance and of attack are only diminished. It is not possible to calculate, according to the usual principles which guide human actions, that the power remaining in their hands will be zealously and effectively employed in any plan very conducive either to our views or interest. The desire of revenge, and of recovering their losses, cannot but exist: it will be present incessantly to their minds, and the first opportunity will be embraced of recovering the situation of which they have been deprived by us. We have left wounds in every quarter, and produced everywhere discontent: the confidence which was once reposed in our moderation and justice is gone. We have made use of treaties, contracted solely for protection, as the means of making violent demands, and of rivetting our chains. Every individual almost above the common artisan and labourer suffers by our system of government.

I have produced this picture with great reluctance; but it is necessary to show the state of the public feeling towards us, and the uncertain reliance of any support from our allies in any case of dangerous extremity. This is the result of the natural course of things, and belongs to the circumstances of our situation. The system of policy followed in India has been the natural consequence of the relative situation of the respective powers. Without any preconcerted plan, or even wish of extending their dominion, the Company have insensibly, and step by step, obtained possession of nearly the whole of that immense empire. This is the never failing result of strength and ability on the one hand, of wealth and weakness on the other. In the course of these transactions the Company have often manifested a spirit of remarkable moderation and justice. The schemes of ambition and of aggression are principally to be laid to the charge of their agents; but even of their conduct, it may be remarked, that if it cannot always be justified, it was the consequence of circumstances, and such as would have been followed by any other men of talents, who had a great field suddenly opened to them of honour and preferment.

But great and preponderating as the Company's influence is in India, it is imperfect, and exercised under too many impediments for the equitable and proper administration of the affairs of the country. It is utterly impossible for a small number of Europeans to superintend the concerns of a population of 60 or 80 millions; but this apparently irreparable defect can only affect those provinces under the undivided dominion of the Company: the effects of our system on the rest of India are still more deplorable. To the imbecile and powerless state to which we have reduced the Native governments, we must ascribe all the disorders that have lately disturbed the country. The first effect of their unsuccessful contests with us was the necessary discharge of a great part of their armies, who no longer finding regular pay and subsistence, and having arms in their hands, have been obliged to maintain themselves by robbery and violence. The same thing would have happened in Europe after the defeat and dispersion of the French armies, had not the spirit of licentiousness and rapine been restrained, by the presence of the forces which the allies have kept on foot. By reducing the Native powers to this weak and degraded state, we have deprived them of the ability, and perhaps of the inclination of erasing disturbances, which they may think more hurtful to us than to themselves. They may hope from anarchy and insurrection to recover their losses.

I would now advert for a moment to the fate of those European nations who have besides ourselves acquired power and dominion in India: they may afford us a lesson of useful instruction. It may be first observed, that those nations have constantly viewed the progress of each other with an unfriendly jealousy, and *deleuda est Carthago*, has been the universal rule of their conduct. The Native states have had little or no hand in their ruin and decay; they have fallen in succession a prey to one another. As the Portuguese were the first who established themselves in India, they were also the first to experience a fall. The Dutch founded their power on the subversion of that of their rivals. The superior ascendancy of the British arms has succeeded in annihilating the power of the French in India, and the same doom has attended the celebrated establishments of Holland. In the reduction of the Dutch settlements a circumstance occurred not more remarkable than natural. The Natives co-operated with zeal and effort in assisting us to drive them from their country.

I shall now proceed to consider three important questions:—1st. How far has this vast extent of territorial possession been beneficial to the Company and to the British nation?—2d. Is it practicable to fix a limit to our territorial dominion?—3d. If practicable, how is it to be done?

These questions are not only of vital importance to our prosperity, but to our existence in India. I beg to refer you to a paper which I transcribed on my passage home, and which I shall annex to this letter: it was written at a time when the concerns of India were fresh on my mind, and still occupied my daily thoughts. I shall probably in the following remarks repeat many of the sentiments contained in that paper, but this is not easily avoided; and it is necessary for the continuation of the subject.

It has been doubted whether the possession of colonies has been the source either of revenue or power to any of the modern European nations. The most useful power is that which increases our consequence where we are immediately connected by the ties of society and of interest. In this view, has the conquest of India increased the strength and influence of Great Britain, with relation to France and Europe? If it should be found to have diverted those means of enterprise which might have been employed in support of our honour and independence at home, this question can hardly be answered in the affirmative.

affirmative. The people of India can never be brought to reinforce our fleets and armies of Europe.

It may be said these objections are applicable to all colonial possessions: but this is a wrong term for India. We hold it by quite a different tenure and connexion. In the case of a colony, the mother-country may be disposed to make sacrifices in favour of a body of people drawn from among her own offsprings, which she might refuse to a foreign population. There is a natural obligation to support a colony, and it cannot be abandoned, but a conquest may be relinquished whenever it becomes burdensome or troublesome, without foregoing any duty.

I have confined myself in this discussion entirely to the consideration of a territorial revenue. The profits and advantages of our commerce with India form a distinct question, they depend little upon the possession of territory. A few seaports and the Bengal provinces would secure all the advantages that can be derived from a trade to India. The most profitable branch of our commerce is that with China, where our factory is not even fortified.

But the dispersion and waste of the population of a country can be easier replaced than the wealth which is spent in maintaining a remote dominion. I fear it will also appear that our possessions in India have operated as a drain on the treasures of Great Britain as well as on her population. The revenues of that country, although exceeding in amount that of most of the kingdoms of Europe, have not for the last twenty-five years been able to defray the expenses of the government. We have a debt of upwards of 30 millions sterling, which is about double the sum total of the revenue, and imposes an annual burden of perhaps two millions sterling. It has been found necessary to transport specie from England to pay the armies who were fighting in India, and a country which has been to every conqueror the most abundant source of wealth has hitherto been a drawback on that of Great Britain. I will venture to add, that so long as the present system is continued, no improvement in the pecuniary state of our affairs in India is to be expected. To illustrate this position, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the present condition of our Eastern empire.

This empire extends from the Indus to the Ganges, and from thence to the Himalaya mountains. It is in contact with China and Tartary. Its population is almost unexampled in history. Within this vast space many different nations are comprised, unlike in their manners and language. The dynasties of the ancient princes of the numerous kingdoms into which this immense region has been from time immemorial divided, have survived the independence of their country. Some of them are still in the exercise of sovereign power, and the rest live on pensions which are allowed them from the Company. The descendants of the Zannorin who received Vasco de Gama, and of the princes who opposed Alexander, are yet in existence. Those who are in a situation to perform the functions of sovereigns may be divided into two classes. The first are our subsidiary allies, who live under our protection; the second, although still free from this tie, are so much reduced in their power, that they have no real means of resisting any of the mandates of the British Government. It is upwards of 40 years since a French officer observed, 'that the Indian princes in the alliance of the Company were allowed the exercise of their prerogatives only in matters of little moment.' This is pretty nearly the case at present. In this mixture of authority and dependency, it would be in vain to look for any solid or sincere alliance. They all feel a yoke, which they would be glad to embrace any favourable opportunity of throwing off. The sentiment of hostility is deeply rooted, and must remain so long as the causes exist that produced it. Those who are bound to us apparently by the strongest ties of confederacy, feel that the treaties concluded with us have not been between independent states, but between a sovereign and his vassal.

They perceive that in signing these treaties they have consigned themselves to a state of degrading dependence. The moment therefore, that any power appears which affords a promise of being able to cope with ours, they will instantly range themselves on its side. Is it certain that we shall never have to contend with such a power? France, we may be well aware, is viewing our predominance in the East India with an eye of perpetual jealousy, and though she may be at present too busy, or too weak, to make any great exertion for the recovery of her former influence, she will certainly avail herself of the first moment of leisure to accomplish that favourite object. It is in vain to hope that we can long exclude her from India. China, Siam, Ava, Persia and Arabia, are open to her enterprise and her ambition. In time and repose she will find ships. Her former passions will regain their influence. But is there no other enemy to dread besides France? May not the policy of Russia be again directed towards India? The barbarous nations that intervene would rather be disposed to augment her power than to oppose her progress. The ambition of Persia may be excited to invade this rich prize, and constant danger must be apprehended from the warlike hordes which extend from Tartary to this frontier.

It has been by this route that every invader has entered India, from the time of Alexander down to that of Nadir Khan. Instead of a weak and mercenary government in this direction, the security of India would require an independent and powerful state. The intervention of such a power would form a strong boundary, and prove a hearty and ready confederate against an enemy. Our present system has destroyed this barrier, and the British troops now occupy the advance post in this line of defence.

From this sketch, the basis of our dominion in India will appear not a little discordant and heterogeneous. It is to be secured not merely against foreign and open enemies, but against the secret hostility of the inhabitants, or of those princes whom we have reduced to a state of dependence. It is evident, also, that in proportion to the extent of any empire



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must be the difficulty of defending it. The army maintained by Britain in India may be estimated at nearly 200,000 men, yet it has never been possible, however urgent the necessity, to assemble at any one point more than 35,000 of all descriptions. In the last contest with Tippoo, when the entire and utmost efforts of the three Presidencies were directed to that object, they were scarcely able, after several months of preparation, to assemble that number. This arises not only from the great extent of the Company's dominions, but also from their mixed and extraordinary circumstances. As the whole of this immense territory is held by the sword, it must be covered and overawed by military detachments. If these were withdrawn, the revenue would be unpaid, and the authority of the Company would instantly cease. From this statement, whatever may be the desire expressed from this country, it will be found impossible during the most profound peace in India to reduce any part of the military establishment. We must keep both our subjects and our allies in subjection. There must be besides a disposable force to make head against any enemy that may arise. There is no Native army indeed that could oppose us with any prospect of success, and we may view the issue of any war in which we can be engaged without any apprehension. But although the superiority of an European army is completely established, and there is no longer any Native power which can endanger our existence in India, yet the instability of their politics, and the rapid movements of their predatory forces, are sufficient to keep us continually on the watch. By inspiring frequent alarms they make us incur all the expense and all the inconveniences of war. The demonstrations of hostility made by Amoor Khan, and the extensive depredations committed by the Pindarries did not place the Company in any real danger, but they rendered it necessary to prepare and equip an expensive armament. In the present state of India similar alarms may be expected continually to occur.

It is from these circumstances that we are probably to trace the principal causes which have rendered the possession of India hitherto of so little value. By what system, then, can it be made really productive? In attempting to solve this great question, I am aware that I shall propose an unusual and an unpopular expedient. A proposal to contract the bounds of our territories, and to relinquish the fruits of conquest, will have an unpromising appearance. The events of fate are not revealed to us; but it would be a blind confidence to say as Jupiter did, in the language of an ancient poet, "to the Romans I fix neither limits nor duration of empire." I am, however, fully sensible that I make a proposition very novel in its nature, and which has perhaps only one example in history. I refer to the example of the Romans in the reign of Hadrian. The opinion of the historian Gibbon appears to be expressed pretty plainly, and he is evidently disposed to ascribe the conduct of Hadrian to prudence and moderation. In resigning the eastern conquests of Trajan, Hadrian restored to the Parthians the election of an independent sovereign, withdrew the Roman garrisons from the provinces of Armenia, Mesopotamia and Assyria. It is important to observe that he did this in compliance with the precept of Augustus, which prescribed the Euphrates as the frontier of the empire. Gibbon adds, that by this conduct Hadrian confessed himself unequal to the task of defending the conquests of Trajan. The same writer clearly evinces the advantages of this policy, when he afterwards observes, "A forty years' tranquillity, the fruit of valour and moderation, had succeeded the victories of Trajan."

Bayle, as wrote an observer as Gibbon, agrees with him in this exposition of Hadrian's conduct, and he says further, that Hadrian abandoned almost all the conquests of Trajan, "rather than expose his empire to the confusion that threatened it on all parts." Upon the whole, the motives of Hadrian's conduct are not, I think, equivocal, and it is supported by the prudent maxim of Augustus. At any rate, the example of Hadrian, according to the construction I entertain of it, is consonant with the policy which I conceive to be suitable to our situation in India, under the modifications which the difference of circumstances require, and which I shall proceed to show. I hope to point out a system which may free the Company from many of its present embarrassments, without any diminution of its present revenue, by which a great reduction may be effected in our expenses, and the army become more concentrated, and be made more effective.

Whether it might not originally have been more advantageous to confine our territorial possessions in India to forts and factories for the purposes of trade, is a question which it is too late to discuss. We have been forced forward by irresistible circumstances, and the supremacy which we have assumed cannot be relinquished. It would be an irremediable error to fall back. I must premise, therefore, that I propose to relinquish only such territories as may not be essential to our power, which may be embarrassing to administer, and which may neither be productive of revenue nor profitable to our commerce. I shall endeavour to draw a line between the territories which it would be wise to relinquish, and those which it would be advantageous to retain.

I imagine it is the first object of the Company's policy to exclude the nations of Europe from forming any political connexions in India, and that it is necessary for this purpose to possess every avenue by which they can enter the country. With the exception of the small extent of space occupied by Goa and Tanquebar, the whole coast from the Indus to the Ganges, comprising a line, exclusive of Ceylon, of upwards of 30 degrees of latitude, is either in our actual possession, or belongs to princes in our alliance. If we run a line from Calcutta to Kitch, the space included will be nearly an equilateral triangle, and will give an extent of frontier by sea and land of more than 3,000 miles. The entire sea-coast and the adjacent territories we must continue to occupy. These are important to our commerce and to our safety. There are also among the British possessions in India many extensive districts, manufacturing, fertile and highly cultivated, which it would be eligible

to retain. These districts, from the unwarlike character of the inhabitants, have invariably been the prey of every invader, and have consequently been long inured to a foreign yoke. They suffer nothing from a state of subjection to which they have always been accustomed, and a mild and beneficent government must be all they can wish. The people who inhabit the fine provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, come under this description. The possession of the great manufacturing towns on both sides of the peninsula are of evident importance, and many extensive tracts in the interior may be necessary for maintaining our present preponderance, which I have never proposed to relinquish. I wish to make that preponderance more secure, and to exercise it without impediment. It is equally impossible to point out at present all the countries that we may hold with advantage, as it would be to specify every one that we may without injury abandon. It is sufficient, in a sketch like this, to point out a ground of action; the application of the principle must be left to better information, and more mature consideration.

I have mentioned some of the possessions which I think may be retained without difficulty, and with decided advantage to the Company and the nation. But there are other districts of a very different character, which must always be maintained by a military force, and can never pay the expenses of their administration. These are the Rajpoot states everywhere; the Nair principalities of Malabar; the Polgars of the Carnatic, and in general all the hilly and jungly tracts. Many of the Hindoo rajahs and zemindars are of this description.

These people have never been completely subjected to any foreign power. The character of tameness and submission, which we are apt to ascribe indiscriminately to the natives of Hindostan, does not apply to them. They are a martial race, devoted to arms and their peculiar institutions. Every power, from the days of Timu: to the present, which has aimed at the empire of India, has found in them a constant and formidable enemy: they may have made a formal submission; they may have consented to the payment of a tribute, but they have never, unless with the utmost impatience, suffered their internal administration to be conducted by another. Their obedience can only be maintained by a military force, which consumes a scanty revenue, for those countries are in general not productive, and divert the troops from more important purposes. The territories of which I am speaking have neither productions nor manufactures which can become the foundation of a commerce and revenue at all considerable; the advantage derived from them can never bear any proportion to the burden they impose.

It may be urged, that as these states are warlike, if they were also independent, they might be the source of new dangers, and combine with more powerful enemies for the overthrow of the Company's dominion in India. If we examine their history, we shall find that all their exertions have been of a defensive nature, they have never united in any general federative system of conquest, their continual wars amongst each other are prompted by petty quarrels and limited disputes, never by any general and extensive plan of ambition. Could they be cordially attached to us, they might, in the prosecution of a defensive system, be employed as a formidable bulwark against any danger. It was this use that the Mogul emperors made of them, but they effected their purpose more by address and management than by coercion. In the decline of that empire, when treachery and rebellion hastened its ruin, these martial tribes were its most zealous supporters. On the invasion of Nudir Shah, "You must be watchful over the Mogul Omras," said Rajah Jey Sing, "who seem to be united, in order to compass some treacherous design, as for us Rajpoots, we are ready to join the royal ensigns."

These principles will apply to many parts of our empire, and to extensive territories in the centre of India. The plan which I am anxious to recommend with regard to these, is to restore the administration entire into the hands of the Native princes, and to attach them to us as allies rather than as reluctant dependants. I am persuaded that the simple operation of this measure would cause a certain augmentation of our clear revenue. In some of these districts, the expense of administration, under the present system, uniformly exceeds the revenue derived from them; and though in some others there may seem in ordinary cases to be a balance in our favour, yet the contingencies that are continually arising, create from time to time extraordinary expenses, which soon absorb any apparent advantage. In lieu of the present revenue, the Native states, on having their independence restored to them, would most willingly consent to pay a tribute, which would be clear of any deduction, and amount probably to more than we now receive. But how, it may be asked, will these princes be able to pay a tribute out of territories, which in our hands do not defray the expense of governing them? To this I reply, that the services of the natives of India are commanded at a much easier rate than those of Europeans, and that a large proportion of our expense is incurred in consequence of the nature of our government.

This arrangement might be made to produce another important object, and to assist in paying off the debt of the Company, by obtaining the command of a large amount of capital. In consideration of receiving back their territories, those who reaped the benefit of the measure would willingly pay a pecuniary recompense, the aggregate of which might be very considerable. India abounds with rich men, and the shroffs would be the guaranties of every pecuniary stipulation which this transaction might involve. It was the knowledge of their extraordinary wealth, and the expedition with which the largest sums were raised by the Guicowar government, that suggested the present idea.

The proposed measure would make an important addition to the revenue of the Company, and no less considerable would be the augmentation of their power. That immense mass of force which is now frittered away in supporting the Company's authority in many unprofitable districts, would then be concentrated and disposable. Those princes who were restored to independence, would form a real addition to our military resources. At present they are

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a source of weakness rather than of strength. When they were once satisfied by experience that they had nothing to fear from the Company, and that its preponderance formed their best security against the attack of others, they would then be ready to lend their aid on any emergency; they would form the bulwarks of that defensive system upon which the British Government would then act. In cases of extremity and danger, these people might be reckoned upon as useful auxiliaries.

I have in a former part of this letter observed that our supremacy in India is not to be relinquished, and there is no part of the present measure which is meant to affect this lofty attitude. We shall continue to hold the balance of power, and to be at the head of the confederate governments. I have not proposed the smallest reduction in our military establishment, unless circumstances should afterwards permit this to be done with prudence and safety. I propose, on the contrary, to maintain every military post, station or garrison, which we now occupy, and which may be thought useful or necessary, either for the support of our influence in India, or for its protection from foreign aggression. This formidable position will repel the objection, that these *states*, when once freed from our yoke, may refuse to pay the stipulated tribute, and join even the standard of our enemies. We are at present probably fully as much exposed to this danger as we can be by any change of system, and a judicious disposition of our numerous forces throughout India must prove the best security against every danger. By the proposed plan they would have their professional duties only to perform; they would be assembled in large bodies ready to chastise the first instance of disaffection, and to punish with rigour every infraction of allegiance. The prompt and decisive punishment of the guilty would prevent others from following their example. It is likely that the most common offence would be to procrastinate, and perhaps to refuse the payment of their tributes. The system would provide that this should be at the expense of the party who commits the transgression and that the charge of every extraordinary armament should be defrayed by the guilty person. This would at once be a moderate, just, profitable, and effectual punishment. In cases in which this method has been acted upon in India, the example seemed always to produce the most useful impressions, to be long remembered, and to answer the purpose of preventing a repetition of the offence. The disturbances must be expected to be frequent in such an immense empire, which would require military interference, but the Company would be freed from every extraordinary expense which such occasions might call forth.

Cases of treachery and of greater atrocity would of course demand a greater punishment, which circumstances would point out.

We might hope, as the efficiency of the military force of the Company would be greatly augmented by the proposed system, that this would be equally the means of deterring and of effectually punishing either secret or open attempts to disturb the public tranquillity. Let us require of the chiefs of India every check and security which we may think necessary, it would be conceded in exchange for their territories. All the present subsidiary engagements would remain in their full force, the same system of defensive alliance would exist, and no pledge or caution would be relinquished that might be likely to check turbulence and disorder.

I shall now proceed to the objections which you have stated with so much ability and perspicuity, as operating to prevent a perpetual limit being fixed to our dominion in India. It would be difficult to take up the subject in every view of it, without entering into a very long, and probably a very unprofitable discussion. The arguments on a question of this nature must be founded either on experience or observation, but experience and observation, when applied to transactions which are the result of human life, amount only to a probable degree of truth. A proposition may be stated, of which the reverse is equally correct.

You have observed, that "it is by no means certain that our situation would be at all improved by a voluntary contraction of our territorial limits;" and express a doubt, "whether this would extinguish those feelings of secret enmity and jealousy which have been excited by our paramount dominion." But if those hostile feelings should not be destroyed, would it not answer a great purpose to diminish their effect and render them less acrimonious? This is the most natural consequence of a kind and benevolent action. A forty years' tranquillity was the fruit of Trajan's valour and Hadrian's moderation.

It is admitted, "that there are dangers attending upon too extended dominion, and that an addition of territory is not unfrequently a subtraction from real power." Farther, that "there are also circumstances peculiar to our Eastern empire, which would lead one to regret the necessity of spreading over a large surface that ingredient of our military force, which it has been found difficult to supply:" these are exactly the arguments that I would use.

The plan of a balance of power I believe to be impracticable in India. The political state of that country is too unsettled, and the principles of government are too little studied, to admit of this idea ever being realized there. Lord Cornwallis attempted to introduce a system of this kind; but in fact the apprehension justly entertained of Tipoo's power and designs, produced only a short-lived confederacy, which was dissolved the moment the danger passed over. The ascendancy of the British power will not easily be made to yield to a balance which must suppose some degree of equality. It would not, however, be inconsistent with our policy to effect some sort of counterpoise among the native states; but in reality, while our superiority exists, and the subsidiary system continues, they cannot be aggrandized at the expense of each other, unless with our perfect concurrence. As it is the object of our treaties with those powers to guarantee their dominion, they must necessarily remain in their present state. But in case of any restoration of territory to them, it would not be difficult to regulate this by some kind of equality and reciprocity. This might be  
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made to depend on their merits, on their character for good faith, on our degree of confidence, on their losses, and the various interests which we should have to consider. There would be no necessity to restore more than we thought fit, and they would accept what was gratuitously bestowed. No cession of territory would be required from them, and as every thing they received would be an unexpected gift, it is difficult to conceive that it would produce any dissatisfaction. We may presume at least that a little address and management would reconcile them to the measure, and that it might become an instrument of conciliation and friendship. I have no idea, indeed, that the measure would be viewed in India in an unfavourable light, and above all that it would be considered as a mark of debility or weakness. The concessions would be made at a time when our power is at its greatest height, when we have neither enemies in the East nor the West; when on every hand a profound peace prevails; and when they would be conscious that in fact all India lies at our disposal. They have too much experience of our superiority in the cabinet and in the field to impute the measure to imbecility or fear. Let them experience for once our moderation, and let us try the effects of it.

It would, however, be sufficient to remove any alarm of this nature, should any really exist, to precede the measure by a declaration from this country, in explanation of the principles by which we wish to act; of our desire to avoid conquests, to preserve the happiness, peace, and independence of India. We might appeal with propriety in such a document to the Acts of Parliament, and to the orders of the Court of Directors, as evidence that this disposition has long existed. The people of India have a very high opinion of the justice, wisdom, and moderation of our government at home, they are always willing to make a distinction in its favour, and to impute exclusively to the governments abroad, a system of ambition and encroachment. They would place more confidence and credit in a declaration issuing from the paramount authority.

On the whole, you will perceive that my conclusion essentially agrees with yours—"We must still hold the balance, and take care that its equiscope be preserved." But if we adopt such a line of policy as I have recommended, we can never be re-conducted back to the position in which we now stand. Wars would unquestionably arise, and the loss or the acquisition of territory would be the consequence. There is no state of society exempted from this, and it cannot be avoided by any human arrangement. In view however to those changes which are incident to human affairs, you have anticipated every expedient that can be resorted to. Whether we should, on the acquisition of new territory, exact a pecuniary fine, or bestow the dominion of a vanquished enemy on others, or change the dynasty, must depend entirely upon circumstances; but in no case would it be necessary for us to undertake the burden of government. We should always find substitutes willing to pay for protection.

There is still another argument which is brought forward against any relinquishment of dominion by the Company. This is, "the inhumanity of handing over to Native rapacity and misrule, a large population who now enjoy the benefit of British government." I have chosen your words, as they state the question with fairness and with clearness. I must own, however, that much more weight is attached to the objection than is necessary. The blessings of British government in India are equivocal. A very slight examination would suffice to show that they are attended with great drawbacks, and fall infinitely short of the ideas that we attach to them in this country. The term, however, is employed, the assertion is made, our feelings and reason become naturally interested to preserve to our fellow-subjects in India advantages which many suppose are equivalent to what the favoured people of this country enjoy. There is something fascinating in bestowing on so many millions the benefit of a free and liberal government.

While the British Government in India protects with the greatest care, and to the utmost of its imperfect means, the persons and property of its subjects, it deprives them, without remorse or compunction, of the most valuable privileges and rights which give society its "sweetest welcome." A Native can aspire to no public office of importance, profit or respectability. In the administration of his country he has no share; he is doomed to pass his life without any possibility of elevation, and without any prospect of advancement, he is excluded from every avenue of distinction and honour. Whatever may be his rank and talents, he must remain in the same state of insignificance and obscurity. All the classes of society are levelled into one. Every gratification of a Native subject of the Company must be limited to sensual and selfish pursuits. The government affords no patronage to genius and science. We are not to wonder that the mind should remain unimproved, that knowledge should be lost, and that the inhabitants should no longer possess a desire to cultivate the language of their forefathers. It would form a curious and not an unuseful investigation to consider what are likely to be the effects of this system on the intellectual and physical condition of India, should it continue fifteen years longer. Let us examine the effects on the arts and on trade, and we shall find strong reasons for concluding that they have been unfavourable. I mean the Native commerce, which has not merely decayed, but in many places, where it flourished to an amazing extent, it has entirely disappeared. One of the great and extraordinary anomalies of the Company's government is, that while it entrusts the Natives with arms, and employs them freely in its defence, it refuses them every participation of civil rights. We must be at the same time aware, that with the best intentions, and allowing the greatest talents and application, it is impossible for a few Europeans scattered through this immense population, to perform the duties of its administration. It is unnecessary to insist on the disadvantages and general unfitness of foreigners for the performance of many of these duties; it is sufficient to observe, that to do justice to India, and to enable it to enjoy the benefit of our

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Government according to the present system, it would be required that we should transport to that country 100,000 of the best informed of our countrymen.

While we rather ostentatiously exhibit to the world the advantages which India derives from our government, we are equally careful to represent the Native governments as entirely corrupt and profligate. Candour and impartiality will make statements on both sides. The crowded population of India, its flourishing manufactures, extensive commerce, high state of cultivation, numerous and wealthy cities, before Britain acquired there any dominion, may attest the fact, that it enjoyed the benefit of a protecting administration. Even at this day, the great number of monied shroffs who live within the native jurisdiction, and the aspect of the country itself, still subject to that rule, sufficiently bespeak, that the great ends of government, the security of life and of property, are at least tolerably fulfilled. But I shall admit that these governments are very bad, and that it would materially contribute to the happiness of the people of India were they destroyed. It would not follow that there is any tie or obligation which requires that the Company should sacrifice its own prosperity and advantages, to administer the government of these distant nations.

This romantic spirit might lead us with the same propriety to administer the government of Africa, where the people are still worse treated than they are in India. This would be a degree of generosity which neither reason nor duty requires at our hands. Instead of being dissuaded by humanity from contracting the limits of our empire, that motive ought probably to lead us to adopt the measure. By the contraction of those limits we should be more able to apply ourselves to their administration, by employing those servants who would be withdrawn from the relinquished territories, and adding them to the establishment of such as we should retain. By bestowing on the Natives a greater share of our confidence, by a proper mixture of their agency with Europeans, a form of government would be established, made strong and respectable by mutual interests, which might then justly excite the envy and, let us hope, the emulation of India. On this event we might emphatically call these provinces our own, and consider them incorporated with the British empire. We must be sensible that the people in many situations have submitted to our government with violent reluctance, and greatly by those means impaired its beneficial effects. The question under this circumstance is not always how to improve their condition, but how to mould them to submission? They have paid their revenue without compulsion, but have opposed themselves with arms to the introduction of our government. As their repugnance arose from a sentiment superior to the consideration of property, it was respectable, and it became certainly less necessary that we should bestow on them a benefit, to which they had no inclination. This has been the case wherever the Hindoo population has not been previously subdued and inured to the yoke of the Mahomedans. The quiet and passive inhabitants of Bengal, long bowed beneath this yoke, willingly exchange it for our more mild and equitable rule; but the case is widely different with the independent inhabitants of Malabar, of the Circars, the Poligars, the Kulis and Grassias of Guzerat. Supposing, however, the improvement to be real and generally desired, is that a sufficient reason for the Company to persevere in a system by which they suffer? Is it not an extravagant generosity to waste the strength and resources of England in promoting the interests of remote nations, with whom we are not united by any natural ties?

With regard to Mr. Smith's opinion, I admit that it is entitled to very great respect and attention. He owns, however, "that it would be better if this country could go back to its original commercial establishment, provided we could be secure from any future attacks from our neighbours; but as that is impossible, the field," he thinks, "which we must in such case leave open to them would increase their strength and power, to the endangering our own safety." Now, with regard to the application of this reasoning to India, I do not conceive it has much force. There is no power or neighbour there that can be anywise alarming or dangerous to us in the field. This is proved by the experience of half a century, and confirmed by a superiority which the Natives seem incapable of attaining. Whatever addition they might receive of territory, they would not be more formidable. All the dangers we have to fear and guard against in India are external. Let us prevent our ambitious neighbours, the French, from gaining access to India, and we may consider ourselves as safe for a long period. It is evident, that if we secure the way by which India can be entered from the sea, there will be nothing to apprehend on the side of Europe, and I am doubtful whether our security from any other quarter would not be best promoted by making the Native states respectable and contented.

These opinions may require an apology; but I offer them from conviction, and from a most sincere desire that the prosperity of India and of the Company may be inseparably united. I may, however, justify my opinions by the great names of Hastings and Clive, men whose natural capacity and experience entitle them to be at least as good judges as any of their successors. They were men also of great ambition and of elevated views, capable of embracing the most extensive schemes, which promised real advantages to their country. They agreed, however, that the Bengal provinces, with a few other possessions, ought to limit the extent of the British empire in India. Lord Clive expressly stated his opinion, that Bengal, Madras and Bombay, ought to have formed the utmost limit of our desire. Their opinions received the sanction of the British Legislature in 1782, and the Company's instructions to their servants have repeatedly pronounced a similar judgment.

I have endeavoured to prove that the wealth, honour, character and power of the Company would be promoted by a voluntary diminution of the extent of their empire. Were the Native powers once convinced that Britain entertained no designs hostile to their independence, a turbulent chief might indeed occasionally excite some troubles, but nothing would

would be felt of that fixed hostility which renders our present dominion precarious, and which aims incessantly at our destruction.

I am perfectly aware of the obstacles which must be surmounted before a resolution of this character could be carried into effect. It is not easy for the human mind to penetrate that false lustre which surrounds the possession of extensive dominion, or to attach to the sacrifice of it any other ideas than those of loss and disgrace. I am aware also that men even of fortitude and ability, connected with the government of India, would rather wish that a plan like this should be carried into execution by their successors than by themselves. When I consider, however, the remarkable moderation which has on so many occasions been displayed by the Company, I am led confidently to believe, that if the proposed measure should appear essential to the welfare of India, they will not be deterred from it by any delusive impressions. They will feel that dominions which afford neither revenues nor means of security, are a mere burden upon their possessors. I admit that many embarrassing circumstances will oppose the plan; but if the Company steadily and temperately persevere in the prosecution of this great object, there is no doubt that they possess the means of overcoming every obstruction.

I must conclude by observing, that the mere establishment of the proposed system would be of little importance, unless measures were taken to prevent its future violation. Future governors, like their predecessors, would find ample temptation to gratify their interest and ambition. Motives of security, of remote or immediate danger, the necessity of avenging injuries, and perhaps of punishing aggressions, would furnish pretences for war and conquest.

The Peninsula is at present in a very unsettled state, and a country like India will always afford the opportunity of hostility. Unless, therefore, proper checks were established, the advantages of any reform would be lost, and the evils which it was intended to prevent, would probably return with aggravated pressure. To provide a proper check upon transactions which take place at so vast a distance, and of which the means of judging are often very imperfect in this country, is exceedingly difficult. It will be some advance towards that object, if we can ascertain the leading causes, besides those of a fortuitous nature, which have encouraged schemes of ambition, and greatly aided in producing the present extension of our dominion.

The almost unlimited power which the Company's servants possess of obtaining pecuniary supplies, enables them to put armaments on foot with uncommon facility. The natural wealth of India; the great number of its monied men; the power, connexions, and apparently flourishing state of the Company; the punctuality of their payments, are causes, some real and some imaginary, which have tended to raise their credit to an unexampled height. This great readiness of procuring money in India, joined to the extensive power which the governments have had of drawing upon Europe, have given them a command over the grand instrument of military operations, and has removed a main bar to the execution of the most extensive projects.

This command of money, it must at the same time be observed, has in some perilous periods of the Company's progress saved their affairs from distress and the verge of ruin: so closely do the cause and the remedy of evil approximate. If, however, it had been established as a principle in our Indian policy, that the natural resources of the country must supply every exigency of administration and defence, we should not probably have at present a revenue of 15 millions and a debt of 30, nor would that revenue have been burthened with so heavy an expenditure as to intercept every benefit. Although the enforcement of such a principle as I have here mentioned, might be attended with occasional and temporary inconveniences, nothing would be so effectual in preventing the designs of the Company from being hereafter thwarted. It would confine the plans of the Indian governments to a strict system of defence.

Another great cause which appears to have led to many of the political changes in India, and which have uniformly produced an extension of our empire, is to be traced to the power vested in the local government, not only to conclude but to alter and annul treaties of alliance with the Native princes, after they have received the sanction of the Government at home. By the limitation of this power some inconvenience and some delay would no doubt be incurred, though none I think of any serious magnitude. It is only, however, by this or similar expedients that the Company can form a complete check upon their own servants, and prevent them from undoing with one hand what they were labouring with the other to establish.

The paper which accompanies this letter is of a miscellaneous character; but it contains the principal topics for examination as they appeared to me at the time, and is a brief outline of the observations which occurred to me at the period. The state of India is a little different at present, but the same objects are still important, and continue, I believe, to require the utmost attention and deliberation.

This letter has insensibly acquired a bulk and magnitude far beyond what I intended. It bears a formidable appearance, and would require a free use of the pen and the knife to eradicate much that is superfluous. I have expressed some opinions loosely and hastily, while others are of so common and obvious a nature, that they might have been advantageously omitted. I shall however submit it, without any farther apology, to your discernment. I request in return all your objections, and I am prepared to expect many.

I remain with most sincere regard and esteem, my dear Sir,  
(signed) A. Walker.

Appendix, No. 20.

(Enclosure, No. 1.)

Letter from

La.-Col. Walker

to

B. S. Jones, Esq.

Jan. 31, 1818.

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(Enclosure, No. 1.)  
Considerations on  
the Affairs of India;  
accompanying  
Letter from  
Lt.-Col. Walker  
to  
B. S. Jones, Esq.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA.

Written in the Year 1811.

Whoever reflects on the situation of the affairs of the East India Company, will find it replete with difficulty and danger. Notwithstanding the receipt of a revenue of 15 millions sterling, they are burthened with a debt of 30 millions; and it is not without the greatest difficulty and the utmost exertions of economy, that they find even in years of ordinary peace expenditure, this revenue sufficient for the current expenses of the civil and military administration of their Indian empire.

Under such circumstances, how are the ordinary vicissitudes of human affairs to be met; and how are the Company to overcome any crisis of difficulty and danger?

These questions are important; they involve considerations closely connected with the duration of the power of the British nation in India.

It is an observation of the celebrated Mr. Gents, that trans-European dominion has never been the source of revenue to any nation of modern Europe; even the immense remittances which Spain and Portugal have received from their settlements, form no exception to the general rule.

These companies of settlers who have proceeded on the principle of territorial revenue, have very rapidly declined; and this result has been so uniform, that it has been supposed to be inseparable from the possession of dominion remote from the seat of government.

Were this really the case, the possession of trans-European dominions would be a continual drawback on the wealth, the power, and the population of the parent state; and this is in fact the case in a considerable degree at present.

These, however, are probably necessary evils, and we must be content to bear them, in order to insure to ourselves the continuance of a commerce that upholds and supports the vital principles of our greatness.

To maintain and confirm this commerce to England, and to preserve to Europe the general advantages of the trade with India, it is necessary that we should possess a paramount and controlling power on the peninsula of India.

If, however, this power is to be maintained at the expense of the parent state; if its own particular resources are insufficient to preserve it, and it must be guaranteed not only by the blood but the treasure of England, it is problematical whether it would not be better to renounce such a dominion, and to trust to commercial emulation alone for those advantages which we derive from the Indian trade.

It is, however, a remarkable phenomenon, that the valuable and extensive territories which are now enjoyed by the India Company, which, while in the possession of the Native princes of India, were so fruitful a source of accumulating wealth, should, while in the hands of the Company, be insufficient to bear the ordinary expenses of their administration.

The accumulation of 30 millions of debt, is a sufficient evidence of the truth of the assertion, and affords, under the continuance of a similar system of government, the most melancholy prospect for futurity.

It would seem, however, that the ample resources which a revenue of 15 millions yield, ought to be sufficient for every purpose of government and defence; and that it would only require a system properly modified, to cause the revenues of India to become a valuable addition to the wealth and strength of the parent state.

The obvious mode of effecting this desirable object is by the reduction of expenses, so as to allow a surplus, but this has been seldom or but partially obtained even in years of peace and prosperity; the vast accumulation of debt will abundantly prove that the general result must be a deficiency.

We may allow the Court of Directors and the governors of their settlements, every praise that can be due to the most laudable anxiety and the most unwearied industry in their economical exertions; but how insignificant and inadequate their endeavours have proved to meet the exigency, how insufficient to satisfy the public expectations!

The expectations of the nation might indeed be realized by the retrenchments of superfluities or extraordinary allowances; but it will require the severest operation of economy and of integrity, to yield any essential relief to the Company's finances. The system of reform must have a wide and an extensive range; it must be radical, or it will fail of its effect.

Assuming it for granted that a commanding influence on the continent is indispensable for our interests, it remains yet to be found whether our present power is of that secure and permanent nature that those interests require.

When we reflect on the amazing extent of our Indian empire, occupying and controlling every point of the shores of the Indian seas from the gulph of Cutch to Acheen head, and commanding a population unexampled in extent, it must be evident to a very superficial observer, that our means of defence are not more than adequate to cover and protect territories of such magnitude. The difficulty of defence is proportionate to their extent, and our troops can scarcely assemble at any one point without leaving the others exposed to invasion and depredation.

If we also inspect the state of our political relations with the powers of India, we shall find we stand nearly in the same situation as France does in Europe. We have not got one natural friend; we must not deceive ourselves, and conceive that we are engaged in an alliance supported with subsidized forces with the principal powers. There can be no alliance

alliance without perfect and reciprocal independence, the princes who subsidize our battalions are our dependants and our nominal friends; we may control, influence, or direct their counsels, but we shall take a wrong estimate of human nature were we to permit our sophistry to convince us that real affection or partiality could be the result of such a state of circumstances or connexion.

If such is a true picture of our situation, it becomes an important object of consideration what conduct sound policy would dictate, and whether we could not increase our power and security by a judicious consolidation of our resources, and less interference in the affairs of the Indian powers.

It must be acknowledged that there are certain positions occupied by the British power affording great political and military advantages; some of these it may be necessary to maintain; but there are others the advantages of which are extremely doubtful, and the revenue they yield is insufficient to bear their own expenses.

Within the last 10 years the political relations of India have suffered a great and wonderful change. Repeated experience has proved that there is no Native army whatever that is capable of contending with the British troops in the field; the means of attack of fortified places has ever proved superior to the means of defence among those with whom the art of war has made any progress; we have always a decided superiority in this respect over the Natives of India, while a fortification of the most ordinary kind is sufficient to stop the progress of any Native power now existing, in the open field.

There is no power whatever in India who can be in the least formidable to the British nation. The predatory armies of India, indeed, by threatening our extensive territories with invasion, will keep us in a continual alarm; they will often occasion extensive preparations and formidable equipments. The expense occasioned thereby will be considerable and frequent, but the issue of an actual contest would never be doubtful.

There are other considerations which add considerably to the importance of this question.

The French nation, under whatever government, will be the enemy and rival of England. She has wants and interests the same as we have, and next to England, being the first naval power in the world, she has the means of satisfying her wants and gratifying her interests, and she will not submit to be controlled or thwarted in this respect by us.

A share in the advantages which we derive from India has been and will continue to be the object of her ambition and her policy; and she will attempt, either by negotiation or conquest, to participate in our Indian trade. She is stimulated to this as much by a sense of her own interest, as by a desire to annoy and destroy a rival: this nation, therefore, must continue, whether in peace or war, to be the object against which we are to guard, and every measure adopted in this country must have a reference to the politics of France.

It is probably impossible to exclude this nation from India; we cannot exclude them from China, Ava, Pegue, Cochin China, Sindh, Persia, and Arabia, and in any of these places they will be troublesome if not formidable to our Indian empire. Whenever a peace is restored to Europe, the adventurers of that nation will flock to the East. It must not be expected that peace will at all enable us to diminish the extent of our means of defence, or our expenditure in India.

It is therefore particularly necessary that these means should be more consolidated, and every step we take to effect this also renders our offensive means more formidable.

Under the preceding considerations it may be useful to examine what ought to be the general nature of our defensive policy.

There are certain tracts of territory in India, which uniformly have been the source of continual expense and inquietude to those who possessed the sovereignty over them, without yielding any advantage whatever. Under this description may be included all the Rajpoot states, from Bhurtpore to Guzerat; the Nair principalities of Malabar, the Poligars of the Carnatic, and, generally speaking, the hilly and jungly tracts inhabited by the Hindoo rajahs and zemindars.

In the course of the Indian history from the Mussulman conquest, we do not observe that any of these Hindoo chieftains have discovered any extensive views of ambition, or have ever been able to effect any considerable conquest.

Among the martial race whose sole profession is arms, we shall frequently find them prosecuting wars against each other; but the object of those have been some frivolous point of honour or boundary dispute, the clashing of family interests, or a prosecution of domestic feuds.

On the other hand, we have found them prosecuting with fortitude, resolution and apparent success, a continued war against their oppressors and invaders from the time of Tamerlane to the present day; and whatever power, Mussulman, European or Marhatta, has been predominant in Hindoostan, has found their states marked with the same uniform and decisive character.

Of all the partialities that distinguish the human mind, attachment to the rights connected with territorial property, will be found the strongest and the most prevalent; and this propensity probably exists with more strength among the tribes above alluded to than Europeans conceive.

To this tenacity, in respect to their territorial rights, is to be imputed that long and continued resistance they have opposed to every power that has attempted to make a conquest: indeed, scarce any conquest has ever been permanent among them. The descendants of that race which opposed Alexander still occupy with little variation the seats of their ancestors. Neither the Poligars in the Carnatic nor the Nairs of Malabar can be said to be subdued; the descendants of the Zamorin, and the princes who resided at Vasco da Gama, and who

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opposed Hyder and Tippoo, have manifested but very lately the spirit of independence which animates them.

Considering the peculiar habits and prejudices of these people, the inveterate animosity and determination with which they defend their native possessions against all invaders, the little propensity they have to ambitious or foreign conquests, a question arises,—whether we might not with safety to ourselves consider these people as our natural allies, and instead of endeavouring or wishing to extend our sovereignty over them, it would not be better policy to strengthen their independence?

The uniform consistence of their character, manifested in a series of centuries against every description of invaders, assures us that they will allow none to deprive them of their independence without a desperate struggle, and when assured they had nothing to fear from our moderation, we might command the utmost services and friendship of these warlike classes in any system of common defence.

Nor probably should we lose any advantage by this conduct, which we now possess. The expenses of keeping a race of warlike men fond of liberty and independence in subjection, is greater than the advantages we derive from the country they inhabit. They are ever ready to rise in rebellion, from the constant operation of the same spirit and sentiment that would lead them to oppose a foreign enemy, and which spirit would also lead them to a cordial assistance as friends or allies, which we can hardly expect as subjects.

If we had courage to pursue a course of policy thus novel and determined, it might be rendered the means of lessening the debt of the Company. With an establishment free from debt; a better secured and more contracted territory; with resources more consolidated, and consequently more permanent and durable, their situation would be really enviable. There would be no real diminution of power, but that power would be more collected and more formidable.

Amongst the advantages of this measure the increase of our disposable forces should not be omitted.

Notwithstanding we have an army of from 160,000 to 200,000 men in India, it would be difficult for the three Presidencies to assemble one-fourth of that number. The remainder of the troops are occupied in fiscal duties, or in guarding against rebellion, or preserving obedience in our provinces.

The territories that are useful to us are the large manufacturing towns and the sea-ports; those yield a large revenue with little expense, and the produce of which either furnishes us with investments for our Europe market, or with the means of supporting and assisting our army and navy. On the contrary, those territories the revenues of which are consumed in their administration and defence, that are distant and remote, and require large establishments; those that are neither commercial nor manufacturing, are the descriptions of territory which are useless and cumbersome.

It however would require the utmost consideration that ability and local acquaintance could give, before a plan of this extensive nature could be adopted.

The numerical powers of the army might remain the same, but its efficacy would be increased in proportion to its concentration; and if ever the period should come, when we may have to contend with an European power in India, our success must depend on the degree of physical force that we may have to oppose, independent of that which may also be necessary for the defence of our territories.

No nation, no set of men that ever existed, would voluntarily yield advantages that they can retain. We may trust to this principle, guaranteed as it would be by treaties, and supported by our power, that those to whom we relinquish these territories would not voluntarily cede them to the French or any rival European nation. None of the powers of India ever desired a French alliance, or the assistance of a French army, from affection. This desire was generated solely from the conviction that this assistance was the only effectual means of controlling or resisting our ambition and power. Let the governments of Hindostan be convinced that we desire not what they possess; let them but thoroughly understand that they are safe from our ambition, while our resources and actual force leave them no hope in a contest with us, the desire of a French alliance will be annihilated. The wretched and mercenary conduct of those officers of that nation, who were bribed over during the late Mahratta war, has destroyed all confidence in their fidelity.

Although the hints and suggestions which are thrown out above may be rejected as impracticable or visionary, (for in these days of ambition it would require some fortitude to imitate the example of Hadrian,) it may be hoped, that however exposed the extensive territories of the British nation in India are to foreign attack and ultimate loss, yet the affairs of the Company are still susceptible of a domestic reform, that may with a few years of peace and moderation, place them in a state of affluence and prosperity.

The natural wealth of India and the number of monied men which it produces; the great power, extensive concerns, and apparent flourishing resources of the Company; their punctuality in pecuniary matters, and the high rate of interest paid for money, are causes, some of which are real and others delusive, which have tended to raise the public credit and rendered the borrowing of money extremely easy.

The facility with which money is procured in India, and the unlimited credit which the governments of India have had upon Europe, has tended to place one of the most powerful instruments of human operations at the disposal of the governments in India.

With such ample means and powerful resources, it is no wonder if they have been expensive, and that one of the strongest passions of humanity should be excited to action. Plausible and justifiable causes of warfare can never be wanting in a region so fertile of turbulent and enterprising men as Hindostan.

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Had it however been a maxim in our Indian policy, that the natural resources of the country must supply every exigency of government, those resources would have been better husbanded, we should not have been less able to maintain our commercial advantages, and been relieved from an expenditure of 2,400,000*L.* of interest on a debt of 30 millions.

In considering this subject a curious question arises,—why the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Danes, while they possessed valuable possessions in this country, were not considered as objects of jealousy and alarm; and that the Native powers of India have confined their enmity and devoted their resources solely to check our ambition?

When conquest and aggrandizement ceased to become objects of those nations, the powers of India have viewed their settlements without jealousy, and their commerce without envy.

Their riches and prosperity may have occasionally excited the avarice of some unprincipled neighbour, but it does not appear that they have ever been the objects of a war of expulsion.

This was also the case with us, until we enmeshed ourselves in the politics of the country, and assumed the character of sovereigns, without quitting that of merchants.

Were we capable of moderating our views in conformity to this idea, we might even yet disarm enmity, and the powers of India might conceive themselves guaranteed more by our system of moderation, than they would be by an alliance with France, or by the assistance of the troops of that nation.

The extent of territory which has fallen into the possession of the Honourable Company has been the result of a mixed operation of voluntary cession and conquest; but the tenure by which we hold these possessions is of little consequence, as it will probably be admitted that the very object of these acquisitions is to render them available to the interests of the parent state.

An unfortunate error, arising from ignorance and utter unacquaintance of the Natives of India, has generally prevailed among Europeans, that they are ill-bred, ignorant, uneducated, and unprincipled. Judging from the loose principles of those illiterate and interested adventurers that frequent our settlements and live by our warts, we are apt to imbibe very wrong prejudices on our early arrival; and it falls to be the lot of a very few indeed to be able to overcome their early impressions by familiar acquaintance among the respectable and well educated part of Native society.

A stupid and barbarous national pride or conceit causes us to associate with a dark countenance every idea of degrading inferiority, and our manners and conduct receive a wrong bias, that is in consequence extremely prejudicial to our national character.

Those gentlemen whose situations have enabled them to acquire the friendship or intimacy of Natives of rank and education, will acknowledge that they possess an urbanity and mildness of manners that soon engages esteem. I could wish that their progressive acquaintance with the European character would enable them to confirm the ideas they certainly entertain of us in general as a superior race of men, and possessing many valuable qualities; instead of which, they find us haughty, rude, and severe, so that none but low people will solicit our society; men of spirit, education, or generous principles being under the necessity of avoiding our society or submitting to degradation.

These ideas seem to have entered into the system of our government in a very considerable degree, and Natives of rank and education are excluded from employment, either as too corrupt, too ignorant, or too unworthy.

It is probably not difficult to trace the causes whence these prejudices have arisen.

Ambition and jealousy have had some share in them, and urged us to attempt the removal of the principal Natives from situations of trust and emolument.

To effect this, their corruption and venality were represented in the highest colouring; plausible instances were not wanting to support these general charges; and in our eagerness to depress the character of the Natives, we forgot that human nature is nearly the same all over the world, and vices will flourish where they are neither restrained nor discouraged.

Probably our own times and our own country have furnished as flagrant instances of corruption as possible. If we occasionally see instances of strict probity and integrity, they must not be considered as confined to our own country alone, it is a virtue that cannot exist without opportunity, and we have permitted but few occasions to occur wherein it might be displayed by the Natives of India.

These people are as capable as any in the world of discriminating between right and wrong, fraud and honesty. Their principles are probably not different from our own; but, like ourselves, they require the restraint of laws and regulations. It is unfair to determine that to proceed from innate principles which may only be the effect of a bad education, or more probably the contagion of example.

It should be remembered, that the early transactions of Europeans in this country were unrestrained, and that they had no other guide for their conduct than natural probity.

Experience quickly proved that this was no security when temptation, interest, and opportunity incited peculation. I should, however, be extremely sorry that any instances of this description, the prevalence of any practice at an unfavourable moment, should stamp us as an immoral and venal race.

It will be more liberal, and probably more conformable to human experience, were we to  
(445.—VL) s's suppose

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suppose the natives of India as capable of improvement as any other; with the advantage of some experience, they now begin to be convinced that the government of the Company will not connive at any deviation from rectitude, and this conviction will work its effects.

Those talents and principles are sure to become objects of attention and cultivation that are found either useful or conducive to honour and emolument.

With the advantage of these principles, the strength of which will improve as our intercourse increases, there is no doubt that many of the civil offices of Government may be entrusted to Natives with safety and advantage. One advantage of this measure would be economy, a consideration of the first importance in the present situation of the Company's affairs; but it would be attended with others not less deserving of consideration with reference to the duration of our dominion in India.

It is proved by the uniform evidence of history, that scarcely any circumstance has proved more galling to the spirits and feelings of a people, placed under a foreign government, than an exclusion from the enjoyment of those offices which they conceive as their natural right, and to which their rank in society affords them pretensions.

If an exclusion has these effects, a moderate participation must be the only way to obviate them, by restoring a respectable portion of the Natives of this country to their hereditary pretensions. We should certainly inspire them with a greater share of affection and interest in favour of a government which not only afforded protection, but in which they also participated. The people of rank and influence in the country would be gratified, and both with satisfaction on an order of things which respected the privileges of their birthrights: and it would be more grateful to the feelings of all classes were they to find some of the duties of Government administered by persons actuated by the same prejudices and opinions.

It may be objected to this system, that it would raise up a dangerous rivalry, and that it would impair the influence of Government; but I conceive that the contrary would rather be the case.

The government of foreigners can never be acceptable in any country, and the people who enjoy the mildest kind of foreign government will always seek to exchange it. In India we must always be considered as foreigners, and the idea connected with this sentiment is still further strengthened by the striking contrast in our habits; and to these natural causes of disunion must be added that cause of exclusion of the Natives which is peculiar in our policy.

It must always be remembered, that the real foundation of our power, and of every government foreign to the country, must be force; no people ever submitted that had the power of successful resistance.

Good policy, however, will direct that Government should disguise as much as possible the principles of its support. The most judicious and the most equitable expedient is to permit the inhabitants to participate in the civil government. This was the practice of the Romans, and perhaps no cause contributed more to the tranquillity and subordination of the multitude of nations under this dominion.

If a due proportion of magistrates and civil officers were taken from among the inhabitants, their local influence and knowledge must of necessity be exerted for the discharge of their offices, and if they were negligent, and failed in affording their utmost support to Government in cases of emergency and danger, Government would know unto whom to impute negligence and failure. Under the present system we have not even that satisfaction. We have no authentic and responsible channel through which we could claim the support of the country; for where there is no trust there can be no responsibility. The needy and servile Natives who at present fill the subordinate offices in the Company's service can form no exception to this observation; they serve for a pay which generally is but barely able to support their families, and have seldom either influence, or honour, or character. I am far from wishing to deny the superior efficiency and integrity of European agency; but its application to a sufficient extent is impracticable. Without a colonial system it would never be sufficiently diffused, and whether a colonial system could be introduced into India without danger, is not very clear; but it would not be difficult to show that it would be the best system for consolidating and preserving an European empire; this, however, is a speculative question. The real object is to suggest the immediate means of administering the Company's Government in India, according to the most natural rules of policy, and on a scale of expense within its income.

At present a handful of Europeans divided and dispersed over an immense space of country, must be quite insufficient to unite the interests of so many different nations with the governing power. A few hundred Europeans scattered over a country exceeding in extent and population the largest kingdom in Europe, must be insufficient to administer to the wants of such a society.

By the total exclusion of Natives of respectability from our service, we are deprived of the means of acquiring information. Impartiality can scarcely be expected from interested dependents; unbiased communications can only be hoped for from men of education and independent principles.

Another consequence of this system is the employment of a very expensive European agency, instead of the very moderate compensation which Natives would require. Hence follows all the concomitant expenses of English writers, translators, and all the expenditure incident to the transaction of public business in a foreign tongue. Much of this, it is true, arises

arises out of our situation, and could not be avoided under any system. I would increase and not diminish our European agency in India; but as this is impracticable, the exclusion of Natives from the service of the Company causes the Government to be without partisans and without friends. It is contrary to the practice of all nations who have acquired extensive empire, originates in a false conception of the Native character, and is degrading to the feelings of the men of rank and merit in that country.

These are natural consequences of our system; but to the British Government itself we must allow every praise and credit that is due to the purest and most benevolent desires. Its object and wish is to be just, and to extend to its Indian subjects the benefits of a solid system of protection and equal justice; but the marked contrast and dissimilarity between the manners of the European and Indian, renders difficult the cultivation of those common offices of mutual intercourse that improve and correct society. This void might be supplied with very considerable positive and political advantage by a judicious intermixture of European and Native agency.

No one can refuse to assent to the philanthropic and benevolent motives which have led to the establishment of the Company's judicial system, but while every praise may be offered to the principle, we may still find the system defective in practice, and inapplicable in many parts to the circumstances of our subjects. If the records of the Sudder Dewanny and Nizamut Adawlut are examined, the number of untried causes on the file will fully evince how wholly inadequate our system of jurisprudence is to administer justice to the people.

They amount to thousands: almost every zillah judge of these presidencies has more causes to try than he can decide in years. The evil must continue to increase. The most active magistrate can hardly expect to dispatch the business of his predecessor, and preserve his files clear from the accumulation of recent complaints.

Different states of society require a very different mode of government.

It would be unwise to extend the same judicial system with uniform powers throughout our territories in India, without regarding the vast difference in the stage and progress of society.

The difference between the industrious, peaceful, and manufacturing inhabitants of Bengal, the Nair of Malabar, and the turbulent Grassia of Guzerat, is very great. What one would probably view as the means of protection, the other might conceive as oppressive and degrading.

Besides the foregoing objection, a very slight inspection will evince that our judicial system is unequal to the duties it ought to perform.

For Malabar and Kanara, and each province containing several principalities, some of which were formerly dignified with the names of empires and kingdoms, there are now a court of circuit and four zillah judges, whose separate jurisdiction extends from Sedashagur to Cochin, and several extensive districts above the Ghauts.

For the territories of Guzerat we have three judges and a court of circuit. Within this jurisdiction the city of Surat is included. The geography and population of the country is sufficient to prove that these courts are inadequate were their duties transacted solely in the vernacular language; but instead of the magistrates being able to dedicate their time to their profession, they are employed in preparing then reports and despatches, and translating their proceedings into English, a duty which they cannot neglect, but which must be performed at the expense of a more essential one.

Yet the imperious call of economy has obliged the Company even to reduce these establishments, when to do justice to the country would require a more extensive and the best concerted agency that wisdom could devise.

Lord Lauderdale, in his pamphlet on India affairs, has denied that the extent of the Company's investment is a proof of the prosperity of India, as it is depriving the country of its produce without leaving any equivalent. But must not the demand for manufactures in every country operate as an encouragement to its industry and ingenuity?

There must be some outlet for the accumulating treasures of India. Under its original Hindoo princes, this outlet and circulation was produced by rapine and invasion, from Mahmood of Ghizni and its successive invaders, until the establishment of the Mogul dynasty; subsequently by Nadir Shah and Ahmed Abdali, and now by the English Company. If it must find an outlet somewhere, is not that produced by exportation of its commodities the least hurtful to the country, the more especially as it is gradual, and not produced by any of those convulsions so destructive of human happiness?

Another drain for the surplus of India during the Mogul empire, was the pilgrimage to Mecca, in which vast sums were expended by the devotion or vanity of pilgrims. During the Mogul empire also, Bengal was impoverished more by the remittance of the revenues to Delhi than by the remittances to Europe; the officers of the government made the same fortunes, and the court of the Emperor was the place where all the splendour of the empire was accumulated.

Tavernier says, "I met that day 110 waggons, every waggon drawn by six oxen, and in every waggon 50,000 rupees. This was the revenue of the province of Bengal, with all charges defrayed, and the Governor's purse well filled, and comes to 55,00,000 rupees."

In a former part of these remarks it has been observed, that trans-European dominion has never been a source of revenue to any nation, and it is doubtful whether our possessions

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in India contribute anything to the security, strength, or even prosperity of the parent country. That it is a continual drain on our population and our treasure is admitted; and that the consumption of little of our manufactures has been a continual source of complaint. The annual amount of British exports to India do not exceed half a million sterling, whilst American exports amount to upwards of 12 millions.

The cause of the small amount of our exports is to be found partly in the nature of the society in India. The Natives can use but little of our goods, and the consumption of English manufactures is principally confined to the European part of the society. The Isle of France will probably consume alone more European goods than all British India would be an important service to the country to devise a mode by which the exports of our national industry might be made more extensive to India.

It is certain that our present policy prevents us availing ourselves of all the advantages which our Indian possessions are capable of producing. Perhaps the time is not yet arrived when this question can be calmly, impartially, and without prejudice discussed. Nations are slower than individuals in ascertaining their real interests, and it is only notwithstanding we have long acknowledged the scarcity of timber at home for shipbuilding, that we have endeavoured to avail ourselves of the valuable productions of the forests of India.

In Bombay alone, two ships of the line or one ship and two frigates can be produced to the British navy every 18 months. The docks at Bombay are capable of containing ships of any force.

Situated as Bombay is between the forests of Malabar and Guzerat, she receives supplies of timber with every wind that blows. Flax of a good quality is also the produce of our territories in India. It is calculated that every ship in the navy of Great Britain is renewed every 12 years. It is well known that teakwood-built ships last 50 years and upwards. Many ships Bombay-built, after running 14 or 15 years, have been bought into the navy and were considered as strong as ever. The *Sir Edward Hughes* performed, I believe, eight voyages as an Indiaman before she was purchased for the navy. No Europe-built Indiaman is capable of going more than six voyages with safety.

Ships built at Bombay also are executed by one-fourth cheaper than in the docks of England.

Let the result of these observations be reduced to calculation, and the advantages will be evident.

Every 18 months two ships of the line can be added to the British navy, four in three years, and in 15 years 20 ships of the line. Thus in 15 years we should be in possession of a fleet which would last 50 years. English-built ships requiring to be renewed every 12 years, the expense is quadruple. Suppose, therefore, a ship built in England to cost 100*l*., in 50 years it would cost 400*l*.; but as a ship of equal force to last the same period would cost in India only 75*l*. of the sum, the difference in favour of India-built ships would be 325*l*. per cent.

Say that a ship of the line in its original cost is 100,000 <i>l</i> .	£.
Four times renewed - - - - -	400,000
A Bombay ship - - - - -	75,000
Saving - - - - -	£325,000

This calculation is excessive, but it is chosen to show how much may be saved even although one half be erroneous.

Were it not for our numerous captures we should probably have had some difficulty in keeping our navy complete. Has it been found that the number of prizes brought into our ports has diminished the demand for our own ships; or has it had the effect of producing any of those consequences which jealousy imputes to our Indian-built shipping?

The docks that have recently been constructed at Bombay, under the superintendence of Major Cooper of the Engineers, are elegant specimens of architecture, and excite universal admiration. They are capable of containing vessels of any force.

In Bengal, Prince of Wales Island, and other maritime stations, excellent ships may be constructed, and the number may be increased to a much greater extent than above estimated; but the estimate has been purposely confined to Bombay, which is furnished with docks, and ships are there constructed with more advantage than anywhere else; and it is our grand naval arsenal in India.

A. Walker.

(Enclosure, No. 2.)

LETTER from Lieut.-colonel *A. Walker* to *B. S. Jones, Esq.*, dated Bowland, Feb. 1818.

My dear Sir,

NOTWITHSTANDING a long and tedious answer to your letter of the 5th of December 1817, I find that I have overlooked some circumstances, which it may be material, and not yet I hope too late, to take into notice. I shall still, therefore, offer some observations on the facts which you have so ably stated, in the order in which they are mentioned in your letter, and with as much brevity as their nature will admit.

There can be no hesitation in thinking that the solution of the question on which you do me the honour of requesting my opinion, is one of the most important and difficult that can be submitted to human judgment. There is no wonder, then, that the politicians of India should be divided in their sentiments, and that they should have formed conclusions widely differing from each other. This must ever be the case when the subject comprehends an extensive view of futurity, and must necessarily speculate on the uncertain anticipation of human events; but it will be still more likely to happen, as is the case at present, when the decision must involve the prospects and passions of individuals, as well as the welfare of the community at large. I bear no hostility to any of the parties who may be interested or engaged in this question, and am only anxious to reconcile the honour and interest of my country with the happiness of India, and to establish a safe but a liberal control over that distant and interesting portion of the world.

Every dominion, established as ours is in India, must have a natural tendency to enlarge itself until it has reached that point which seems to have an ascendancy in human affairs, and from which they are so naturally disposed to decline. It is fortunate that our empire has not yet attained this point, and I therefore think that we have still time to check with safety its tendency to enlarge itself, or rather that we may, without any danger to its duration, contract its limits. With us the symptoms of vigour and enterprise remain unimpaired. Every thing in India is in a state of progression and advancement. The spirit of enterprise is alive, which in man will always put forth new exertions, in proportion as it has increased facilities afforded for its gratification. There is every probability that this prosperity may continue for a number of years, and that it may not produce any other inconvenience than what may be a weight on the finances of the East India Company. For we must be aware by constant experience, that no acquisition of territories in India will delay the expense of their conquest, and maintain the military array which is necessary for retaining them.

It is quite unnecessary for those who are the advocates for the enlargement of our Indian empire to maintain by arguments that it is imperative upon us still to advance, since this is done to our hands, and we are irresistibly impelled to this course by our situation, and the natural progress of human affairs. I have undertaken the harder task of undertaking to prove that this is contrary to our interest, and of suggesting that we should interpose some check which may counteract the natural tendency of our empire to increase contrary to our wishes, and even almost without our exertion. I am of opinion that this may be done with safety, because we are still in a state of progress, and in the fullest career of successful enterprise.

I would beg here to propose a question. Is it the object and interest of Great Britain to establish her dominion from the Indus to the Ganges? If this is really our aim, I would recommend that we should accelerate the event as much as possible; that we should not wait for those causes which are at present slowly but surely operating to produce it, which must be attended by many harassing and expensive wars, equally fatal to the prosperity of India, and burdensome to this country. I would, under the circumstances which are here supposed, pursue much bolder and more decisive steps than the warmest advocates of this system have ever proposed.

Instead of circumscribing the power of the Native states, and diminishing their territories at the end of every war, it would be a policy of far more foresight to establish our paramount authority without disguise, and without the subterfuge of temporary expedients. If we are to have the power of the Emperors of Delhi, let us assume their name and dignity. This would put an end to many equivocal circumstances, render our situation less anomalous, and prevent those interminable wars which must be the consequence of the present system. I really believe, that were we at once to adopt this line of conduct, it would prove not only the most effectual means of keeping India in subjection, but be more palatable to its rulers and men of rank in the end, than its present precarious state, uncertain in everything except the complete degradation of the inhabitants. In adopting this proceeding there would be no injustice by pursuing our success to the utmost extent in our power, and it might be excused on the score of humanity, by shortening a contest which must be the inevitable consequence of persevering in the present system.

This I say, if the conquest of India should be considered for the advantage of Great Britain, it would be the wisest and the most direct way of effecting it. But if, on the contrary, this measure should be hostile both to the interest of India and of Great Britain, would it not be prudent to adopt some means to prevent it happening, which might delay or avert the course of those events which are certainly operating to produce it? Does not policy, humanity, and good sense, dictate this to us?

I need say nothing of the danger from possessing such an extensive dominion and so remote, nor of the perfect impossibility of administering such a government. All the essential wants of the people must be neglected, and the whole order of their society be overturned. It would be in vain to talk of Natives of rank, or of any other distinctions under our government, where nothing can exist but selfish and sensual gratifications: every

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(Enclosure, No. 2)

Letter from  
Lt.-Col. *H Walker*

to  
*B. S. Jones, Esq.*  
February 1818

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
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thing would be levelled, confounded, and degraded. The intellectual improvements of India would be at an end, and the general effect would be disastrous to the morals, character, and happiness of the people.

In comparing the conquests made by Great Britain with that of the Moguls, or even of any of its invaders, we must always remember that the sovereign in our case does not reside in his dominions, and the incalculable detriment which this circumstance must produce to himself and to his people. It is this which must for ever render the government of this country in India a cold and an unnatural connexion. Our government, however, from the many excellent principles which it contains, might, notwithstanding all its disadvantages, be converted into a boon and a blessing, were it confined to those bounds which would be within the reach of our management. By spreading ourselves over this vast empire, we are unable to attend to many essential interests, and are obliged to neglect the administration of the valuable provinces which have been long under the sovereignty of the Company.

I am aware that this will be the language of very few Indian politicians, and probably nobody has yet ventured to express sentiments which are hostile to the feelings and judgment of many able men, and for whom also I entertain a very great respect and esteem. My sole design has been to place the truth in a conspicuous point of view; and if possible, to connect us with India by solid and natural ties. I have proposed a measure capable of various modifications, but which, if generally followed, would, I think, be the means of effecting many objects of which good sense would approve. It would afford at least an example of justice and magnanimity which would astonish the world.

The individual views and sentiments of those who have governed India at different periods to the present time must have conferred a character on their governments, warlike or pacific. We must, however, look for many, if not all the principal events which have taken place in that country, to the peculiar circumstances of the times. I own that I am disposed to regret the occurrence of events which have laid the foundation of all that weakness in the Native states, which has rendered them incapable or indifferent in the exercise of the legitimate rights of their respective governments. Most of our governors have been merely guided by those events which have arisen out of the administration of their predecessors, which were produced by the natural progress of human affairs, and to which they have uniformly been obliged to sacrifice their own views.

The character of all the late governors has been pacific, but their administrations have been made remarkable by successful wars. New alliances and a new accession of dominion have invariably been the result of their operations: this will continue, and cannot stop, while there remains either power or courage in India. It can alone be checked by Great Britain recovering a character for moderation, and by restoring to the Native States some portion of the territories of which they have been deprived in the course of warfare. I have no idea that this measure would lessen our influence, and it might be done, as I think I have suggested in my former letter, so as not to impair any of those means which might be necessary for securing India against intestine or foreign dangers: I have merely stated a principle and sketched an outline. I cannot presume to say what territories should be relinquished or retained, but I am quite certain that no nation or government, which has resigned its political independence to another, will long remain satisfied with that state. We must, therefore, under the fullest adoption of this system, resign the agreeable illusion of maintaining an universal peace in India. Causes of contention, of encroachment and jealousy, must continually arise, which war can alone settle. I allow that the scheme is vast and beautiful; but have we found it practicable?

A. Walker.

(Enclosure, No. 3)

(Enclosure, No. 3.) LETTER from Lieut-colonel A. Walker to B. S. Jones, Esq., dated Bowland, May 1819.

Letter from  
Lt.-Col. Walker  
to  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
May 1819.

My dear Sir,

SINCE I last wrote to you, the affairs of India have been proceeding in a natural and progressive order; they have followed the course which many men of judgment and experience expected; but they have not yet passed their crisis, and we must be prepared for many new and extraordinary events. It has been observed that human affairs are never long stationary; they are either in a state of re-action or progression. But if things cannot remain long in their present state, it must be wise and prudent to consider how they are likely to terminate, and be prepared in time for the event which is most likely to happen. This would be a safe conduct in an individual, and is equally applicable, and even more necessary to be pursued by those who are entrusted with the far greater concerns of nations.

It would occupy more time than is necessary, and would have more the appearance of a book than a letter, to take a minute review of the transactions, which have lately taken place in India. A few explanations may however be useful, and sufficient to understand the circumstances which have produced occurrences of such magnitude and importance. The causes which have led to the present condition of India, have been operating slowly but steadily for the last 30 years. India has been precipitated into its present situation by the weakness, misfortunes, and vices of the Native governments, and the excessive power or preponderance which has been obtained by the European nations. The first attack upon Tipoo produced the blessings of harmony and peace. Although the British Government took the lead in that war, and claimed the principal glory of victory, this caused neither jealousy nor suspicion. It was evidently undertaken for our own safety, and Tipoo's character had made him the universal object of fear and detestation.

At no period, perhaps, since our connexion with India has our character been so popular and the reputation of our government so high, as during the administration of Lord Cornwallis. Much was owing to his character, but a great deal also to the times and to the peculiar state of India.

The second war with Tippoo was equally the effect of necessity and self-defence on our part, but the case was not the same with respect to the rest of India. Tippoo was not at this period equally the object of their alarm and apprehension: his power and resources were diminished. The Native states saw only in his machinations the desire of revenging himself on the British Government. By this time, the vigour and enterprise which it had exhibited, excited the jealousy of the Mahrattas, and they would not have been sorry to have seen the power of Great Britain reduced even by the hand of Tippoo. This was the usual effect of envy caused by a series of prosperous events; but the reduction of Seringapatam and the ruin of Tippoo's family did not disturb the public tranquillity. It produced a contrary effect, and for a moment silenced and astonished those engaged in intrigues, which were at once hostile to peace and unfavourable to the British interests in India. The Mahrattas expressed friendly sentiments, and in many respects their conduct was cordial towards the Company. Although we had been successful beyond their wishes and expectations, yet the war we had been engaged in was just; it had not been sought for aggrandizement, but strictly for our own security. The whole of our conduct at the same time was so fair and open, and so free from offence to any of the Native powers, that neither Sindia nor the court of Poona could find any reasonable cause of umbrage. It cannot fail however to be remarked, that the general feeling of the Mahratta governments towards us must have been hostile and suspicious. This could not have been evinced more strongly than by the refusal of the Peishwa to accept a share of Tippoo's dominions, which he had lent no assistance to conquer, merely on the condition of forming a closer connexion with the British Government. The rejection of this proposal, so congenial to the propensity of the Mahrattas and to his own interest, showed how much we were the objects with this people of alarm and apprehension.

But we must go back a few years to trace to its source the decline of the Mahratta governments, and our own overwhelming ascendancy.

The ruin of the Mahratta governments was begun by cabals and disputes among the heads of their aristocracy. The position which Sindia so long maintained at Poona obstructed the views of the triple alliance, and involved the affairs of the Mahrattas in irretrievable disgrace and confusion. The differences between the Peishwa, the Nizam and Sindia, produced the most melancholy and destructive effects, equally fatal to each. Sindia was the most culpable, as he had the greatest power and was the least restrained in the use of it. While his indiscreet ambition kept the interests of the others in a state of incessant agitation, his own interests were neglected, and the respectability of the Mahratta states received a blow from which they have never recovered.

After an ephemeral blaze, and an elevation to power (principally by means of the French corps in his service) which might have made him the arbiter of India, Sindia was rather unwilling, except on his own terms, than unable to protect the Peishwa against the attack of Holkar. It was not until by this event the Peishwa became a fugitive, until he had been driven from his capital, and appeared to be abandoned by all the world, that he deigned to accept of a British alliance. This measure, which had been the principal object of our politics at the court of Poona for many years, was at length acceded to by the Peishwa, when he was in a state of desperate distress, and was forgotten or proscribed by the rest of the Mahratta confederates.

This measure, which had been so long desired, was unluckily successful, and perhaps to the consequences of it we must chiefly ascribe the annihilation of the Mahratta power. What was not certainly intended, it has produced the deposition of the Peishwa himself, and the overthrow of his government.

At the moment of the conclusion of the alliance we overlooked every difficulty. The risk and expense of a war which was inevitable, before an expelled sovereign could be restored to his throne, where we should afterwards be obliged to maintain him; the danger of interfering in the domestic dissensions of such a complicated machine as the Mahratta governments, and above all, the infamous character of the man in whose behalf we were to make all these sacrifices; these circumstances were at once slighted and disregarded.

It was thought that everything would be repaid by establishing a paramount influence at Poona. The complete success of the war which followed with Sindia and Holkar, attended by a vast accession of territory, and the possession of the imperial throne at Delhi, seemed to confirm all the advantages which were expected from the alliance with the Peishwa. Sindia, however, after a succession of defeats, and the loss of the greatest part of his dominions, at a time when his existence as a sovereign depended on our decision, steadily declined to bind himself to us by the chains of a subsidiary alliance. He resisted all the arguments of flattery and interest, rather than enter into an engagement which, however much it might be dressed in specious colours, must reduce him in reality to the degraded situation of a dependent on the British Government. This example is mentioned to show the real feeling which is universally entertained in India of this connexion, and how little we are to depend upon the co-operation or friendship of such allies.

The circumstances under which these alliances have been generally formed, and the principles upon which they have been conducted, are unfavourable to a long intercourse of cordiality.

They have been always eagerly offered by the Company, and by watching the moment of some imminent danger pressing upon the Native states, many of them have been prevailed



on to accept of our assistance. They might have been improved into many solid advantages could we have regulated ambition and checked the passions of our nature. But as they were entered into from some dreadful necessity, and often for the support or gratification of a particular faction, when the apprehensions from the first ceased, and the interest or influence of the last gave way to those of another party, the British alliance was viewed as an intolerable thralldom. The advantages on both sides became then quite illusory. From the constitution of the subsidized forces, the Native governments can exercise little or no authority over them. They have found not only their measures, but often the person of the prince watched by a military force.

They are deprived of the choice of peace or war, and are stripped of all the privileges of independent states. They are deterred from the due exercise of the rights and laws of nations. They are not only controlled in their external relations, but the Company's government have sometimes interfered in the management and arrangement of their domestic affairs. This is done on the specious pretence of humanity, and under the plea of recommending measures better adapted to the interest of our ally; but the recommendation is mandatory, and the usual exercise of authority is violated. Many of the Native governments have tributaries and powerful feudal dependants subject to them, who are frequently in a state of resistance, and against whom it is necessary to use force to compel them to perform their duty. These men will always complain of oppression, and endeavour to seek protection against the claims they are bound to satisfy. When our government becomes their advocate, our ally suffers in his reputation and revenue. When our assistance is required to punish these refractory and rebellious persons, the aid of the subsidized force is refused, and our ally is told that the British troops are not to be employed on trifling occasions. At all events our influence at the subsidizing court must be maintained. We must for this purpose engage in all the cabals of the government, and we must support those that are favourable to our interest: these have sometimes been found acting in opposition to their own sovereign. This is but a brief and a faint description of the nature of our subsidiary connexions. It is evident they must form a weak bond of conciliation and friendship between the Company and the states of India.

The veil is now torn off from these alliances; and it is generally admitted that their natural effect has been to produce doubt, jealousy, and resentment. They are more specious in theory than beneficial in practice. Is it possible that affection, cordiality, or confidence can exist under such circumstances? The measure, however, of subsidizing ourselves to the Native courts was not invented by us; it was first adopted by the French. We have, indeed, carried it to an extent which neither nation could have had in view at first, and by attempting to form a federative system which should preserve universal peace, we have undertaken an Utopian scheme which is impracticable, as it is contrary to the course of human life and experience.

The system, however, of forming subsidiary engagements was an admirable contrivance, if it had been kept within due bounds, and confined to weak states. As their governments were to be controlled, it was necessary that they should have no pretensions; that they should be humble and submissive; that they should be involved in embarrassments, and alarmed for their existence. These difficulties were not to be temporary, but such as from which there was no chance or hope of a speedy extrication. It was necessary, in fact, in order to render these engagements effectual, that the safety of the government should depend on the support of our troops, and to make this apparent, it was also necessary that the weakness which required the support of a foreign army, should be long, hereditary, and past cure. Desperate as this description may appear, there were many states in India in this condition, and it was with them, generally speaking, that our first and most fortunate connexions have been formed. In determining the fate of these alliances, the character of the government, or of those who administered its affairs, was of some importance; but a long train of misfortunes, and the indispensable want of our assistance, formed the surest means for its continuation. Although the Mahratta governments were in a state of disorder and decay (I refer to the period when the treaty of Bassein was concluded), yet their sentiments were still lofty, they retained their warlike character, and they had too much vigour and spirit remaining to submit habitually to our control. Thus, our alliances with that nation having originated in causes of temporary necessity only, have been dissolved almost as soon as they were formed. Witness the fate of our alliance with the Peishwa and with the Rajah of Berar. That with the Guicowar has been more fortunate, because it was formed with a weak state, of small extent, and in complete anarchy. There is reason to think, and even proof to produce, that the Peishwa contemplated to break his engagement at the very time that he put his hand and seal to the deed. It is quite impossible that a government of any power and vigour can submit for a long time to the degradation of our subsidiary alliance. That principle is not applicable to them, and it was an unwise policy that attempted it.

I shall resume this part of the subject afterwards, and at present advert to the Pindarries, who have become formidable as we have seen them, from the success of our arms in wars with the more powerful states, and from pursuing too far the federal system. I shall proceed to offer some proofs in support of this opinion.

There are two periods in the history of the Pindarries which we must carefully distinguish.

1st. The Pindarries are a constituent part of every Indian army. They are the scouts and foragers. They are soldiers; but the lowest and least honourable link. They belong to no particular caste, but are men attracted by the hopes of adventure and plunder, who can furnish a sword and a horse. They receive no pay, and subsist themselves by what they

can pillage in the country of the enemy to which their service is confined. They are only employed in time of war, and exercise their vocation only in the field. However irregular and lawless, the Pindarrie is bound by obligations, and is obliged to submit to regulations which sometimes lay even a restraint on his licentious habits.

The commander of the army occasionally shares in the booty he acquires, and such part of it as is applicable to the subsistence of the troops, must invariably be exposed to public sale in the bazar. This was the use and origin of the institution. It bore a strong resemblance to the pillagers of Europe in the 13th and 14th centuries. At that period every army had bands attached who were called the pillagers, and it was remarked that the English pillagers were the most numerous and the most rapacious.

In this state the Pindaries were limited in their number, and made subservient to the views of government. They were not worse than the Cossacks and Hulans.

2d. It was in the second period that they became formidable to the peace and tranquillity of India. In proportion as the powers of the Native states have been reduced; as they lost their territories and disbanded their armies, the number and licentiousness of the Pindaries have increased. With these circumstances the evil has been gradually gaining ground. The population of India is essentially military. Many have no other profession than that of arms. The destruction of Tipoo's power, the decline of the Nizam's, of the Peishwa's, Sindia's, Holkar's, and many less powerful states, must have thrown out of employment, at a moderate computation, half a million of combatants. The number of dependants and followers of all kinds who were at the same time discharged must have been still greater.

The increase of the English army, the only army that added to its numbers in India, did not probably exceed 30 or 40,000 men. The remaining multitude who were disbanded had no other means of supporting themselves but by their swords. There was no longer any service for them among the Native governments. An overstocked profession is like a superabundant population; but the people of India cannot have recourse to emigration; they cannot fly from their distress by seeking relief or destruction in other regions, as the unfortunate in this country look to the uncultivated lands of America. But the mischief did not come all at once; its approach was gradual, as I have already observed. It was remarked that the number of Pindaries was first augmented in the Mahratta armies, while their usual force diminished; that their chiefs assumed more consequence, and that their durrans were kept embodied in the time of peace. They were in this situation maintained commonly by living at free quarters, in the territories of the prince whom they served, and taking advantage further of his weakness, they soon possessed themselves of forts and districts. The increased views of plunder would necessarily be the means of adding to their numbers, and they became every day of more importance in the political consideration of India. Their character and condition was now considerably changed. They became a powerful community, exercising a separate, and in many cases an independent jurisdiction, professing in some instances a nominal obedience when it suited their purpose, but everywhere in fact setting authority at defiance, and committing the most licentious excesses. It is not necessary to pursue the history of the Pindaries farther, but it is not superfluous to observe, how, in human affairs, the same circumstances have almost invariably produced the same results. The Pindaries, as we have latterly seen them, and the free companies of the middle ages, have the same identity. The former were augmented by disbanded armies in India, and the latter owed their origin to the soldiers who were dismissed from the service of France and England. The Pindaries may be described in the words of an historian, the cotemporary of the free companies. "These companies having been brought up to arms, and taught to live on pillage and plunder, neither could nor would abstain from it. The disbanded men formed themselves into corps and chose leaders. They said among themselves, 'that, though the kings had made peace with each other, it was necessary for them to live.'"

The free companies had the same fate as the Pindaries. Their increasing enormities excited the outcry of Europe, and they were gradually extirpated or incorporated with the regular armies, and compelled to change their mode of life. Negotiations were entered into with their leaders; pensions and lands were assigned to them on condition of relinquishing their disorderly habits. What is this which happened 500 years ago, but the history of the Pindaries? They were brought into activity by the same causes, and they were reduced for the same crimes.

But neither did the free companies nor the Pindaries arise out of the natural order of society. They were produced by particular circumstances, which returning in our own times, would have again produced them, had not the prudence or precaution of the allied government stationed in France a great force, which overawed its dispersed soldiery, and checked their mischievous associations. Notwithstanding this precaution numbers formed themselves into troops of banditti, and infested different parts of the country. I shall offer but one more reflection upon this subject. Although these disorders have been suppressed in India, and they have been nipt in the bud in France, we must not expect to see either in that, or in this part of the world, those moral habits soon restored, which are necessary to secure prosperity and domestic tranquillity. Evil passions and contending interests will long prevail.

But it is useless to repine at events that are past, and at misfortunes that are beyond recall. We may, however, derive from them the materials of watchfulness and wisdom, whose due exercise may prevent their recurrence, and mitigate many evils over which our control is but partial. These events have come in what we may regard as the natural course of things, and it is by no means intended to inculpate that peculiar culpability is attachable to the immediate agents. The evils alluded to might perhaps have been avoided at an earlier

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(Enclosure, No. 3.)  
Letter from  
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to  
B. S. Jones, Esq.  
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period; but Lord Hastings and the present Government of India have done everything in their power to prevent the war which has laid India at our feet. The language and the conduct of Lord Hastings have been equally marked by moderation and a frank and manly decision. There has appeared less of political manoeuvre and mystery in his proceedings than it is common to find in the transactions of statesmen.

In this long letter, much longer than I intended, I have confined myself to the statement of circumstances and facts. The deductions to be drawn from them are obvious, and cannot be mistaken. I shall now proceed to examine more closely the questions which seem to relate to the present state and the future prospects of this country in India. I shall not repeat what I have said in my former letter respecting the policy which might be pursued in order to fix a limit to our territorial dominion, although I still think it practicable, and all the events which have lately occurred in that country prove that it is desirable.

There are two ways of viewing the state of India: one of them would consist in preserving, and the other in changing the general system of its government. England has adopted the last method, without probably intending it. In renouncing the old system to adopt a new one, we have encountered all the difficulties which the interest and the prejudices of a numerous people could interpose. The habits of nations are strong, and those of India are almost unconquerable. The yoke which we have imposed, however mild, is borne with much less patience by them than their own domestic tyranny. The chiefs are exasperated at the late events, and are ready to renege the first opportunity. Then power and connexions are still great. The people, and especially the men of rank and property, remain attached to their hereditary race of princes. They would instantly rise against us whenever they perceive any hopes of deliverance: we must not be deceived by any outward appearance of amity and good humour. Vassal states are always more inclined to assist than to repel danger. The whole are hostile to us. The best informed men in India scruple not to say, that discontent and rebellious designs are to be found in every class of society; and that there must be another explosion in a year or two. It was believed that Sindia would take the first opportunity of breaking out, and that the Peishwa was an unconquerable intriguer who would not remain quiet. The Nizam's government is in a state of dissolution, and it is not to be supposed that it can long stand. Rumours are already prevalent in India of there being a league on foot between all the Native powers to rise upon us; this is most probably untrue, as it is not likely that this design would be formed so soon after defeat; but the very existence of such reports shows the public feeling, and how generally the expectation of an attack on us is entertained. It implies the reality of our danger and the suspicious nature of our situation. However miserably planned and ill executed their leagues may have been, would it be prudent to rely on this being always the case? Those are never well advised who despise their enemies. The scene of empire is always changing. Can we expect that a dominion held under so many extraordinary and unfavourable circumstances, will escape the common fate? This would be contrary to reason and experience. Its safety depends on an unbroken train of success and prosperity. The smallest check or reverse would expose it to the greatest hazard. Many may still remember the agitation which the rumour of the unfavourable result of the battle with the Rohillas occasioned, and the extensive scene of rebellion or insurrection which was on the eve of bursting forth.

The danger of a foreign attack may appear remote at present, but we should not for that reason overlook it. The northern frontier of India is surrounded by warlike, enterprising, and numerous nations. They have been accustomed to look upon India as their prey, and the high road to fortune. Intestine divisions and excessive population have at different periods compelled them to make their irruptions. Should this danger ever come, and come it will, as the sources of information are beyond our reach, we have no means of calculating when it may happen: it will be sudden and unexpected. But have we no danger to apprehend from Europe? The naval forces of France must revive, and the first moment of leisure or opportunity will be employed in an attempt to despoil us of India. Russia can approach us by land: she once entertained the design of marching thither, and to a conquering nation like her, there is no scheme so vast, which has that object in view, which she may not be expected to attempt. In our calculation of accidents, we must not overlook the rising power, the great resources, and the active ambition of America.

But when this country is engaged in war with her neighbours, the expense and burthen of defending India may be more than she can support. This difficulty has been felt at various periods, and it occurred during the last European war. This occasioned a suggestion to the Government in England, regarding the expediency of employing in India his Majesty's regiments of negroes, when the urgency of the public service required the employment of so large a body of European troops for the service of India.

Independent of the great risk and uncertainty of maintaining this remote dominion, there remains a circumstance of perhaps still more vital importance to be considered: this is the expense and sacrifice of various kinds which it requires. If our territorial possessions in India cannot pay the expense of governing and of defending them, it is difficult to say how they can be valuable to Great Britain, since they neither add to her power nor her wealth. They operate, in fact, as a drawback on the strength of this nation. In times of public danger and distress they exhaust her treasures and population.

It is unnecessary now to consider what would have been the consequences had the policy of the Company been directed to preserve, instead of subverting the ancient system of India; but it may be useful to examine how far our interest and influence may be maintained by returning to the old channels, and the long established mode of government in that country. I have already made this proposition, and I am aware that it is a very debatable question. The interests of many, and the prejudices of others, will always

be ready to put a negative upon it. I do not mean to deny that we may exercise the right which we have obtained, and which victory has been admitted in all ages to confer. But would it be wise to seize all that strength and power may have given us, when its possession is not merely unprofitable but burdensome? We have attained a situation contrary to the will of the Legislature, and contrary to the wish of the Company. It has been proved by experience, that we cannot provide for the domestic government of India, which must include its happiness and prosperity, unless at the expense of the population and finances of Great Britain; it would require establishments and sacrifices which we cannot support. A prudent person would desire to escape from such a situation, provided it can be done with safety and honour. I have attempted to show in my former letter that both these circumstances may be provided for, and I shall not offer any more arguments upon this subject, until I see the objections made to those already advanced.

I may be permitted, however, to observe that the argument here is very strong, and it will be the interest of the Company to attend to the facts, while they can be turned to account. Britain is daily becoming less able to bear expenditure. In the mean time India is continually becoming less productive, and with the extension of territory more expensive. Every wise and reflecting man, who at the same time loves his country, cannot fail to desire the adoption of some measure which may turn aside the misfortunes to be predicted from such a state of things.

The question at issue is a singular one in politics, but not altogether a new one. It is not to reduce but restore the government of our rivals, by replacing in India a wholesome counterpoise to our power. This can only be effected by restoring in some degree the vigour of our Native governments, by releasing from our grasp many provinces which we uselessly possess, and whose government we can imperfectly administer. We have imagined that our Government is a boon to the people of India. This is quite unsupported by facts, and it would be contrary to human nature. This opinion owes its origin to national flattery, and to the habits of praise and adulation, which seem to be inhaled with the climate of that country. It is not the question, whether our Government may be better or worse than those of the Natives. Be that as it may, they prefer their own. Whether this opinion be well founded or not is a thing which does not in the least affect the conclusion of the argument, and the result to which it should lead. But I will not dilate upon this subject, which I have already considered on another occasion.

This is but a cursory view of the difficulties of our anomalous situation in India, and it would certainly be of importance to suggest any practicable remedy by which they might be either removed or diminished. At present we are running great risks, without any national benefit, and if the present system is allowed to continue, we shall in a short time have much greater to encounter. The language of Livy regarding the Roman empire is emphatically applicable to the state of our Eastern dominions. "*Ab exiguis profecta initis, eo creverit, ut jam magnitudine laborat sua*" (which having taken its rise from small beginnings, hath grown to such a pitch of greatness that it now totters under its own weight). He seems to have had the same ideas of extensive and growing territory which it has been my object to unfold. He again says, "*Jam pridem prevalentis populi vires se ipse conficiant*" (the strength of this overgrown people hath been for some time working its own ruin.) He foresaw that well-conducted and well-organized but vast government crushing itself under its own weight.

Agas before the event he saw the growing torpor which finally succeeded in extinguishing the vitality of the body politic. Such was the fate of Rome, and it was anticipated. But that the same fate has not long ago attended our Indian empire has been the wonder of many reflecting men. The crisis is however approaching, and it will be wisdom to ward it off. It appears to me that many of the dangers of our situation may be guarded against by the adoption, in substance at least, of the measures I have suggested, and it is under this sincere conviction that I have ventured to propose an alternative, which I am afraid will not be much relished. I should still wish, if possible, to be useful to the Company, and that the name of our nation should be revered among the people of India. The terror of our arms would add weight and dignity to our moderation. I would urge us again, in the words of another historian, to imitate the conduct of the Romans, by maintaining the dignity of our empire without attempting to enlarge its limits. "By every honourable expedient they invited the friendship of their enemies, and endeavoured to convince mankind, that their power, raised above the temptation of conquest, was actuated only by the love of order and justice."

The progress of human affairs is everywhere the same. The same scenes will be repeated in India which we have lately witnessed in Europe. The Native governments are exasperated against us, and they will certainly embrace the first opportunity of retaliation. The struggle can only be ended by their recovering their authority to a certain extent, or in our making a complete conquest of India. The question is then, in fact, whether this conquest would be desirable and advantageous to this country? This question is answered by its having been condemned by both houses of Parliament, and by the justice, good sense, and moderation of the Court of Directors, who have uniformly disapproved of extensive territorial acquisitions.

I conceive it is in our power, by a great and magnanimous act, which justice and reason will approve, but of which history affords only one or two examples, to relieve ourselves of many of our present difficulties. I have already explained this plan to consist in voluntarily relinquishing a great part of our dominions to the Native sovereigns of India; to recover their confidence by showing them that we are not actuated by ambitious views of possessing their country, and by leaving them in a state of real independence, to engage

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them to unite sincerely and cordially in the defence and tranquillity of India. By this plan our influence would not be diminished, but be made more secure, and the income of the Company would be augmented. Great Britain has reached a stage of power and glory in India which has nothing to fear from having her conduct misinterpreted. It would be easy to prevent her motives from being mistaken, and insidious reports which her enemies might circulate would quickly vanish. On the strength of this sentiment we might securely rely, and on the efficiency of our situation. With troops at every point, and so well equipped, we should at least have nothing to fear. The people of India are far from being indifferent to political measures, and it is only necessary to place them in circumstances favourable to the expression of their sentiments, to see revived a considerable portion of patriotic spirit. Why are public undertakings, either of ornament or utility, less heard of in India than formerly? Why are they scarcely heard of at all in the territories which are subject to the Company? Why have literary pursuits ceased? We must answer—the inhabitants are no longer allowed, at least in our dominions, to take any part in public affairs; and in those countries which are still under the native rulers, their powers are cramped and subdued, partly by the influence of our system, and partly by other causes of decay. Men are excited to action by their feelings: remove this impulse, and torpor or death must succeed to a useful life.

No period can be more favourable for making this important experiment than the present. We have recently victoriously concluded a just and necessary war. The fate of India is at our disposal. We should have all the advantage of the rank, weight, character, and experience of the present Governor-general. This circumstance would be of great moment in carrying into effect any radical change in our system. The people who saw the same eminent person conferring the gift, who so lately led or directed against them all the force of British India, and overthrew with ease the utmost efforts of a powerful confederacy, would never imagine that the concessions he was disposed to make were the effects of weakness or fear. They would rather see in the measure the realization of the professions which the Company have continually made in India, and at length be convinced that they desired no further territorial acquisition; that the extent and aim of their policy was to maintain an equilibrium of power, not to oppress or destroy the institutions of the country. In order to plant more deeply and firmly the principles which would guide this measure, and to give to it the solemnity which is due to its importance, it would be highly expedient to appoint a convenient place where the present heads of the Native governments or their representative might meet the Governor-general. In this congress the affairs of the country would be discussed, and the resolutions which might be formed, carried into effect by men the most competent to appreciate them, and the most interested in their execution. In this assembly, while the Governor-general would have an opportunity of settling a system of government for India with the natives of the highest rank, influence, and talent, he would have the inestimable advantage of promulgating, personally, the principles and motives which actuated the British Government. It would be in his power to ascertain the dispositions of the chiefs, and by the ascendancy of his high talents and unquestionable influence, to engage both their feelings and judgment in favour of the measure. Cordiality would thus be restored, and a spirit infused which, spreading through the whole society, would inspire a general zeal in what every man would feel to be his own, as well as the common cause; for many of these men are susceptible of public feelings, and all of them are alive to their own interest. It was by conferring benefits that the Romans enlarged the circle of their friends. Before concluding, I may refer to another maxim of that celebrated people. It was one of the established principles in their policy, to regard the obedience which flows from inclination, as at once more safe and honourable than that which is extorted by coercion.

The tenure of our empire in India is purely military. Would it not be desirable to supplant this cold and rigid tie by one of a more natural, and consequently of a more durable kind? Would it not, in short, be desirable to engraft the strength of the sword on the habits and affections of the people?

I am strongly convinced of the necessity of adopting a new line of policy in regard of our Indian empire, and that the substratum, at least, of that policy should consist of the general principles which I have endeavoured, however imperfectly, to develop. If I have failed to impart the same impressions to your mind which much reflection has produced in my own, I am disposed to attribute this not to the cause itself, but to him that pleads it. Let this acknowledgment, then, gain for the facts which have been stated, and arguments which have been brought forward, all that cool and candid consideration which is due to their immeasurable importance.

Much indeed would I rejoice in the adoption of any plan which would bring about the manifold benefits to which I have alluded, to my country, to the East India Company, and to the innumerable inhabitants of these regions, where a great portion of my days have been spent.

I remain, my dear Sir, with great regard and esteem,

(signed) A. Walker.

I did not retain a copy of my reply to the foregoing letter. Much as I valued the information, and admired the liberality of my correspondent's sentiments, I could not hold out to him any expectation that the measure which he recommended would be adopted.

B. S. J.

Appendix, No. 21.

Appendix, No. 21.

EXTRACT from a MINUTE by a Member of the *Bombay Council*,  
dated 13th April 1810.

Minute by a Member  
of the *Bombay*  
Council, 13 April  
1810.

THE Letter from Colonel Walker, now brought forward, involves a question of great political importance, on which I shall take the liberty of offering a few concise remarks.

I have often advocated the curtailment of the Company's territorial possessions in India, and have even reiterated propositions to this effect to gentlemen in England, one object of which too, as here suggested, was the means of raising funds, to pay off, or diminish, the Company's debt.

That our territories are now too extensive; that our aggrandizement is an object of universal discount and dismay; that it has superinduced a preferable attention to foreign policy rather than to the improvement of internal resources; that our strength and pecuniary means are consequently wasted on remote objects; that it is a system essentially warlike, and incurring heavy expense; that military pursuits will be the chief object of all government where a military ascendancy is found to prevail; that peace is now a vain hope; and that constant hostility, internal or external, has been the consequence of extended empire, and will inevitably continue to employ both our arms and resources, without some radical change, must be evident to those who have reflected on the series of events during late years in India, compared, also, with those which present to our view a picture of striking resemblance, though on a grander scale, in the European commonwealth.

I am of opinion, however, that curtailment of territory, if it takes place at all, should rather be regulated by general principles applicable to our possessions and to the state of our neighbours, than by any supposed advantages of local and limited effect, and that it should be founded on a far broader basis than the trifling reduction of a few public servants, or of a small portion of public debt, whilst millions are accumulating in other quarters.

Our most valuable possessions, taken collectively, are the Bengal provinces, and in arrangements of the nature above suggested, due regard should be had to the guarding and strengthening of that portion of our dominions, and to the check it may be necessary to establish against neighbours or rivals likely to assail us in that quarter. It is in this view that the line of demarcation ought to be drawn, when all beyond it might be advantageously surrendered. But this, it is evident, must require profound deliberation, minute chorographical and statistical inquiries, and a most comprehensive view, both of immediate effects and of probable remoter consequences; neither do I think it should be decided by any distant authority, but by the greatest talents that can be assembled on the spot, to bestow, on a question so complicated and important, the most grave, deliberate, and undivided attention.

As to the possessions on this side, I incline to the opinion, for reasons to be hereafter detailed, that, under the present circumstances of India more especially, they cannot be separately or partially reduced without danger.

The advantages of Bombay consist in its commercial site, importance, and resources, its unequalled harbour and means of naval accommodation, and its situation on the Western coast, considered relatively to Europe and to the Poona Mahrattas. These are too well known to require amplification. The advantages of Guzerat (including all we hold to the northward) may be referred to its particular position considered in respect to the other greater powers of India, its internal resources, and to its frontier position in regard to the Western powers.

First.—Whether or not any plan of general curtailment and consequent partition of territory be seriously a regular system of check in respect to the continuous native States, cannot be denied to be of the highest importance. An inspection of the coloured map of India will show that the distance from the eastern boundary of Guzerat to that part of the Nizam's territory formerly possessed by us, and now in fact occupied by a large detachment of British troops, is but short, the intervening country being open; that the northern boundary about the Jumna, and that armies stationed at these points ready to move in any required direction, or to co-operate, if necessary, with forces from Bengal or Bundelcund, would give a weight to our foreign politics widely felt by those powers in India most likely to retain, if not most able to improve, their present formidable degree of strength.

To this head may also be referred the policy of a local act of the nature recommended, in its effects on the other subsidized powers, and whether it may not excite expectations or demands in other quarters calculated to embarrass our more extended political relations. The obvious deductions from this argument would still further support the suggestion above offered, viz., that curtailment of territory should be a general, not partial measure. The one might be rendered unquestionably safe, the other is at least liable to the risk of injurious consequences. It might also be asked, whether the measure should not be general to be strictly just?

Second.—The internal resources of Guzerat are great. Its wealth, both landed and commercial, is, from the description given of it, very considerable, and it is likely to continue  
(445.—VI.)

one of the richest portions of our Eastern empire, for, independent of its rich merchants and shroffs, it contains a race of landed proprietors whose rents are, comparatively speaking, but moderately assessed to the public revenue. The sums capable of being raised in that quarter on emergent occasions would almost surpass belief if the fact were not ascertained. These will ever be at the command of the Company's government while its power and influence remain unimpaired; but with any material diminution thereof, the continuance of at least the same extent of advantage may reasonably be questioned. In estimating the value of these resources to ourselves, we should also seriously consider both the consequences and the chance of their being possessed by enemies.

The interference of our Government in the affairs of Guzerat is moreover liable to less objection than might be urged against most, if not the whole, of our other late acquisitions. It was earnestly and long solicited by the Guicawar government before it was given, and when given, it may be said not only to have saved that State from impending ruin, but lately to have retrieved the almost desperate condition of its affairs.\*

It is hence a matter of no small importance to know precisely both the means and the consequences of a levy of one crore of rupees, or upwards, to be paid at once for the territories restored. The Guicawar can only effect it by mortgaging some part of his territorial revenue, and if his finances should thence be involved in fresh embarrassments, an evil of serious magnitude would be generated, highly desirable to be avoided as long as we continue to exercise a predominant influence in that quarter. The offer of territorial surrender might be so alluring to the Guicawar as to render him careless of the conditions on which the price of redemption was to be provided. The money might be raised on terms that would involve certain future distraction, in which case we could, neither in justice nor policy, refuse our interposition, and this at a time when the difficulties, if not expense, of restoring order might be greatly enhanced.

But of the policy of weakening or strengthening Guzerat, a better judgment may be formed after considering its frontier position in respect to the Western powers.

Though little alarmed by the threats of a French invading force in India, I by no means think our situation devoid of danger even from Western foes.

In this estimate we may pass over the smaller vicinal powers, who, I should hope, may be found, on experience, to be rather additional defences in the long extended barrier than objects of great jealousy and alarm. The greater powers, however, will always require the eye of attention and vigilance. In this number I should especially class Cabul and Candahar, Persia and Scind. The former are distant, and at present perhaps friendly disposed. Scind has ever shown an excessive, nay hostile degree of jealousy of the British power. Its means of intercourse with Joudpoor are now ascertained to be much easier than was formerly supposed, and Joudpoor, a country of great resource and strength bordering Guzerat on the North, is at the devotion of Meer Khan, our present declared enemy, through whose influence and power the present rajah, Maun Sing, was placed on the throne. We may therefore, in reality, consider these countries as four great Mahomedan powers, capable of being leagued by religious as well political ties; for independent of the influence of Meer Khan in Joudpoor, the rajah is now actually supported as a kind of state puppet, if not prisoner, on his throne by the power of another Mahomedan nawaub, Ibrahim Khan, who placed him there†.

Though some of these countries are far removed from Guzerat, the immediate subject of discussion, they are still capable of exercising a direct influence in respect to it. Persia, for example, may shortly have it in her power to influence the councils both of Cabul and Scind, either jointly or separately. Many circumstances might combine to give her influence over both, the latter being a tributary of the former, or, from the jealous nature of the Scind government, Persia, if necessary, might easily detach her from the Cabul State to prosecute French schemes on India, and, if joined with Joudpoor, whose alliance in such case it would be neither doubtful nor difficult to secure, a formidable combination is at once established on the Guzerat frontier, necessary for us to counterpoise, or whose eventual invasion we may very possibly be required to repel.

In the case supposed, I think we may confidently anticipate that our tributaries and dependents in India, together with those on whom we have forced, and those who have yet to dread a subsidiary alliance, will cordially join in common league, either openly to

(assist)

\* I beg not to be understood as urging this as a sufficient plea, either in justice or sound policy, for the permanent subversion of the Guicawar independence, but merely to intimate that if the reason given in the text be valid, there may perhaps be some other fitter quarters than Guzerat, in which to begin the business of territorial surrender.

† Joudpoor is a rajahpoor State, but it is said to contain at this moment a stationary Patan army of from 30 to 50,000 men, and from 100 to 300 guns, under the command of Mahomed Shaw Khan.

There are other Mussulman tribes and petty chieftains along the Guzerat frontier, whom I have not noticed for the reason above given. The most powerful of these is Futty Mahomed of Cutch, whose alliance with Scind is not very probable, from the known views and anxiety of the latter State to extend its dominion over Cutch, and the consequent jealousy now subsisting between the two countries.

assist, or secretly to favour, a Western invasion. In a country where independence is highly valued, and where the prejudices of religion and of caste inspire even extraordinary notions of personal superiority, a state of subjugation or dependence can be pleasant to none of the native powers; to many it is intolerable. In the latter more especially we accordingly perceive feelings of humbled and disappointed pride, a feverish sense of degraded honour, and an eager desire of emancipation from the British yoke, while those who are yet free must often look abroad to apprehend that submission to it may be their fate next. Numerous native officers of distinction who have been thrown out of employ by this overthrow of the ancient order, tend, by their intrigues and complaints, to keep up the spirit of discontent in greater vigour, and to disseminate it more widely.

It is therefore vain to say that we have added either to our comparative strength or real security by extended empire. We now know and feel that we have not. Our power to retain what we have acquired is at this moment suspended in a doubtful balance. Neighbours, to be sure, and some of them troublesome, are no more. Their possessions are effaced from the map of India, and the red mark of British empire is seen fearfully extended from the Sutleje to Cape Comorin\*. But we have not added all these resources to our own; we are not strong in the strength of the conquered; "we are only safe in their weakness;" and the time may justly be apprehended, perhaps it is not far distant, when one universal crash shall retort annihilation upon ourselves.

Against this day of retribution there appears to me to be no effectual safeguard, without the general curtailment of territory above suggested, and the re-establishment of that system of federation, or *balance of the power of States*, united in political or commercial intercourse, which was formerly in tolerable force on the continent of India, began to be daily better understood, and affords, when fully acted up to, the best if not the only security which human ingenuity can devise against the projects of ambition or the ruinous effects of reciprocal enmity. In this system unavoidable hostility is counterpoised by the certain support of some friends; it is also mitigated and tempered by the interest which each state ultimately feels in the preservation of the whole. But conquest, like tyranny, is one and indivisible; it can suffer no brother near the throne; it stands singly supported, but universally hated, and depends, even for security, on bearing down all that has the power or the semblance of opposition.

These seem to me to be some of the most important points to which the question of territorial surrender in Guzerat may be referred. Viewing its geographical position, its bearings in respect to the Western and to the greater Maharratta powers, and to Bengal; its superior advantages both from internal resources and locality over other comparatively useless possessions; combining these with our limited means of supporting an independently efficient force, and the delay and difficulty of relief, when necessary, from other parts, and comprehending more specially in view the actual circumstances of Indian policy, I think would clearly dictate that we should improve rather than impair our strength in Guzerat. Whether for check or for offensive operations, its importance cannot be doubted; whilst to be really respectable, useful, and efficient, whether at home or abroad, it is, I think, equally evident that we ought to be independently strong. The measure of partial surrender, considered in respect to the other subsidized powers, might also be questioned, as before intimated, on the grounds of impartial justice. But if the wisdom of superior authority decides otherwise; if either now, or in any future general arrangement for India, this portion of the empire should be deemed of little relative importance, it might then, I think, be fairly debated, insulated as these our Western possessions are, whether complete surrender would not be more politic, and even more productive, than a retention of territory too limited for a commanding weight in the scale of Indian politics, perhaps too limited for effectual local sway or defence, and therefore burdensome on the general resources without the return of commensurate advantage; where diminished power or internal distraction might also give to foes fresh motives to attack, and thereby add to the perils and difficulties of the situation, with our means of meeting either much reduced.

As to the question of general curtailment of territory, and recurrence to a federative system of free and independent States, I should think it peculiarly worthy the attention of a great and commanding power situated like that of Britain in the East. Her influence in the general balance may always be great. With the certainty of her moderation and forbearance, she will be sure of many friends; but the moment of extension is the signal for alarm, and the progress of an exterminating policy serves but to generate combinations and hate, ultimately dangerous and most probably fatal to her own existence. It is very true that the duration of a conqueror's power may vary, under various circumstances, over barbarous nations. It may continue for several generations, but probably much shorter over nations of internal energy and resources, whilst, in India in particular, we have certainly no pledge of the prolongation of this period in the total dissimilarity of religion, manners, habits, language, and institutions, and in the almost total suspension of social and domestic intercourse between the conquerors and the conquered.

It were superfluous, and perhaps it would be tedious, even if time admitted, to quote instances in elucidation of the preceding remarks. The records of the India House, and authentic

\* This line has been a little contracted of late years, but not near enough to remove the source of danger.



**VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FORRIGN.**

**Appendix, No. 21.**

Minute by a Member of the Bombay Council, 13 April 1810.

**328 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE [VI. Political.**

authentic publications, contain many historical facts to which I should hope these observations would be found applicable, and to verify even a long existing and not superficial knowledge in India of the true principles of the balancing system.

These principles, indeed, must naturally arise in all countries out of the peculiar circumstances of vicinal civilized states. They must be referred to these sources, and these only, to be really useful and permanent in their effects, and when purely exercised in the cause of self-defence, they constitute the soundest of all policy, that founded in justice, and cannot be too highly cherished or too forcibly inculcated in the direction of our foreign affairs.

But to develop this subject fully would lead to great length, whilst I, perhaps, have greater cause to apologize even for this intrusion. Were time allowed, I should still feel that I wanted ability to discuss this question as its importance merits. I have noticed it more from a sense of duty than of competency to treat it, from conceiving that questions of magnitude, when before the Board, require from its members those opinions which local observation has enabled them to form, and which they conscientiously believe to be promotive of the public weal. It is to these motives, and the liberality of the honourable Court, that I must trust for indulgence in respect to those now submitted, and which are most respectfully offered to maturer judgments to be considered or rejected as to their wisdom shall seem meet.

The Minute of the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 27th of last month being connected with this subject, I have only to add that, under the views and impressions above submitted, his proposed arrangement respecting the European regiment seems to me in every respect advisable, and has that cordial acquiescence which I feel prompted to give to every measure calculated to improve either our internal resources or internal strength, believing, as I do, these objects to be of the first importance to the stability of our Indian possessions, and combining this particular proposal with what I conceive to be the relative advantages of increased strength in the Guzerat quarter.

Since writing the above, the accompanying letter and inclosure from the Accountant-general, dated the 6th instant, have reached me in circulation. By these it appears that the annual revenue we now get from the subsidy districts, and which therefore constitutes the amount proposed to be surrendered to the Guicawar, is equal to - - - R<sup>y</sup> 12,43,291

Colonel Walker proposes, as an equivalent for these, upwards of a crore of rupees, or one and a half million sterling, by which, if we are to conclude that the Colonel calculates the Guicawar being able to raise on this account 1 crore and 20 lacs, this sum will only buy up Company's paper, or diminish a principal sum of debt, equal in annual interest to - - - - - 9,60,000

To which if we add the amount of Civil and Judicial Savings, proposed by the honourable Governor - - - - - 2,92,251

12,52,251

The pecuniary gain to the Company will be, per annum - - - - - 8,960  
Or, if the battalion of sepoy and troop of cavalry be also reduced, the total gain to the Company will still be no more than - - - - - 2,66,961

Under this view of the case, it seems to me doubtful whether even the pecuniary gain can be deemed an object of sufficient magnitude to compensate the risk of the proposed arrangement without reducing the military part of the establishment. The actual gain appears to be a mere trifle, whilst the preceding remarks will show that I have more than doubts of the present policy or safety of this military reduction. If, on the other hand, the Guicawar be required to raise a sum sufficient to make the pecuniary compensation a desirable object, it will require near two crore of rupees to raise our gain by the transaction, including only civil saving to 5½ lacs; and in such case, should it ever occur, the consequences of allowing the Guicawar to borrow so enormous a sum by mortgage of his revenue, and the Company's government to guarantee the contract, ought doubtless to be duly weighed.

**Appendix, No. 22.**

LETTER from the Governor-general in Council at *Fort William*,  
dated 22d September 1810.

To the honourable the Secret Committee of the honourable the Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs,

**Appendix, No. 22.**

Letter from the Governor-general in Council at *Fort William*, 22 Sept. 1810.

THE principal purpose of this Despatch is to submit to your honourable Committee our sentiments on the proposition for the commutation of the territory ceded to us by the state of the Guicawar as security for subsidy, referred to your decision by the honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, in his address of the 14th of April, copies of the proceedings of that government having (as already intimated to your honourable Committee) been transmitted to us to enable us to form and communicate to you our opinion on that important question.

2. The reference however to your honourable Committee, we observe, is not confined to the question above stated, but occasion has been taken, strongly to urge the policy of restoring to the powers from which we derived them, the whole of the territories in India, ceded as security for subsidy, or rather, as it will be found on a consideration of the subject, of abandoning our subsidiary alliances, and restoring the whole of our conquests in the late Mahratta war. To this extraordinary proposition, we shall advert more particularly in a subsequent part of this address; in this place we shall only remark, that it would perhaps have been more proper if a suggestion, involving a change in the political state of India, more extensive and momentous than ever engaged the speculative deliberations of the legislature, had been submitted to your honourable Committee in communication with that superior local authority, which is exclusively vested with the immediate cognizance, superintendence, and control of our external relations in this quarter of the British dominions.

3. On the question of commutation as applied to Guzerat, we have little to add to the arguments stated in the Minutes of the several members of the government of Bombay, who appear unanimously to oppose the measure on grounds which, in our opinion, are conclusive. The most material objections appear to us to be the certain diminution, if not the absolute extinction, of our present efficient political ascendancy in the province of Guzerat, the more than probable return of the state of the Guicawar to that condition of pecuniary distress and pecuniary dependence on the native capitalists, with all its attendant evils, from which, through the great ability and exertions of the late resident at Baroda, we have been enabled to relieve it, the inability of the state of Guicawar, under the pressure of its pecuniary difficulties, and under the consequent disorganization of its system of government, to fulfil the obligations of the alliance, the augmented probability and frequency of the occasions for the employment of our troops in suppressing internal disorders or repelling external danger, the discredit attending a traffic of territorial dominion for a pecuniary consideration, and the obloquy, not to add the inhumanity, of transferring by sale a body of people from a subjection to the mild and equitable laws of a British Government, to the misrule, oppression, and injustice of a native administration.

4. On the other hand, the pecuniary benefits of the proposed arrangement appear to us to be even more problematical than they have been represented by the Government of Bombay.

5. The only case in which any positive advantage could be supposed to arise from the discharge of a portion of the capital of the Indian debt, by a sacrifice of a part of the public income, corresponding in amount to the reduction of interest, would be that in which the public securities having been depreciated in consequence of their amount exceeding the demand for them, it might be requisite to adopt measures for withdrawing a portion of those securities from the market, with a view to restore the credit of the public funds. But as that case does not exist, and is not likely to occur in the present flourishing state of public credit, the benefit of the measure in this view of it is remote and speculative, and is balanced by the possible disadvantage of the measure in a contrary event, of the further improvement of credit and the consequent reduction of the rate of interest on public securities below that which is here contemplated.

6. Admitting the practicability of reducing a battalion of sepoys and the troop of cavalry after the restoration of the ceded districts in Guzerat, (a measure, however, which your honourable Committee will observe is decidedly opposed by the professional judgment of the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, in whose opinion we are disposed to concur,) the annual amount of the saving arising from the proposed transaction will not exceed 3,02,960 rupees.\* Without the reduction of the battalion and troop, the annual saving is, as stated in the Minute of the Member of the Bombay Council, only 8,960

7. But at the period of discussing this subject, the government of Bombay could not have had in contemplation the measures now in progress for the reduction of the rate of interest on the whole of the Indian debt to 6 per cent. If those measures should ultimately succeed (and of their success we have at present no reason to doubt) they may be expected to have taken effect at Bombay by the time when, supposing your honourable Committee's approbation of the proposed plan, the commutation would take place. In that event, therefore, the actual saving of interest on the Indian debt would be of course one-fourth less than that which is at present computed, and the result of the transaction would exhibit an

* Reduction of Interest - - - - -	Rs. 9,60,000
Reduction of Civil Charges - - - - -	2,92,231
First Battalion N. Infantry - - - - -	2,16,000
Troop of Cavalry - - - - -	79,000
Deduct	Rs. 15,46,231
Revenue of the Ceded Districts in Guzerat to be restored	12,43,291
Annual Saving - - - - -	3,02,960

The honourable the Governor of Bombay has calculated the annual expense of a Battalion of N Infantry at 1,80,000 rupees, which reduces the whole saving to 2,66,960. But this is an error of calculation, as the monthly charge of a Battalion is stated at 18,000 rupees, which makes 2,16,000 per annum, not 1,80,000.

Appendix, No. 22.

Letter from the  
Governor-general  
in Council at Fort  
William, 22 Sept.  
1810.

an annual loss of 2,31,040 rupees, instead of an annual saving, if no reduction is made in the military establishment of Bombay, and with that reduction a saving of only 62,960.

8. On the whole, therefore, it may be observed, that political objections of great weight oppose the suggested arrangement: that they are of a nature not to be counterbalanced by the utmost supposable advantage to be derived from it in a pecuniary point of view; but that in fact no advantage even of that description, but, on the contrary, an annual pecuniary loss, is likely to result from the adoption of it.

9 We shall now proceed to state a few observations on the project of a general surrender of the territories acquired by our connexion with foreign states, suggested to the consideration of your honourable Committee by the government of Bombay. As that proposition appears to have originated with a member of the Council of Bombay, and as the grounds of it are exclusively stated in his Minute of the 13th of April, we must necessarily refer to that document in discussing the merits of it.

10 The expediency of territorial restitution is rested on the jealousy, apprehension and discontent of the native powers, and the advantage of re-establishing what he terms "the system of federation or balance of the power of states, united in political or commercial intercourse," which, he observes, "was formerly in tolerable force on that continent of India, began to be daily better understood, and affords, when fully acted up to, the best, if not the only security which human ingenuity can devise against the projects of ambition or the ruinous effects of reciprocal enmity."

11. Referring to the extent of our territorial dominions, and the nature of our political relations as the cause, it is observed, that "a state of subjugation or dependence can be pleasant to none of the native powers; that to many, it is intolerable, that in the latter more especially, we accordingly perceive feelings of humbled and disappointed pride, a feverish sense of degraded honour, and an eager desire of emancipation from the British yoke"

12. It cannot be meant to be contended, that the mere extension of the project of commutation proposed with respect to Guzerat, to all the other states from which we have acquired territory as a security for subsidy, can have the effect either of restoring the supposed pre-existing balance, or of removing the evils which he has so forcibly described, because, when the proposed restitutions should have been effected, various other states or powers would still be left in the condition believed to generate the sentiments ascribed to all, nor will his reasoning be found applicable even to the states subsidized by us on territorial security; since it is not with them so much the loss of territory as the loss of independence which is represented as the cause of their aversion; and if the arrangement proposed with respect to Guzerat be extended to the states in question, they will still be subject to the dependence and control resulting from the stipulations of subsisting treaties. Even in this limited application, therefore, of the system of territorial restitution, we can only understand the proposition to mean, the entire renunciation of our defensive alliances with those states.

13 Admitting this interpretation, and supposing the arrangement to include not only the states of Hyderabad and Poona, but even Oude and the Carnatic, there will still be left under the pressure of the feelings represented as the source of danger to the British Government, the state of Nagpore, and the once formidable powers of Sindiah and Holkar. The removal of these feelings, and the restoration of what is termed the federation or balance of the power of states, seem therefore necessarily to require the entire restitution of our conquests and territorial acquisitions, since the formation of the existing alliance with the state of Hyderabad, as well as the dissolution of all our subsidiary engagements, in other words, the re-establishment of the several powers of India, in the condition in which they existed before the above-mentioned period of time; or, if that be deemed impracticable in consequence of the intermediate mutation of territorial property, at least such a distribution of our conquests and acquisitions as may be thought calculated to satisfy the minds of the discontented chiefs, and establish the desired balance of power from which the reserved portion of the British dominions is to derive security.

14 We

* Revenue of Coded Districts	-	-	-	-	Rs 12,43,291
Reduction of Interest	-	-	-	-	7,20,000
Ditto - Civil Charges	-	-	-	-	2,92,261
					<u>10,12,251</u>
Annual Loss	-	-	-	-	2,31,040
Reduction of Interest	-	-	-	-	7,20,000
Ditto - Civil Charges	-	-	-	-	2,92,261
First Battalion, N. Infantry	-	-	-	-	2,16,000
Troop of Cavalry	-	-	-	-	78,000
					<u>18,06,261</u>
Deduct, Revenue of Coded Districts	-	-	-	-	12,43,291
Annual Saving	-	-	-	-	<u>62,960</u>

14. We are left to conjecture the specific nature of the arrangement by which these effects are expected to be produced. We can only understand from the tenor of the Minute, that they are to be the result of territorial restitutions, combined with the re-establishment of the independence of those states, who are represented to be enthralled by their alliances with the British Government, and of the power of others which have been weakened by our conquests. We cannot therefore reconcile the means to the end, without supposing the proposition to comprehend the dissolution of our alliances with the states of Hyderabad and Poona, and the restitution of the territories ceded by them, the surrender of a part, if not the whole, of the territory acquired by the war with the Mahratta chieftains, and as the result of this course of policy, the re-establishment of the federative form of the Mahratta empire.

15. If this be the general outline of the arrangement in contemplation, it has not probably occurred to the member of the Bombay Council, that the execution of it involves the immediate dismemberment of the territories of other states as well as of our own, the dispossession or subjugation of various chiefs placed by our power in a condition of independence, and a complicated violation of public faith and solemn treaties and engagements, and that consequently such a system of restitution and concession could alone be accomplished by a series of acts of violence, injustice, and public treachery.

16. It cannot however be necessary to enter into the discussion of a project which, to every person acquainted with the political state of India, and with the nature of our public engagements and external relations, carries with it its own refutation, since it is in the first place morally impracticable; and if that were otherwise, it would be calculated to counteract the views which it was intended to accomplish. But we shall close this branch of the subject by transcribing (with a view to save the trouble of reference) the following passages of a letter from the Governor-general in Council to your honourable Committee, of the 1st of June 1806, which are directly applicable to the question before us, although originating in a proposition infinitely less extensive than that which is the subject of our present remarks.

"With regard to the question of restitution, upon which your honourable Committee, by the tenor of your despatch, appears to desire the opinion of the Governor-general in Council, the information which will be in the possession of your honourable Committee, on your receipt of this despatch, may be expected to enable your honourable Committee to judge both of the expediency and practicability of any restitutions, in addition to those which have been made by late arrangements to Dowlut Row Sindiah, and which are about to be made to the Rajah of Berar. We deem it proper, notwithstanding, to offer some remarks upon that subject to the consideration of your honourable Committee.

"The precise limits of our territorial dominion, which your honourable Committee has stated to be desirable, having actually been established, and the remainder of your conquests being disposed of by arrangements sanctioned by the obligations of our public faith, we doubt the justice and the policy even of any attempt to disturb them, and are convinced of its impracticability, consistently with indispensable considerations of equity and interest. Admitting that it were advisable to re-establish Sindiah in the possession of the northern territory of Hindostan, it would evidently be necessary to make an adequate compensation within the limits of our reserved dominion, or from our permanent resources, to the numerous chieftains whose claims have been advantageously satisfied by the assignment of those tenures to the westward of the Jumna, which, under such a proposed arrangement, they would be required to relinquish. But of the policy of re-establishing the power of Sindiah in the vicinity of our north-west frontier, and of the far superior advantages of the late disposal of our Western conquests, we have already stated our opinion, if therefore that opinion, which corresponds with the sentiments both of the late Marquis Cornwallis and of Marquis Wellesley, be correct, the expediency of such a measure must depend upon a much more comprehensive question, to which we shall advert in a subsequent part of this despatch. Similar observations apply to the question of effecting the restoration to Sindiah of the forts and districts in the Deccan, which he ceded to the honourable Company and its allies at the conclusion of the peace.

"With regard to the expediency of the retrocession to the Rajah of Berar of the territory formerly in his possession to the westward of the river Wurdah, our opinion is, that adverting to the present system of our political relations, and to the condition of the other Mahratta states, it would, upon the whole, be desirable to accomplish that object, excluding however from the retrocession of that territory the system of a participation of rights in the same districts. The grounds on which we deem it an object of policy to improve the condition of the Rajah of Berar's dominions have been stated in documents submitted on former occasions to the notice of your honourable Committee, and are fully explained in our despatch of the 14th ultimo, which your honourable Committee will receive by the present opportunity. The principal of those grounds is the considerable restitutions which have been made to Sindiah by the treaty of November last, and to Holkar by the late treaty of peace, restitutions which afford to the Rajah of Berar room to contemplate a disadvantageous comparison of his condition with that of Dowlut Rao Sindiah, and Jeswant Rao Holkar, with reference to the different course of policy pursued by the rajah and by the two latter chieftains since the termination of the war of 1803, and even with reference to the fact of Sindiah having been the principal instigator of the war. For although we have great reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar meditated a co-operation in the hostile proceedings of Dowlut Rao Sindiah, and a union of interests with that

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chiefain and Holkar, yet he never proceeded to the length of actual hostility against the British power, unless his participation in the irruptions of his brother's troops into the territory of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deekan, be presumed, of which fact however we are not altogether satisfied; and even admitting his participation in that act of aggression, he is entitled to the credit of having speedily abandoned that course of conduct, and of subsequently regulating his proceedings in conformity to the established relations of amity and concord between the two states.

"The impracticability, however, of obtaining the consent of his highness the Soubahdar of the Deekan, to relinquish the extensive and valuable territory to the westward of the Wurdas without an equivalent, and the objections which oppose the expediency and even the justice of any such attempt, must be obvious to your honourable Committee. We are not aware of the practicability of offering any other equivalent than an equivalent in money (not less than 20 lacs of rupees per annum), which our finances could ill support, and the grant of any species of equivalent, the burden of which must be exclusively borne by the honourable Company, cannot, we imagine, be contemplated.

"But the political disadvantages and danger of any additional extensive restitutions to the Mahratta states, supposing them to be practicable, without gross violations of public faith, are in our judgment extreme. Even the restoration of all our conquests, combined with the dissolution of the treaty of Bassein, far from disposing the Mahratta nation to observe the relations of peace towards the British power, would evidently, from the nature of the transaction, the habits and principles of the nation, and we might add, from the inherent propensities of human nature, lead the Mahrattas to take advantage of such acquired power on their part, and such diminished strength and resources on ours, to attempt the subversion of the British power in India. But the complicated confusion which must result from such an extensive revolution in the political state of India; the complexity of subverted interests which must attend it; the unlimited violation of pledged faith involved in such a project, and the total derangement of the whole system of our Government, which the execution of such a project must inevitably produce, appear to us to exclude even the possibility of contemplating so vast a plan of concession. We consider, indeed, any concessions to the Mahrattas beyond a certain limit, to be dangerous in proportion to their extent. We are of opinion that the utmost admissible degree of concession has been extended to Sindiah. We should deem it advisable, for the reasons above explained, to grant proportionate concessions to the Rajah of Berar, but we have stated the absolute impracticability of such a measure in the existing order of affairs.

"The security and tranquility of our dominions must depend upon the actual superiority of our power, upon the sense which the native states entertain of it; upon the comparative weakness of those states individually; upon the natural obstacles to an effectual combination of their strength; and upon our strict observance of those principles of forbearance, justice and moderation towards other states, a confidence in which must relieve them from the apprehension of any desire on our part to control their independence, to invade their rights, or to interfere in the management of their internal concerns. It is vain to expect that any extent of concession would eradicate from the minds of the Mahratta chieftains a disposition to take advantage of any state of circumstances favourable to the recovery of their reduced power and dominion, or to the subversion of our own. But while on the one hand the unfettered command of our extensive resources, and the experienced superiority of our arms, combined with such a state of military preparation as may enable us at all times to oppose a prompt resistance to any external attack, may be expected to overawe the independent states of India; on the other, the due observance of the principles above described must at least deprive them of any additional motive to the prosecution of hostile designs, and may gradually render Sindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, contented with the reduced condition of their power, and dispose them permanently to abstain from the contemplation of any systematic project of ambition or revenge.

"The main foundations of our present power, greater than at any former period of the British dominion in India, have been laid by those arrangements, which excluded from these territories the dangerous ascendancy and growing power of the French, which have united our interests and combined our strength with the interest and the strength of the two great states of the Deekan, and by those memorable exertions in the cause of justice, which have eradicated or subdued all that was formidable of the power and influence of our enemies: which have augmented our political ascendancy and territorial resources, established the superiority of the British arms, and finally enabled us to accomplish that complete consolidation of our dominion, which it has uniformly been the object of this Government to obtain.

"Before we close this address, we deem it proper to advert to the observations contained in your honourable Committee's despatch on the subject of modifying the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein.

"Any relaxation in the stipulations of that treaty would be gratifying to the Mahrattas, in proportion to the hope which it might afford of weakening and ultimately of subverting the influence of the British Government in the state of Poona. The endeavours, therefore, which under such circumstances would be made by the principal Mahratta chieftains for the accomplishment of that object, would evidently occasion much embarrassment to the British Government, would produce the necessary alternative of either suffering those endeavours to take effect, or of interfering in the intrigues of the Durbar of Poona in a manner inconsistent with the principles which we profess to maintain, and would probably involve

us in disputes with the principal Mahratta chieftains, and lay the foundation of interminable troubles. We are satisfied that as far as respects the object of reconciling the Mahratta chieftains to our connexion with the Peishwa, there is no alternative but either to maintain the alliance on its present basis, or to abandon it altogether. The former secures the advantages for the attainment of which the alliance was originally formed; the latter (admitting its practicability consistently with public faith) would only serve to revive the ambition of the Mahratta state, and afford additional means of prosecuting hostile designs against the British Government, with a view not only to the recovery of the conquered territories, but to the subversion of the British power, in the prosecution of which the Mahrattas would possess the means almost wholly uncontrolled of efficient co-operation with a French force.

"Your honourable Committee appears to suppose that the suggested modifications of the treaty of Bassein would be consistent with the wishes of the Peishwa; your honourable Committee, however, will observe, from a reference to the correspondence with the resident at Poona, that whatever may have been the original reluctance of his highness to accede to all the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, he now considers his welfare to depend entirely on the maintenance of those stipulations, and we are satisfied that the Peishwa has no desire whatever for the modification of the treaty. That of the two propositions suggested by your honourable Committee, he would receive with indifference the proposition for the abrogation of the article which prohibits him from entering into any negotiation with a foreign state without the knowledge and concurrence of the British Government, and that the proposition for the removal of the subsidiary force to a position without the limits of his dominions, would be received by his highness with alarm, and would be decidedly rejected. With reference to those facts, it only remains to consider the dissolution of the alliance and the suggested modifications in a practical point of view.

"With regard to the dissolution of the alliance, assuming, as is undoubted, the Peishwa's solicitude for its continuance, it becomes a question whether, consistently with public faith, the British Government could renounce the alliance, even though such renunciation should be accompanied by the restitution of all the rights and territorial acquisitions obtained by the treaty of Bassein, and its subsequent modification. The restoration of those rights and acquisitions, however, would certainly be indispensable, under the supposition that, consistently with public faith, we could declare the dissolution of the alliance without his highness's consent.

"When your honourable Committee adverts to the importance of the rights and the territory acquired under the treaty of Bassein, your honourable Committee will judge of the injury and the embarrassment which would result from the surrender of them, considered not only with reference to their political advantages, and to the actual resources of the ceded territory, but also to the danger of unlimited concession to the chieftains lately in arms against us, for in favour of their views and not those of the Peishwa, the concession would in fact be made.

"But in the dissolution of the alliance with the state of Poona, the question of our public faith is involved, not only with the Peishwa, but with his highness the Subahdar of the Deccan, the treaty of Bassein containing stipulations in favour of his highness, of which the foundation was laid in the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in October 1800, and which by anticipation are confirmed by the provisions of the secret and separate articles of that treaty.

"With respect to the suggested modifications of the treaty of Bassein (still adverting to the disinclination of the Peishwa to the introduction of any change in its existing stipulations), it is obvious that his highness's consent to such modifications could alone be obtained by sacrifices or concessions adequate, in his opinion, to the benefits which he would relinquish; and we have already stated to your honourable Committee our opinion of the evils which would result from those modifications."

17 Setting aside the question of the practicability of territorial restitution as it relates to the obligations of justice and of public faith, it may not be improper to state a few general observations with respect to the "federation or balance of the power of states united in political or commercial intercourse," which is represented to have been "formally in tolerable force on the continent of India," and to have been destroyed by the British Government at a time when it began to be daily better understood.

18. As an abstract proposition, all opinions will agree that a balance of the power of states united in political or commercial intercourse, "affords the best if not the only security which human ingenuity can devise against the projects of ambition, or the ruinous effects of reciprocal enmity." But a balance of power to be efficient must, we apprehend, be formed upon principles of convention, such as those under which it subsisted on the continent of Europe before the French Revolution. It must arise out of a consensual submission to a system of public law, and a recognition of reciprocal rights as they respect the several states individually, and of reciprocal duties as they relate to the imposition of restraints upon their own ambition or on the ambition of their neighbours. It must be founded at least upon a declared renunciation of views of conquest as a principle of government, and it must operate by the apprehended, and as the occasion may require, by the actual association of several states to resist the endeavours which any one state may employ to aggrandize its power at the expense of another.

19. At no period of the history of India do we recognize the existence of any such system of federation or balance of the power of states; nor indeed is it compatible with the character,

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character, principles, and constitution of the states which have been established on the continent of India. With them, war, rapine, and conquest constitute an avowed principle of action, a just and legitimate pursuit, and the chief source of public glory, sanctioned and even recommended by the ordinances of religion, and prosecuted without the semblance or pretext of justice; with a savage disregard of every obligation of humanity and public faith, and restrained alone by the power of resistance.

20. Under the successful impulse of these principles, the vast empire of the Mahomedans was established over more than the continent of India. On its ruins arose the power of the Mahratta state, which subsequently branched out into a confederation of chiefs, professedly directed to objects of conquest and universal exaction, the fruits of which by regular convention were to be divided by specific proportions. The same views and principles animated and extended the usurpations of Hyder Ali and his successor. The checks which the Mahrattas and the rulers of Mysore occasionally received from the power of the Nizam, and from different combinations among these three states, were the result not of a pre-established federation and balance of power, but of the prevalence of a system of conquest, violence, and usurpation. The efforts of the contending parties were directed not to the just limitation, but to the subversion of each other's power, and the aggrandizement of their own; and it is unnecessary to refer to the testimony of specific facts, with a view to demonstrate the self-evident proposition, that the permanent existence of a balance of power is incompatible with reciprocal views of conquest and ambition.

21. We have referred the period of time when it is said that a balance of power existed in India, and that it was becoming daily better understood, to that which immediately preceded the conclusion of the treaty of alliance with the state of Hyderabad in the year 1800, because from that date must be considered to have commenced that system of supposed oppressive connexion, to which and to its consequences are ascribed the evils so feelingly deplored. At that time we discern no traces of a balance of the power of states. Five years before, the dominion of the Nizam had been laid at the feet of the Mahrattas, and he was compelled to purchase their lenity by enormous sacrifices, his dominions were subsequently invaded by the troops, and his government insulted and menaced by the power of Sindiah, and he continued in this degraded state of dependence and control until relieved by the complete consolidation of the general defensive alliance concluded with the British Government. The Mahratta power extended in the north of Hindostan from the Ganges to the Jumna, and from the Jumna to the Indus; to the north and south, from Seind to the Nerbuddah; to the east and west, from Bundelcund to Guzerat. In the Deccan it extended from the Nerbuddah on one side of the Nizam's dominions to the confines of the Mysore, and on the other to the Northern Circars. The several Rajpoot states, and the various petty chiefships interspersed throughout that vast extent of country, unable to oppose, yielded their contributions to the predatory armies of the Mahrattas. It will not be contended that this description of the political state of Hindostan and the Deccan exhibits any features of a balance of power. But it may perhaps be alleged, that this enormous extent of dominion, although comprehended under the general denomination of the Mahratta Empire, and united by a species of confederation, consisted in fact of four distinct powers counterbalancing each other.

22. That this bond of association might induce them to protect each other from the attack of a foreign power may be admitted, but it involved no restraint upon their own projects of conquest and rapacity, nor provided against the ambitious designs of one to control or absorb the power of another. Accordingly at the period alluded to, we have seen Sindiah at the head of a powerful army domineering over the state of Poona; at another we have seen him exacting contributions from the state of Nagpore. We have seen him contending for the supremacy with Holkar, and the latter usurping the government of Poona, and expelling the Peshwa from his capital; while, in the midst of this collision, they were all ready to unite in the prosecution of foreign conquest, eager to extend their general dominion, but careful to provide for their separate interests by a division of the spoil.

23. We are at a loss to discover in this representation of facts any improved knowledge or practical application of the principles of a balance of power among the states of India.

24. But it may perhaps be intended to maintain, that the power of the Mahratta state was counterbalanced by that of the British Government; and that the former was withheld by a dread of the latter from prosecuting against it any hostile designs. Admitting this fact, still the solid principles of a balance of power and commercial intercourse are not to be traced in such a situation of affairs; such a counterpoise of power must momentarily be subject to destruction, when tranquillity and self-defence are the sole objects of one party, and war, rapine, and conquest constitute the governing principle of the other. It then behoves the former to combine every means of additional security that justice may warrant, and circumstances may render attainable.

25. We shall not adduce in proof of the existence of that spirit of insatiable conquest which we have ascribed to the native states without distinction, the various efforts which they have employed to subvert the power of the British Government in India since the period of its establishment. The existence of it as the actuating principle of every Indian power requires no demonstration; and we found upon it this undeniable conclusion, that no extent of concession and of territorial restitution could have the effect of establishing any real and effectual balance of power in India, or would purchase forbearance on the part of other states when the means of aggrandizement should be placed in their hands. Your  
honourable

honourable Committee has indeed justly remarked in your letter of the 30th of October 1805, that "to recede is often more hazardous than to advance," adding, that "this observation is peculiarly applicable to India, where there is little probability that concession would be attributed by the native powers to any other motives than weakness and fear."

26 To enter more deeply into this discussion would require a laborious review of transactions and events during a long course of years, and an inquiry into the views, character, disposition, and relative constitution of the present states of India, the necessity of which is superseded both by the knowledge which your honourable Committee already possesses on these subjects, and by the conviction which we entertain, that no argument can be requisite to demonstrate how vain would be the expectation of augmenting our security by diminishing our power and political ascendancy on the continent of India.

27. We deem it unnecessary to pass any observations on the views and principles of conduct which the member of the Bombay Council has thought proper to ascribe to the British Government, or to point out the errors of his information regarding the political state of India, and the condition of the native powers. The knowledge which your honourable Committee derives from more authentic sources will be sufficient to disprove the one and to correct the other.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Fort William,  
22d September 1810.

Minto,  
J. Lumsden  
H. Colebrooke

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Letter from the Governor-general in Council at Fort Mifflam, 22 Sept. 1810.

### Appendix, No. 23.

EXTRACTS from DESPATCHES from the Court of Directors to the Governor-general in Council at Bengal, relative to Political Transactions with the States of OUDE, NAGPORE, KATTYWAR, HYDRABAD, CUTCH, MYSORE, and TRAVANCORE.

#### O U D E.

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bengal, dated 9th November 1825

153. THE correspondence before us presents a truly deplorable picture of the condition of the territories under the government of the King of Oude, and gives us strong reason to apprehend, that the services of our troops have been too frequently employed, not to suppress disorder, but to perpetuate it by supporting oppression.

154. The difficulties attending the realization of the revenue in almost all parts of the Oude territory appear to be so great, that without our assistance they would be absolutely insuperable. Year after year our troops have been called in, not to protect the King of Oude against foreign enmity or internal rebellion, but to aid the aumils in exacting the annual assessment from every petty zemindar or talookdar, and frequently in seizing the persons of the landholders, or demolishing their forts.

155. A government which is constantly complaining of the impossibility of keeping its subjects in obedience cannot be a good government. The disaffection and the difficulty of raising a revenue of which the King of Oude so continually complained, appear to have been mainly occasioned by the extortions and oppressions of the aumils. Not only the late acting resident, Major Raper, and the present resident, Mr. Ricketts, have made repeated representations on the subject in the strongest terms, both to the King of Oude and to you; but even the officers who have been successively employed at the head of detachments, to accompany the aumils in raising the revenue, have been forcibly impressed with the same view of their conduct.

156. Under an ordinary state of things, the evil would have partially remedied itself. The talookdars would have resented the attempt to extort from them more than the due amount of revenue; and the fear of driving them to a resistance which the Oude government without your aid is little able to overcome, would have operated strongly as a check upon undue exactions, whether on the part of the aumils themselves, or of the government.

157. This salutary restraint you have effectually removed by employing your troops in accomplishing a general and systematic demolition of all the gurrees which the landholders in the disturbed districts had erected for their own protection.

158. The commanders of detachments were indeed enjoined by the resident never to lend their assistance in exacting revenue, without having previously satisfied themselves, by documentary evidence, of the justice of the demand. In the first place, however, you will remark in what situation by this arrangement you are placed. You erect your military officers into judges between a prince, whom you still profess to call independent, and his own subjects, and call upon them to decide on the justice of his demands for revenue. Nevertheless this interference, however objectionable in principle, would, if effectual, be at least preferable to the practice of employing your troops without investigation, in support of the most atrocious acts of misgovernment; but you are yourselves fully aware that such

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a precaution never can be effectual: "It is quite obvious," says Mr. Secretary Prinsep, in his despatch to the resident, dated 29th March 1823, "that an inquiry of the description above adverted to, although conducted with the best intentions, can afford but a partial check to, and a feeble security against injustice and oppression, where specific engagements rarely exist, and where the point at issue is frequently the demand for augmented jumma, founded on alleged assets sufficient to meet the increase."

159. It can rarely be possible for us, at so great a distance, to point out particular instances of the evils arising from a mischievous course of administration; but in the present instance, one remarkable case has forced itself particularly on our attention; we allude to the case of Meer Cossin Ali, formerly talookdar of Beerpore, who, by his services to your government, had established a claim upon your good offices, and who, in the opinion both of the resident and of yourselves, was the victim of oppression, to which it was more than probable that he would never have been exposed, had not you compelled him to surrender his forts, and lent the assistance of your troops to enforce their demolition.

160. Nor were our own territories exempt from the consequences of the system of mis-government which prevailed in Oude; several instances have occurred in which talookdars, ejected from their estates in consequence of inability or unwillingness to pay the jumma which was demanded of them, have collected bands of armed followers, and sought refuge in our territories, where they employed themselves, as in the instance of Pirie Paul Sing, in rapine and plunder, and the inefficient police of Oude has suffered formidable bands of dacoits to form themselves in the jungles, who infest not the frontier merely, but our territories to a considerable distance.

161. These evils have not escaped your attention, and we learn from your letter of 10th September 1824, and from your proceedings of a date subsequent to those referred to in that letter, that you have exerted your influence with the King of Oude, with the view of inducing him to reform the whole plan of his government, and that in consequence a system is likely to be introduced, of which the basis is the abolition of the plan of farming the revenues annually to amins, and the gradual introduction of quinquennial settlements through the whole of his dominions.

162. We agree with you that these measures, if judiciously carried into execution, are calculated to remove a portion of the evil, and at any rate to prevent the assistance of our troops from being annually demanded to enforce exactions, of the justice or injustice of which it is impossible that your officers should have the means of forming a correct opinion. As it is impossible to draw the line between just and unjust exactions, there are only two modes of proceeding which do not involve us in the support of oppression; the one is, that of withdrawing altogether from our connexion with the Oude state, the other is, that of bringing about a reform in its administration. From the former course we are debarred by the provisions of the existing treaty, the stipulations of which fully empower you to interfere in the way in which you have done. While, however, your right thus to interfere is indisputable, we sincerely regret that necessity should have arisen for exercising it.

163. The general tenor of your instructions of the 29th March 1823 to the resident appears to be very proper. We are happy to observe, that instead of attempting to prescribe to the King of Oude the adoption of a specific plan of revenue management, similar to that which has been established in the ceded districts of Oude, you directed the resident to call upon his majesty to revert to the institutions prevalent in the best times of his predecessors, when the country enjoyed a much higher degree of prosperity than at present, and the people are stated to have been comparatively happy and contented. Although the king professed to be quite convinced of the necessity of abandoning the farming system, and of collecting the revenues amance, and expressed himself in terms indicating satisfaction at your having brought the state of his internal affairs to his serious notice, it would appear from your letter to the resident, of the 3d October 1823, that you were doubtful whether his majesty was sincerely disposed to adopt such regulations as would ensure an equitable assessment of the lands, and afford full security to the zemindars and talookdars against undue exactions on the part of the revenue officers, and also to the inferior landholders against the oppressions of the more powerful talookdars and zemindars. Judging from the remarks made by Mr. Ricketts upon the draft of proposed regulations, inclosed in the King of Oude's letter, we are, indeed, led to apprehend that there is too much ground for your suspicion, but we are nevertheless of opinion, that if the resident should not have succeeded in his endeavours to obtain a revision of those regulations to the desired extent, it would still be a valuable point gained to introduce the new system, however imperfect, into those districts, where, from the long prevalence of disorder and contumely, there will be the least danger that any change can injuriously affect either the condition of the people or the revenues of the state.

164. Although we possess the political consultations of your government to the 24th September 1824, eleven months later than the date of the instructions above alluded to, we have not been able to discover what was the result of Mr. Ricketts's negotiation, and we are, therefore, quite uncertain whether or not any practical measure has been taken by the government of Oude for superseding the authority of the amins in the districts inhabited by the Rajoomar talookdars and zemindars. We are in an equal state of uncertainty, whether anything has been done for the extirpation of the formidable bands of robbers who have found a secure shelter in the jungles on the king's frontiers. Considering how much importance you attach to the negotiation upon these points, we are rather surprised that it should have been allowed to drop; for however much your own attention may have been absorbed

showed in the prosecution of hostilities with the state of Ava, we see no reason why the resident or acting resident should have omitted to keep you advised of the progress of affairs at the court of Lucknow.

163. There is one passage in your last instructions to Mr. Ricketts which has particularly attracted our notice; we allude to that wherein you assign as a reason for requiring detailed information respecting the state of the country, your wish to possess the means of adopting some ulterior course of proceeding, in case the King of Oude should fail to act up to his professions. Combining this observation with the anxiety you expressed to prevail upon his majesty to allow you to employ British officers in making the first settlements of the revenues, it has occurred to us as possible, that you may have contemplated the authoritative imposition of that agency as the ulterior course to be resorted to in the case supposed. If so, we must call to your recollection that the article which gives you the right of requiring the king to reform his administration, provides expressly that the reform shall be carried into effect by his own officers. It must indeed be admitted that a pertinacious and persevering disregard on his part of your counsels would constitute a literal infraction of the terms of the treaty. Rather, however, than incur the hazard and odium of a rupture with the King of Oude, we should greatly prefer your acquiescing in his propositions, however defective, trusting to the vigilance and zeal of the resident to detect and point out the evils which may become apparent in the practical application of the king's plan.

166. Under any system that may be established, the result must mainly depend upon the character of the agents by whom it is administered; and we would not utterly despair of the possibility of an intelligent resident, of conciliatory manners and active mind, being enabled to acquire an influence over the minds of the king and his ministers, which might be advantageously exercised in procuring the selection of a better class of revenue officers, and in prevailing upon the government to establish checks upon the conduct of the aumils, where the farming system prevails, and to rest satisfied with just and equitable assessments. In thus expressing ourselves, we would not be understood as under-rating the importance of prosecuting by all fair means the object you have in view of effecting a change in the revenue system itself, but merely as deprecating the resort to any measures which may tend to subvert the existing basis of our relations with the King of Oude, or even to interrupt the good feeling which has now for many years actuated his conduct towards the British Government.

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# EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bengal, dated 1st October 1825.

9 You have been apprized in a former communication, of the deep impression which had been made upon our minds by what we have learned from your correspondence, and from your proceedings with respect to the misgovernment and disorganized condition of the Oude territory; and the conviction we entertained of the necessity of a thorough reform in the administration of that country. On this subject it is scarcely necessary to assure you that our opinion continues unchanged. That the agency of British troops should be the means by which the zemindars and malgozars, who are unable or unwilling to satisfy the undue demands of the king's aumils for revenue, should be subjugated by force, disabled from future resistance by the demolition of their forts, subjected to all manner of extortion and oppression, and, finally, in too many instances expelled from their possessions, and driven by desperation to betake themselves to a predatory life, is a state of things so unworthy of the character of your Government, and so discreditable to the British name, that there are few sacrifices which we should not be willing to make rather than it should continue.

10 The accounts now transmitted are so far more satisfactory than those which preceded them, inasmuch as they do not inform us of any fresh employment of your troops for the coercion of the Oude zemindars. The inability, however, of the King of Oude, without your assistance, to enforce even just demands is such, that his revenues have fallen off greatly since the practice of employing your troops to levy them has been discontinued; while any such reform in his administration as would render it either just or politic to revert to that practice seems as far distant as ever.

11. There appears to have been no negligence on your part in pressing upon the attention of the King of Oude the absolute necessity of a reform. To the abolition of the farming system in the more disturbed districts, and to the formation of a quinquennial settlement he consented without much difficulty. But these changes, however beneficial they might prove in conjunction with other equitable regulations, are utterly fruitless so long as the claims made upon the zemindars are not limited to the terms of their engagements, and so long as the possibility exists that those engagements may have been extorted by compulsion. Your attempts to obtain the king's consent to any arrangement by which these dangers would be guarded against, have been met, first by evasion, and finally by a positive and determined refusal. He will neither permit a British officer to co-operate with his aumils in settling the settlements, nor will he even consent that the commanders of detachments, furnished at his requisition to enforce his demands of revenue, should enter

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into any investigation of their justice, further than a bare inspection of the "kubboleats, kashbandies, dakhillas and other papers signed by the malgoosars, and attested by the sikhars." These kubboleats, Mr. Ricketts positively affirms, that the amils are in the habit of extorting by force from the malgoosars, who however are not to be heard for the purpose of disputing either the genuineness of these documents, or their own freedom when they gave their signature, or of showing ground for a remission of part of the demand. Any such inquiry on the part of a British officer, termed by the King of Oude, "listening to the excuses of the landholders for not paying the revenue," he persists in regarding as a derogation from his power; nor can it be denied that it is so, however conducive to his own ultimate interest, and to the prosperity of his dominions. And although we agree with you in thinking that Mr. Ricketts, in some of his communications with the King on this subject, has not evinced all the address which might be expected from a skilful diplomatist, the tone of the king's refusal is so decisive, that we cannot permit ourselves to hope, even from the ablest management, for the removal of his repugnance.

12. In the mean time, such reform as the king could be prevailed upon to consent to, that is to say, the substitution of the aumeen for the farming system in some of the disturbed districts, has commenced. And it is material to the present question, that such information as we possess with respect to the working of the new system should be adverted to. This is derived from the Reports of Major Tapp, the commander of a detachment which accompanied the king's aumeen in making the settlement. It may here be remarked, that as this officer was positively prohibited from taking any part whatever in the aumeen's proceedings, there could have been no sufficient reason for sending a British detachment, "for the purpose," as Mr. Ricketts expresses himself, "of giving a safe escort to the aumeen," a purpose to which the Oude troops must have been fully adequate; nor can we divest ourselves of a suspicion, that although the aumeen was not permitted to avail himself of the active assistance of our troops, either in settling or in collecting the revenue, it was intended, nevertheless, that their presence should operate in the way of intimidation upon the zemindars. Major Tapp's presence, however, was so far fortunate, that it has furnished us with the following information:

"When I first arrived," says Major Tapp, "in the aumeen's camp, being quite unaccustomed to see villages plundered, and imagining this could only be done by a few unruly characters, I used to send safeguards to those in the vicinity of my encampment, and particularly where the families of men in our service reside; but I soon found that unless sufficiently near to be immediately supported, these safeguards were unable to give efficient protection. The men of his majesty's battalions seemed to consider this as an infringement of their privileges, and frequently declared that they had a right to plunder *their own country*. They prowled about in such numbers (and always armed), that to avoid further disputes, I was obliged to confine myself latterly to the protection of one village only, and that close to our encampment. Since the late disturbances, I have deemed it advisable to request the aumeen to furnish safeguards from his kusbardars, to act in conjunction with mine.

"That such outrages must be very prejudicial to his majesty's revenue is undeniable, but the misery it occasions to the wretched inhabitants is beyond all calculation; and it was from motives of humanity that I was induced to endeavour to prevent the practice; but my detachment is too weak to effect this, unless some rigorous measures are resorted to, to introduce a better mode of discipline among his majesty's troops. I have frequently spoken on this subject to Tajood Deen Hoosain Khan, who lamented his want of authority over the troops, and his inability to repress their excesses. He has never refused to furnish safeguards when requested, but so little has this put a stop to the system of plundering, that there are now hundreds of chuppers in camp which have been carried away from the surrounding villages. The distress which this has occasioned at the present season of the however great, is not the worst, for that the men are rarely contented with taking the year, chuppers only, is acknowledged by the khan himself."

13. Of the general character of the king's revenue management, Mr. Ricketts continues to speak in such terms as the following.

"It is as glaring as the sun in the middle of the day, that in no manner does a settlement for a fixed period exist in your majesty's dominions; your majesty's amils exact kubboleats by force from the malgoosars for an enormous jumma, and not contented with this, they also, in the course of the year, require increase upon increase and innumerable perquisites. When the crop gets ready they seize it, and having taken as much as they think proper, they sell it, and for the realization of such balances as they think proper to fix of themselves, they put into close confinement the family, the wife and the children of the defaulters, who reluctantly leaving them and their lands and houses, retire to the honourable Company's dominions for the preservation of their lives, and, considering it a safe asylum, there become ryots."

14. The consequences of this system of government are apparent in the continual requisitions of the Oude government for the surrender of revenue defaulters, who have abandoned their possessions, and fled for refuge into our territories. Of such persons Mr. Ricketts says: "Though many of his majesty's landholders are bold and lawless rebels, yet those who for the most part fly into the Company's districts are the zemindars who, sunk by heavy assessments, and the unreasonable and untimely demands of the amils, are obliged to leave their lands and families, and flight or robbery becomes their only alternative." You have in consequence been so often under the necessity of rejecting the king's applications for the

the delivery of fugitives, that you have felt yourselves obliged, except in aggravated cases, to abstain from requiring his compliance with similar demands on your own part.

15. We should delude ourselves were we to suppose that for the state of things thus depicted the British Government is in no degree responsible, or that any one is more nearly concerned than that Government in its being promptly and efficaciously remedied. Had it not been for our connexion with Oude, oppression and disorder, although it might have obtained as great a height, could not have been of equal duration. The subversion of the government by which it was produced or tolerated, and the substitution of a more vigorous, and probably a more moderate rule, would have been the speedy result. It is the British Government which, by a systematic suppression of all attempts at resistance, has prolonged to the present time a state of disorganization which can nowhere attain permanence, except where the short-sightedness and rapacity of a semi-barbarous government is armed with the military strength of a civilized one. It is therefore incumbent upon the British Government, not only to abstain from any further active co-operation with the revenue agents of the King of Oude, while the present system shall continue, but to use its most earnest endeavours for remedying the evils which its co-operation has already occasioned, and if, as appears but too probable, there be no hope of introducing any substantial improvement with the voluntary consent of the King of Oude, it behoves us next to consider what means we possess, consistently with treaties, of obtaining that compliance from his necessities which he has refused to your friendly advice and remonstrance.

16. We have reminded you in a former despatch, nor do you yourselves appear to have overlooked, that you are not entitled by treaty to require the king's consent to the employment of a British officer in making the settlements in conjunction with his aumeens. What, however, you cannot authoritatively impose, you are not precluded from annexing as a condition to any good offices which the king may solicit of you, and which the treaty does not compel you to render. Among such might be ranked, if the treaty alone were considered, the affording any assistance whatever in realizing the revenues, or coercing revenue defaulters. The provision in the treaty binding you to defend the king's territories against foreign and domestic enemies, with the stipulation respecting the additional aid of your troops in suppressing rebellion or disorder, would compel your interference in case of any attempt to subvert the government of the King of Oude, or to establish an authority independent of it. But, where the sole offence of a zemindar is non-payment of the required jumma, and armed resistance to the attempts of the king's officers to exact it by force, you are not warranted in treating such conduct as rebellion or disorder, until you have satisfied yourselves that the demand is just; which, if the king will not furnish you with the means of doing, his requisitions for assistance are unauthorized by the treaty. It is only by virtue of Lord Wellesley's answer to the paper of propositions transmitted to him on the 15th February 1802, that the King of Oude has a right to require in any case your assistance in the realization of revenue balances. But while we readily admit that we are bound to furnish assistance in the realization of the king's just demands, that obligation, it must be remembered, is granted by an express stipulation, that the resident should be furnished with "all the information necessary to establish the justice of the proceeding by vouchers and proofs." While the king shall persist in his refusal to furnish any proofs but such as experience has proved to be altogether insufficient, it is in vain that he would plead as obligatory upon you a promise, the conditions of which on his part have not been fulfilled.

17. We have no right to insist upon the employment of British officers to aid the aumeens in settling the king's revenue. But we have a right to make his consent to such an arrangement the condition of our enforcing his demands, if it should appear, that without the adoption of it, that satisfactory evidence of the justice of the demands, which by the stipulation of the engagement ought to be afforded, cannot be obtained. Experience having rendered it too clear that this supposition is conformable to the fact, we are clearly of opinion that we are not bound to afford to the king any assistance in levying his revenues, except in cases where the engagement fixing the amount of the jumma shall have been examined, and after a full inquiry, approved by a British officer, previously to being executed by the zemindar.

18. We direct accordingly, that your conduct be hereafter regulated in conformity with the above principle, and that this determination, with the grounds of it, be communicated to the King of Oude.

19. We observe that your attention has of late been strongly drawn to the continued prevalence of the ravages of the Shigal Khor banditti on the frontiers of Oude. The superintendent of police in the Western provinces, in a Report dated 1st September 1825, observes, "The Governor-general in Council will doubtless have observed, in perusing the report, that the crime of decoity is very generally confined to the zillahs bordering on the Oude territory, and that frequent as the crime is, few or none of the criminals have been apprehended. This has always been the case since I have had the honour to hold my present situation, and the evil is more likely to increase than diminish, for it is next to impossible for a border magistrate to apprehend foreign marauders in his own district, and quite so for him to obtain their arrest by addressing the resident at Lucknow; for, as it is obvious that the Oude government regard the outrages committed by its subjects in our territories either with utter indifference or entire approbation, the applications of the British representatives on that subject meet with worse than disregard."

Appendix, No. 24.

Extracts, &c.  
Political Letter to  
Bengal, 1 October  
1828.

20. We consider Mr. Ricketts highly blamable in not having pressed this subject more perseveringly upon the government of Oude, and we are surprised that his non-execution of the instructions issued to him as long ago as March and October 1823, should not have attracted your attention before June 1826. We trust that the subject will not now be allowed to drop, and that we shall speedily hear of the adoption of decisive measures for the extirpation of these formidable gangs of robbers.\*

N A G P O R E.

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bengal, dated 26th November 1828.

Political Letter to  
Bengal, 26 Nov.  
1828.

3. IN these letters you inform us that the transfer of the Nagpore territories to the Rajah's government has taken place, and bring up your report of Nagpore affairs to the date of Mr. Jenkins' departure.

4. The re-establishment of the native government had been enjoined by us, and was strictly the fulfilment of a positive pledge; a pledge which undoubtedly, when the country came into our power, it was not obligatory upon us to give, but which, having been given, we have already delayed to fulfil, quite as long as was in any way reconcilable with the spirit of the promise. Mr. Jenkins, indeed, thought it desirable that the transfer should be still further postponed, and he supported his opinion on grounds connected with the interest of the inhabitants. That the inhabitants have been greatly benefited by the substitution of our rule for that of Appa Sahib is clearly made out, and that they may suffer to some extent by the introduction of the Rajah's government in place of ours is sufficiently probable. But it is to be considered, that if this be an objection to the transfer, it is one which a further prolongation of our agency probably might not diminish.

5. As, however, the present Rajah owes his sovereignty to the spontaneous liberality of the British Government, it is the undoubted right of that Government to annex such conditions to the gift as it deems necessary, to prevent the power which it has conferred from being turned to purposes of oppression. We accordingly approve of your having inserted in the treaty, an article binding the Rajah to govern in conformity to the advice of the resident; and likewise another provision, to secure the observance of the former, by empowering the British Government to place the administration of the whole country, or any part of it, again in the hands of its own officers, if those of the Rajah should fail of their duty to such a degree as to endanger the prosperity of the state. That your powers should extend even to this ultimate point was, in our opinion, desirable. But it of course does not follow because you possess these powers, that they should be hastily or vexatiously exercised. The right even of giving advice should be employed with such forbearance, as may convince the Rajah that you are willing to allow him freedom of action, so far as his conduct proves that he is not disposed to abuse it. And the success of every measure must depend, to so great a degree, upon the spirit in which it is received by those who are to execute it, that a less perfect system, originating with themselves, will often be preferable to a far better one, inculcated, and, as they may think, imposed upon them by the British agent. With regard to the ulterior measure of reverting to the plan just abandoned, of administration by British superintendents, that of course will only be adopted if the system now introduced should totally fail, a result which we do not at present see reason to apprehend.

6. It has been very properly the endeavour of Mr. Jenkins to redress the practical evils of the previous state of society, with as little alteration as possible in the general scheme of government; and he has so well succeeded, that the Rajah's officers will have no difficulty in carrying on the improved system of administration, if they really are so disposed. Some of the officers who have hitherto conducted the different departments of government under the resident, will continue for a limited period in the character of supervisors, to watch over and report to him the conduct of their native successors. The knowledge which has been acquired under the late arrangements of the condition of the people, their institutions and customs, and the details of the government, will assist the resident in the exercise of your right to advise the Rajah and his ministers; and the consequence which the treaty attaches to a determined disregard of your advice will, we hope, be a sufficient security for its being in general well attended to. The character and disposition of the Rajah, and the manner in which he had begun to demean himself after his assumption of the government, appear from Mr. Jenkins' last despatches, to have been such as give ground for favourable anticipations of his future behaviour.

8. We have perused Mr. Jenkins' Report on the Nagpore territory, and on his administration of it, with deep interest. The sections relating to revenue and judicial affairs are those which have appeared to us most peculiarly honourable to him; first, as containing a clear, precise, and particular exposition of the rights which exist, and the arrangements which are in force to secure those rights among a people hitherto little known; and next, from the evidence they afford of the great judgment and ability with which Mr. Jenkins has exerted himself to render the securities as perfect as was consistent with the state of society, and with the reserve dictated by the consideration, that both he and his government were exercising only a temporary authority.

\* For further papers respecting the affairs of Oude, vide Appendix, No. 26 and No. 28.

KATTYWAR.

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER from *Bombay*, dated 20th July 1830.

Appendix, No. 26.

Para. 1. We now reply to such paragraphs of your various letters as are yet unanswered, relating to the affairs of Kattywar.\*

Extracts, &c.

2. These paragraphs comprise the history of the province for a period of several years, and exhibit very fully its state and prospects under the system of management which has been acted on up to the present time.

Political Letter  
from *Bombay*,  
20 July, 1830.

3. All the rights which we possess in Kattywar, we acquired from the Peishwa and the Guicowar; from the former by conquest, from the latter by mutual arrangement. These rights we consider as limited to the exaction of a tribute, with the power of taking such measures as might be essential to the security of that tribute. Beyond this we did not propose to interfere; and we determined to treat the Kattywar tributaries as independent chieftains, entitled to the uncontrolled exercise of the powers of government within their own territories, and subject only to the obligation of not molesting our subjects, our allies, or one another, and of paying the stipulated tribute to the Guicowar or to ourselves.

Affairs of Kattywar.

4. This mode of treating the Kattywar chiefs has not been willingly deviated from. While you called them independent princes, you have also endeavoured to treat them as such, from the Rana of Porebunder down to the chief of Purchree, whose tribute amounts to the trifling sum of 21 rupees per annum; except in so far as, for the enforcement of their engagements with your Government, you have found it indispensable to treat them otherwise. This however is a most important exception, as respects both them and ourselves; and it has led to consequences which were not anticipated, and of which it is now necessary to take a calm and deliberate review.

5. It might appear at first sight, that the chiefs could not but be gainers, in point of independence, by the commutation of irregular and undefined exactions for a moderate fixed tribute. But it is a circumstance which must be taken into the calculation, that under the system which prevailed when the Peishwa and the Guicowar filled the place now occupied by our Government in Kattywar, how much soever might be demanded, the amount which was received was particularly limited, by the power which the tributary almost always possessed of offering such resistance as made it the interest of the *Mahrattas* to accept a moderate commutation. While this state of things lasted, the chiefs could not easily be weighed down by a load of debt arising from unpaid contributions; arrears indeed might nominally be allowed to accumulate, but as the *Mahrattas* would at any rate have taken all they could get, and as they could take no more, whatever might be the outstanding arrears, what was lost for the year was in reality lost for ever; and the tributary retained in the succeeding years his power of resistance unimpaired. Again, if the chief injured his resources by profuse expenditure, he could expend only what he had; his power of anticipating his resources was early checked by a high rate of interest and the difficulty of obtaining credit, and consequently two or three years of good administration sufficed to free the talooka from almost any incumbrance it could contract.

6. The case is widely different, when instead of the *Mahrattas* the chiefs have to do with us. Remissions, it is true, are liberally granted on the occasion of failure of payment produced by unavoidable calamities, and for your conduct in this respect, you are entitled to commendation, although of these remissions it is well understood that the chiefs rather than the ryots have derived the benefit. When, however, inability to pay the tribute is the consequence of misconduct, remission is not granted, and indeed if it were so, few of the chiefs probably would be long without availing themselves of the plea in its fullest extent. By this circumstance, their situation is materially altered. Under the old system, inability, in whatever manner produced, had the effect of exemption, since what the tributary had not, he could not give. The tribute therefore of one year did not fall an additional burthen upon the resources of another; while at the same time, the dangers consequent upon diminished powers of resistance afforded a strong motive to the chief to abstain from any permanent deterioration of his resources. While, too, the defence of the state depended upon its own strength, all the persons of influence in it, all who had anything to lose by its conquest or its devastation, felt it strongly their interest that there should be an able and vigilant administration, capable of opposing a vigorous resistance to attack. But at present the state having no longer anything to fear from foreign invasion, the interest of the same persons is directly the contrary, it lies in encouraging the chief to a lavish expenditure, and neglect of the duties of government; because a relaxed administration affords them the greatest opportunities of undue emolument, and the greatest personal power. The chief, meanwhile, is induced the more readily to give way to his natural inclinations, by the certain knowledge that the worst consequence which can ensue to himself is the sequestration of his talooka; while the soukars are the more willing to give him credit, because they know that although our bhandarry may not be expressly given, yet, when the day of reckoning shall arrive, some mode of adjusting their claims is sure to form part of any arrangement which we may dictate to the chief, for the reform of his financial administration.

7. Accordingly

\* Political Letters, dated 16th April 1825, para. 14; 23d November 1825, paras. 153 to 274; 12th February 1827, para. 17; 1st November 1827, paras. 53 to 91.

7. Accordingly there are very few of the Kattywar chiefs who have not become deeply embarrassed. Among the crowd of petty talookas which fill the province, there are five principalities of some magnitude: Porebundes, Noonuggur, Joanaghur, Goondul, and Bhownuggur; of these the last is the only one which is not greatly in debt, and its thakoor is the only one of the five chiefs whose administration appears to be tolerable; indeed this chief, and the thakoor of Moovres, are the only individuals among the Kattywar chieftains who are represented as at all fit for the business of government.

8. The successive steps by which our fixed pecuniary demands, operating upon a chief whose expenses exceed his income, reduce him gradually to the condition of a dependant, have been generally as follows. When the tribute falls into arrear, or when it is seen that the chief is dissipating the funds from which it must be derived, he is usually required to enter into an engagement under our bhandarry with a soukar, by which the latter, on undertaking to pay the arrears and becoming responsible for the tribute for a certain definite number of years, receives an assignment on the revenue of particular villages of the amount necessary to repay to him, within that number of years, the principal and interest.

9. This engagement the chief almost invariably violated, by collecting and appropriating to his own use the revenues which he had assigned under our bhandarry to the soukar. It being found impossible to prevent this, the agreement is cancelled, and we proceed to the next step, which is that of compelling the chief to assign, not the revenues merely, but the villages themselves to a farmer, who becomes responsible, as in the former case, for the tribute and arrears. The difference between this arrangement and the preceding is that the collections, instead of being merely paid over to the soukar, are now actually made by him, and the chief divests himself of all right of interference with the revenues of the assigned districts. This measure has been adopted in the states of Noonuggur and Goondul.

10. The stipulation, however, which excludes the chief from interference is found to be ineffectual as a security against his misappropriating the assigned revenues. He speedily violates his engagements with the farmer, who, finding the fulfilment of his contract under the opposition which he meets with impracticable, soon expresses a wish to throw up his farm, as has happened in each of the two principalities just mentioned. And in Goondul, as in July 1828 the accounts of the farm were not yet settled, the evil has not had time to proceed further.

11. On the failure of these partial farms, our next step is to insist upon the chief farming his whole possessions, that is, giving up their entire administration for a term of years under our bhandarry to a monied man. Most of the districts, however, being already separately mortgaged for private debts, to which we were no party, we are compelled to include the whole of these in our arrangement, since we could not otherwise, without injustice, transfer the security to another creditor; thus we have to provide in some way for the ultimate payment of all the debts which the chief has incurred by a course of profuse expenditure, and which by this time have commonly swelled to an immoderate amount. To this mass of debt must be added the fines which we have imposed upon the chiefs for their infractions of our bhandarry, and the advances, sometimes to a large amount, made by the farmer, to enable them to pay the arrears due to their seabundy, which we compel them to maintain of the strength we deem necessary for preserving the peace of the country, but whom they seldom have left themselves the means of paying with regularity. A general farm of the nature now described has been concluded in Noonuggur, in Pallytomah, and twice in Joanaghur.

12. At each of these stages, but especially at the last, the chief gains as much time as possible by procrastination, and it is almost always necessary to threaten, and generally to carry into effect, the attachment of his talookas before he will give his consent.

13. By the conditions of the farm of his possessions, the chief binds himself to take no part in the administration, and to restrict his expenses to a certain annexed sum. The former condition he generally finds extremely irksome, the latter always; indeed, as his embarrassments were brought on by his propensity to expend more than his whole income, it is no wonder that he should find still greater difficulty in confining himself within a park. He does not fail to make private applications to the farmer for increased advances; these he sometimes, contrary to the purpose of the agreement, obtains; if, however, the farmer refuses, or ceases to administer to his prodigality, he employs the means in his power, which are considerable, of thwarting the farmer in all his proceedings, in particular, by preventing the seabundy from attending to his orders or enforcing his rights. The various parties whose interest is injuriously affected by the farming system, including all former karbarries, and all who could have hoped to become karbarries, join in obstructing the farmer's operations, and in a short time there is a complete rupture between the chief and the farmer. The occurrence of a bad season, or any other of the contingencies on which, by agreement, a remission is to be allowed, becomes now an occasion for acrimonious discussion; and the farmer generally finds his engagement to afford him so much annoyance, and so little profit, that he applies to be released from it. This happened in Noonuggur; it happened in the first farm of Joanaghur, and was on the point of happening in the second, in which perhaps it is even to be regretted that the differences were ultimately accommodated; as there is reason to believe that the farmer had practised considerable over-exactions upon the ryots, and had otherwise violated his engagement. How far the reconciliation in this case is likely to be permanent, as it took place in April 1836, there has not been time to ascertain.

14. You have still another expedient in reserve, which is certainly more likely than any of the others to be attended with temporary success; and to this in Joonaaghur and Noonagur, if not in Gondul, the progress of events seems to be rapidly conducting you. It is the plan of farming the entire state for a term of years, under the immediate superintendence of a British officer, who was stationed on the spot to protect the farmer against any attempt on the part of the chief to infringe the contract, the revenue being collected and the country governed by the farmer. This is the plan which was adopted at Porebunder, and it had all the immediate effect which was expected from it. In the appointed period (eight years) the state was freed from its embarrassments, and the country restored to the rana with an increased revenue, and in a highly flourishing condition.

15. The sequel, however, proved how little good is accomplished by these temporary arrangements. It required eight years of an able and moderate administration to recover the state of Porebunder from its embarrassments. Before seven years had elapsed, from the date of its restoration to the rana, its debts were as large as when we formerly took it under our management. The ryots were oppressed; the tribute paid by loans; the revenues invariably mortgaged before they were collected; and the produce of the talookas was pronounced to be hardly two-thirds of what it was at the expiration of Soonderjee's farm. In order to recover the country from this state, or enable the rana to discharge his pecuniary obligations to the Guicowar and to ourselves, it was declared by your political agent to be indispensable that you should either appoint a minister or sanction another farm of the entire principality. This, then, is the final result of the most successful expedient which you have yet devised for retrieving the prosperity of the Kattywar states. After a few years the whole work is again to be recommenced.

16. As a further example of the ill use which these chiefs have hitherto made of their power, it may be mentioned that both the rana of Porebunder and the nawaab of Joonaaghur, the two most important chieftains in the province, have been clearly proved to be in league with hands of plunderers to whom they afforded shelter and supplies, and from whom they, or the persons about them, received a portion of the spoil. For this conduct you imposed upon the Joonaaghur chief a fine of a lac of rupees, not paid, but only added to the catalogue of his debts. We are not yet informed with what penalty you have visited the still more culpable misconduct of the rana of Porebunder.

17. If we could ascribe the ill success of our plans to a bad choice of agents for carrying them into effect, it might be hoped that, with a better choice, they might yet be found practicable, and adapted to the exigencies of the case. But your service did not, so far as we are aware, afford any individual possessing in a more eminent degree the qualifications needful in the situation in which he was placed than Major Barnewall, and his conduct has been in no way unworthy of his previous high character. All which could be expected from a man in his situation was, that he should be firm in essentials, conciliatory in unimportant matters, active in investigating, and equitable in deciding disputes. Major Barnewall has proved himself to be all this, and he appears to have been seconded by his assistants, Captain Wilson and Mr. Langford, with that zeal and attention which talents and excellence in a superior usually ensure. It being impossible, therefore, to ascribe the ill result of our system to the defects of its administration, the inference is forced upon us that the system itself is unsuited to the accomplishment of its ends.

18. You will receive, at an early period, from the Secret Committee, a communication of their sentiments upon the policy which it would now be expedient to adopt in Kattywar.

## HYDRABAD.

## EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bengal, dated 7th January 1831.

2. We are glad to learn, that on the decease of the Nizam, his son Nusser-ood-Dowlah, who had already been recognized as his successor, ascended the musnud without opposition.

3. We perceive that the resident, Mr. Martin, has conceived a favourable opinion of this prince's disposition and capacity. We hope that this opinion may be confirmed by further experience.

4. One of the first acts of the new sovereign was to signify to you formally his wish that the civil administration of his territories might be placed in his hands, and that all interference on the part of our officers might be discontinued. You are aware of the strong desire we have always entertained that the management of the Nizam's affairs by British officers should not be unnecessarily prolonged; and we hope you have exercised a sound discretion in acceding at once to his highness's wish, but we think it might have been more prudent to have waited until you acquired some experience of his highness's character before you adopted a measure of this importance.

5. We entirely approve of your having stipulated for the maintenance of the revenue engagements, to which the faith of both governments was pledged, and of your having reserved your right to insist upon the performance of this stipulation.

76. You have announced to the Nizam, that you desired to exercise no control over the choice of his ministers, and that whether he retained the present administration or appointed a new one, you would not interfere. We earnestly hope that no circumstances may arise to induce you to regret the having made this declaration.

Political Letter to  
Bengal, 7 January  
1831.



Appendix, No. 27.

Extracts, &c.  
Political Letter to  
Bengal, 31 Oct.  
1832.

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bengal, dated 31st October 1832.

13. THE despatch from Mr. Ravenshaw, the acting resident, dated 3d November 1830, submitting "a brief sketch of the effects which appear to have hitherto resulted from the withdrawal of our interference in the administration of the affairs of the Nizam's government," exhibits no favourable picture even of the present state of the country, and a most unfavourable one of its future prospects. Mr. Ravenshaw holds out little hope of our being able even to prevent the infringement of the revenue engagements which we had entered into with the cultivators of the soil, and for maintaining the observance of which, our officers still continue to exercise a kind of superintendence over the districts they formerly administered. The complaints which have been made to these superintendents of the violation of the Cows, though not few in number, bear, according to Mr. Ravenshaw, no proportion whatever to those which, in his opinion, are kept back.

14. The country appears to have already made considerable progress towards a state of disorder. "The number and frequency of robberies and murders have been greatly increased," the forces employed to act against robbers are compelled, by the non-payment of their salaries, to become robbers also, "the zemindars are daily becoming more insubordinate; at one time turning their arms against each other for the requital of hereditary injuries, or for the settlement of boundary disputes, at others in withholding the payment of public revenue, and in openly opposing the orders of the ministers." The aid of the troops is frequently required to punish refractory zemindars.

15. The finances of the state are becoming embarrassed. "The troops at Ellichpore are now upwards of six months in arrears of their pay, and are consequently in the greatest distress." Although the estates of a number of the leading jagheerdars have been resumed, the whole of the revenue of the coming year had been anticipated in the year preceding, and tankahs granted for the amount to the soucaris who advanced the loans.

16. All these evils Mr. Ravenshaw expects to continue and increase. "The vigilant eye of the superintendents having been withdrawn, things will gradually revert to their former state, and insecurity of life and property, a scanty population, and a diminished revenue, the natural results of the above system, will annually become more and more conspicuous."

17. Major Evans, the agent of the Bombay government, with the Bheels of Candelaish, expects very mischievous consequences from the removal of the British officer who was agent among the Bheels of the adjacent country, belonging to the Nizam. You have not, however, yielded to the recommendation of the Bombay government, that this officer should be re-appointed. If the evil consequences apprehended by Major Evans should be realized, and the disturbed state of the Bheel districts in the Nizam's country should render fruitless the arrangements made with so much difficulty and so much ultimate success for the pacification of our own Bheels in the neighbouring districts; we should approve of your suggesting to the Nizam's government the transfer of the Bheel districts to our management upon the principle which was adopted in the case of Mharwarra. They might then be placed under the superintendence of the Bheel agent in Candelaish.

18. With respect to the general state of the country, we can only direct that you will instruct the resident never to forget the solemn obligation he lies under, in no case to permit the subsidiary force or even the Nizam's own army, so long as it is offered by British subjects, to obey the requisitions of the minister until he has first satisfied himself that the purpose for which their services are required is a just one, and even then to require from the officer in command the fullest reports of all his proceedings.

CUTCH.

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bombay, dated 26th May 1830.

Political Letter to  
Bombay, 26 May  
1830.

Para. 1. WE now reply to such paragraphs of your correspondence with us as have not yet been answered relating to the affairs of Cutch; viz.

Political Letter, dated 1st September 1826, para. 142 to 151.

Ditto - - - 18th February 1827, para. 7 to 12.

Ditto - - - 1st November 1827, para. 92 to 126.

Ditto - - - 24th May 1828, para. 30 to 45.

2. By the treaty with Cutch, concluded immediately after the successful termination of our last expedition, which led to the establishment of the present system of government in that country, it was provided that a subsidy should be annually paid, in three instalments, to the British Government; and when, at a more recent period, Anjar was given back to the Rao, it was stipulated that we should receive a pecuniary compensation of 88,000 rupees yearly.

3. When the engagements were entered into, it was understood that the subsidy, which amounted to two lacs of rupees, would absorb about one-fourth part of the revenues of the state, and the compensation for Anjar was considered, it is fair to suppose, no more than an equivalent for the surplus revenues which the Cutch government would gain by its acquisition. So far, however, were these expectations from being realized, that, according to the testimony

testimony of Major Pottinger, the present resident,\* "the British Government is entitled to receive, even in what may be termed tolerably productive seasons, almost 50 per cent. of the whole available resources of the country," and on a retrospect of the seven years which had elapsed since the treaty,† "even with all our remissions, we have received about 50 per cent of the clear revenue," an assertion which is borne out by numerical calculations.

4 The remissions here alluded to by Major Pottinger consisted in the abandonment of three subsidy kists out of five which were in arrear. The remaining two have been subsequently remitted. The compensation for Anjar had also fallen considerably into arrear, but this demand, we conclude, has not been abandoned.

5 Although we apprehended from the beginning, and are now confirmed in the opinion, that the amount of subsidy was originally fixed too high, yet as the difficulty of payment in the years in question had been greatly increased by famine, pestilence, earthquakes, emigration and the depredations of the Meeanahs, all which calamities have fallen very heavily upon Cutch since we acquired a predominant influence in its administration, it was advisable in the first instance to grant annually such remissions as might be required, until you had acquired sufficient data for fixing the subsidy at a rate which would not require a subsequent revision. You will by this time have acquired the means of forming a more correct estimate of the permanent resources of this state, and whatever be the footing on which our connexion with Cutch may hereafter be placed, such a modification of the annual demands of the British Government as shall enable them to be regularly discharged without inconvenient pressure upon the Rao's finances, should form part of the arrangement.

6. You have been led into a much more minute interference in the internal administration of Cutch than entered into your contemplation when you formed the present arrangement for the government of that country. This extension of your direct authority has taken place, as is usual in such cases, by insensible degrees, evils having been found to be produced by partial interference, which it required a greater interference to remedy.

7. The first arrangement for the administration of the revenues proved a signal failure. They were formed, for five years, almost exclusively to members of the regency, and chiefly to one of their number, Butsons, who was, moreover, one of the two principal ministers, while, as a member of the house of the late Soonderjee Sewjee, he participated in the Government Pottdarry. When to this accumulation of powers he added that of firmer of the revenue, it is not much to be wondered at if his authority was so employed that, in the words of Captain Walter, the assistant resident, "The country was gradually losing its population, the villages were deserted, all confidence was destroyed, and the minds of the people became completely estranged from the government." Captain Walter's Report,‡ which we have perused with much interest, contains a detailed statement of the means whereby the country was brought into this unhappy state.

8. At the expiration of the quinquennial leases, no person could be found who, in the then impoverished state of the country, would undertake the administration of the revenues. The Durbar was therefore obliged to depute its own karbars, who, says Captain Walter, "were principally relations of the members of the regency, and as neither of the ministers would undertake the superintendence of the conduct of the karbars appointed by his colleague, there was consequently neither check nor control, and the year closed with an extraordinary defalcation of revenue."

9. At this period it appears that the resident interposed, and adopted a series of measures which you have never noticed in your correspondence, and of which we are informed only through Captain Walter's Report, nor is that document by any means so explicit as we could have wished. Karbars were appointed, removable, it would seem, by the British authority alone; and a new settlement was effected with the ryots on a reduced scale of assessment, chiefly, if not wholly, by the agency of Captain Walter himself, who took the opportunity of abolishing a variety of vexatious and useless exactions, and consolidated the government demand into one sum, instead of a number of items differing in nature and amount. The effect of these reforms, according to that officer, has been highly salutary, and the country is rapidly recovering from its depressed state. That some such measures were necessary, and that the resident, by virtue of the treaty, and of his authority as a member of the regency, had power, with the consent of the other members of the regency, to introduce them, we are fully satisfied; but we fear it must be admitted that this necessity was, in a great degree, of our own creation. We are aware of the difficulty which must exist, in a small state like Cutch, of finding a sufficient number of agents in all respects fit to have the powers of government intrusted to them, and we feel how much easier it is for us, writing after the event, to criticise any arrangement the results of which have not been fortunate, than for you to have devised beforehand any other which would have afforded a better chance of success. Still, the objections to the revenue arrangements introduced by Captain Macmurdoo were so weighty that we cannot think they were the best which

\* Letter to Mr. Secretary Newnham, dated 7th May 1826, p. 20. (On Cons. 23d August 1826.)

† Letter to Mr. Secretary Newnham, dated 24th December 1826, p. 7. (On Cons. 24th January 1827.)

‡ Enclosed in Major Pottinger's first Letter above referred to.

Appendix, No. 28.

Extracts, &c.  
Political Letter to  
Bombay, 26 May  
1830.

which circumstances allowed. That officer, it is true, on farming the revenues to the members of the regency, distinctly informed them that he would continually visit each district to see that the rights of the ryots were not violated. This intention, however, has not been carried into effect. Captain Macmurdo's death prevented him from executing his design, but his successors ought to have prosecuted it; and we cannot exonerate them from the charge of having neglected an important, and indeed, under our existing relations with Cutch, the most important duty of their office.

#### EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Bengal, dated 1st February 1832.

Political Letter to  
Bengal, 1 February  
1832.

38 NOTWITHSTANDING the losses occasioned by Ruttonsi's malversations, we are glad to observe that the financial situation of the Cutch government is on the whole improving, and that the inhabitants are increasing in prosperity under the better revenue management introduced by Captain Walter. The resident, in his character of a member of the regency, continues to possess a paramount influence in the administration, and of this it probably is not desirable that he should divest himself until the young Rao becomes of an age to assume personal charge of the government; but we perceive that he very judiciously allows all measures as far as possible to originate with the native members of the regency, and does not render his own authority unnecessarily prominent.

40. The depredations of the Meeanahs appear not to have entirely ceased, but they are now no longer formidable, and will ere long, we trust, be put a stop to altogether.

41 The annual sum which the Cutch government has undertaken to pay to you as compensation for the cession of Anjar is considered by Major Pottinger, after the experience of some years, to be much above what that pergunnah can ever yield. It is consequently a charge upon the other resources of the Cutch state, which you ought not to content yourselves with occasionally remitting, but from which the finances of our ally should be permanently relieved. This would be proper in any case, but is most peculiarly so when it is considered that the contract which has turned out so disadvantageous to the other party was dictated by ourselves, while we were the virtual rulers of the country.

42 The obligation to reduce the pressure of our pecuniary demands upon this state is increased by the step you have recently taken of removing a part of the subsidiary force, without diminishing the subsidy. We are aware that this was done with the ready acquiescence of the native members of the regency; but though it may be true, as stated by you to them, that the subsidy falls far short of the total expense which we incur for the protection of Cutch, we still think that, in the intention of the sixth article of the treaty, the subsidy was an equivalent only for the expenses of the subsidiary force, and should be abated when that force is diminished.

#### MYSORE.

#### EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to Fort St. George, dated 6th March 1832.

Political Letter to  
Fort St. George,  
6 March, 1832.

1. We now reply to your Political Letter, dated 18th March (No. 4) 1831, and para. 1. of your Political Letter, dated 24th May (No. 5.) 1831, relating to the affairs of Mysore.

2. These communications and the papers which accompany them exhibit a highly unfavourable picture of the present situation of the native monarchy which we created after the fall of Tipoo, in the family of the ancient Mysore rajahs.

3. The dynasty, in whose favour we thus relinquished our right of conquest, is represented to have governed the country prudently and equitably until the close of the administration of the Dewan Poorneah in 1810. From his death the government appears to have been progressively deteriorating. The present rajah has not only squandered the treasure accumulated by Poorneah, amounting to seventy-five lacs of Canteray pagodas, but has also incurred considerable debts. He has moreover alienated, and is continually alienating, large portions of the resources of the state by extensive Enam grants. The abuses which are the consequence of laxity and inefficiency in the controlling power, have gradually crept into the administration of the revenues, and at last arrived at a height that threatened to overthrow the government. The intermediate authorities, the foudars and amildars, have, it would seem, been in the habit of paying into the public treasury as little, and exacting from the ryots as much as possible. This led to disaffection and acts of insubordination, especially in the Nuggur and Chittledroog foudarries, which appear to have been still more neglected by the central government than any other part of its dominions, and which having formed the ancient possessions of the Bednore rajahs, not formerly subject to the Mysore family, were likely to feel least attachment to its rule.

4. Sir Thomas Munro, so far back as the year 1825, perceiving the progress towards this state of things, and foreseeing its inevitable consequences, deemed it necessary to adopt measures to prevent the Mysore government from reducing itself, by its own misconduct, to a condition, in which it would be no longer able to fulfil its engagements with us; and with this view, he required that accounts of the receipts and disbursements of the government should be periodically furnished to the resident. And Mr. Cassamajor, the present resident,

states,

states, that his friendly remonstrances produced, for a time, some apparent improvement in the rajah's conduct. He was prevailed upon to investigate personally the accounts of the local revenue officers. He professed that he had made considerable reductions in his personal expenses; and, that of a debt exceeding 11 lacs of Canteray pagodas, he had liquidated the whole within four years, except about three lacs and a half. Mr Casamajor was not, however, without suspicion that, while with one hand he was paying off debts, he was with the other contracting new ones, which were not avowed. This conjecture proved to be true. On the 8th January 1830, Mr Casamajor reported, that the troops had fallen considerably into arrears, and that the rajah had himself acknowledged that his debt to soucars had increased upwards of six lacs of pagodas. "His highness' revenues" (we quote your words) "had been in many instances diverted from their proper object, the payment of his troops and Boozoor establishments, to his personal expenses. When his ready money funds had been insufficient for this purpose, his highness had either substituted donations and lands, or granted to soucars some particular privileges of collection. A system of bribery in the nomination to aumildaries had led to the appointment of unfit persons to those offices, in which, uncontrolled or connived at by the foudars, they had either embezzled the revenues by acting in collision with the ryots, or had put a total stop to their realization, by driving the oppressed people into insurrection. Meanwhile the troops, remaining unpaid, had shared the discontents, if they had not sympathized in the grievances of the people, who had committed for a time with impunity, excesses which had brought his highness' authority into contempt." Mr Casamajor finding that the periodical accounts furnished by the Mysore government could no longer be relied upon, suggested in the same despatch from which we have now quoted, that you should require the rajah to allow him access to the records of the talook cutcherries. It was at the same time reported to you by Mr. Casamajor, that "a formidable insurrection in the northern districts of Mysore had co-operated with his efforts in bringing the rajah to some sense of his situation: that the office of foudar had been abolished, thirty-five aumildars dismissed, a judicious hookumnamah circulated for the guidance of aumildars in future, and proclamations made to potails and gowdals, instructing them in their relative duties, and how applications for redress direct to the hoozoor or dewan cutcherries are hereafter to be made."

5. The breaking out of this insurrection had been first brought to your notice by Mr Casamajor about a month previous, on the 6th of December 1830. He then said, "As his highness is now fully convinced of the impolicy and feebleness of his conduct, in not more promptly attending to the first symptom of discontent manifested by the ryots, and is fully prepared to render them full and ample justice in their legitimate demands upon the sircar, it is of course essential that his authority should be fully upheld and supported by the British Government, if resisted." And he accordingly recommended that the subsidiary force should be eventually employed to put down the insurrection.

6. But on the 8th January 1831, speaking of the rajah's promises of amendment, Mr. Casamajor says, that they have been so often made and violated, that he receives them with distrust, "not from my doubts of the present and immediate sincerity of his intentions, because he now feels himself in difficulty, but the instability and infirmities of his character, my daily experience of his total disregard for truth, his adoption of bad companions, bad advisers; but above all, his procrastination and delay in supporting the measures of his dewan, and a habit of allowing his favourites to influence his own sound judgment, and, in consequence, his best decisions are often revoked by the interested views of others."

7. Mr. Casamajor could scarcely expect that the ryots, whom he represents as having been driven into insurrection by an oppressive government, should at once return to obedience upon the faith of assurances, in which he himself had no confidence. Yet if they should fail to do so, he thought it quite right to employ British troops against them, although this could not fail to involve the destruction of such as should persevere in their resistance. The aid of our troops could not indeed be withheld, since the rajah was entitled to it by treaty, in case of actual rebellion; but that redress of the people's grievances, which you really intended to secure to them, should have been held out to them from the first, under the pledge of your faith, as an inducement to submission. It is altogether improbable that the insurgents would have opposed so obstinate a resistance to our troops, had they been sufficiently made aware of your determination to see justice done to them.

24. So far as we are at present informed, we see great reason to concur in Mr. Lushington's inference, from the character of the insurrection and from the petitions of the people, "that the spirit of hatred and revenge has been so excited as not to admit of any real reconciliation between the people of Nuggur and his highness's government."

25. Supposing this to be the case, it would seem, as is stated by your president, that "there will be no effectual remedy for these shocking disorders but the exercise of that indisputable right which the Company possess, of assuming the direct management of the disturbed portion of the country, in the manner reserved by Lord Wellesley in the treaty of 1799; and of which the rajah was distinctly apprized at the moment of his accession, in order that nothing might be left for future doubt or discussion." The petition of twenty head ryots of the Nuggur foudarry, which accompanies Mr. Lushington's Minute, and which is filled with horrible details of tyranny and cruelty, specifically requests that they may not remain subjects of the rajah of Mysore.

Appendix, No. 23.

Extracts, &c.  
Political Letter to  
*Fort St. George*,  
6 March 1832.

26 Your president accordingly proposed, that application should be made to the Governor-general for his sanction to the eventual exercise of the powers reserved in the 4th and 5th articles of the treaty of 1799.

27. We shall anxiously expect the answer of the supreme government to this communication from you. The measure which was proposed by your president, though one which we have an undoubted right to adopt, is an extreme measure: but the case which has led you to contemplate it is an extreme case. In employing our troops to suppress this extensive and formidable insurrection, we incur an obligation to protect the people of the country both against vindictive severities, and against a renewal of the treatment by which they were provoked to rebel. But of the best means of affording this protection, we can judge but imperfectly at this distance, and with our present information. The measures which you contemplate can only be approved by us on clear evidence, that the duty we owe to the people, whom our troops have reduced to subjection, cannot otherwise be performed.

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to *Bengal*, dated the 6th March 1832.

Political Letter to  
*Bengal*, 6 March  
1832.

In a Despatch to the Madras government, dated 6th March (No. 3.) 1832, we expressed our sentiments on the recent insurrection in the northern talooks of Mysore, and on those vices in the rajah's government which had thrown his finances into disorder, and driven his subject to rebellion.

Having at so recent a period discussed at so much length the train of events which has led you, under the provision of the 4th article of the subsidiary treaty, to assume and bring under the direct management of "the servants of the Company" the whole of the territories of the Mysore state, little remains for us in the present despatch but to intimate to you our opinion as to the propriety of that decided, but as it appears to us, necessary measure, to make such observations as seem called for by subsequent events, and to furnish you with such instructions as may be further required in the altered state of affairs.

Having considered all the circumstances of the case, we have no hesitation in fully recognizing the policy, and indeed necessity of superseding the rajah, and carrying on the government of Mysore in the name and by the sole authority of the Company.

The mode of providing for the rajah's personal support and comfort, in case you resorted to this extremity, had been defined by the treaty, in conformity to which he is to receive one lac of star pagodas annually, and one-fifth of the net revenues of the country.

He has evinced a creditable degree of good sense in attempting no resistance, nor even making any remonstrance or complaint, at least with respect to the essentials of the measure. He requested that the administration might still be carried on ostensibly in his name; but while you expressed the strongest disposition to gratify him in any way not inconsistent with the purpose of the present change of system, you declined compliance with this request. His wish to retain the government of his capital, and of a small district immediately surrounding it, we think opposed by insuperable objections.

We observe with satisfaction, that, while you are anxious to adhere to native usages as far as is compatible with an effectual reform of the administration, you feel that this last ought to be the paramount object. After adverting to the absence of any regular courts of judicature in the Mysore, Mr. Prinsep adds, "But the Governor-general cannot be satisfied that the administration of justice in the Mysore territory should be left in this state. Tribunals for the administration of justice, both civil and criminal, with the obligation to keep records, and to conduct their proceedings according to fixed rules, are, in his lordship's opinion, institutions of primary importance, and his lordship looks to the commission to devise a scheme applicable to the state of society in the Mysore provinces at an early date. Whether the superior court at the capital shall be organized on the model of that established by Purneah, as described by Lieutenant-colonel Briggs, or in any other form which may be suggested by the experience of the present day, is a matter which his lordship leaves with confidence to the decision of the Right honourable the Governor in Council; but he doubts not to find in the Governor in Council a coincidence of opinion as to the necessity of not allowing so important a matter to remain unprovided for longer than may be absolutely unavoidable."

These observations are in accordance with our views, and their spirit is no less applicable to the revenue than to the judicial administration. In neither should any unnecessary changes be made, but in both you should avail yourselves of every expedient for preventing abuse, which experience either in Mysore or elsewhere has shown to be really requisite.

Mr. Lushington, the Governor of Madras, in a Minute which he recorded on the receipt of Mr. Prinsep's letter, dwells much upon the necessity of slowness and caution in introducing even such amendments as are really necessary; caution undoubtedly is indispensable, but slowness may be carried beyond the degree which caution requires. No alteration should be made unless you feel sure of its advantage, and care should be taken that changes which are good in themselves should not be rendered bad by being ill-timed. The rule should be, not to abstain from changes, but to precede them by due deliberation, and to time them well.

TRAVANCORE

EXTRACT POLITICAL LETTER to *Bengal*, dated the 18th December 1832.

Appendix, No. 23.

33 UNDER date 18th September 1829, you transmitted to the government of Fort St George, an extract from our general letter, dated 18th February 1829, in which we had suggested to you the propriety of considering whether the subsidiary force and residency maintained in Travancore might not be dispensed with, and you desired that "the Governor in Council would be pleased to state his sentiments on the several points discussed in the extract."

Extracts, &c.  
Political Letter to  
*Bengal*, 16 Decem-  
ber, 1832.

41. The president had without your authority proposed to the rajah the plan of withdrawing the subsidiary force and the residency, and now reported, that the rajah assented to so much of the plan as consisted in reducing the subsidiary force to one regiment of native infantry; but desired to retain the residency, at least for a time, on reasons which the Madras government regarded as satisfactory.

43. With respect to the proposition of the Madras government, that the subsidiary force, with the exception of one regiment, should be withdrawn, and the residency for the present maintained, the Governor-general recommended that it be adopted, and instructions to that effect were transmitted to the Madras government.

45. Of the propriety of the assent which you were induced to give to the half measure recommended by the Madras government, we have considerable doubt.

49. We see that the principle of it is dissented from, both by the fourth member of Council Sir C. Metcalfe and by Colonel Morrison, though on opposite grounds.

50. Colonel Morrison, when applied to by you for a statement of his sentiments on the subject, adduced a variety of reasons to show that the interests of both states required the continuance of the system, the beneficial tendency of which in maintaining their relations had been so long and fully experienced.

51. Sir Charles Metcalfe affirmed, that the compromise now adopted between interference and non-interference is more exceptionable than either. We see perfectly how such a compromise will always be acceptable to the native princes. They will always be anxious to retain as much of the British military force as may suffice to overawe their own subjects, and hold them quiet under any oppression, while it is insufficient to enable the British Government to interfere with effect in preventing the evils of misrule. The inference of Sir Charles, with respect to the present measure appears, therefore, to us, to rest on strong grounds, that "we do not leave the rajah to rule his country with the wholesome check of respect for the opinion of his subjects operating upon him. We still give him the ostensible support of our military force in his internal rule. We still to that extent overawe his subjects and encourage him in despotism, at the same time we weaken our control over him."

52. Our relations with the state of Travancore therefore appear to us, as they existed at the date of your most recent communications, to have been in a state by no means satisfactory. Upon authority indeed, which Colonel Morrison seems confidently to rely on, it would seem that the country, which on the accession of the rajah was in a most flourishing condition, was hastening to decline. Its affairs we trust have received in the meantime your watchful attention.

56. We confide in your judgment and care for discovering and executing whatever the exigencies of the case may require, and for that purpose we desire that you will consider the management of Travancore affairs as specially intrusted to you.

Appendix, No. 24.

EXTRACT from a MINUTE of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, late Governor of *Bombay*, dated 3 May 1820, respecting the affairs of the *Gujawoor*.

Appendix, No. 24.

I HAVE the honour to lay before the Board an outline of my proceedings at Burda, which I hope will be found to accord with the views of the other members of the government.

Minute of the Hon.  
*M. Elphinstone*,  
3 May 1820.

At my first interview on business, which took place at the residency on the day after my arrival, I intimated to Syajee that the necessity for our retaining the management of his government in our own hands had ceased with the life of the prince whose natural defects first occasioned it, and that the British Government was now desirous of intrusting him with the entire administration of his own affairs, provided he would satisfy it that the engagements into which it had entered would be strictly fulfilled. I explained that those engagements were—

Settlement of the  
Government.

1st. Our guarantee of the allowances of his ministers.

2d. That of his agreements with his tributaries.

3d. That of his bargains with bankers. That the two first required no interference in the details of his government, and that the last might also be secured without interference if he would set aside such a sum for the payment of his debts as might be deemed sufficient by his creditors, and assign such funds for the supply of it as might afford them full satisfaction.

If he did this, I said nothing would be necessary on our part beyond that occasional advice which the nature of our alliance must ever render necessary, and our interposition in such

Appendix, No. 24.

Minute of the Hon.  
M. Ephraïm,  
3 May 1820.

extreme cases as might threaten the ruin of the state. If he could not make this arrangement, I observed that his expenses must still be liable to the close inspection of the resident, but that even then the whole of the government should be in his hands, and the resident would only control what he formerly used to administer.

At this and at subsequent meetings I explained to him, in detail, the limits of his own authority and the resident's interference; that all foreign intercourse was to be exclusively in the hands of the British Government; that our control over his transactions with his tributaries was to be exercised up to the letter of our engagements, the degree in which it had hitherto been exerted having been found inadequate to secure the fulfilment of our promises; that in internal affairs he was to govern by himself, but that the resident was to be made acquainted with the plan of finance he intended to adopt for each year, to have access to his accounts whenever he thought it necessary, and to offer his advice whenever the system was likely to be deranged. I repeatedly impressed on Syajee that this right to advise was inherent in the British Government from the nature of the alliance, and that it never would be offered but for his own good.

To conclude, I endeavoured to fix on Syajee's memory that his success in his connexion with us depended, 1st, on his payment of his debts and fulfilment of our engagements; 2d, on his being not only friendly but open and sincere in all his dealings with the British Government; and 3d, on his abstaining from any intercourse with Foreign States, which, of itself, would amount to a dissolution of our alliance.

Syajee received my first communication of the intention of intrusting to him the full administration of his government with great joy, but without any appearance of surprise. He made repeated and solemn promises of adhering to all the rules laid down for him, said he owed his misund. and his state and its existence, to the British Government, and that he would not, on any account, dispense with the advice of the resident even if he himself should be disposed to withhold it, but he particularly requested that all representations should be made to him in private, and that all acts of his government should emanate directly from himself. On one occasion (at the next meeting after the rejection of Seeta Ram for minister) his highness showed a greater degree of jealousy, was desirous that his management of his finances should be taken on trust, and that the resident should be content with seeing the accounts once a year at the Durbar, but, on this plan being objected to, he at once recurred to that explained in the last paragraph, which accordingly is to be considered as in force henceforward. Syajee was very anxious that I should give him a writing fixing the limits of his own and the resident's authority, to which I willingly agreed, having always intended to take this method of securing that clear understanding by both parties on which so much depended. A copy of that writing is annexed. (A.) I had at first drawn up a longer paper, explaining the grounds of our former interference and present forbearance; but Syajee being desirous of a more simple note of our future relations, I drew up the present.

As the introduction of Syajee's direct administration depended on the security to be afforded for the payment of the debts of the state, I early found it necessary to examine the condition of the Guicowar's affairs, and here I unexpectedly met with the principal difficulty in effecting the arrangement desired. The latest official information I possessed (Captain Carnac's letter, dated 14th February 1819) gave reason to expect that there would be a surplus by the end of that year, but, in fact, the Guicowar is in debt to an amount exceeding a crore of rupees.

It became the principal object of my attention to put these debts in such a train of liquidation as should be satisfactory to the bankers to whom we had guaranteed the payment of them, and this was peculiarly necessary, as some of the troops were five years, and almost all near three years in arrears, and no money could be procured from the bankers who usually supplied it.

It appeared to me that the requisite reduction in the army might be made without any diminution in its numbers, and with an increase in its efficiency, by equalizing the rates of pay, and introducing such regulations as should prevent money being drawn for troops that were not actually employed, but it soon appeared that this was a difficult and delicate task. The abuses in the army are almost inherent in its nature, and are not to be removed without a sort of revolution, not only in the army, but in the state. As there are few jagheers in the Guicowar territory, the income of his chiefs is almost entirely derived from their military pay and perquisites, which again are connected with the superior rates of pay to the men belonging to the greater sirdars, and likewise to the loose system of muster in use in this state. Even if it were desirable to introduce a system of muster, there is no way in which it can be done with any prospect of success, unless by subjecting it to the control of European officers, which would be more unpopular than any part of our former interference, and most probably not effectual after all. For these reasons I have acquiesced in the plan of reduction proposed by the Guicowar, and I think it a very great advantage that it is his own plan, and therefore that he enters on it with good-will, and feels his credit concerned in its success. I have not failed to impress upon his highness, in the strongest manner, the necessity of a strict adherence to the plan he has now laid down, the wealth and independence to which he may raise himself by order and economy, and the absolute necessity of our again resuming our old administration of his government, if his arrangements for satisfying his creditors should entirely fail; and I forcibly pointed out to him the irksomeness and disgrace of the renewal of such a system, after he should once have been put in possession of all the powers of his own government.

[Here

[Here follows a report of Mr. Elphinstone's conference with Syajee Row, respecting the choice of a minister in the room of Dhakjee Dhadajee, with whom he was displeased.]

Dhakjee's removal being effected, the next question was who was to be his successor. I reminded Syajee at my first meeting of the objections of the British Government to Seeta Ram; but nevertheless, at a subsequent interview, he proposed that very individual, supporting his recommendation with allusions to the magnanimity of forgiving his offences, and the high claims of his adoptive father on the gratitude of the Guicowar government. I renewed my objections on the ground of the original incapacity which procured Seeta Ram's removal, but still more on that of his intrigues with foreign powers, and his acts against the alliance. I reminded his highness that he had sent an avowed accredited agent (Govind Row Bundoojee) to Poona, to interest the Peshwa in his own behalf, to induce that prince to embarrass the existing administration; at first by refusing to come to any compromise about the Guicowar's debts, and latterly by setting up a pretender to the Musnud of Baroda, and preferring a claim to jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Guicowar family. These intrigues, I said, led to the murder of the Shastree, and ultimately to the downfall of the Peshwa. I said, that if Seeta Ram was not directly implicated in the first of these transactions, he certainly was the original occasion of it; and to conclude, whatever might have been his former character, he had now been too long placed in opposition to the British Government and connected with its enemies, for us to have the least confidence in him. Syajee did not deny any of the facts I had brought forward, but still urged that Seeta Ram should be taken on trial, as he was now improved by age and corrected by misfortune; but on my declaring that his government was in no state for experiments, that with every talent in his minister, and every confidence on the part of the British Government, he would find his task difficult, and without these aids impracticable, he agreed to give up Seeta Ram, and requested Mr. Williams and me to select some other person. This was of course refused, although supported by repeated entreaties on the part of Syajee, during which that prince said that there were only four persons who had claims to the ministry, Seeta Ram, whom we rejected, the Shastree's children, who were infants, Dhakjee, who was just dismissed, and Wittul Row Bhow, Dhakjee's nominal associate, in whom he had no confidence, and whom (he might have added) he had accused to Mr. Williams of plotting to set aside his title to the Musnud. At length he proposed Wittul Row Dewanjee, the Soobedar of Kattywar, in which I readily concurred, both as he is the fittest man in the state for such an appointment, and as his removal from Kattywar would take away one of the principal obstacles to the sort of settlement we wish in that province. Syajee afterwards mentioned his design of retaining the present minister as colleague to the Dewanjee, as he had been to Dhakjee, by which means he should keep both in order, and would be able to give his confidence to whichever best deserved it. In this I also concurred. The Dewanjee's allowances and the title of his office were discussed; and it was agreed that he was to be invested and presented to me next day, Syajee at the same time exacted a promise, that we were not to remove him without a fault, and that if he gave us ground of offence, he was not to be removed directly, but by an application to Syajee. In granting this promise, as on other occasions, I said that the British Government would of course always expect him to attend to its objections to any obnoxious minister, but, I added, that except Seeta Ram, I could think of no man in his dominions to whom I should object. Next day was the occasion when he discovered so much jealousy, as before noticed. Some conversation had taken place, when he in a very indirect and uncandid manner, disclosed his intention of retaining Wittul Row Bhow, attempting to make it appear that this was the arrangement which he had from the first proposed. I agreed to the change, as Wittul Row is in himself really unexceptionable, but I stated to Syajee, that his naming a person in whom he had no confidence for his ostensible minister, led me to fear that he intended to have a more confidential one behind the curtain. I warned him of the bad consequences of such a system, said I would much rather have Seeta Ram as public minister than as secret adviser, and that besides my objections to that person, such a system of imposition would at once destroy all confidence between the two governments, without which nothing can go on.

Syajee pretended that he had no intention of consulting Seeta Ram, and asked if there were any objection to his seeing him in public. I replied that there was none either in public or in private, as I relied on his highness for following the plan he promised to adhere to; but that, if he did otherwise, he might depend on it I should soon discover it, and that the result would be the loss of that confidence from which he was about to derive so much benefit. Syajee renewed his protestations, and then said he intended to be minister himself, on which I told him, that without personal attention and labour on his part, his government could never be well administered; but that he must have some minister to conduct the details, and to be responsible for such duties as require more experience and more habitual attention than he could possibly be possessed of. If he did not select a fit person for this duty, the course of events would throw it into the hands of an unfit one. Syajee agreed to this, said he would have the Bhow for his minister at present, but that he would exercise a constant control over him, and bring in the Dewanjee if he found the other did not succeed. Syajee concluded by expressing a wish that Wittul Punt Bhow should never visit the residency without his leave, as he found that a minister who once established himself there was not easily dislodged; and likewise, that none of his ministers should be sent for to the resident except through him. These requests were cheerfully acceded to; but it was pointed out to his highness that he must go on with perfect cordiality with the resident, as any distrust or reserve towards him would tend more than any

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Minute of the Hon.  
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3 May 1820.  
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thing else to bring things back to their old state. Whether the appointment of Wittal Row Bhow was suggested by Seeta Ram, who would see the impossibility of preserving a secret influence if the Dewanjee were minister, or whether it is the effect of a bribe to Syajee himself, it is unfortunate, not only as shutting the fittest man in the country out of the ministry, but by the weakness that must arise from the want of cordiality between the minister and the prince. I nevertheless am of opinion that any interference on our part would, in the end, injure the party we wish to serve; and that as the objects of our guarantees will be secured by separate arrangements, it is better to leave the Guicowar to learn wisdom by experience than to endeavour to force him into a path in which we could never oblige him to walk with cheerfulness.

20. After everything was settled regarding the ministry, I received a visit from Seeta Ram Rocajee, who entered into a statement, the tendency of which was to make it appear that he had been displaced from the ministry by the artifices of Gungadthur Shastry, and that he has never since done anything to forfeit the confidence of the British Government. He admitted that he had communicated with the Peishwa through Govind Row Bundoojee, but he solemnly protested that he had done so at the pressing solicitation of that prince, who had invited Bundoojee from his retreat in Salsette, with fair offers of procuring the restoration of Seeta Ram to power, and he declared that his communications with the Peishwa never had any other object than his restoration. In reply, I recapitulated the effects of Bundoojee's intrigues, terminating in the murder of the Shastry, and the downfall of the Peishwa; and observed, that although I acquitted him of direct concern in the atrocious part of those transactions, I could not hold him exempt from serious blame for the part which he avowed, or from suspicion of a share in the further intrigues of his acknowledged vakeel, for the purpose of obstructing the Guicowar's negotiations, and shaking his alliance with the Company. I ended by saying, that the British Government had no wish to notice his conduct any further, and I should not have mentioned it now but to explain the reasons for which I never could have sufficient confidence in him to agree to his being minister.

21. It was to be expected that the Guicowar would be reluctant to agree to the plan that we thought requisite for protecting his tributaries from undue exactions, but all that I learned at Baroda strengthened my conviction of the necessity of such an arrangement.

22. There seems to be but one opinion among all the gentlemen who have had opportunities of judging on the alteration in the state of Kattywar since our troops first entered that province. All agree that it has declined from a state of high prosperity to one of extreme misery; that the spirit of the people is entirely broken, and that they are no longer capable of defending themselves against the Khoshas and other invaders whom they formerly were always able to repel. This unfortunate change is no doubt chiefly to be ascribed to the famine and pestilence which raged in Kattywar about 1813. The exactions of Babbajee in the three years preceding Colonel Walker's settlement, must also have sown the seeds of the decline of the province, but it seems also to be the general opinion that the encroachments and extortions of the Guicowar's officers since the settlement have contributed their share to the ruin of Kattywar. These exactions appear to have been made under pretence of interest on the arrears of tribute, and of presents and fees to the officers employed; and the encroachments which are represented (by Captain Barnwell in particular) as still more injurious are stated by him to have been effected by introducing a creature of the Dewanjee's (the Guicowar's commander) into the office of minister to each of the chiefs. By this plan, some hopes of relief from pressing demands of tribute were held out to them, but in the end the Dewanjee or his dependants, and the new minister, preyed upon the zemindary at their own discretion. If it were desirable to restore things to their ancient footing (which seems somewhat doubtful in the present state of the surrounding country) it is now impracticable, and there remains no alternative but to bestow effectually on our part that protection which the zemindars are no longer capable of affording to themselves. In Mahee Caunta, the case was in many respects different; our guaranty, though promised by the assistant deputed to that district in 1811, was not confirmed till very lately, and as it was only binding for a period of ten years, we had the choice of receding from it if we thought proper. It however appeared to me much more desirable to render it perpetual. As long as the Guicowar kept a force in Mahee Caunta, the country was in a state of constant irritation, and our neighbouring districts suffered from the depredations of rebels and outlaws. Since the force was withdrawn, in consequence of Mr Williams arranging that the tribute should be paid at Baroda, the country has been in comparative tranquillity, and the Guicowar's tribute is likely to be realized without either expense or difficulty. The position of Mahee Caunta, which stretches along our frontier for an extent of near 100 miles, renders its tranquillity an object of great interest to us, and as we are already bound to assist the Guicowar against rebellious tributaries, it is desirable that we should have the means of preventing any of them from being driven into rebellion.

I therefore proposed to Syajee Row, that we should collect his tribute both in Kattywar and Mahee Caunta, and that he should engage to have no concern with the tributaries unless we should call for his aid. Allowances are made by these agreements for deductions in the revenue from natural causes and for expenses incurred in reducing refractory zemindars. A translation of a writing given to me by the Guicowar, fixing his future relation to the tributaries at Kattywar and Mahee Caunta, accompanies this Minute. (F.)

Before I conclude, it is proper that I should say something of the effects of our past measures in the Guicowar's country, and of the prospects held out by the present.

There can be no doubt that the effect of our connexion with the Guicowar has hitherto been extremely favourable. Our interference must have caused much annoyance, and the  
rule

rule of our native agent much more, but these were compensated, even to the Court, by their deliverance from the dominion of the Arabs, by the order introduced into their finances, and by the safety and tranquillity of their capital and country. Except in Kattywar, the people gained still more by the absence of all violence either foreign or domestic, and from the check imposed by our resident on the tyranny of the officers of the Guicowar government. It is not to be expected that things will go on quite as well hereafter, and in points where we are immediately concerned, the transfer of direct authority from our own hands to those of others will doubtless be most felt; but, judging from the present state of things in Guzerat, and from the character of Syajee (who, considering his total inexperience, is remarkably far from wanting talents or application to business), I should hope that his administration will not be inferior to that of most Indian princes. In respect to fidelity to his alliance, he has at present neither motive nor inclination to take any step hostile to the British Government; and it is to be expected that his release from all vexatious interference, and the marked line drawn between him and the British authorities, will prevent any of those misunderstandings in which a disposition to such conduct is most likely to originate. Much will depend on Syajee's advisers, and much on the talents and temper of the resident. Every man connected with the residency must lose some portion of power or consequence by our retiring from the administration of the Guicowar's government, and every one will be ready to misrepresent the Guicowar, and to foment disputes between him and the resident. On the other hand, Syajee Row, though at present more open and more tractable than is usual with independent native princes, is not unlikely to give offence hereafter by his jealousy of his authority, and he is not above the practice of evasion and double dealing, which tends more than anything else to increase every misunderstanding. It will therefore require considerable effort on the part of the resident to avoid over-interference and irritation on the one hand, and on the other entire neglect of the Guicowar's proceedings, which in the end would be as injurious as the opposite error.

I retain my opinion as to the necessity of the resident being provided with a native agent whose salary should be on a liberal scale, but I am more than ever impressed with the necessity of his managing all business of importance by direct intercourse with the Guicowar, and excluding his agent from everything like political ascendancy at the Durbar. For this purpose I have requested Mr Williams to conduct all the business himself, for such a period at least as may be necessary to give him a complete and intimate knowledge of all details, and may show the people about the Durbar that even in them he is capable of understanding any complaint, and consequently is entirely above the control of the native agent. Whoever is appointed to this last office should be named by the resident without reference, and should only be known to government by his pay being charged with the rest of the resident's establishment.

[Here follows a report of arrangements respecting the appropriation of the treasures of Syajee's predecessors, and the provision to be made for the families of those princes.]

34 The Guicowar presented me with a paper containing several demands of his government against the Company, which I promised should be investigated. The principal was the claim to Ghans Dinna, both in Kattywar and in our other possessions in Guzerat. This he said was an ancient source of revenue which had fallen to the Guicowar's share in the partition of Guzerat. He said that it was the part due from Kattywar only, which was renounced by a treaty with the Peishwa, and even that, he said, had regularly been collected, notwithstanding the treaty, for the last fifty years. I assured him, that if he could prove that, he should receive his due, and that he might depend on it all his claims would be treated with strict justice.

35 Syajee repeatedly entreated me in the most earnest terms, to grant a provision in his native country to his brother-in-law, a sardar named Dhybur, who had lost his jagher in the Deccan. This wish I promised to consider.

36 I cannot conclude without recording my approbation of the zealous and able assistance I received from Mr Williams in all my transactions at Baroda. Mr Williams has been so fortunate as to gain Syajee's confidence, and as he takes a liberal and correct view of the relations between that prince and the Company, I hope that as far as depends on him, the new arrangements will go on well. I also received much assistance from Captain Ballantine, from Captain Barnwell on the subject of Kattywar, and from Captain Reynolds of the Commissariat, in arranging the Guicowar's accounts.

PS.—At the Guicowar's request, I directed Mr Williams to issue a short proclamation, announcing his highness having entered on the administration of his own government. A copy of the drafts annexed.

SUBSTANCE of a LETTER from the Honourable M. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, to his highness Syajee Row Guicowar, dated 3rd April, 1820, answering to 17th Jumadee ool Auhir, Arabic year 1220, and to Chatyr vud 4th, Sumbut 1876

SINCE my arrival at Baroda we have had many interviews, in which, besides increasing the former friendship by personal intercourse, we have had various conferences regarding the manner in which you are to be vested with the administration of your own government. For the better remembering of the points settled, I now commit them to writing.

All foreign affairs are to remain as hitherto, under the exclusive management of the British Government.

With regard to internal affairs, your highness is to be unrestrained, provided you fulfil your engagements to the bankers, of which the British Government is guarantee. The

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resident is, however, to be made acquainted with the plan of finance which your highness shall determine on at the commencement of each year. He is to have access to the accounts whenever he requires it, and is to be consulted before any new expenses of inmagnitude are incurred.

The guarantees of the British Government to ministers and other individuals must be scrupulously observed.

Your highness to choose your own minister, but to consult the British Government before you appoint him.

The identity of interests of the two states will render it necessary for the British Government to offer its advice whenever any emergency occurs, but it will not interpose in ordinary details, nor will its native agent take a share, as formerly, in the Guicowar's government.

This letter is written in the spirit of entire friendship and good-will towards your state; and I look to hear henceforward of your increasing prosperity and reputation.

TRANSLATION of a MEMORANDUM, under the seal of his highness *Syajee Row Guicowar*.

WITH a view to the tranquillity of the country, and to the peaceable realization of his highness the Guicowar's tribute from Kattywar and Mahee Caunta, it is agreed that his highness *Syajee Row Guicowar* shall send no troops into the lands of the zemindars in either of those tracts without the consent of the British Government, and shall make no demand on any zemindar or other person of those provinces, except through the medium of the British Government. The British Government engages to procure payment of the Guicowar's tribute, free of expense, to his highness, agreeably to the principles of the settlement made with the zemindars of Kattywar and Mahee Caunta respectively, in the years 1807-8 (answering to Sumbut 1864) and in 1811-12 (answering to Sumbut 1868).

If any great expense be produced by the refractory conduct of the zemindars, the British Government shall be at liberty to levy that amount and no more from the zemindar resisting.

Executed on the 4th of Chyter vud, answering to Jummudee ool Abter 1220 Fusly, and to 3d April a D. 1820.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER to *Syajee Row Guicowar*, Senna Khaekiel Shumshare Behauder, from the Honourable *Mountstuart Elphinstone*, Governor of Bombay.

On the death of the late *Futteh Row Sing Guicowar*, for the purpose of quieting the minds of his wives and family, it was agreed by Captain *Carnac*, resident at Baroda, that a child should be adopted, but that the said child was to have no claim whatever to the government; and it was agreed, under the guarantee of the British Government, that the family should receive a provision from the Guicowar government; but as they now refuse to abide by these arrangements, the guarantee promised by the resident is hereby annulled.

3d April 1820, or 17th Jummada ul Akeer, or Sumbut 1876, Chyter vud 4th.

THE infirmity of the late *Anund Row* having rendered it necessary to provide other means for the regulation of his country, a commission was instituted under the direction of the British resident, which managed all affairs during the lifetime of his late highness.

The accession of his highness *Syajee Row*, a prince of full age and acknowledged ability, rendering this arrangement no longer necessary, the government will henceforward be conducted by his highness in person, and all complaints and representations are henceforward to be addressed to him.—April 7th 1820.

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EXTRACT from a MINUTE of Sir *John Malcolm*, G.C.B., Governor of Bombay, dated 30th November 1830.

INTRODUCTION.

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Minute of Sir *John Malcolm*, 30 Nov. 1830.

1. At a period when I am leaving a government over which I have presided for three years, it may be useful to those who succeed, and satisfactory to my superiors, to take a general review of the different measures I have proposed, the reforms and changes which have been made, as well as their financial result, and to offer my opinion as to the means which appear best adapted to maintain what has been done, and further to promote economy as far as practicable without injury to the efficiency of the public service.

2. The principal measures in the Political department have been those connected with the Guicowar state. A reform has been effected in the conduct of the political duties, which, while attended with considerable reductions, has, as far as I can judge, added to the efficiency of this branch of administration in Guzerat. It would far exceed the limit I have prescribed to myself to enter upon the details of the various arrangements proposed and adopted, suffice it to say they appeared to me indispensable to root out evils more inveterate than I had ever found in any political connexion with a native state in India; and when all past efforts to remedy these evils had but tended to increase them, by adding to the debts of the prince and to our embarrassing obligations, there seemed to me to be no option

between

between allowing an ill-managed and distracted native state to hasten to dissolution, or to adopt measures which might save it from the baneful effects of its own impolicy and weakness.

3. The most marked feature in the first arrangement was the sequestration of districts to the amount of about twenty lacs of rupees, to discharge loans for which we had recently become guarantee, in order to promote a beneficial settlement of the debts of the Guicowar, which had been impeded and broken by Syajee, with the view of enriching his private purse and of adding to his power of conferring boons upon his low and unworthy parasites and favourites. This measure was, too, necessary for the protection of the Baroda state, and the vindication of the honour and maintenance of the good faith of the British Government, to permit attention to the violent and continued remonstrances of Syajee against its adoption. The sequestration was carried peaceably into effect, and we have a prospect, by the liquidation of the principal debts, of being early released from our guarantee engagements, which, however recommended by expedience at the time they were adopted, were of a character that associated our acts as much, if not more, with the Bazar than the Durbar at Baroda. We shall also be freed by this arrangement from that recurring necessity for a constant fretting interference, which in its every day's exercise through the agency of subordinate instruments, limits the sphere of action and depresses the spirit of good princes, while it irritates and renders worse those that are bad, and terminates in both cases in what it is our policy and professed desire to avoid, the subjection of the countries of its dependent allies to the direct rule of the British Government.

4. The Court of Directors, I am happy to state, have in their Despatch of the 28th April, fully approved of the measures to which I have alluded, and we have a prospect, by the liquidation of the principal debts, of being early released from our guarantee engagements, which, however recommended by expedience at the time they were adopted, were of a character that associated our acts as much, if not more, with the Bazar than the Durbar at Baroda. We shall also be freed by this arrangement from that recurring necessity for a constant fretting interference, which in its every day's exercise through the agency of subordinate instruments, limits the sphere of action and depresses the spirit of good princes, while it irritates and renders worse those that are bad, and terminates in both cases in what it is our policy and professed desire to avoid, the subjection of the countries of its dependent allies to the direct rule of the British Government.

5. Referring to the effects which the increasing embarrassments and our Bhandarry or guarantee engagements have had upon the Baroda state, the Court justly observes, "Under a native government, the near approach of total bankruptcy does not generally produce reform. It rather produces increased exactions from the people. Predatory habits are engendered by distress, and civil and military functionaries, equally without regular pay, introduce corruption and violence into every part of the government. Under these circumstances our Bhandarry engagements render it incumbent on us to interfere. Our interference can hardly be exerted with efficacy consistently with the maintenance in the native government of the shadow of independent authority, and we are driven at last to a virtual assumption of the government, apparently not by any desire to alleviate the sufferings of the people, but by the consideration of our own pecuniary interests and our engagements to individuals. We thus exhibit our government under circumstances of disparagement, and injure our character."

6. In a subsequent paragraph of the same despatch, the history of our pecuniary concerns with the Guicowar, and the successive failures of our plans to relieve that state, are concisely and ably given. "When the British Government first affixed its guaranty to the Guicowar debt, the receipts and expenses of that state were prospectively calculated,\* and an arrangement framed by which it was predicted that the whole of the guaranteed debt would be extinguished in a certain and that a small number of years. These predictions, however, were not verified, and the time having expired without any material diminution of the Bhandarry debt new calculations were made and new arrangements were grounded on them, by which it was predicted, with the same confidence as before, that the whole debt would be paid off within a very limited period, and in this state things have remained, the failure of each successive arrangement having been followed up by the adoption of another which promised as much and effected as little †. These arrangements failed, because in none of the calculations which were the basis of them had sufficient allowance been made for adverse contingencies. But a new cause of failure, which no accuracy of calculation could have guarded against, has arisen since 1820, when Syajee Row was placed in the full exercise of the powers of government. His highness diverted to his private coffers a large portion of the public revenues in the form of bribes for annually underletting the land, and for granting, under various pretexts, remissions of revenue. While, therefore, Syajee accumulated a private treasure of more than thirty lacs, the revenue of the state fell short of its expenses; the pay of the army and various other public charges fell into arrears; as often as these arrears became from their amount a source of serious inconvenience to his highness, and should have induced him to part with a portion of his hoard for their liquidation, our government relieved him from the pressure by guaranteeing a further loan to pay off the

\* Receipts estimated at R' 65,60,663. Disbursements at R' 54,49,350, leaving a surplus of R' 11,17,313 applicable to the payment of interests and the liquidation of the principal of the debt.

† The year 1816-17 was fixed by Major Walker, in his Report of the 10th January 1809, as the period at which the Guicowar government would be out of debt. On the 29th November 1816 the debt was stated to be R' 54,97,990, but there is reason to believe that its real amount was much greater. The year 1818-19 was fixed by Major Carnac as the period at which the debt would probably be extinct, in April 1820 it amounted to more than a crore of rupees, while the pay of the army was from three to five years in arrears. In that year Mr. Elphinstone visited Baroda, and guaranteed loans to the amount of a crore of rupees at a reduced interest. According to Mr. Elphinstone's calculations, fifteen lacs were to be annually appropriated to the redemption of a debt now amounting to R' 1,32,27,981. In 1825-26, notwithstanding considerable payments made in liquidation, and a further reduction of the interest from 10½ to 6 per cent., it amounted to R' 1,33,61,889.

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Minute of Sir John  
Malcolm, 30 Nov.  
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the arrears. Under this system, the guaranteed debts instead of diminishing naturally increased, and rose at length to a greater amount\* than that of the incumbrances of the Guicowar government in 1804-5, before our Bhandarry system had commenced."

7. On this view of facts, the Court, after detailing the failure from similar causes of the septennial leases made by the resident, gave their approbation of the measures which this government was compelled to adopt, of a temporary sequestration of territory.

"Nothing therefore remained (they observe, when commenting on Syajee's conduct) but that the British Government should take the fulfilment of the obligations to which its faith was pledged into its own hands, either by assuming the temporary management of the whole of the Guicowar's dominions, by exacting a permanent cession of such parts of his territories and other resources as should be equivalent to the interest of the Bhandarry debt, or by temporarily sequestrating such larger portion of them as should enable you to pay off the principal as well as the interest within a certain period."

"To the first of these three modes of action, it was a sufficient objection that it involved a greater assumption of power on our part, and a more extensive alteration in the existing order of things than was necessary for the preservation of our faith and the speedy redemption of the Bhandarry debt. Your choice therefore lay between the other two measures, and we think you acted wisely in adopting the alternative of a temporary sequestration, in preference to that of a permanent assumption of territory. We likewise entirely approve of your having determined to make no essential change in the mode of administering the districts you have sequestered, and of your having declared to the Guicowar government, that these districts would be restored to it immediately upon the discharge of the loans we had guaranteed."

8. The measures adopted to secure the benefits we have a right to expect from our alliance with the Guicowar state were suggested by me when on a tour through Guzerat, where observation on the spot, added to my previous information, led to my proposing plans which appeared to me to combine the increase of political and military strength in our northern provinces, with future benefit to our allies, and considerable reduction of expense.

9. These plans embraced the objects of removing the residency from the city of Baroda, and vesting extended power† in a political commissioner, whose residence was fixed at Ahmedabad, at which central spot the general officer commanding the northern division was also stationed, and the whole of the troops placed under his command, all former separations of our troops (such as the Guicowar subsidiary force, &c.) were to cease, and the whole force consolidated became the northern division of the army; leaving however the number of men stipulated in the various treaties, within the Guicowar's territories, at the disposal of the commissioner, under whom all the political agents in Guzerat were placed.

10. That our future connexion with the Guicowar's state will be free of trouble, it would be folly to expect. We must reconcile ourselves to many evils and embarrassments in this as in all similar alliances, we have only a choice of difficulties, but these will be found fewer than they have been, if we have wisdom to persevere with unflinching firmness in the plan we have adopted, it is, I am assured, the only one by which we can keep alive the native state, but I must here observe, that while I am decidedly averse to that continued interference which debases and destroys native princes and chiefs, I can never approve a course of policy which abstains from the exercise of that general control vested in us by treaties, until those whom our counsels and salutary warnings might have saved plunge themselves into irremediable ruin.

11. I must, in concluding this short record of Baroda affairs, state that the evils attending them, both as affecting Syajee and the government, have been greatly aggravated by corrupt agents instilling into his mind false hopes of his receiving support from His Majesty's courts of law at Bombay, and afterwards from the visits of one of his principal agents to Calcutta, proofs will be found of these facts in the records, and they are worthy of the serious attention of the authorities in England. They may not be capable of complete remedy, but that should be applied as far as practicable; for there exists not amidst the difficulties which must ever attend the administration of this empire, one more likely to generate corruption and intrigue, or which is more calculated to hurry princes and chiefs to their ruin, than that impression which low and interested men create and maintain, of their being able to appeal in political matters beyond the local government under whom they are placed.

12. The countries of Kattywar and Mahee Caunta are divided among tributary princes and chiefs, each exercising independent power in the internal rule of his own limits. Some of these are under our direct authority, but the greater part are subject to the Guicowar, but placed under our control and management, as we collect the tributes, accounting for them to the prince.

13. This arrangement is indispensable to preserve the general peace of the country and on the whole works well, though often attended with embarrassment; but this chiefly arises from our not being content with the great benefit bestowed on these countries by the comparative mildness of our rule, and the good done our own provinces by the additional means we have acquired of saving them from the continued attacks of predatory neighbours. Instead of dwelling upon these real benefits, and receiving occasional outrages with that toleration it is necessary to do in such countries, when under the progress of improvement, we

\* Rupees 1,33,81,389.

† Kattywar has been placed under his general control.

we often hurry to condemn the whole system, from its wanting some of those forms which we have introduced into more settled districts under our direct rule, and we doubt, on legal grounds, our rights of interposing our authority to alleviate, when we cannot altogether remove evils of such magnitude. But our non-interference, if continued, will tend to unhappy results. Many chiefs have contracted to maintain the local peace, and failing in this obligation, they are liable to forfeiture of their lands, but cases continually occur when they really have not the power of fulfilling such terms, and it appears harsh to punish men for not doing what they cannot do. But I have treated this point very fully in my Minute on Kattywar, under date the 24th September 1830, with the last paragraphs of which I shall conclude this part of my subject.

14. "The permanent control over these countries must, I conceive, carry with it a power to fulfil the guarantees, and to maintain the general peace of the peninsula of Kattywar. It is to me quite evident that we can only do so by acting in these instances as our predecessors did; their interference to punish outrages committed by outlaws and insurgents, which the injured parties had not power to do, formed a part of the existing usages of the country that we guaranteed; and to adopt another course appears to me contrary to the letter and spirit of our engagements.

15. "It may be stated, that though a regard to our public faith recommended such a course, legal difficulties, which arise out of a strict construction of these terms, must render the exercise of such a power by us highly objectionable. Those objections did not probably occur when our guaranty was pledged, and the chiefs who concurred in our arrangements no doubt expected that we would act in the same manner as their former superiors had done. Besides, they were at that period under the rule of native princes, and never could have anticipated events which would subject them to forfeiture of their lands, to which they now are liable, for the non-performance of engagements which, from the actual condition of their power, they may be unable to perform. Of this I am convinced, that if we do not interpose our authority more than we have hitherto done to terminate the recurring outrages against the public peace, this country will either remain infested, as at present, by plunderers, or its chiefs will fall one by one into the vortex of our ordinary rule—an event I think much to be deprecated, as it will in every view, financial and political, be attended with evils. The change, in its commencement, will spread alarm, and we shall have the impressions of our meditated encroachments spread along the whole of our western frontier, where, from the nature of the soil and the population, it is most essential we should be regarded as protectors and supporters of the princes and chiefs, who enjoy their power from, perhaps, an older line of ancestry than any in India, if not in the world.

16. "There is no escape from such a consequence that I can contemplate, except that we either abandon Kattywar to anarchy, or introduce a special authority suited to our obligations, to the actual condition of the country, and to the usages and character of its inhabitants. To those who assume that we are restrained from assuming the exercise of our controlling rule over such countries as Kattywar, according to its condition, by the attention we are bound to pay to established regulations or legal enactments, I can only reply, that if such are found to be inconsistent with the diversified character of our power over the different natives of India, they should be changed or modified so as to admit exceptions." The period is arrived when, if this is not done, all India must shortly become subject to our courts of Adawlut, for if there is no medium between these and the opposite extreme of non-interference, no native state in the present condition of India can long exist. The anarchy that will prevail from constant warfare in territories contiguous to our own, or the follies or crimes of then uncontrolled princes or chiefs, must sooner or later make them become subject to our direct rule—an event which is assuredly not desirable, and every effort therefore should be made by which it can be averted.

17. Referring to Kattywar, I proposed,\* in the first instance, that the political agent in that country should be placed under the general authority of the Commissioner of Guzerat, and that the latter should visit Kattywar twice annually, and all criminals who had been guilty of capital crimes, such as robbery and murder, in the territories of these petty states, in which the chief might be too weak to punish them, should be tried, and acquitted or sentenced by a court in which the commissioner should preside, aided by the political agent, and three or four chiefs as assessors.

18. The sentence, when death, should require the confirmation of Government. I had much communication on the subject of a trial like the above, while in Kattywar, with the acting political agent, Mr. Blane, and with natives the most conversant with the habits and actual situation of that country, and found all of the same opinion upon this point, which they deemed quite essential to the preservation of peace and order; and they thought, as I do, that without some such arrangement, we could not fulfil our guaranty of preserving the peace of the country, or promote its general improvement. It would, no doubt, add greatly to our influence and power, but that is desirable as long as it does not supersede the authority of the princes and chiefs of Kattywar in their internal administration.

19. There has been no change in our existing relations with Cutch; but the force maintained in that country, as well as the political agency, have been reduced, so as to exceed, in a very small degree,† our receipts from it. The whole of the late proceedings of Government regarding that country are fully stated in my Minute, dated Dapooniee.

20. With

\* This has been done.

† See Minute, &c. Cutch.

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Sattarah.

20. With regard to the rajah of Sattarah and the northern jagheerdars, their relations have undergone no change since first established in 1818, and finally settled in 1822. The expense of the political agency has been greatly reduced by an arrangement that vests the commandant of troops at Sattarah, as at Khoj, with political powers. I have stated, in a Minute, that it is necessary to hold out objects of ambition to military officers, who render themselves acquainted with the languages, the manners and usages of our native subjects, and "I know no greater advantage that Government can derive from their success than being able, when they obtain rank, to combine in one person military and political duties. Under ordinary circumstances this is of the greatest utility, and on the occurrence of war, on an extended scale, the benefits\* which may result from it are incalculable."

21. A recent rupture between the rajah of Sattarah and the family and adherents of the minor chief of Ukulote, who was under his care as guardian, occasioned his garrison to be expelled from that strong fortress; but my being in the Deccan at the period, and instantly moving troops from every quarter, produced the early termination of an affair, which, had less prompt measures been adopted, might have been attended with great expense, and much loss of life. I state this fact, because it is the second time (the first instance occurred in Gu. eratt) within this year that my presence in the provinces has remedied the great defects of our system, which subdivides power in a degree that creates delays which are alike injurious to the financial and political interests of Government.

22. None of our subsisting engagements with the Imaun of Muscat or Arab chiefs have been modified or changed. Interference in their internal disputes has been carefully avoided, while piracy has been repressed, and the increasing trade now carried on in Arab Buglas announces the success of that humane and wise policy which sought the reform of these predatory tribes by opening to them honest and profitable employment.

Survey of the Indus.

23. In conformity with my Minute noted in the margin (the measures suggested in which were sanctioned by the supreme government), Lieutenant Burns had been directed to proceed up the Indus with presents for Ranjeet Singh, and he may be expected to add to his political labours a much more complete account than we yet possess of the navigation of that river, particularly its "Delta."

Privileged Classes.

24. There are few considerations more connected with the political prosperity of the territories of Bombay than the maintenance of the privileged classes of the Deccan, and the further extension of an order which gives such hope of forming a respectable and attached native aristocracy. My attention was early directed to the subject, and having visited Poonah soon after my arrival, I brought to the notice of the Board, and proposed arrangements to which my colleagues agreed. To understand these arrangements, however, it is necessary to trace the rise and progress of this order and its present condition, as well as the means by which it has been maintained.

25. In the beginning of the year 1822 registers were appointed to the Deccan, and the nobility and gentry became alarmed lest they should be made liable to the forms and process of such English courts as they had already heard of in the Concan. In the middle of the same year Mr. Elphinstone visited the Deccan, and received remonstrances on the subject from the Vinchurkur and other chiefs, who quoted his proclamation of the 11th February 1818, by which, they said, all the privileges enjoyed under the Maharratta Government had been guaranteed, that the revolution had burdened them with debts which they never could pay, and that it would, therefore, be a breach of faith and ruinous to their characters and comfort to subject them to Adawits. In consequence of these remonstrances, when courts of justice were introduced into the Deccan, the same order which announced their appointment and jurisdiction contained "a list of persons of rank to whom some exemption from strict process was intended," which measure, and the further refuge that the Commissioners afforded to these persons by hearing representation and petitions daily, prevented for the moment further complaint.

26. Mr. Chaplin§ wrote to Government that the Sardars must not only be exempt from ordinary processes, but that the judges should be strictly enjoined not to drag up to court unnecessarily men of rank and respectability on even criminal charges, and Government accordingly ordered without reservation that causes against sardars were to be reported to the "Commissioner, who would take measures himself for settling them, or furnish the judge with special instructions in each case." The judges were also directed to treat men of rank with the consideration to which they were entitled by usage, and received a full discretion to set aside forms that were harsh and derogatory to their character. The Commissioner accordingly divided|| the privileged orders into three classes, exempting some persons entirely, and others partially, from the strict process of the court.

27. A new difficulty arose. Suits had been filed, and in some decrees passed by the registers against sardars, which could never be enforced without running them, and their  
creditors

\* The late Sir Thomas Munro, Sir Barry Close, Sir David Ochterlony, Colonel Walker, and myself, may be adduced as instances of the advantage that may be derived from this combination of the political power with military command.

† An impostor invaded the north-east district with nearly 6,000 plunderers, who were speedily discomfited by my being within 40 miles of the scene, and issuing orders to the different corps to move.

‡ Vide Minute of the Governor, entered in Cons. 30th January 1828.

Letter of October 1826.

|| Letter of 3rd November 1826.

creditors gave them no rest in the Adawlut, and no intermission of private *tukaza*.<sup>\*</sup> To meet this evil the judge was empowered† to execute such cases partially in reference to the debtor's rank and means, and *tukaza* was declared illegal by proclamation.

28. In two months afterwards the commission was abolished. The political duties of that officer were transferred to Government, the vakeels of the *surdars* to the Persian secretary's office, and the Poonah and revenue *duftars*, by which last the commissioner had exercised a check over collectors, to a sub-secretary in the territorial department. Mr. Elphinstone, however, having at the same time repaired to Poonah, his presence weakened the effect of the evils produced by the loss of the commission; but it soon became apparent that something more than a judge and a collector was required in the Decan, and the delicacy of the duty entrusted to the judge in respect to claims against *surdars*, and the striking contrast it presented to the rigid and uncompromising routine of an *Adawlut*, suggested the propriety of establishing a separate jurisdiction for its performance. The agent for *surdars* was appointed. This was the state of affairs when I came to India. I was easily convinced of the evil of retaining the native vakeels of chiefs in a society constituted as that of the island of Bombay is, and that the records of the Poonah office could not be conveniently referred to if kept at the residency, and that the revenue *duftar*, without a competent superintendent, would be quite useless, and that the heavy *Adawlut* duties of the agent left him but little leisure for the trial of suits against *surdars*, which had fallen into great arrears. This combination of causes led to my proposing several modifications of the system. One of the most important was the appointment of a deputy agent of *surdars*, acting under the agent, but with the under-mentioned specific duties

To hear original and appealed suits against *surdars*

To be the medium of communication between them and Government

To receive their vakeel, and to pay themselves all the courteous attention which they derive from the representative of Government

And, lastly, (though not specified in the instructions) to form a complete substitute for the Persian secretary's office whenever the Government was in the Decan. I am decidedly of opinion, that for many years, and until those that belong to the privileged classes fully understand their condition, an experienced and able deputy agent cannot be dispensed with. It is quite impossible that the agent for *surdars*, with high judicial duties to perform, could give that minute attention to the arbitration of differences which occur to any of these classes, much less could he accompany the Governor when on a tour in the Decan, Candeish, or the Southern Mahratta country.

29. The general reasons for maintaining this appointment will be found in my Minute, 3 August 1829, noted in the margin. But it is on its superior economy as well as utility that I ground my opinion for the necessity of its continuance.

30. The deputy agent has attended me at Dapooree, and throughout all my tours in the Decan. He has completely supplied the place of the Persian secretary, having conducted all my intercourse with princes and chiefs. He has during that period translated and disposed of seventeen hundred and four petitions, all of which have been submitted by him, and orders given regarding them by me. Nor has this prevented the execution of other duties. Four hundred and fifty-six suits and arbitrations have been decided and adjusted during the period of the last two years and a half. The cost of the whole charge of the agent's department, including the agent, his deputy and office, is 24,417 rupees per annum. Since it was established, the Persian secretary's duty has been performed with the Governor during twenty months that I have been in the Decan, at an extra charge only of 4,000 rupees, and this includes a very long tour through the Southern Mahratta country.

31. The extra disbursement of these twenty months are little more than one half of what that part of the Persian office cost that attended Mr. Elphinstone four months in 1826, when his tour did not extend beyond Sattarah; but there cannot be a doubt as to the superior economy as well as efficiency of the Governor when in the Decan, being aided by this officer instead of the Persian secretary.

32. I stated in a Minute, noted in the margin, on the policy of maintaining the privileged classes (particularly the third class), "That there is nothing in the new code that creates inconvenience or embarrassment from the existence or extension of the privileged classes of the Decan; I can confidently state that, during my whole experience in India, I have known no institution so prized by those who enjoy its exemptions, or more gratifying to the whole people among whom it was established." It is recognized, as I have elsewhere stated, by the lowest orders, as a concession in forms to those whom they deem their superiors, and as such is received as a boon by a community who, from their condition, neither understand nor appreciate those unyielding forms that deny alike advantages of birth and the claims of rank and service; and when one of my colleagues deprecated what he termed a departure from "an even course of justice, wherein all injurious distinctions are unknown," and expressed doubt of the soundness of the policy which confers the privileges that have been conferred on the third class of this order, "I will ask (I observed in reply) if privileges and exemptions similar in principle to those from which arguments that have been brought forward on this occasion go to include our native subjects, are not familiar to every government of the known world? Has the principle of equality as to the substance of justice banished from England privileges and exemptions that mark, in the forms

\* Continued and violent importunity.

† Circular Letter, 9 January 1826.



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Mackenzie, 30 Nov.  
1830.

forms and process of law, the distinctions of birth, of rank, of office? Has not the peer the privilege to be tried by his peers? Is he not exempt from personal arrest, except in criminal matters? and does he not, in certain cases, claim distinction, even in death, by asserting a right to resign his life on the block, not on the gallows? Members of Parliament have many privileges; that of pardon from arrest is a principal one; judges, and the clergy, have privileges; and to all these, and to officers high in the civil and military employ of their country, usage has granted a courteous treatment, which confers distinctions even where the right is not established. All this existing under our Government, and in a country where man is more on a par with man in reality than in any nation in the universe, proves how natural the desire of such distinction is to the human breast. Yet when we became, through combination of extraordinary causes and events, sovereigns of India, whose population cherish distinctions in the various branches of the community more than any people of the earth, we desire to lay it down as a principle to admit no privileges or exemptions even in the form of the judicial branch of our administration; the inhabitants of this vast empire are all to be reduced to one level. The same writ, the same messenger, is to summon noble and peasant to our courts of Adawlut, and beyond what the courtesy of an English judge may choose to bestow, no man is to have a privilege that marks the high family of which he is the representative, the honourable place he holds in the community, the name he may have acquired by public works or charities, or the obligation the state owes him for his civil or military services."

33. "There are reasons why as foreign rulers we cannot elevate the natives of India to a level with their conquerors. We are compelled by policy to limit their ambition, both in the civil government and in the army, to inferior grades, but this necessity constitutes in my opinion the strongest of reasons for granting them all that we can with safety. Their vanity and love of distinction are excessive, and a politic gratification of such feelings may be made a powerful means of creating and preserving a native aristocracy worthy of the name, and exciting to honourable action, men whom a contrary system must degrade in their own estimation and in that of the community, and who, instead of being the most efficient of all ranks to preserve order, and give dignity to society to which they belong, and strength to the Government to which they owe allegiance, are depressed by our levelling system into a useless and discontented class. Many, judging from results, ascribe to the want of virtue and good feeling and to rooted discontent in this class, what appears to me to be distinctly attributable to our conduct as rulers. We shape our system to suit our own ideas. The constitution of our Government requires in all its branches an efficient check and great regularity, but in our attention to forms and routine, we too often forget the most essential maxims of state policy, and every deviation is arraigned that disturbs the uniform usage of our affairs in courts of justice. No motives suited to their prejudices and their habits are supplied to awaken the merit to action, to kindle the embers of virtue, or to excite an honourable ambition among our native subjects. Yet, pursuing this system, our records teem with eulogies on the excellencies of our establishments, and the degeneracy of all, and particularly the higher classes of India, whom, in the case before me, it is desired (from no cause that I can understand but rigid adherence to system) to exclude from a few unimportant privileges, which, though little more than a shadow of distinction, are sought for with an eagerness that singularly shows the character of the community, and confirms me in the belief I have long entertained, that by our neglect in conciliating and honouring the higher and more respectable class of our native subjects, we cast away the most powerful means we possess of promoting the prosperity and permanence of the empire. The maintenance of the privileged classes in the Deccan, and the extension of that excellent institution to our northern provinces, where it is more particularly required, will greatly depend upon the establishment of a high local authority. I have fully treated this subject in a letter to Lord William Bentinck, upon the revision of the administration of this presidency. In enumerating the many advantages, financial as well as political, that would result from the appointment of a commissioner to the different divisions of our territory, I have stated my opinion that this form of rule was essential to enable us to preserve the privileged classes in the Deccan and the Southern Mahratta country, as well as to introduce them to Guzerat."

7 November 1830.

34. "It appears to me desirable that employment and means of distinguishing themselves in the public service should be early afforded to this class, that we cannot do without they have confidence in support and protection from some high local authority. Their alarm at our Regulations, which are few and easy to be understood, will gradually subside; a complete knowledge of them will be acquired, but men of rank can only be encouraged to engage in public duties, by a belief grounded on personal feeling, that they are safe in their honour and character, which they never can be while the construction of our provincial administration exposes them to the daily hazard of being placed under superiors often changing, and sometimes of comparative junior standing, and at the head of distinct departments."

35. "The privileged classes in the Deccan (I observed in the letter to which I have alluded) were instituted by Mr Elphinstone. This order was regarded by him with anxious solicitude till the day of his embarkation, and he went to his native country accompanied by the strongest testimonies of their regard and gratitude. I have in my treatment of individuals, and in every arrangement connected with this class, endeavoured to follow the steps

\* From the nature of the service and the effect of climate on the health of Europeans, a youth but a few years from school often officiates as judge of a zillah court.

steps of my predecessor, and my previous knowledge of many of those who belong to it, and other circumstances, have given me many advantages in allaying their fears, and confirming their confidence in the preservation of an order to which recent events have shown they attach importance, and are prompt to resist every change\* of that administration of the laws, which, modified as they are with reference to their feelings and condition, they recognize as the best that could be established."

36. As connected with the maintenance of the privileged orders, and still more with the preservation and creation of a landed aristocracy, I must consider the question of establishing Nuzerana, now under reference to the honourable the Court of Directors, as one of much importance, and I shall be pardoned, therefore, if I recapitulate at some length the reasons which make me so anxious upon a subject, which in my opinion so seriously involves the prosperity of the political interest of this quarter of India.

37. My Minutes, noted in the margin, upon the subject of Nuzerana (or fine upon succession) are too voluminous to give an abstract of them; suffice it to state, that early after my arrival at Bombay, I took up this subject on the ground of a Minute of Mr. Chaplin's, formerly Commissioner of the Deccan, whose local knowledge and general experience well qualified him to judge such a question. It had in its favour, that of being a tax that was one way or another familiar to all holders of grants of lands throughout India. It was recommended in the quarter where I proposed to introduce it by the peculiar circumstance of our largest landholders (the Mahratta jagheerdars) holding a considerable proportion of their lands as serinjams or military service tenures. To the inheritance of these lands, their direct heirs were admitted to have undoubted right, but that of adoption, though granted to several, was refused to others, and thus, I found, threw doubt and distress upon the minds of all, unfavourable to then happiness, to the prosperity of their estates, and to the peace of the country.

38. The imposition of Nuzerana was of course popular with them, because it seemed an inheritance which had been rendered uncertain; but on the other hand, our refusing it, because they had no positive right, included an annihilation of then family, which, under all the vicissitudes of fortune to which they were exposed under a native government, they could but little dread.

39. It has been argued that Bajee Row in several cases resumed then estates. In the early part of Bajee Row's reign, this was not his policy: in latter times he became alarmed at the increasing power of his nobles, and certainly did so, but his conduct in this particular is believed to have been one of the chief causes of his downfall. It excited not only discontent, but the defection of those who had been attached to his family, and it cannot therefore be adduced as an example worthy of our imitation.

40. The proposition for establishing Nuzerana, owing to a previous order that restricted the Bombay government from making any changes affecting the condition of the Mahiatta jagheerdars, was referred to the supreme government, who took a different view of many parts of the subject, on the ground of its being financially as well as politically inexpedient. The first was no doubt grounded partly on a mistake, for it was evidently thought by the supreme government that revenue to the amount of forty-one lacs of rupees would be sacrificed, if serinjam lands, to which there were no direct heirs, were not sequestered; and though this profitable result could not be anticipated to occur in less than sixty or seventy years, it appeared too much to abandon even in prospect. A clear statement however from Mr. Nisbett, the principal collector, enabled me to show, that under no circumstance could one half the amount calculated revert to government, the remainder being alienated for ever. It was also clear that if the resolution of government not to admit of adoption was decidedly taken, few estates would be long without an heir, and as I observed in my Minute of 12th November 1829, "Spurious children would be imposed upon government, and no country presents such means of fraud in this particular as India. These frauds I found practised to a great extent throughout Malwa and Rajpootana. They were seldom detected, though it was the interest of the collateral heir to do so. In the present case, no one will have an interest in seeking to reveal the secrets of the Harem, because no one but a direct heir male will be allowed to succeed.

41. "As yet (I added) men have been unwilling to believe we would refuse to admit adoptions, and attempts have not been made to deceive; but let it be decided that they are not to be admitted (and it will be cruel, if not unjust, to keep individuals in doubt on such a point), and every art will be practised to prevent a lapse in the succession. Can it be otherwise, when so many are interested in the event? for our resumption of a large jagheer is a complete revolution among all who have influence or office. The village officers and ryots may remain, but all others are generally displaced."

42. If the principal jagheerdars and others, whose grants depend upon direct heirs male and to whom we deny the right (sacred amongst Hindoos) of adoption, had been admitted on paying Nuzerana, the government of Bombay would this last year have had its treasury enriched with eight or ten lacs of rupees; limited as it is, we have not received a lac and a half. I consider, however, that circumstances gave one of the chiefs, Chintaman Row Putwardin, so full a right to the confirmation of his adoption, that I have not hesitated to give him a letter to that effect, stating that the whole subject being before the Court of Directors was the only ground which led me to refrain from complying with his earnest request, so strongly supported as it was by the facts and claims, and so earnestly recommended

\* The address presented to the Governor at Poona, the day after they heard of the false allegation of the natives of Bombay, relating to their desire to have the jurisdiction of the supreme court extended to the provinces, is a remarkable proof of the value they attach to their condition.  
(445.—VI.)

mended by the political agent. Appah Dessye Nepankur is another case in which leave to adopt cannot, I think, be refused. He is most anxious, from being in very infirm health, and the whole of his country is in a state of agitation, from fear of the consequences that will attend his death.

43. In reference to this chief and Chintaman How, who are the greatest of the jagheer-dars, I have in my remarks on the probable result of the views of the supreme government on this point being adopted, observed, I cannot know how far the supreme government would consider the case of both or either of these chiefs, as exceptions to the operation of the principles they have stated; but it is proper I should here observe, that if either takes place while I am at the head of this Presidency, I shall entreat the Governor-general in Council to pause before he directs the resumption of lands of chiefs who have acted so prominent a part during the last thirty years. Their reputation is known throughout all the southern part of India, and these chiefs, whatever has been their conduct at various periods of their history, have had their names associated with our first successes in the Deccan, having co-operated in 1800 and 1803, as allies of the British troops, and having subsequently, with their numerous dependants, been settled by us in the jagheers they now enjoy.

44. The resumption, on the ground that we are not compelled by treaty to admit of them or their widows adopting a son according to the usages of Hindoos, might be no injustice, but it would nevertheless be deeply injurious to our interest. It would add to the impression, already too common, of our grasping policy. Men who would applaud our seizing upon lands by conquest, or who would not be startled by our arbitrarily imprisoning, or even putting to death those we deem hostile, would consider the annexation during a period of peace of the estates of chiefs above stated to our territories, as an act which violated implied if not direct pledges of favour and protection, and it would bereave of all hope those who held property in land, that was liable under any pretext to be attached by government. The legal right we had to attach such lands in the failure of direct heirs was much dwelt upon; to which I replied, "With respect to the legal rights of the parties proposed to be subject to Nuzerana in this quarter of India, it is a question into which I have never entered. The legal right to lands, power or office of a conquered people, appears to me to be such as the conquerors may choose to continue to them at the period of conquest, or afterwards confer." In examining their claims and rights when brought into discussion, it has ever appeared to me that we were bound to consider more how our acts, words and engagements were received and understood by the native parties concerned, than how they might be interpreted by our strict rules of judging and deciding upon such questions. Reasoning upon this question, I will affirm, that no class of men had more right to expect the consideration that I have proposed should be granted to them, than the principal Mahratta Jagheer-dars. The mode in which they have for thirty years been viewed by the British Government, the manner in which their submission to our authority was received, and the great attention with which they have always been treated by the governor in person and the highest functionaries of government, combined with the leave already granted to numbers to adopt, had, I am sure, conveyed an impression that the estates we left in their possession, however designated, would not be resumed. They judged this question with no reference to legal rights, but to the usages to which they had been habituated; and they expected the same motives which had induced the British Government to confirm them in their estates during a struggle, in which their secession from their prince was of importance, and gave it reputation at a period of victory when peace and order were advanced by acts of grace and generosity, would continue to operate to the benefit of their families, friends and dependants who submitted at the same time they did to our authority. Such, I have not a doubt, were the impressions of these chiefs, and such they continued to entertain till the resumption of the lands of one of the branches of the Poorundaree family created a great sensation; but that has been much allayed, by its being considered a case of doubt whether the adoption of the late chief was complete before he expired, and from their continuing to cherish hopes that the appeal of the family will still meet with attention.

45. The supreme government, from the tenor of their reply, appeared to attach little importance to the jagheer-dars, being obliged to furnish a quota of eleven hundred and fifty horse: this horse, it was concluded from a former Report of Mr. Chaplin, continued in a state of complete inefficiency, and in fact a mere name of a subsidiary. I stated in reply, that such bodies of men were exactly what those by whom they were employed choose to make them, and that I meant to carry into execution an arrangement by which four hundred of them, well commanded, would be constantly on duty with the political agent; and the remainder would be kept up and called for on emergency. With the power we had from treaties to enforce this obligation, I could entertain no doubt of rendering the contingent efficient. It has already become so: and the reports of Mr. Nisbett, of the character and conduct of this body, have fully verified all my anticipations. They are now, as they have been for the last twelvemonth, employed in preserving the general peace of the country.

46. I have asserted that this tax might be greatly extended, and that it would be most productive, and not unpopular. The reasons for these opinions are fully given in my Minute. The payment of Nuzerana is in conformity with ancient and established usage; it is associated with the confirmation of hereditary claims; and as a tax, it is peculiarly appropriate to the actual condition and feelings of a number of the inhabitants of the provinces which have recently become subject to British rule in this quarter of India. The same view of this question has been taken by nearly all the most able revenue officers at this Presidency; but as was to be expected, very different opinions were formed by some of the civil functionaries of other settlements, to whom his Lordship in Council thought proper

to refer the subject for consideration. Some of these saw no prospect of success in the proposed maintenance and reforms in the higher classes of our subjects; others viewed the whole plan as unfavourable, from its interference with the established forms and processes of our courts; while numbers could not anticipate attachment in any class of natives, except those who grew rich and great in our offices and establishments; and the latter looked to create from them a native aristocracy, which all were ready to admit was wanted in our Indian administration.

47. In remarking upon arguments like the above, I have stated, "It is a too common usage to abandon in despair our effort to reform petty princes and chiefs from their idle and lawless habits, and to consider them irreclaimable from their condition to that of good and attached subjects and dependants. There is no branch of our Indian administration in which I have had more experience or have more studied, and I must affirm my belief that we have failed more from causes on which I shall here only shortly remark, than from the impossibility, or indeed difficulty, of effecting the object. We are generally fixed in the belief of our own superiority, and repose too great confidence in our own native servants, to have that patience and forbearance, and to make the allowances that are required for the errors of those we desire to reclaim. We too often expect and enforce a sudden conformity to a system of rule that is opposed to every existing feeling and prejudice of the party from whom it is exacted. Where this is not the case, and a more tolerant system is established, still men's faults and crimes are, from the nature of our government, recorded against them, and men are often, on the statement of an agent who may be inexperienced in such matters, or misinformed, driven to acts of contumacy and opposition to government, and these acts which, according to their knowledge or experience, were but venial offences, are construed by the more severe maxims of our rule into inexpiable crimes. In this mode I have known chief after chief fall before our unbending system. In some parts of our extended dominions, this may have been necessary. I neither mean to impugn the wisdom nor the policy of those who have had to reduce such countries to a state of order, and render their inhabitants (whatever was their rank) subordinate to our principle, and obedient to the very letter of our laws and regulations; but as a desire of avoiding these results has suggested the measures which have been adopted to maintain the superior classes, and particularly the higher jagheerdars in the Deccan; and as I believe these measures, if successful, will ultimately tend to promote the permanent peace and prosperity of this quarter of India, and in so doing to increase, instead of diminishing, our resources, I must contend that peculiar circumstances require that the question, as it affects this Presidency, be decided not as to its general but as to its local merits."

48. The chiefs and natives of rank under this Presidency are not liable to come into collision with our provincial courts of justice, as they have done in other parts of India almost immediately after they recognized our power, and before they could understand or break the forms and principles by which these courts are regulated. Several are wholly exempt from the jurisdiction of the Adawlut. The establishment of the privileged classes has secured to others exemptions in our law proceedings that prevent their pride being offended; and our short and simple code is becoming every day more known, and the way is gradually paving for its more general introduction. Civil suits under this code will be almost entirely in the hands of respectable natives,\* which will greatly tend to our laws becoming popular. From all these causes combined, we may expect that men of the highest rank will soon be reconciled to a system in which we sacrifice so much of form and of our own prejudices to meet theirs. Though several of the great jagheerdars are exempt from the operation of laws, it is provided that their descendants (maintaining their personal privilege) shall become subject to them, but as those who are not exempt, as well as large proprietors, are magistrates within their own estates, they may be pronounced as gradually becoming associated with us in the administration of the country, and no result can tend more to promote the future peace and prosperity of this part of India.

49. These are the grounds on which I must pray the Court of Directors to hesitate before they direct the resumption of the estates of the jagheerdars subject to this Presidency on failures of their heirs male. It is on these grounds that I desire that adoption should be permitted, and Nuzerana taken. I am fearful to disturb the actual condition of the principal countries possessed by these chiefs. I can see no profit to the state from the measure; and I am certain, however lawful we may deem it, we shall suffer greatly in our local reputation, and destroy the fairest prospect I have yet seen in India of not only preserving a high and intelligent aristocracy, but of gaining their attachment by associating them in the administration of the country.

50. I have, in the Minute referred to, enumerated the claims of those high families upon whom the resolution of the supreme government would operate most severely, and shall close these observations with some further extracts from my last Minute on this subject.

51. "I am quite sensible I may be accused by many of mixing on this and other occasions too much of feelings for individuals with questions of policy, but if this is a crime, I can only state it is one to which I attribute much of that success that has attended my efforts in the public service. I have endeavoured through life (and shall as long as I am employed) to mitigate what I deem the evil effects produced by a cold and inflexible policy, which, substituting in almost all cases attention to principles for consideration of persons, runs counter to the feelings and usages of natives. I know the change must take place; but I desire it should be gradual, and I cannot convince myself that either our financial or political

Vide Minute,  
12 Nov. para. 30.

Vide Minute,  
12 Nov. para. 34.

\* Since this Minute was written, they have been made entirely so by a new regulation.  
(445.—VI.)

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Minute of Sir John  
Malcolm, 30 Nov.  
1830.

tical interest will be promoted by the adoption of measures that consign to early extinction the family of the jagheerदार of Vinchoor, or that of a man of rank and character like Balla Sahib Rastia, or Rajah Bahador, and several others belonging to that class, whose estates it is the opinion of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council should be resumed. The revenue to be obtained by this measure would be eventual, and never would be great, and we should lose the impression which our consideration of these chiefs would make upon all classes, and which would be, for reasons stated, particularly useful on the introduction of the Nuzerann on an extended scale.

52. "On all these grounds I must hope, that this class will meet with the liberal consideration of the honourable the Court of Directors, and that they will at least give to the government of this Presidency, a latitude that will enable it to exempt some of the most meritorious from the fate which will otherwise await them. As regards the whole, I think it is to be regretted these chiefs were ever placed in possession of estates not intended to be conferred on their heirs, according to the laws and usages of their tribes; or when this was done, that it was not specifically stated in their grants that no collateral succession or adoption would in any case be admitted, and a resolution taken never to deviate from the rule laid down. Expedience no doubt dictated a reserve which prevented discontent, and particular considerations have led to subsequent deviation from an intended resumption of their tenures; but the future evil resulting from our proceedings in this case will be great. The parties concerned, our native subjects, will only refer it to a cautious policy which seeks to deprive all we can of rank and possessions, but waits an opportunity of effecting its object without danger. These impressions may be unfounded, and our official records will no doubt refute them; but they have prevailed over parts of India on many occasions, and they will, if we resume the estates of the principal Mahratta chiefs, prevail in this quarter. Their tendency is to shake that confidence in our promises, professions and acts, which my experience leads me to believe is beyond all resources essential to our rule in India, both as a means of maintaining peace, and of promoting success in war."

Middle of para. 39-

53. "The points agitated in the course of this Minute are much limited as to local effects, but most important principles have become involved in the discussion. These indeed are connected with considerations of policy, that relate to the present and future welfare of the Indian empire. Various opinions prevail as to the mode in which India can be best governed and maintained. Some look to increase of revenue, from its furnishing the means of paying a great and adequate force, as being the simplest and surest mode of preserving our power; but an army chiefly composed of the natives of the country we desire to keep in subjection may prove a two-edged sword; and besides, history informs us, that though armies are the sole means of conquering a country, they never were the sole or even the chief means of preserving it. Others look to colonization as a source of great strength. India has benefited, and will benefit still further from the introduction into its ports, and some of its most fruitful provinces of the capital, enterprise and science of Europeans; but no sprinkling of our countrymen and their descendants (if allowed to colonize) to which we can ever look, would render them a support upon which we could rely for the preservation of the empire. That must ever depend upon our success in attaching our native subjects, and above all, the higher and more influential classes. The task is for many reasons arduous and difficult, but it must be accomplished, or our empire on its present extended basis will be weak and insecure. No sacrifices can, in my opinion, be too great to effect this object, and it must be pursued with unremitting perseverance in every quarter of our dominions, varying in its mode according to the actual character and situation of the community."

Para. 42.

54. With regard to the effects of this measure upon our local and general interests, it would certainly retard the fulfilment of, if it did not altogether destroy those hopes which we now entertain, of our being able to preserve a native aristocracy in this part of India. The maintenance of the jagheerदारs and sardars in their present stations, besides other advantages, is quite essential to enable us to raise to that rank and consideration we desire those who distinguish themselves in the public service, for if the representatives of the high families, who now belong to the first and second classes of the privileged orders of the Deccan, fall one by one before our system of rule, that institution will lose what gives it value and elevation. The jagheerदारs and sardars are in the estimation of their countrymen an hereditary nobility, to whom proud ancestry and possession of land for successive generations give consequence; and it is the association with them that is prized\* by those whom we raise to inferior grades of the same order. Is not this natural? What is the principal charm of the pageantry in our own country; is it not to be of the same order with the Howards and the Percies? Did the wonderful successes of Buonaparte, or the heroic achievements of his generals, raise them above this feeling? Associations and alliances were sought with conquered princes and impoverished but noble and ancient families. It was in them an extorted compliance with feelings and prejudices, which all the boasted philosophy of the age, have, fortunately for society, not been able to extinguish.

\* I have stated in my Minute how strongly this feeling operated on the recent occasion of investing native officers with the rank of killadars. The seniors were raised to the third class of the privileged classes, and prized it in the highest degree. "I am now," said Subedar Major Purnesra Singh, (one of the oldest and bravest soldiers in the army,) "on a footing with jagheerदारs and sardars."

Appendix, No. 26.

LETTER from the *Bengal Government* to the Court of Directors,  
dated the 15th October 1811.

1. AGREEABLY to the intention expressed in our Address of the 27th July last, we now proceed to bring under the notice of your honourable Court the circumstances connected with the endeavours employed by this government to introduce into the territories of his Excellency the Vizier a reform of the vicious system of his Excellency's administration.

2. Your honourable Court cannot fail to have observed with sentiments of regret and concern, the frequent occasions for the employment of British troops in reducing to obedience the zemindars of the Vizier's territory, who have been represented by his Excellency or by the amils to be refractory. The cause of resistance, on the part of the zemindars, to the authority of the amils has too frequently been the oppressions and undue exactions of the Vizier's officers and the over-assessment of the lands; and the British Government has thus often been required to support, by the aid of its troops, the cause of injustice, and to contribute to the preservation of a system injurious to the real interests of the state, and destructive of the rights, the comfort, and property of the people.

3. Your honourable Court is apprized, by former reports, of the endeavours employed by this government to establish, in concert with the Vizier, an arrangement which should afford the means of investigating the merits of the cause in which our aid was demanded, previously to the actual adoption of coercive measures. But the peculiar character and disposition of the Vizier has rendered those endeavours abortive. Indeed, an effectual remedy for the evil of which we have so much reason to complain would not be afforded even by the success of those endeavours, because the evil exists in the system itself, which, independently of any injustice on the part of the amils, has a tendency to deprive the zemindars and farmers of the means of fulfilling their engagements. A power of inquiry established in the hands of the resident at the Vizier's Court, cannot reach the evils and abuses proceeding from a system of dominion from which the administration of justice is totally excluded, and in which the will of the sovereign, stimulated by a spirit of insatiable rapacity, constitutes the law.

4. The present resident at Lucknow, Major Bailie, has in more than one instance taken the occasion of the employment of our troops on services of the nature above described, to employ all the influence of his representative character, with a view to induce the Vizier to adopt an improved system for the assessment and collection of his revenues in those parts of his territories which were the scenes of disturbance, but his efforts have proved fruitless. We shall advert with some degree of detail to the circumstances of the last occasion, as being the immediate cause of the adoption of those measures which it is the purpose of this Address to report to your honourable Court.

5. In the month of July 1810, the Vizier founded on the report of his amil of Purnauburgh, relative to the refractory conduct of the principal zemindars, a requisition for the aid of our troops, to support the authority of the amil, and to effect the destruction of the fortresses of all the zemindars in the district, a requisition extended with respect to the neighbouring districts of Sultanpore and Dalnaw.

6. The measure properly adopted by the resident on that occasion was to issue instructions to the officers commanding the British troops stationed at Purnauburgh and Sultanpore, directing them to investigate and report upon the merits of the several alleged causes of complaint against the zemindars, the state of the districts, and the character and conduct of the principal landholders, with a view to be prepared to pursue such measures of a military nature as justice might demand when the rainy season should expire. The intentions of the resident, however, were not confined to this object. He judiciously endeavoured to combine with it the accomplishment of a system of reform with regard to those districts which might subsequently be extended to others, and thereby lay a foundation for a general improvement in the administration of the country. The sole object of the Vizier himself was to effect the destruction of all the forts, not only in these districts but throughout his Excellency's dominions, which afforded the zemindars the means of resisting either the just or the unjust demands of the amils. The resident, on the contrary, while he admitted the policy and acquiesced in the proposal of destroying the forts, wisely sought to provide for the future security of the zemindars against oppression and exaction, and for the realization of the dues of government, by ascertaining the real assets of the districts, and founding on a knowledge of them the assessment of the lands to be secured by a triennial settlement.

7. In pursuance of his views, the Vizier, in the course of his correspondence on this subject with the resident, proposed, with reference to the resident's complaint of the neglect of persons already acting in the districts in quality of amees in failing to transmit information regarding the state of the country, that some respectable person should be appointed by his Excellency with suitable assistants, and another person with requisite assistants on the part of the resident, to ascertain the condition and strength of the several forts, the number of armed men with the zemindars, their strong-holds, &c. so that every necessary information regarding the forts being obtained during the rainy season, measures might

Appendix. No. 26.

Letter from the  
*Bengal Government*,  
15 Oct. 1811.  
Oude.

\* For Extracts from the Despatches from home, relative to the affairs of Oude, see p. 336 to 340.  
(445.—VI.) 3 A 3

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Letter from the  
British Govern-  
ment, 16 Oct. 1811.  
Oude.

might with the greater facility be adopted for their demolition when the season for military operations should arrive; proposing at the same time to the consideration of the resident, the expediency of their subsequently proceeding into the districts in question, and there determine on future measures.

8. The resident in his reply, after adverting to the insufficiency of the measures which had already been adopted to ascertain the state of the districts, expressed his intention of selecting some respectable person to accompany another on the part of the Vizier, to ascertain the real condition of the districts, with a view to their future settlement, and stated his readiness to attend the Vizier to the spot at a proper season, and assist him in concluding the settlement; intimating at the same time, that measures should be adopted after the rains for effecting the demolition of the forts by means of troops and a battering train, if intermediate arrangements should not preclude the necessity of pursuing those means.

9. His Excellency the Vizier, in replying to this communication, objected to the resident's proposition of deputed ameens for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the districts with a view to a final settlement of them, observing, that his own proposal went no further than to depute persons for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the forts and the military strength of the zemindars preparatory to the reduction of the former, and that the object proposed by the resident was unnecessary, as ameens were already in the districts.

10. The resident deemed it necessary to report his proceedings at this stage of his negotiations, for the purpose of obtaining the instructions of government. He adverted to the Vizier's perversion of the object of deputed ameens, and observed, that the limited purpose proposed by the Vizier would render that measure nugatory. That if it was the wish of government that the whole of the fortresses in the Vizier's dominions be destroyed, with a view to the permanent tranquillity of the country and the easy realization of its revenue, without reference to the conduct of his Excellency's amils or zemindars, there appeared to be no necessity for an investigation of the causes of disorder in the districts of Purtaubgurh, Sultanpore, and Dalmow; and he conceived that the employment of the disposable force already stationed at Sultanpore and Purtaubgurh, with the aid of a battering train from Elahabad, would answer every purpose of the Vizier's present requisition in the course of a few months of the ensuing cold season. But if the expediency of the repeated destruction of forts in his Excellency's dominions, which past experience had proved that the neglect or venality of his amils might soon recall into existence, independently of the consideration of justice towards the landholders by whom those fortresses were erected for the purposes of self-defence against the rapine and extortion of the amils, were a question of doubt, there seemed strong ground to insist on the measure of deputing the ameens on this occasion, in the hope of accomplishing every just object of the Vizier's government, without engaging in extensive military operations, from the result of which no permanent benefit could be expected under the present system of the Vizier's administration.

11. The resident proceeded to state, that it was at the same time but justice to observe, that the Vizier had lately appeared to be fully sensible of the ruinous consequences of the system of farming his revenues, in the manner hitherto practised, to persons totally unworthy of trust, and that a considerable portion of his dominions was then under the management of ameens, whose instructions had been prepared, at the resident's suggestion, in terms very similar to those adopted in the Company's territories. That a proclamation against the construction of repair of fortresses, under a heavy penalty, and in terms suggested by the resident, had been circulated to most, if not all of the amils and principal landholders in the country; and that his Excellency had repeatedly recognized and acquiesced in a declaration of the resident's, that no future requisition for the reduction of a fortress already taken and destroyed, or made over to an amil, by the exertions of a British force, should under any circumstances be complied with, save as a voluntary concession on the part of the British Government, not implied by even the spirit of its engagements.

12. On the other hand, the resident remarked, that the precarious expectation of any permanent salutary effects from the measures which had been thus recently adopted at his suggestion, by no means appeared to warrant an immediate decision in favour of the Vizier's requisition for the reduction of all the forts in his dominions, or even in the district of Purtaubgurh, without an investigation into the state of the country in the manner which he (the resident) had proposed.

13. In reply to this communication, the resident was informed that government entirely approved his suggestion to the Vizier on the subject of the ameens; that it was left, however, at his discretion, to urge the adoption of the measure, when he should have received the reports which he had called for from the commanding officers in Purtaubgurh and Sultanpore; that government at the same time was by no means prepared, as the alternative of the suggested measure, to acquiesce in the perverted object of it proposed by the Vizier; and that, with regard to the question of destroying the forts, the only determination government was at present disposed to form was, that they should be destroyed in cases in which the possessors had taken advantage of them to resist the just authority of the state, and compelled the employment of our troops to enforce their obedience.

14. The reports furnished by Lieutenant-colonel Samuel Palmer, commanding in Purtaubgurh, relative to the conduct of the principal zemindars, in conformity to the resident's instructions, represented them generally in a state of disobedience, and appeared to justify the orders which the resident in consequence issued to Lieutenant-colonel Palmer and the officer commanding in Sultanpore, to proceed to the destruction of the forts in the three districts, of which he transmitted a list of twenty-two, calling at the same time for a battering train from Elahabad. But Lieutenant-colonel Palmer was also directed by the resident to mediate an adjustment of the demands of the amils on the zemindars, without relinquishing the

the object of destroying the forts; an object which the Vizier continued to urge, although with views different from those of the resident, who was anxious to combine with that desirable measure such a settlement of the country as would deprive the zemindars of the only plea on which they could justify a claim to the possession of their forts.

15. This contrariety of views formed the subject of a long and vexatious correspondence between the Vizier and the resident, the general outline of which it will be proper to trace. But as no difference of opinion existed with regard to the expediency of destroying the forts in the three refractory districts, that service was undertaken and pursued with success, and without resistance on the part of the zemindars, but not without difficulties and delays, arising from the negligence or inactivity of the Vizier's officers in furnishing supplies to the British troops and materials for the demolition of the forts.

16. That part of the resident's correspondence with the Vizier to which we have above alluded, commenced by his Excellency's requesting the resident to suggest some plan for the restoration of order in the three districts, and to state his opinion regarding the expediency of his Excellency's proceeding thither in person, or deputed Hukeem Mehdee Alee Khan to settle the affairs of the districts. Mehdee Alee Khan, it may be proper to observe, is amil of Khyrabad and Mohomdee, districts in the northern quarter of the Vizier's territories, and the most able and intelligent of his Excellency's amils.

17. In reply, the resident very properly observed, that if the Vizier's object was merely the punishment of the refractory zemindars and the reduction of their forts, neither his Excellency's presence in the districts, nor the deputation of Mehdee Alee Khan was necessary. That neither would his Excellency's progress through the districts be attended with any advantage, if it was his intention, in the future arrangements for those districts, to revert to the original system of consigning them to farmers, nor in the case of his Excellency's determining to retain them aumancee, that is, under charge of officers appointed by the Government, if he intrusted the settlement of the lands to the whildars then in employment. But, on the other hand, if his Excellency proposed to make a settlement of that portion of his dominions in the manner adopted in the Company's territories, his Excellency's presence in the districts was certainly advisable, and might prove beneficial in the highest degree.

18. With respect to the deputation of Mehdee Alee Khan (meaning as the alternative of the Vizier's proceeding to the districts in question), the resident discouraged it on the ground of the apparent impracticability of his taking charge of the affairs of those districts with effect, in addition to the charge he already held in a distant quarter of his Excellency's dominions.

19. In a subsequent letter, however, written after a personal conference with the Vizier on the subject of it, the resident founded partly on the tenor of that conference, and partly on the receipt of intelligence from Colonel Palmer regarding the disinclination or inability of the amils to furnish supplies and other necessities for the troops, a proposition for the deputation of Mehdee Alee Khan to the districts in question, for the purpose of collecting the necessary supplies in the first instance, and for other important purposes; alluding, as subsequently explained by the resident, principally to an investigation into the state of the districts and their real assets, with a view to a future final settlement. The Vizier, however, interpreted this proposition to be the deputation of Mehdee Alee Khan merely for the purpose of collecting supplies for the troops, and on that ground withheld his consent; and notwithstanding the resident's subsequent explanation, his Excellency persevered in giving that construction to the resident's proposition, until at length, by drawing from Mehdee Alee Khan a declaration of his inability to undertake the additional duty suggested for him by the resident, the project was necessarily abandoned, and another person, named Mohumud Ashraf, appointed for the purpose.

20. The real motive of the Vizier's conduct on this occasion was, we are satisfied, that to which we have already adverted, namely, his Excellency's disinclination to any arrangement which would lead to a just and moderate assessment of the lands, founded on a review of their real assets, on principles consistent with the prosperity and happiness of his subjects, and calculated to deprive him of the profits arising from the injurious system of arbitrary assessment, and from the confiscation of the property of defaulting farmers and collectors, which had so long prevailed throughout his Excellency's dominions; and to deprive the zemindars and other landholders of the means of resisting the exactions and oppressions necessarily proceeding from this vicious system of administration, has been the sole object of his Excellency's solicitude for the destruction of their forts. The object of the resident, on the other hand, has been (as we have already observed) in depriving the zemindars of the means of resistance, to remove the causes which have excited it, by determining and permanently securing their rights and the rights of the state, through the medium of a fixed and guaranteed assessment.

21. In pursuance of this salutary project, the resident, in the course of his correspondence with the Vizier, and previously to the appointment of Mohumud Ashraf, availed himself of the desire expressed by the Vizier, that he should suggest what appeared to him to be advisable for the settlement of affairs in the districts of Purtaubgurih, Sultanpore, and Dalmow, to convey to his Excellency several distinct propositions directed to that object, the detail of which it seems proper to insert in this place. Those propositions were as follow:—

1st. That an able and intelligent man (if not Mehdee Alee Khan, some other person) should be immediately appointed by his Excellency, and deputed to provide for the necessary supplies for the troops, to make inquiry regarding the fortresses and other strong-holds of the zemindars, to give timely and regular information to the commanding officer, to ascertain the revenue of the districts and what the talookas were capable of yielding at a fair and moderate valuation; in short, to obtain and furnish to his Excellency every degree of necessary information with a view to the final settlement of the districts.



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2d. That a proclamation should be issued in the districts in the terms of a draft which the resident submitted to the Vizier, and which was to the following effect:—

"Be it known to the zemindars, talookdars, &c. &c. in the mughals of Sultanpore, Purtaubgurh, and Manickpore Behar, that whereas, with a view to the security, happiness and prosperity of all my subjects in these districts, I have now directed a triennial settlement at a moderate assessment to be made, commencing with the Fusly year 1218, that so the zemindars and ryots being secure from the unjust exactions of amils and mootsajars (farmers) may with confidence cultivate their lands and labour for the increase of the revenues: and whereas it is obvious that, under this arrangement, there can be no occasion whatever for the protection of forts or strong-holds of any description in the possession of the zemindars, many of whom have been proved to take advantage of the forts in their possession, for the purpose of resisting authority and withholding the revenues of the sircar, which conduct on their parts has frequently induced other zemindars to act in a similar manner, to the great injury of the government; therefore it has now been resolved, that no zemindar in my dominions shall be permitted to retain a fortress or strong-hold of any description in his possession, and that in the same manner as the fortresses, ghurries and other strong-holds in the zillahs of Baraich and Koowase have been destroyed and levelled to the ground, the forts in the districts of Purtaubgurh, &c., shall also be taken and levelled, but that the zemindars of the districts in question shall be permitted, without molestation or objection, to retain or construct and inhabit their houses, gardens and inclosures, whether *kutchas* or *tucks*, and of whatever extent or description.

"You are accordingly hereby required to surrender and make over to Colonel Palmer, commanding the British troops in Purtaubgurh, whatever fortress or ghurry you may possess, without delay, opposition or hesitation; and in this case every favour will be shown to you, your balances of revenue for all preceding years till the end of the Fusly year 1216 will be forgiven, and no demand on account of those years shall be made; but in case of your disobedience to this order, and the reduction of your fortresses by force of arms, no forgiveness nor exemption shall be granted, your forts and habitations shall be destroyed, and yourselves shall be expelled from your zemindaries."

The third proposition related to the remission of balances up to the end of the year 1216 Fusly, as stated in the proclamation, and was to this effect. That as the districts in question had been for many years in the hands of farmers, and the zemindars and inhabitants of them at large had been long subjected to unjust exactions and oppression, in addition to which it was difficult, if not impracticable, to ascertain the true amount of arrears of revenue for preceding years, the resident suggested that the balances of all former years, till the end of the Fusly year 1216, should be remitted to the zemindars of the three districts in question, and also of the district of Akbarpore, and that no demands should be made on account of the balances of those years.

The fourth proposition related to the formation of the triennial settlement, as noticed also in the proclamation, and was stated as follows. That a triennial settlement should be concluded with all the zemindars of the districts, which would prevent the necessity of his Excellency the Vizier's marching every year, or of detaching the British troops to assist the amils in their settlements. That as this settlement would also involve the specification of a fixed time for the payment of every instalment of the revenue of each year, the outstanding balances would be at all times clearly ascertained, and there would be no trouble, as heretofore, in investigating the justice of the amil's demands from the zemindars. That the zemindars, too, would have confidence in the government, and would occupy themselves in the cultivation of their lands, the revenue of the state would be increased, and the people contented and happy.

The fifth proposition suggested his Excellency the Vizier's fixing a period for his stay in each of the districts to be comprehended in his proposed tour, and his issuing injunctions to his officers, under a penalty, to conclude the settlement with the zemindars within a given period, and to the zemindars, under a penalty also, to come to a settlement within the same time: and with a view to facilitate the execution of the suggested orders, the resident proposed that a scheme of the settlement of each district, under the signature of the chowdries and canoonges and the seal of the ameen, should be submitted to his Excellency before his arrival in the district.

22. These propositions occasioned a voluminous correspondence between the Vizier and the resident, in the course of which his Excellency, although professing to be guided by the resident's advice, endeavoured to evade the ultimate object of them, by withholding his consent to the deputation of a person vested with the requisite powers and instructions to collect the information, and supply the materials necessary for the conclusion of the triennial settlement on just and moderate terms. His Excellency met that article of the resident's propositions, by announcing his intention to depute an officer of his government merely for purposes connected with the supply of the troops and the destruction of the forts, referring the resident to a former letter, in which his Excellency had signified that the amils must be left to decide on the real amount of the revenue and the capacity of the lands; and that if after the amil's decision any person proved refractory and refused to satisfy the just claims of the state, the commanding officer of the British troops should be instructed to act against him. His Excellency maintained the impracticability of framing a scheme of the settlement such as the resident had suggested, and signified to him that if he desired to know what the districts were capable of yielding, his Excellency would inform him, as soon as it could be ascertained by the papers which might hereafter be sent by the amils,

23. His Excellency resisted also the proposition for the remission of balances, but expressed his concurrence in the expediency of the triennial settlement.

24. It is unnecessary to describe the various points of discussion which formed the subject of this correspondence and of frequent conferences with the Vizier, and it is sufficient to state, that the resident finally succeeded in obtaining his Excellency's consent to most of the propositions which had been submitted to him. His Excellency actually issued the suggested proclamation, and appointed an officer (Mohummud Ashruf above mentioned) with the requisite powers, and with instructions conformable to the resident's recommendation.

25. In the meantime the battering train having arrived, Lieutenant-colonel Palmer proceeded with the British troops into the districts, to execute his orders relative to the suppression of the refractory zamindars and the demolition of the forts. His operations, although continually impeded by the negligence or inefficiency of the amils, were conducted with success and without any opposition.

26. For the details of the preceding concise and imperfect narrative, we beg leave to refer your honourable Court to the despatches from the resident which will be found recorded on the proceedings noted in the margin.\*

27. We deem it proper, however, to bring more particularly under the notice of your honourable Court a despatch from the resident dated the 5th of December, recorded as per margin, as representing the condition of affairs in his Excellency's country, and his Excellency's conduct in a point of view that appeared urgently to call for the interposition of this Government in support of the measures which the resident had so laudably, but, as it ultimately proved, vainly pursued, to effect a reform in his Excellency's internal administration.

28. We have stated above, that the Vizier had at length been induced to acquiesce in the resident's propositions, and had deputed Mohummud Ashruf into the districts of Purtaubgurh, &c. with powers and instructions conformable to the resident's suggestions. It soon appeared, however, that Mohummud Ashruf totally perverted the object of his mission; that instead of adopting measures to ascertain the real assets and condition of the districts, with a view to the relief of the zamindars and farmers from the excessive demands and extortions to which they had so long been exposed, to the ruin and disturbance of the country, and to the conclusion of a triennial settlement on just and moderate terms, Mohummud Ashruf acted as if deputed for the sole purpose of increasing the revenues, by exacting even larger sums from the zamindars than they had hitherto been accustomed to pay. This was sufficiently evident from an address of Mohummud Ashruf himself to the Vizier, a translation of which formed an enclosure in the resident's despatch. In a remonstrance which on this occasion the resident addressed to the Vizier, he justly remarked, that from Mohommud Ashruf's own report, it was evident "that nothing but oppression to the ryots, disputes between Mohommud Ashruf and the zamindars, and finally disorder in the country, could be expected from his deputation. That the views which the resident had entertained, and for the satisfactory accomplishment of which both the Vizier and he had laboured so long and had held so many unpleasant discussions during a period of five months, must be entirely and inevitably frustrated, and that no satisfactory arrangement could now be made in the current year."

29. In thus reporting the failure of his endeavours to effect a beneficial arrangement with regard to the districts of Purtaubgurh, Sultanpore, and Dalmow, the resident brought under the notice of Government the condition of the extensive territories formerly under the charge of the late Almass Alee Khan, to which we have already briefly adverted.

30. The resident represented the state of these territories in the following words:—"The districts which were occupied by that amil (Almass Alee Khan), yielding an annual revenue of about thirty lacs of rupees, had been transferred immediately on his death, in opposition to my wishes and suggestions, to the eunuch Rohmut Alee Khan, Almass's nominal brother, whose failure in the payment of the revenue occasioned his removal and disgrace in the course of a few months, and the subsequent transfer of the districts on similar terms to a person named Mirza Jân, the adopted son of Almass, who has also necessarily failed to fulfil his engagements to the government, and is now under personal restraint for balances which can never be liquidated, and the demand of a large portion of which is, in my opinion, unjust and oppressive."

31. The resident proceeded to state, that on the occasion of the death of Almass Alee Khan, and on the two subsequent occasions of the transfer of the districts which he farmed to his nominal brother and son, at the exorbitant rate of his engagements, the resident suggested in strong terms to the Vizier the impropriety of his consigning so large a portion of his dominions to any individual amil, more particularly to the dependants of Almass, and the expediency of his appointing a number of trustworthy persons as ameens, to investigate and report upon the real state of the districts and the condition of the landholders and peasantry, with a view to a beneficial arrangement for the future management of the country; but that a compliance with the resident's suggestions was evaded by his Excellency upon grounds which precluded the resident from continuing to urge the point. The resident added, that the territories which had thus been farmed by Almass, Rohmut Alee Khan, and Mirza Jân, in succession, had now been parcelled out to a number of petty zamindars.

\* Consultation, 16th August, 25th September, 4th October, 10th November, and 20th December 1810.

† Consultation, 25th December 1810.

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farmers, without any reduction of the terms, and under circumstances which precluded the possibility of the due realization of the revenue, without the gradual devastation of the lands and the ruin of the landholder and peasantry.

31. The resident reported, that he had again set before the Vizier the ruinous consequences of those measures, and had predicted to his Excellency the speedy removal and impotence of a majority, if not all, of the newly appointed amils, whose personal wealth only, and by no means their capacity for the trust, had induced their nomination. The resident further observed to the Vizier, with great justice, that individual wealth among his subjects, and the sources from which it was derived, were now nearly at an end and must very shortly be exhausted; and that ultimately, when the soil of his dominions, and the industrious cultivators of that soil, should form the only sources of his revenues, he would find the first to be totally unproductive, and would search for the latter in vain.

32. The resident continued in his despatch his report of the substance of additional remarks and remonstrances on the same subject, in the course of which he had suggested to his Excellency the justice of remitting a portion of the balances, and had repeated his earnest advice that a system so ruinous should be immediately corrected.

33. The resident, after noticing the failure of all his remonstrances, concludes with the following observation:—"His Excellency's leading passion of avarice, and all its concomitant evils, have, as is natural, increased with his age; and the reluctance and impatience with which he ever listened to remonstrance against the inordinate gratification of this passion, or against any other unjust measure of his government, have lately arisen to a degree of peevishness and irritation, which renders the efficient conduct of the duties of my station at his court, combined with the observances and offices of personal respect and conciliation, a great deal more difficult than before."

34. As an instance of the truth of this latter remark, the resident took this occasion to report to government that the Vizier having recently evinced a design to take advantage of the change of his system with regard to the districts of Almaza, by whom and his successors in office the jagier of Tujummool Hoosein Khan (the son of the late celebrated Tufuzool Hoosein Khan) had been farmed, for the purpose of converting this jagier into an annual pension, to the manifest loss of the jagiendar, he (the resident) considered it to be his duty to remonstrate against the execution of this design in the most urgent terms, and to state to his Excellency the impropriety of his adopting any new measures with regard to the jagier, without the previous sanction of the British Government, at whose instance it was originally granted to Tufuzool Hoosein Khan, and subsequently confirmed in the possession of his only son and representative.

35. This remonstrance, however, only produced on the part of the Vizier an avowal of his intention to commute the jagier, and an ungenerous complaint against the support afforded by the British Government to Tujummool Hoosein Khan and others in a similar predicament; alluding principally to the protection afforded to that person by this government on the occasion of the calumnious accusation of an attempt against the Vizier's life, the particulars of which were reported to your honourable Court in the Governor-general in Council's address of the 4th August 1809. The resident repelled this unjust insinuation with proper spirit, but deemed it necessary to call for instructions on the question of opposing the resumption of the jagier. The resident also desired instructions with regard to the propriety of his more active interference for the protection of the dependants of Almaza Alee Khan, in their character of amils, against the unjust demands of the Vizier.

36. The Governor-general in Council deemed the present a fit occasion for calling on his Excellency the Vizier to fulfil that article of the treaty of 1801, by which he engaged to "establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration to be carried into effect by his own officers as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants." The efforts of the resident had fruitlessly been employed, as we have shown in the preceding part of this despatch, to lay a foundation for a general reform, by introducing it into those districts, for the tranquillization of which his Excellency the Vizier had required the aid of our troops, and he had in vain endeavoured to persuade his Excellency to abrogate that ruinous system of farming which prevailed in the extensive territories formerly managed by the late Almaza Alee Khan. The alternative, therefore, was left to the British government, of acquiescing in the failure of those efforts, and thereby encouraging the Vizier in a resistance to the legitimate counsels of the resident, and sanctioning by its silence the continuance of a vicious and oppressive system of administration, which government had so long upheld by the unavoidable employment of its troops in the suppression of disorders, the consequence of that system, or to aim at the removal of those evils by a direct interposition of that weight and influence which it is entitled to possess and to employ by the nature of the connexion between the two states and by the express provisions of treaty.

37. The Governor-general in Council could have no hesitation in adopting the latter course of proceeding. The necessary instructions were accordingly issued to the resident at Lucknow, under date the 28th of December 1810, accompanied by a suitable letter from the Governor-general to the address of his Excellency the Vizier.

38. The Governor-general commenced this address by referring to recent transactions, and to the negotiations which had passed between the Vizier and the resident; and which the conduct of his Excellency's officers, of the very persons whose duty it was to carry into effect the measures recommended by the resident and acquiesced in by his Excellency, had rendered abortive. His Lordship then proceeded to advert to the evils and errors of the existing system of the administration of the revenue in the Vizier's dominions; to the almost

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annual employment of British troops in suppressing disorders occasioned by the prevalence of that system; to the consequent right and duty of the British Government to inquire into the sources of this evil, and to urge the adoption of such a system of measures as, in the judgment of that Government, was calculated to counteract it, without injury to the rights and authority of his Excellency.

39 The Governor-general next adverted to the obligation imposed on the Vizier by the sixth article of the treaty of 1801 to reform the system of his administration, referring also to a supplemental agreement resulting from the late Governor-general Marquis Wellesley's personal conferences with his Excellency in the year 1802, by which the Vizier engaged to advise with the British Government and to conform to its counsels, in the establishment of an improved system of administration within the reserved territories, and also in all affairs connected with the ordinary government of those territories, and with the usual exercise of his Excellency's established authority.

40 His Lordship having next adverted to the actual exercise of this right of counsel throughout the legitimate organ of the British representative at his Excellency's Court, to the failure of the resident's endeavours to accomplish the object of it, and to the duty consequently devolving upon his Lordship to interpose, in the form of a direct address, the earnest advice and recommendation of the British Government on this important subject, proceeded to point out more particularly the causes of the evils and abuses prevailing in the administration.

41. His Lordship observed, that those evils and abuses arose principally from the destructive practice of assigning the charge of the collections to persons who offered the highest terms; from the uncertain tenure by which the amils held the charge of their respective districts, from the violation of the engagements contracted between the amils, zemindars, under-renters, and ryots; from the arbitrary and oppressive exactions which pervaded the whole system of the revenue through every gradation, from the amil to the ryot; from the defective and injudicious constitution of that system and the injurious mode of making the collections; that it was solely to the prevalence of these defective and destructive system of administration, that the refractory disposition of the zemindars, the failure of the amils and farmers in the execution of their engagements, the existence of heavy balances, and all the disorders which so frequently required the employment of troops, were to be attributed.

42. Having then stated that these evils could alone be remedied by an essential change in the system of assessment, management of collection, his Lordship proceeded to trace the outline of a plan of reform which he recommended to his Excellency's adoption, and of which the following composed the fundamental principles, viz. a just and moderate assessment; a settlement for a term of years; the conclusion of engagements, by gradation, from the amil to the ryot, and the guarantee of those engagements by the authority of the state.

43. For the details of this scheme of reform, as far as the Governor-general in Council deemed it necessary to describe them in a letter to the Vizier's address, we beg leave to refer your honourable Court to the record of that document which is entered on the proceedings of the date noted in the margin.

44. Your honourable Court will observe, that the Governor-general in his letter to the Vizier had not adverted to that branch of administration, without which no arrangement for the due management of the revenues can ever be completely efficient, namely, the establishment of tribunals of justice for the protection of the lives and property of the subjects, for the detection and punishment of crimes, for the redress of grievances, and for the adjustment of disputed claims. The Governor-general in Council was withheld from introducing that subject, by his unwillingness to press at once upon his Excellency's attention too many objects of reform, and thereby diminish the hope of his regard to any; but the resident was instructed to bring that important subject under discussion also at a proper season.

45. As affording a striking instance of the evils of the existing system of the Vizier's administration, the Governor-general took occasion to introduce the subject of the lands held by the late Almaas Allee Khan, noticing the salutary but unsuccessful counsel of the resident with regard to the future management of those lands, pointing out the ruinous consequences of the system, and combining with the discussion an appeal to the Vizier in favour of the dependants of Almaas Allee Khan; referring his Excellency, however, to the resident, to whom particular instructions on these points had been issued.

46. The Governor-general added his earnest request, that the Vizier would give his serious and immediate attention to the accomplishment of the object of reform; an object in every respect so important to his Excellency's interests, his reputation, the prosperity and tranquillity of his country, and the comfort and happiness of his subjects; in which salutary work, his Lordship informed him, the resident would be prepared, under instructions issued to him for that purpose, to afford to his Excellency every degree of assistance and support.

47. The Governor-general concluded his address by adverting to the Vizier's declared intention of commuting the jagier of Tujummool Hoosein Khan for a stipend, and to the claims to every degree of favour and indulgence which the family of the late Tufuzzool Hoosein Khan possessed on his Excellency and the Company, and by soliciting the Vizier in the strongest terms to abstain from the prosecution of a measure so injurious to the interests of Tujummool Hoosein Khan.

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48. The instructions issued to the resident on this occasion commenced with a communication of the Governor-general in Council's entire approbation of the whole of the resident's proceedings, as reported in his despatches. After expressions of regret at the failure of the resident's zealous and laudable endeavours to induce the Vizier to commence the work of reform, the motives and the necessity of the direct interference of government were stated to the following effect: that its interests were too deeply concerned in the reform of the present vicious system of administration in his Excellency's dominions to permit the Governor-general in Council tacitly to acquiesce in its continuance; that to the evils and abuses of that system, to the oppression and injustice which naturally flowed from it, were principally to be ascribed those disorders which the British troops were so frequently employed to suppress; that this government had ever viewed with painful regret the employment of its troops in services of this nature, the general tendency of which had necessarily been to uphold and encourage those acts of violence, injustice, and extortion, which a system erroneous in its principle and oppressive in its operation could not fail to engender.

49. That it concerned the reputation of the British government, therefore, as well as its interest, to interpose the weight of its influence, for the introduction of a reform which might relieve us from the imputation of being the instruments of oppression and injustice, of perpetuating the practical gradation of evils and abuses which, unsupported by the military power of the Company, would speedily produce their natural consequences, successful resistance to the authority of the Vizier, and general anarchy and confusion throughout his Excellency's dominions.

50. A reference being then made to an enclosed copy of the letter to the Vizier for a knowledge of the arrangement recommended by government for the reform of the administration, it was observed, that adverting to the character and established habits of the Vizier, the Governor-general in Council did not entertain very sanguine hopes that either the proposed arrangement would be carried into complete effect, or that the engagements which might be concluded under it would be faithfully adhered to. That it was to be apprehended his Excellency would not be induced to accede to the terms of a just and moderate assessment; to sacrifice, for the hope of some permanent but distant benefit, any prospect, however fallacious, of immediate pecuniary profit. That while he acquiesced in the expediency of the plan, he would interpose obstacles to its efficient execution, and that its operation would be in a great measure defeated, by practices and abuses which the ordinances of a wise and well constituted government, or a strong and steady principle of justice in the governing power, was alone capable of restraining.

51. That at the same time, however, even a defective execution of the plan would be attended with some advantage. That the engagements which might be concluded would at least form a criterion by which to judge of the merits of complaints of oppression, to regulate demands, to afford relief, or to inflict punishment, and that some foundation would be laid for the gradual improvement of the system of administration. That at all events, this government discharged a positive duty, by employing its efforts for the correction of evils affecting its own interests, the interest of humanity and justice, those of the Vizier and his subjects, and the prosperity and tranquillity of his dominions; and that government preserved, by asserting and exercising it, that right of interference, which by disuse might prescriptively be lost or essentially impaired, and which if not on the present, might on some future occasion be efficiently exercised.

52. These observations were followed by directions conveying to the resident some latitude of deviation from the precise plan of arrangement recommended to the Vizier, but requiring an adherence to its fundamental principles.

53. Although the Governor-general in Council was aware that both the state of the Vizier's country and his Excellency's views and dispositions were entirely adverse to the success of a proposition for the introduction of that most efficient and beneficial of all systems of reform, a permanent settlement of the land revenue, yet his Lordship in Council deemed it advisable to state some remarks on its peculiar applicability to the condition of a government, which by its dependent connexion with another, was not subject to great occasional increase of charge by war, and the expenses of which, therefore, might themselves be considered as permanently fixed; and to express to the resident our opinion, that it should be an object of our policy gradually to bring it about, and that government could not employ the influence which it had a right to exercise over the affairs of Oude either more usefully or more worthily, than first in promoting the general improvement of the internal administration of that country (which was the purpose of the present measures), and subsequently in introducing, if possible, at a proper season, that radical principle of prosperity, both to government and people, the permanent settlement of its land revenues.

54. The cause which induced the Governor-general in Council to abstain from recommending in the letter to the Vizier the establishment of regular tribunals of justice was then noticed to the resident, with an intimation, however, that as a system of judicial administration was intimately connected with the efficient operation of the proposed arrangement for the assessment and realization of the revenues, it was necessary that the resident should be prepared, at a convenient season, to urge this important topic to the Vizier; and, with this view, the Governor-general in Council deemed it proper, in the instructions to the resident, to trace the general outlines and principles of the system of judicial administration which should be recommended to his Excellency's adoption, although little hope, it was observed, could be entertained that his Excellency would ever be induced to adopt it more than partially, if to adopt it at all.

55. For the details of this projected system which was founded on the general principles of

of the British laws and regulations, we beg leave to refer your honourable Court to the record of the instructions to the resident, which will be found as noted in the margin.\*

56. With regard to the two points on which the resident had specifically desired the orders of government, he was informed that his advice and remonstrances to the Vizier on both those points were entirely approved, and he was directed to renew his representations under the express sanction of government. It was observed, at the same time, that our right to demand the adoption of more just and lenient proceedings, with regard to the unfortunate family of Almass Alee Khan, than those which his Excellency had hitherto pursued, was more questionable than that which we possessed, and were bound indeed by every obligation of justice to exercise, of securing the family of the late Tufuzool Hoosen Khan from the effects of his Excellency's disposition to injure their condition, and the resident was therefore directed distinctly to signify to the Vizier, that the British Government considered itself as the guarantee of their rights derived from his predecessor, and could not acquiesce in any violation of them.

57. Before we notice the resident's reports of his proceedings under the foregoing instructions, it is proper to advert to the substance of his intermediate communications, received subsequently to the despatch of those instructions, the execution of which was necessarily delayed until the resident's receipt of the Governor-general's letter to the Vizier, the preparation of which, in the Persian language, occupied a considerable time.

58. Those communications will be found recorded as per margin†. They report the successful progress of the peaceable surrender and destruction of the fortresses in the districts of Purtaubgurh and Dalnaw, the consequence not only of the imposing presence of the force under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Palmer, but of the faith reposed in the proclamation issued at the suggestion of the resident, as already described. But the confidence of the zemindars in the wise and lenient measures announced in the proclamation appears to have been disturbed, and the obligation of that instrument to have been violated by the proceedings of Mohummud Ashruf (whose conduct has already been substantially noticed) in the temporary settlement of the districts to which he was deputed. His conduct was reported to the resident by Lieutenant-colonel Palmer in the following terms:—

"I am under the painful necessity of making known to you that contrary to the tenor of the Vizier's proclamation that the lands in this province shall be assessed at such reasonable rates as to render the payment of the revenues easy to the subject, his Excellency's agent, Mohummud Ashruf, has lately, in various instances which have come to my knowledge, imposed the most burthensome and highest possible terms on many of the zemindars; and I have the mortification to perceive, that the presence of the British detachment under my command is made use of solely, though under other pretences, to intimidate such persons as venture a remonstrance, into an agreement to conclude a settlement at the most exorbitant rates.

"The obvious consequences of which behaviour of the commissioner are a renewal of those discontents which have so long prevailed, and which the assurances contained in his Excellency's proclamation in a great measure caused to subside, a total distrust in such proclamations in future, and the difficulty which will attend the collection of the revenue, if the payment of it should not be altogether refused or evaded."

59. His Excellency the Vizier, at the instance of the resident, issued instructions to Mohummud Ashruf, directing him to abstain from demanding excessive rates of revenue; but we are compelled to admit the belief, that the conduct of that officer had the private sanction of his Excellency himself, who, while professing to act in conformity to the resident's advice, and at this very time giving him reason to expect the early receipt of a scheme of a triennial settlement for the districts to which Mohummud Ashruf was deputed, which however has never been furnished, was very capable of promoting measures of an opposite tendency.

60. The communications from the resident to which we have above referred, also report the extension of disorders to the district of Touda, and the consequent necessity of directing a detachment of the British troops to proceed into that district, for the purpose of quelling them and of destroying the forts. Disturbances, also, nearly at the same time, broke out in the districts of Jugdeespore. On this subject the resident stated the following observations, which we cite as being calculated, in conjunction with the facts and circumstances already noticed, to elucidate the character of the Vizier's administration and his Excellency's personal disposition.

"It is worthy of particular remark, that the district of Jugdeespore is one of those which were long under the management of the late Almass Alee Khan, and recently farmed by his adopted son, Mirza Jan, and that the present farmer, Hyder Alee, is the grandson of a person named Fyzoolah, who was treasurer to the late Almass Alee Khan, and is now under personal restraint, on a vague suspicion of his possessing some portion of the wealth of Almass.

"That his Excellency the Vizier has in his view the appropriation of all the wealth of Fyzoolah, either by the measures of personal rigour which are now practised against the unfortunate treasurer himself, or by the process of imprisonment and confiscation to be hereafter pursued against his grandson for failure in his engagements as an aumil, cannot reasonably be

\* Consultations, 28th December 1810.

† Consultations, 9th and 23d February, and 9th and 15th March.

be doubted; and that the supposed wealth of Fynoolah, and not the capacity of Hyder Alee for the trust which is now in his hands, was the cause of this amil's nomination, is, in my mind, an unquestionable fact."

61. In replying to the Vizier's application for the employment of the British troops to suppress the disorders in Jugdeespore, the resident observed to his Excellency, that as the amil of that district was one of those persons against whose nomination to the charge of the district which he farmed the resident had some time since remonstrated to his Excellency in earnest terms, on the grounds of his unfitness for the office, and as there was every reason to believe that the disturbances excited in Jugdeespore had arisen from the amil's mismanagement, the employment of the British troops on that occasion might, with apparent justice, have been delayed till a due investigation had taken place into the causes of these commotions; yet, as it appeared that the zemindars had rebelliously opposed the amil and killed and wounded several of his Excellency's subjects, the resident considered their punishment to be necessary, and had issued instructions accordingly.

62. Your honourable Court will observe, in the circumstances above detailed, an additional instance of a requisition (and the necessity of complying with it) for the aid of the Company's troops in suppressing disorders, which the vices of the Vizier's system of management, combined with the unfortunate propensities of his Excellency's disposition, have alone occasioned; and your honourable Court will infer from it the urgency of the motives which demanded an effort, on the part of your government, to effect a reform of the existing administration.

63. We now proceed to advert to the resident's discussions and correspondence with the Vizier on the subject of the general reform of the administration, as recommended in the Governor-general's letter.

64. It would be impracticable, without transcribing the greatest part of the documents on this subject, to represent the whole scope of the extensive and vexatious discussions which, both verbally and in writing, took place on this occasion between his Excellency the Vizier and the resident; but it is necessary to notice the principal points of those discussions, with a view to exhibit the temper and disposition of his Excellency's mind, and to elucidate the progress and result of this arduous, but, as we have too much reason to apprehend, unsuccessful negotiation.

65. The resident having read to his Excellency the Governor-general's letter stating such comments and observations as the occasion required, the Vizier stated generally to the resident that he was disposed to acquiesce in the Governor-general's suggestions to the utmost practicable extent; adding, that he would bestow the most deliberate attention on all the topics of that letter, making his remarks on each, and would convey those remarks to the resident in writing, for consideration and discussion, before his Excellency prepared his reply to it.

66. This intention the Vizier accordingly fulfilled. In the paper which he transmitted to the resident he expressed generally, as he had verbally, his disposition to accede to the Governor-general's proposition relative to a reform of the administration, to be carried into effect in the manner prescribed by treaty, but referred to the resident for the mode in which the particular system recommended by the Governor-general was to be accomplished, advert- ing to the difficulty of ascertaining the real assets and resources of the country, of procuring trustworthy and capable persons to whom the charge of the several districts should be committed, and of remedying the contingency of the misconduct or incapacity of the persons selected, of investigating the proceeds of the several districts with a view to fix their amount by guaranteed engagements, which engagements, however, his Excellency promised to cause to be executed, when, with the resident's advice, he should have ascertained the actual proceeds of the several districts, expressing a resolution to punish those who should deviate from such engagements when formed, all which points were specified in the plan of reform recommended by the Governor-general, and on which his Excellency evidently commented in a spirit of resistance to the arrangement proposed to his adoption, while he professed his consent to it.

67. On the subject of the imprudent and ruinous arrangement adopted by the Vizier, with regard to the country formerly under the management of Almas Alee Khan, which was specially noticed in the Governor-general's letter, his Excellency stated some remarks tending to justify that arrangement on the grounds of usage; desiring, however, that if it were determined, with or without a good cause, to alter the existing system, the resident would point out such a manner of carrying this change into effect as might tend to his Excellency's reputation, to the increase of the revenue of his government, and the prosperity of his subjects at large, and at the same time might not be contrary to the engagements already entered into by his Excellency, so as in any degree to affect his reputation or cause pecuniary loss.

68. On the question of relieving the condition of the dependants of the late Almas Alee Khan, the Vizier merely observed, that as the Governor-general had issued particular instructions to the resident on that subject, he should be prepared to give an answer whenever the resident might renew his representations.

69. On the subject of Tujummool Hoosein Khan's jagier, his Excellency was totally silent. 70. The resident prefaced his answer to the Vizier's remarks, by advert- ing to the total failure of the measures which, with so much labour and discussion, had been pursued for the settlement of the districts of Purtaubgurh, &c. with the exception only of the reduction of the fortresses; adding, however, that as the means by which the future good order, not

only of those districts, but of the whole of his Excellency's dominions, were now under consideration, the resident proceeded to submit arrangements for that purpose, in the form of replies to his Excellency's remarks.

71. The Vizier had declared generally his acquiescence in the Governor-general's propositions, and his resolution to depute ameens into his districts as a measure preparatory to the accomplishment of the proposed arrangement. The resident therefore observed, that it was necessary first to consider to what places the ameens should be deputed, and what duties they should be required to perform: that, in the first place, it was indispensable that a division of his Excellency's dominions into four or five zillahs or general departments, and then a subdivision of those zillahs into districts, yielding an annual revenue of from one to three lacs of rupees, should immediately take place: that an upright intelligent ameen should be selected for each of those districts: that when his Excellency had made the selection, he should inform the resident of their names and characters, in order that he also might investigate their characters, and submit his opinion of their qualifications for his Excellency's consideration, after which they should be ordered to proceed into their respective districts, to act according to instructions, of which the resident proposed to submit a draft for his Excellency's approval.

72. In reply to the Vizier's remark regarding the impracticability of ascertaining the true revenue and resources of his country, the resident observed that this would form the grand object of the deputation of the ameens, which would produce the necessary information. The resident then proceeded to describe the duties of the ameens with reference to the attainment of that primary object.

73. In answer to the Vizier's remarks on the difficulty of finding upright and intelligent men to perform the duties of ameens, the resident referred that difficulty to the unhappy system of administration that had so long prevailed in his Excellency's dominions, to the instability of employment under his government, and to the danger of personal dishonour as well as confiscation of property which attended it, observing, that when these obstacles should be removed by the reform of the administration, his Excellency would find many able and upright men desirous of employment in his service: that in the ceded districts the native officers employed by the British Government were originally subjects of his Excellency, yet having confidence in the government they discharged their duties with zeal and fidelity, and that the same effect would be produced by the operation of the same cause in his Excellency's reserved dominions; that the proofs of the integrity and capacity of the ameens would appear from the mode in which they executed the duties to be assigned to them, and that those only should be appointed tehsildars or collectors whose conduct as ameens should be approved of. This observation had reference to that part of the Governor-general's plan, which recommended the appointment of collectors to each zillah with fixed salaries, as in the Company's provinces.

74. The resident took advantage of his reply to that article of the Vizier's paper which stated his intention of causing engagements to be taken, as recommended by the Governor-general, and of punishing those who deviated from them, to introduce the subject of establishing regular courts of justice, observing that when a satisfactory settlement of the land revenue should be concluded, and when the appointment of capable collectors in all the districts should have taken place, he should earnestly recommend to his Excellency the establishment of an efficient police and of a court of justice in each zillah: that no separation of the department of the collections from that of civil and criminal justice might take place, adding, also, some remarks on the beneficial operation of this principle.

75. The resident entered into some detail of discussion in replying to his Excellency's remarks on the system of management prevailing in the extensive districts formerly under the charge of Almass Allee Khan. After noticing the ruinous consequences of that system, and the benefits to be expected from the change, recommended by the Governor-general, the resident adverted particularly to the apprehension expressed by the Vizier of a breach of his engagements with the farmers of those districts being the consequence of the proposed change. On this point the resident observed, that having originally remonstrated with his Excellency against those engagements before they were entered into with the farmers, having repeatedly and earnestly represented to his Excellency the ruinous consequences which they would produce, and the failure of his representations having occasioned the Governor-general's remonstrance on the subject, it followed that his Excellency's perseverance in the formation of those engagements, in opposition to the counsels of the British Government, was a violation of his engagements with that Government; and the resident referred to his Excellency to decide which of the two considerations was most important, a departure from his engagements with the farmers, or a departure from his engagements with the Company. The former, he observed, if productive of loss to the farmers might easily be repaired without injury to his Excellency's reputation, whereas a breach of his engagements with the Company might be productive of the most ruinous effects, and an adherence to them must be beneficial in every respect.

76. In answer to that article of the Vizier's remarks which related to the dependants of the late Almass Allee Khan, the resident adverted to his former representations on that subject, and to the orders which, in consequence of the failure of those representations, he had received from the Governor-general in Council to urge his Excellency's attention to them; and concluded his detailed observations on the subject by renewing the request he had formerly ineffectually preferred, that his Excellency would furnish him with a statement of the demands against Mirza Jün and of the several exemptions which that person pleaded, that the resident might be enabled to form an accurate judgment on the case, and then to



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suggest to his Excellency what might appear to be most advisable for the recovery of the just dues of the state.

77. The resident terminated his remarks on the Vizier's paper by noticing his omission of the subject of Tujumool Hoosein Khan's jagier, and after stating some remarks on that question, by earnestly requesting his Excellency to reinstate him in the jagier.

78. The resident delivered to the Vizier the paper containing his replies, as above described, and subsequently transmitted to him drafts of a proclamation addressed to the revenue officers, zemindars, and peasantry of each district, and of instructions to the ameen proposed to be deputed into each. The purport of the former was to the following effect:—A statement of the evils of the farming system, and a declaration of its perpetual abolition, and the introduction of a system of assessment and collection, calculated to remedy the abuses and evils of the former; the deputation of ameens for the purpose of investigating the assets and condition of the country, as preparatory to the establishment of the improved system, with a description of their duties, and a requisition to the persons addressed to attend the ameens, and furnish them with the necessary information and documents.

79. The instructions proposed for the ameens consisted of six articles, the general substance of which it is proper to state, in order to show the nature of the arrangement recommended by the resident for the reform of the system of assessment and collection. They were prefaced by an exhortation to integrity and diligence, and an assurance that, in the event of the ameen's able and upright discharge of the duties now committed to his charge, he should be appointed a tehsildar of some zillah with a suitable salary and establishment, and should never be dismissed without sufficient cause.

The first article of the instructions referred to the proclamation and prescribed the mode of giving it currency.

The second article related to the principal object of the duty of ameens, that of ascertaining the real state and condition of the pergunnah committed to his charge; observing that this could alone be accomplished by his obtaining possession of all the revenue papers having reference to preceding years, and a list of the papers so to be obtained was inserted under this article.

The third article contained an injunction to the ameen to respect the rights of the zemindars, and to make his arrangements with them as the persons naturally interested in the soil, in contradistinction to farmers, whose interests were unconnected with the internal prosperity of the country, and to investigate cases of disputed right to a zemindary, transmitting the documents on the subject for the decision of the Vizier.

The fourth article required the ameen to inspect the engagements concluded by the farmers (under the general farming system) with the zemindars and under-renters, and to enforce the just demands of the amils, agreeably to the caboolat and pottali, or engagement, and deed of lease, and intimated that it was particularly desirable that no just balances should remain after a certain specified date, when the collections of the current year were to cease.

The fifth article required the ameen to proceed to visit every village and estate in the district committed to his charge, for the purpose of ascertaining the quantity and quality of the lands, the condition and character of the landholders and others, comparing their assets and means with the amount of the present jumma, and adopting various other specified measures with a view to the triennial settlement of the whole of the Vizier's dominions, which, as declared in this article, his Excellency had resolved to introduce from the commencement of the ensuing year, that is, in the middle of September 1811.

The sixth article described the rate of allowances to be granted to the ameen during the continuance of his duty as such, which would, of course, terminate with the introduction of the new system, when, if his conduct had been correct, he would be appointed collector of a zillah with a suitable salary.

80. After some intermediate correspondence with the Vizier, relative to that article of the resident's replies, in which he had ascribed to the Vizier a breach of treaty, and which his Excellency earnestly desired the resident to modify, a request with which the resident so far complied as to alter the terms without departing from the substance of the charges, the resident received from the Vizier a paper containing his answers to each point of the resident's observations and propositions.

81. The present report of the progress of this negotiation requires that we should state the substance of that paper, which the resident, in his report to us, termed a truly extraordinary document.

82. The Vizier began by a very unsatisfactory explanation of the causes which had defeated the projected settlement of the districts of Pirtaubguri, &c., but of which it is unnecessary to state the details.

83. In reply to that article of the resident's paper, which proposed the division and subdivision of his Excellency's country into districts, and the appointment of an ameen to each, the Vizier observed, most irrelevantly, that in the month of March he had issued orders to two of his sons, and "to the other officers, to search for and procure some upright and able candidates for the situation of ameens, who should first be sent to those districts which the resident considered in an unsettled state." That the draft of instructions which the resident had prepared should undergo personal discussion, and when the terms should be adjusted the instructions should be delivered; but that the resident must first detail to his Excellency the necessary qualifications of ameens, in order that someone so qualified might be selected and appointed exclusively by his Excellency.

84. In answer to that part of the resident's paper, in which he stated the chief and ultimate duty of the ameen to be to ascertain the new revenues and resources of the country, and described the mode of proceeding to be adopted by the ameen with a view to that object, his Excellency merely stated, that he should issue his orders to the ameen agreeably to the resident's suggestions, but recommended actual measurement of the lands in preference to the collection of revenue papers of each village for ten years back, which the resident had proposed.

85 The Vizier entered into a defence of his own conduct and practice, in reply to the resident's remark that the want of upright and able men to fill the office of ameen was to be ascribed to the vicious system of his Excellency's administration, and then suggested a modification of the resident's proposition of appointing the ameen to be subsequently tehsildars, by recommending the separation of those officers, or at least the nomination of the ameen to be tehsildars not in the districts where they had acted in the former capacity, but in some other.

86 In reply to the resident's proposition, relative to the future establishment of courts of justice, the Vizier explicitly and satisfactorily declared, that after the new system of assessment and administration of the revenue should have been carried into effect, an efficient police and a court of justice, as recommended, should be established.

87 With respect to the total change of system in the districts formerly under the management of Almass Alee Khan, the Vizier observed, that what the Governor-general had recommended, should certainly be carried into effect. that it was, of course, his Excellency's particular desire that the population should increase, that his subjects should be rendered happy and prosperous, that present and future loss should be guarded against, and that the revenues should annually increase, and that if all those objects could be accomplished by the change of the present system, his Excellency had no objection to it.

87 A. The Vizier's reply to the resident's remarks on his Excellency's imputed breach of treaty, by rejecting the counsels of the British Government, was in the following words "I have not, on the present occasion, done anything unprecedented or new, that you should have advised me to desist from it. What I have done was in perfect conformity with the long established usage of the country, against which no resident at this Court has ever hitherto remonstrated; and thanks be to God, that no bad effects have hitherto arisen from those measures, neither would any objection have been made in Calcutta to those measures if you had not written on the subject; but your representations have, of course, occasioned what has happened. It matters not. You will now consider me as intent on carrying the new system into execution."

88. To the resident's observations relative to the case of Mirza Jān, his Excellency replied by the extraordinary argument, that Mirza Jān and his property were the property of Almass Alee Khan, and the latter himself belonged to his Excellency, and that consequently Mirza Jān also was his Excellency's property, and the resident had no right to interfere, adding, however, that his intention towards Mirza Jān should be communicated to the resident thereafter.

89 In answer to the resident's representation on the subject of Tujummoool Hooseen Khan's jagier, his Excellency urged his disinclination to grant jagiers, and his desire to abridge their number, observing, that as his intention was merely to preserve his authority over the jagier in question, and as the clear revenue would be paid to Tujummoool Hooseen Khan, there was no reason why it should not be managed by one of his Excellency's amuls.

90. The resident acknowledged the receipt of the document of which the substance has been described, but stated merely some general observations regarding the extraordinary nature of it, referring to a personal conference the discussion of its details.

91. The resident, in his despatch enclosing copies of the above described documents, reported at length the tenor of his personal communication with the Vizier on the subject of that last mentioned. He represents himself first to have commented on the irregular form of that document, which it appeared had been sent without authentication, and in a blank envelope, without address or superscription; and then, after alluding to the solemn appeal to his Excellency's justice and good faith contained in the Governor-general's letter, and to his Excellency's promise of deliberately discussing with the resident the several points stated in that letter, to have called upon the Vizier to acknowledge or disavow the obligation imposed upon him by treaty, of carrying into effect a reform of his administration, and to declare whether or not, in his Excellency's own judgment, he had fulfilled, or even attempted to fulfil that obligation. If he had not, his Excellency was bound, he observed, to consider the present remonstrance of the Governor-general in Council as a solemn demand for the fulfilment of a positive obligation, by adopting the plan of reform recommended to him by the British Government, with whose counsels he had engaged to conform, or by suggesting and carrying into execution some other plan of his own, which should be equally calculated to answer the purposes of that obligation, namely, to provide for the security and happiness of his subjects, and to relieve the Company's government from the extraordinary and disreputable burden of supporting by force of arms an unjust and oppressive administration.

92 The resident then proceeded to comment on the manner in which his Excellency had met the Governor-general's propositions, observing, that his Excellency, instead of declaring his cordial acquiescence in the general plan of reform, recommended to him by the British Government, and of manifesting that acquiescence by an immediate and cheerful assent to the measures which the resident had suggested, had purposely omitted to notice a few of the most important of those measures to which no plausible objection could be formed, had made frivolous objections to others, for the obvious purpose of protracting un-

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important discussion and procrastinating the work of reform, had stated some extraordinary assertions, the inaccuracy of which was well known, and had evinced, by the whole tenor of the document in question, a resolution to evade at least, if not to resist, the salutary counsels of the Governor-general in Council, conveyed to him in the language of friendship, and in the terms of existing treaties, which were equally binding on both, and a departure from which on one part, might exonerate the other from a responsibility essential to the existence of his government, and to the exercise of his Excellency's authority.

93. These, and further similar observations having made a considerable impression on his Excellency's mind, and having produced from his Excellency an assurance of his sincere intention to abide by his engagements with the Company, as well as to withdraw from the document under discussion all such expressions and remarks as the resident might now show to be inconsistent with that assurance, the resident proceeded to discuss the Vizier's several replies.

94. It is not necessary to notice particularly the resident's observation on the first topic of the Vizier's paper, that which related to the failure of the project of settlement in the districts of Purtaubguri, &c. It is sufficient to state, that the resident deduced from the failure of all the various measures employed on that occasion, supported, too, by a large detachment of British troops, the existence of some radical evils in the system of his Excellency's administration, and the necessity of a total change in that system, in the manner suggested by the Governor-general.

95. On the next point, the appointment of ameens, the resident remarked his Excellency's total silence on the two important and indispensable preliminary measures which the resident had originally suggested to him, namely, the division and subdivision of his dominions into districts, and the selection and appointment of ameens, with the resident's advice and concurrence. He observed that, on the question of appointing the ameens, his Excellency had merely referred, in general terms, to orders issued the preceding month to his sons: that his Excellency had further (apparently for no other purpose than procrastination) required the resident to repeat to him in detail the qualifications of proper ameens, although those qualifications were sufficiently described in the Governor-general's letter, and amply enlarged upon by the resident in his replies to the Vizier's original remarks on that letter. That his Excellency had finally declared his desire of restricting the deputation of ameens to a few particular districts which the resident should consider to be in a state of disorder, forgetting that the Governor-general in Council had described the whole of his Excellency's dominions as labouring under a baneful system of assessment and collection, to which no remedy but a complete and radical change could be applied.

96. Under these circumstances, the resident deemed it his duty to call upon his Excellency distinctly to declare, whether he declined or consented to the division and subdivision of his dominions in the manner suggested, and to the subsequent deputation of an ameen to every district, giving previous information to the resident of the characters and qualities of the ameens, with the view of enabling him to judge of their fitness and capacity for the trust to be reposed in them.

97. To these two propositions, his Excellency, after some deliberation, signified his assent, reserving only for future discussion the proposal of the resident's being previously informed of the character and qualities of the ameens, and of his being entitled to a voice in their nomination, which proposal, it appeared, his Excellency considered as inconsistent with the provisions of treaty, a point which the resident combated, but finally left to future discussion.

98. The resident's observations on the two succeeding topics of the Vizier's paper do not require particular notice. With regard to the next, of the establishments of courts of justice, the resident expressed his satisfaction at the assurance which his Excellency had afforded on that subject, and stated, that he should be prepared in due season to submit to his Excellency such suggestions regarding it as the importance of the subject required.

99. The resident then proceeded to advert to the Vizier's denial of the resident's right to interpose his counsel and remonstrances respecting the management of the extensive lands formerly under charge of Almass Alee Khan, demonstrating, by reference to the words of existing engagements, the right of the British Government to interpose its advice "in all affairs connected with the ordinary government of his Excellency's dominions, and with the exercise of his Excellency's established authority;" and the confirmation and approval of the resident's counsels and remonstrances on the subject in question, as expressed in the Governor-general's letter to the Vizier, deducing from his Excellency's absolute rejection of this authorized counsel, the imputation of a direct infraction of his engagements, which bound him to attend to the advice of the British Government. The resident then referred to the practice of the representatives at the Court of Lucknow during the time of the late Asaf-ud-Dowla, to prove that the species of interference of which his Excellency denied the right had ever been exercised, and pointing out the particular urgency and necessity of that interference with respect to the districts in question, and demonstrating it to be a case to which the provisions of the treaty respecting the offer and acceptance of advice were peculiarly applicable.

100. In answer to that part of the Vizier's paper which reproached the resident with being the cause of the remonstrances and propositions his Excellency had lately received from the Governor-general, the resident merely observed that this reproach could be considered in no other light than as a proof of the conscientious discharge of his duty to both states, in having faithfully reported his proceedings at his Excellency's Court, and that he felt persuaded of receiving from his Excellency's justice and candour, at some future period, the

the most ample credit for his motives in every stage of those proceedings and discussions, which had now excited his Excellency's reproach. The Vizier, in reply, offered to withdraw this article of his remarks altogether; an offer which, however, the resident declined, with the exception of the particular words, "that you should have advised me to desist from it," which the resident desired might be expunged.

101. At the same conference the resident pleaded in a very forcible manner the cause of Tujumool Hoosein Khan, and finally succeeded in obtaining his Excellency's unqualified consent to the restitution of the jagier

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102 At the conclusion of the conference, the Vizier requested the resident to furnish him with a draft of the several alterations which he required in the other articles of his Excellency's paper. This was accordingly done, and the alterations proposed by the resident substantially were a declaration of his Excellency's concurrence in the division and subdivision of his country, and in the deputation of ameens possessing, if possible, all the requisite qualities, to all the districts, his Excellency furnishing them with the instructions and proclamations proposed by the resident, modified only in such manner as should be mutually agreed upon after consultation. that the rigorous measures hitherto adopted with respect to Mirza Jān should cease, and a statement of the just balances against him should be sent for the resident's investigation.

103 The Vizier's reply to the resident's paper of proposed alterations was far from being satisfactory. His Excellency signified his consent to take into consideration the draft of instructions to the ameens proposed by the resident, rejecting after discussion such parts as his Excellency might not approve. He consented, also, to a division of his country into districts, in the manner that might be determined by mutual consultation, and to the deputation of ameens to all the districts, but his Excellency decidedly objected to the resident's having any voice in the selection of them, on the ground of its being a supersession of authority.

104. The Vizier assented to the resident's proposition relative to Mirza Jān, but insisted on retaining the assertion contained in his former paper, that Mirza Jān was his property, and that the resident had no right to interfere in the case. The Vizier further retained his anterior observations relative to the justification of the resumption of the jagier of Tujumool Hoosein Khan, although he at the same time declared the restitution of it, in compliance with the Governor-general's desire.

105 In consequence of the receipt of this unsatisfactory reply, the resident obtained another conference with the Vizier; at which, after acknowledging that all the important measures which the resident had suggested, under the instructions of the Governor-general in Council, had been assented to, with the exception of that which related to the resident's participation in the selection of ameens, the resident remonstrated on his Excellency's persisting, contrary to promise, in retaining in his amended replies the whole of the exceptional arguments to which the resident had objected at the former conference.

106 The resident then repeated his former observations on those arguments, and the Vizier finally consented to withdraw them; expressing, however, his reluctance to abandon those which related Mirza Jān, whom he persisted in considering as his slave and property, a position which the resident combated with great force and justice.

107. The resident then proceeded to the discussion of the only point remaining unsettled, namely, his Excellency's refusal to admit of the resident's participation in the selection of ameens. On this topic the resident entered into great detail, concerning it essential to the success of the projected reform, and to be a point of obligation involved in the provisions of the treaty.

108 The Vizier, however, continuing inflexible on this point, although he waved any replies to the resident's arguments, the latter found it necessary to refrain from further urgency, and signified his intention of referring the question to our determination.

109 The resident then submitted for his Excellency's consideration a few questions, proceeding on the supposition of his choice and appointment of ameens without the resident's previous knowledge or concurrence. Was it his Excellency's intention, the resident inquired, not only to exclude him from a participation in the choice of the ameens and collectors, but to keep him, as heretofore, in ignorance of the proceedings of those officers? Did his Excellency intend, as formerly, to convey to him detached and desultory papers and articles of intelligence transmitted by venal newswriters in the pay of his several ameens, and to withhold from him every paper of importance or authentic document, on the ground that it had not or could not be prepared, or that his Excellency himself considered it as unsatisfactory? And did his Excellency continue to entertain the wish, or indulge the vain expectation of receiving the support of the British troops to the proceedings and demands of his ameens and tehsildars under the new system, as to those of his farmers of revenue under the old, without satisfying the resident, or enabling him to satisfy himself, of the propriety and justice of those proceedings and demands? If such, the resident observed, were his Excellency's designs, it was now his duty to undeceive him, and to caution him, in a manner the most solemn, against the fallacy of such expectations; adding, that the repeated and positive instructions of his government precluded his compliance with any future requisition for the aid of the British troops, till entirely satisfied of the justice and expediency of the measures which those troops might be required to support.

110. The resident in his report of this conference, stated that the Vizier was visibly affected by the foregoing remarks, and that after some further conversation his Excellency took down in writing the terms of an agreement respecting the conduct of ameens and tehsildars, which he promised to insert as a qualification of his Excellency's rejection of

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the resident's original proposal, declaring at the same time with earnestness, that it never was his intention to withhold from the resident any information that he might desire, but that the conduct of his officers had frequently been such as to prevent his deriving or conveying satisfactory information of their proceedings.

111. This intention his Excellency carried into effect by the transmission of a paper of amended replies, the substance of which was, that all the proceedings of the amins, and copies of the several papers which they might transmit to his Excellency, should be explained and forwarded for the resident's information, and that the resident's opinion of those proceedings and papers, after investigation and discussion with his Excellency, should guide the continuation of the amins or their dismissal from their offices, and that copies of all engagements whatsoever which might be received or entered into by the tehsildars should be furnished for the resident's information. These were the points proposed by the Vizier, as qualifications to his Excellency's refusal to permit the resident to have a voice in the selection and nomination of the amins.

112. The first of those points the resident admitted to be satisfactory; but under the terms of the second, the resident justly observed that he should possess no information regarding the proceedings of any of the tehsildars until a commotion should have been excited in the country, and even then would only be apprized of the proceedings respecting such individual landowners, or others, as resisted the demands of the tehsildars and were actually in a state of rebellion.

113. In consequence of this representation, the Vizier finally modified the last-mentioned article, by engaging that the papers transmitted by the amins which might be ultimately approved with the advice of the resident, should be given to the tehsildars, with strict orders to abide by them in forming the settlement of the districts, and after the conclusion of the settlement to transmit all the original engagements of the zemindars and renters which they might grant to his Excellency, for the purpose of being recorded, keeping copies for their own guidance, and for all payments of revenue to grant receipts, that so, if at any future period a tehsildar represent to his Excellency the failure of zemindars in their engagements, or their resistance to the authority of the tehsildars requiring troops to coerce them, the several engagements of the zemindars might be ready for the resident's inspection; so that, after satisfying himself of the rebellious conduct of the zemindars, and their actual breach of their engagements, the resident might take measures for their coercion and punishment.

114. The resident's despatch from which the preceding report is taken will be found recorded as per margin.\*

115. For the better comprehension of the result of these discussions, which as before observed we have stated with a view to show the temper and disposition of the Vizier relatively to the proposed reform, it will be useful to insert in this place the resident's original remarks and propositions and the answers of the Vizier, in the form in which they were finally modified.

*Resident's Remarks and Propositions.*

I have derived considerable satisfaction from the general tenor of your Excellency's remarks on the Right honourable the Governor-general's letter, because they evince a conviction in your Excellency's mind of the importance of a complete and immediate reform of the system of assessment and realization of the revenue in your dominions, and a desire of obtaining information regarding the best practicable method of carrying that reform into effect.

As it is by no means my wish or intention to revive any former discussions of a disagreeable nature between us, or to suspend your Excellency's attention to the future important arrangements by any retrospect of the past, I shall pass over in silence the remark with which your Excellency has commenced on this occasion, observing merely, with a reference to the conduct of your officers in the districts of Sultanpore and Purtaubgurh, that the scheme of a triennial settlement for those districts, which was the first and most essential requisite towards a just and beneficial arrangement for the future management of the districts, as repeatedly and earnestly suggested by me, and as often promised by your Excellency, has not even yet been produced; and that although both your Excellency and I have been frequently told by your amils, and Mohummud Ashruf in

*Vizier's final Replies.*

With regard to what you have stated in the first of those answers, namely, that the scheme of a settlement for the districts of Sultanpore and Purtaubgurh, which was the first and most essential requisite towards a beneficial arrangement, &c. The case is this.—That the causes of the delay in transmitting a perfect scheme of settlement for the districts in question have already been explained to you, and that the non-arrival of a perfect scheme can only be ascribed to some of those causes. In the scheme which I received from the amils it is written, that a correct statement of diminution and increase in the jumma would be afterwards furnished when the real assets were ascertained. I did not myself consider that scheme as satisfactory, and accordingly told you so at one of our personal interviews. A document, therefore, which was considered as incorrect by myself, to what purpose should I send it to you? With respect again to your observation of our not having received the jumma-bund of any one village or estate, if a perfect scheme of the settlement had arrived, the jumma-bund would have doubtless been contained in it; and with regard to your remark, that notwithstanding Mohummud Ashruf's and the other amils' representations, &c. every paper conveying information of the conclusion, or approaching conclusion of the

\* Consultations, 3d May.

in particular, that a moderate assessment has been made, and an advantageous settlement concluded or nearly concluded, of all the districts under his charge, neither your Excellency nor I have yet been informed of the jumma of any one estate or village in the country, nor has a single revenue paper, of any description whatever, been hitherto submitted by the amil, whose duty it unquestionably was to transmit copies of all the engagements of the zemindars and vouchers of the statements in those engagements, for your Excellency's knowledge and approbation, before the settlements were concluded.

In short, I consider the districts of Puraubgurh and Sultanpore, notwithstanding all that we have heard from Mohammud Ashruf and the amila, to be at this moment, and after all the trouble which they have occasioned to both your Excellency and me, with the exception of the reduction of fortresses, which we owe entirely to the British troops, in a condition as far removed from good order and advantageous settlement as they were in the time of Hoolas Sing. But the measures by which the future good order of not these districts alone, but of the whole of your Excellency's dominions, is to be restored and permanently established, are now in our joint contemplation, and to the delineation of those measures I shall therefore proceed immediately, and shall submit them for your Excellency's consideration, in the form of answers to your remarks.

Your Excellency, in the second of those remarks, has declared your acquiescence in my original proposal, that ameens should be deputed to those districts, &c.

Before proceeding, however, on the present occasion, to the adoption of this measure, let us first consider to what places the ameens shall be deputed, and what duties they shall be required to perform. It appears to me to be indispensable that a division of your Excellency's dominions into four or five zillahs, or general departments of proper extent, and then a subdivision of those zillahs into districts, yielding an annual revenue of from one to three lacs of rupees each district, be determined on, and carried into execution with the least practicable delay. Then let an upright and intelligent ameen be selected for each of those districts; and when your Excellency shall have made the selection, be pleased to inform me of the names and characters, as far as known to you, of the persons thus to be employed in offices of so high importance, that I also may endeavour to investigate their characters, and submit my opinion for your consideration; after which let them be ordered to proceed to their districts respectively, under written instructions for their guidance, a draft of which I shall have the honour of submitting for your approval.

the settlement of those districts which I have received, copies of them have invariably been sent to you, because it is not my wish or desire to conceal anything from you.

In the second article you have stated that it is first necessary to consider to what places the ameens shall be deputed, &c.

On the 18th of Suffer 1226 (15th March 1811) I issued orders to my beloved sons, Shums-ood-Dowlah and Nuseer-ood-Dowlah, and to the other officers of my government, to search for and procure some upright and able candidates for the situation of ameens. The draft of instructions to the ameens which you have furnished shall be attentively perused. Such parts as I may not approve, after consulting with you, shall be withdrawn from it, and final instructions shall then be prepared and delivered to the ameens, and such division and subdivision of my dominions as you shall suggest, after discussion between us, shall be carried into immediate effect, under my authority and by my officers and for this purpose Raee-Dya-Krishen has already been summoned to the presence, that the situation and extent of the several zillahs and muhals, and the amount of the jumma of each, may be ascertained from the records in his possession, after which the division and subdivision shall take place, and ameens possessing the qualities described in the Governor-general's letter shall be deputed by me to all the muhals. In short, the ameens must be chosen and appointed by me, and the whole system must be established under my authority and by my officers, with your advice. But the mode which you have suggested for the appointment of ameens cannot be acceded to by me, because, in this case, it would be necessary that after selecting proper persons for the office, I should write to you to inform me who should be appointed and who should not be ap-  
3 c 3 pointed

Appendix, No. 26.

Letter from the  
Bengal Govern-  
ment, 16 Oct. 1811.

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pointed. You will naturally approve some and reject others, and I should be obliged to comply with your suggestions on this point. Hence it is obvious, that the selection and appointment or rejection of the ameen would proceed under your authority, and that I should have no further power or authority in the matter, but merely those of informing you and requiring your consent; and this circumstance being generally known, not one of the ameen would be obedient to my orders or regard my authority. I can never, therefore, consent to the appointment of ameen in a manner which would diminish my own authority; more particularly, as it is stipulated in the concluding part of the seventeenth article of the treaty concluded with the British Government in the time of Sir John Shore, that "I shall possess full authority over my household affairs, hereditary dominions, my troops, and my subjects;" and in the sixth article of the Treaty of Cession, it is stated, that the honourable the East India Company thereby "guarantee to me, my heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of mine and their authority within the said dominions; and I engage always to advise with, and act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the said honourable Company."

The ameen having proceeded to their respective districts, all papers and documents relative to the scheme of a settlement, and of every other nature whatever which they may transmit to the presence, shall be submitted to your investigation, and copies of them shall be furnished for that purpose; after which, if the papers or proceedings of any ameen shall appear to you to be improper, and you satisfy me of the impropriety of his proceedings, that ameen shall be immediately dismissed, and another person shall be selected by me to succeed him. But if the proceedings and papers of the ameen shall be approved, he shall continue in employment, and be appointed to some other district.

Further, the papers transmitted by those ameen which may be finally approved with your advice, shall be given to the tehsildars, with strict orders to abide by them in forming the settlement of the districts, and after the settlement is concluded, to transmit all the original engagements of the malgoosars, such as *akarnamah*, *caboolat*, *malasmines* and *harsamines*, with copies of the *potlaks* which they grant to the presence, for the purpose of being recorded, keeping copies for their own guidance, and for all payments of revenue which are made, to grant *dakhalats* or receipts under their seals, that so, if at any future period a tehsildar represent to the presence the failure of semindars in their engagements, or resistance to the authority of the tehsildars, requiring troops to coerce them, the several engagements of the semindars, which will then be on the records of the government, may be ready for your inspection, and copies of them, with copies of the *dakhalats*, shall accordingly be sent for your perusal, that after satisfying yourself of the rebellious conduct of the semindars, and their actual breach of their engagements,

you

In the third article your Excellency has doubted the practicability of ascertaining the true revenue and resources of your country, and has inquired how this is to be done, &c.

The investigation and ascertainment of the revenue form the grand and sole object, and will prove to be the happy result of the deputation of ameenas, as I have suggested. The duty of those ameenas, as prescribed by the instructions which I shall submit, will be to assemble and conciliate, in the first instance, the chowdries, cancongoses, and putwarries of the several districts under their charge, and then to require from those officers the whole of the revenue papers of every village distinctly for a period of ten years, with the wasilbankoe accounts of the last and preceding years, and the scheme or register of the settlement for the year now drawing to a close. Those papers, after the minutest investigation which may be practicable, to be transmitted, under the signature of the revenue officers, to the presence, when your Excellency and I shall consider them, and be enabled to form an accurate judgment of the real resources and assets of every district in your dominions.

In the fourth article your Excellency has desired me to inform you where intelligent and upright men are to be found.

The absence or deficiency of such men as your Excellency has described is, in my opinion, alone to be attributed to the unhappy system of the administration which has long prevailed in your dominions, to the instability of employment under your government, and to the danger of personal dishonour, as well as confiscation of property, which attends even temporary employment. When these obstacles shall be happily removed by the improved system of your administration, your Excellency will find many able and upright natives desirous of employment in your service.

In the provinces which your Excellency ceded to the honourable Company, a majority, if not the whole, of the native officers employed by the British Government as tehsildars, &c., were the subjects of your Excellency's dominions, yet they, having entire confidence in the government, performed their duties with diligence, fidelity, and zeal, to the advantage and satisfaction of their employers. On the same principle, under an improved system of administration for your Excellency's dominions, your Excellency may be perfectly assured, that many able and upright men will be found to fill those offices under your government, and I will cheerfully take it upon myself to procure as many as may be necessary. The proofs of their capacity and integrity, if possessing those qualifications, will hereafter fully appear upon an examination of the documents which they transmit from their districts, respectively, to the presence; and those only should, of course, be appointed tehsildars whose conduct as ameenas should be approved of.

In the fifth article your Excellency desires to be informed of the means of ascertaining the real state of the mubla.

(445.—VI.)

you may take measures for their coercion and punishment.

In the third answer you have stated, that the duty of those ameenas will be to require from the chowdries, cancongoses, and putwarries, the whole of the revenue papers, &c.

I shall issue my orders to the ameenas, agreeably to what you have suggested; but I recommend that this measure be carried into effect by actual measurement of the cultivated and waste lands, and of lands capable of being cultivated; in which case the exact measurement of the lands, as well as the amount of the jumma, will be ascertained, and the boundaries of villages will also be fixed, so as to preclude future claims or disputes among the zemindars on questions of unsettled boundary.

In the fourth answer you have stated, that the deficiency of men of abilities is, in your opinion, alone to be attributed to the present system of the administration in my dominions, to the instability of employment under my government, and to the danger of personal dishonour, &c.

I have never broken my engagements, nor retracted my promise in any way so as to create want of confidence in the people; on the contrary, many of the amils have broken their engagements with my government, and I have knowingly put up with the loss and released them from confinement. With regard to those who are still confined, I have frequently required them, in the first instance, to liquidate their arrears, agreeably to the statements prepared by my officers, and afterwards to their own statements, giving credit for all their claims, nay, for more than they could justly require; yet, destitute of shame as well as honesty, they still retain the just dues of the sirkar.

You suggest, that such ameenas as perform their duties properly shall hereafter be appointed tehsildars, but, in this case, if the ameen be previously informed, that after ascertaining the jumma of their alakas (districts), and transmitting the revenue papers for ten years with the wasilbankoe accounts of the revenue, they will be appointed to the office of tehsildar, it is probable that, for their own future advantage, they will knowingly lower the jumma, and state less than the real amount. I therefore think it would be more advisable to separate the two offices entirely; or, at all events, that no ameen should be appointed tehsildar in the sillah in which he may have acted as ameen. In this latter mode, the ameenas who are found to be deserving may still be rewarded, and the opportunity for fraud may be prevented.

No answer to this article on the part of the Vizier.



The real condition of the country will, I doubt not, be fully ascertained by the appointment of ambaas as I have suggested, and by their exertions, in the manner pointed out in my answer to the third article, and in obedience to the instructions which I shall furnish.

Your Excellency has stated in the sixth article, that when, with my advice, &c.

The intention which your Excellency has declared in this article is highly commendable; but the views of the British Government, as hinted at in the passage of the Governor-general's letter, to which your Excellency has here referred, and detailed in his Lordship's instructions to me, are still more extensive in their nature, and far more beneficial in their consequences, than your Excellency would appear to have conceived. When a satisfactory settlement of your Excellency's land revenue shall be concluded, and when the appointment of capable tehmildars in all the districts shall have taken place, the establishment of an efficient police and of a court of justice in each zillah will be earnestly recommended to your Excellency, as a measure manifestly indispensable to give complete effect to the salutary arrangements which precede, so that a separation and distinction of the department of collection of revenue in all its branches, from that of the dispensation of civil and criminal justice throughout the country, may take place, that the subjects of your Excellency's government at large may have the gates of justice and redress of grievances open to them at all times, that the hand of oppression or extortion in the aumils and collectors of revenue against the landholders and peasantry may be restrained, that the just demands of those aumils and collectors against the landholders and peasantry may be enforced, if necessary, by the regular process of the law, and the revenues of the government may thus be duly realized, that the lives and property of the subjects may be protected, and the detection and punishment of thieves and plunderers may be ensured.

Your Excellency has stated, in the seventh article of your remarks, that your measures, with a reference to those districts, have been in conformity with the established usage of the country, &c.

Although I have not heard that serious disturbances do actually exist in any other of those muls than Jugdeespore, yet the ruinous consequences of the present system of farming are equally to be apprehended in all of them while that system shall prevail; and on this principle it is, that a total change of the system has been so earnestly recommended to your Excellency by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, as absolutely necessary and indispensable to remedy the evils which exist. That the suggested reform will be productive of those benefits, will serve to increase your Excellency's reputation, and greatly tend to the increase of your revenue as well as to the welfare and prosperity of your subjects, cannot reasonably be doubted; and with regard to your Excellency's apprehension of a breach of your engagements with your farmers, it must be sufficient for me to remark, that having originally remonstrated against those engagements

In the sixth answer you have stated, that the views of the British Government, as hinted at in the Governor-general's letter to my address, &c.

After the new system of assessment and administration of the revenue shall be carried into effect, an efficient police and a court of justice, as recommended by the Governor-general and by you, shall also be established by my orders.

In answer to the seventh article, you have stated, that to remedy the evils which at present exist, a total change of the system has been earnestly recommended to me by the Governor-general, &c.

What the Governor-general has recommended shall certainly be carried into effect. It is, of course, my particular desire that the population of the country be increased, the happiness and prosperity of my subjects be provided for, that present or future loss of revenue to the sarkar be effectually guarded against, and that the revenues should yearly increase. If those objects can be accomplished by the change of the present system it is well, and I have no objection whatever.

With regard to what you have stated, that my apprehension of a breach of my engagements, &c.

Praise be to God, that as yet no breach of engagements has ever been committed by me, nor can any take place hereafter.

I have not, on the present occasion, done any thing unprecedented or new. What I have done was in perfect conformity with the long-established usage of the country, against which

engagements before they were entered into by the farmers, having repeatedly and earnestly represented to your Excellency the ruinous consequences which they would produce, and the failure of my representations having occasioned the Governor-general's remonstrances on the subject, it follows that your Excellency's consignment of those mullahs under the engagements which are now referred to was in direct opposition to my advice, and to the counsels of the British Government, and consequently, that your Excellency's adherence to those engagements, or refusal to comply with my suggestions of reform on the ground of them, would necessarily now imply (which God forbid) a departure from your engagements with our government.

Under these circumstances, I leave it to your Excellency to judge which of the two considerations is the most important. A departure from engagements with those farmers, which were entered into contrary to my advice, or in other words, to the terms of your engagements with the Company, if productive of loss to the farmers may very easily be repaired without injury to your Excellency's reputation; whereas a breach of your engagements with the Company may be productive of the most ruinous effects, and an adherence to those engagements must be beneficial in every point of view.

Your Excellency has stated in the eighth article, that as the Governor-general has transmitted particular instructions, &c.

The Right honourable the Governor-general has left little for me to add to his own earnest intercession in behalf of the dependants of Alnass.

Your Excellency cannot but be aware of the nature of my original instructions on this subject, which were issued on the death of Alnass. In pursuance of those instructions, I have repeatedly, and on various occasions, had the honour of addressing your Excellency in favour of many of the dependants of Alnass, more particularly after the death of Rehmut Alee Khan, in favour of his women, and after the dismissal of Khanzad Khan (Mirza Jān), on the subject of the adjustment of his accounts and recovery of his demands from subordinate aumils. Your Excellency having been pleased to inform me on one of the occasions in question, and in answer to my earnest representation, that I had nothing whatever to do with the affairs or accounts of Mirza Jān, nor any title to address you in his behalf, it became my duty to report this discussion to the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, who has been pleased to notice it in his Lordship's letter to your Excellency's address, and not only to approve my former representations on the subject, but to direct that the discussion be now renewed, under the express sanction of his authority, and be carried on to a satisfactory conclusion, by the equitable adjustment of the balances which are claimed from this unfortunate aumil, so as to increase your Excellency's reputation.

You will, I trust, do me the justice to believe, that I am by no means desirous of conducting to your Excellency's loss in the adjustment of accounts with your aumils; (446. —VI.) and

which no resident at this Court had ever hitherto remonstrated, and thanks be to God that no bad effects have hitherto arisen from those measures; neither would any objection have been made in Calcutta to those measures if you had not written on the subject; but your representations have, of course, occasioned what has happened. It matters not. You will now consider me as intent on carrying the new system into execution.

In the eighth article you have requested me to furnish you with a statement of the demands against Mirza Jān and of the several exemptions which he pleads, &c.

In compliance with the wishes of the Right honourable the Governor-general, which it is my duty and my inclination to attend to, the troopers and others placed over Khanzad Khan have been withdrawn, and two chuprassies only are over him. A statement of the just balances against him shall be sent for your investigation.

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Letter from the  
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ment, 12 Oct. 1811.  
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and my recovery, on a former occasion, by your Excellency's particular desire, of the balances which were due by Almas, is a proof of the sincerity of this assurance. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting, that your Excellency, as on the former occasion, will now also be pleased to furnish me with a statement of the demands against Mirza Jân, and of the several exemptions which he pleads; that I may be enabled to form an accurate judgment on the case, and then to suggest to your Excellency what may appear to be most advisable for the recovery of the just dues of the sîrkar. Your Excellency may be fully assured, that after inspecting the documents which you may send to me, and ascertaining the just amount of your demands, I shall be ready to support those demands with all the influence of my authority; and that, in the case of Mirza Jân's refusal to discharge them, I shall myself submit to your Excellency the justice and expediency of his renewed and still more rigorous confinement.

The foregoing are my detailed observations in answer to your Excellency's remarks on the subject of the Governor-general's letter. The concluding paragraph of that letter, however, which relates to Tujummool Hoosein Khan's jagier, having been passed over by your Excellency in silence, and I having in consequence, at our last personal interview, not only submitted my own sentiments on the subject, but also conveyed to you, in explicit though delicate terms, the sentiments of surprise and concern with which the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council had heard of the violation of rights considered as under the guarantee of his government, I naturally expected as the result of those communications, that your Excellency would have ordered Tujummool Hoosein Khan to resume the management of his jagier. Disappointed in this expectation, I now most earnestly request that, from a consideration of the extraordinary claims of this family to the favour of both states, your Excellency will be pleased, without any further delay, to reinstate Tujummool Hoosein Khan in the unmolested possession of his jagier, as an act of justice on the part of your Excellency, which cannot fail to be gratifying to the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council in the highest possible degree.

Although no injury nor loss could, in my opinion, arise to Tujummool Hoosein Khan from committing the management of his jagier to an amil of my selection, yet, in compliance with the Governor-general's desire, the jagier shall be restored to the khan.

116. In reply to the resident's report of his proceedings, he received the commendation due to the zeal, judgment and ability which he had certainly displayed in conducting these discussions; but he was informed, that the satisfaction we derived from the result of the negotiation, as far as it had hitherto proceeded, was qualified by the reflection that the Vizier's acquiescence in the main points of the proposed arrangement must be ascribed more to the energy and firmness with which the resident had urged them, than to a cordial admission on the part of his Excellency of the expediency of the suggested measures and to a sincere desire to carry them into effect. With regard to the specific measures recommended by the resident, it was observed to him that we considered them to be generally judicious, and the most effectual that could be devised under the disadvantages arising from the inherent vices and defects of his Excellency's government. That on one point alone we entertained considerable doubt; not, however, on the abstract ground of expediency, but upon that of public faith, as affected by a resumption of the farms before the expiration of the leases, and with or without the consent of the farmers.\* That we were not entirely satisfied of the argument with which the resident met the Vizier's objection, founded on that very ground, because, admitting even the constructive violation of his engagements with the Company, which the resident had maintained,† it could not be considered to affect the validity of a contract

\* Vide seventy-fifth paragraph of this despatch.

† Ibid.

a contract between the Vizier and his farmers, and that we therefore recommended, in all practicable cases, a compromise with the farmers, but in none a compulsory resumption of the farms.

117. On the only essential article of the resident's propositions to which the Vizier had ultimately withholden his consent, namely, the resident's participation in the selection and appointment of amins, it was observed to him, that whatever might be our opinion with regard to the importance of this participation, we approved his having yielded the point; first, because some doubt might be entertained of the right of the British Government to insist upon having a voice in the appointment of the Vizier's officers, even for the execution of measures prosecuted under the influence of its counsels; and secondly, because the object would, in some degree, be obtained by the compromise\* to which his Excellency had assented. The chief secretary's letter conveying the above, and some additional remarks, will be found recorded as per margin.†

118. We now proceed to report the substance of the resident's communication of the further progress of his negotiations, from which we had the mortification to find our opinion of the Vizier's real reluctance to the introduction of any effectual reform into the system of his administration practically confirmed.

119. It is not necessary to follow the further argumentative correspondence between the Vizier and the resident with the detail which appeared expedient in reporting the discussions antecedent to his Excellency's acquiescence in the proposed plan of reform. It will be sufficient to state, in general terms, the nature of the objections which the Vizier now brought forward against the prosecution of the very measures to which his Excellency had given his positive assent.

120. He stated his conviction of the impracticability of ascertaining the assets and resources of his country by the means suggested by the resident, and at all events the impossibility of inspecting and deciding on the voluminous documents which, preparatory to that object, the amins were to be instructed to transmit to Lucknow. He expressed his apprehension, that the operation of the measures in question would throw into disorder the districts where at present no disorder existed, and where the revenues were collected with regularity. That this effect would be produced by the deputation of amins, because (as his Excellency conceived) their authority would supersede that of the amils. He alleged that the introduction of the new system would not secure the accomplishment of one of its principal objects, that of preventing the necessity for the frequent employment of the Company's troops; and maintained, that in the districts subject to Mehdee Alee Khan (viz. Khyrabad and Mohumdee, the northern quarter of the Vizier's dominions), in the districts lately farmed by Mirza Jām, and in the district of Baraitch, and other places where no disorders existed, and where the rents were regularly paid, there was no occasion whatever for changing the present system. That the flourishing state of those districts implied that the peasantry were perfectly satisfied with it, and that a change would only be productive of loss to his government. His Excellency, on those grounds, proposed that the new system should for the present be introduced merely for trial into some one district which might be considered as in the greatest disorder; and if the result of this experiment should prove satisfactory, it could be introduced into the whole.

121. The Vizier, in support of what he had stated regarding the practical difficulty of carrying into effect the measures proposed by the resident, transmitted to him a representation, signed by six of the selected amins to whom his Excellency had shown a copy of their proposed instructions, which representation referred article by article to the draft of instructions, specifying such of the duties as the amins would engage to perform, and such of the revenue papers as they would be able to furnish, and stating the impracticability of performing the other required duties and of furnishing the remaining documents. But with regard to this transaction, the resident stated the following singular facts, namely, that from two of those six persons who were formerly in his employment while agent to the Governor-general in Bundelcund, the resident received information that they had been furnished, by the Vizier's orders with drafts of the above-mentioned representations, which they were required to seal and present to his Excellency under pain of his displeasure.

122. The resident met the objections stated by the Vizier by remarks and explanations which were certainly of a nature to satisfy his Excellency's doubts and apprehensions, if such were really entertained by him, or if he had been sincerely desirous of promoting the system of reform; but the following passages of his Excellency's reply to the resident's arguments sufficiently demonstrate his total disinclination to the introduction of any change.

123. To an observation of the resident's, that his Excellency's cordial concurrence in the propriety of the proposed measures, and his sincere resolution of carrying them into complete effect, was all that could possibly be required to ensure advantage and success, the Vizier replied as follows. "The case is this: that as, immediately on the introduction of the new system, the present settlement of the country must be entirely subverted and no part of it can remain, and consequently the failure of the new system, or the delay or impossibility of carrying it into complete effect, must be productive of certain loss and injury to me, it follows that a want of attention or diligence on my part to give effect to the system in question cannot be supposed. But with regard to a system of administration, the adoption and execution of which are extremely difficult and impracticable, my attention and diligence must,

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Letter from the  
Bengal Govern-  
ment, 15 Oct. 1811  
Oude

\* Vide one hundred and thirteenth paragraph of this despatch.

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Bengal Govern-  
ment, 15 Oct. 1811.  
Oude.

of course, be totally unavailing. If, on the other hand, you will be pleased to suggest such a plan for the introduction and exercise of the system as shall be conformable to the terms of the treaty and compatible with the perfect exercise of my independent authority, so that no injury nor falling off, the most minute, in my authority can be occasioned, nor any, the smallest, loss of revenue from whatever cause can arise, and you satisfy me as to all those particulars, how then can I refuse to comply with and adopt your suggestions?"

124. Again, in answer to an observation of the resident, that the new system of assessment was much milder than the former, and tended evidently to the comfort and happiness of the ryots, and to the ease and security of the landholders, the Vizier stated as follows: "Although the new system appear milder to you, and though it be also my wish that this system should be successfully administered, yet the fact is, that the talookdars and the whole of the zemindars in my dominions have long been in the habit of concealing and withholding the real assets of their lands; and the new system being calculated to bring those practices to light, and to expose the real capability of each particular estate, it is impossible, in my judgment, to expect that this system should be agreeable to them; and, on the contrary, I am greatly apprehensive that its introduction will cause the zemindars to retire, nor can we possibly expect that it will be established in the manner we wish, since it has not yet been properly carried into effect in the honourable Company's ceded and conquered provinces, although upwards of ten years have elapsed since its first introduction into those provinces. Of what avail, therefore, will be my cordial concurrence in a business which it is impossible or extremely difficult to accomplish?"

125. It is worthy of remark, as a singular instance of inconstancy in his Excellency's professions, that the preceding observations were communicated to the resident only five days after his receipt of a paper in which his Excellency desires him to "rest assured that he had no hesitation whatever as to the introduction of the system recommended, and that, on the contrary, his Excellency was zealously employed in putting it into a train of execution."

126. In the course of these discussions, which were conducted verbally as well as by correspondence, and embraced a great variety of subordinate points, and among others a modification of the resident's proposed instructions to the ameen, the resident properly intimated to the Vizier, that any further alteration or correspondence regarding the excuses, whether valid or frivolous, alleged by the ameen, could tend only to procrastinate the introduction of the salutary system of reform recommended by the Governor-general in Council; that not one of those excuses, even admitting their validity, was of a nature to preclude the introduction of that system, or to impede its progress, in the manner which the British Government desired, namely, to the immediate improvement of the condition of his Excellency's landholders and peasantry, and to the consequent advantage of the state, as well as to the future increase of its revenue; and on these and other grounds, the resident again earnestly recommended to his Excellency to despatch the ameen into every district of his dominions without further delay, delivering to them, however, the proclamations and instructions in the terms of the resident's original drafts.

127. The resident observed, that a perpetual or even a decennial settlement of the revenue, which would require a minute investigation to ascertain the real assets of the land, had not been recommended to his Excellency, that neither was it advisable for the present; that, on the contrary, a triennial settlement at a moderate rate of assessment, for the purpose of giving confidence to the zemundars and peasantry, and encouraging the cultivation of the soil, was all that had been suggested; and that, for this beneficial purpose, the duties which the six ameen had engaged for (in the representation alluded to in the one hundred and twenty-first paragraph), and the documents which they had promised to furnish, if executed and prepared with fidelity and zeal, in the spirit of the proposed instructions, by all the officers whom his Excellency might appoint, would be amply sufficient; and that a triennial settlement, proceeding out of the labours of the ameen, if concluded agreeably to the resident's suggestions, would fully answer the object proposed by the introduction of the new system in its commencement.

128. The resident's letter enclosing the correspondence, of which we have briefly stated the substance, contained a detailed and a satisfactory explanation, on that point, of his proceedings, which had attracted our particular notice, namely, his supposed suggestion relative to the resumption of farms before the expiration of the leases, or without the consent of the farmers. It appeared, indeed, from the result of the resident's inquiries, instituted after his receipt of our remarks on the point in question, that all the leases in the Vizier's dominions, with the exception of those of Khyrabad and Mohumdie, which had three years to run, and a few other inconsiderable districts under charge of Mehdee Alee Khan, would actually expire at the close of the current year; and with regard to those which formed exceptions, the resident deemed it his duty, in consequence of our remarks, to signify to the Vizier that the introduction of the new system of assessment into those particular districts, although expedient in the highest degree on general grounds, and for the sake of uniformity in his Excellency's administration, ought not to take effect but by compromise with the farmer, which compromise his Excellency promised to endeavour to settle with Mehdee Alee Khan.

129. The resident's despatch above referred to will be found recorded as per margin.\*

130. From all that had now passed, it was evident, in our opinion, that the Vizier, while he admitted the necessity of a reform, because he could neither deny the facts, nor resist the arguments on which that necessity was founded, and while he acknowledged the obligation imposed on him by treaty, of executing such reform at the suggestion and with the advice of the

the British Government, did not desire that it should take effect; and that, under the influence of this disposition, his efforts were employed to render the proposed system abortive, by means consistent with an ostensible solicitude to promote the success of it.

181. We could not but apprehend, that the inclination of his Excellency's mind would lead him, and his unlimited means of clandestine influence and control would enable him, to realize all the difficulties and impediments which he had represented as opposing the practicability of the meditated plan of reform, but which do not really belong to it: that he would then be disposed to triumph in the fulfilment of his predictions, to charge the British Government, as in fact he actually had charged it, with the pursuit of a chimerical system of theoretical improvement, tending only to produce confusion and loss of revenue, and to deduce from its failure the practical superiority of that mode of assessment and collection, which having been established from distant times, was, however defective, best adapted to the habits and genius of the people, and best calculated to realize the resources of the country.

182. In truth, those enlarged principles of polity which embrace a consideration for the comfort and happiness of the people, which provide for the security of the rights and property of the subjects of the realm, for their protection against the abuses of power, for the control of injustice and oppression, which reject the allurements of immediate pecuniary advantage in favour of the more distant but solid benefits arising from the purity of the administration and the general prosperity of the country, are foreign to the character of the Vizier, and adverse to the natural propensities of his mind and disposition. From the tenor of the resident's reports, these propensities appeared to be too firmly established to admit of the expectation which government was willing originally to indulge, that they might be made to yield to the force of argument and reason, addressed to an understanding certainly of no ordinary class, and supported by all the influence of the British power, the stipulations of treaty, and the present resident's zealous and able agency.

183. We directed those observations to be stated to the resident in replying to his last-mentioned despatch, intimating to him, at the same time, that the object of stating them was not to discourage the continuance of his efforts, but partly to afford him the satisfaction of knowing that we were fully aware of the difficulties which opposed them, and would not be disposed to ascribe their too probable failure to any defect of ability or exertion on his part, and partly to place him on his guard against those arts, by which the just and benevolent intentions of the British Government in urging the reform might be converted into the charge of having occasioned a material defalcation of his Excellency's revenues, and involved his country in confusion, by effecting the subversion of a long-established system of assessment and collection, without substituting another, either efficient in its operation or adequate to the purposes for which it was proposed. While he persevered in his endeavours, therefore, to accomplish, at least, a partial reform of the Vizier's administration, the resident was instructed to be careful not to suffer the effects of his Excellency's open or clandestine obstruction to be charged upon the inefficiency of the system itself, as recommended to his adoption. These instructions, which were dated the 21st June, will be found recorded as per margin.\*

184. In his next despatch the resident reported the details of a conference with the Vizier to which he had alluded in his preceding letter. On that occasion the resident answered categorically, and with much force and justice, every point of the Vizier's objections, doubts, and apprehensions; previously noticing, however, his Excellency's total silence on those points at the time when he consented to all the fundamental articles of the resident's propositions, and the consequent inadmissibility of the arguments now employed by the Vizier, in a form inconsistent with his previous unqualified assent: an assent which, with reference to the positive obligations of treaty to establish an improved system of administration, became as binding as the treaty itself, and to which therefore the resident observed he had a right to insist on his Excellency's adherence. For the details of this discussion we refer your honourable Court to the resident's despatch recorded as per margin.†

185. Having refuted all the grounds on which his Excellency founded either his avowed disinclination to fulfil the engagements to which he had consented on the subject of the reform, or the plea under which he evidently sought to evade the execution of them by procrastination, and having drawn from his Excellency a repeated recognition of the obligation of those engagements, the resident proceeded to recapitulate each article for his Excellency's reconsideration, connecting each in its turn with one of the four fundamental principles of reform stated in the Governor-general in Council's instructions of the 28th December 1810, viz.:—First, A division and subdivision of his Excellency's dominions into *allahs* and *muhals*, with a view to facilitate the adoption of all the subsequent arrangements. This preliminary measure his Excellency declared to be totally unobjectionable as far as it was practicable, and offered to send his *dewan* to the resident for the purpose of concluding that arrangement. Secondly, The deputation of *ameens* to all the *muhals*, to investigate the state of the country, and to collect revenue documents, with a view to the moderate assessment of the lands. To the immediate and universal adoption of this measure his Excellency opposed, as before, his apprehension of general disorder in the country by the supercession of all his officers at once, and also his engagements with some farmers who deserved well of his government, and whose districts he alleged were in excellent order.

186. This

\* Consultations, 21st June.

† Consultations, 5th July.

Appendix, No. 23.

Letter from the  
British Govern-  
ment, 15 Oct. 1811.  
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136. This last objection led to a discussion, in the course of which the Resident admitted that almost the whole of the Viceroy's revenue was for a single year, and that the death of the farmer of Baraitah, the farm of which districts, therefore, although it had been granted for a term of years, was reasonable. The districts of Khandwa and Malhar, under Mubbar Ali Khan, he stated, were also farmed for a term of years, as before noticed.

137. The Resident gathered from his Excellency's further remarks, that a moiety, if not more, of his Excellency's dominions was already under the management of ameenas, or officers corresponding in some degree in their functions with those employed by the British Government in similar trusts; and this circumstance suggested a proposal which the Resident was about to make for the removal of the Viceroy's apprehensions, when he interrupted the Resident by stating it himself, namely, that the investigation and selection of revenue papers should be committed to the ameenas already employed in these districts; under the instructions which the Resident had suggested for the ameenas, and with the further benefit of the proclamation in the Viceroy's speech. By this arrangement his Excellency admitted that a number of his apprehensions would be removed, and it was agreed that this proposal should be committed to writing and maturely considered by his Excellency, who promised to signify his determination upon it in the course of a few days.

138. The Resident then proceeded to state the third and fourth articles of agreement, viz., a provision for a triennial settlement with the landholders, for a moderate rate of assessment under a graduation of engagements for that period to be guaranteed by the state, and ultimately the establishment of a court of justice and efficient police in each sikkah, when the settlement of the revenue should be concluded. To both these articles his Excellency signified his implicit adherence; and the conference concluded with a promise, on the part of the Resident, to submit the heads of it to his Excellency on the same or the ensuing day.

139. This was accordingly done, and that document will be found on record as noted in the margin.\* His Excellency, in his reply to that document, still professed his adherence to all the articles of agreement, although he declared the fulfilment of them to be dependent upon the removal of a few remaining apprehensions, of which, as his Excellency neglected to specify them, having referred for a knowledge of them to documents already in possession of the Resident, the latter desired an explanation.

140. This correspondence, also, had reference to other points of detail which it is not material to notice; with the exception of his Excellency's positive objection to the insertion of the words "with the advice and concurrence of the British Government" in the proclamation proposed by the Resident. His Excellency conceived that the insertion of those words would affect his authority, as they implied that the arrangement was adopted under the guidance of the British Government. The Resident deemed their insertion essential, with a view to give to the people that confidence which they would derive from the declared association of the British Government in the new arrangement; but finding the Viceroy inflexible on this point, he ultimately relinquished it.

141. The Viceroy's withholding any reply during fifteen days to the Resident's written request for an explanation of his Excellency's remaining doubts and apprehensions, produced a further correspondence, which the Resident reported in another despatch recorded as par margin.†

142. In consequence of that delay, the Resident addressed a letter of remonstrance to the Viceroy, in which he again called upon his Excellency to fulfil his own positive engagements, by immediately transmitting to the Resident a sketch of the division and subdivision of his country, by adopting the necessary measures for the collection of the revenue papers and the investigation of the state of the districts, either by deputation ameenas, as proposed by the Resident, or by issuing instructions to the ameenas, according to the modified proposal before mentioned.

143. On this occasion the Resident, with a view to remove every pretext on the part of the Viceroy to an immediate fulfilment of his engagements, conceded the points to which his Excellency had objected, namely,—First, The deputation of new ameenas; in lieu of which the Resident agreed that the investigation of the state of the districts and the collection of the revenue papers should be committed to the ameenas actually in authority under the new character of ameenas, and with the benefit of the proclamation and instructions; and, Secondly, The insertion of the words "with the advice and concurrence of the British Government" in the proclamation.

144. These concessions might certainly have been expected to induce the Viceroy to proceed to the adoption of the measures to which he had given his unqualified assent; but, on the contrary, his Excellency had recourse to new evasions, as well as to the revival of his former objections, although these objections had reference solely to the very arrangement which the Resident had consented to abandon, namely, the deputation of ameenas. The Viceroy referred to the Resident's desire of being acquainted with his Excellency's remaining doubts and apprehensions, with a view to remove them; to the Resident's having transmitted to the Presidency a copy of the Viceroy's statement of objections to the deputation of ameenas, and also to the Resident's having objected to the partial deputation of ameenas to the two districts of Partabgarh and Balasore, a deputation proposed by his Excellency in the course of the negotiations, under his suggested scheme of making a trial of the new system in one or two districts; and on these grounds the Viceroy founded an assumption, not only

\* Consultations, 5th July.

† Consultations, 5th July.

that the subject of his doubts and apprehensions was under reference, but that the deputa-  
tion of a mission was suspended at the resident's own request, and that consequently this  
measure being preliminary to the whole project of reform, every other measure connected  
with it was necessarily suspended.

145. To this extraordinary document the resident replied in great detail, exposing and  
refuting every plea on which his Excellency had endeavoured to justify his departure from  
his engagements; and on the same occasion, with a view to leave his Excellency no shadow  
of pretext for further delay, the resident entered into a discussion of the evils represented by  
his Excellency to be the necessary consequences of adopting measures to collect materials and  
pave the way for the future assessment of the lands on moderate terms, and under a triennial  
settlement; evils which, on the present occasion, his Excellency thought proper, in exagger-  
ated language, to describe as being the subversion of his authority, the retirement and dis-  
affection of his subjects, general disorder in the country, a suspension of the collections, and  
a total loss of balances.

146. The resident demonstrated the absurdity of these assumed apprehensions by advert-  
ing to the exactly parallel case of the Ceded Provinces, which at the period of the cession  
were in the same state as the reserved dominions, but which were brought into their present  
flourishing condition under the British Government, by the very measures now recommended  
to the Vizier, and were by the agency of means formerly his Excellency's subjects.

147. The resident, in his despatch enclosing copies of the above-mentioned documents,  
stated the following observation relative to the state of the negotiation: "The effect of this  
last letter (meaning that described in the preceding paragraph) remains yet to be seen. I  
cannot relinquish the hope of his Excellency's being ultimately induced to evince a cordial  
concurrence in the just views of the government for his own eminent advantage, as well as  
the comfort and happiness of his people; and I am further encouraged to indulge this expecta-  
tion, by reflecting that the expiration of the present current Fussy year will shortly of  
itself supersede the existing revenue arrangements, and that as his Excellency can scarcely  
entertain the design of renewing the leases of the farmers in direct opposition to the advice  
of the British Government, as conveyed by the Governor-general's letter, nor can he propose  
to himself, at any future period, the support of the British troops to the exercise of the pre-  
sent system of his administration. He must soon see the necessity of adopting the measures  
of reform, or of sacrificing wantonly a large portion of his revenue."

148. In this expectation, however, the resident was deceived; and in his next despatch,  
recorded as per margin,\* he had occasion to transmit a copy of a letter from the Vizier, in  
which his Excellency asserted that he had never made any positive promises with regard to  
the introduction of the system of reform recommended by the British Government, denied  
the application of the provisions of the treaty to the measures proposed to his adoption, and  
reasserting his former refuted pleas and arguments, declared his resolution not to adopt any  
of those measures, unless every subject of doubt and apprehension regarding the effects of  
their operation should be removed from his mind.

149. It is remarkable that this retraction followed a personal conference between the  
Vizier and the resident, in which the latter exposed in a forcible manner his Excellency's  
continued prevarications and evasions, and by argument and remonstrance apparently suc-  
ceeded in persuading his Excellency to abandon his untenable objections to the prosecution  
of the measures in agitation.

150. The arguments which, according to the resident's report, seemed to produce the most  
impression on the Vizier's mind, were substantially those to which he adverted in his former  
despatch, as quoted in the 147th paragraph, and were stated to the Vizier in the following  
terms, viz.—"That a renewal of any of the leases which were now about to expire, or the  
consignment of any portion of his dominions to the future management of farmers, in direct  
opposition to the advice of the British Government and to the express terms of the Governor-  
general's letter, could not, the resident trusted, be in his Excellency's contemplation; that  
the future assistance or support of a single soldier of the British army to the present baneful  
system of assessment and collection, or to any of its instruments in the person of his Excel-  
lency's amils, was totally out of the question; and that, under all those circumstances, it  
behoved his Excellency to consider under what so beneficial arrangement as the plan sug-  
gested by the British Government, the resources of his country could be realised and the  
internal tranquillity of his dominions secured against the probable insurrections of the land-  
holders, the effects of their oppression and despair."

151. A note of these observations his Excellency requested the resident to leave in his  
hands, promising to make a personal consideration of the subject of them in the course of a  
few days. The resident had accordingly prepared, though not transmitted, a letter contain-  
ing the substance of his verbal remarks and arguments, when he received the extraordinary  
letter from his Excellency already noticed, which however only rendered the more necessary  
the transmission of that which the resident had prepared.

152. The resident closed his report upon this unexpected issue of the negotiation in the  
following terms:—"On a retrospect of the whole of the proceedings in this arduous and im-  
portant negotiation, his Excellency the Vice-president in Council, will I doubt not, do me  
the justice to believe, that every possible exertion of my judgment and zeal has been applied,  
in the first instance, to prevail on his Excellency the Vizier to acquiesce in the salutary  
arrangements proposed to him. Right honourable the Governor-general in Council:  
that,



Appendix, No. 26.

Letter from the  
Bengal Govern-  
ment, 15 Oct. 1811.

Quoted.

that, further, no arguments which the instructions of the government suggested, or the nature of the case and subsequent occurrences required, has been omitted on my part, with the view and for the purpose of inducing his Excellency to banish his imaginary fears and to adhere to his original engagements; and that his Excellency's ultimate denial of those engagements, in direct opposition to the terms of a written document authenticated by a letter under his seal, when every argument and even plausible pretext for further delay had been repelled, is a circumstance which I could not have foreseen, and which no exertion of my judgment could at any time have enabled me to guard against.

"I am still encouraged to hope for some favourable change in the mind of his Excellency the Vizier as the effect of my last letter; and I shall not fail to take advantage of such a change, if produced, for the purpose of renewing the discussion and of prosecuting it to a satisfactory conclusion.

"A firm and decided refusal of the future assistance of our troops to support the proceedings of the aumils or coerce defaulting zemindars, must of necessity have the desired effect in a very limited time; and a declaration of this resolution on the part of the government, in a direct address from the honourable the Vice-president to his Excellency the Vizier, would, I humbly conceive, be of use in accelerating the accomplishment of the object."

153. From the tenor of these last reports we were finally compelled to entertain a conviction of the impracticability of obtaining the Vizier's concurrence in the system of reform so earnestly recommended to his adoption, excepting only by measures of absolute compulsion, that is to say, by a renewed and direct urgency on the part of this government, founded on the obligations of treaty, and accompanied by the declaration suggested in the last paragraph of the resident's despatch, as above quoted; and from the adoption of measures of this description we considered ourselves to be withheld, not only by considerations affecting, in our judgment, the very existence of the connexion on its actual basis between the two states, but by the conviction that the Vizier's involuntary acquiescence in the system of reform, even to the full extent proposed by the resident, would fail to secure its successful operations; for perverted and erroneous as are the views and sentiments of his Excellency, he would have an interest in rendering that system abortive, and we were well aware that his means of doing so were unlimited and beyond control. This consideration, indeed, was present to the mind of the Governor-general in Council, when he issued his instructions to the resident of the 28th December 1810, and it consequently was never in the contemplation of government to carry the negotiation to the extreme now suggested by the resident.

154. The object of the reference in those instructions to the obligation imposed upon the Vizier by treaty, and to the reluctance with which the British Government employed its troops for the suppression of disorders occasioned by the evils and abuses of his Excellency's administration, or to state the case more strongly, in supporting the course of injustice and oppression, was to demonstrate the right of that government to demand from the Vizier the reform of his administration, and to supply the arguments which might be supposed to have the greatest efficacy in convincing the Vizier of the necessity of a reform and in persuading him to adopt it. We could not but be of opinion, therefore, highly as we approved the resident's zeal and able exertions, manifested in the conduct of this arduous negotiation, that he had gone too far in declaring to the Vizier a positive resolution, on the part of the British Government, to refuse in future the aid of its troops in the suppression of disorders in his Excellency's country, although those disorders should be occasioned by the oppressions or misconduct of his officers; for the introduction of compulsory measures as above explained would entirely change the ground of negotiation, would bring into immediate question the continuance or dissolution of the relations between the two states, as established by treaty, but the course of proceeding suggested by the resident appeared to us to be objectionable on other grounds, namely, on the doubt we entertained of its being supported by the laws and principles which regulate the interpretation of treaties.

155. In the instructions which on this occasion were issued under our authority to the resident, these several points were discussed at great length. Instead of stating the details of these discussions in the body of this address, we beg leave to refer your honourable Court to the record of those instructions which will be found on the Consultation noted in the margin.\*

156. These observations, the resident was informed, were not intended, in any degree, as a defence of the Vizier's conduct, which we admitted to have been marked by prevarication, evasion and insincerity, throughout the whole course of the late arduous negotiation; but they were stated, first, because we deemed it of importance that the resident should be apprized of our sentiments on a question affecting the stability of the engagements subsisting between the British Government and the Vizier, and the obligations of public faith; and, secondly, as being introductory to the resolution which we found ourselves compelled to adopt, under the certain disappointment of all the resident's zealous and able efforts to accomplish the object of the Governor-general in Council's instructions of the 28th December 1810, and under the conviction already stated, that even the Vizier's acquiescence in every part of the proposed plan of reform, in the actual temper and disposition of his mind, would fail to secure any of the benefits which his cordial adoption of it would unquestionably produce.

157. That resolution was the relinquishment, for the present at least, of any further efforts on the assumed ground that the protraction of the negotiation, and the subsequent delay in the

the adoption of preliminary measures and arrangements, occasioned solely by his Excellency's *business* and *disingenuous* conduct, until the near approach of the termination of the current *Fisul* year, had rendered the prosecution of the plan of reform at the present season impracticable. The resident, at the same time, was instructed not to disguise from the Vizier the sentiments of disappointment with which we had contemplated his Excellency's conduct during the whole of the negotiation, and now contemplated the effects of it in the suspension of the salutary and unobjectionable system of reform recommended to his adoption.

158. The resident, in his despatch on the subject of the negotiation received next after the transmission of the above-described instructions (which despatch is recorded as per margin),\* having noticed an indisposition with which the Vizier had been troubled, and which had occasioned a suspension of the negotiation, stated that he had received information of a circular order having been issued to all farmers of revenue (with the exception of *Mehdee Alee Khan*, whose lease, as before mentioned, had several years to run), purporting that no renewal of their leases would be granted, and that the revenues were in future to be collected under the *amanees* system exclusively.

159. The resident took this occasion to reply to the instructions of the 21st June (the substance of which is stated in the one hundred and thirtieth and following paragraphs of this Report), expressing our opinion of the Vizier's decided disinclination to the adoption of the proposed reform, and our consequent apprehension of his Excellency's probable endeavours to render its operation abortive, and putting the resident on his guard against those arts, by which the just and benevolent intentions of the British Government in urging the reform might be converted into the charge of having occasioned a material defalcation of his Excellency's revenues, and involved his country in confusion, by effecting the subversion of a long-established system of assessment and collection, without substituting another, either efficient in its operations or adequate to the purposes for which it was proposed.

160. The resident stated himself to be well aware of the necessity of this caution, and to have kept it uniformly in view: observing, however, that with regard to this point of our apprehension, government might be considered to be sufficiently secure; for that, in the case of the Vizier's being at length happily induced to fulfil his engagements with the resident, and to execute the measures of reform under the constant influence of his suggestions, proceeding on his Excellency's own correct and unreserved communication of the circumstances to which the resident's advice might be intended to apply, the information which he (the resident) already possessed regarding the character and disposition of the principal landholders, and the state of the country and population at large, enabled him with confidence to predict the successful progress of those measures in every district of his Excellency's dominions, without any material defalcation of his revenue during even the first three years of reform, and with a certain prospect of increase at the beginning of the second settlement of the revenue; whilst, on the other hand, if his Excellency were seriously disposed, and being so disposed should be permitted to depart from any one of his engagements with the resident, to commence hereafter, as he had already on one or two occasions commenced, what his Excellency termed a partial and experimental reform of the system of assessment and collection of his revenue; if his Excellency continued, as heretofore, to withhold every degree of useful and important information from the British resident at his Court, to ask the advice of the resident occasionally on a few unimportant points, and to evince a total disregard of that advice in every instance where it might oppose his own baneful propensities or the oppressive views of his government; under such circumstances, the resident observed, the failure, whether partial or total, of the projected measures of reform, and the future decrease of a revenue which was actually decreasing with extraordinary rapidity every year, could not, on any principle, be referred to the councils of the British Government or of its representative, nor could they constitute a valid charge against the efficiency of a general system of reform, which to be executed in the terms of the treaty and existing engagements between the two states, must be executed with the uniform concurrence and advice of the honourable Company's officers, and the total failure of which might, in this latter case, and in this case alone, be made a ground of charge or reproach against the wisdom and justice of the British Government.

161. The despatch above referred to was succeeded by another three days later in date (and recorded as per margin),† communicating a copy of a letter to his address from his Excellency the Vizier, representing, in the language of apparent alarm, his extreme indisposition, entreating the resident to visit him, taking with him two or three physicians, and expressing in terms of extraordinary warmth his Excellency's confidence in the resident's friendship and sympathizing kindness. The resident stated, that he instantly obeyed the summons: that the physicians pronounced his disorder to be merely rheumatic, and though severe, not dangerous: that he had remained a considerable time in attendance on his Excellency, administering every degree of consolation which the nature of his complaint, the apparent condition of his mind, and the kindest offices and expressions of friendship could afford; and that on his second visit he had found his health considerably improved.

162. We mention this circumstance, because the resident appeared to found on this apparently sincere manifestation of the Vizier's confidence in his friendship and attachment, the expectation of a change in his Excellency's disposition with regard to the pending question of reform, and of his being ultimately induced to yield to suggestions, which this display

\* Consultations, 19th July.

† Consultations, 19th July.

display of the feelings of confidence and personal regard in the hour of distress and distress implied on the part of his Excellency a consciousness of having been dictated by an anxious desire to promote the welfare and prosperity of his government.

163. These communications appeared to render expedient the expression of our sentiments upon them, with reference to the tenor of our last instructions; and accordingly, after nothing in suitable terms our concern at his Excellency's illness, and referring to a letter which the Vice-president deemed it proper to address to the Vizier on the occasion, we directed the resident to be informed, that the circumstances and observations stated in the first of the two above-described despatches, combined even with the oscillatory language of the Vizier's letter to the resident's address, had not appeared to us to render necessary any alteration of our instructions, because they indicated no material change in that disposition of his Excellency's mind with regard to the projected system of reform on which those instructions were founded.

164. If, it was observed, his Excellency could be supposed to be sincerely desirous of effecting a reform of the present vicious system of assessment and collection; if his objections to the proposed plan were not (as they unquestionably were) fictitious; if (to use the language of the resident's despatch) any prospect existed of inducing his Excellency "to fulfil his engagements with the resident, and to execute the measures of reform under the constant influence of the resident's suggestions, proceeding on his own correct and unreserved communication of the circumstances to which the resident's advice might be intended to apply," it would be the duty of government to persevere in urging his Excellency's execution of the suggested plan; not, however, by the compulsory means of menacing the withholding of our troops from the internal service of his country, for which, indeed, no necessity would then exist, but by arguments calculated to remove his objections; arguments to which, in the temper and disposition of mind above described, his Excellency might be expected to yield, or by compromises not subversive of the object in view: but that, under the Vizier's most manifest aversion to the change of system, no advantage could be expected to arise from our perseverance. That he had resisted the force of argument, had retracted his own positive engagements, and had declined to accept the compromise proposed by himself. That the removal of one objection has been succeeded by another; and, finally, the whole course of his Excellency's conduct during the negotiation had demonstrated a systematic design to avoid the adoption of the proposed measures of reform, and warranted a conviction, that if his acquiescence were enforced by menace or by importunity, he would clandestinely employ the means within his power of rendering it abortive.

165. That the case which, as above cited, the resident had himself described as enabling him with confidence to predict the success of the meditated measures of reform could not be expected to arise. That in the disposition which his Excellency had so unalterably displayed, he might be compelled, but could not be persuaded, "to fulfil his engagements with the resident, and to execute the measures under the constant influence of his suggestions;" but that there the effect of compulsion would cease. The disposition would be wanting, which should lead his Excellency to render the resident's suggestions beneficial, by "his own correct and unreserved communication of the circumstances to which the resident's advice might be intended to apply;" and that disposition would still prevail, which as it had hitherto led his Excellency to obstruct by every species of artifice and evasion the introduction of the plan of reform, would actuate his secret endeavours to demonstrate the justice of his uniform aversion to it, by precluding the efficiency of its operation.

166. That unless, therefore, such a change should have occurred in the temper and disposition of his Excellency's mind, as to lead him cheerfully to co-operate in the measures of reform proposed to his adoption, limiting his objections to points of real doubt, not raising them, as hitherto, with the secret design of preventing the execution of those measures, we must consider a further prosecution of the negotiation to be more than useless.

167. The next despatch from the resident contained a reply to our instructions of the 6th of July, the substance of which is stated in the one hundred and fifty-third and following paragraphs of this address. The resident stated some explanations on two points which formed the principal topics of the discussions contained in those instructions.

168. We had disputed the justice, on the ground of those principles which regulate the interpretation of treaties, of founding a refusal to afford the aid of our troops in suppressing disorders in his Excellency's country; that is to say, a refusal to fulfil a specific obligation of treaty, on the Vizier's declining to accede to a specific plan of reform proposed to him under that article of the treaty of 1801, which imposes on his Excellency an obligation to introduce into his country an improved system of administration and to conform to the counsels of the British Government; in other words, we contended that this refusal on the part of the Vizier could not be deemed such a violation of the articles of treaty as to warrant what we could not but consider to be tantamount to a declared dissolution of the alliance.

169. A. The explanations of the resident tended to demonstrate, not that the Vizier had violated the treaty by refusing his consent to a specific system of reform recommended to him by the British Government, and that the penalty of that violation should justly be the withholding the aid of our troops for the suppression of disorders in his country (a position which he never intended to maintain), but that his Excellency had evinced a disposition to refuse the fulfilment of a positive obligation of treaty, by obtaining from the adoption of any system or measure of reform, which justified the ultimate declaration of a refusal of the aid of our troops to the oppressive and arbitrary demands of the Vizier's farmers and sumils, combined with the exercise of the essential right of every government to investigate and ascertain

ascertain the justice of the demands which its power might be required to enforce, before proceeding to enforce those demands, by extensive and hazardous, as well as in most cases, unnecessary warfare.

169. The resident supported the first part of this position by observing, that his Excellency, in the outset of the negotiation, acknowledged his obligation to reform the system of his government. That he tacitly admitted his own inability to suggest an efficient plan for that purpose, and that he called upon the British Government, in the person of its representative, to devise and arrange the details of an improved system of administration, such as that government might consider itself bound and authorized to support, without incurring any longer the reproach of abetting injustice and oppression. That his Excellency after mature deliberation and discussion acquiesced, and declared his acquiescence in the principal measures of reform which had been suggested at his own desire for his adoption, and had finally retracted his acquiescence under circumstances of extraordinary aggravation.

170. In the second place, the resident contended that his declaration to the Vizier, relative to the future refusal of the aid of our troops, fell far short of that of a positive resolution to refuse their aid for the suppression of any future disorders in his Excellency's country, to be occasioned by the oppression of his amils, and that it had been limited to the future refusal of the aid or support of our troops to the oppressive demands of the amils in the progress of their collection of the revenue, a peculiar description of support for which (the resident observed) no article of the treaty provided, and which, in fact, was expressly superseded by the second clause of the third article, authorizing and requiring the Vizier to retain in his service such number of armed peons as should be deemed necessary for the purposes of the collections, and a few horsemen and nujeebs to attend the persons of the aminees; although the practice of the British Government, proceeding on principles of liberality to his Excellency the Vizier, had certainly tended to establish a belief in his Excellency's mind, that the British troops, like the armed peons in his service, were the bounden slaves of his will, the necessary instruments of his oppression.

171. The resident added, that the only question in his contemplation, in suggesting (as noticed in the hundred and fifty-second paragraph of this address) a direct declaration on the part of the Vice-president, in a letter to the Vizier, of our resolution to refuse the future assistance of our troops to support the proceedings of the amils or coerce the defaulting zemindars, was, whether the belief above mentioned should be removed from the Vizier's mind, by a solemn declaration of the future intention of the government to investigate the justice of the demands which its power might be required to enforce, or should continue to influence the Vizier's conduct in direct opposition to our counsels.

172. The resident concluded his despatch (for the details of which we refer your honourable Court to the record of it on the Consultation noted in the margin\*) by signifying his intention of carrying out our instructions of the 6th of July into effect, as soon as the state of the Vizier's health should admit of his entering on the subject.

173. The last despatch of the resident connected with the subject of reform, reported that the Vizier appeared to have recovered his usual state of health. That his Excellency had requested, in an earnest manner, the discontinuance of the daily visits of inquiry that the resident had paid him; expressing the highest sense of the resident's friendship and the extraordinary gratification of his Excellency's mind by the sedulous attention of the resident during the whole course of his illness, on which the resident observed, that the then apparently happy frame of the Vizier's temper and disposition, if there were any certainty of its continuance, would authorize the hope of success from the renewal of the negotiation; but that he considered himself precluded from taking advantage of any circumstances for that purpose by our recent orders, and that he should therefore content himself with receiving such proposals on the subject as the Vizier might think proper to convey to him. The resident, in the same despatch, also described the terms on which he proposed to communicate to his Excellency our resolution relative to the suspension of the negotiation.

174. In the reply to the two last-mentioned despatches, a reference was made to specific passages in the resident's preceding reports, on which we had founded the construction of the resident's declaration relative to the future employment of our troops. Without disputing the accuracy of the resident's explanations on that point, it was merely observed that the intent and meaning of the declaration as described by the resident required that it should have consisted not of an indefinite and unqualified refusal of the future aid of our troops to support the proceedings of the amils or coerce the defaulting zemindars, but of an alleged right of previous investigation, of a right to arbitrate the demands which the troops might be called upon to support, and of an intimation of the resolution of the British Government to exercise that right on all future occasions.

175. The case, it was observed, might be supposed, of one or more zemindars in a province, driven perhaps to extremity by the injustice or exactions of an amil or farmer refusing to pay any portion of the public revenue, assuming an attitude of resistance, and preparing to oppose any attempt on the part of the latter to enforce his demands. Such zemindars must then be considered to be in a state of rebellion, and under the supposition that the local authority did not possess the power of reducing them to obedience, the demand of assistance from the British troops would be authorized by the stipulations of the treaty, and the case would require the march of our troops to the scene of these disorders; not, however, necessarily for the purpose of enforcing the demands of the amil, but for the preservation of tranquility

Appendix, No. 96

Letter from the  
Bengal Govern-  
ment, 12 Oct. 1811.  
Oude.

\* Consultations, 2d August.

Letter from the  
Bengal Govern-  
ment, 18 Oct. 1831.  
Oude.

tranquillity in the first instance, and ultimately for the enforcement of the demands which on investigation, might be found to be just, at the same time that investigation would be prosecuted in the manner that might be settled between the resident and the Vizier.

176. It was observed, that this course of proceeding would obviously require, as the alternative of the Vizier's declining the adoption of any reform, a declaration essentially differing from the terms of that which the resident actually conveyed to him, since it would require that the right of investigation and arbitration should be asserted and recognised in all cases in which the aid of our troops should be demanded.

177. The resident was directed actually to convey the intimation above described to the Vizier, adjusting with him, at the same time, the mode of inquiry to be prosecuted for ascertaining the justice of the demands which our troops might be required to enforce.

178. The resident was informed, that this instruction was founded on the supposition that the Vizier could not be induced cordially to enter into the scheme of reform which had been proposed, because that scheme involved an effectual restraint on the oppressions and exactions of his Excellency's officers, and the means of ascertaining the equity of their demands on the landholders. But that if the change of disposition adverted to in the resident's last-mentioned despatch should have proved so essential as to lead his Excellency to acquiesce in the beneficial arrangements which he had till then resisted, the resident would, of course, have prosecuted the negotiation which, by the orders of government of the 6th ultimo, he had been directed to suspend.

179. With the preceding instructions (which will be found recorded as per margin\*) the correspondence on the subject of the proposed reform of the Vizier's administration has for the present closed. We learn from the private advices, that on the plea of ill health, the Vizier has continued studiously to avoid any further communication on this subject, and that it is his Excellency's object to observe this course, and to refrain from replying to the Governor-general's letter of the 28th December 1810, until after his Lordship's return to the Presidency.

180. Our object, in conveying to your honourable Court this detailed Report, is to bring under your notice the peculiar character and disposition of the Vizier's mind, and to exhibit the difficulty, and we fear the impracticability, of influencing him to the adoption of any arrangements which are calculated to affect the operation of his inordinate desire for the accumulation of wealth, however conducive to the prosperity of his country, the happiness of his subjects, and even to the future augmentation of his revenues.

181. When the lands are let in farm, they are leased on exorbitant terms. The farmer with a view both to fulfil his engagements and to secure a profit to himself during the limited period of his tenure, naturally exercises rigour and oppression within the limits of his authority. When the lands are held *aumane*, that is, placed under charge of an officer of the government appointed to collect the revenue, that officer is rendered responsible for the realization of the imposed jumma, and the excess of the assessment is generally such as cannot be levied without extortion, violence, and injustice. When a compliance with such demands is refused, the farmer, amil, or officer represents the zemindar or under-renter to be a defaulter and rebel, and urges the necessity of employing troops for his coercion. Thus the Vizier employs the British troops as the instrument of those wide extended exactions, while their presence, and the knowledge of the obligations imposed on the British Government to suppress disorders within his Excellency's country, precludes that natural remedy which overstrained and unprotected oppression carries within itself.

182. Disappointed in our endeavours to relieve the British Government from the necessity of supporting the activity of a system of rapacity and injustice, without assuming a degree of interference in the internal concerns of the Vizier's dominions which would amount to the absolute control of his Excellency's authority, no alternative seems left but the establishment and exercise of that right of investigation and arbitration which is described in our last instructions to the resident. This course of proceeding, however, even supposing it to be unobstructed by the perverted interests and artifices of the Vizier, can only be expected to remedy the evils complained of in a very partial degree. The abuses of a system radically vicious must continue to exist, and under the most favourable operation of the proposed arrangement, we can only hope, in some cases, to be the means of preventing specific acts of injustice, and to avoid the pain and the discredit of enforcing exactions by the terror of the British arms.

We have, &c.

(signed)

G. Hewett,  
J. Lumsden,  
H. Colebrooke.

Fort William,  
15th October, 1811

### Appendix, N° 27.

MINUTE of Lord William Bentinck, dated 30th July 1831.

Appendix, No. 27.

Minute of Lord  
William Bentinck,  
30 July 1831.

DURING the last thirty years, the earnest endeavours of the Supreme Government have been unceasingly exerted to induce the rulers of Oude to reform the administration of that misgoverned and oppressed country. It is unnecessary to say, that these endeavours have been uniformly and entirely unavailing, and it may not be too much to add, that as long as it shall be held to be inconsistent with a rigid adherence to existing treaties, to push our interference

Consultations, 2d August.

interference beyond the limits of friendly counsel, or of measures of a merely negative character, the task, for the present at least, must be utterly hopeless. Indeed, it may be asked, what better prospect does the future hold out when the experiment has been under trial during the reigns of three successive princes of entirely different characters, and has been accompanied with the same results and the same failure.

As this state of misgovernment continues to prevail in a greater and more aggravated degree than in any former period, as will be presently shown, it becomes necessary to consider, whether under all the circumstances of our position in relation to the state of Oude any justification is to be found, either in the letter or the spirit of our engagements, for the forbearance to apply a remedy to evils which by no possibility could have existed for so long a period, and to such an extent, except under the safeguard of our protection and power. It is true, that the honourable and much more able persons who have preceded me in the government, with the concurrence also of their council, have deemed themselves forbidden, by a strict interpretation of existing treaties, forcibly to compel the fulfilment of that stipulation by which the Vizier and his successors have bound themselves to introduce "such a system of administration as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and calculated to secure the lives and properties of the inhabitants, as well as to act according to the advice of the Supreme Government." If I presume to differ from these high authorities, and to recommend a course of decided and peremptory interposition, as more consonant to the high obligations imposed upon us, it is right that I should disclaim all idea or desire of promoting any separate British interest, at the expense of the dignity and comfort of the reigning sovereign of Oude; the policy, on the contrary, which I think ought to be pursued to all the dependent chiefs subject to our paramount power, is mainly an abstinence from interference, a forbearance from all display of our real power except in extreme cases, where the peace of neighbouring states may be disturbed from the effects of anarchy and disorder which the ruler may be unable or unwilling to suppress, or where a system of internal administration prevails, marked by such extraordinary cruelty and oppression as to call down universal reprobation. But these sentiments will be further explained in considering the decision of former governments upon the same question.

I shall now record a memoir submitted to me by the resident at Lucknow, on my march to the upper provinces, in which is depicted the actual state of that country.

Referring to the misrule that had prevailed during the life of the preceeding sovereign, the resident observes, "but with the present reign the administration has become still more vicious;" "the country has been going to ruin, and, from want of order, arrangement, or stability in the government oppression and anarchy universally prevail; the people have, in consequence, no faith or reliance in their government, and constant desertion is going on from the capital and the rest of the kingdom." "No revenue system on equitable principles can be ever effected by the unaided efforts of the Oude government; constant oppression and the habitual breach of all contracts have so completely destroyed their confidence in their rulers, that they cannot be expected to trust them again, while, as they themselves declare, they would agree to pay much higher rents than at present, if they were assured that the contracts made with them would not be infringed. A minister of Oude knows, with the disadvantages he labours under from this feeling of distrust and insecurity, that however honest he may personally be, it is impossible for him to prevent those employed in the collection of the revenue under him from following the rack-renting oppressive system which can alone render their appointments profitable to themselves, or enable them to meet the probable exactions to which they may themselves be subjected. During the late cold season, hardly a day elapsed that we could not hear at Lucknow the fire of artillery at places which the king's troops were besieging, or in engagements between them and the zemindars. Now again that the season for operations has arrived, we have hostilities carrying on in the immediate vicinity of the capital." "The inefficiency of the police was never so glaring as at present." "The capital and its environs are the scenes of nightly robberies and murders, and the roads in the vicinity are so beset by thieves and desperate characters, that no one thinks of passing by day or night without protection." "The military force maintained by the King of Oude is preposterously large, and a considerable portion of it, exceeding in number 40,000 men, with guns, is scattered over the country to strengthen the hands of the local officers, and to secure the collection of the revenue, yet they are not found sufficient for the duty they have to perform."

These extracts will suffice to show the disorder prevailing in every department of the administration of the country. Being aware of the indisposition of the resident towards the minister of the King of Oude, and of the inclination which he had shown to receive too easily every complaint and representation that his numerous enemies would eagerly pour into the ear of a hostile British functionary, I thought it possible that this memoir and report might have received a somewhat exaggerated colouring from the prejudiced feelings under which it was written. But all the British officers, both those in civil situations at Cawnpore, as well as those belonging to the regiments cantoned in different parts of Oude, gave complete confirmation to the statement. The desolate and deserted state of one of the finest portions of Oude, and I may say of India, in respect to fertility of soil and goodness of climate, through which, during several days, I myself marched from Lucknow to Rohilkund, afforded a melancholy proof of the oppression occasioned by the farming system. Our own collectors and magistrates in the districts contiguous to the Oude frontier have made such frequent reports of the incursions of plunderers and dacoits, that we have been forced to entertain additional bodies of horse to preserve tranquillity, and have required the King of Oude to defray the expense.

FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 27.

Misrule of Lord  
Wellesley in India,  
3 July 1831.

Oude.

Indeed, in the confidence I had with the king and his ministers, the existence of these disorders was not denied; but it is but fair to say, that this admission might not have been so readily made, if the minister had not been desirous of heaping as much blame as possible upon the administration of his predecessors in office, one of whom, Moosunood Dewlah, was his great rival. He might not have been unwilling to exhibit to their utmost extent the difficulties he had to encounter, by way of excusing his future failure or enhancing his future success.

In his memoir, the object of the resident is to show, that it is the suspension of that rigid interference and control over the affairs of Oude, which was stipulated for in the treaty of 1801, made by Lord Wellesley that all this mismanagement is to be attributed, and from no other measure short of the actual assumption of the government, either directly in the substitution of our own authority, or indirectly in the nomination of a minister, who as formerly at Hyderabad, shall be solely dependent upon the British Government, and the agent is fact of the resident, that any change can be expected. The consideration of subsequent measures will be hereafter examined. It will be necessary previously to review the causes assigned by the resident for this long-continued failure; and, with respect to the failure, he argues, and in my opinion justly argues, that the same effect must continue as long as our guarantee is allowed to neutralize all those principles of self correction existing in every other independent state. If, while we secure the sovereign from all insurrection and aggression from his subjects, however great be his tyranny and oppression, and withhold at the same time the only remaining remedy in the efficacious interposition of our own power, the case of the Oude people is desperate indeed. Is it possible that construction of our obligations can be right which makes our protection instrumental to evil alone, and to evil of such enormous magnitude!

From the character of the king, the main source of all hopes and fears in a despotic state, nothing good is to be expected. Mr. Maddock says of him, and I believe with perfect truth, "His present majesty was bred up among women, and all his ideas are effeminate. He has no sound talents, and less habitude for business, and the government of his country must devolve upon other hands. But he is extravagant and wasteful in his expenses, and will never be satisfied with any administration that attempts to limit his income." Upon the records are certainly to be found reports from the former resident of acts of great cruelty and revenge committed under his majesty's orders; but when at Lucknow, I was not satisfied that depravity of this nature could be justly charged to him. Of his extreme weakness there can be no doubt. He must ever be a cipher as to the important duties belonging to a sovereign. He must always be a tool in the hands of those who have possession of his mind, and this influence has hitherto been gained by the vilest subserviency to all his bad passions.

The minister is described by the resident "as being in his heart more decidedly inimical to us than could possibly be expected in a person who has so long enjoyed the benefits of our protection, and who owes, if not his existence, the preservation of an immense fortune which he amassed in this country, to the asylum which has been afforded to him in the British territory."

Honestly, no doubt, entertaining this conviction, the resident without any authority from the government, showed himself extremely adverse to the hukoom's elevation, and deeply prejudiced, thought he saw in every act and measure of the minister a systematic design to oppose the wishes of the British Government, and in one instance, indeed, the removal of the ex-minister, he indulged the extravagant belief that the hukoom entertained the idea of resisting by military force the execution of this order of the supreme authority. I believe in no such hostility on the part of the minister. He is indisputably one of the ablest men in India, and is not surpassed by any other individual, whether European or native, as a revenue administrator. He saw from the beginning that nothing would satisfy the resident but the becoming, to use his own words, the King of Oude, and to this inferior position it suited neither his ambition nor his interests to submit. My hope has always been, and is, that able as he certainly is beyond all other men to reform the administration, so cordially assisted by a resident, whose advice, however firm and decided, shall never be wanting in conciliation and respect, he will be equally willing to accomplish this great object; and it must always be moreover recollected, that to a remedy to all the political evils of the state, he has the additional and more difficult task of governing an imbecile, childish, and capricious monarch.

Speaking of the effects of our guarantee, the resident makes these very judicious remarks: "If the people were assured that the king would receive no military aid from us, the probability is, that his own attempts to coerce his subjects would be defied, and everywhere resisted." The very arrears into which the army and other establishments had in the meantime fallen, would, under ordinary circumstances, in any government, have brought about a revolution or a change of system; and here also the sovereign of Oude is, by his connexion with us, placed in a different situation from that of other princes, for it cannot be imagined that an army of 60,000 men would have quietly submitted to remain, some a year, some two years and upwards, without pay, but from a fear that we should protect the king against any serious and general mutiny of the troops to enforce payment of their arrears. The most powerful stimuli, from the same feeling, evince a degree of subordination and obedience to the government, even to the relinquishment of their offices, and the almost certain consequences, loss of liberty, honour, and property, which could not be expected from them if they had no other fear but that of their own government. If the state of Oude had no right to our protection, these officers would resist its power with every prospect of success; and

and not only could not the government pursue its present system of misrule without the understood sanction of our Government, it would shortly crumble to pieces, and the annals, or the leaders of the army, would portion "out the kingdom among themselves. The alliance with us alone enables it to exist, and to pursue a system, decidedly detrimental to the prosperity of its subjects." "Yet hitherto we have discharged no one of our duties, and while maintaining and augmenting the power and dignity of the prince, and securing him from all aggression, we have neglected the claims of the people, and have been instrumental to riveting the chains by which they are kept down, and prevented from asserting their own rights, and securing, by resistance, a better government for themselves."

Such are, such have been, and ever will be the evils, as long as the system of double government prevailing in Oude continues to be administered upon the present principle; the story of to-day is the exact counterpart of that of thirty years ago. In 1798, Sir Thomas Munro, that able and long-sighted politician, in a letter to the Governor-general, strongly objecting (and how just have his objections proved!) to the establishment of the Rajah of Mysore, to whose family no attachment remained on the part of the natives, "for it has been long despised and forgotten;" and urging in preference the partition of Tippecoo's dominions between the Company and the Nizam, observes, "There is, perhaps, none of them (natives) who would not prefer a strong government like that of the Company, to one like that of the rajah, which must necessarily be composed of different interests, must be weakened and perplexed by intrigue, and must carry with itself, like the double governments of Oude and Tanjore, the destruction of the resources of the country."

I cannot refrain from introducing the opinion of the same great man upon the effect of a subsidiary force, or, in other words, of our interference to protect the sovereign, and of our non-interference to protect the people. It is peculiarly applicable to the present case of Oude, while the existing state of Mysore fulfils to the very letter the prediction of the future consequences of the rajah's administration. This letter was written to the Governor-general in 1817: "There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force; it has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists weak and oppressive, to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy for a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion, or by foreign conquests; but the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security, and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects; wherever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Peshwa and the Nizam, and is now beginning to be seen in Mysore. The talents of Purneah, while he acted as dewan, saved that country from the usual effects of that system, but the rajah is likely to let them have their full operation. He is indolent and prodigal, and has already, besides his current revenue, dissipated about sixty lacs of pagodas of the treasure laid up by the late dewan. He is mean, artful, revengeful, and cruel; he does not take away life, but he inflicts the most disgraceful and cruel punishments on men of every rank, at a distance from his capital, where he thinks it will remain unknown to Europeans; and though young, he is already detested by his subjects."

Although Lord Wellesley did not unfortunately adopt the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro, as expressed in his letter of June 1799, respecting the partition of Mysore, he at least endeavoured to provide against the mischiefs of the double government. In his letter to the honourable Court, dated the 3d of August 1799, he observes, "With this view I have undertaken the protection of his country in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas; but recollecting the inconvenience and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double government and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, I resolved to restore to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country, &c."

Two years subsequently, in 1801, the Marquis Wellesley proceeded to reform the abuses in the administration of Oude, the description of which, as given in his Lordship's letter to the Viceroy, dated the 5th of April, will be found to correspond in every particular with that contained in the Report of the present resident at Lucknow. "I now declare to your Excellency in the most explicit terms, that I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity rather than to suffer the progress of that ruin to which the interests of your Excellency and the honourable Company are exposed, by the continual operation of the evils and abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the province of Oude;" and it is added, "But I must recall to your Excellency's recollection the fact, which you have so emphatically acknowledged upon former occasions, that the principal source of all your difficulties is to be found in the state of the country. I have repeatedly represented to your Excellency the effects of the ruinous expedient of anticipating the collections, the destructive practice of realising them by force of arms, the annual diminution of the jummahs of the country, the precarious tenure by which the annals and farmers hold their possessions, the misery of the lower classes of the people, absolutely excluded from the protection of the government, and the utter insecurity of life and property throughout the province of Oude."

And in a letter to the resident, dated 27th May 1801, it is declared, "His Lordship cannot



Appendix, No. 37.

Minutes of Lord  
Wellesley's Speeches  
30 July 1851.

Oude.

cannot permit the Vizier to maintain an independent power with a considerable force, within the territories remaining in his Excellency's possession."

With reference to all these evils, the Governor-general declared his conviction, that no effectual security could be provided against the ruin of the province of Oude, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country should be transferred to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of his Excellency and his family. Such was his Lordship's view of the only remedy that could effect any improvement; but the Vizier making the most determined opposition to the plan, his Lordship was compelled to relinquish it, but substituted, what he probably considered to be tantamount to it in effect, the stipulation, "That while the British Government guaranteed to the Vizier, his heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain to his Excellency after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of *his own and their authority*" (the force of the latter expression I do not exactly understand) "within the said dominions, his Excellency, on the other hand, engages to establish such a system of administration, &c., and will always advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the honourable Company."

The historian, Mr. Mill, justly enough remarks, "No dominion can be more complete than that which provides for a perpetual conformity to one's counsel, that is, one's will." I have not the means of referring to Lord Wellesley's despatches, to know precisely in what relation his Lordship intended that the Vizier and the resident should stand for the future to each other; but the inference is clear, that the whole power of the state was to be transferred to the resident, the nominal sovereignty only being left with the Vizier.

An opinion of Sir Thomas Munro's, written in 1817, upon this kind of arrangement, is worthy of being transcribed: "A subsidiary force would be a most useful establishment, if it could be directed to the support of our ascendancy, without nourishing all the vices of a bad government, but this seems to be almost impossible. The only way in which this object has ever in any degree been attained is by the appointment of a *dewan*; this measure is no doubt liable to numerous objections, but still it is the only one by which amends can be made to the people of the country for the miseries brought upon them by the subsidiary force, in giving stability to a vicious government. The great difficulty" (Sir Thomas would better have said the impossibility) "*is to prevent the prince from counteracting the ~~dewan~~ and the resident from meddling too much*; but when this is avoided, the *dewan* may be made a most useful instrument of government."

During the remainder of Lord Wellesley's government, it does not appear that much progress was made in the work of improvement. I perceive that in 1802, plans were brought forward for a better judicial administration and revenue system, but the Governor-general's attention being drawn to the more important subjects of a war with Scindia and the Mahrattas, and not wholly unoccupied perhaps with the discussions in England upon his various political measures, all minor questions seemed to have been overlooked. It may, however, be right to remark, that in November 1803, the home authorities declared their entire approbation of the late transactions with the Vizier. "The stipulation of the treaty being calculated to improve and secure the interests of the Vizier as well as those of the Company, and to provide more effectually hereafter for the good government of Oude, and consequently for the happiness of its inhabitants."

It is impossible to suppose that it could be any part of the comprehensive and decisive policy of the Marquis Wellesley, or of the home authorities, to allow one of the principal parts of this treaty to remain a dead letter, that they merely cared for the pecuniary benefit which they derived, and that for the rest, "the good government of Oude, and the happiness of the inhabitants," these were nothing more than professions of philanthropy, introduced to give a kind and beneficent colouring to transactions that might be characterized as unjust and oppressive; I entertain, however, that high opinion of the noble Lord's decision and firmness, as to be perfectly satisfied that had he remained in India, the government of Oude would not have remained for 28 years the curse of its own people, and the disgrace of the British council.

But to those of Lord Wellesley succeeded other policy and other measures; the renunciation of conquests, the abandonment of influence and power, the maintenance of a system strictly neutral, defensive, non-interfering, pacific, according to the full spirit of that enactment declaring, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation." The impossibility of adhering to this beautiful theory was soon manifested, even in the government of Lord Minto, than whom there could not be a man more desirous of acting up to the letter of his instructions, or less disposed to entertain projects of ambition or aggrandisement. Subsequent events have all shown that, however moderate our views, however contented we may be with our commanding position, however determined not to extend our limits, it has been utterly out of our power to stand still; such have been the restless, plundering habits which belong to this great Indian society, such its very natural jealousy and apprehension of our power, and such its disregard of all rules and maxims of common prudence or safe conduct, that after a series of unprovoked aggressions, Lord Hastings at last, in 1817, brought to a completion that system of policy which the great genius and foresight of Lord Wellesley had originally planned, and would have probably accomplished five and twenty years before, had he remained in India. Lord Hastings thus established the pre-eminence of our power, and a new era of civilization, happiness, and of blessing to this great Indian world, to be effected by British hands; but Minto remain on this fair surface, and one of the greatest

is Oude, and this I hope may still be washed out, to the ultimate advantage of both the rulers and the people.

I shall pursue with as much brevity as possible, the history of our negotiations with Oude, for the reformation of its administration; and this result will clearly appear, that in proportion as we have receded from the vigorous line of policy laid down in Lord Wellesley's treaty, so has the misrule of Oude become greater and greater, while during all this time we have been admitting that this impunity to commit every species of extortion and oppression has been solely suffered to exist in consequence of our support.

During the four first years of Lord Minto's administration, nothing could be more active and unceasing than his endeavours on this question of reform, and the task could not have been confided to abler hands than to those of the resident at Lucknow at that period; but in 1811, the Governor-general having met with nothing but opposition from the Vizier, and being satisfied of the impracticability of obtaining his concurrence, except by measures of absolute compulsion, finally relinquished all further efforts; his Lordship did not even feel himself justified to adopt that negative measure recommended to him by the resident, and disapproved the threat of it which had been held out by the latter to the Vizier, viz "of refusing heretofore the aid of the British troops in the suppression of the disorders in Oude, although occasioned by the oppressions or misconduct of the Vizier's officers."

The despatch from the secretary to government to the resident, dated the 11th of July 1811, communicating this resolution, contains a very able exposé of the law and principles by which the interpretation of the treaty should be regulated, according to which, in his Lordship's opinion, we were not authorized, even if the stipulations might have been violated, unless indeed the Vizier had placed himself in the condition of a public enemy, to enforce them by an exercise of our power; I need not state in further detail a train of reasoning so well known to those by whom this question will have to be decided, and in accordance with which the home authorities appear in a great measure to have acted.

The subject, however, of reform, was not abandoned by Lord Minto; on the 2d of July 1813, a letter was addressed by his Lordship to the Vizier, in which expostulation is expressed in the strongest terms, upon the neglect shown by the Vizier to all the representations made to him upon the state of his country, and in which are described, also, the obligations imposed by the treaty of 1801 upon the two governments; but then, as now, these remonstrances consisting of vain and empty words, and followed by no ulterior measures, the stipulations of the treaty and the voice of the British Government were, and always have been, held at naught. It is impossible to have stated these stipulations and obligations more strongly than his Lordship did in the following passages: "But it is necessary to draw your attention to those questions upon which your Excellency has continued to withhold your consent to the just and reasonable demands and expectations urged by the British Government, *under the clear and unequivocal sanction of existing treaties and engagements.* The most prominent of these, in point of interest and general importance, is the reform of your Excellency's administration, &c. It can hardly be necessary to recall to your Excellency's recollection the tenor of my letter of the 28th of December 1810 (five years before), in which the right of this government to propose to your Excellency the introduction of a reform, *and the obligation imposed upon you by treaty to adopt that advice were proved* beyond the reach of contradiction." "Entertaining the most deliberate conviction of the advantage, *my necessity*, of the proposed reform, of the right possessed by this government to urge your Excellency to introduce it, and of the obligation which the treaty imposes upon you to attend to the advice and opinion of the British Government in carrying into effect that salutary arrangement, the British Government would have been entitled, and was perhaps required to insist upon your Excellency proceeding without delay to carry it into effect;" and the letter concludes with these words, "but while your Excellency shall persist in disregarding that advice, and resisting those demands, in matters deemed essential to the welfare of your government, and the welfare of your subjects, and in your compliance with which the British Government is entitled and required to insist, your Excellency must not expect that the British Government, by whatever hands administered, will shrink from the performance of its duty, however painful it may be to discharge it."

Lord Hastings succeeded to the Supreme Government in October 1813. The measure of reform continued to be urged on the Vizier, but with the same unavailing success. In the letter to the resident, dated 25th of March 1814, the Governor-general laments the perverse and unenlightened policy which induces the Vizier to reject that system of administration recommended to his adoption by the British Government; but it does not appear to his Excellency in Council, that under a just and fair construction of the "obligations of the alliance, we are entitled to proceed to the only measure of a compulsive nature which was ever suggested, namely, a renewed and direct demand, founded on the stipulations of the treaty, accompanied by a menace of withholding the aid of the British troops, in support of his Excellency's authority in case of refusal." Lord Hastings then expresses his concurrence in the arguments of Lord Minto, upon a like occasion, in 1811, and adds, "The conclusion appears to the Governor-general in Council to be inevitable, namely, that the specific plan of reform proposed to the Vizier by Lord Minto must be relinquished or insisted on as the alternative of a resolution on our part, which would amount to a dissolution of the existing relations between the two states."

The Vizier, Sadat Ali, died on the 11th of July 1811.

His successor soon after his accession promised to comply with the so often repeated advice of the Supreme Government; but at no very great distance of time, the hopes held out proved entirely delusive; and though during the reign of that monarch, as well as of his

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present majesty, the same remonstrances and demands have been continually renewed, not the slightest improvement has taken place in any branch of the administration.

Lord Hastings visited Lucknow in 1816; the war with Nepal and the Mahrattas was then going on, and very serious embarrassment was experienced in raising the funds to meet the heavy demands of military operations; recourse was had to loans from our different allies; and after much reluctance on his part, two crores were advanced by the Vizier, in the hope, no doubt, of purchasing an exemption from all further importunity upon the subject of reform. After an act of such substantial service, it would have been indeed difficult, and most ungracious in any rate, to have persevered in pressing a measure to which so much repugnance had been shown. I may perhaps be permitted in this place to remark, that to these loans from dependent states, or as they might be more justly described, unwilling contributions extorted by fear of our power, there is, in my judgment, the greatest objection in the destruction of confidence which they necessarily occasion. When twenty lacs were borrowed from the Rajah of Puttala, which that chief, as I learnt from the late agent, never expected to be repaid, Runjeet Sing laughed, and asked if this was the gratuitous protection that he and the other Sikh chiefs had obtained at the hands of the British Government. Nothing has given me greater satisfaction than the opportunity afforded by the state of our finances and credit to discharge these political loans, and thus to rescue from all doubt our honour, our promise, and our exact performance of our engagements. In the particular case of Oude, it was to be regretted that for the sake of a pecuniary advantage to ourselves, we should have weakened the right so often urged, of insisting upon the cessation of the tyrannical and oppressive system prevailing in the Oude dominions.

It is necessary that I should conclude this narrative of the various proceedings and transactions, together with the line of policy pursued by preceding governments, with the latest opinions of the honourable Court respecting the state of Oude.

I have already said that the honourable Court entirely approved of the principles upon which both Lords Minto and Hastings considered themselves precluded from interfering, authoritatively, upon the subject of reform, and down to the present moment no sanction has been given to any measure of compulsion to attain this object.

But in the later despatches of the Court, while, as is most just and becoming, the strongest reluctance is expressed to intrench in the smallest degree on the independence of the King of Oude, to interfere with his internal administration, or to commit any act which should have the semblance of taking advantage of his weakness, yet the utmost anxiety is expressed to put an end to this state of things, and a doubt escapes, whether the principle so long acted upon had not failed.

In a despatch from the Court to Bengal, dated the 28th of November 1821, in remarking an apparent contravention in the policy observed by Lord Hastings towards the King of Oude and the Nizam, they state in reference to the former system of forbearance and non-interference, "But adverting to the frequent instances reported by the resident at Lucknow, of Company's troops employed in coercing the Vizier's refractory zemindars, &c., we cannot but doubt whether the Governor-general's other object has been obtained, namely, *that by allowing freedom of action to the legitimate power of the state, our ally might be taught to manage his territories with benefit to his people, and with an exoneration of the British Government from the odium which attached to it as the source of the existing evils.*"

In then despatch, dated 9th November 1825, the Court observe (paragraph 153), "The correspondence before us presents a truly deplorable picture of the condition of the territories under the government of the King of Oude, and gives us strong reason to apprehend that the services of our troops have been too frequently employed, not to suppress disorder, but to perpetuate it by supporting oppression."

The Court here ascribe the mischief to the employment, heretofore, of British troops in the collection of the revenue, and in the destruction of the forts, the consequences of which were our direct support of the avarice in every species of extortion, and all successful resistance to oppression was necessarily prevented. The Court specify a strong act of individual injustice committed under our protection, and notice the plunder and rapine which our own provinces were suffering from the bands of armed followers, who took refuge within our frontiers. The Court remark upon the extreme difficulty in defining the line between the cases of extortion on the one hand, and contumacy on the other, by which the employment of our troops should be regulated. To escape from this dilemma, two measures only present themselves, either to withdraw altogether from the connexion with Oude, from which it is stated, "we are debilitated by the provisions of the existing treaty," or to bring about a reform in the administration.

The latter measure, the Court urged the Supreme Government to use every means of persuasion to engage the King of Oude to adopt. But they, at the same time, discountenanced any more decided course of proceeding which a passage in some instructions sent to the resident, Mr. Ricketts, seemed to indicate. An ulterior course of proceeding was adverted to in case the King of Oude should fail to act up to his professions, and combining this expression with the desire to prevail upon the king to allow the employment of British officers in the revenue administration, the Court observe, "It has occurred to us as possible that you may have contemplated the authoritative interposition of that agency, as the ulterior course to be resorted to in the case supposed." They then say that this would not be in accordance with the treaty, which stipulates that the reform shall be carried into effect by the king's own officers, and they conclude, "Rather, however, than incur the hazard and odium of a rupture with the King of Oude, we should greatly prefer your acquiescing in his propositions,

however

however defective, and trust to the zeal of the agent to point out any evils apparent in the practical application of the king's plan."

In the despatch of the Court, dated the 1st of October 1828, the disorganized state of Oude, and the deep responsibility incurred by the British Government in consequence of such sanctioned misrule, are again most strongly and truly stated: "You have been apprized in a former communication of the deep impression which had been made upon our minds by what we had learned from your correspondence, and from your proceedings, with respect to the misgovernment and disorganized condition of the Oude territory, and the conviction we entertained of the necessity of a thorough reform in the administration of that country; on this subject it is scarcely necessary to assure you that our opinion continues unchanged: that the agency of British troops should be the means by which the zemindars and malgoozars, who are unable or unwilling to satisfy the undue demands of the king's aumils for revenue, should be subjugated by force, disabled from future resistance by the demolition of their forts, subjected to all manner of extortion and oppression, and finally in too many instances, expelled from their possessions and driven by desperation to betake themselves to a predatory life, is a state of things so unworthy of the character of your Government, and so discreditable to the British name, that there are few sacrifices which we should not be willing to make rather than it should continue." Again, in paragraph 15, "We should delude ourselves were we to suppose that for the state of things thus depicted, the British Government is in no degree responsible, or that any one is more nearly concerned than that Government in its being promptly and efficaciously remedied. *Had it not been for our connexion with Oude, although misrule might have attained as great a height, it could not have been of equal duration. The subversion of the Government by which it was produced or tolerated, and the substitution of a more vigorous and probably more moderate rule, would have been the speedy result. It is the British Government which by a systematic suppression of all attempts at resistance, has prolonged to the present time a state of disorganization, which can nowhere attain permanence except where the short-sightedness and rapacity of a semi-barbarous government is armed with the military strength of a civilized one.*"

The conclusion from these well established and consequent obligations is this (par. 15): "It is therefore incumbent upon the British Government not only to abstain from any further co-operation with the revenue agents of the King of Oude, while the present system shall continue, but to use its most earnest endeavours for remedying the evils which its co-operation has already occasioned; and if, as appears too probable, there be no hope of introducing any substantial improvement with the voluntary consent of the King of Oude, it behoves us next to consider what means we possess, consistently with treaties, of obtaining that compliance from his necessities which he has refused to your friendly advice and remonstrance."

The measure of which the honourable Court consider the treaty to justify the adoption, is a refusal of the British force either to suppress the rebellion of the people or to enforce the realization of the revenues. Unfortunately, the army of 40,000 men, maintained by the King of Oude, has superseded the necessity of recourse being had to our assistance. This measure, therefore, is wholly nugatory.

There is indeed another measure short of compulsion, and partaking of the same negative character, the withdrawal of our resident and troops, which is still open to us. But would not this be an infraction of the treaty, quite as great as any positive interposition of our power, while the consequences of civil war to the unhappy country, which has been the victim of our protection of their misguided government as well as to our own boundary provinces, *would make our conduct decidedly criminal?* But even under the restricted interpretation with which the delicacy of Lord Hastings surrounded our right of active intervention, an exception was allowed by his Lordship of ultimate "interference in extreme cases, which of necessity belongs to a protecting power relatively to the state protected." Now, if the picture given in the Court's despatch of 1828 is true; if the actual state of Oude, as described in the memoir of the resident written in November last is not exaggerated; if, on the contrary, it is confirmed, as I can vouch, by the concurrent testimony of every native of Oude, and of every British officer in Oude, and in the still more damning proof, the desolation and desertion of the country, I ask, is not that extreme case arrived? Much as I admire and revere the two great men, Lords Minto and Hastings, and much as I am desirous of concurring in every principle and sentiment upon which they acted, founded as they always were, and in this instance in particular, upon feelings of generosity and forbearance towards a dependent sovereign, still this so long continued hesitation to put a stop to evils of which our own protecting power is admitted by those great men themselves to be the source and the cause, appears to my humble reason to be irreconcilable to humanity, justice and every obligation of public duty. It seems to have been the inclination to view Lord Wellesley's treaty as an arbitrary measure, and the condition by which the Vizier bound himself not to misgovern and oppress his people as having no validity and not intended to have any, by the contracting parties. I know not what Lord Wellesley may have said or may have to say in his own behalf upon this point; but we have his recorded opinion, that in his time the misrule was so great as to be incurable by any measure short of the assumption of the government; and if his opinion concurred with that of every other authority who has written upon this subject, that the British Government was responsible for the consequences, I cannot imagine it not to have been his intention to have compelled the Vizier to perform his engagements; without such intention, why introduce at all into the treaty a most objectionable stipulation of this kind, which, with respect to the Vizier, lowered unnecessarily his dignity and independence in the eyes of the world, and placed the British Government in this awkward dilemma, that

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either they must be considered as parties to the Vizier's bad government, or, if opposing his measures, to have it publicly appear that their counsel and authority had been treated with disregard and contempt?

Lord Hastings adverts to the "heavily reluctant assent," which Saadut Alee gave to the cession of a large portion of his territory, in commutation of the pecuniary contribution for our subsidiary force, and of the assurance which he obtained in return of the independent exercise of his authority within his reserved dominions.

It would seem as if it was meant to be said, that availing ourselves of our power, we had taken more money than we ought, and therefore by way of compensation, the Vizier, under the protection of our subsidiary troops was to be allowed to oppress his subjects as much as he pleased. But this was not the assurance given by Lord Wellesley; he did give it, but with this qualification, that the exercise of his authority, so secured, should not be abused to the injury of his subjects, and to the dishonour of himself and the British Government. But admitting, for the sake of argument, that peculiar consideration and forbearance might be due to Saadut Alee, in return for the sacrifice of territory and of feeling which had been wrung from him; supposing also, that for the two millions sterling advanced by his successor in a time of great financial difficulty, an equal degree of indulgence might be shown to him; the present incapable sovereign has, at any rate, no such claim for an unrestrained license in misrule. My opinion upon this subject entirely accords with one upon a similar question contained in a letter from my worthy colleague, when resident at Hyderabad, under date the 31st August 1822: "I suppose our interference in his highness's affairs to be not merely a right but a duty, arising out of our supremacy, which imposes upon us the obligation of maintaining the tranquillity of all countries connected with us, and consequently of protecting the people from oppression, as no less necessary than the guaranteeing of their rulers against revolution. The only refuge of a people intolerably vexed is in emigration or insurrection; and as we secure the Nizam's government against rebellion, it seems incumbent upon us to save his subjects from grievous oppression." Our duty and right of interference would have been the same whether Lord Wellesley's treaty had been made ar not, while the stipulation, by which the Vizier bound himself not to oppress his people, takes away from him all excuse for his own mismanagement, and all pretext for complaining of our interposition.

With the strong conviction that it is the bounden duty of the British Government to put an end to this cruel state of oppression and misgovernment in Oude; with an equally strong conviction, confirmed by the experience of thirty years, that advice remonstrances and measures merely negative will avail nothing, and that the arm of power forcibly interposed will alone effect this object, I humbly advise and recommend, that the sanction of the home authorities may be given for this purpose.

This being my decided opinion, I thought it my duty, at a personal interview which I had with the King of Oude at Lucknow, at which his minister was present, to represent to his majesty the state of disorder which I had found to prevail; the incompatibility of such a state of things with the welfare and prosperity of his dominions, with the order and tranquillity of our contiguous provinces, and with the provisions of the treaty of 1801. I represented the little hope of any improvement that I could be authorised to entertain, after the total failure of the advice and remonstrances which had been made so repeatedly to his majesty both by my predecessor and myself. It was my duty to state to his majesty my decided opinion, that the British Government could not permit this state of anarchy to continue, and that misrule had reached that extremity of evil when the British Government was bound, both from necessity and duty, to interpose its authority: and that I thought it right to declare to his majesty beforehand, that the opinion I should offer to the home authorities would be, that unless a decided reform in the administration should take place, there would be no other remedy left, except in the direct assumption of the management of the Oude territories by the British Government.

I have the honour to lay before the Board, copies of my conversation with the king, and of his written reply.

The grounds of my opinion rest upon the acknowledged excessive misgovernment and oppression existing in the kingdom of Oude, and upon the broad principle, that as the paramount power, from which alone these evils have their source and their endurance, we are bound to put an end to them. I consider it unmanly to look for minor facts in justification of this measure; but if I wanted them, the amount of military force kept up by his majesty is a direct infraction of the treaty; from this force we have nothing at present to fear; but should circumstances, either of internal or external commotion, occupy our troops elsewhere, it is quite evident that very serious inconvenience and even danger might be apprehended from this large armed multitude, consisting of the finest men in India, and little controllable by their own government, if the check of our power were removed. It must not be forgotten, that the warlike Rohillas, ever ready to join any standard of revolt, are immediately contiguous to the Oude frontier.

It may be asked of me—And when you have assumed the management, how is it to be conducted, and how long retained? I should answer, That acting in the character of guardian and trustee, we ought to frame an administration entirely native; an administration so composed as to individuals, and so established upon the best principles, revenue and judicial, as should best serve for immediate improvement, and as a model for future imitation; the only European part of it should be the functionary by whom it should be superintended, and it should only be retained till a complete reform might be brought about, and a guarantee for its continuance obtained, either in the improved character of the reigning prince,

or if incorrigible, in the substitution of his immediate heir, or in default of such substitute, from nonage or incapacity, by the nomination of one of the family as regent, the whole of the revenue being paid into the Oude treasury.

Although I have presumed to differ with two of my distinguished predecessors upon the question of right and obligation to force the ruler of Oude to desert from his arbitrary and tyrannical sway, I beg to express my entire concurrence in the description given by Lord Hastings of the conduct and demeanour that ought to be observed by a British resident towards the King of Oude, and to the chiefs of all dependent states. In proportion as our power is notoriously overwhelming and irresistible, so should the display of it be carefully suppressed, and, if possible, inviolate; the utmost delicacy should be used on all occasions of intercourse, whether of ceremony or business, to uphold the rank and dignity of the native prince, and to treat him with the utmost consideration and attention. The errors of our policy in this respect seem to have been twofold: first, to interfere a great deal too much in all the petty details of the administration, and in the private and personal arrangements of the sovereign, making, in fact, the resident more than king, clothing him with a degree of state equal to that of royalty itself, and allowing him to act the part rather of a schoolmaster and dictator, than of the minister of a friendly power professing to recognize the independence of its ally. The immense extent of jurisdiction exercised by the resident at Lucknow, within the town itself, the actual residence of the sovereign, is totally incompatible with the royal dignity and authority, is often the occasion of much complaint and inconvenience, and is strongly opposed to a considerate and liberal policy; and secondly, not to interfere with sufficient promptitude and decision as the paramount power, when the vital interests of both states, the cause of good government and of humanity, imperatively demanded it. It is to the first description of meddling and interference and the mischiefs of the double government, which have been so often described, that I feel so much adverse. If the political agents, for the most part, were altogether removed, I believe it would be for the comfort of the sovereign, for the advantage of good government, and for the real interest of both states. This measure is of course not possible where we have our subsidiary forces, and where there are large collections of European officers, whose conduct it is necessary to control. But in the minor states, in which this measure has been carried into effect, the best consequences appear to me to have accrued. It is impossible that this *imperium in imperio* can ever be successful; it is directly opposed to every feeling and passion of human nature. If the Dewan is the creature of the resident, the prince, as Sir Thomas Munro observes, will necessarily counteract his own minister. If on the other hand, as it has frequently happened, the minister is supported by the prince but not by the resident, the influence of the latter is immediately coated by the faction in opposition, and his intentions and conduct are, contrary to his own will, often misrepresented for party purposes. Again, it often happens that an administration offensive to the people draws, or pretends to draw, a sanction to its proceedings from the support of the British authority.

I have now stated the only measure which, on the threat of which, will, in my judgment, be effectual in compelling, I may say, any ruler of Oude to govern his country without oppression; it is a sad reflection, that few of these native princes, more especially among the Mussulmans, have that high moral feeling which should teach them to consider the welfare and happiness of the people as their paramount duty, they have no education, they are surrounded from their infancy by flatterers and self-interested counsellors, who are always exalting their consequence and dignity, and endeavouring to maintain the favour of the prince by administering to all his bad passions. The security afforded by our power remains the only real restraint upon a despot, in his fear of insurrection and of the revenge of his people. But the threatened assumption of the government brings into action a countervailing power, that will much better supply the place of insurrectionary movement, the immediate consequences of which must be bloodshed, and the final result by no means certain of effecting a remedy. But by a direct assumption, the life of the sovereign and the continuance of his dynasty is not endangered, while all the oppressed find immediate redress, the whole community have a better prospect of future prosperity under their own institutions, and the guilty prince himself and all his successors will have an example before their eyes of the certain effects of their own misrule: they, as well as all those who surround them, will always feel the heavy responsibility by which they are surrounded, and will discover that their interest as well as their security is to govern well.

But I am sanguine in hoping, that upon the present occasion, this extreme measure may be avoided, and nobody can more ardently desire such a result than I do. I am as anxious as it is possible to be, that no abuse of power, to the degradation of our dependent chiefs, should be chargeable to the administration of which I have the honour to form a part. But at the same time I fear not the charge when I know it not to be well founded, and when, as in this case, my most deliberate opinion and feelings are, that the present state of things, so long allowed to exist in Oude, is equally injurious to the sovereign and to the people, and is most discreditable to the British paramount power. But I am sanguine in a great present amelioration from my belief in the capacity and willingness of the present minister to effect it, and from the entire possession he has of the confidence of the king; that part of Oude through which we passed had formerly been under the minister's management, and though now a desert, the superiority of his management, recognized also by Lord Hastings at the time, has left traces of his enlightened system which are scarcely to be seen in any parts of the Company's dominions, and his memory, as I was assured by the officers stationed in that district, was still held in reverence by the ryots. To the change of hostility to the

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British Government made against him long ago, and lately repeated, I pay no regard whatever; as are his interests so will be his conduct. It is his interest to govern well, and to receive the support of the British Government, without which he cannot stand. He knows, and I rather think is confident, that unless he does effect a reform, he will not have that support; this support is necessary, as well to secure him against the king's former advisers and minions as to enable him to subdue the great rebellious feudatories in opposition to the government. The work of reform has hitherto been retarded by untoward circumstances, but I hope the time is at hand when it will make satisfactory progress under the direction of the talents and experience of the minister, supported when right, and controlled when wrong, by the friendly counsel of a judicious resident.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

Appendix, No. 28.

MEMORANDUM ON OUDE AFFAIRS, by the Resident, Mr. Maddock.

Appendix, No. 28.

Memorandum on  
*Oude Affairs*, by  
Mr. Maddock.

SINCE the first connexion between this state and the British Government, the sovereign of Oude has held his territories virtually in dependence upon the British Government. The dependent alliance which bound him to us, previous to the treaty of Lord Wellesley, was changed by that document into a nominal release from subjection to our authority in the government of his reserved territories; but he still continued answerable to the supreme government for the due and proper administration of affairs in his own dominions; and as he was precluded from adopting any measure of importance, even in the management of his own country, without the advice and counsel of the British representative at his court, his power could have been considered as virtually no more than that of a viceroy, responsible to the authority from which it emanated. The natural effect of such a connexion would have been under ordinary circumstances, the gradual establishment of the paramount influence of the British authority and principles of government, under a minister dependent on our protection, while the nominal sovereign dwindled into a state puppet, of use only for maintaining the pomp and pageantry of a court. That such were not in fact the consequences of the treaty of 1801, can be ascribed only to the personal character of the prince who then sat upon the throne. Saadut Ali Khan was fond of power, he was active and intelligent, and it was his ambition to shake off the trammels of British interference; but the stipulations of his treaty kept him in constant dependence upon us, and as he could little brook the dictation and restraint arising from that treaty, he was involved in continual altercations and differences with the resident, and opposed, for the sake of opposition, every species of reform which it was the object of the British Government to introduce into his administration. His temper was soured by the perpetual opposition thus engendered, and his rule, though vigorous and efficient, was disfigured by cruelty and rapacity. The accumulation of wealth seemed to be his master passion, though it may in his mind have been subservient to his ambitious projects, had he found a favourable opportunity of putting them in practice. Under a prince of his character, it is probable that his country would have been better managed had he been rendered virtually, as well as nominally, independent of our control in the details of government, and been absolved from all obligations but those of fealty and allegiance to us as the guardians and protectors of his independence, and of the integrity of his dominions. Under his successor, though a prince of a very different character, Lord Hastings, seeing the embarrassments and difficulties which a state of almost constant collision between the court and the resident had produced, wished, without dissolving the treaty of 1801, to relinquish the practice of interference in the internal affairs of Oude, and to leave the prince uncontrolled in the management of his country; and the controlling influence of the resident was in consequence diminished. But the good effects which might have been expected from such a change of policy under Saadut Ali Khan, could not result from the measure under Ghazee-ood-Deen; he was a weak prince, and having given up his authority into the hands of a favourite, that individual alone reaped any benefit from the slackening of his master's shackles. Under circumstances where the control of the resident would have been peculiarly salutary, when indeed it was indispensable to prevent a minister like Aga Meer from squandering, as he did, the resources of the state on his own private amusements, that control was withdrawn; and as the minister under the change of system felt his strength and security to consist, not in his favour and approbation of his measures, but in the weakness and partiality of his master alone, the consequence was that during the whole of his administration, he opposed those measures of reform which were recommended to him by the British Government for the benefit of the country, because they would have interfered with his own emoluments. Self-interest was the principle of his rule, and the benefit of his sovereign were as little regarded by him, as the pleasure and the advice of the British Government; no single advantage that I am aware of arose from his emancipation from the control of British influence. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe, that if the treaty of Lord Wellesley had been enforced, and it was well calculated to correct the evils of such a régime, every object of British policy would have been attained; and the minister would have been re-trained from usurping, not only the power, but the greater portion of the income of his sovereign. In the

the present reign the administration has become still more vicious, and the want of some corrective influence has been more severely felt. The state of the country may be judged from the annexed memorandum on the subject, and the character of the ruling prince is well known to government. His present majesty was bred up among women, and all his ideas are effeminate; he has no sound talents and less habitude for business; and the government of his country must devolve into other hands. But he is wasteful and extravagant in his expenses, and will never be satisfied with any administration that attempts to limit his income. The expenditure of his mahals is already exorbitant, and there is every prospect that, if unrestrained, he will go on increasing it as long as he lives. Yet the revenues of the country have diminished greatly in his time, and must continue to diminish; and as they have long been inadequate to the expenses of the state, the fatal effects of the present system, though they may be delayed as long as the horrors of Sadut Ali Khan can furnish temporary relief, must at length be felt in the total derangement of the finances. All the ministers that have held office in the present reign have been exempt from control by the resident. They have had only to consult the pleasure of their master; their own favourites have been placed in all situations of trust and emolument, and not an officer of the government has been actuated by any other motive than self-aggrandizement. In the mean time the country has been going to ruin, and from want of order, arrangement or stability in the government, oppression and anarchy universally prevail. The people have in consequence no faith in, and no reliance on their government, and constant desertion of the inhabitants is going on from the capital and the rest of the kingdom.\* It is my opinion, that matters would never have arrived at their present condition, if the British Government had continued to exercise that control over the government of Oude, which it is by treaty authorized to assume. The minister of the late king would then not only have consulted the British Government, but he would have felt that his only security lay in governing so as to gain its approbation. He must have restrained his own exorbitant rapacity and extravagance, and introduced such a system of administration as would conduce to the general prosperity of the country. We should have seen the farming system generally abolished, and an equitable assessment for a term of years substituted in its place; while an efficient judicial system would have been enforced, and the police of Oude would have been put on a proper footing. Under weak and indolent princes, like the late and the present king, when the minister must be the master, we can have no hold and no check upon him, if we refrain from interloping to secure the appointment of a proper person, and from exercising a certain control over his proceedings. The prince is responsible to the supreme government for the good government of his country; while the minister, the virtual sovereign, is altogether irresponsible under our present system, and while the British Government is bound to ensure the due administration of the affairs of this state, we debar ourselves of the only legitimate means whereby we might always secure a good government for the people of Oude. If the king were himself an efficient ruler, there would be less reason for us to interfere in the appointment of his minister; it would be unwise to do so. But where every thing depends upon the character of the person to be selected, the selection ought not to rest with a weak, capricious monarch, and though it would be comparatively unimportant whether the minister under a competent sovereign were well or ill-disposed to the British Government, and willing or not to forward its views of policy for the government of the country, it is in vain to expect that our objects can be attained through an absolute minister, altogether independent of our authority, in whose appointment or dismissal from office we so ungraciously abstain from interference, who has consequently no obligation and no fear of our resentment, and may happen to owe his elevation or continuance in office to his professed enmity to our rule. It is well known to be my opinion, that the individual who at present aspires to the seat, and who has virtually directed all the king's proceedings, and all the measures of his government for some months, is in his heart more decidedly inimical to us than could possibly be expected in a person who has so long enjoyed the benefits of our protection, and who owes, if not his existence, the preservation of an immense fortune which he amassed in this country, to the asylum which has been afforded to him in the British territory. My sentiments regarding him, as expressed at the time when his return to Lucknow was in agitation, remain unaltered; and I am still of opinion, that with our previous knowledge of his character, we should either have persisted in excluding him from power in this kingdom, or have accepted his proposition to assume office under our sanction, and on a clear understanding that his influence was to be exerted for the furtherance of those objects of reform in which the British Government was interested.

But while the British Government wishes to restrain its representative from all control over the minister, and all interference with the details of his administration, the Oude authorities themselves feel the utter impracticability of carrying on successfully the duties of government without his countenance and support. It is impossible for them to curtail the royal expenses unless backed by the resident; they can never conclude an equitable settlement of the revenue without some such guarantee to the landholders as his sanction would afford; and no minister would venture upon any considerable reduction of the army without his concurrence and advice. A ministry here is powerless for all good purposes, without the acknowledged sanction and co-operation of the resident, and the reason is obvious; no class

\* Of 300 Shroffs said to have been settled in Lucknow in the reign of Sadut Ali Khan, not more than seventy now remain.



of people can place confidence in the permanence of their power while it depends only on the caprice of a prince, of whose weak and vacillating disposition they are all aware at this moment; the king could not disband any considerable portion of his army, unless the measure was known to be sanctioned by the British Government, without the almost certain risk of serious mutiny and disorder; much less will he ever be able to affect a radical reform in his territorial administration without the aid and guarantee of the resident. The zemindars and other landholders have no faith, no confidence in his majesty's government, or in the verbal or written agreements of his local officers; those who are strong, set his authority at defiance, and protect themselves by force from the aggressions and exactions of his amils; while the weaker combat the system under which they suffer by fraud and stealth; and when sorely oppressed betake themselves to flight, and endeavour to indemnify themselves for the loss of their houses and their property by recourse to robbery and plunder. From all that I can ascertain of the state of Oude, I feel convinced, that no revenue system on equitable principles can ever be effected by the unaided efforts of the Oude government. Constant oppression, and the habitual breach of all contracts with the people, have so completely destroyed their confidence in their rulers, that they cannot be expected to trust them again; while, as they themselves declare, they would agree to pay much higher rents than at present, and would apply themselves to the cultivation of their lands, in the fullest security that the contracts made with them would not be infringed if those contracts were only guaranteed by a British officer. A minister of Oude knows well the disadvantages he labours under from this feeling of distrust and insecurity, and it would be impossible for him, however honest and well-disposed he may personally be, to prevent those employed under him in the collection of the revenue, from following the rack-renting, oppressive system, which alone can render their appointments profitable to themselves, or enable them to meet the probable exactions to which they may themselves be subjected. At this moment, several of the amils, to whom the collection of the revenues has been intrusted, can find no banker who will become security for the amount they have engaged to pay, and the ministry has found it necessary to surround the revenue farmer with a military force, under an officer appointed to watch and control him, in order to prevent his embezzlement of the rents which may pass through his hands. In such a state of things, and when such expedients are judged necessary, no mutual confidence can exist between the government and the collectors, or between the collector and the people. The whole frame of government becomes disorganized, and the subjects learn to withhold payment of the dues of the state till they are extorted from them by force.

During the last cold season, hardly a day elapsed that we could not hear at Lucknow the fire of artillery, at places where the king's troops were besieging, or in engagements between them and the zemindars. Now again that the season for operations has arrived, we have hostilities carrying on in the immediate vicinity of the capital. At one place, in short distance from hence, an attack was made upon the forces under the amil Imut Lal Pathak a few days ago, when the insurgents succeeded in capturing three guns, and putting the royal army to flight, with considerable loss. The spirit of opposition is evidently on the increase, and the number of zemindars capable of resisting the power of the local officers and of opposing, sometimes with success, the king's regular troops, is yearly augmenting. A zemindar bribes the amil, or perhaps the minister, to connive at his usurpation of the villages in his neighbourhood, and at his building a strong fort and conveying guns into it, and when he has strengthened himself sufficiently, he sets the authority of the amil at defiance, and will not yield without a desperate struggle to the army which may be sent against him from the capital. Notwithstanding some solitary instances of more than ordinary energy, displayed by the present administration to subdue this refractory spirit in the zemindars, as in the case of Sendeen, who was lately surprised and taken prisoner, the authority of government has, generally speaking, received no accession of strength; and in the district of Mohmmdee, famed nominally to a nephew of Hakeem Meldee, but in reality to himself, a more general combination of the insurgent zemindars to oppose his rule has lately been organized than was ever before known. He will probably be able to collect little revenue without fighting for it, and when this spirit of opposition is thus boldly evinced against a person who yields the whole military power of the state, the disposition of the people in other districts will not be more peaceable or submissive. Some of the most powerful amils, whether bribed to connivance at the usurpations of the zemindars, or conscious of their own weakness and inability to coerce them, seem willing to abstain from interfering with them, and allow them to assume and exercise the power and privileges of petty princes in the land over which they rule, to make war upon another, and not unfrequently, to lay the unprotected villages in their vicinity under contribution.

The British Government enjoins its resident to avoid, scrupulously, all interference in the details of the administration; while that of Oude, conscious of its weakness, is ever anxious for his support and countenance in any measure that it desires to accomplish. It is the opinion of every man who is called to administer the affairs of this kingdom, that his plans cannot succeed without the previous sanction of the resident; and he is constantly endeavouring to obtain from that officer, by indirect means, the assistance and advice which he finds necessary to strengthen his own hands; and in this anomalous state of things must often make use of the name and authority of the resident for the accomplishment of objects which, if that officer's right to counsel and interfere were openly avowed, he would hesitate to approve or sanction. The resident cannot enter into the merits of the question which he is precluded from investigating, and of which he hears only one side; and his advice, if under

under such circumstances he ventures to give it, can be regarded only as that of a private individual. For myself, I rarely give any opinion on points submitted to me, because I am not master of the subject, and can only recommend the government to do that which appears to them best; and while the ministry complain of my apathy and backwardness to co-operate with them, they make use of my name to sanction their proceedings, as boldly as if their measures had actually been framed in concert with me. The late minister, Moatunood-dowlah, from long possession of power was so firmly established, that he must have stood less in need of this fictitious support to his administration; but it is his decided opinion, that the removal of the controlling influence of the resident over the affairs of this government in the time of Lord Hastings was the greatest misfortune that it could have sustained. Fuzl Ali, Ramdial and Akbar Ali, were utterly unable to govern for want of this influence; and I fancy Mehudee Ali Khan is fully sensible how weak and inefficient his rule must be, unsupported by the British Government. While therefore from principle and policy, and a wish to leave the sovereign uncontrolled and unshackled in the measures of his government, we endeavour to refrain from taking any part in the administration, the ministry in want of that support which we withhold, would fain persuade us, against our inclination, to resume the position which, according to the treaty with Saadut Ali Khan, we ought to maintain in the direction of the affairs of Oude.

As far as the question concerns the independence of the sovereign, it will be expedient to be guided, not only by abstract principles, but also by the circumstances of the particular case and the characters of the individuals concerned in its decision. It will, I presume, be taken for granted, that the present king can never become virtually the ruler of his dominions. He can only be a tool in the hands of his minister; and not possessing the judgment and discretion that would secure his selecting the best minister, if the choice is left to him, it must depend upon chance or caprice, or most probably, the influence of his women, on whom the choice will fall. If left entirely to himself, it is not likely, considering his fickleness of disposition, that he would ever long retain the same ministers. His favourites would constantly be changing, and they in their turns would be his ministers. From persons of this description no good could be anticipated, and it would be unnatural to expect any reform at their hands. To flatter and humour their master, and to make the most of the opportunity to enrich themselves, would be the objects of their government; and if, what is not to be expected, a man of talent and energy, such for instance as Hakeem Mehudee, were to find himself so firmly established in power, and had brought his master to a state of such absolute dependence upon him as Moatunood-dowlah had done with the late king, that he might follow without fear of offending his master any course of policy which he approved, he becomes absolute, and though the king and the kingdom have preserved their independence of foreign control, they will have fallen into the grasp of a domestic despot, who may convert the resources of the country into a source of private emolument to himself, and impoverish the state to satiate his own avarice.

Nominal independence under such circumstances could benefit neither the king nor the country: how much more beneficial would it be that such a minister should be under the control of some competent and disinterested authority, that would prevent his abusing the trust reposed in him! Had Moatunood-dowlah not been emancipated from this control, how different would have been the result of his administration! There is every probability that, instead of sacrificing the country for his own private emolument, and rejecting every project for reform, he would have courted our approbation, and entered cordially into our views for the benefit of the state. Excepting the loans that in his time we obtained from this state, no object in which the British Government was much interested was gained through him; and even with respect to the money which was lent to us, a large portion of it was only transferred from the king's treasury to ours, there to remain for the minister's perpetual benefit.

The character of the present is far inferior to that of the late king, and the country is in a more disastrous state now than it was at any period of Ghazee-ood-Deen's reign. Though scarcely two-thirds of the revenue can be collected,\* the royal establishments are infinitely more expensive than at any former period, and while the king remains uncontrolled, they will continue to increase. If we maintain our present system of non-interference, his minister must either retain his favour by furnishing him with funds for all his extravagances, or must reduce him, by intoxication and other means, to such a state of utter imbecility, that he will be able to rule independently of his master. It would be vain to expect that either the king himself, or a minister in the circumstances I have described, will feel any pride or ambition for the good government of the country beyond what may be consistent with their desire to raise the revenue; and what minister in such circumstances will forego the immense advantages that the present system of venality and corruption hold out to him? It would at the present day require the exertion of the greatest talent and perseverance in a wise and beneficent prince to effect a thorough reform in the corrupt and vicious system which prevails, and has been strengthened and confirmed by many years of misrule. Where there is neither the wish nor, perhaps, the power to correct the abuses of the government, the present system must of necessity continue in force, and the evils to which it gives birth must go on increasing, till ruin and bankruptcy fall upon a state, which in hoarded wealth was a few years ago the richest in Asia. The disorder and misrule that prevail in Oude have been depicted in such strong colours for a series of years, that one would naturally conclude

\* In the past year, little more than half of the assessed jumma was realized.  
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conclude the descriptions of them exaggerated, as it appears impossible that such a state of things could have existed for a number of years without bringing on a crisis that would have worked out a remedy for the evils complained of; and one might be inclined to think the present system less objectionable and prejudicial than it appears to be, from a knowledge that it has lasted so long without ending in total ruin and the downfall of the government. But the evils complained of have not been always stationary. The degrees in which they have been felt have fluctuated, and the utmost misrule and disorder that have at any time prevailed may have been partial and not general at one time throughout the kingdom. Certain it is, that flourishing districts have been, under tyrannical and rapacious amils, so completely devastated in a few years as to be left almost uninhabited, and have at a subsequent period, under milder and better management, been restored to prosperity. The agricultural population may be considered as a machine of wonderful elasticity, for however they may be wronged and oppressed, and even when deprived of their all, and forced to desert their villages and seek a temporary livelihood in other countries, their natural love of home will recall them to cultivate again their hereditary fields on the slightest prospect that gleams upon them of better treatment than they had before experienced there; and when a district has been ruined and depopulated, and little or no revenue can any longer be extracted from it, it has been customary to farm it on moderate terms for a number of years to some man of property and good management, whose interest it has immediately become to allure back the fugitive zemindars and ryots till, by keeping faith with them for a time, and encouraging them with hopes of continued protection, he has succeeded in restoring the district to order, and raising the revenues to their former standard. Some parts of Oude are now in a high and beautiful state of cultivation, while others are deserted and overgrown with jungle. But upon the whole, the state of the country is described as being in greater disorder now than at any former period, and it is natural that this should be the consequence of the weak and vicious administration of the present ruler. The inefficiency of the police was never, I understand, so glaring and palpable as at present. The capital and its environs which, under Moatmud-ood-Dowlah, used to be as safe and well guarded as any city in India, are now the scenes of mighty robberies and murders, and on the roads in the vicinity which might then be traversed without fear, either by night or by day, unarmed individuals are now so beset by thieves and desperate characters, that no one thinks of passing along them without protection. To account, however, for the manner in which a state like this has been enabled to exist under a long course of misrule, and that matters can go on from worse to worse without an ultimate explosion, we have only to reflect on the political position of the sovereign and his subjects. The former feels security against the mutiny of his army, or a rebellion among his subjects, in the treaty by which he is connected with the supreme government. His power being confirmed by other means, he has no stimulus, no inducement, to seek for its stability in the love and gratitude of his people; while his servants and his subjects, knowing our obligations to maintain his throne, and believing that the acts of his government have the approbation and sanction of the British authorities, and that any insurrection or rebellion against his authority will be immediately quelled by our power, are virtually deprived of those means of security and self-defence against outrageous tyranny, which other people would find in resistance and revolt. Till lately, our aid was constantly and openly afforded in support of the Oude government, and British troops were annually employed in the coercion of refractory zemindars. Since his Lordship in council wisely and justly resolved that military assistance should no longer be granted to the king's local officers till the circumstances of each case requiring such interference were explained to the British authorities, and they had first decided on its merits, such applications are no longer made to us, and the great zemindars have been gradually increasing their means of resistance, and many of them have become independent of the local amils. In some parts of the territory they are entirely beyond the control of the chukladars, and make such payments of revenue as they please, and in some instances withhold payment altogether. But the great mass of zemindars and cultivators possess not those means of opposition, which strong forts and large bodies of armed followers give to the more powerful, and they must yield their necks to the yoke of oppression, till they learn to resist it without fear of being opposed by our troops. The military force maintained by the king of Oude is preposterously large; and a considerable portion of it, exceeding in number 40,000 men, with guns, is scattered over the country to strengthen the hands of the local officers, and to secure the collection of the revenue, yet they are not found sufficient for the duties they have to perform: and if the people were assured that the king would receive no military aid from us, the probability is, that his own attempts to coerce his subjects would be defied and every where resisted. In the smaller independent native states with which I am acquainted, I have always observed a certain moderate limit, beyond which the tyranny and oppression of rulers could not pass. It is pointed out to them by self-interest, and as they have no resources to depend upon from without, they pursue that course of management which their own means can render most advantageous to them. Instead of exciting their subjects to resistance, they are compelled to conciliate them, and a moderately good government is the consequence of their policy. Here there is no such obligation upon the governors; the king is not dependent for his income on the revenues alone which may be annually raised from his dominions, for he found a treasury of hoarded wealth at his command on ascending the throne, and he has not therefore been compelled to seek the legitimate means of rendering his territories more productive. His ministers, meanwhile, have found their own interest in maintaining the present system under which the country is parcelled out among a set of great farmers, whose only object is to enrich themselves, and who care not a straw for the permanent

permanent prosperity of the districts which it falls to their lot to collect and plunder. The misery and ruin which they occasion to thousands of the subjects are unknown to the king, who is satisfied if they make good the rent they have stipulated to pay, and those petty governors being allowed almost absolute power in their own districts, there exists no sympathy between the people and the government; while the latter, unwilling to believe that the defalcations in the revenue arise from over-assessment and undue exactions, takes its revenge on the farmer for balances unpaid, and sends another to succeed him, who, finding his farm deteriorated and its resources diminished, must have recourse to still more grievous exactions to make good his bargain and save himself from ruin; and thus a succession of aumils takes place, each more oppressive than his predecessor; and the government is not aware of the ruin it is causing, till at length no one will accept the farm but on terms which involve a vast sacrifice of revenue, that comes too late to save the district from temporary ruin. The revenues are thus at this time yearly diminishing;\* and if the government had only to depend upon this source of supply, it would long ere this have changed its system, for its expenses have not been proportionally decreased; on the contrary, they have been and are increasing. The very arrears into which the army and other establishments had in the mean time fallen would, under ordinary circumstances, in any government have brought about a revolution or a change of system; and here also the sovereign of Oude is, by his connexion with us, placed in a different situation from that of other princes; for it cannot be imagined, that an army of 60,000 men would have quietly submitted to remain, some a year, some two years and upwards, without pay, but from a fear that we should protect the king against any serious and general mutiny of the troops to enforce payment of their arrears. The most powerful aumils, from the same feeling, evince a degree of subordination and obedience to the government, even to the relinquishment of their offices, and the almost certain consequences, loss of liberty, honour and property, which could not be expected from them if they had no other fear than that of their own government. If the state of Oude had no right to our protection, these officers could resist its power with every prospect of success, and many of them would no doubt do so; and not only could not the government pursue its present system of misrule without the understood sanction of our Government, it would shortly crumble to pieces, and the aumils or the leaders of the army would portion out the kingdom amongst themselves. Its alliance with us alone enables it to exist, and to pursue a system decidedly detrimental to the prosperity of its subjects. But the people of Oude are entitled as well as its sovereign, to our protection; and he is under obligations to us to govern them well. Yet hitherto we have discharged only one of our duties; and while maintaining and augmenting the power and dignity of the prince, and securing him from all aggression, we have neglected the claims of the people, and have been instrumental in riveting the chains by which they are kept down and prevented from asserting their own rights, and securing by resistance a better government for themselves. When Lord Hastings proposed that we should withdraw from our system of interference in the details of the administration, the boon of independence was received with gratitude and exultation by the Oude government; and while it was ambitious to enter upon its new career, it might probably have consented to the removal of our subsidiary army from its territory; for when we gave up all control over the administration of affairs within the kingdom, the presence of our troops was unnecessary to aid in the internal management of the country, or to protect it from external danger. We at all events ought not, in justice to the people, to have allowed our army to remain merely to overawe them, and to be employed against them under a government and under a system of oppression, which we had renounced all right and all intention to restrain. We ought, I conceive, to have stipulated for the removal of our troops before we rendered the king independent of our control. Then the prince and the people would have been restored to their natural position of the governor and the governed, and the weight of our influence would not have been thrown all into one scale. But in consulting our own convenience and in seeking a way out of the embarrassing predicament in which we before found ourselves, the interests of the people appear to have been overlooked, and all our subsequent endeavours to improve their condition have proved of no avail. In vain have we endeavoured to induce the Oude government to introduce, through native or European agency, a more equitable and sensible mode of revenue management. The system under which so much evil has been produced continues unchanged, while the profligacy and corruption of the court, though always notorious and almost proverbial, have ruined the character of the government as effectually in other countries as the impolicy and weakness of its measures have destroyed it in the estimation of its own subjects.

The British Government has all along acknowledged itself responsible for the good government of Oude, and having lately pronounced its resolution to see a reform effected in the administration, has a task of real difficulty to perform, and one that it appears impossible to accomplish without a wide departure from the system of non-interference which has so long prevailed. To effect its objects, it must either restore the relations between the two states to the footing on which they were placed by the treaty with Soudut Ali Khan, or it must take a still more active and prominent part in the control and superintendence of affairs than was contemplated by the noble framer of that agreement.

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\* It may be added as a cause of the present defalcation of the revenues as compared to the income realised in the time of Moatmud-ood-Dowlah, that during the whole period of his ministry, the prices of agricultural produce maintained a very high standard in this part of India, whereas in the last three years they have fallen off so much as to increase the difficulty of paying the rents, and the same amount cannot now be realized from an estate that it yielded without exaction during his administration.

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The objections of government to such a course of proceeding, while it can possibly be avoided, were stated in the resolution of government, dated 28th May 1830; but the state of affairs at this court since that period has prevented me from pursuing the line of policy therein explained for my guidance. Had circumstances been more favourable for the experiment of such a system of corrective control over the Oude government as was there laid down, I must be allowed to doubt whether it would have been productive of the beneficial results that were anticipated from it, even if it were possible for a resident to exercise a right of censure and animadversion on the acts of the ministry, without overstepping the line chalked out as the limit of his interference. If, for instance, the expression of his sentiments had the desired weight with the Oude government, his notice of the oppression and misuse of an amil or other public officer would insure that person's dismissal from office. He could not applaud or censure the measures of an individual without touching the character of the man, and thereby influencing his fortunes, contributing to his promotion or disgrace, and exercising that species of patronage which he is particularly instructed to avoid. If, on the other hand, government was averse to listen to his advice, they would render such interference futile and ineffectual by openly reprimanding the officer complained against, whilst he was secretly supported and maintained in his appointment. But the truth is, that from the jealousy and suspicion with which the resident is viewed and treated by the court of Oude, he is not at present in a competent situation to judge of the proceedings of the government or its subordinate functionaries. Neither the officers of the government nor private gentlemen are allowed to visit the residency, from whom the resident might learn the true posture of affairs, the sentiments of the people, or the condition of the country. No official communications are made to him by the government of its measures proposed or in progress unless when his advice or assistance are required, and he becomes acquainted with its acts and intentions only by common report, or through the doubtful channel of a newsmen stationed at the palace-gate. To enable him to exercise the limited species of control authorized by government, he must recover that influence and tint position with relation to the government and the people, which belonged to his office before its duties were restricted and remodelled by the Marquis of Hastings, or his attempt to act up to his instructions of the 20th May will lead him gradually back to the former state of things. In the meantime, however, he must expect to meet with as much opposition as mistrust and jealousy can throw in his way, and to be accused of more interference in details than his own government wishes or authorizes him to exercise. Unless, indeed, the Oude government is clearly apprized that it is expected, according to the stipulations of its treaty with us, to consult the resident and be guided by his advice in every measure of importance, and finds it its interest to treat him with confidence, his interference at all can be productive only of ill-will, and his proceedings will constantly be construed into dictation and opposition to the pleasure of the sovereign. It being the object of his Lordship in council to excite in the native government the disposition to govern well, and to leave this disposition, when excited, to operate in its own way without any special guidance or dictation on our part, the first point to be secured is such a reliance of the inferior state on the supreme government that its main ambition will be the approbation of that government. But our measures have been calculated to wean the king of Oude from pupillage and dependence on ourselves, and his present advisers have laboured to separate his interests from ours, and to estrange his mind as much as possible from the habits in which he had been brought up, of perfect reliance upon us. The ambition to govern well might easily be instilled into the mind of a prince like the present king, by a resident so situated as to obtain an influence over him; but it will depend not on him, but on his ministers, whether his good intentions will be realized, and they cannot be exerted to promote the welfare of the country by feelings of patriotism or honourable ambition, to increase their own and their master's reputation; they can be effectually swayed by no motives but their own personal benefit, unless they feel themselves dependent on our government for the permanence of their power. The encouragement which the resident can give to plans of reform, and his attempts to lead the Oude government to a better system, will be effectual just in proportion to the extent of his influence over the ministry. But where it unfortunately happens that the minister is decidedly opposed to British influence, has insulted his own principles into the mind of his sovereign, and has engrossed his favour and confidence, it were vain to expect that the voice of the resident will be attended to. If we must interfere in the administration, still leaving the government in the hands of the king or his minister, we can only avoid the embarrassment of constant collision and mutual irritation by first securing the attachment of the minister, and his dependence upon ourselves. The British Government is averse to involve itself in a connexion of this kind, and the obligation which it incurs of support to the minister of our choice, and I am fully aware of the objections which may be raised to such a course of policy; but the question of our interference to secure a reform in the administration of this state is beset with difficulties, and if the attempt is to be made with any prospect of success, without our assuming the actual charge and direction of the government, I know no other course by which we can so effectually preserve a nominal sovereignty for the king of Oude, and secure a good government for his subjects. There must be far less apparent and visible interference in a plan of this kind than under any other system, and what there is would hardly be offensive. We should direct unseen the main-spring of the machine, without seeming to touch the subordinate and dependent wheels by which it was worked; and till the minister feels himself responsible to us for his administration, our interference must be minute and vexatious without the least certainty of its being efficacious; but the control of the resident over the minister must be complete to render it of use, and would involve so constant and vigilant a superintendence over every branch of the administration, that it may be apprehended the government of the country would be transferred

transferred to his hands; and it may be argued that, better than this would be the actual and open assumption of the government under British functionaries. I am fully sensible of the force of such objections; and if a minority of the sovereign or any other favourable circumstance would afford us an opportunity of taking the government temporarily into our own hands, I should consider that a far preferable alternative; for such a measure can alone ensure the radical reforms which the system requires, and the influence of the resident exercised through a minister would not go to change the system, though it would control and amend its operations. If the king were dependent for his income on the territorial revenue of his dominions, it is not improbable that he himself might be induced to accede to a proposition for the temporary transfer of his territory into the hands of the British Government, as there can be no doubt that under our management it would be infinitely more productive to him than it is at present. But he is not yet compelled by want to resort to such an expedient, and would not consent to it readily, as he may be expected to do to a measure by which, though his power will apparently be curtailed, his royal dignity would be unimpaired, and the government would be conducted in his name, and by his officers. It was suggested a few years ago by the British Government, that if the king would consent to the measure, British officers might be employed in the management of the country with every prospect of advantage to his majesty, and the certainty of great amelioration in the condition of the people. The same plan was proposed to me by Hakeem Mehudee on his first arrival at Lucknow, and Maatumud-ood-Dowlah, than whom no one is better acquainted with the state of the country and the evils of the prevailing system, has frequently expressed to me his conviction, that all other measures can prove but palliatives, that this is the only remedy which can be of avail. Officers so employed could act only under the control of the resident, or some other functionary appointed by the British Government to superintend their labours, and the territorial management being given up to us, there would remain but a shadow of government in the hands of the king. This proposition, therefore, though it did not express such a meaning, must always have implied a temporary transfer of the government into our hands. If the British Government is prepared to sanction a measure of this kind and to take charge of the Oude territory, as it did some years ago of that of Nagpore, for a limited period or till some specific object is attained, and if the king would cede it to us, either in form, or to be managed on his account, I cannot entertain a doubt that this, the finest province in India, would be rapidly restored to a high state of prosperity; and that without infringing the customs, or making any alteration in the existing laws of the country, we should have the satisfaction of abolishing a most corrupt and oppressive system of misrule and tyranny, and adopting such measures as would prevent its revival soon after our superintendence had been withdrawn. Arrangements might of course be made to rule the country through British agency, in a manner as little derogatory as possible to the dignity of the king. Every thing might continue to be done in his name, and the superintending British officer might be appointed by him, his naib, or lieutenant. There can be no doubt that this would be a more effectual plan than the other of discharging ourselves of the duty which we owe to the people of Oude; but it would subvert our present relations with this state, and could only be effected by negotiation; whereas the plan of controlling the government through a minister would be the mere enforcement of an existing treaty. By the latter course we should incur no charge of aggression or encroachment; by the former we should lay ourselves open to the imputation of being actuated by a spirit of aggrandizement, which might excite the suspicions and fears of other dependent states. It is notorious, not only in India, but throughout a great portion of Mussulman Asia, that our character for moderation and forbearance in our Indian rule has gained its greatest support from the good faith which we have kept with the Oude state. We have even had it in our power to annex its territory to our own, but have abstained from all attempts on its integrity, and the nominal independence of its sovereign; and to satisfy the Mussulman world that we were still actuated by the same feelings, it would be necessary to convince them that we were compelled by the necessity of the case to a temporary occupation of the country, that we had no object in doing so but the benefit, not only of the people but of the monarch himself, and that when that object were attained, we should replace the government in the hands of its legitimate sovereign in the same manner that we have lately restored the management of their territories to the princes of Nagpore and Hyderabad. One or other of these plans must, I conceive, be adopted, if we really propose to introduce an effectual reform: I at least can suggest no other alternative. The time is in many respects favourable for decisive measures, and the disorder and mismanagement of the native government have arrived at that pitch that, if it is intended to save the country and the ruling family from the ruin that is impending over them, the opportunity presented by the visit of the Governor-general to Lucknow should not be neglected.

Before adopting a measure so decisive as the assumption of the government, though only for a time, we must be able to convince ourselves, if not the world, that a moral necessity compels us to make use of the power which we possess to rescue the people from their present miserable condition, by substituting our own in place of the king's authority over them. Our forbearance hitherto has warded off the recourse to this extreme remedy, and though we have avoided the opprobrium of aggression and cupidity, to which such a measure, however indispensable, would naturally expose us, we may accuse ourselves of an insufficient discharge of our moral duty as the guardians of this state. The total failure of all former plans and efforts to induce the local government to correct the abuses of its system, and the grounds which we have for despairing, from a retrospection of the past, of any future benefit from the same course of policy that we have been pursuing for the last twelve years, must be

our justification for any innovation that may now be introduced, and any infringement that we may be compelled to make on the authority of the sovereign. The opposition likely to be made to such a measure would be stronger on the part of the ministry, and all who profit by the existence of the present order of things, than on that of the king. There are circumstances in his situation and character which might help to reconcile him to an abridgment of the actual power, if he could retain the pomp and splendour of royalty, and the same circumstances would tend materially to justify the most decided measures that the supreme government might resolve to adopt under a profligate and imbecile prince on the throne of Oude. I have already expressed my opinion that the direct or indirect interference of this government is indispensably necessary to ensure the proper administration of affairs. The only way in which our influence can be brought into operation, indirectly but effectually, is by the nomination of the minister, and by rendering him in a certain measure dependent upon us; and if that measure is considered an infraction of our treaties with Oude, and it appears impolitic to take upon ourselves the responsibility which it would entail upon us of securing the good government of the country, though not holding the reins in our own hands, there will remain no alternative but to administer the government by our own agents, or leave it in the hands of persons of the king's choice to be conducted by them for their own benefit, while the interest of the state and every species\* of reform are neglected. I think, however, that the objections to our assuming, under any pretext whatever, the direct administration of affairs, are stronger than any that can be brought against our controlling it through an intermediate agent, nominally the servant of the king, and really the servant of the state, though acting under our guidance. There would be less difference between the two measures in reality than in appearance; but if much good can be effected by an indirect system of control, though it may be embarrassing and not perfectly effectual for the purposes intended from it, it is still, I conceive, preferable to any measure that, however necessary, might be misrepresented as a breach of faith and a wanton encroachment on the rights and territories of a dependent ally. Previous to having recourse to that extreme remedy for existing evils, it would have been desirable that the Oude government should be formally and distinctly warned of our resolution to adopt it, in case all other measures failed, and the inability of the government to work out a reform by its own means remained as apparent as ever; and though the sentiments of government, communicated to me in Mr. Secretary Swinton's letter of the 28th May last, have been fully explained to the king and the ministry, and they must have understood, from the tenor of that letter, that government contemplated the possible occurrence of a state of things that would justify our direct interference, and was prepared in such an event, and would feel itself bound to interfere decisively, the nature of the measures which we proposed ultimately to adopt was not so clearly stated as to amount to a warning formal and explicit enough for the importance of the occasion. True it is that, instead of amendment in the mode of government since that communication was made to the king, the practice of it has grown from worse to worse, and has been disgraced by acts of cruelty and rapacity calling more loudly for the interference of the supreme authority than any former excesses committed in the last or the present reign; but much of the misrule and abuse of power that have prevailed in the interim may be attributed rather to the character of the individual at the head of affairs than considered a part of the system. The reputation of the king himself has, no doubt, suffered from the barbarous punishments inflicted on individuals who had immediately before enjoyed his regard and confidence; but he was instigated to these cruelties by the counsellor whose special duty it was to dissuade him from such excesses; and for the increase of anarchy and disorder that prevail in the city and the kingdom at large, the minister must be considered solely responsible. The personal character, however, of the reigning monarch is of that description that it cannot be expected to influence essentially the character of his government, which must ever depend upon the disposition and talents of his minister, and this consideration renders it the more important that the choice of a minister, who must become for all purposes of good or of evil the arbiter of the destinies of all his subjects, should not depend alone on the whim and caprice, or the favour and affection of a person, the slave of women, without any firmness or consistency of character, and liable to all the bias and prejudice engendered in the society in which he lives, but that it should be swayed and directed by a power which has no interest but in the welfare of the state and the prosperity of the people. The political relations between natives on a footing of equality must vary according to circumstances, and can be tied down by no everlasting laws. Much more should the connexion between a dependent principality and the sovereign power which protects it, and is in a measure answerable that the relative duties of the prince and his subjects are duly performed, be dependent on the actual condition of the parties rather than on any general notions of policy. If at the present time there were an able and virtuous prince seated on the throne of Oude, it should be an act of wisdom to relax the bonds by which, according to treaty, his independent exercise of the powers of sovereignty is controlled, and to leave him unshackled in his projects to benefit his subjects; but when a monarch of a very different character wears the crown, we are bound, I conceive, to restrain him from the abuse of power by every check that we are already authorized to impose upon him; and if that is not sufficient to dissuade him from evil and to induce him to reform his government, there is a paramount obligation upon us to remodel our treaties with him or abrogate them altogether. He is bound by his obligations to govern well, and to consult and be guided by the advice of the head of the British Government, or its representative, in the administration of affairs. If he rejects our advice and admonition, and universal anarchy and misrule prevail throughout his dominions, he is answerable to us for a breach of his engagements; but we are not without our responsibility to the people whom

we leave unprotected from the consequences of his misgovernment, for what can have been meant by our guarantee of his possessions, subject to the obligation of his ruling over the people with justice and clemency, but that while we protected him in the enjoyment of sovereign power, we engaged to secure them from the abuse of it? Though a degree of evil and much embarrassment arose from the clashing of interests and a perpetual contest for power between the king and the resident at his court while the provisions of the treaty of 1801 were acted upon, there can be no doubt that great advantages also arose from the restraint placed upon tyranny and misrule by the superintending vigilance of the British representative, and evils of a more unquestionable and unqualified nature have resulted from the withdrawal of British influence over the administration of Oude. Of this every native of observation is sensible, and I fear the impression is not uncommon that we have connived at excesses, and have allowed the vices and mismanagement of the native government to go on unchecked, till the general disorder of the country would furnish us with a plea for assuming the government into our own hands. Such a crisis may have already arrived, and if so, it has been hastened, if not caused, by our principles of non-interference. But if an event so little to be desired, with a view to our reputation in India, and perhaps in Europe also, can be protracted or provided against, it can only be by our again undertaking the duty of superintending and controlling the administration of affairs at this court, and by thereby infusing into the practice of the government somewhat of the principles that actuate our own. Our aversion to this species of indirect control is not understood by the people of the country, who would consider it a legitimate exercise of authority in the protecting over the protected power. The king desires it whenever it will serve to strengthen his hands and add to his weight and respectability among his subjects; the minister regards it as necessary to the due and efficient discharge of his functions; and the people look up to it as their only security against oppression, and without it will never be induced to repose confidence in their rulers. A kingdom of the extent and population and fertility of Oude, if placed politically in a situation of independence, would naturally have evinced the energy and strength required to maintain its independence, and for the establishment of a strong and efficient government throughout its dominions; but its connexion with us has enervated its power, and kept it in a state of pupillage and imbecility. It habitually leans for support upon the British Government, and I really believe can only prosper through our constant and cordial co-operation with it in the measures which it may devise for the amelioration of affairs. This cannot be accorded, unless those measures are in unison with our ideas of policy and propriety; and when we tell the government to judge and act for themselves, they sink under the responsibility, and are able to effect nothing, or make the want of our sanction and support their excuse for doing nothing. Let the British Government declare that from the interest it takes in the welfare of this state, it will aid it by counsel and support in restoring order throughout the country, and in putting down the corrupt and vicious system which has rendered its administration inert and useless for all good purposes, and that we expect, in return, the faithful discharge of the obligations of all treaties by which the state is bound to act in conformity with the advice of the Governor-general, and in virtual dependence upon the supreme government, and let us act firmly up to the stipulations of existing treaties, and it may not be too late to save this fine province without taking the management of it into our own hands; and we may rest assured that such a declaration will be hailed throughout Oude as the harbinger of better days than have been witnessed for ages, and that all India will applaud the resolution to secure, without infringement of treaties, a better order of things for the people of Oude, and, though with modifications of his absolute power, the dignity and splendour of the sovereign.

Under such a system, it must be a task of the greatest difficulty to define the limit of our interference. It must be very extensive, and for a time, I should fear, very minute; equivalent in fact to the virtual control and direction of the administration in all its branches; for it can only be by placing the resident in the situation of a counsellor, whose advice, given in the name of his government, the Oude government will be bound to follow, that any benefit can arise from his interference and control. The restrictions upon his interference in the details of government and of his patronage in deciding upon the fitness of individuals proposed to fill important situations in the state must be withdrawn, and he must be rendered responsible for the success of the system which he is to superintend. He must be enabled to guarantee upon the faith of his government the contracts entered into between the king and his officers or subjects for the payment of his rents, and under whatever title or designation his right of interference may be disguised, he must, I fear, be invested with powers above those of the nominal sovereign. The only question that remains is, whether such a system can be preferable to the absolute and avowed assumption of the government, and, looking to the necessity of consulting the feelings and prejudices of the world, I think it is: the king would remain unshackled in his expenses, because he happens to possess a still unexhausted treasury, and it would only be necessary to direct the appropriation of that portion of his income which is required for the maintenance of the public establishments, leaving the residue at his disposal. A short period also would suffice to show how much his finances might be improved under better management, and for ourselves we should avoid all imputation of breach of faith, of being actuated by a spirit of encroachment, and of desiring to appropriate to ourselves the wealth of Oude, to which the assumption of the government in our own name could hardly fail to expose us; and to considerations of this nature we cannot attach too much weight.



AN ABSTRACT VIEW OF THE STATE OF Oude, as gathered from the  
PERSIAN PAPERS, &c.

Appendix, No. 28.

Memorandum on  
Oude Affairs, by  
Mr. Maddock.

THE government of Oude is divided into districts, or chucklas, yielding each a revenue of from 60,000 rupees to 24 lacs of rupees; they are farmed out to individuals, who, engaging to pay the stipulated sum, are, in addition to the revenue management, invested with the whole power, magisterial and judicial. If justice can be said to be an ingredient in the government of Oude, they are, in short, governors of those provinces, the revenues of which they engage to pay, and are designated either *amils*, *cluckladars*, or *mustagirs*.

Besides such divisions of territory, there are various large *jageers* made over to individuals for the support of establishments, and in those tracts of country the *jageerdars* also exercise the full authority of *amils*, and are at liberty to make the most of their *jageers* by raising the rents to their utmost extent.

But though farming out the country to the highest bidders, to court favourites, or to the most successful intriguers, is the favourite system of management, there are sometimes *amaunees* *amils* placed in charge of districts; and *amaunee* management, if the *ameen* employed happens—a rare case—to be a person qualified, for such a trust, is, in the principle, somewhat similar to the British system of collection. The *ameen*, as the collector, ought faithfully to lodge all collections in the government treasury, his salary being a fixed sum, or a per centage on the receipts, with a few perquisites of office. In addition to his revenue authority, he is also local governor, and has full powers in all matters, civil and criminal. *Amaunee* management appears only to be resorted to when the rapacity or mismanagement of the farmer has ruined the district; or when it is supposed capable of yielding a higher revenue, the *ameen* is sent to ascertain its full resources.

The following are the principal divisions or districts into which the state is divided:

	Chucklas, or Districts	Said to contain Muhals.	Average Jumma, said to be.
1.	Sultanpore - - -	19	R <sup>s</sup> 22,15,000
2.	Manekpore - - -	2	1,09,000
3.	Puchumrat - - -	4	4,62,000
4.	Selafr - - -	11	6,11,000
5.	Sundeelah - - -	11	14,65,000
6.	Mahomdee - - -	18	5,12,000
7.	Bainswaiah - - -	22	15,05,000*
8.	Khcerabad - - -	22	21,00,000
9.	Buddoo Serace - - -	1	61,000
10.	Baraich, &c. - - -	15	14,78,000
11.	Dewa Sitturkan - - -	7	4,90,000
12.	Dureesabd - - -	9	4,11,187
13.	Bangermow - - -	9	5,12,000
14.	Gosaeengunge - - -	4	2,78,000
15.	Ramnuggur - - -	3	1,37,000
16.	Nowabgunge - - -	1	95,000
	Names of Divisions	Estimate of Yearly Revenue	
17.	Lucknow villages - - -	-	R <sup>s</sup> 1,10,000
18.	Rent for ground for Brick, Lime, Silus, &c. &c. -	-	20,000
19.	Abkaree - - -	-	10,000
20.	The Farm of the Newspapers - - -	-	1,10,000
21.	The Mint - - -	-	15,000
22.	Bazars and Gunges - - -	-	2,14,000
23.	Saer and Custom Duties - - -	-	2,00,000
24.	Chuckla of Shah Jehanabad - - -	-	16,000

The high and lucrative situations of *amils* are prizes too valuable to be obtained without intrigue and favour at court; bribery and corruption appear the usual preliminaries to such appointments. The candidate, by powerful bribes and heavy nuzzurs to men of influence about the court, or by the strong female interest within the palace, is nominated by the king to the elevated charge. He gives security for the payment of his revenue contract, and binds himself, by a written document, to maintain a good government over the extensive *pergunahs* and *muhals* intrusted to his care; he engages to study the interests of the people, and promote their welfare; to put down crime by the establishment of an efficient police, and so rule as to increase the government revenue. The period of his engagement varies from one to five years.

The farmer, rarely chosen from possessing those virtues essential to the faithful discharge of his extensive duties, but, on the contrary, too often selected from success in intrigue, or by capricious court favour, thus armed with the king's commission and full authority, proceeds to his charge. In addition to the government revenue to be paid into the treasury, the *amil* generally has to raise from the peasantry the amount of the underhand bribes and

nuzzurs

\* Exclusive of *Jageer* of Mulka—*Zumanee* R<sup>s</sup> 6,50,000.

nuzzurs to the unprincipled court officers, by which he purchased his situation, amounting sometimes in large districts, it may fairly be concluded, to 150,000 rupees; and after paying these, and collecting the government demand, the amil has yet to make his own fortune. He goes then to his district, bent upon self-aggrandizement, and urged to exact the last penny from the people by his anxiety lest his enormous contract should fall short of its accomplishment, and plunge him into difficulties, and perhaps dishonour, should he fall under the displeasure of the capricious court.

As illustrative of this system of purchasing appointments by bribery, an extract from the public ukbar of 9th May 1830, may be quoted. It is there stated, that Moonshoe (Gholam Murtuza (an influential man at court) complained to the king, that when Meindoo Khan Rupadar, the amil of Gonda and Baraich, was appointed to his charge, he engaged to give as a nuzzur, 50,000 rupees to the moonshee, and 20,000 rupees to Maha Raja Rewa Ram, (being 70,000 in nuzzurs or bribes in excess to the government jumma,) but Meindoo Khan, amil, having failed to pay the money, the moonshee requested that it might be taken from the amil and carried to the account of government. The king ordered that it should be paid by Meindoo Khan's brother in Lucknow, and on that day 30,000 rupees in cash, and 10,000 rupees in hoondees, were paid by the brother, and the money placed at the king's disposal by the moonshee. Ramiyal was the security for this amil, Meindoo Khan; and the king also ordered that Ramiyal should be held responsible for the payment into the treasury of these 70,000 rupees, stipulated for as nuzzurs to the moonshee and Rewa Ram. Ramiyal requested that the sum might be credited in his own accounts with the government.

Arrived at his charge, and having appointed his own umlah or assistants in office, the amil, if a new man, finds himself and his officers strangers to the people, and to the circumstances of the country. He is aware that in self-defence every possible opposition and falsehood will be offered by those who have revenue to pay; thus, distrusting and opposed, he proceeds to examine the resources of the various talooks, mulahs and villages into which, as farms, his district is subdivided, and after taking the usual means of ascertaining the necessary information, he issues his districts or summons, commanding all contracting parties to attend for settlement at his cutchery. The poor and tractable, who have no power to resist, obey the call; but the turbulent or powerful zemindars, fearing indignities, or having troops and strongholds to uphold their disobedience, attend not themselves, sending only their vakeels to treat for revenue. To deal with such unruly subjects, the amil must frequently draw out his troops and invest their forts.

The amil now, attended by all who will come, viewing the collections for the last ten or twenty years, is said often unmercifully to fix the highest sums which the farms may have paid during that period, and without reference to the present state or capabilities of the villages or talooks, demands that jumma, enforcing his demand by every argument in his power; he informs the farmers that it is optional with him to resume their farms and place them under Khauas management, i. e. by discontinuing the renter to gather the money from the cultivators themselves. He tells them that the Nankas grants, or rent-free land which they may hold, are available for resumption should they fall under displeasure by exhibiting disaffection to the government, and by persuasive threats, or even personal chastisement, he obtains from the unfortunate farmers their koobuleuts or engagements for an exorbitant rent, and this is exclusive of various arbitrary taxes, as tulubana, nuzzrana, zabutana, umeneah, &c. and pay for troops stationed to guard the crops. Neither does this engagement make allowance for calamity of seasons, as blight, hail, frost, floods or storms, nor is this all, for security must be given for payment, and to obtain this, a per centage must be paid to the parties becoming sureties.

Engagements thus dictated by the selfish and powerful amil and his men in office, the troops and means are in his hands to enforce collection. Regardless of future injury to the country, his aim being speedily aggrandizement, he proceeds to collect his rents, and in such an extensive, unruly charge, without minute information of poverty or riches, suspecting always that poverty is falsely pleaded, he enforces payment by the sale of property. The poor people, who have no appeal, sell their little all to pay the sum; their cattle, the agricultural stocks, and even their household utensils, are all disposed of to meet the demand of the relentless revenue officers. Thus reduced to poverty, and without funds to carry on their farms, they betake themselves to labour for their daily food, that they may earn a pittance for themselves and families, or forsaking their homes, they become wanderers.

A few seasons of extortion such as this lays waste the fields, and throws a multitude upon the world, now almost deprived of honest means to gain subsistence. These, driven from their homes, betake themselves to crime, and, goaded by poverty, become thieves and robbers, infesting the country on every side. The amil or his officers, finding a yearly decrease of revenue, are naturally urged to further exactions, until, at length, the kingdom has arrived at such a crisis that hundreds of villages have gone to ruin, the former cultivation now a waste, and the hamlets once occupied now deserted. Theft, robberies and murders spring up in all directions, the lance, high roads and streets of the villages and cities being endangered.

In some cases, where the amil is unable to fulfil his contract, he absconds and leaves balances due to the state, and his place is then filled by an amanoor amil, sent, if possible, to repair the injury the farmer may have done.

But on these occasions the poor are the sufferers; the disobedient zemindars, who are secured by forts and backed by troops, can almost dictate their own terms of the amils, to

Appendix, No. 28.

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Oude Affairs, by  
Mr. Maddock.

whom they pay only as much as they think proper. They insist, also, upon reductions in case of blight, hail, frost, &c.

These zemindars encourage crime by fostering the idlers and thieves who infest the country. In the interior of Oude there is no system of civil or criminal justice; nor can this be expected when the government of districts is sometimes entrusted to low individuals from the meanest grades of society. "Nuwab Ameer-ood Dowlah," for instance, has been raised to the dignity of an amil from the very humble duties of a fiddler. His sister, formerly a concubine, or nautch girl, having gained the royal favour, is now one of the king's wives, designated by the title of "Tauj Muhuls," receiving for the support of her dignity a jagore, of which her brother, the "Nuwab Ameer-ood-Dowlah" is the manager.

In like manner, the individual placed in charge of Annow, &c. was formerly the humble attendant upon nautch girls, but has lately been advanced to the title of "Nowab Allee Bux" through female influence in the palace, and from such hands the administration of justice may not be expected. Amils refer cases for adjustment to the talookdars, or farmers contracting with them for the revenue; but there is no regular appeal and no efficient control at the head of the government.

One engine of government, the intelligence department, is rendered nugatory, because it is usually rented out. These news writers are supposed to be spies and reporters upon the public officers, but the department of the intelligence being rented out, the amil farms the newspaper for his own district, and places in his cutochery, to report his actions, a creature of his own. This truth can never reach the head of the government; and in the public offices of the state there is no one to care for its prosperity, no one to interest himself in the removal of abuses.

Had the country been blessed with an efficient ruler, or had those placed by him at the heads of all departments been chosen with reference to the duties intrusted to their care, had there been exercised a vigilant control over every branch of the government, Oude might have escaped from the present melancholy disorder with which it is afflicted.

But even now, if the ruling authority would give itself for two or three years to re-model the government, would introduce a thorough reform into every branch of the administration, would establish a reasonable and fixed revenue for land, and collect that revenue at stated and convenient periods, and would exercise a vigilant control over its officers, in three years, at most in five, the revenues might be doubled.

Tracts of lands, which have been deserted and waste for years, might be brought under tillage, were puttas granted, from one to four annas per beega, and were this low rent continued for three years.

But in the wretched farming or mustagery system, the amils have no time or disposition to think of future improvements in which they may have no share, their grand object being speedy aggrandizement; nor can they be expected to forego immediate present gains for prospective increase, which shall pass into other coffers than theirs.

The whole system of government would seem almost to insure corruption, exaction, and misrule; for in amils chosen frequently from the lowest classes of the people, threatened by the fear of imprisonment or disgrace should they fail to realize the enormous sums contracted for, unchecked by principle, and unwed by the opinion of their fellow men, being strangers usually almost to those they govern, the desire of self-aggrandizement, backed by arbitrary power, and encouraged by a corrupt, time serving umlah of their own creation, must inevitably lead to those evils which the state of Oude at this moment exhibits.

It has been shown that the farming amils buy their appointment by heavy bribes; such also is the case with amannee amils, who must dearly pay for their nomination, and in addition to the government collections, they must collect those bribes from the people to repay themselves.

The following are some of the abuses practised by the amils:

In amannee management, when the zemindar comes to contract for a farm, if its resources be worth 1,000 rupees yearly, the amil writes in the government books only 800 as the jumma, and 200 rupees are separately written as nuzzarana, and appropriated to his own use.

If a zemindar has a nankar or rent-free grant under the signature of the last amil, and desires that the amount may be deducted from the rent he would otherwise have to pay, the new amil makes him give 200 rupees as nuzzarana instead of 100 rupees.

The poor cultivators are ruined by weight of arbitrary taxes, as fullana, zabitana, nuzzarana, sugawallee, &c. In 1,000 rupees paid by them, 200 are in those unjust demands. The unruly zemindars, however, will not submit to such exactions.

In the decision of litigated causes, nuzzars are taken from both litigants, as "Cheekarana."

Powerful zemindars oppress the poor cultivators by obtaining possession of their lands, because when, by the oppression of the amil, lands have fallen out of cultivation from the poverty of the cultivators, and a farm, yielding once 2,000 rupees, can now only pay 500 rupees, the powerful zemindar comes forward with the offer to take the ruined farm, and for placing him in possession the amil receives 500 rupees in nuzzarana. The new man pays from one to four annas per beega for four years, or even five; the old farmer, thus ousted, is reduced to distress, and if he at all resist, he is exposed to the power of the zemindar, and finds it difficult to live in the village.

The people suffer loss by the number of instalments on the payment of their rents, as the amils sometimes fix so many as 10, 11, or even 12 kiate in the year gained by nuzzarana.

Amannee amils make money by receiving bribes at the time of measurement of lands. Thus, where there may be five or six maunds per beega, the amil is bribed by 10 or 20 rupees

to write only one or two maunds per beega, to the loss of government; and where there are ten beegas of land which ought to pay to revenue, the aumil is bribed by 10 or 12 rupees to take off a few beegas.

Both mustajeres and aumanees aumils make great and illegal profits at the time of closing the yearly accounts, by deducting from the aumanees various items under the head of zabtana, amilana, talbana, batta for bad grain, chulun, &c. The whole of the aumil officers here profit at the expense of the cultivator.

The aumanees aumil derives much gain by charging a per centage for the test of examination of rupees passing through his hands, under the head of nakadee duty.

When the country has been ruined by a farmer, and balances are due, an aumanees manager is sent vested with authority to make remissions, and where he sees balances of years and poverty in the people, he cancels the debt to government, receiving, however, for his own use, a nuzzer of thanks; and, in other cases, where he finds balances and ability to pay them, he collects the money; but by virtue of his authority to grant remission, he writes in the government accounts, as remitted, the sum which he has collected, and appropriates the money to his own use.

It is essentially necessary to the good government of Oude that the aumils, whether farmers or aumanees, should be upright, able men, acting under a vigilant control from the head of the government, whereas now the state has gone to ruin by a vicious system of self-aggrandisement, uncontrolled by the higher authority.

Although the following statement of nuzzerana, said to have been stipulated for by Moatmud-ood-Dowlah, the late minister, when in power, may be much exaggerated, yet if the real sums bear any proportion to the statement, it will show the immense sums diverted from the general treasury into the coffers of an individual.

The District of Sultanpore is said to have paid him	-	-	R' 5,00,000
— Bainswarah, not including other gifts	-	-	2,00,000
— Manehpore Behare, under Gholam Hussein	-	-	23,000
— Punchum Ratund Goolzaree Mull	-	-	50,000
— Selon, under Durdhur Singh	-	-	50,000
— Sundeeleh, under Wahed Alees Khan	-	-	1,00,000
— Mohumdee, under Sah Beharee Lall	-	-	75,000
— Kheeroabad, under *	-	-	1,00,000
— Budor Serace, under Gholamce	-	-	10,000
— Baraich and Goudahundee Meerhader	-	-	2,00,000
— Dewa Sunk, under Buddree Doss	-	-	75,000
— Deraohad, under Sahjee	-	-	25,000
— Banger Mow, under Bapeelall	-	-	50,000
— Gosseengunge, under Faker Mah <sup>d</sup>	-	-	25,000
— Ramnugger, under Soorut Sing and Mendookhan	-	-	25,000
— Nuwabgunge, under Mendoo Khan	-	-	15,000
— The Gunges, under Gholam Hussein	-	-	10,000
— Manufactures	-	-	10,000
— Hoozoor Lupeell, under Maha Raja Mona Rum	-	-	—
— Villages of Lucknow	-	-	10,000
— "Deal" of Sale of Cattle	-	-	2,00,000

\* Name omitted in original.

If sums to this amount have been appropriated by one individual, it may be judged to what extent must be the defalcations in the treasury, when to this is added the appropriation of all aumils and contractors by leases far below the actual collections. It is said that the aumils share amongst them nearly 50 lacs of rupees yearly.

The police of Oude, like every other department, requires reform. During the late reign a reform was urged upon the attention of the king, and he acceded to it. Great abuses had prevailed. The aumils were allowed a deduction from the collections of 1 rupee 8 annas per cent. for the purpose of keeping up a police; but as the police was farmed out, the aumils in their own districts appropriated the money instead of keeping up the establishment. The king, therefore, without loss, had this fund, amounting to about one lac and 40,000 rupees, for the expenses of the new establishment, and he determined to keep the appointment of the thannadars in the hands of the government instead of leaving them to be filled by the aumils. Scarcely, however, had the new system been set on foot, and it extended to the district of Mahomdee, Burgernow, Shahabad, Mahometabad, Barce and Seewan, also to Mulleeawa, than Ramdial set his face against it, and effectually prevented its taking root. He instructed the aumils and the dependents on himself to oppose it, and to resume the pay of the thannadars. The aumils readily co-operated in instructions so profitable to themselves. They proclaimed it in their districts that the thannadars were abolished, and they gave out, as formerly, that the police was under their authority, and that it was not rented out to them. The thannadars, receiving no pay, were in great distress; the people were forbidden to apply to them; in fact, their functions were at an end, and many returned to the presence, and thus was frustrated that attempt. No attention is now given to the subject, and the disorder which prevails on every side particularly require efficient police arrangements. It is true that there has lately been appointed, as superintendent of the city police, one Mumun, a Khowas, high in favour with the king, and designated by the title of darogah of "Urbabinihal," or master of the revels; but he was formerly a humble menial, and the son of a scow;† though well suited to administer to the royal pleasure, he gives no promise in his new department of police. Under the present ruler, it is vain to expect

† A scow or scow, is a groom.

**POLITICAL**  
or  
**FOREIGN.**

Appendix, No. 28.

Memorandum on  
*Oude Affairs*, by  
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expect any efficient arrangements for the protection of the people against the accumulated evils of exaction, oppression and a disordered country, unless by British influence. The king might be influenced to establish courts of justice and a good police, much to the relief of an injured people, but this only through British councils.

Such institution, however, would, in many places, be almost nugatory, from the prevailing disorder of the district. Khairabad, for instance, is represented to abound with turbulent and refractory zemindars, each having followers and power to hold light even the order of the amil, unless backed by his troops. Several having forts, one, Bugut Sing in particular, is said to have nearly 2,000 or 3,000 sepoy ready for action, with seven or eight guns, and a strong fort with deep ditch. Aeen Sing, of Bareeghur, is another of these refractory men, of whom, for the number of his followers, his fort, and haughty, unruly disposition, the amil stands in awe. Many more could be mentioned who, contributing largely to the revenues by possessing extensive tracts of country, have naturally great influence over the population under them. They are said to give encouragement to idlers and vagabonds who infest the country, thus encouraging, instead of checking, the growing evil. Courts of justice or police in such districts, &c. would be set at naught by the zemindars and their followers. The zemindars, therefore, must first be reduced to obedience; but this cannot be effected without removing the cause of their turbulence, exactions and oppressions on the part of the amils, and the intrusting of too great talooks to the zemindars themselves, who, feeling their power by having many pergunnahs under them, whose population, eager for reduction of high rents, encourage opposition, have strong temptation to disobedience. In short, reform, to be successful, must begin at the fountain-head, by the re-modelling of the amils and their charges.

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Appendix, No. 29.

COPIES of such of the TREATIES, &c with the NATIVE STATES and CHIEFS of Asia, as have not been already published; to which is prefixed a LIST of all the TREATIES, &c. including as well those which have been printed at various times, as those which are now printed.

Appendix, No. 29.  
Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

(No. 1.)

LIST of TREATIES or ENGAGEMENTS between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and the NATIVE PRINCES and STATES of Asia, from the earliest period to the present time; arranged chronologically.

*Note.*—In the following List reference is made to the printed volumes in which the Treaties or Engagements will be found; the present collection containing only such documents as have not yet appeared in print, or are not easily accessible.

To facilitate reference, the volumes containing the documents not included in the present collection are distinguished by Letters, as under-mentioned:

- A. A Collection of Treaties and Engagements with the Native Princes and States of Asia from the earliest period up to the year 1809; printed by the East India Company in 1812.
- B. Treaties presented to the House of Commons in pursuance of an Order dated 15th May 1818, and ordered to be printed 27th May 1818
- C. Treaties concluded with the Native Powers in India, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of the Prince Regent, February 1819
- D. Treaties with Native Powers in India, presented to both Houses of Parliament by His Majesty's command; 1825.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found
1.	Treaty with the Mahrattas; 12th July 1789 - - -	- -	A. 477.
2.	Treaty with the Mahrattas; 12th October 1756 - - -	- -	A. 482.
3.	Treaty with the Prince of Cherrika; 1756 - - -	- -	A. 486.
4.	Perwannah from Serajah Dowlah; 31st March 1767 - - -	- -	A. 4.
5.	Treaty with Jaffier Ali Khan; 1757 - - -	- -	A. 6.
6.	Perwannah from Jaffier Ali Khan for the Mint, 1757 - - -	- -	A. 9
7.	Perwannah from Jaffier Ali Khan, for the Saltpetre of Behar; 1757 - - -	- -	A. 12.
8.	- - - Sunnud for the Company's Zemindarry, for lands given under the seal of Allow-o-Dowlah, Meer Mahomet Saddock Khan Behauder Assud Jung, Dewan of the Soubah of Bengal, 1757 - - -	- -	A. 12.
9.	General Sunnud from Jaffier Ali Khan; 15th July 1757 - - -	- -	A. 8.
10.	Perwannah from Jaffier Ali Khan, for the granted lands; 20th December 1757 - - -	- -	A. 10.
11.	- - - Sunnud for the free tenure of the town of Calcutta, &c., to the honourable East India Company, given under the seal of the Nabob Allow-o-Dowlah, Meer Mahomed Saddock Khan Behauder Assud Jung, Dewan of the Soubah of Bengal; 1758 - - -	- -	A. 23.
12.	- - - Articles of the Firmaund granted by the Bringah Rajah, for granting to the Company the exclusive privilege of purchasing pepper, &c. in his dominions; 1758 - - -	- -	A. 497.
13.	Perwannahs, &c. from the Prince of Scinde, relative to the rate of Customs and Duties to be paid by the Company; 1758 - - -	- -	A. 488 to 493.
14.	- - - Articles of Agreement made with Meah Atehund, at Surat, for the confirmation of Faris Khan in the Nabship; 4th March 1759 - - -	- -	A. 494.
15.	Treaty with the Nizam for the cession of Masulipatam to the Company; 14 May 1759 - - -	- -	A. 347
16.	- - - Articles of Agreement, offensive and defensive, relative to certain commercial arrangements with the King of Coteote, dated the 23d August 1759 - - -	- -	A. 503.
17.	Perwannahs, &c. relating to Surat, &c.; 1759 - - -	- -	A. 495.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	References to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
18.	--Sunnud under the seal of the Nabob Nasser-ul-Mulk, Imteaz-o-Dowlah Nossaret Jung Meer Mahomet Cossim Khan Behauder; 1760 - - - - -	- -	A. 32.
19.	Firmaund from the Rajah of Soundah, for the purchase of Pepper in his country for one year, 24 December 1760 - -	- -	A. 506.
20.	--Royal Grant of King Baddacalameur, Regent of Colastria, for the trade in Pepper, and Agreement for the payment of certain debts; dated 9th September 1760 - - - - -	- -	A. 506.
21.	--Treaty between the Nabob Meer Mahomed Cossim Khan and the Company, assigning to them the lands of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong; 27th September 1760 - - -	- -	A. 29.
22.	--Articles of Agreement with Sciddee Hillol, on the part of himself and the inhabitants of Jaffrabad, relative to Commerce; dated 3d January 1761 - - - - -	- -	A. 509.
23.	Three Perwannahs from the Prince of Scinde, relative to certain commercial privileges; 22d & 23d April 1761 - - -	- -	A. 513.
24.	--Articles of Agreement made with Souram Punt Tatiah, in behalf of Madarso Balajee, son of Balajee Badjeerow, Pundit Punt Purdan; 14th September 1761 - - - - -	- -	A. 511.
25.	--Articles of Agreement made with the King of Cartenaddu, for the purchase of Pepper in his country, and for mutual aid and assistance; 30th December 1761 - - - - -	- -	A. 516.
26.	--Articles of Agreement made with Shaik Sadoon, of Bushire, for the establishment of a Factory, and other commercial privileges; 12th April 1763. - - - - -	- -	A. 517.
27.	--Articles of a Firmaund granted by the Nabob Hyder Ali Khan Behauder, for the establishment of a Factory at Onore, and other privileges; 27th May 1763 - - - - -	- -	A. 518.
28.	Royal Grant from Carem Khan of certain privileges of trade; 2d July 1763 - - - - -	- -	A. 520.
29.	--Articles of a Treaty and Agreement between the Governor and Council of Fort William on the part of the East India Company, and the Nabob Shujah-ul-Mulk, Hossam-o-Dowlah, Meer Mahomed Jaffier Khan Behauder, Wahabnt Jung, on his restoration to the Soubahship, 10th July 1763 - - - - -	- -	A. 32.
30.	Sunnud from the Nabob of Arcot, for the seven Nagans dependent upon the Soubah; 16th October 1763 - - - - -	- -	A. 348.
31.	Nabob Meer Mahomed Jaffier Ali Khan's note for R <sup>y</sup> 5,00,000 per month for the expenses of the Army; 16th September 1764 - - - - -	- -	A. 36.
32.	--Proposals made and Articles executed by the Mogul, granting to the Company the Zemindary of Bonaroe, 22d November, and 6th December 1764 - - - - -	- -	A. 37.
33.	--Articles of a Treaty and Agreement concluded between the Governor and Council of Fort William, on the part of the English East India Company, and the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowlah, on his accession, 20th February 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 39.
34.	Agreement with the Prince of Cherika, for the grant of the Province of Randoterrah to the Company; 23d March 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 526.
35.	Articles of Agreement of Peace and Friendship with the Bounello, concluded at the Fort at Ravee; 7th April 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 523.
36.	--Firmaund from the King Shah Aulum, granting the Dewannee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa to the Company; 12th August 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 43.
37.	Firmaund from the King Shah Aulum, for the Dewannee of the Province of Bengal; 12th August 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 45.
38.	Firmaund from the King Shah Aulum, for the Dewannee of the Province of Bahar; 12th August 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 46.
39.	Firmaund from the King Shah Aulum, for the Dewannee of the Province of Orissa; 12th August 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 47.
40.	--Firmaund from the King Shah Aulum, confirming the Grants of Burdwan, and the rest of the Company's possessions in Bengal, to them; 12th August 1765 - - - - -	- -	A. 48.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
41.	Firmaund from the Mogul for the Northern Sircars; 12th August 1765	- -	A. 361.
42.	Firmaund from the Mogul, being a confirmation of the Nabob's Grants to the Company in the Carnatic; 12th August 1765	- -	A. 362.
43.	-- Treaty between the Nabob Shujah-ul-Dowlah, the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowlah, and the English Company, executed at Illiabed; 16th August 1765	- -	A. 50.
44.	Articles of Agreement between the King Shah Aulum and the Company for the Tribute of Bengal; 19th August 1765	- -	A. 53
45.	Grant from the Nabob of Arcot for the Company's Jaghire; dated 28th and received 30th August 1765	- -	A. 357.
46.	Agreement between the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowlah and the Company for his Stipend; 30th September 1765	- -	A. 54.
47.	Grants for Lord Clive's Jaghire and the Sunnuds for the reversion of the Jaghire to the Company; 1765	- -	A. 55 to 62.
48.	Articles of Agreement made with the Rannie for the restoration of Fort Augustus, and in regard to Commerce, 12th January, 1766	- -	A. 527
49.	Grant from Hyder Ali Khan Behauder of certain commercial privileges in Malabar; 23d February 1766	- -	A. 530.
50.	-- Articles of a Treaty and Agreement concluded between the Governor and Council of Fort William, on the part of the English East India Company, and the Nabob Syef-ul-Dowla, on his accession; 19th May 1766	- -	A. 63
51.	Treaty with the Nizam for ceding to the Company the Northern Sircars; 12th November 1766	- -	A. 363.
52.	Treaty of perpetual Friendship and Alliance with the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Soubah of the Deccan; 23d February 1768	- -	A. 369.
53.	Treaty between the Company and the Vizier Shujah-ul-Dowlah, for the reduction of his army; 29th November 1768	- -	A. 64.
54.	Treaty of perpetual Friendship and Peace with Hyder Ali; 3d April 1769	- -	A. 383.
55.	-- Articles of a Treaty and Agreement between the Governor and Council of Fort William, on the part of the English East India Company, and the Nabob Mcharek-ul-Dowlah, on his accession; 21st March 1770	- -	A. 66
56.	Treaty of Peace with Hyder Ali; 8th August 1770	- -	A. 530.
57.	-- Translation of a Paper containing the Articles agreed to by the Rajah of Tanjore, for the discharge of the Peishwah; dated the 20th October 1771	- -	A. 385.
58.	Agreement with the Nabob of Cambay for the eventual grant to the Company of a Factory at Gogo; 22d October 1771	- -	A. 535.
59.	Treaty with the Nabob of Cambay for the cession to him of the Fort of Tarrajah, taken from the Coolees; 1771	- -	A. 533.
60.	Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Nabob of Broach; 30th November 1771	- -	A. 536.
61.	Treaty with Futteh Sing for a participation of the Revenues of Broach; 12th January 1773	- -	A. 539.
62.	Treaty of Subsidy with Shujah-ul-Dowlah; 7th September 1773	- -	A. 68.
63.	Treaty under the hands and seals of the Nabob Shujah-ul-Dowlah Behauder and Colonel Champion; October 1774	- -	A. 72.
64.	Treaty under the hands and seal of Fyzulah Khan and Colonel Champion; October 1774	- -	A. 73.
65.	Treaty with Ragobah for placing him in the Peishwahship; 6th March 1775	- -	A. 540.
66.	Proposed Articles of the Treaty with the Nabob Asuf-ul-Dowlah, for the cession of Benares to the Company; 21st May 1775	- -	A. 74
67.	-- Agreement with the Rajah of Tanjore for subsidising a body of the Company's Troops for the protection of his country, 12th April 1776	- -	A. 387.



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Appendix, No. 28.  
Copies of Treaties,  
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No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
68.	Sunnad granted to Rajah Cheyt Sing for the semindarry of Gausypore, Benares, &c., 15th April 1776 -	-	A. 83.
69.	Treaty of Peace between the honourable the English East India Company and the Mahratta State; May 1776 -	-	A. 78.
70.	Treaty with Ragobah for conducting him to Poonah, with a view of placing him in the Peshwahship; 24th November 1778 -	-	A. 547.
71.	Convention of Wurgaon; 1779 -	-	A. 552.
72.	-- Treaty of Alliance with Bazalet Jung, for renting of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, and for receiving into his service a body of the Company's troops; 27th April 1779 -	-	A. 390.
73.	Draft of a Treaty proposed between the Company and Maha Rajah Luckindar Behauder, Rana of Gohud; 2d December 1779 -	-	A. 86.
74.	Treaty of Alliance and Defence with Fattch Sing, by General Goldard; 26th January 1780 -	-	A. 555.
75.	Treaty of Alliance and Defence with Fattch Sing, as amended and ratified by the Governor-general in Council; 26th January, 1780 -	-	A. 558.
76.	Copy of the Pottali granted to Rajah Mohipnarain Behauder of Benares; 14th September 1781 -	-	A. 91.
77.	-- Agreement concluded by the Governor-general with the Vizior, on the 19th September 1781, for the removal of the temporary Brigade -	-	A. 89.
78.	-- Translation of a Copy of the Treaty entered into by Mo-barus-ul-Mulek Ifuker ul-Dowla Colonel Muir Behauder Mahabut Jung, on the part of the English East India Company, and the Maha Rajah Sahab Soubadar Madhee Row Sundia Behauder, on his part; 13th October 1781 -	-	A. 97.
79.	Treaty of Peace with the Mahrattas; 17th May 1782 -	-	A. 99.
80.	Treaty of perpetual Peace and Friendship with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun Behauder; 11th March 1784 -	-	A. 393.
81.	-- Preliminary Treaty and Agreement with the Nabob Mahomed Ali, for his proportion of the Charges for the Defence of the Carnatic, June 1785 -	-	A. 397.
82.	Agreement with the King of Queda for the cession of Prince of Wales' Island in 1786 -	-	A. 107.
83.	-- Treaty with the Nabob Mahomed Ali, for settling his proportion of the Expense for the protection of the Carnatic, and for the adjustment of his private Debts; 24th February 1787 -	-	A. 401.
84.	-- Treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore, for settling his proportion of the Contribution towards the Defence of his Country, and for adjusting his private Debts; 10th April 1787 -	-	A. 409.
85.	Treaty with Asuf-ul-Dowlah, Nabob of Oude, fixing the whole of his payments at Fifty Laes of Rupees; 15th April 1787 -	-	A. 108.
86.	Agreement with the Rajah of Travancore for Two Battalions to be stationed within his Dominions; 12th August 1788 -	-	A. 416.
87.	Treaty of Commerce with the Nabob Asuf-ul-Dowlah; 1st September 1788 -	-	A. 116.
88.	-- Translation of the Nizam's Order to Seyt Jung, for the surrender of the Guntoor Circar to the Company, delivered to Captain Kennaway, the Resident at the Nizam's Durbar; 18th September 1788 -	-	A. 121.
89.	Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to the Nizam, desuned equal to a Treaty, written 7th July 1789 -	-	A. 122.
90.	Treaty of Alliance between the Company, the Peshwa, and the Nizam, against Tippoo Sultaun; 5th June 1790 -	-	A. 126.
91.	Treaty of Alliance with the Rajah of Cochin; 2d February 1791 -	-	A. 421.
92.	Treaty with the King of Queda, for an annual Quit-rent for Prince of Wales' Island; 1st May 1791 -	-	A. 131.
93.	Preliminary Treaty with Tippoo Sultaun; 22d February 1792 -	-	A. 133.
94.	Definitive Treaty with ditto; 18th March 1792 -	-	A. 134.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
95.	Treaty of Commerce with the Rajah of Nepal; 1st March 1792	- -	A. 144.
96.	- - Treaty with the Nabob Mahomed Ali, with a Modification of the Treaty of 24th February 1787, assigning certain districts as securities for payment of sums stipulated; 12th July 1792	- -	A. 424.
97.	Agreement with the Rajah of Travancore, commonly called the Pepper Contract; 28th January 1793	- -	A. 561.
98.	Commercial Agreement with the Rajah of Assam; 28th Feb. 1793	- -	A. 146.
99.	Treaty with the Nawaub Asuf-ul-Dowlah and the Chief of the Bohillas; 18th December 1794, with Appendix	- -	A. 150.
100.	Captain Syme's Commercial Arrangement with the King of Ava; 1795 and 1796	- -	A. 161.
101.	Agreement with the Nabob Vizier Asuf-ul-Dowlah for the pay of an additional Regiment of Cavalry; 20th March 1797	- -	A. 169.
102.	- - Treaty with the Rajah of Travancore, as originally proposed by the Government of Bombay, and afterwards amended, and finally concluded and ratified by the Governor-general in Council of Bengal; 18th May 1797	- -	A. 170.
103.	- - Engagement executed by the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, to the Bhow Begum (mother of the late Nabob Asuf-ul-Dowlah), under the guarantee of the Company; 7th February 1798	- -	A. 181.
104.	- - Treaty of Alliance and Subsidy between the Nawaub Vizier Saadut Ali Khan Behauder and the Honourable East India Company; 21st February 1798	- -	A. 177.
105.	- - Treaty of Alliance, Defence and Subsidy with the Nizam, and for the dismission of the French Troops from his service, and the reception of a body of British Troops in lieu of them, with two separate Articles; 1st September, 1798	- -	A. 182.
106.	Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore; 8th July 1799	- -	A. 454.
107.	- - Partition Treaty of Mysore for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, and for effecting a settlement of the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun; 13th July 1799	- -	A. 441.
108.	Treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore, for transferring the sovereignty of his country to the Company; 25th October 1799	- -	A. 460.
109.	Treaty of Friendship with the Imaum of Muscat; 18th January 1800	- -	A. 188.
110.	- - Treaty with the Nabob of Surat, for the cession of the city of Surat and the circumjacent country to the Company; 13th May 1800	- -	A. 563.
111.	Articles of Agreement for the adjustment of the Dosh Cavally and Talem Cavally of the province of Tinnevely; 26th Aug. 1800	- -	A. 461.
112.	Treaty of Alliance and Defence with the Nizam, and for the cession of territory in commutation of subsidy; 12th Oct. 1800.	- -	A. 188.
113.	Political Treaty with the King of Persia; January 1801	- -	A. 200.
114.	Commercial Treaty with - ditto; January 1801	- -	A. 205.
115.	- - Treaty with Assem-ul-Dowlah, for settling the succession to the Scoubahdarry, and for vesting the administration of the Civil and Military Government of the Carnatic in the Company; 31st July 1801	- -	A. 466.
116.	Treaty of Alliance with the Rajah of Nepal; 30th Oct. 1801	- -	A. 209.
117.	- - Treaty with the Nabob Vizier Saadut Ali for ceding to the Company, in perpetual sovereignty, certain portions of his Excellency's territorial possessions, in commutation of subsidy; 10th Nov. 1801	- -	A. 213.
118.	Final Arrangement with the Nabob Vizier Saadut Ali; 15th Feb. 1802	- -	A. 217.
119.	- - Articles of Convention between General Duncan and Rowjee Appajee, for and on behalf of Anund Rao Guicowar Senakasakell Shumshere Behaudur, for the security of the dominion and government of the Guicowar in Guzerat; 15th March 1802.	440	-

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120.	Commercial Treaty with the Nizam; 12th April 1802	-	A. 230.
121.	Treaty of Alliance and Subsidy with Anund Rao Guicowar; 6th June 1802	-	A. 565.
122.	- - Treaty with the Nabob of Furruckabad, for ceding to the Company, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Furruckabad and its dependencies, in commutation of tribute; 24th June 1802	-	A. 227.
123.	Agreement concluded between the Resident at Baroda, and Anund Rao Guicowar; 29th July 1802	440	—
124.	Treaty with the King of Queda, for cession of territory on the coast of Queda; November 1802	-	A. 245.
125.	Treaty of Alliance and Subsidy with the Peishwa, commonly called the Treaty of Bassein; 31st December 1802	-	A. 233.
126.	Agreement with Anund Rao Guicowar, 26th January 1803; supplementary to the Treaty of March and June 1802	-	A. 585.
127.	Treaty with Amrut Rao; 14th August 1803	-	A. 308.
128.	- - Instrument, under the signature of the Governor-general in Council, delivered to the Nizam (Secunder Jah) on his accession to the Musnud, recognizing all the former Treaties and Engagements with Nizam Ali, deceased; 24th August 1803	-	A. 250.
129.	Agreement with Rajah Hummut Behauder; 4th September 1803	-	A. 309.
130.	Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with the Rajah of Bhurtpore; 29th September 1803	-	A. 251.
131.	Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with the Rajah of Macherry; 14th November 1803	-	A. 252.
132.	Treaty with the Rajah of Lunawara, declaratory of his allegiance to the Company, 14th November 1803	-	A. 592.
133.	Treaty of Amity and Alliance with the Rajah of Jypore (or Jyonagur); 12th December 1803	-	A. 253.
134.	Treaty with the Rajah of Soonth, declaratory of his allegiance to the Company, 16th December 1803	-	A. 590.
135.	Treaty of Amity and Alliance with Rajah Umbajee Rao Enghah, 16th December 1803	-	A. 255.
136.	Supplemental Articles to the Treaty of Bassein (No 125); 16th December 1803	-	A. 242.
137.	- - Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Rajah of Benar, commonly called the Treaty of Doogaum; 17th December 1803	-	A. 261.
138.	- - Supplementary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore, for adjusting an exchange of certain Districts, dated 29th December 1803, with a reference to the 15th Article of the Treaty of Mysore, concluded in 1799	-	A. 248.
139.	Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Dowlat Rao Scindia; 30th December 1803	-	A. 263.
140.	Treaty of Amity and Alliance with the Ranah of Gohud; 17th January 1804	-	A. 268.
141.	Treaty with the Soubahdar of Jansee; 6th February 1804	-	A. 312.
142.	Treaty of Alliance and mutual Defence with Dowlat Rao Scindia; 27th February 1804	-	A. 272.
143.	Treaty concluded with Rao Rajah Parcechoet of Dutteea; 15th March 1804	-	A. 314.
144.	Partition Treaty of Hyderabad with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, 28th April 1804	-	A. 278.
145.	Partition Treaty of Poonah with his Highness the Peishwa; 14th May 1804	-	A. 280.
146.	Treaty with the Rajah of Purlaunghur, declaratory of his allegiance to the Company; 25th November 1804	-	A. 593.
147.	Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Rajah of Travancore; 12th January 1805	-	A. 283.
148.	Treaty of Amity and Alliance with the Rajah of Bhurtpore; 17th April 1805	-	A. 287.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
149.	- - Definitive Treaty with Anund Rao Guicowar, in confirmation of former Treaties, and for the augmentation of the Subsidiary Force; 21st April 1805	- -	A. 594.
150.	Definitive Treaty of Amity and Alliance with Dowlat Rao Scindia; 22d November 1805	- -	A. 290.
151.	Treaty of Peace and Amity with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, 24th December 1805	- -	A. 294.
152.	- - Treaty with the Ranah of Gohud, for the relinquishment to the Company of the Country and Fort of Gohud and others, and for the investiture of the Ranah in the sovereignty of the districts of Dholepore, Baree, and Bajekera; 10th January 1806	- -	A. 298.
153.	Agreement entered into by the Agents of Bhunga Sing; 1st April 1806	- -	A. 316.
154.	Engagements on the part of Kooar Soonee Sah 4th April 1806	- -	A. 320.
155.	- - Engagement with the Rajah of Berar, for the restitution of the provinces of Sambulpore and Patna by the British Government to the Rajah; 24th August 1806	- -	A. 300.
156.	Treaty with the Nana of Calpee; 23d October 1806	- -	A. 321.
157.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, presented by, and sunnud granted to Koor Luchmon Sing; 19th September 1807	- -	A. 337.
158.	Articles explanatory of the third Article of the Treaty of Mysore, concluded in 1799; 29th January 1807	- -	A. 302.
159.	Sunnud granted to Maha Rajah Kishore Sing; 1st February 1807	- -	A. 328.
160.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, on the part of Rajah Bukht Sing; 8th June 1807	- -	A. 331.
161.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, presented by Furseram; 7th October 1807	- -	A. 341.
162.	Agreements with the piratical Mahrattas; December 1807, and January 1808	- -	A. 602 to 610
163.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, presented by Laul Shew, Rajah of Cucheerah and Nagode; 11th March 1809	442	—
164.	Treaty with the King of Perera; 12th March 1809	- -	Not printed
165.	Sunnud granted to Laul Chow, Rajah of Cucheerah and Nagode; 20th March 1809	443	—
166.	Treaty of Alliance with the Rajah of Lahore; 25th April 1809	- -	A. 305.
167.	Itila-nameh, addressed to the Chiefs of the country of Malwa and Sindh, on this side of the river Sutlege; 3d May 1809	445	—
168.	Treaty of perpetual Friendship and Subsidy with the Rajah of Cochin; 6th May 1809	- -	A. 472.
169.	Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with the King of Caubul, 17th June 1809	- -	A. 304.
170.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, presented by Laul Aunsaun Sing of Souhawal and Rygown, 16th July 1809	446	—
171.	Sunnud granted to Laul Aunsaun Sing; 18th July 1809	447	—
172.	Copy of the original promissory Agreement with the Ameers of Seind; 22d August 1809	- -	A. 306.
173.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from Dewan Joogul Puraud; 23d August 1809	449	—
174.	Sunnud granted to Dewan Joogul Puraud; 25th August 1809	450	—
175.	Engagement with Dewan Hass-raj of Mandavie; 28th October 1809	- -	B. 38.
176.	Agreement with Futeh Mahomed of Cutch; — 1809	- -	B. 38.
177.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from Laul Doonierput; 16th August 1810	450	—

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

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Appendix, No. 29.  
Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
178.	Sunnud granted to Lall Doopierput; 17th August 1810 -	452	—
179.	Sunnud granted to Dewan Joogul Purahead; 7th January 1811 -	453	—
180.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from the Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder, Rajah of Punna; 22d March 1811 -	454	—
181.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder, Rajah of Punna; 22d March 1811 -	455	—
182.	Sunnud granted to the Rajah Bajee Behauder, Rajah of Chukary; 25th March 1811 -	463	—
183.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from the Rajah Ruttun Sing, Rajah of Bijawur; 26th March 1811 -	464	—
184.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Ruttun Sing, Rajah of Bijawur; 27th March 1811 -	465	—
185.	Engagement with the Rajah of Macherry; 16th July 1811 -	-	B. 89.
186.	Sunnud granted to the Chiefs of the country of Malaa and Sirhind, on this side of the river Sutlege; 22d August 1811 -	468	—
187.	Treaty with the Vizier of Oudo; 14th January 1812 -	-	B. 89.
188.	Sunnud granted to Dewan Gopaul Sing; 24th February 1812 -	469	—
189.	Treaty with the King of Persia; 14th March 1812 -	-	Not printed.
190.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, from the Chobey Dareso Sing, late Killedar of Calinger; 19th June 1812 -	470	—
191.	Sunnud granted to Chobey Dareso Sing, late Killedar of Calinger; 4th July 1812 -	471	—
192.	Ikar nameh, or obligation of allegiance from Nawul Kishwur, and the relict of Bherit Jew Chobey; 19th June 1812 -	472	—
193.	Sunnud granted to Nawul Kishwur, and the relict of Bherit Jew Chobey; 4th July 1812 -	473	—
194.	- - Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from the Chobey Chittersaul, and the mother of Chobey Chittersaul; 19th June 1812 -	474	—
195.	Sunnud granted to Chobey Chittersaul, and the mother of Chobey Chittersaul; 4th July 1812 -	475	—
196.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from Gya Purahead Chobey; 19th June 1812 -	476	—
197.	Sunnud granted to Gya Purahead Chobey; 4th July 1812 -	477	—
198.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from Poker Purahead Chobey; 19th June 1812 -	477	—
199.	Sunnud granted to Poker Purahead Chobey; 4th July 1812 -	479	—
200.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from the Chobey Salagram; 19th June 1812 -	479	—
201.	Sunnud granted to Chobey Salagram; 4th July 1812 -	480	—
202.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance from Gopaul Lall, 4th July 1812 -	481	—
203.	Sunnud granted to Gopaul Lall; 4th July 1812 -	482	—
204.	Sunnud granted to Thakoor Doorjun Sing -	482	—
205.	Agreement with the Rajah of Colapore; 1st October 1812 -	-	B. 40.
206.	Agreement with Rajah Poud Sawunt Bounsello Behauder, Desaye of Sawunt Warres; 3d October 1812 -	-	B. 42.
207.	Treaty of Friendship and Defensive Alliance with the Rajah of Rewah and Mookundpore, 5th October 1812 -	-	B. 45.
208.	Treaty of Friendship and Defensive Alliance with the Rajah of Oorcha, or Tehree, 23d December 1812 -	-	B. 48.
209.	Second Treaty with the Rajah of Rewah and Mookundpore; 2d June 1813, with a supplemental Article -	-	B. 47.
210.	Third Treaty with the Rajah of Rewah and Mookundpore; 11th March 1814 -	-	B. 50.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
211.	Engagement with the Vizier of Oude; 12th July 1814 -	-	B. 51.
212.	Counterpart of engagement with the Vizier of Oude by the British Government; 3d August 1814 -	-	B. 51.
213.	Treaty with the King of Persia; 25th November 1814 -	-	Not printed.
214.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Maha Chund, of Belaspore; 6th March 1815 -	483	-
215.	- - Sunnuds granted to Rana Juggut Sing, of Baghal, 3d September 1815; to Rana Bhoop Sing, of Koobhar, same date; to Rooder Paul, of Booye, 4th September 1815; to Sunsaroo Thakoor, same date; to Goburdhur Sing, of Dhamee, same date; to Maun Chund, of Booye, same date; to Roy Mungoo Deo, same date; to Thakoor Gugrak, 21st September 1815 -	483	-
216.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Futtoh Sing, of Nahan; 21st September 1815 -	484	-
217.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Ram Sing (or Ram Surrin); 20th October 1815, for Hindore -	484	-
218.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Ram Sing (or Ram Surrin), for Burrowlee; 20th October 1815 -	485	-
219.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Rurrum Sing, of Putoala; 20th October 1815, for Pergunnah Mahalee, &c. -	485	-
220.	Sunnud granted to Rajah Rurrum Sing, for Bughaut and Juggutgurb; 20th October 1815 -	486	-
221.	Sunnud granted to Melendra Sing, of Bussahir; 6th November 1815 -	486	-
222.	Treaty of Peace with the Rajah of Nepaul; 2d December 1815 -	-	B. 54.
223.	Treaty of Alliance with Rao Bharmuljee, of Cutch; 16th January 1816, with a Supplemental Article -	-	B. 52.
224.	Ikar-nameh, or obligation of allegiance, executed on the part of the Rajah of Nepaul; 4th March 1816 -	486	-
225.	Treaty with the Vizier of Oude; 1st May 1816 -	-	B. 54.
226.	Treaty of Defensive Alliance with the Rajah of Borar; 27th May 1816 -	-	{ B. 55. C. 1.
226a.	Treaty with the Rao of Cutch; 18th June 1816; supplemental to that of the 16th January 1816 -	487	-
227.	Sunnud granted to Purtaub Sing; 11th January 1817 -	487	-
228.	Sunnud granted to Chobee Newal Kishore; 11 January 1817 -	492	-
229.	Sunnud granted to the widow of Bhurtjoo Chobee; 11th January 1817 -	492	-
230.	Treaty with the Rajah of Sicim; 10th February 1817 -	-	B. 59.
231.	Sunnud granted to the Rajah of Sicim; 7th April 1817 -	493	-
232.	Treaty with the Peishwa; 13th June 1817 -	-	{ B. 60. C. 6.
233.	Engagement with Nana Govind Row, of Calpee; 1st November 1817 -	-	C. 13.
234.	Treaty with Dowlut Rao Scindia; 5th November 1817 -	-	{ B. 65. C. 17.
235.	Supplement to the Definitive Treaty with the Guicowar; 6th November 1817 -	-	D. 1.
236.	Treaty with the Rajah of Kerowlee; 9th November 1817 -	-	C. 21.
237.	Treaty with Meer Khan; 9th November 1817 -	-	C. 22.
238.	Engagement with the Rajah of Simphur; 12th November 1817 -	-	C. 24.
239.	Treaty with the Soubahdar of Jhansi; 17th November 1817 -	-	C. 27.
240.	Treaty with the Rajah of Kotah; 26th December 1817 -	-	C. 30.
241.	Treaty with Mulhar Rao Holkar; 6th January 1818 -	-	C. 32.
242.	Treaty with the Rajah of Joudpore; 6th January 1818 -	-	C. 36.

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
243.	Provisional Treaty with the Rajah of Berar ; 6th January 1818	- -	C. 87.
244.	Treaty with the Rana of Ondipore ; 13th January 1818	- - -	C. 38.
245.	Treaty with the Rajah of Boondoe ; 10th February 1818	- 498	—
246.	Treaty with the Nabob of Bhopaul ; 26th February 1818	- - -	C. 40.
247.	Treaty with the Rajah of Bickaneer ; 9th March 1818	- - -	C. 42.
248.	Treaty with the Rajah of Kishenghur ; 28th March 1818	- -	C. 44.
249.	Treaty with the Rajah of Jyepore ; 2d April 1818	- - -	C. 45.
250.	Treaty with the Rajah of Duttoeah ; 31st July 1818	- - -	D. 7.
251.	Treaty with the Rajah of Bhanawarra ; 16th September 1818	- -	D. 10.
252.	Supplementary Article to the Treaty with the Rajah of Bhanawarra ; 16th September 1818	- - -	D. 11.
253.	Treaty with the Rajah of Dowleah and Purtaubghur ; 5th October 1818	- - -	D. 11.
254.	Additional Article to the Supplementary Treaty with the Guicowar ; 28th November 1818	- - -	D. 14.
255.	Sunnud granted to Sujahut Khan ; 28th November 1818	494	—
256.	Sunnud granted to Naumdar Khan ; 28th November 1818	- 495	—
257.	Treaty with the Rajah of Doongerpore ; 11th December 1818	- -	D. 14.
258.	Treaty with the Rajah of Jessulmere ; 12th December 1818	- -	D. 16.
259.	Treaty with the petty Chiefs of Dewass ; 12th December 1818	- -	D. 17.
260.	Treaty with the Rajah of Bhanawarra ; 25th December 1818	- -	D. 19.
261.	Treaty with the Rajah of Dhar ; 10th January 1819	- -	D. 21.
262.	Sunnud granted to Ramchunder Bullar, for Villages in the district of Saugur	- - - 495	—
263.	Treaty with the Regency of Sawaunt Warree, 17th February 1819	- - -	D. 23.
264.	Treaty with the King of Acheen ; 22d April 1819	- - 497	—
265.	Treaty with the Rajah of Sattara ; 25th September 1819	- - -	D. 24.
266.	Sunnud granted to Maha Rao Omeed Sing, of Kotah ; 25th September 1819	- - - 498	—
267.	Treaty with the Cutch Government ; 13th October 1819	- - -	D. 29.
268.	Treaty with the Arab Tribes ; 8th January 1820	- - -	D. 32.
269.	Preliminary Treaty with Hassan bin Ramah ; 8th January 1820	499	—
270.	Preliminary Treaty with Sultan bin Soggur ; 9th January 1820	499	—
271.	Preliminary Treaty with the Sheikh of Dubey ; 9th January 1820	499	—
272.	Preliminary Treaty with Sheikh Shakhbool bin Dyab, of Abon Dyaboe ; 11th January 1820	- - - 500	—
273.	Preliminary Treaty with Hassan bin Ali ; 15th January 1820	500	—
274.	Treaty with the Regency of Sawaunt Warree ; 17th February 1820	- - -	D. 34.
275.	Sunnud granted to the Rajah of Gurhwal ; 4th March 1820	- 500	—

No.	LIST.	Page of this Volume.	Reference to the Pages of the Volumes in which the Treaties not included in this Collection will be found.
276.	Treaty with the Ameers of Scinde; 9th November 1820 -	-	D. 35.
277.	Treaty with the Imaum of Senna; 15th January 1821 -	-	D. 36.
278.	Treaty with the Rajah of Dhar; 18th December 1821 -	-	D. 37.
279.	Treaty with the Government of Cutch; 21st May 1822 -	-	D. 38.
280.	Treaty with the Raghoojee Angria, of Colabba; July 1822 -	-	D. 39.
281.	Treaty with the Imaum of Muscat; 29th August 1822 -	501	—
282.	Treaty with the Nizam; 12th December 1822 -	-	D. 47.
283.	Treaty with Rao Shoo Sing, Regent of Serowee; ratified 31st October 1823 -	-	D. 51.
284.	Treaty with Rajah Govind Chunder, of Cachar; 6th March 1824 -	-	D. 54.
285.	Treaty with Rajah Ram Sing, of Jyntia; 10th March 1824 -	-	D. 53.
286.	Separate Article of Rajah Ram Sing, of Jyntia; 10th March -	-	D. 54.
287.	Treaty with the Sultan and Tumongong of Johore; 2d August 1824 -	502	—
288.	Agreement with the King of Oude; 17th August 1825 -	504	—
289.	Agreement with the Rajah of Colapore; 30th December 1825 -	505	—
290.	Treaty of Peace with the King of Ava; 24th February 1826 -	506	This Treaty was also presented and printed separately in 1826.
291.	Treaty with the King of Siam; 20th June 1826 -	508	—
292.	Treaty with the Rajah of Nagpore; 1st December 1826 -	511	—
293.	Treaty with the King of Siam; 17th January 1827 -	516	—
294.	Agreement with the Rajah of Colapore; 23d October 1827 -	518	—
295.	- - Bond from His Royal Highness the Prince Royal of Persia, annulling the 3d and 4th Articles of the Treaty (dated 25th November 1814); 10th March 1828 -	-	Not printed.
296.	Agreement with the Rajah of Colapore; 15th July 1829 -	519	—
297.	Revised engagement with the Rajah of Nagpore; 26th December 1829 -	515	—
298.	Treaty with the Government of Khyrpore; 4th April 1832 -	520	—
299.	Treaty with the Ameer of Hyderabad; 20th April 1832; with a Supplementary Article -	521	—

Note.—The preceding List contains a reference to all the Treaties and Engagements which are known to exist. There may possibly be some omissions, which might have been supplied if there had been time for a reference to the detailed proceedings of the Local Governments; but as every material Treaty is referred to or transmitted separately, with the Despatches addressed by the Governments in India to the Court of Directors, it is hoped, as these have been consulted, in view to the collections of Treaties which from time to time have been made, that the present List will be found to contain the most important of the documents by which our relations with the Native States of India have been established.

The delay which has taken place in the printing of this Appendix has afforded an opportunity of including two Treaties in the collection (Nos. 298 & 299), which have been received since the Report of the East India Committee was presented.



(No. 2.)

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
No.

LIST OF TREATIES with NATIVE PRINCES and STATES of Asia, classified according to the existing state of the Relations of the British Government with them.

No.	NAME OF THE STATE.	NAME OF THE CHIEF with whom the Engagement was concluded.	DATE of the TREATY.	No. on the preceding List.
I.—Foreign Independent States.				
1.	China - - -	- - - - -	No Treaty.	
2.	Cochin China - - -	- - - - -	No Treaty.	
3.	Siam - - -	The King - - - - - The King - - - - -	20 June 1826 17 Jan. 1827	291 298
4.	Ava - - -	The King - - - - - The King - - - - -	1795 & 1796 24 Feb. 1826	100 290
5.	Queda - - -	The King - - - - - The Empetuan - - - - - Yong-de-Fur-Tuan Rajah Mooda	1786 1 May 1791 Nov. 1802	82 92 124
6.	Acheen (in the Island of Sumatra) - - - }	- - - - -	22 April 1819	264
7.	Persia - - -	Carem Khan - - - - - Futteh Ali Shah - - - - - Futteh Ali Shah - - - - - Futteh Ali Shah - - - - - Futteh Ali Shah - - - - - Futteh Ali Shah - - - - - Bond on Abbas Mirza, Prince Royal - - - - -	2 July 1763 Jan. 1801 Jan. 1801 12 Mar. 1809 14 Mar. 1812 25 Nov. 1814 10 Mar. 1828	28 118 114 164 189 213 295
8.	Bushire - - -	Shaik Sadoon - - - - -	12 April 1763	26
9.	Cambul (Affghânistan) -	The King - - - - -	17 June 1809	169
10.	Muscat - - -	The Inaum - - - - - The Inaum - - - - -	18 Jan. 1800 29 Aug. 1822	109 281
11.	Piratical States in the PERSIAN GULF; viz. Arab tribes - - -	- - - - - Hassan bin Ramah - - - - - Sultan bin Saggur - - - - - Mahomed bin Kaya bin Zaal - - - - - Shaik Shakhbood bin Dyab - - - - - Hassan bin Ali - - - - -	8 Jan. 1820 8 Jan. 1820 9 Jan. 1820 9 Jan. 1820 11 Jan. 1820 15 Jan. 1820	268 269 270 271 272 273
12.	Senna - - -	Meer Fathullah - - - - -	15 Jan. 1821	277
II.—Native States not under British Protection.				
13.	Nepaul - - -	Rim Behader Shah Behader } Shumshere Jung - - - } The Rajah - - - - - Bikram Sah - - - - - The Rajah - - - - -	1 Mar. 1792 30 Oct. 1801 2 Dec. 1815 4 Mar. 1816	95 116 222 224
14.	Rajah of Lahore - - -	Runjeet Sing - - - - -	25 April 1809	166
15.	Scinde (on the River Indus)	Golan Shah - - - - - Golan Shah - - - - - Meer Golan Ali, Meer Kureem Ali, and Meer Mourad Ali - - - } Meer Kureem Ali, Meer Mourad Ali Meer Mourad Ali - - - - - Meer Rostum Khan - - - - -	1758 22 & 23 Apr. 1761 22 Aug. 1809 9 Nov. 1820 22 April 1832 4 April 1832	13 23 172 276 298 298
16.	Khyrpoor - - -	Meer Rostum Khan - - - - -		
16.	Scindia - - -	Sahab Soubahdar Madhee Rao } Scindia Behauder - - - } Umabjee Rao English, a dependant of Scindia (obsolete) - - - } Dowlut Rao - - - - - Dowlut Rao - - - - - Dowlut Rao - - - - - Dowlut Rao - - - - -	13 Oct. 1761 16 Dec. 1808 30 Dec. 1803 27 Feb. 1804 22 Nov. 1805 6 Nov. 1817	78 135 139 142 180 234

No.	NAME OF THE STATE.	NAME OF THE CHIEF with whom the Engagement was concluded.	DATE of the TREATY.	No. on the preceding List.	Appendix, No. 29. Copies of Treaties, &c.
III.—Native States with which Subsidiary Treaties exist.					
17.	Oude - - - -	Shujah-ul-Dowlah - - - -	16 Aug. 1765	43	
		Shujah-ul-Dowlah - - - -	29 Nov. 1768	53	
		Shujah-ul-Dowlah - - - -	7 Sept. 1773	62	
		Shujah-ul-Dowlah - - - -	Oct. 1774	63	
		Asuf-ud-Dowlah - - - -	21 May 1775	66	
		Asuf-ud-Dowlah - - - -	19 Sept. 1781	77	
		Asuf-ud-Dowlah - - - -	15 April 1787	85	
		Asuf-ud-Dowlah - - - -	1 Sept. 1788	87	
		Asuf-ud-Dowlah - - - -	13 Dec. 1794	99	
		Asuf-ud-Dowlah - - - -	30 Mar. 1797	101	
		Saadut Ali Khan - - - -	7 Feb. 1798	103	
		Saadut Ali Khan - - - -	21 Feb. 1798	104	
		Saadut Ali Khan - - - -	10 Nov. 1801	117	
		Saadut Ali Khan - - - -	15 Feb. 1802	118	
		Vizier-ool-Murmanlik-Yemeen- ov-Dowlah-Nazin-ov-Mulk, Saadut Ali Khan Behauder	14 Jan. 1812	187	
		Moharez Jung - - - -			
		Refaut-ood-Rufce-ool-Mulk- Ghazu-ood Dheen Hyder Khan Behauder Shehamut Jung	12 July 1814	211	
		Refaut-ood-Rufce-ool-Moolk- Ghazu-ood-Dheen Hyder Khan Behauder Shehamut Jung	3 Aug. 1814	212	
		Refaut-ood-Rufce-ool-Moolk- Ghazu-ood-Dheen Hyder Khan Behauder Shehamut Jung	1 May 1816	225	
		Abool Mozuffur Moizood Dheen Ghasevor Deen Hyder Shah	17 Aug. 1825	288	
	Rohillas - - - -	Fyzulah Khan - - - -	Oct. 1774	64	
		Ahmed Ali Khan Behader - -	13 Dec. 1794	99	
18.	Nagpore - - - -	Senah Saheb Soubah Rhagojee Boonsla - - - -	17 Dec. 1803	137	
		Senah Saheb Soubah Rhagojee Boonsla - - - -	24 Aug. 1806	155	
		Puroojee Bhooala - - - -	27 May 1816	226	
		Moodhojee Bhooala - - - -	6 Jan. 1818	243	
		Rahojee Bhooala - - - -	1 Dec. 1826	292	
		Rahojee Bhooala - - - -	26 Dec. 1829	297	
19.	Nizam - - - -	Salabut Jung - - - -	14 May 1759	15	
		Asuf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk-Ni- zam-ud-Dowlah-Moer Nizam Ali Khan Behauder Futteh Jung Sepoy Sirdar - -	12 Nov. 1766	51	
		Bazalet Jung - - - -	27 April 1779	72	
			18 Sept. 1788	88	
			7 July 1789	89	
		Ali Khan Asuf Jah Behauder -	5 June 1790	90	
		Nizam-ul-MulkAsophJahBehauder	1 Sept. 1798	105	
		Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asuf Jah Be- hauder - - - -	13 July 1799	107	
		Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asuf Jah Be- hauder - - - -	12 Oct. 1800	112	
		Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asuf Jah Be- hauder - - - -	12 April 1802	120	
		Secunder Jah - - - -	24 Aug. 1803	128	
		Asuf Jah Moer Akber Ali Khan- Asuf Jah Behauder - - - -	28 April 1804	144	
			12 Dec. 1822	282	
20.	Holkar - - - -	Jeswunt Rao - - - -	24 Dec. 1805	151	
		Mulhar Rao - - - -	6 Jan. 1818	241	
21.	Mysore Rajah - - -	Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder	8 July 1799	106	
			13 July 1799	107	
		Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder	29 Dec. 1803	158	
		Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder	29 Jan. 1807	158	
22.	Travancore - - - -	The Rajah - - - -	12 Aug. 1788	86	
		The Rajah - - - -	28 Jan. 1795	97	
		Ram Raja Behauder - - - -	18 May 1797	102	
		Ram Raja Behauder - - - -	12 Jan. 1805	147	

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

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Copies of Treaties,  
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No.	NAME OF THE STATE.	NAME OF THE CHIEF with whom the Engagement was concluded.	DATE of the TREATY.	No. on the preceding List.
23.	Cochin - - - -	Paramadappoo Vales Ramavannah The Rajah - - - -	2 Feb. 1791 6 May 1809	91 168
24.	Gulcowar - - - -	Futteh Sing - - - - Futteh Sing - - - - Futteh Sing - - - - Anund Rao Gulcowar Senasakell } Shumshere Behauder } Anund Rao - - - - Anund Rao - - - - Anund Rao - - - - Anund Rao - - - - Anund Rao - - - - Anund Rao - - - -	12 Jan. 1773 26 Jan. 1780 26 Jan. 1780 15 Mar. 1803 6 June 1802 29 July 1802 25 Jan. 1803 21 April 1805 6 Nov. 1817 28 Nov. 1818	61 74 75 119 121 123 126 149 235 254
25.	Cutch - - - -	Hans-raj - - - - Futteh Mahomed - - - - Rao Bharmuljee - - - - Rao of Cutch - - - - Mirza Rao Sree Dussuljee - Mirza Rao Sree Dussuljee -	28 Oct. 1809 1809 16 Jan. 1816 18 June 1816 13 Oct. 1819 21 May 1822	175 176 223 226 267 279

IV.—Native States under British Protection, but *without* Subsidiary Treaties.

26.	Siecim - - - -	The Rajah - - - - The Rajah - - - -	10 Feb. 1817 7 April 1817	230 251
	Seik or Hill States, on the left bank of the Sutteje:			
27.	Malwa and Sirhind -	Chiefs - - - - Chiefs - - - -	3 May 1809 22 Aug. 1811	167 186
28.	Belaspore - - - -	Maha Chund - - - -	6 Mar. 1815	214
29.	Beghal - - - -	Juggut Sing - - - -	3 Sept. 1815	215
30.	Koobar - - - -	Bhoop Sing - - - -	3 Sept. 1815	215
31.	Boojye - - - -	Rooder Paul - - - - Maun Chund - - - -	4 Sept. 1815 4 Sept. 1815	215 215
32.	Dhamee - - - -	Goburdhur Sing - - - -	4 Sept. 1815	215
33.	Nahan - - - -	Futteh Sing - - - -	21 Sept. 1815	215
34.	Hindoor - - - -	Ram Sing (or Ram Surran) -	20 Oct. 1815	217
35.	Burrowlee - - - -	Ram Sing (or Ram Surran) -	20 Oct. 1815	218
36.	Puttcala - - - -	Rurram Sing - - - - Rurram Sing - - - -	20 Oct. 1815 20 Oct. 1815	219 220
37.	Bussahir - - - -	Mehendra Sing - - - -	6 Nov. 1815	221
38.	Gurkwall - - - -	The Rajah - - - -	4 Mar. 1820	275
39.	Sattarah - - - -	Purtaub Shah - - - -	25 Sept. 1819	265
	Jaut and other States, on the right bank of the Jumna:			
40.	Bhurt pore - - - -	Bisboinder Sewase Runjeet Sing } Behauder - - - - } Bisboinder Sewase Runjeet Sing } Behauder - - - - }	29 Sept. 1803 17 April 1805	130 148
41.	Macherry - - - -	Seway Buctawur Sing Behauder Buctawur Sing - - - -	14 Nov. 1805 16 July 1811	131 185
42.	Rajah of Dolapore, Bur- ree and Rajakerah, for- merly Rana of Gohud }	Luckindar Behauder - - - - Kerrut Sing Luckindar - - - - Kerrut Sing Luckindar - - - -	2 Dec. 1779 17 Jan. 1804 10 Jan. 1806	78 140 152
43.	Rawah - - - -	Jey Sing Deo - - - - Jey Sing Deo - - - - Jey Sing Deo and Baboo Bishen- nath Sing - - - - }	5 Oct. 1812 2 June 1813 11 Mar. 1814	207 209 210

No.	NAME OF THE STATE.	NAME OF THE CHIEF with whom the Engagement was concluded.	DATE of the TREATY.	No. on the preceding List.
	BOONDELA CHIEFS:			
44.	- - - - -	Himmat Behauder - - -	4 Sept. 1803	129
45.	Subadar of Jhansi - -	Sheva Rao Bhoo - - - Rao Ram Chund - - -	6 Feb. 1804 17 Nov. 1817	141 239
46.	Rajah of Dutteah - -	Rao Rajah Pareesheet - - Rao Rajah Pareesheet - -	15 Mar. 1804 31 July 1818	143 250
47.	Baddowlee - - -	Bhunga Sing - - -	1 April 1806	153
48.	Not known - - -	Koar Soonee Sah - - -	4 April 1806	154
49.	Nana of Calpee - - -	Nana Govind Row - - - Nana Govind Row - - -	23 Oct. 1806 1 Nov. 1817	156 233
50.	Rajah of Oorcha or Tehree	Bickumajeet - - -	23 Dec. 1812	201
51.	Village of Nugwan, &c. in Punworey Pergunnah	Koar Luchmon Sing - -	19 Sept. 1807	157
52.	Mahla, Villages, &c. situ- ated above the Ghauts }	Kishore Sing - - -	1 Feb. 1807	159
53.	Ponna - - -	Kishore Sing - - - Kishore Sing - - -	22 Mar. 1811	180 181
54.	Elakas of Kotra and Puway	Bukht Sing - - -	8 June 1807	160
55.	Pergunnah of Mataund -	Punseram - - -	7 Oct. 1807	161
56.	Cucheerah and Nagode -	Laul Shew - - - Laul Shew - - -	11 Mar. 1809 20 Mar. 1809	163 165
57.	Soubawul and Rygown -	Laul Aumaun Sing - - Laul Aumaun Sing - -	16 July 1809 18 July 1809	170 171
58.	Villages of Chillee, &c. -	Joogul Purshaud - - - Joogul Purshaud - - - Joogul Purshaud - - -	23 Aug. 1809 25 Aug. 1809 7 Jan. 1811	173 174 179
59.	Villages in the Pergunnah Cooley }	Laul Doonierput - - - Laul Doonierput - - -	16 Aug. 1810 17 Aug. 1810	177 178
60.	Chukary - - -	Bajee Behauder - - -	25 Mar. 1811	182
61.	Bijawar - - -	Ruttan Sing - - - Ruttan Sing - - -	26 Mar. 1811 27 Mar. 1811	183 184
62.	Villages in Pergunnah Punwary }	Gopaul Sing - - -	24 Feb. 1812	188
63.	Calinger - - -	Dareao Sing - - - Dareao Sing - - -	19 June 1812 4 July 1812	190 191
64.	Villages in the Pergunnahs of Bhetry and Konis }	Nawul Kishwar - - - Nawul Kishwar - - -	19 June 1812 4 July 1812	192 193
65.	Villages in Pergunnahs Bhe- try, Konis and Calinger }	Chittersaul - - - Chittersaul - - -	19 June 1812 4 July 1812	194 195
66.	Villages of Zerown, &c. -	Gya Purshaud - - - Gya Purshaud - - -	19 June 1812 4 July 1812	196 197
67.	Kushab, Poorwah, &c. -	Poker Purshaud - - - Poker Purshaud - - -	19 June 1812 4 July 1812	198 199
68.	Villages of Purn, &c. -	Salagram - - - Salagram - - -	19 June 1812 4 July 1812	200 201
69.	Komptah and Ragowiah -	Gopaul Laul - - - Gopaul Laul - - -	4 July 1812 4 July 1812	202 203
70.	Villages in Pergunnah of Mohur }	Doorjun Sing - - -	no date to this Sunnud.	204
71.	Villages in Pergunnahs of Lowree and Kuttolah }	Purtaub Sing - - -	11 Jan. 1817	227
72.	Muckree, &c. - - -	Newal Kishore - - - Widow of Bhurtjoo Chobee	11 Jan. 1817 11 Jan. 1817	228 229
73.	Simpthur - - -	Runjeet Sing - - -	12 Nov. 1817	238

No.	NAME OF THE STATE.	NAME OF THE CHIEF with whom the Engagement was concluded.	DATE of the TREATY.	No. on the preceding List.
CHIEFS of RAJPOOTANA and CENTRAL INDIA :				
74.	Rajah of Jyepore or Jyenagur	Dheersaj Juggut Sing - -	12 Dec. 1803	133
75.	Rajah of Joudpore - -	Sewajee Juggut Sing - -	2 April 1818	249
76.	Rana of Oudipore - -	Maun Sing - - - -	6 Jan. 1818	242
77.	Rajah of Kishenghur - -	Bheem Sing - - - -	13 Jan. 1818	244
78.	Rajah of Bickaneer - -	Kulleaun Sing - - - -	28 Mar. 1818	246
79.	Rawal of Jessulmere - -	Soorut Sing - - - -	9 Mar. 1818	247
80.	Rajah of Kerowlee - -	Rawul Moolraj - - - -	12 Dec. 1818	258
81.	Rajah of Serowee - -	Jud Kool Chanderbhol Hurbukah- pol Der - - - -	9 Nov. 1817	236
82.	- - - -	Rao Sheo Sing - - - -	31 Oct. 1823	283
83.	Rajah of Kotah - -	Nabob Ameer Khan - - - -	9 Nov. 1817	237
84.	Rajah of Boondee - -	Omed Sing - - - -	26 Dec. 1817	240
85.	Rajah of Lunawara - -	Omed Sing - - - -	25 Sept. 1819	266
86.	Rajah of Soonth - -	Biahen Sing - - - -	10 Feb. 1818	245
87.	Rajah of Puraubghur - -	The Rajah - - - -	14 Nov. 1803	132
88.	Rajah of Soonth - -	The Rajah - - - -	15 Dec. 1803	134
89.	Rajah of Bhanswarra - -	Shahamut Sing - - - -	25 Nov. 1804	146
90.	- - - -	Shahamut Sing - - - -	5 Oct. 1818	253
91.	- - - -	Nuseer Mahomed Khan - -	26 Feb. 1818	246
92.	Rajah of Dhoongerpore - -	Racee Raceaun Maha Rawul Sree Omed Sing - - - -	16 Sept. 1818	251
93.	- - - -	Racee Raceaun Maha Rawul Sree Omed Sing - - - -	16 Sept. 1818	252
94.	- - - -	Racee Raceaun Maha Rawul Sree Omed Sing - - - -	25 Dec. 1818	260
95.	Villages in District of Saugur	Racee Raceaun Maha Rawul Sree Jeswunt Sing - - - -	11 Dec. 1818	257
96.	Dewass - - - -	Tookoojee Powar and Anund Rao Powar - - - -	12 Dec. 1818	259
97.	Dhar - - - -	Ramchunder Rao Powar - -	10 Jan. 1819	261
98.	Rajah of Bhanawarra - -	Ramchunder Rao Powar - -	18 Dec. 1821	278
99.	- - - -	Ramchunder Bullar - - - -	- - - -	262
CHIEFS situated on the Western Coast of India :				
100.	Kattywar - - - -	Jeerjaboy - - - -	12 Jan. 1766	48
Pratical Mahrattas :				
101.	Dhingey - - - -	Waglia Manick - - - -	20 Dec. 1807	162
102.	Aramra - - - -	Sree Suggaramjee - - - -	14 Dec. 1807	
103.	Bato - - - -	Coer Babjee, - - - -	14 Dec. 1807	
104.	Dewarka - - - -	Mooloo Manick - - - -	28 Dec. 1807	
105.	Posetra - - - -	Coer Megrajee - - - -	- - - -	162
106.	Kutch, for Bato & Dewarka	Rao Sree Raidun - - - -	- - - -	
107.	Joonsagur - - - -	Hamed Khan Behauder - -	without date	
108.	Nowannuggur - - - -	Jam Jussajee - - - -	27 Jan. 1808	
109.	Poorbunder - - - -	Rana Sertanjee and Coer Hallajee	- - - -	162
110.	Jorrebunder - - - -	Khawass Suggaram and Fragjee -	1 Nov. 1807	
111.	Cambay - - - -	Momun Khan - - - -	22 Oct. 1771	58
112.	- - - -	- - - -	1771	59
113.	Broach - - - -	Imptyasood Dowlah Haasud Khan Behauder Dillerjung (obsolete)	30 Nov. 1771	60
114.	Gingerah - - - -	Sciddee Hillol - - - -	3 Jan. 1761	22
115.	Colabba - - - -	Raghojee Angria - - - -	July 1822	280
116.	Colapore - - - -	Kemasvant - - - -	7 April 1765	55
117.	- - - -	The Rajah - - - -	1 Oct. 1812	205
118.	- - - -	Shahjee Chettraputty Meharaj Kurraveer - - - -	30 Dec. 1825	289
119.	- - - -	Shahjee Chettraputty Meharaj Kurraveer - - - -	23 Oct. 1827	294
120.	- - - -	- - - -	15 July 1829	296

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	CHIEFS situated on the Western Coast of India—continued.			
105.	Sawant Warree - -	Pond Sawunt Bouncello - -	3 Oct. 1812 17 Feb. 1819 17 Feb. 1820	206 263 274
105.	Bringah Rajah - -	- - - - -	1758 24 Dec. 1760	12 19
104.	- - - - -	Badda Calamcur - - -	9 Sept. 1760	20
105.	Malabar Chiefs :			
	Cotiote - - -	- - - - -	23 Aug. 1759	16
106.	Cartenaddu - -	- - - - -	30 Dec. 1761	25
107.	Cherrika - - -	- - - - -	1758 23 Mar. 1765	3 34
	BURMESE FRONTIER :			
108.	Assam - - -	Maha Rajah Singy Deo - -	28 Feb. 1793	98
109.	Cachar - - -	Govind Chuuder - - -	6 Mar. 1824	284
110.	Jyntia - - -	Ram Sing - - -	10 Mar. 1824	285
111.	- - - - -	Ram Sing - - -	10 Mar. 1824	286
112.	Johore - - -	- - - - -	2 Aug. 1824	287
	V.—State Pensioners.			
113.	King of Delhi - -	- - - - -	22 Nov & 6 Dec. 1764	32
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	36
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	37
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	38
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	39
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	40
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	41
		Shah Aulum - - -	12 Aug. 1765	42
		Shah Aulum - - -	19 Aug. 1765	44
114.	Nabob of Bengal - -	Serajah Dowlah - - -	31 Mar. 1757	4
		Jaffier Ali Khan - - -	1757	5
		Jaffier Ali Khan - - -	1757	6
		Jaffier Ali Khan - - -	1757	7
		Allow-o-Dowlah Meer Mahomed	1757	8
		Saddock Khan Behauder Assud Jung - - -	- - -	-
		Jaffier Ali Khan - - -	15 July 1757	9
		Jaffier Ali Khan - - -	20 Dec. 1757	10
		Allow-o-Dowlah Meer Mahomed	- - -	-
		Saddock Khan Behauder Assud Jung - - -	1758	11
		Naseer-ul-Mulk (Imteaz-o-Dowlah)	- - -	-
		Nessaret Jung Meer Mahomed	1760	18
		Cossim Khan - - -	- - -	-
		Meer Mahomed Cossim Khan	27 Sept. 1760	21
		Bhujah-ul-Mulk Hossam-o-Dowlah Meer Mahomet Jaffier Khan Behauder Mahomet Jung - - -	10 July 1763	29
		Jaffier Ali Khan - - -	16 Sept. 1764	31
		Nudjum-ul-Dowlah - - -	20 Feb. 1765	33
		Nudjum-ul-Dowlah - - -	30 Sept. 1765	46
		Sunrud for Lord Clive's Jaghire	1765	47
		Syef-ul-Dowlah - - -	19 May 1766	50
		Meharek-ul-Dowlah - - -	21 Mar. 1770	55
115.	Rajah of Benares - -	Cheynt Sing - - -	15 April 1766	68
		Mehipnarain - - -	14 Sept. 1781	76
116.	Nabob of Furruckabad - -	Imdaud Hoossein Khan - -	24 June 1802	122
117.	Nabob of the Carnatic - -	Mahomed Ali - - -	16 Oct. 1763 23 Feb. 1768 30 Aug. 1765 June 1765	30 32 45 81
		Mahomed Ali - - -	24 Feb. 1787	83
		Mahomed Ali - - -	12 July 1792	96
		Omdut-ul-Omrah - - -	26 Aug. 1800	111
		Azem-ul-Dowlah - - -	31 July 1801	115

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118.	Rajah of Tanjore - -	Tuljee - - - - Sree Ram Partaub - - - - Amer Sing - - - - Serfojee - - - -	30 Oct. 1771 12 April 1776 10 April 1787 25 Oct. 1799	57 87 84 108
119.	Nabob of Surat - -	Meah Atchund - - - - Naseer-ud-deen Khan - - - -	4 Mar. 1769 1759 19 May 1800	14 17 110
120.	The late Peshwa and } Mahrattas - - - }	Bajee Rao Pundit Purdan - - Seuram Punt Tatia - - - - Ragoba - - - - Peishwa Row Pundit Purdham - Ragoba - - - - Madhoo Row Narran - - - - Madhoo Row Narran - - - - Madhoo Row Narran - - - - Bajee Rao - - - - Bajee Rao - - - - Bajee Rao - - - - Bajee Rao - - - -	12 July 1739 12 Oct. 1756 14 Sept. 1761 6 Mar. 1775 May 1778 24 Nov. 1778 17 May 1782 5 June 1780 31 Dec. 1802 16 Dec. 1803 14 May 1804 13 June 1817	1 2 24 65 69 70 71 79 90 125 136 145 232
121.	Amrut Rao - - -	(Brother of Bajee Rao) - - -	14 Aug. 1803	127
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*Note.*—In the preceding List, the arrangement, as the title expresses it, is according to the existing relations. Some Treaties, however, have become obsolete. Thus, for instance, the Treaties enumerated under the 5th or concluding head, entitled State Pensioners, may be considered as generally obsolete, excepting the later engagements by which the allowances of these Chiefs have been fixed, and the conditions on which the countries they formerly governed have been transferred to the British Government.

The Treaties also with the Chiefs on the Western Coast of India, marked 103\*, 104, 105, 106 and 107, may be considered obsolete from the lapse of time, although they could not be conveniently disposed of, in this arrangement, under any other head. A similar remark is applicable to the Treaties with Golan Shah of Scinde (see No. 15), another dynasty having subsequently obtained the government of that country, with which the engagements which follow have been concluded.

The Treaty with Umbajee Rao English (see No. 16), is marked as an obsolete engagement, the country ceded to us by that Treaty having, on the 22d Nov. 1805, been re-transferred to Scindia.

Many of the earlier engagements with the Native States, enumerated under the 2d, 3d and 4th heads of this List, have necessarily been superseded by the later Treaties, by which their present relations are established, but the engagements which have thus in a manner become obsolete, could not be clearly distinguished within the compass of a note, and a reference to the later documents will be sufficient, in any case, to determine whether those which precede them can be of any practical importance at the present time.

(No. 3.)

# INDEX to the TREATIES with the NATIVE PRINCES and STATES of Asia

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Copies of Treaties,  
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ARTICLES of CONVENTION between the Honourable *Jonathan Duncan, Esq.* President and Governor in Council of *Bombay*, for and on behalf of the Honourable East India Company of the one part, and *Rowjee Appajee*, for and on behalf of *Anund Rao Guicowar Senahassell Shumshere Behauder*, of the other part, for the security of the dominion and government of the Guicowar in *Guzerat*.

ARTICLE 1st.—The said Rowjee Appajee having solicited the assistance of the English troops against Mulhar Rao, with a view of bringing him to reason, either by peaceable or hostile means, so as to prevent his ruining the country of the state of the Guicowar, of which Anund Rao is the proper and legitimate heir and head; and the English troops under the command of Major Walker having accordingly arrived in the territories of the Guicowar, and the said Rowjee Appajee being also come to Cambay to meet the Honourable the Governor. It is hereby agreed by and between them, that the expense already incurred, and such others as may hereafter be occasioned, for the pay, allowances, and transportation of the troops, expenditure, and transportation of stores, ammunition, &c. shall be accounted for and paid, with interest at the rate of three quarters per cent. per month of thirty days, by the said Rowjee Appajee, on Anund Rao Guicowar, and the state aforesaid, in two instalments; the first to become due on or before the 5th of October next, and the second on or before the 5th of January 1803, for the security of which he assigns and mortgages the Guicowar's share of the district of Attaveesy, near Surat; hereby agreeing that, on failure of the first instalments, the English are to take possession of the said country, and to retain the same under their own collection and management, until the whole be fully cleared and made good to the honourable Company, with interest.

ARTICLE 2d.—It is further hereby stipulated between the honourable East India Company and the Guicowar State, that the latter shall permanently subsidize from the honourable Company a force of about two thousand sepoys, one company of European artillery, and its proportion (consisting of two companies) of Lascars, the estimated expense of which, including establishment of stores, being about 85,000 rupees per month: It is hereby agreed that landed jaidad or funds be assigned so as fully to cover this expense, and whatever it may amount to, from such part of the Guicowar territories as may be hereafter fixed, in view to the greatest convenience of both parties; but this article is not to be carried into effect till the war against Khurree be closed, when it is also proposed, through the co-operation of the English, to effect, a reduction in the number of the Arab force now kept up, and meanwhile this is to be considered as an eventual, and to remain at present an entirely secret article.

ARTICLE 3d.—The Pergunnah of Chourassey, and the Guicowar's share of the choute of Surat having been ceded to the honourable Company in pursuance of the engagement, by letters to that effect from the late Govind Rao to the honourable the Governor of Bombay, the same is hereby confirmed for ever.

ARTICLE 4th.—This agreement to be binding and permanent when ratified by the Supreme Government of Bengal, who, in all political concerns, control the other presidencies, but in the meantime to be in full force.

In witness whereof, the parties have interchangeably set hereunto their hands and seals, in Cambay, this 15th day of March 1802.

A true Copy.

(signed) *H. Shank,*  
Act<sup>g</sup> P<sup>o</sup> S<sup>r</sup>.

(signed) *J. Duncan, (L.S.)*

(signed) *Rowjee Appajee.*

(Seal of the  
Guicowar State.)

AGREEMENT concluded between the Resident at *Baroda* and *Anund Rao Guicowar*, dated the 29th of July 1802.

*Maise Kaunt.*  
(In the Rajah's own  
handwriting.)

I, *ANUND RAO Guicowar Sena Khass Khel Shumshere Behauder*, do hereby confirm and ratify such compacts and agreements as my faithful dewan, *Rowjee Appajee*, hath in my name and on my behalf made and concluded with the honourable the Governor of *Bombay*.

FIRST, I hereby confirm and ratify such grants of land as my said dewan, *Rowjee Appajee*, has made to the honourable Company, either in *Enam* or *Jaydad*; and I also declare, that I hold myself, my heirs and successors, bound to repay in money, or in such further landed assignments as may be sufficient for the purpose, all debts and expenses which the English Government have been at or contracted in the course of the military operations in *Guzerat*, undertaken for the support of my government.

SECONDLY, I entirely approve and highly commend the prudence of my dewan in having obtained a body of English troops to remain permanently in this country, as on their courage and fidelity I place an unlimited dependence.

I have

FORWARDED  
TO THE  
GOVERNMENT  
OF INDIA

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I have determined that the payment of this subsidiary force shall commence from the first of this month, English style, or first of Asser 1859, Hindoo era.

THIRDELY. As I repose an entire confidence in the English, I depend on their friendship to shield me from misfortunes. I am sensible there are many evil-disposed persons amongst the Arabs, who, disregarding my legal authority, have plotted against my liberty, and even my life. By the favour of God, they have been defeated; but should their wicked machinations at any time hereafter succeed, I shall expect the English to release me; and desire that all my acts and deeds, although executed by me in the usual form while in that state of restraint, may be considered as of no validity. I desire, therefore, that my subjects will pay no attention to my orders in this situation, but hear what Major Walker has to say, strictly following his directions, and assisting him in every measure that he shall devise or direct for restoring my person to freedom.

Whoever, in short, shall either bring Canoojees into the management of affairs, or shut me up in the fort of Baroda or elsewhere, is a rebel; and I fully authorize the aforesaid Major Alexander Walker, or the person entrusted with the chief management of the Company's affairs in Guzerat, to chastise such disturbers of government, and bring them to that punishment which is due to those who endanger the person of their sovereign in every part of the world.

Thus, therefore, I order all the faithful officers of government, silladars, seebundies, and others, on any of the foregoing events occurring, to obey Major Walker's orders.

FOURTHLY. Whereas it is signified in certain articles of agreement between the honourable Company and my dewan, Rowjee Appajee, that the English Government is disposed to assist in reducing the Arab force in my service, Major Walker, Resident on the part of the English Government at Baroda, consents to assist me with a pecuniary loan to effect this reduction on the following terms.

FIFTHLY. As it seems impossible that I can retrieve myself or my country from its present embarrassments without reforming and reducing the expense in every department, I do hereby promise and agree to make the necessary reductions by degrees. The objects of reduction are contained in the annexed account; and, if possible, they shall be effected at the periods specified opposite to each of the articles.

SIXTHLY. Before any money is to be advanced, Major Walker must be satisfied that a real and effective reduction shall take place. For this purpose, an exhibition must be made of the accounts, and muster taken of the troops in the presence of three persons, viz. one on the part of the Company, one on the part of the Guicowar government, and the third by such of the jamadars or parikhs as may be the agents of the sebandy. According to this muster, the accounts shall be taken and discharged.

SEVENTHLY. I do hereby further agree and promise, that I shall positively reduce the Arab and other force within six or eight months after the present reduction is accomplished, to the standard of Futeh Sing's time; but to enable me to perform this stipulation, it will be necessary for the English Government to assist me, as they have done on the present occasion.

EIGHTHLY. Provision is already made in the 4th article of agreement, executed and interchanged between the honourable the Governor of Bombay and my dewan, Rowjee Appajee, bearing date the 6th June, or 5th Suffer last, for the payment of the principal and interest of the money to be advanced by the Company; but as it has since been proposed to pay the same off one year sooner than is hereby provided, by applying the entire ruseed of the lands appropriated by that article to the amount of 11,75,000 rupees per annum to the discharging in equal proportions of the principal and interest of the money to be advanced by the Company, and by such other persons as may engage therein, Major Walker accepts of the modification by which the Company's advance may be liquidated one year sooner than it would be by a strict adherence to the letter of treaty, it being, however, always understood, that the provisions in the 4th article of the said treaty of the 6th June or 5th of Suffer, are always in full force, the same as if this subsequent engagement had not been made, in the event of the repayment of the honourable Company's loan, as well of principal as of interest, failing to be made good in the more speedy mode now proposed. The amount of the above receipt, or ruseed, is to be collected every year from the comavaders of the pergunnahs allotted for this purpose in the treaty of the 6th of June, by such persons as the government of Bombay may appoint.

NINTHLY. Interest on that part of the pecuniary assistance and aid which the Company may give on this occasion shall be reckoned and accounted for from the time the said Company may raise a loan for that purpose, and it shall be reckoned every six months at the rate of three-quarters per cent per month of 30 days, instead of every year, or every twelve months; all or any loss by exchange, or otherwise, which may arise by bringing the money from Bombay to this place, shall be on my account, and made good by me and my successors.

TENTHLY. Conformably to Major Walker's suggestions and wishes, the articles contained in this dedication were written, and to which I have given my assent. But on the event of evil-disposed persons attempting any thing unfair or unreasonable against my person, my dewan, Rowjee Appajee, his son, his brother, nephews or relations, and Madow Rao Tatia (445.—VI.)

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Muzumdar, or even should I myself, or my successors, commit any thing improper or unjust, the English Government shall interfere, and see in either case that it is settled according to equity and reason.

I have also required of Major Walker, on the part of the Company, to promise that my state and government shall be permanent, and descend to the lineal inheritors of the Musnand, and that the dewanah shall be preserved to Rowjee Appajee.

In the last place, I desire to form the most intimate connexion with the Company, and that all business with the Poona Durbar may be jointly managed by the English Resident and my vakeel.

Such are my wishes and sentiments, so help me God.

Given at Baroda, 29th of July 1802.\*

Witnesses,—

Gopaul Rao Bapoojee, Vakeel, in behalf of Senekass Khel Shamshere Behauder.  
Meg<sup>1</sup> D<sup>a</sup> Lima é Sordzas.

TRANSLATION of an IKARNAMEH, or Obligation of Allegiance, presented by  
*Laul Shew, Rajah of Cucheerah and Nagode*

WHEREAS I, Laul Shew Raje Sing, sincerely professing my submission and attachment to the British Government, have invariably manifested my obedience to the officers appointed to the superintendence of the province of Bundelcund from the period of its first annexation to the British territories, and whereas an Ikarnameh, or Obligation of Allegiance, having lately been required of me therefore, and with a view to confirm my obedience and attachment to the British Government, have prepared and hereby present this Ikarnameh, containing nine distinct Articles, to Mr. J. Richardson, from whom I have received a sunnad confirming to me all my ancient possessions in this province, and I hereby declare, that I will scrupulously observe all the articles contained in the Ikarnameh, and never evade nor infringe any one of them.

ARTICLE 1st.—I hereby engage never to connect myself with any marauders or plunderers, either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, to afford them no asylum, or permit their families or children to reside in my possessions, and to abstain from all intercourse and correspondence with them. I further engage to avoid entering into quarrels or disputes with the dependents and servants of the British Government; and if at any time a dispute should arise on account of mahal or village, or from any other cause between me and any of the rajahs and chiefs of this province in dependence on the British Government, I agree to submit such dispute, without delay, to the officers of the British Government for their decision, and implicitly to observe and abide by what decision shall be passed upon it. I further engage to make no reprisals on any one for past injuries, nor to seek redress by force without the permission of the British Government, and always to be obedient and submissive to the government.

ARTICLE 2d.—I engage to guard all the passes up the Ghauts which are situated in my possessions, in such a manner as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, and evil-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts by any of those passes, and from entering the British territories for the purpose of exciting disturbances; and if any sirdars or troops should meditate an invasion of the British territories through my possessions, I engage to give timely notice thereof to the officers of the British Government, and to use every practicable exertion to obstruct their progress.

ARTICLE 3d.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts by any of the passes situated within my possessions, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute an intelligent person to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with necessary supplies and provisions so long as they shall continue within or in the vicinity of my possessions.

ARTICLE 4th.—If any of the subjects of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to deliver up such person to the officers of the British Government immediately on his being demanded; and if any of my ryots or zemindars abscond and take refuge in the British territories, I agree to submit to the principal officer in Bundelcund a statement of my complaint against such a person, and to abide by whatever orders may be passed on the occasion, agreeably to the regulations of the government, and to take no steps of my own accord to apprehend him.

ARTICLE 5th.—I engage not to harbour thieves or robbers in any of my villages; and if property of merchants or travellers be stolen or robbed in any of the villages subject to my authority, I agree to render the zemindars of such village responsible for the restitution of the

\* The Date of the Mahratta version in the handwriting of the dewan, as also the signature, Anund Rao Guicowar Sena Khass Khel Shamshere Behauder.

The following words are written in the Rajah's own hand:

"The above written is true."

(seal.)

the stolen property, or for the delivery of the thief or robber to the officers of the British Government; and if any felon or murderer, or person or persons amenable to the British laws for crimes committed in the British possessions should take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to seize and deliver over such offenders to the British Government, not to permit their escape from my possessions.

ARTICLE 6th.—Having presented a statement and list of the villages in my possession, and having obtained a sunnud for the same, I therefore promise and engage, that if amongst the villages enumerated and stated by me, any village, the property of any other person, shall be found, and the right to the same proved, or it shall appear that, during the government of the Nawab, Ali Behauder, the said village or villages were not in my possession, I bind myself to abide by whatever the British Government shall be pleased to direct, and obey the same implicitly.

ARTICLE 7th.—Whereas Gopeul Sing of the Boondella Cast, and Behauder Sing of the Furber Seit, have rebelled against the British Government, and have plundered and carried their outrages into the villages granted by the British Government to the Rajah Bukht Sing and Kishore Sing, I therefore engage and promise not to give the above rebels shelter or protection in any part of my possessions, and not to suffer them to pass through my territories to those of either of the aforesaid rajas, or of the British Government, and if the said men shall, either openly or secretly, come into my possessions, I will, by every means in my power, attempt to seize or apprehend them; and if in the execution of this engagement I am negligent, or step aside from its performance, I agree to any responsibility that the British Government may think proper.

ARTICLE 8th.—As the villages inserted in the sunnud now granted by the British Government are my hereditary property, descended to me through many generations, and as I am now in possession thereof, I hereby bind myself, that after having received my sunnud from the British Government, I will not require or ask to be put in possession of one village amongst the before-enumerated villages, nor require from the British Government any aid for their government.

ARTICLE 9th.—I will appoint, on my part, a person from amongst those in whom I have confidence, who shall remain at all times as a vakool for the transaction of my business in the presence of the representative of the Governor-general in Bundelcund, and if the British representative shall on any account, or for any fault, be displeased with the above person, I will recall him and send another.

This engagement containing nine Articles, under my seal and signature, I have delivered unto the British Government, and I promise to bind myself strictly to abide by the above stipulated articles, and in no sort deviate therefrom.

Given this 11th March 1809, equal 10th Cheyto 1216 F S

#### TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD to Laul Shew Raje Sing

BE IT known to all choudries, kanongoos, zemindars and mookuddums of the tuppas of Nagode and Cucheerah, in the pergunnah of, in the province of Bundelcund, that whereas Laul Shew Raje Sing, one of the hereditary chieftains of the province of Bundelcund, having from the period of the annexation of the said province to the territories of the honourable the East India Company, invariably observed a friendly conduct, and refrained from every outrage or any sort of improper conduct, and now manifests his wish to be admitted to obedience and submission to the British Government, and having lately presented an ikarnameh, or obligation of allegiance, to the British Government by the hands of dewan, Darenao Sing, and requesting that a sunnud confirming him in the property and possession of the villages now occupied by him: he therefore enters into the present engagement, consisting of nine articles, expressive of his sincere attachment and fidelity to the government, therefore, and with a view to the entire satisfaction of the British Government, and to the support of his claims as an hereditary chieftain of this province, the villages contained in the subjoined schedule, which from ancient times have been and still are in his possession, are hereby granted to the said Laul Shew Raje Sing, and the said villages shall continue in the permanent possession of the said Laul Shew Raje Sing and his successors, so long as he and they shall continue strictly to adhere to the conditions of the ikarnameh, and to be obedient and submissive to the British Government. The villages enumerated below shall be confirmed and continued to him and his heirs free of revenue, the choudries, kanongoos, zemindars and mookuddums of the said village will continue as heretofore to exercise their duties in their respective villages, under the authority of the said Laul Shew Raje Sing; and it is the duty of the said Laul Shew Raje Sing to render his ryots and zemindars happy and grateful by the just administration of his government; to devote his utmost attention to the prosperity and improvement of the country; and, finally, to remain firm in his obedience and submission to the British Government, according to the several stipulated articles of the engagement. After the sanction of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council shall be obtained and exchanged for and substituted in the place of the present sunnud granted by the agent to the Governor-general.

VI.  
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or  
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444 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE [VI. Political,

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&c.

STATEMENT.—Talooka Cucheerah and Nagode.

Cucheerah, with a Gurry	1	Mohokeer	-	1	Poondey Kohawrey	-		
Kuttur	-	1	Chuckohul	-	1	Amloah	-	1
Pokharrah	-	1	Ruley-pour, with Gurry	1	Bahar	-	1	1
Umgerreh	-	1	Huhsar	-	1	Burrah	-	1
Moganny	-	1	Kulpoorah	-	1	Loockmud	-	1
Dhunnahay	-	1	Kulpoorey	-	1	Lalpoore	-	1
Folhunpore and Ghograh	2	Joyetpore	-	1	Butchbohey	-	1	1
Lohorah	-	1	Maur	-	1	Purroreyrah	-	1
Kunholey	-	1	Mohorey	-	1	Puthorah, with a Gurry	1	1
Etabah	-	1	Mogawhur	-	1	Dhowrah	-	1
Bodah	-	1	Pathorah Badmymce, } with a Gurry	1	Bearpore	-	1	1
Soutah	-	1	Khojorey	-	1	Utraurey	-	1
Gohorey	-	1	Unterbeddiah	-	1	Gurwoolah	-	1
Burrowien	-	1	Kooldawah	-	1	Woognakey	-	1
Bhuggertolawhey	-	1	Muzgawah	-	1	Woomry	-	1
Doowurah	-	1	Khojah	-	1	Kherudwoornh	-	1
Tettyheednandy	-	1	Echub Khurd	-	1	Jegnahaut, with a Gurry	1	1
Mojekahpaw	-	1	Goharawah Khurd	-	1	Durrechan	-	1
Peprawhey	-	1	Luttyroy	-	1	Kutch Koue	-	1
Nugtah	-	1	Muttyrug	-	1	Tukkoorey	-	1
Chowthaur	-	1	Umderry Mohuntollah	-	1	Ghoraulty	-	1
Woordawney	-	2	Bodahs Khurd	-	1	Sullohegan	-	1
Murhow	-	1	Untarah	-	1	Supty	-	1
Nurbaulby	-	2	Neddaw	-	1	Koosley	-	1
Luggurgawah Khurd	-	1	Lidpoorah	-	1	Doorawhan	-	1
Dudrey	-	1	Konney	-	1	Kutch	-	1
Etwah	-	1	Hurdwah Burrah	-	1	Chddan	-	1
Rudggerwarro	-	1	Bhattanrey	-	1	Putnate	-	1
Mahar	-	1	Dawmahah	-	1	Purraintollah	-	1
Bandey	-	1	Baboopore	-	1	Boodhaudo	-	1
Blurhootey	-	1	Burkhorah	-	1	Subnah	-	1
Rowoshah	-	1	Burrah	-	1	Korrohegah	-	1
Bussollah	-	1	Pipperey	-	1	Kodawharey	-	1
Bowseyah	-	1	Ukkahow	-	1	Dawaur Khurd	-	1
Khomoreah	-	1	Dagwar	-	1	Salpoore	-	1
Nagode, with a Gurry	-	1	Nogoon	-	1	Peprokhar, with a Gurry	1	1
Etwah	-	1	Murwah	-	1	Bhurry	-	1
Puthorondah	-	1	Putwar	-	1	Toorrey	-	1
Puthowndah	-	1	Koolgurry	-	1	Ummertoy	-	1
Loothgaws	-	1	Umkoohay	-	1	Bansseyburry	-	1
Jakhey	-	1	Buttayheyah	-	1	Burkachey	-	1
Deyhee	-	1	Toorkahah	-	1	Chund Kooab, with a } Gurry	-	1
Lulha	-	1	Jookaho	-	1	Doobeh Heyah	-	1
Jellerra	-	1	Nucktellowah	-	1	Luckrut	-	1
Bubroslah	-	1	Boyravgul	-	1	Khurhondah	-	1
Burkoonegah	-	1	Boyravgul	-	1	Woomrey	-	1
Rohoneah	-	1	Manickpore	-	1	Korohayah	-	1
Suddowah	-	1	Bussowrah	-	1	Bhutnolaur, with a Gurry	1	1
Kutchelelowah	-	1	Kumdowhah	-	1	Ghotey	-	1
Bickrah	-	1	Khoe	-	1	Ukhownah	-	1
Kurdwah Khurd	-	1	Dhunneh	-	1	Moorreyah	-	1
Etwah	-	2	Kolaundow	-	1	Kubelnar	-	1
Utrawrah	-	1	Sumnowawar	-	1	Bumrahey	-	1
Kennowtah	-	1	Hurban	-	1	Boorhey Murhan	-	2
Jellowrah	-	1	Kheyyrooah	-	1	Busturrah Burrowhard	-	2
Pipperey	-	1	Khurrey	-	1	Loyjannah	-	1
Muzzawah	-	1	Sunrey Bunjerry	-	2	Burhauttah	-	1
Etwah	-	1	Killowndhah	-	1	Woordawnah	-	1
Gowrah	-	1	Gublorawo Burry	-	1	Lunggigawah Burry	-	1
Khoiyrah	-	1	Bundarahah	-	1	Bunglaur Guley	-	2
Hhokhoradah	-	1	Kurrawhey Burry	-	1	Burkutchchey	-	1
Chundkooah	-	1	Mojakhur	-	1	Loyjahah	-	1
Woontookaroo	-	1	Blaw	-	1	Putborauttah	-	1
Gizzar	-	1	Putteyah	-	1	Nubustah	-	1
Mahkonnah	-	1	Kurroy Khurd	-	1	Jooraurwarpore	-	1
Bukrampore	-	1	Kurrowar	-	1	Sorebah, with a Gurry	1	1
Redwah Budgruck	-	1	Gurrowby	-	1	Boornalaw Choannah } Iampore	-	2
Redwah Khurd	-	1	Ruggorawah	-	1	Rhoorhawrey	-	1
Barateyah	-	1	Koolwah	-	1	Kawpermuddowah	-	2
Barateyah (Burry)	-	1	Gowreah Checkley	-	1	Puresowar	-	1
Ehand	-	1	Woomrut, with Gurry	-	1	Jhungodar	-	1
Etwah	-	1	Woodun	-	1			
Bambhore	-	1						

Baboopore

Babooopore Paker -	2	Unterheddeah -	1	Maulun -	1
Aumkoohuy Burry -	1	Burkonneah -	1	Tiekkur -	1
Tellowndah -	1	Majan Lullohayah -	2	Doongreah -	1
Khurwah -	1	Khakhorey Kutter -	1	Roy Moonh -	1
Boodkhurwah -	1	Nowneah -	1	Buddhawah -	1
Kotah -	1	Koolpooreah -	1	Maharajahpore -	1
Etawah Burrah -	1	Tigrah -	1	Jharriah -	1
Barrowley -	1	Etwah -	1	Toottiah Jhare -	1
Powohayah -	1	Ghuilahaw -	1	Bhubbornah -	1
Korur -	1	Bholoney -	1	Goonore -	1
Chotah Jhengrey -	2	Boodkhan -	1	Bussawhah -	1
Shasarey Burry -	1	Lohororah, with a Gurry -	1	Ricker -	1
Moorug Dewarey -	2	Deyhia Mahodahey -	2	Dandy -	1
Simrey -	1	Hurdooah -	1	Puuharey -	1
Buddhawokhurd -	1	Dinpone Woomrey -	1	Chokhore -	1
Woomrey -	1	Burrah -	1	Koombey -	1
Satheyopore Muhudahey -	2	Marhey -	1	Kurrowby -	1
Lullohayah -	1	Barrauje -	1	Piprawgur -	1
Mudegarey -	1	Telgawah -	1	Pippereah -	1
Pungurrah -	1			Koonneyah -	1
Soyjoney -	1			Punnah -	1
Woomrey -	1	TALLOOKAH PUTTAUR.		Punney -	1
Moheywoah -	1	Rampore Buchawah -	2	Jhunjoy -	1
Umbyah -	1	Undurrey -	1	Gurrey -	1
Dhorahurah -	1	Baremoy -	1	Murphohey -	1
Putnah -	1	Raur -	1	Hurbaw -	1
Utterhaugh -	1	Guthawoteh -	1	Mudggawah -	1
Echowby Burry -	1	Mogurdaheh -	1	Bechawah -	1
Jugganauthipore -	1	Bhoboorah -	1	Umbah -	1
Porey -	1	Pippereah Burrah Dandy -	3	Kootrawley -	2
Murley -	1	Mohonnah -	1	Kodoray -	1
Kodahurry Khurd -	1	Khammoreah -	1	Solkhowah -	1
Burhattah -	1	Lursohawhey -	1	Etwah -	1
Fulltall -	2	Umgaure -	1	Boodkhan -	1
Goorrah Goondeah -	2	Rudjowmy -	1	Lowjhan -	1
Inchol Rampore -	2	Ummahdandy -	1	Gedrawley -	1
Boodkhare -	1	Dhokokhawn -	1	Jumreah -	1
Woordany Burry -	1	Pursawalneah -	1	Godheyney -	1
Kurrohbehay Khurd -	1	Koledurrey -	1	Koorahbey -	1
Gurrah Moorkatty -	1	Bijjah Cawhaur -	1	Kothowtah -	1
Nurhaupore -	1	Dubrah -	1	Tooksanah -	1
Aukawhey -	1	Dhowsando -	1	Mohonnah -	2
Moorrah -	1	Kaurey Mautty -	1	Cawnpoorah -	1
Buttohayah Khurd -	1	Khanah -	1	Kodedarrah -	1
Sunbursah -	1	Dobhaw -	1	Kaurajahare -	1
Bidjohorah -	1	Putbut -	1	Ludbud -	1
Sunkunchur -	1	Burreh -	1	Goorhaw -	1
Rohongah Khurd -	1	Burrowhowee -	1	Guttowah -	1
Goonkaur -	1	Joosagawah -	1	Mundoe -	1
Dhunneah -	1	Kurrowndy -	1	Tigghorey Tigghorah -	2
Mudggawah -	1	Lunghohey -	1	Kotemess -	1
Ruggowley -	1	u rrey -	1	Sursawhawee -	1

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&c.

Dated 20th March 1809, corresponding 19th Choity 1216 F. S.

TRANSLATION of an ITTILAH NAMEH, addressed to the Chief of the Country of  
*Malwa and Sirhind, on this side of the river Sutlege.*

It is clearer than the sun, and better proved than the existence of yesterday, that the detachment of British troops to this side of the Sutlege was entirely in acquiescence to the application and earnest entreaty of the chiefs, and originated solely through friendly considerations in the British to preserve the chiefs in their possessions and independence. A treaty having been concluded on the 5th of April 1809 between Mr. Metcalfe, on the part of the British Government, and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, agreeably to the orders of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, I have the pleasure of publishing, for the satisfaction of the chiefs of the country of Malwa and Sirhind, the pleasure and resolutions of government, contained in the seven following articles

1st. The country of the chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind having entered under the protection of the British Government, in future it shall be secured from the authority and control of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, conformably to the terms of the treaty.

2d. The country of the chiefs thus taken under protection shall be exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government.

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3d. The chiefs shall remain in the exercise of the same rights and authority within their own possessions, which they enjoyed before they were taken under the British protection.

4th. Whenever a British force, for purposes connected with the general warfare, shall be judged necessary to march through the country of the said chiefs, every chief shall, within his own possession, assist and furnish the British force, to the full of his power, with supplies of grain and other necessities which may be demanded.

5th. Should an enemy approach from any quarter, for the purpose of conquering this country, friendship and mutual interest require that the chiefs join the British army with their forces, and, exerting themselves in expelling the enemy, act under discipline and obedience.

6th. Any European articles brought by merchants from the eastern districts for the use of the army, shall be allowed to pass by the thanadars and sirdars of the several districts belonging to the chiefs, without molestation or the demand of duty.

7th. All horses purchased for the use of the cavalry regiments, whether in Sirhind or elsewhere, the bringers of which being furnished with sealed rakhows from the Resident at Delhi, or officer commanding at Sirhind, the several chiefs shall allow such horses to pass without molestation or the demand of duty.

TRANSLATION of an IKARNAMEH, or obligation of allegiance, presented by  
*Laul Aumau Sing, of Souhawal and Rygown.*

WHEREAS I, Laul Aumau Sing, sincerely professing my submission and attachment to the British Government, have invariably manifested my obedience to the officers appointed to the superintendence of the provinces of Bundelcund, from the period of its first annexation to the British territories; And whereas an Ikarnameh, or obligation of allegiance, having lately been required of me; therefore, and with a view to confirm my obedience and attachment to the British Government, I have prepared and hereby present this Ikarnameh, containing nine distinct articles, to Mr. John Richardson, from whom I have received a sunnod confirming to me all my ancient possessions in this province, and I hereby declare that I will scrupulously observe all the articles contained in the Ikarnameh, and never evade nor infringe any one of them.

ARTICLE 1.—I hereby engage never to connect myself with any marauders or plunderers either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, to afford them no asylum, or permit their families or children to reside in my possessions, and to abstain from all intercourse and correspondence with them. I further engage to avoid entering into quarrels or disputes with the dependents and servants of the British Government; and if at any time a dispute should arise on account of mahal or villages, or from any other cause, between me and any of the rajahs and chiefs of this province, in dependence on the British Government, I agree to submit each dispute without delay to the British Government for their decision, and implicitly to observe and abide by what decision shall be passed upon it. I further engage to make no reprisals on any one for past injuries, nor to seek redress by force, without the permission of the British Government, and always to be obedient and submissive to the government.

ARTICLE 2.—I engage to guard all the passes up the Ghauts which are situated in my possession, in such manner as to prevent all marauders, plunderers and evil-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts by any of those passes, and from entering the British territories for the purpose of exciting disturbances; and if any sirdars of troops should meditate an invasion of the British territories through my possessions, I engage to give timely notice thereof to the officers of the British Government, and to use every practicable exertion to obstruct their progress.

ARTICLE 3.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts by any of the passes situated within my possession, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute an intelligent person to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies and provisions, as long as they shall continue within or in the vicinity of my possession.

ARTICLE 4.—If any of the subjects of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to deliver up such person to the officers of the British Government immediately on its being demanded; and if any of my ryots or zemindars abscond and take refuge in the British territories, I agree to submit to the principal officers in Bundelcund a statement of my complaint against such person, and to abide by whatever orders may be passed on the occasion, agreeably to the regulations of the government, and to take no steps of my own accord to apprehend him.

ARTICLE 5.—I engage not to harbour thieves or robbers in any of my villages; and if the property of merchants or travellers be stolen or robbed in any of the villages subject to my authority, I agree to render the zemindars of such village responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the delivery of the thief or robber to the officers of the British Government; and if any felon or murderer, or person or persons amenable to the British laws for crimes committed in the British possessions should take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to seize and deliver over such offenders to the British Government, not to permit their escape from my possession.

ARTICLE 6.

ARTICLE 6.—Having presented a statement and list of the villages in my possession, and having obtained a sunnud for the same, I therefore promise and engage, that if amongst the villages enumerated and stated by me, any village, the property of any other person shall be found, and the right to the same proved, or it shall appear that during the government of the Nawab Ali Behauder, the said village or villages were not in my possession, I bind myself to abide by whatever the British Government shall be pleased to direct, and obey the same implicitly.

ARTICLE 7.—Whereas Gopaul Sing of the Boondela Caste, and Behauder Sing of the Furhar Seit, have rebelled against the British Government, and have plundered and carried their outrages into the villages granted by the British Government to the Rajah Bukht Sing and Kishore Sing: I therefore engage and promise not to give the above rebels shelter or protection in any part of my possessions, and not to suffer them to pass through my territories to those of either of the aforesaid Rajah or of the British Government; and if the said men shall, either openly or secretly, come into my possessions, I will by every means in my power attempt to seize on and apprehend them; and if in the execution of this engagement I am negligent, or step aside from its performance, I agree to any responsibility that the British Government think proper.

ARTICLE 8.—As the villages inserted in the sunnud now granted by the British Government are my hereditary property, descended to me through many generations, and as I am now in possession thereof, I hereby bind myself, that after having received my sunnud from the British Government, I will not require or ask to be put in possession of one village amongst the before enumerated villages, nor require from the British Government any aid for their government.

ARTICLE 9.—I will appoint on my part a person from amongst those in whom I have confidence, who shall remain at all times as a vakeel for the transaction of any business in the presence of the representative of the Governor-general in Bundelcund, and if the British representative shall on any account, or for any fault, be displeased with the above person, I will recall him and send another.

This engagement, containing nine articles, under my seal and signature, I have delivered unto the British Government, and I promise and bind myself strictly to abide by the above stipulated articles, and in no sort deviate therefrom.

Given this 16th July 1809, corresponding with the 19th Aansur Saner 1216 F.S.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD granted to *Laul Aumaun Sing*.

BE it known to all chowdries, kanongoes, zemindars, and mokuddims of Tuppa of Son-hawul and Rygown, in the talook of Doorgunpore and Beringpore, in the province of Bundelcund, that whereas Laul Aumaun Sing, one of the hereditary chieftains of the province of Bundelcund, having from the period of the annexation of the said province to the territories of the honourable the East India Company, invariably observed a friendly conduct, and refrained from every outrage, or any sort of improper conduct, and now manifests his wish to be admitted to obedience and submission to the British Government, and having lately presented an ikarnamch, or obligation of allegiance, to the British Government by himself, and requesting that a sunnud confirming him on the property and possession of the villages now occupied by him, he therefore enters into the present engagement, consisting of nine articles, expressive of his sincere attachment and fidelity to the government therefore, and with a view to the entire satisfaction of the British Government, and to the support of his claims as an hereditary chieftain of this province, the villages contained in the subjoined schedule, which from ancient times have been and still are in his possession, are hereby granted to the said Laul Aumaun Sing, and the said villages shall continue in the permanent possession of the said Laul Aumaun Sing and his successors, so long as he and they shall continue strictly to adhere to the conditions of the ikarnamch, and to be obedient and submissive to the British Government. The villages enumerated below shall be confirmed and continued to him and his heirs free of revenue.

The chowdries, kanongoes, zemindars and mokuddims of the said village will continue as heretofore to exercise their duties on their respective villages under the authority of the said Laul Aumaun Sing, and it is the duty of the said Laul Aumaun Sing to render his ryots and zemindars happy and grateful by the just administration of his government, to devote his utmost attention to the prosperity and improvement of the country, and finally to remain firm in his obedience and submission to the British Government, according to his several stipulated articles of engagement. After the sanction of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council shall be obtained, another sunnud, signed by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, will be exchanged for and substituted in the place of the present sunnud granted by the agent to the Governor-general.





Burreah - - - - 1	Village.	Jelwa, Chitta and Buthar - - - - 3	Villages
Bhumnowree - - - - 1	ditto	Bhundy, Pultey and Sumrah - - - - 3	ditto
Parsanjah Loobapoor - - - - 1	ditto	Gholul - - - - - 1	ditto
Parsanjah (Khoord) - - - - 1	ditto	Amurpore - - - - - 1	ditto
Gurlegah - - - - - 1	ditto	Goorsany - - - - - 1	ditto
Jummahhah - - - - - 1	ditto	Salah - - - - - 1	ditto
Musawee Khair - - - - 1	ditto	Bhelah - - - - - 1	ditto
Munhah - - - - - 1	ditto	Peppia - - - - - 1	ditto
Rwary - - - - - 1	ditto	Bonet - - - - - 1	ditto
Medah - - - - - 1	ditto	Bhurkery - - - - - 1	ditto
Sillah - - - - - 1	ditto	Bhyrah - - - - - 1	ditto
Goor Ghaub - - - - - 1	ditto	Bheriah - - - - - 1	ditto
Suckawur - - - - - 1	ditto	Berenah - - - - - 1	ditto
Bhumtaraw - - - - - 1	ditto	Hulleah - - - - - 1	ditto
Pomrie - - - - - 1	ditto	Missgawah - - - - - 1	ditto
Hamrey - - - - - 1	ditto	Mohaul - - - - - 1	ditto
Chumhar - - - - - 1	ditto		
Burtah - - - - - 1	ditto		199½ ditto
Betmah - - - - - 1	ditto		
Currendy - - - - - 2	ditto	PUDARUCK, 22 Villages; viz.	
Burhrowa - - - - - 1	ditto	Hurdowah - - - - - 1	ditto
Baoroh - - - - - 1	ditto	Majun - - - - - 1	ditto
Lungowra - - - - - 1	ditto	Shewjub - - - - - 1	ditto
Puchtellylorah - - - - 1	ditto	Burrendah - - - - - 1	ditto
Manjwar - - - - - 1	ditto	Shersah - - - - - 1	ditto
Shudah - - - - - 1	ditto	Ijey - - - - - 1	ditto
Doonah - - - - - 1	ditto	Persandy - - - - - 1	ditto
Kinatal - - - - - 1	ditto	Khonge - - - - - 1	ditto
Soonbusee - - - - - 1	ditto	Dewrey - - - - - 1	ditto
Kuraoty - - - - - 1	ditto	Seerorah - - - - - 1	ditto
Dhwut - - - - - 1	ditto	Patna - - - - - 1	ditto
Khandura - - - - - 1	ditto	Hurdu - - - - - 1	ditto
Nungwar - - - - - 1	ditto	Rajookhur - - - - - 1	ditto
Hurrah - - - - - 1	ditto	Putturah - - - - - 1	ditto
Ruchmallah - - - - - 1	ditto	Sunwarsah - - - - - 1	ditto
Tergah - - - - - 1	ditto	Puraneah - - - - - 1	ditto
		Ookah - - - - - 1	ditto
		Puchley - - - - - 1	ditto
	177 ditto		217½ ditto
PURWAH, 2½ Villages; viz.			
Purwah - - - - 1	Village.		
Jamenah - - - - 1	ditto		
Cawnpore - - - - ½	ditto		
	2½ ditto		

Dated 18th July 1809, corresponding with Ausaur Saner San 1216 F.

IKARNAMEH, or Obligation of Allegiance, No. 1.

I, DEWAN Jooggul Purshaud, declare, that I have submitted in person to the British Government, and with a view to confirm my obedience and submission to the British Government, I do hereby present this Ikarnameh, comprising the following:

ARTICLE 1.—Whereas from the period when the British troops first arrived for the purpose of subduing and punishing the refractory in the province of Bundelcund, I cheerfully and voluntarily acknowledged my obedience and submission to the British Government, and have been admitted among the number of its dependants: And whereas J. Richardson, Esq., who has been invested by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council with the general superintendence and control of the province of Bundelcund, having required of me an Ikarnameh, or obligation, therefore, and in consideration of the ample provision which the British Government has been pleased to bestow upon me, I have prepared, and do hereby present this Ikarnameh, comprising the following articles, under my seal and signature, from the conditions of which I promise never to depart, and never to commit any act in violation of any of the subjoined articles.

ARTICLE 2.—I hereby engage to have no intercourse, transactions, or correspondence with any marauders or evil-disposed person, either within or without the province of Bundelcund, and never to harbour or permit any such persons to reside in my villages; and whenever I shall obtain information of the haunts of such persons, I engage to use my endeavours to apprehend them, and deliver them up to the officers of the British Government. I engage never to enter into disputes with any of the servants or dependants of the British Government; and never to afford assistance to any of the chiefs, dependants on the British Government, in the event of disputes arising among them, without orders from the British officers;

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officers; and on all occasions scrupulously to observe the strictest obedience and submission to the British Government.

ARTICLE 3.—If any subject of the British Government abscond, and take refuge in any of the villages composing my jaghire, I engage to seize and deliver him to servants of the British Government; and if any person be deputed on the part of the British Government to apprehend such absconder, I agree not only not to oppose that person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the absconder, and I agree to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts on all occasions.

ARTICLE 4.—I engage not to permit thieves or robbers to reside in any of my villages; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or travellers be plundered or stolen in any of my villages, I engage to make the zemindar of such village responsible for the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the robber or thief to the officers of the British Government; and if any person amenable to the British laws for murder, or other crimes committed in the British Government, take refuge in any of my villages, I further engage to seize such offenders, and deliver him up to the British Government.

Dated the 23d of August 1809.

(The Seal of Dewan  
Joogul Purshaud.)

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to *Dewan Joogul Purshaud*,  
on the 25th August 1809.

To the kanongoes and chowdries of the pergunnah of Jellapore, in the zillah of Bundelcund: Be it known, whereas Dewan Joogul Purshaud, who is one of the descendants of the respectable families and ancient chiefs of this province, and who since the period that the province of Bundelcund came under the control and authority of the British Government, has in no way acted in opposition to the British Government; or on any occasion discovered a refractory or disobedient disposition: And whereas he held the village of Aumree in his own possession as a rent-free village: And whereas he, the said Joogul Purshaud at this time has presented an arzee to the presence, praying that he may be restored to the possession of the village of Chillee, in the pergunnah of Jellapore; and to the village of Dadree, in the pergunnah of Kirkah, on the grounds and claim that the above villages were, from ancient times, his rent-free lands, and were resumed by the British Government on its acquiring possession of Bundelcund. And whereas the proceedings held in the investigation of the said claim were submitted to the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, and the right of the said Dewan having been acknowledged to the three above-mentioned villages; but as previous to this investigation the village of Dadree above-mentioned had been transferred to the Nana of Calpee, with other villages, to effect an arrangement ordered by Government, and on that account it cannot now be taken from the Nana: For the foregoing reasons it was ordered by Government, that the said Dewan should receive some other place in lieu of Dadree; accordingly, in conformity to the inquiry and determination of the Board of Commissioners, and the collector of the zillah of Bundelcund, the transfer of the village of Bando Buzzoorog with Gurrah, and the village of Barelee, in the pergunnah of Jellapore, in lieu of Dadree, was sanctioned by Government on the 22d July 1809, as an adequate exchange to be given to the aforesaid Dewan. For the above reasons, the villages of Aumree and Chillee, his ancient rent-free tenures, and the village Bando Buzzoorog and Gurrah and the village Barelee, in lieu of the village of Dadree, together with all appurtenances, are granted, rent free, to the said Dewan Joogul Purshaud, in perpetuity, generation after generation; while the said Dewan and his heirs remain faithful to the terms of the several articles of the Ikarnameh, or the engagement which he has entered into, and delivered to Government, he shall receive no sort of molestation, nor shall the above places be resumed. It is necessary that you consider the said Dewan the confirmed proprietor of the places in question, and the said Dewan is bound to cultivate the said villages with industry, and to treat the ryots and cultivators with kindness, justice and encouragement; and to reap the advantage of the produce in obedience and good wishes to the British Government. When another sunnod shall be received from the Governor-general, the present sunnod shall be exchanged for that signed by the Governor-general, and be cancelled.

List of Villages.

Chillee.  
Bando Buzzoorog with Gurrah, and  
Barelee.

TRANSLATION of an IKARNAMAH, or Obligation of Allegiance,  
presented to *Saul Doonierput*.

WHEREAS I, Saul Doonierput, sincerely professing submission and attachment to the British Government, have invariably manifested my obedience to the officers appointed to the superintendence of Bundelcund, from the period of its first annexation to the British territories: And whereas an ikarnameh, or obligation of allegiance, having lately been required of me; therefore, and with a view to confirm my obedience and attachment

to the British Government, I have prepared and hereby present this ikarnameh, containing nine distinct articles, to Mr. John Richardson, from whom I have received a sunnud confirming to me all my ancient possessions in this province; and I hereby declare that I will scrupulously observe all the articles contained in the ikarnameh, and never evade nor infringe any one of them.

ARTICLE 1.—I hereby engage never to connect myself with any marauders or plunderers either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, to afford them no asylum, or permit their families or children to reside in my possessions, and to abstain from all intercourse and correspondence with them. I further engage to avoid entering into quarrels or disputes with the dependants and servants of the British Government, and if at any time a dispute should arise on account of mahal or villages, or from any other cause, between me and any of the rajahs and chiefs of this province in dependence on the British Government, I agree to submit such dispute without delay to the officers of the British Government for their decision, and implicitly to observe and abide by whatever decision shall be passed upon it. I further engage to make no reprisal on any one for past injuries, nor to seek redress by force without the permission of the British Government, and always to be obedient and submissive to the government.

ARTICLE 2.—I engage to guard all the passes up the Ghauts, which are situated in my possessions, in such a manner as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, and evil-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts by any of those passes, and from entering the British territories for the purpose of exciting disturbances; and if any sirdars of troops should meditate an invasion of the British territories through my possessions, I engage to give timely notice thereof to the officers of the British Government, and to use every practicable exertion to obstruct their progress.

ARTICLE 3.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts by any of the passes situated within my possessions, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute an intelligent person to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies and provisions as long as they shall continue within, or in the vicinity of, my possessions.

ARTICLE 4.—If any of the subjects of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to deliver up such person to the officers of the British Government immediately on his being demanded; and if any of my ryots or zemindars abscond and take refuge in the British territories, I agree to submit to the principal officers in Bundelcund a statement of my complaint against such person, and to abide by whatever orders may be passed on the occasion agreeably to the regulations of the government, and to take no steps of my own accord to apprehend him.

ARTICLE 5.—I engage not to harbour thieves or robbers in any of my villages; and if property of merchants or travellers be stolen or robbed in any of the villages subject to my authority, I agree to render the zemindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the delivering of the thief or robber to the officers of the British Government; and if any felon or murderer, or person or persons amenable to the British laws for crimes committed in the British possessions, should take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to seize and deliver over such offenders to the British Government, not to permit their escape from my possessions.

ARTICLE 6.—Having presented a statement and list of the villages in my possessions, and having obtained a sunnud for the same, I therefore promise and engage that if amongst the villages enumerated and stated by me, any village the property of any other person shall be found, and the right to the same proved, or it shall appear that during the government of Nawab Ali Behnuder, the said village or villages were not in my possession, I bind myself to abide by whatever the British Government shall be pleased to direct, and obey the same implicitly.

ARTICLE 7.—Whereas Gopaul Singh, of the Boondela caste, has rebelled against the British Government, and has plundered and carried his outrages into the villages granted by the British Government to the Rajah Bukht Sing, and Kshote Sing, I therefore engage and promise not to give the above rebel shelter or protection in any part of my possessions, and not to suffer him to pass through my territories, to those of either of the aforesaid rajahs or of the British Government; and if the said man shall, either openly or secretly, come into my possessions, I will, by every means in my power, attempt to seize on and apprehend him, and if in the execution of this engagement, I am negligent or step aside from its performance, I agree to any responsibility that the British Government may think proper.

ARTICLE 8.—As the villages inserted in the sunnud now granted by the British Government are my hereditary property, descended to me these many generations, and as I am now in possession thereof, I hereby bind myself that after having received my sunnud from the British Government, I will not require or ask to be put in possession of one village amongst the before enumerated villages, nor require from the British Government any aid for their government.

ARTICLE 9.—I will appoint on my part a person from amongst those in whom I have confidence, who shall remain at all times as a vakeel for the transaction of my business, in

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&c.

the presence of the representative of the Governor-general in Bundelcund, and if the British representative shall on any account or for any fault be displeased with the above person, I will recall him and send another.

This engagement, containing nine articles, under my seal and signature, I have delivered unto the British Government, and I promise and bind myself strictly to abide by the above stipulated articles, and in no sort to deviate therefrom.

Dated 16th August 1810, corresponding with 2d Bhadoon 1217 Fussali.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD granted to *Saul Doonierput*.

BE it known to all chowdries, kanongoes, zemindars and mokuddums of the pergunnah of Kotte, in the zillah of Bundelcund, in the province of Bundelcund, That whereas Saul Doonierput, one of the hereditary chieftains of the province of Bundelcund having from the period of the annexation of the said province to the territories of the honourable the East India Company invariably observed a friendly conduct, and refrained from every outrage, or any sort of improper conduct, and now manifests his wish to be admitted to obedience and submission to the British Government, and having lately in person presented an Ikarnameh, or obligation of allegiance, to the British Government, and requesting that a sunnud confirming him in the property and possession of the villages now occupied by him; he therefore enters into the present engagement, consisting of nine articles, expressive of his sincere attachment and fidelity to the government; therefore, and with a view to the entire satisfaction to the British Government, and to the support of his claims as an hereditary chieftain of this province, the villages contained in the subjoined schedule, which from ancient time have been and still are, in his possession, are hereby granted to the said Saul Doonierput, and the said villages shall continue in the permanent possession of the said Saul Doonierput, and his successors, so long as he and they shall continue strictly to adhere to the conditions of the Ikarnameh, and be obedient and submissive to the British Government; the villages enumerated below shall be confirmed and continued to him and his heirs free of revenue.

The chowdries, kanongoes, zemindars, and mokuddums of the said village will continue as heretofore to exercise their duties in their respective villages, under the authority of the said Saul Doonierput; and it is the duty of the said Saul Doonierput to render his ryots and zemindars happy and grateful by the just administration of his government, to devote his utmost attention to the prosperity and improvement of the country, and, finally, to remain firm in his obedience and submission to the British Government, according to his several stipulated articles of engagement. After the sanction of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council shall be obtained, another sunnud, signed by the Right honourable the Governor-general, will be exchanged for and substituted in the place of the sunnud granted by the agent to the Governor-general

STATEMENT of the VILLAGES in Pergunnah Cooley.

NAMES.	No. of Villages.	NAMES.	No. of Villages
Cooly Khas - - - -	4	Nubehnawrah - - - -	1
Dewtah - - - - -	1	Pureah - - - - -	1
Dewry - - - - -	1	Mahoreniah - - - -	1
Goolputtah - - - -	1	Coorolce - - - - -	1
Khumrahey - - - -	1	Neighnah - - - - -	1
Burrawhey - - - -	1	Munkung - - - - -	1
Woojraundah - - -	1	Singgonah - - - - -	1
Mungooh - - - - -	1	Didound - - - - -	1
Ghur undah - - - -	1	Mayholah - - - - -	1
Lookheriah - - - -	1	Roypore - - - - -	1
Maan - - - - -	1	Thallie - - - - -	1
Authory - - - - -	1	Nagawah - - - - -	1
Puthur - - - - -	1	Murgowah - - - - -	1
Aumdauney - - - -	1	Nawbustah - - - -	1
Chucker - - - - -	1	Sagere - - - - -	1
Ghorathu - - - - -	1	Goriaiah - - - - -	1
Kutteah - - - - -	1	Pungemah - - - - -	1
Chundey - - - - -	1	Shimree - - - - -	1
Sewtah - - - - -	1	Khumba - - - - -	1
Whadare - - - - -	1	Rauabie - - - - -	1
Bhurgoah - - - - -	1	Nehrah Mustulloh -	1
Bhursurwar - - - -	1	Bhabroullah - - - -	1
Kuttalah - - - - -	1	Poobry - - - - -	1
Soograh - - - - -	1	Sanaur - - - - -	1
Paihore - - - - -	1	Banchore - - - - -	1
Dudwar - - - - -	1	Obkah - - - - -	1
Mohereah - - - - -	1	Punghuttee - - - -	1

Booldany

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NAMES.	No. of Villages.	NAMES.	No. of Villages.
Gooddany - - - - -	1	Gullie - - - - -	1
Gobunny - - - - -	1	Mudnee - - - - -	1
Jorah - - - - -	1	Imliah - - - - -	1
Jogey - - - - -	1	Mahar - - - - -	1
Dheyry - - - - -	1	Porah - - - - -	1
Pattunghur - - - - -	1	Shapoorah - - - - -	1
Buragel - - - - -	1	Khney - - - - -	1
Rucherry - - - - -	1	Ihundah - - - - -	1*
Nundnah - - - - -	1	Deury - - - - -	1†
Pourah - - - - -	1	Barenah - - - - -	3‡
Surwar - - - - -	1		
Burroundah - - - - -	1		
Gulowah - - - - -	1		
		TOTAL Villages - - -	82

REMARKS.

\* This village Mafee to Sal Gudgerage Sing.

† Ditto - - ditto - - ditto.

‡ Ditto - - ditto - - ditto.

Dated the 17th August 1810, corresponding with 3 Bhadoon 1217 Fussily.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD granted to *Dewan Jooggul Purshaud*,  
on the 7th January 1811.

To the kanongoes and chowdries of the pergunnah of Jellalpoore and Humeerpore, in zillah Bundelcund: Be it known, Whereas Dewan Jooggul Purshaud, who is one of the descendants of the respectable families and ancient chiefs of this province, and who, since the period that the province of Bundelcund came under the control and authority of the British Government, has in no way acted in opposition to the British Government, or on any occasion discovered a refractory or disobedient disposition; and whereas he held the village of Omeeree in his own possession as a rent-free village; and whereas he the said Jooggul Purshaud, praying that he may be restored to the possession of the village of Chillee, in the pergunnah of Jellalpoore, and in the village of Daderoo, in the pergunnah of Kurkah, on the grounds and claim that the above villages were from ancient times his rent-free lands, and were resumed by the British Government on its acquiring possession of Bundelcund; and whereas the proceedings held in the investigation of the said claim were submitted to the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, on the 3d April 1809, and the right of the said dewan having been acknowledged to the three above-mentioned villages; but as previous to this investigation the village of Daderoo above-mentioned has been transferred to the nana of Calpee with other villages, to effect an arrangement ordered by government, and as on that account it cannot now be taken from the nana: for this reason, in lieu of the village of Daderoo, the village of Bando Buzzooroog with Gurrah, and the village Barellee in the pergunnah of Jellalpoore, were given to the said dewan; and the copy of his Ikarnamah and Wajibuburz and his Sunnud have been sent to the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, for the purpose of obtaining a sunnud under the seal and signature of the Right honourable the Governor-general; but as it is written in the third article of the dewan's paper of requests, that his possessions should be exempted from the cognizance of the British courts of justice, and as the above promise on account of the villages Omeeree and Chillee and Bando Buzzooroog with Gurrah, and the village Barellee, being intermixed with the British possessions, was disapproved of by the British Government, the said dewan having been left the option to exchange the above villages for others situated on the borders of the Company's territories, and not intermixed with them, or to exchange from his Wajibuburz the third article, together with its answer; accordingly the said dewan determined in favour of an exchange of the lands for others situated as above described on the borders of the British possessions; and according to the orders of government, under date the 25th of August 1810, according to the free agreement of the said dewan, and in pursuance of the orders of the British Government, the villages of Omeeree, &c. were taken into the possession of government, and in lieu thereof the village of Byree Kureahpoore, and the village of Bisalpoore Islampore, and the village of Bondjipore, and the village of Kukerow, and the village Putterelali, in the pergunnah of Jellalpoore, and the village of Pourah, in the pergunnah of Humeerpore, and twenty biggahs of land, in a garden situated in the village of Omeeree, in which garden is the tomb of the father of the said dewan, with all the rights and appurtenances thereto, have been given in perpetuity to the said dewan generation after generation: while the said dewan and his heirs remain faithful to the terms of the several articles of the Ikarnamah, or the engagement which he has entered into and delivered to government, he shall receive no sort of molestation, nor shall the above places be resumed. It is necessary that you consider the said dewan the confirmed proprietor of the places in question; and the said dewan is bound to cultivate the said villages with industry, and to treat the ryots and cultivators with kindness, justice, and encouragement, and to reap the advantage of the produce in obedience and good wishes to

the British Government. When another sunnud shall be received from the Governor-general, the present sunnud shall be exchanged for that signed by the Governor-general, and be cancelled.

LIST OF VILLAGES.

Byree Kurreahpore;  
Bijelpore Islampore;  
Bojepore;  
Kuckrow;  
Puttreretah;  
Purah Neaw, and  
Twenty biggahs of land in a garden situated in the village of Omeerees.

TRANSLATION of an IKARNAMEH, presented by the Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder,  
the Rajah of Pumea.

WHEREAS, since the first annexation of the province of Bundelcund to the dominions of the British Government, I Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder (the contracting party), and proprietor of the share of Herdeh Sah (who is the chief of all the rajahs of Bundelcund); having acknowledged my allegiance and submission, and remained obedient to the British Government, and never in any instance deviated from the obedience and loyalty due from a good subject; but during the period of the agency of Captain Baillie, by reason of a combination of accidental circumstances, I was prevented from appearing in the above officer's presence; I, however, deputed to the above gentleman Rajahdhur Gudge Sing Behauder on my part, and applied for a sunnud from the British Government; accordingly the said Rajahdhur Gudge Sing Behauder above-mentioned delivered in an Ikarnameh (or obligation of allegiance) under my seal and signature, and received a sunnud for several villages. Many villages that were then in the hands of usurpers and oppressors were not inserted therein, and to obtain possession of even those villages which were included in the above sunnud from Luckhmon Dowah and other unjust possessors, I was necessitated to wage war; and in consequence of my own want of power and receiving no aid from the British Government, I was unable to obtain possession of the places in question. After the arrival of Mr John Richardson, I waited upon that gentleman, and according to the orders of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, by the aid of a British force, I obtained possession of the villages included in the sunnud granted by the British Government, as well as those villages which were in the possession of usurpers and unjust claimants. At this period, and with a view to confirming my obedience and attachment to the British Government, I have prepared under seal and signature, and hereby present this Ikarnameh, containing eleven distinct articles, to Mr John Richardson, agent to the Governor-general in Bundelcund, and require a sunnud for the villages and lands now in my possession; and I therefore hereby declare and promise that I will scrupulously observe all the articles contained in this Ikarnameh, and never evade or infringe any one of them.

ARTICLE 1.—I hereby promise and bind myself on no account to unite with external or internal enemies of the honourable Company in Bundelcund, and to be ever obedient and submissive to the will and command of the British Government in all things.

ARTICLE 2.—If any one of my children, brothers, or relations excite sedition or disturbance in the British territories or possessions, or the territories or possessions of any of the chiefs in allegiance to the British Government, I engage to do every thing in my power to prevent and to restrain them, and in the case of their persisting in such conduct, I engage to unite my force with the British troops in the punishment and suppression of such persons.

ARTICLE 3.—If any of the subjects of the British Government shall fly and take refuge in my territories, on application from the officers of the British Government, I will deliver them up to the British Government.

ARTICLE 4.—I further engage that I will never harbour or give protection in my country to persons accused or suspected of robbery or theft; that if a robbery be committed, or the property of merchants or travellers be stolen in any of the villages subject to my authority, I will render the inhabitants of that village responsible for the restitution or value of the property stolen or robbed, or for the seizure and delivery of the thieves or robbers, and in general that murderers and all other persons amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of the British Government for crimes committed in the British possessions, who may take refuge in my districts, shall be immediately seized and delivered over to the British authority in Bundelcund.

ARTICLE 5.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chief, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them, or any of their relations.

ARTICLE 6.—I engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government, and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between me and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case, I promise to submit the cause of such dispute for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.

ARTICLE 7.—I engage to guard all the passes through the Ghauts under my authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, and ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chief or leader should meditate an incursion into the British territory through my possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, I engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstance before his approach to the neighbourhood of my territory, and to exert my utmost effort to obstruct his progress.

ARTICLE 8.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts through any of the passes subject to my authority, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies, so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of my possessions.

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas Gopaul Sing and Rao Himmatt Sing of Murreedah, and Zalim Sing of Burdunah, and Ruddum Sing of Thingah, and Golie Jumadar and Maunick Jue of Mihit Gawah, have rebelled against the British Government, and are guilty of marauding and plundering in the territories of that government: I hereby declare, that I will never have any intercourse with the above-mentioned rebels; but on the contrary, whenever I shall hear of any of their joint or separate depredations in the territories of the British Government or any of its dependants, I engage to attack the aggressor or aggressors, and to the utmost of my power punish them; and in the event of any of them being seized, I engage to deliver them up to the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—Whereas between me and the rajahs and chiefs of Bundelcund, there existed many disputed claims concerning many villages, which disputes have been adjusted and settled by the decision of the British Government, and as now there is no disputed point or cause of difference remaining, I therefore hereby declare and promise, that hereafter I will not dispute or quarrel with any rajah or chief, on account of any village or lands. If any rajah or chief shall dispute or quarrel with me on account of any village or lands claimed, I engage to submit the same to the British Government, and to abide by its decision, and not to dispute or quarrel about the point myself.

ARTICLE 11.—I engage that one of my confidential servants shall always be in attendance as a vakeel on the officer of the British Government in this province, for the purpose of executing his orders; and in the event of such vakeel being from any reason disapproved of by the said officer, I agree immediately to appoint another in his stead.

22 March 1811.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to the Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder,  
Rajah of Panna.

BE IT KNOWN to the chowdries, kanongoes, &c., of the pergunnah of Khuntolah, and the pergunnah of Powey, &c., in the province of Bundelcund, that whereas the Maharajah Kishore Sing Behauder, one of the ancient and hereditary chieftains of Bundelcund, the heir and proprietor of share of Hirdah Sah, (who was the chief of the rajahs of Bundelcund) from the period of the annexation of the province of Bundelcund to the dominions of the British Government, has invariably observed a friendly and obedient conduct, and in no instance deviated from the loyalty or attachment due to the British Government, but who during the period of the agency of Captain John Baillie, having been by a combination of accidental circumstances prevented from waiting upon that gentleman, deputed Rajahdhar Gudge Sing Behauder on his (the said rajah's) part, who presented a list of several villages to the aforesaid gentleman, and received a sunnod for the same, but was not put in possession of those villages, and moreover many of the villages and lands belonging to the hereditary possessions of the said rajah, as the share of Hirdah Sah, which were in the possession of usurpers and persons who had no claim thereto, were not included in the above sunnod. Afterwards, during the agency of Mr. John Richardson, the aforesaid Rajah Kishore Sing himself having waited upon that gentleman, was, by the orders of the British Government, put in possession of all the villages and lands included in the sunnod already alluded to, and also of those villages and lands which were unjustly possessed by usurpers and false claimants; and every other dispute that existed with other chiefs and rajahs having been adjusted and settled, at this juncture the said rajah has delivered in an ikarnamah (or obligation of allegiance) containing eleven distinct articles, expressive of his allegiance and attachment to the British Government, and requesting that a sunnod confirming the villages and lands at present in his possession may be granted by the British Government for the above reasons. The villages enumerated in the subjoined schedule, with all the rights and tenures and usages, revenues, land or sayer, together with forts and fortified places, are hereby granted to the said rajah and his heirs, exempt from the payment of revenue in perpetuity, so long as the said Rajah Kishore Sing and his heirs shall observe and adhere faithfully to the articles of the obligation of allegiance which he has delivered in to the British Government; no sort of molestation or resumption shall ever take place on the part of the British Government; it is necessary that you shall all consider and view the said rajah as the proprietor and lord of the above enumerated possessions. The conduct which it is incumbent on the said Maharajah to observe, is to exert himself to the utmost of his power in the cultivation and improvement of the said possessions, and to pay attention to



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the prosperity and comfort of the people, and to enjoy the produce of the same, in firm obedience, loyalty, and submission to the British Government. After the sanction of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council shall be obtained, another sunnud to the same effect, signed by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, shall be exchanged or substituted in the place of the present sunnud granted by the agent to the Governor-general.

STATEMENT of the VILLAGES inserted in the former Sunnud of Rajah Kishore Sing  
Behauder, the Rajah of Panna.

PERGUNNAH PUNNA.		Kouchay			
Rampoora	- - - - -	1	Baundhey	- - - - -	1
Burragong	- - - - -	1	Kanowah	- - - - -	1
Cusbah Purnah and Babagaue	- - - - -	2	Boodrandah	- - - - -	1
Jumnohy	- - - - -	1	Ummeyhatto	- - - - -	1
Singhpoor	- - - - -	1	Munnour	- - - - -	1
Bhauraur	- - - - -	1	Sulloah	- - - - -	1
Kuzrouhaul	- - - - -	2	Zurdoah	- - - - -	1
Zunwar	- - - - -	4	Ruttooreah Chotty	- - - - -	1
Munkee	- - - - -	1	Ruttooreah Burrey	- - - - -	1
Burreah	- - - - -	1	Pepreyguggaur	- - - - -	1
Durrarah	- - - - -	1	Khuzzoorey	- - - - -	1
Powhey	- - - - -	1	Kutwalley Poonah	- - - - -	1
Pepperpoorah and Loorogipoorah	- - - - -	2	Buguhur	- - - - -	1
Kurwahhoo	- - - - -	1	Beekrampoor	- - - - -	1
Taulgahoo	- - - - -	3	Munkah	- - - - -	1
Lahaur	- - - - -	1	Surkhohah	- - - - -	1
Sauropoorah	- - - - -	1	Balgurhey	- - - - -	1
Ahmohey	- - - - -	1	Tilleah	- - - - -	1
Baharah	- - - - -	1	Murwasley	- - - - -	1
Beggabee	- - - - -	2	Murreah	- - - - -	1
Guttarah Neuzzawah	- - - - -	1	Koosmaney	- - - - -	1
Kursah	- - - - -	1	Bushahy	- - - - -	1
Nahareo	- - - - -	1	Rhunjarah	- - - - -	1
Kuttiery Burry	- - - - -	1	Guggawoe	- - - - -	1
Jhallary	- - - - -	1	Burpoorah	- - - - -	1
Kunichooah	- - - - -	1	Buerah	- - - - -	1
Purtah Poorah	- - - - -	1	Ruttunjoonheyah	- - - - -	1
Jumnahey	- - - - -	1	Sumbhoggey	- - - - -	1
Kullampoora	- - - - -	1	Boharreah	- - - - -	1
Moujha	- - - - -	1	Boydahy	- - - - -	1
Kurrah	- - - - -	1	Chowprah	- - - - -	1
Telgawah	- - - - -	1	Kauntliery	- - - - -	1
Kunharrah	- - - - -	1	Kassohur	- - - - -	1
Koorraund	- - - - -	1	Kare	- - - - -	1
Burktarree	- - - - -	1	Burrowlah	- - - - -	1
Goorba	- - - - -	1	Bugdah Chuffa	- - - - -	1
Audah	- - - - -	1	Rogmassin	- - - - -	1
Chouparah	- - - - -	1	Wooreybun	- - - - -	1
Kottah	- - - - -	1	Soonhahey	- - - - -	1
Worekey	- - - - -	1	Noggawah	- - - - -	1
Hurdoo Chutta (oojar)	- - - - -	1	Rutteah	- - - - -	1
Chuprahohney	- - - - -	1	Kussaurpoorah	- - - - -	1
Butchoolia	- - - - -	1	Doonah	- - - - -	1
Kumreyah (except sunnud given to Rajah Kiseery Sing)	- - - - -	1	Aumbah	- - - - -	1
Ratchaw	- - - - -	1	Woorraho	- - - - -	1
Dholebaza	- - - - -	1	Sohargawah	- - - - -	1
Bussrahey	- - - - -	1	Palor Barry	- - - - -	1
Chowparrah	- - - - -	1	Putun Khord	- - - - -	1
Kussereah	- - - - -	1	Bebgawah	- - - - -	1
Burroolpoor	- - - - -	1	Chapper	- - - - -	1
Burroundah	- - - - -	1	Pulhatchry	- - - - -	1
Purnoh Kuddum	- - - - -	1			
Sookwahoo	- - - - -	1			
Butteah	- - - - -	1			
Zubleah	- - - - -	1			
Karu	- - - - -	1			
Puhrwah (except sunnud given to ah Bidjey Bahadur)	- - - - -	1			
Chundarry	- - - - -	1			
Khurogah	- - - - -	1			
Aumrowan	- - - - -	1			
Aumrawan Chotty	- - - - -	1			

PERGUNNAH POWEE.	
Amaungunge, 176½ Villages; viz.	
Khalsee	- - - - -
Kueba Powee	- - - - -
Rhoopah	- - - - -
Kuttoah	- - - - -
Kurrahey	- - - - -
Soordha	- - - - -
Burhah	- - - - -
Kooniah	- - - - -

PERGUNNAH POWEE.

Amaungunge, 176½ Villages; viz.

Khalsa	- - - - -	-
Kusba Powee	- - - - -	6
Rhoopah	- - - - -	12
Kutteah	- - - - -	1
Kurrahey	- - - - -	6
Soordha	- - - - -	1
Burhah	- - - - -	1
Kooniah	- - - - -	1

Boekowrah	-	-	-	1
Sunwaru	-	-	-	1
Mahagawah	-	-	-	1
Etawah	-	-	-	1
Jugginpoorah	-	-	-	1
Koonimarry	-	-	-	2
Chowmookha	-	-	-	1
Kumtah	-	-	-	1
Kharrah	-	-	-	1
Woomreah	-	-	-	1
Kytee	-	-	-	1
Taggharrah	-	-	-	1
Kuckretty	-	-	-	12
Chaundiy	-	-	-	1
Barrawiteh	-	-	-	6
Baragahanny	-	-	-	1
Decuvarrah	-	-	-	8
Simrah	-	-	-	2
Purtullah	-	-	-	1
Kutkoorey	-	-	-	1
Kharewah Chottey	-	-	-	1
Burkharrah	-	-	-	1
Murwary	-	-	-	11
Pipparey	-	-	-	1
Morawith (except sunnud of Rajah )	-	-	-	1
Ruttan Sing	-	-	-	1
Dumraha	-	-	-	1
Sursallah	-	-	-	1
Mohunpore	-	-	-	1
Deorey	-	-	-	1
Sallour	-	-	-	1
Raugopore	-	-	-	1
Sauttah	-	-	-	5
Bugdoree	-	-	-	1
Summono	-	-	-	7
Burratah	-	-	-	1
Mumalut	-	-	-	1
Etawah	-	-	-	1
Kuckritty or Kutsora	-	-	-	1
Lodhaunce	-	-	-	3
Noumurgunah	-	-	-	1
Karenah	-	-	-	2
Mohagoron	-	-	-	1

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MURWAH, 12 Villages, viz

Murwah	-	-	-	12
Deory	-	-	-	1
Goorlah	-	-	-	5
Tipporry	-	-	-	1
Goregoah	-	-	-	1
Chucklah	-	-	-	5
Rahujah Loata	-	-	-	2
Puiwar	-	-	-	1
Puttey	-	-	-	1
Surrah	-	-	-	1
Ruttare	-	-	-	1
Woomtee	-	-	-	1
Mooholey Bauzrook	-	-	-	1
Kittah	-	-	-	1
Kaloi eny	-	-	-	1
Chappah	-	-	-	1
Aukawlah	-	-	-	1
Nibbiary	-	-	-	2
Bamooly	-	-	-	1
Saggrah	-	-	-	1
Gokholy	-	-	-	1
Deoly	-	-	-	1
Munkey	-	-	-	1
Gadhabhour	-	-	-	1
Choylah	-	-	-	2
Punchey	-	-	-	1
Behvanny	-	-	-	1

(445.—VI.)

Buskharrah	-	-	-	1
Nogoah	-	-	-	2
Deary Chotty	-	-	-	1
Dhurampully	-	-	-	1
Paundey	-	-	-	1
Hauschorrey	-	-	-	1
Singawur	-	-	-	1
Suckra	-	-	-	1
Unter Khoddeah	-	-	-	1

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PERGUNNAH PUTTARH SAHANAGUR,  
209 Villages

Khass Sahanagur	-	-	-	4
Umraah	-	-	-	1
Jogarawar	-	-	-	1
Khoosmey	-	-	-	1
Tollah	-	-	-	1
Joor Singah	-	-	-	1
Surdah	-	-	-	1
Kynorenh	-	-	-	1
Ram Gurrah	-	-	-	3
Soorowudah	-	-	-	12
Duggurgawah	-	-	-	1
Amleah	-	-	-	2
Thurha	-	-	-	1
Dhondhorry	-	-	-	1
Mokarow	-	-	-	1
Boorgawah	-	-	-	3
Bhomusah	-	-	-	1
Jungunnah	-	-	-	1
Chauppah Ghaut	-	-	-	1
Buriot	-	-	-	12
Mohogawah	-	-	-	1
Sunpoorah Chotty	-	-	-	1
Bohoreah Burry	-	-	-	1
Hurdoah	-	-	-	1
Chewlah	-	-	-	1
Woomreah	-	-	-	1
Blurrar	-	-	-	1
Jhurraah	-	-	-	1
Bugdurrah	-	-	-	1
Jullitorry	-	-	-	1
Durwah	-	-	-	1
Kutckratah	-	-	-	1
Sownpore boozook	-	-	-	1
Tuketeah	-	-	-	3
Baresunpepeah	-	-	-	2
Toiro	-	-	-	1
Maholdiaia	-	-	-	1
Bhosahay	-	-	-	1
Choprah	-	-	-	1
Buzzany	-	-	-	1
Degghottah	-	-	-	1
Sumturrah Dodow	-	-	-	2
Deorah	-	-	-	1
Narmidpote	-	-	-	1
Gharry	-	-	-	1
Bissauny	-	-	-	4
Khantorry	-	-	-	1
Hannowty	-	-	-	1
Guzzundah	-	-	-	3
Boray	-	-	-	3
Jhoppah	-	-	-	1
Jhurrah	-	-	-	1
Jhalmatour	-	-	-	2
Hurdoah Khand	-	-	-	1
Rateha	-	-	-	1
Kurroundey	-	-	-	6
Koorahay	-	-	-	1
Pugga Mhorad	-	-	-	1
Sharefoottey	-	-	-	1
Chouptah	-	-	-	1

3 N

Kharmorah

<b>PERGUNNAH.</b>	Khariorah	-	-	-	1
	Buggur boozruk	-	-	-	1
	Roggowa	-	-	-	1
<b>Appendix, No. 26.</b>	Purroasey	-	-	-	1
<b>Copies of Treaties, &amp;c.</b>	Lodharry	-	-	-	1
	Ktrahay	-	-	-	1
	Jamtoirah	-	-	-	1
	Kotey	-	-	-	12
	Dhanmoo	-	-	-	1
	Biskharrah	-	-	-	1
	Buggowleah	-	-	-	1
	Loodhowndah	-	-	-	1
	Ummeatullah	-	-	-	1
	Purranah	-	-	-	3
	Pahorah Khorad	-	-	-	1
	Chaundarah	-	-	-	4
	Kuokkurtullah	-	-	-	1
	Purnahay	-	-	-	1
	Mughurpore pipra	-	-	-	1
	Kutchowrey	-	-	-	4
	Noongawah	-	-	-	2
	Moygawah	-	-	-	1
	Majhurbhur tulla	-	-	-	2
	Sarungpore	-	-	-	1
	Jurleah	-	-	-	1
	Khamreah	-	-	-	3
	Khuzzoorey	-	-	-	12
	Kootooreah	-	-	-	1
	Burrohbery	-	-	-	1
	Rampore	-	-	-	4
	Taulgowah	-	-	-	1
	Gojser	-	-	-	1
	Dhoovarpoora	-	-	-	3
	Doudah	-	-	-	1
	Muggowia	-	-	-	1
	Deory	-	-	-	1
	Kunnawah	-	-	-	1
	Buggowley	-	-	-	1
	Korum	-	-	-	1
	Sungrah	-	-	-	1
	Surrai Khorad	-	-	-	1
	Surrai Buzruk	-	-	-	1
	Lejoputty	-	-	-	1
	Sickatporrah	-	-	-	1
	Sutdharrah	-	-	-	1
	Peppereah	-	-	-	1
	Aunmowah	-	-	-	1
	Sulloeah	-	-	-	1
	Raha	-	-	-	3
	Aummah	-	-	-	3
	Koonneah	-	-	-	1
	Deory	-	-	-	1
	Goorna	-	-	-	1
	Sickrah Kurra	-	-	-	2
	Burtullah	-	-	-	1
	Sulloeah and Jooghwa	-	-	-	2
	Soholeah	-	-	-	1
	Woosur	-	-	-	1
	Khurrah	-	-	-	1
	Bildamur	-	-	-	1

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PERGUNNAH KHUTTOLA, 136 Villages; viz.

KHALISA DUFFA, 90 Villages; viz.

MALHARRA, 8 Villages; viz.

Malharra	-	-	-	-	1
Madeah	-	-	-	-	1
Mowey	-	-	-	-	1
Tougrah	-	-	-	-	1
Putteah	-	-	-	-	1
Mytiwar	-	-	-	-	1
Ghuroeah	-	-	-	-	1
Bullewah	-	-	-	-	1

Barrah Gossun	-	-	-	-	1
Hrrail	-	-	-	-	1
Chundunpoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Salleah	-	-	-	-	1
Goandpore	-	-	-	-	1
Kurkey	-	-	-	-	1
Dhowrah	-	-	-	-	1
Toorry	-	-	-	-	2
Kunnawah	-	-	-	-	3
Mahally	-	-	-	-	1
Kowolarey	-	-	-	-	1
Ruttenpoora or Buggpoora	-	-	-	-	1
Bamunkota	-	-	-	-	2
Burrearpore	-	-	-	-	1
Burra	-	-	-	-	1
Ameliyah Bhoongawa	-	-	-	-	2
Kunnara	-	-	-	-	1
Kummodepore	-	-	-	-	1
Puldah	-	-	-	-	1
Kurdato	-	-	-	-	1
Putta Mungrala	-	-	-	-	1
Sunnowaney Boozruk	-	-	-	-	7
Mahodpore	-	-	-	-	2
Dighey	-	-	-	-	1
Khallow	-	-	-	-	1
Ghoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Soorajepoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Sunrah	-	-	-	-	1
Bessait	-	-	-	-	1
Sewradheka	-	-	-	-	1
Tipparey	-	-	-	-	1
Jhubrah	-	-	-	-	1
Jughara	-	-	-	-	1
Putna	-	-	-	-	1
Roygowah	-	-	-	-	1
Sirsey	-	-	-	-	1
Nibbas	-	-	-	-	1
Woodoypore (except Sunnud of Rajah Ruttun Sing)	-	-	-	-	1
Soonwanney Khoord	-	-	-	-	1
Khurpoora	-	-	-	-	1
Dhowreah	-	-	-	-	1
Butchamah	-	-	-	-	1
Ghowrah	-	-	-	-	2
Bandha	-	-	-	-	1
Tukreah	-	-	-	-	1
Kukrah	-	-	-	-	1
Umiahah	-	-	-	-	1
Chundrowley	-	-	-	-	1
Bunowdah	-	-	-	-	1
Punnearry	-	-	-	-	1
Sillahurrow	-	-	-	-	1
Khurdouty	-	-	-	-	1
Soorrahah	-	-	-	-	1
Bickrampore	-	-	-	-	1
Butchrawonny	-	-	-	-	2
Unlmow	-	-	-	-	1
Burandah	-	-	-	-	1
Bodhour	-	-	-	-	1
Dandorah	-	-	-	-	1
Roypoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Ghorreh	-	-	-	-	1
Sizzahah	-	-	-	-	1
Bildadah	-	-	-	-	1
Dhungawah and Muzgawa	-	-	-	-	2
Maharajegunge	-	-	-	-	3
Surwah	-	-	-	-	1
Suruzpore	-	-	-	-	1
Khurrowhes	-	-	-	-	1
Luokungawa	-	-	-	-	1
Kullokur	-	-	-	-	1
Churrawul	-	-	-	-	1
Soonherry	-	-	-	-	1
Gunge	-	-	-	-	1

Chunderpore

Chunderpore	-	-	-	1
Koond	-	-	-	1
Durgawah	-	-	-	7
Muddenpore	-	-	-	1
Kealo	-	-	-	1
Chutoherry	-	-	-	1
Ustna	-	-	-	1
Moraur	-	-	-	1
Bodgopore	-	-	-	1
Parragore	-	-	-	1
Bungawah	-	-	-	2
Rampoorah	-	-	-	1
Korra	-	-	-	1
Ghurmar	-	-	-	1
Bossannah	-	-	-	1
Ruzzowlah	-	-	-	1
Urdooh	-	-	-	1
Dhungahah	-	-	-	1
Poondey	-	-	-	1
Bhowney Gopaulpore	-	-	-	1
Koondate	-	-	-	1
Goorseah	-	-	-	1
Ghuttarah	-	-	-	1
Untrah	-	-	-	1
Dhoowarey	-	-	-	1
Gowrooh	-	-	-	1
Rudgepore	-	-	-	1
Gurdah	-	-	-	1
Soharpoorah	-	-	-	1
Jhuratah	-	-	-	1
Boodgawah	-	-	-	1

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PERGUNNAH RAURUHD.

Rawinted Dawry Gur	-	-	-	1
Fungurrah	-	-	-	1
Nongurrah	-	-	-	1
Kootah	-	-	-	1
Doondwah Chunnar	-	-	-	1
Bonda	-	-	-	1

6

PERGUNNAH SINGPORE.

Singapore Khas	-	-	-	1
Palkhauneh	-	-	-	1
Mow	-	-	-	1
Chuckerabad	-	-	-	1
Bailahonoty	-	-	-	2
Muzzear	-	-	-	1
Soojawool	-	-	-	1
Boorkharra	-	-	-	1
Kurrehah	-	-	-	2
Punnass	-	-	-	1
Khumreah	-	-	-	1
Kalgawah	-	-	-	1
Kubrah	-	-	-	1
Joomnahey	-	-	-	1
Mehnapore	-	-	-	1
Pursootumpore	-	-	-	1
Jhareah	-	-	-	1
Bhownahy	-	-	-	1
Chowpara	-	-	-	1
Mulkanny	-	-	-	1
Mahatning	-	-	-	1
Pahareah	-	-	-	1
Shurry	-	-	-	1

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Pergunnah Ammowah - - - 96

PERGUNNAH BIRSINGPORE, 30 Villages.

Birsingpore Khas	-	-	-	1
Nowra	-	-	-	1

(145.-VI.)

Mohsoah	-	-	-	1
Kulbulleah	-	-	-	1
Suraskey	-	-	-	1
Soonbursa Khord	-	-	-	1
Mow	-	-	-	1
Tickery	-	-	-	1
Ogaoney	-	-	-	1
Digrah	-	-	-	1
Gurrahawan	-	-	-	1
Nuckoly	-	-	-	1
Mucktoompore	-	-	-	1
Chourahy Wachar	-	-	-	2
Rham Ghur	-	-	-	1
Etala	-	-	-	1
Gootwah	-	-	-	1
Mahoneah	-	-	-	1
Nagawah	-	-	-	1
Mutch Khanda	-	-	-	1
Hulleah	-	-	-	1
Tookrey	-	-	-	1
Purtwoaur	-	-	-	1
Deorow	-	-	-	1
Hurkurpore	-	-	-	1
Rohann	-	-	-	1
Auddhur Warroo	-	-	-	1
Doornahey	-	-	-	1
Furzurbury	-	-	-	1

VILLAGES with Diamond Mines.

Burrorampore	-	-	-	1
Bulrampore	-	-	-	1
Bullahpore and Jahrepore	-	-	-	1
Boyrapore	-	-	-	1
Narampore	-	-	-	1
Seerenagur	-	-	-	1
Singapore (except Sunnud of Rajah Dyreah Sing Chowley)	-	-	-	2
Hunmutpore	-	-	-	1
Manickpore	-	-	-	1
Lullpore	-	-	-	1
Kashorepore	-	-	-	1
Sunkerpore	-	-	-	1
Toypore	-	-	-	1
Koomurpore	-	-	-	1
Mynapore	-	-	-	1
Bahadurpore	-	-	-	1
Chowrey	-	-	-	1
Doorgapore, except Sunnud given to Dyreah Sing	-	-	-	1
Sheopore	-	-	-	1
Jolapore	-	-	-	1
Gundruppore	-	-	-	1
Doorjunpore	-	-	-	1
Woodyopore	-	-	-	1
Mahaanjapore	-	-	-	1
Beejoyppoor	-	-	-	1
Rajahpore	-	-	-	1
Gunneshpore	-	-	-	1
Goorha	-	-	-	1
Babuopore	-	-	-	1
Hurdowah	-	-	-	1
Burdahee	-	-	-	1
Cuttala	-	-	-	1
Roodrahea	-	-	-	1
Heerapore	-	-	-	1
Jurrapore	-	-	-	1
Gunneshpore Dulsongud	-	-	-	1
Rampore	-	-	-	1
Soonhaine	-	-	-	1
Suckaree	-	-	-	1
Sutapore	-	-	-	1
Latchumpore	-	-	-	1

2 N 2

Bassah.

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Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

Bassaha -	-	-	-	-	1
Tidowny -	-	-	-	-	1
Nagpore -	-	-	-	-	1
Muhungawa Bara Khan -	-	-	-	-	1
Rannypore Kumba Cutaul -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhawanyapore -	-	-	-	-	1
Dhowibajee -	-	-	-	-	1
Bara Dhurrumpore -	-	-	-	-	1
Chila Boozrook -	-	-	-	-	1

Kulleanpore, except in the Sunnud	-	-	-	-	1
of Rajah Kessery Sing -	-	-	-	-	1
Dhurrumpore other, except in the	-	-	-	-	1
Sunnud of Rajah Bedjy -	-	-	-	-	1
Bahadur -	-	-	-	-	1
	-	-	-	-	53½
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	856

ADDITIONAL VILLAGES inserted in the SUNNUD of Rajah *Kishore Sing Behauder*,  
the Rajah of *Punna*.

PERGUNNAH PUNNA

Emreah -	-	-	-	-	1
Coony -	-	-	-	-	1
Golmdrah -	-	-	-	-	1
Koodun -	-	-	-	-	1
Khammariah -	-	-	-	-	1
Dowrey -	-	-	-	-	1
Murraha -	-	-	-	-	1
Tendour -	-	-	-	-	1
Hurdoosh -	-	-	-	-	1

Toornah -	-	-	-	-	1
Dawarey -	-	-	-	-	2
Semareah -	-	-	-	-	1
Rodrah -	-	-	-	-	1
Sonowrah -	-	-	-	-	1
Mowha Danae -	-	-	-	-	1
Dhurrumpore -	-	-	-	-	1
Margowah -	-	-	-	-	1
Kurriha Khord -	-	-	-	-	1
Mohur -	-	-	-	-	2

PERGUANNAH KUTTOLA.

Seemereah -	-	-	-	-	1
Gauncheepoorah -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhowanyapore -	-	-	-	-	1
Ahar Rowtpore -	-	-	-	-	1
Koonpoorah -	-	-	-	-	1
Mulgowsha -	-	-	-	-	1
Aherowrah -	-	-	-	-	1
Obery -	-	-	-	-	1
Salajeet -	-	-	-	-	1
Burkers, near the village Koorah, except from Sunnud of Ruttun Sing, the Rajah of Bejawar -	-	-	-	-	1

Pugrah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Dewree Khord -	-	-	-	-	1
Dhorawah -	-	-	-	-	1
Murreah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Kurriah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Koolcohn -	-	-	-	-	1
Rungyah -	-	-	-	-	1
Leeroe -	-	-	-	-	1
Kulhanpoorah -	-	-	-	-	1
Ghatatahurry -	-	-	-	-	1
Murrah Khord -	-	-	-	-	1
Role -	-	-	-	-	1
Rampore -	-	-	-	-	1
Daharah -	-	-	-	-	1
Munjangawah -	-	-	-	-	1
Gowrah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1

PERGUNNAH POWET.

Kusab Aumangune -	-	-	-	-	2
Bekrumpore and Mow -	-	-	-	-	2
Mahadurah -	-	-	-	-	1
Cheklahye -	-	-	-	-	1
Seeree -	-	-	-	-	1
Gurrahkur -	-	-	-	-	1
Kuchnaree -	-	-	-	-	1
Jhurkoah -	-	-	-	-	5
Mohodrah -	-	-	-	-	5
Hinowtee -	-	-	-	-	1
Etowree -	-	-	-	-	1
Seemere -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhomowree Khora -	-	-	-	-	1
Kong -	-	-	-	-	1
Poomneah -	-	-	-	-	1
Bumneah -	-	-	-	-	1
Bandhee -	-	-	-	-	2
Bunowlee -	-	-	-	-	2
Nundun -	-	-	-	-	1
Powyeah -	-	-	-	-	1
Unnowtah Khora -	-	-	-	-	1
Purraeah -	-	-	-	-	1
Hunnowtah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Mookheo -	-	-	-	-	1
Dewry -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhomowry Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhamar -	-	-	-	-	1
Underkoha -	-	-	-	-	1
Belha -	-	-	-	-	1
Khamareah Rowtpora -	-	-	-	-	2

Pisserwah -	-	-	-	-	1
Shugra -	-	-	-	-	1
Ladgawah -	-	-	-	-	1
Murriah -	-	-	-	-	1
Goorka Khord -	-	-	-	-	1
Shelmelah -	-	-	-	-	1
Dugdha -	-	-	-	-	1
Pissereah -	-	-	-	-	1
Etowurah -	-	-	-	-	1
Tarrah -	-	-	-	-	1
Hunowtah -	-	-	-	-	1
Koolwah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Hunowtah Khord -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhatpoorah -	-	-	-	-	1
Gowrah Khord -	-	-	-	-	1

PERGUNNAH PATHAN.

Jowdpore -	-	-	-	-	1
Futtehpore -	-	-	-	-	1
Lokhan Chowry -	-	-	-	-	1
Dhowary -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhartullah -	-	-	-	-	1
Bhilowney -	-	-	-	-	1
Lagowney -	-	-	-	-	1
Bugwah Boozroog -	-	-	-	-	1
Bugwah Khoord -	-	-	-	-	1
Pidareeah -	-	-	-	-	1
Rounepore -	-	-	-	-	1
Ameereah -	-	-	-	-	1
Mungawah -	-	-	-	-	1
Mehigawah -	-	-	-	-	1
Munkowrah -	-	-	-	-	1

Lakowry	-	-	-	1
Rishenpoorah	-	-	-	1
Bugrouna	-	-	-	1
Pepreah Khord	-	-	-	1
Ullowrah	-	-	-	1
Koonrah	-	-	-	1
Jurgawah	-	-	-	1
Bhujawah	-	-	-	1
Hijoonpoorah	-	-	-	1
Konpoorah	-	-	-	1
Murreah	-	-	-	1
Khurpoorah	-	-	-	1
Nawgong	-	-	-	1
Bhujeah	-	-	-	1
Ranneepoorah	-	-	-	1
Cuckrah	-	-	-	1
Behurwah	-	-	-	1
Mohonuh	-	-	-	1
Chundna	-	-	-	1
Bary	-	-	-	1
Putteh Boozroog	-	-	-	1
Chunzery	-	-	-	1
Menygawah	-	-	-	1
Cheoleh	-	-	-	1
Putty Khord	-	-	-	1
Munkee	-	-	-	1
Govindpoorah	-	-	-	2
Bujereah	-	-	-	1
Umdur	-	-	-	1
Poorayah	-	-	-	1
Jamooniah	-	-	-	1
Jamoondeer	-	-	-	1
Doholy	-	-	-	1
Hurdooh	-	-	-	1
Purhary	-	-	-	1
Surselah	-	-	-	1
Mahdhoepore	-	-	-	1
Sunkooah	-	-	-	1
Udrah	-	-	-	1
Boypoorah	-	-	-	1
Moonpaioe	-	-	-	1
Patna	-	-	-	1
Tetoonpony	-	-	-	1
Ghotey	-	-	-	1
Alawny	-	-	-	1
Chow	-	-	-	1
Beerumpoorah	-	-	-	2
Surrye Kheroe	-	-	-	1
Sanspony	-	-	-	1
Shalah Doongreah	-	-	-	1
Mamai	-	-	-	1
Belpoorah	-	-	-	1
Gourha	-	-	-	1
Surrah	-	-	-	1
Dobah	-	-	-	1
Doongareah	-	-	-	1
Damoojub	-	-	-	1
Mulkhan	-	-	-	1
Hurdooh Khoord	-	-	-	1
Toonalah	-	-	-	1
Putteoreah	-	-	-	1
Nauna Chund	-	-	-	1
Powury	-	-	-	1
Semuvry	-	-	-	1
Dhaugawah	-	-	-	1
Teekereah	-	-	-	1
Baabolah	-	-	-	1
Hurdooh	-	-	-	1
Choongoonah	-	-	-	1
Jurye Kheroe	-	-	-	1
Guage	-	-	-	1
Koohah	-	-	-	1
Byakherae	-	-	-	1

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Embah	-	-	-	1
Roojhar	-	-	-	1
Roolah Kherae	-	-	-	1
Putty Khord	-	-	-	1
Bhurwarree	-	-	-	1
Dhurumpore	-	-	-	1
Moorlah	-	-	-	1
Burkherah	-	-	-	1
Burgawah	-	-	-	1
Uchrar	-	-	-	1
Kotah Koomary, &c.	-	-	-	1

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PERGUNNAH RAWAR

Kotah Khord	-	-	-	1
Burkuchil	-	-	-	1
Chitowudha	-	-	-	1
Ordunnah	-	-	-	1
Darinnah	-	-	-	1
Cundyelie	-	-	-	1
Morah	-	-	-	1
Chitowudha	-	-	-	1
Koowreah	-	-	-	1
Gourah	-	-	-	1
Bungaleah	-	-	-	1
Chuckra	-	-	-	1
Chumra	-	-	-	1
Khunguha	-	-	-	1
Joygawah	-	-	-	1

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PERGUNNAH JOYPORE

Hurdee	-	-	-	1
Gurrupoorah	-	-	-	1
Muchgow	-	-	-	1
Chunha	-	-	-	1
Rampore	-	-	-	1
Chatoynee	-	-	-	1
Kullianpone	-	-	-	1
Lullia	-	-	-	1
Bisram	-	-	-	1
Gungegohalra	-	-	-	1
Bhoytye	-	-	-	1
Bhonasmoorah	-	-	-	1
Woodypore	-	-	-	1
Bhunpore	-	-	-	1
Mahana	-	-	-	1
Bara	-	-	-	1
Jaytoopora	-	-	-	1
Kishenpoorah	-	-	-	1
Chowkee	-	-	-	1
Kheehora	-	-	-	1
Peetahbeher	-	-	-	1
Bhoyraba	-	-	-	1
Joypoorah	-	-	-	1
Heerapore	-	-	-	1
Semerda	-	-	-	1
Turavah	-	-	-	1
Betauree	-	-	-	1
Nowbustah	-	-	-	1
Baberoo	-	-	-	1

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PERGUNNAH BARLIVE.

Burhoe Kus	-	-	-	1
Etawah, 11 Mouzahs				
Etawah Khus, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Ghoorkut	-	-	-	1
Pulyaree	-	-	-	1
Deorahs, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Heerapore, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Goora, with - ditto	-	-	-	1

3 N 3

Soorianapore

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
etc.

Soorianapore	-	-	-	1
Dhenhoo	-	-	-	1
Bhurgury, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Koorowly, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Cheryah punry, with ditto	-	-	-	1
11				
Bingpore, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Serswah, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Hurdwahes, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Onsery, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Rorah, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Woodpoora	-	-	-	1
Sarpore, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Heerapore, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Karwarry	-	-	-	1
Bhumpai, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Curroula, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Semeriah	-	-	-	1
Guna, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Pathariah	-	-	-	1
Baboopore, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Dumcharrah, with - ditto	-	-	-	1
Kurywah	-	-	-	1
Fununee, with Diamond Mine	-	-	-	1
Patua Tutchpore	-	-	-	1
Pokrah	-	-	-	1
Etowrah	-	-	-	1
Chunee	-	-	-	1
Burgawah	-	-	-	1
Sookwah	-	-	-	1
Deyhowrah	-	-	-	1
Umlowneah	-	-	-	1
Kondwaree	-	-	-	1
Rahee Kat	-	-	-	1
Koorah	-	-	-	1
Kuthee Khero	-	-	-	1
Chowprah, except from the Sun- } nud of Chowbey Durrao Sing }	-	-	-	1
Chowrah	-	-	-	1

PERGUNNAH CALLINGER

Kheerupoorah and Dhurumpoorah 1

Pergunnah Sun-wahs	-	-	-	1
Sunwahs Khana	-	-	-	1
Kushah Buxkuho	-	-	-	1
Oum Ghurrah	-	-	-	1
Belgawah	-	-	-	1
Govindpoorah	-	-	-	1
Puttooree	-	-	-	1
Pippereah	-	-	-	1
Buttawahs	-	-	-	1
Gudgurrah	-	-	-	1
Muzgawah Boozroog	-	-	-	1
Pulsa Khurd	-	-	-	1
Cuncooh	-	-	-	1
Lahore	-	-	-	1
Karow	-	-	-	1
Korassey	-	-	-	1
Murdiorah	-	-	-	1
Sowrohey	-	-	-	1
Bodgepore	-	-	-	1
Muchdurry	-	-	-	1
Jumneah	-	-	-	1
Sozarrah	-	-	-	1
Khurreah	-	-	-	1
Mahomed Poorah	-	-	-	1
Bizzahwolly	-	-	-	1
Birrampoorah	-	-	-	1
Bamowrey	-	-	-	1
Jungowreah	-	-	-	1
Memmanweg	-	-	-	1

Sooranjepoorah	-	-	-	1
Gutowhoy Doodhowney	-	-	-	2
Kuttohwareh	-	-	-	1
Tallown	-	-	-	1
Janah	-	-	-	1
Knoondon Auzney	-	-	-	1
Gowrah	-	-	-	1
Bugroundah	-	-	-	1
Goograwo	-	-	-	1
Sullo Neyah	-	-	-	1
Sillown	-	-	-	1
Nawaur	-	-	-	1
Daopote	-	-	-	1
Pahpet	-	-	-	1
Doongwassoro	-	-	-	1
Paullah	-	-	-	1
Saugyareez	-	-	-	1
Hirduhpoorah	-	-	-	1
Joorajepoorah Khurd	-	-	-	1
Mawdeah Boozroog	-	-	-	1
Gunchrah	-	-	-	1
Khureah Khurd	-	-	-	1
Dugrehey	-	-	-	1
Lahorepoorah	-	-	-	1
Boulwarro	-	-	-	1
Paulley	-	-	-	1
Muzgawah	-	-	-	1
Murpah	-	-	-	1
Kisumpoorah	-	-	-	1
Logguraw	-	-	-	1
Lahono	-	-	-	1
Loynarow Khurd	-	-	-	1
Bitchown	-	-	-	1
Allumpoornh	-	-	-	1
Poundey	-	-	-	1
Mausoolpoorah	-	-	-	1
Bunackah	-	-	-	1
Toondow	-	-	-	1
Joytupoorah	-	-	-	1
Dhunnowrah	-	-	-	1
Nipneah	-	-	-	1
Murreah Buzruck	-	-	-	1
Doosah	-	-	-	1
Umnollah Khurd	-	-	-	1
Purneah	-	-	-	1
Muzgawah	-	-	-	1
Dudowneah	-	-	-	1
Kurrey	-	-	-	1
Mowlah	-	-	-	1
Naudpown	-	-	-	1
Khuhory	-	-	-	1
Maunkey	-	-	-	1
Jhannur Koondey	-	-	-	1
Kannowrah	-	-	-	1
Goworahmaur	-	-	-	1
Murheyah Soorkey	-	-	-	1
Naonagn Phooteyrah	-	-	-	1
Chowrey	-	-	-	1
Soypoorah	-	-	-	1
Jaunmun Jhoorey	-	-	-	1
Tellowhey	-	-	-	1
Kurwarro	-	-	-	1
Khurpoorah	-	-	-	1
Joklah	-	-	-	1
Isurinokey	-	-	-	1
Mungreahy	-	-	-	1
Purrahey	-	-	-	1
Khoyzareah	-	-	-	1
Gawolarey	-	-	-	1
Bumraanon	-	-	-	1
Moduntallah	-	-	-	1
Rosohyeyah	-	-	-	1

Boorahrah

Boorsahrah Toodonmy	-	-	1	Sourrujeepoor	-	-	-	1
Boodhan Sunrah	-	-	1	Gourahnarud	-	-	-	1
Koobey	-	-	1	Deorey	-	-	-	1
Boorey Seemur	-	-	1	Roosamoor	-	-	-	1
Jeyhaupoorah	-	-	1	Ghoograh	-	-	-	1
Sionrah Burro	-	-	1	Bauggown	-	-	-	1
Moreyah	-	-	1	Phootarah	-	-	-	1
Jugthur	-	-	1	Chokahbo	-	-	-	1
Koyallo	-	-	1	Joadpore	-	-	-	1
Lummow	-	-	1	Futthepore	-	-	-	1
Gurrur	-	-	1	Saukoro	-	-	-	1
Daorah	-	-	1	Buggowdah	-	-	-	1
Auchulpoorah	-	-	1	Uryzarah	-	-	-	1
Nounnowtah	-	-	1	Imleah	-	-	-	1
Aabdah	-	-	1	Hennowtah Khurd	-	-	-	1
Kutchnary	-	-	1	Tigrah	-	-	-	1
Mooraitah	-	-	1	Tellah	-	-	-	1
Kunntey	-	-	1	Suttowheyah	-	-	-	1
Pawahrawo	-	-	1	Bridgepooreah	-	-	-	1
Baundah	-	-	1	Khazorey	-	-	-	1
Rudgewans	-	-	1	Lacheypoorah	-	-	-	1
Russaurrah	-	-	1	Bonrowney	-	-	-	1
Muzgawah Buzruk	-	-	1	Buzaro	-	-	-	1
Mahomed Poorah	-	-	1	Pautsuhpore	-	-	-	1
Blarkah	-	-	1	Taurpoho	-	-	-	1
Mulkawah	-	-	1	Singhowley	-	-	-	1
Naumowtah	-	-	1	Hutah	-	-	-	1
Aulbunpoorah	-	-	1	Seprey	-	-	-	1
Nuckrah Kotah	-	-	1	Naltnah	-	-	-	1
Purrur Lallah	-	-	1	Khajoneah	-	-	-	1
Seuraupoorah	-	-	1	Kulloah	-	-	-	1
Korsheyah	-	-	1	Roomrawul	-	-	-	1
Sooltanpoorah	-	-	1	Kutchwooh	-	-	-	1
Jumneah Khuna	-	-	1	Paulley	-	-	-	1
Bonrey	-	-	1	Pittoulleah	-	-	-	1
Mawahey	-	-	1	Pittoullie	-	-	-	1
Piprah	-	-	1	Roypoorah	-	-	-	1
Chowreah	-	-	1	Nawotanuno	-	-	-	1
Barrekharay Khurd	-	-	1	Moordeyah	-	-	-	1
Puddowrutpoor	-	-	1	Bellalaro	-	-	-	1
Birghur	-	-	1	Tulgawah	-	-	-	1
Chundpoorah	-	-	1	Soonuzpoorah	-	-	-	1
Muzpourah	-	-	1	Burkhurrah	-	-	-	1
Mukull	-	-	1	Kowoneah	-	-	-	1
Munzowrah	-	-	1	Bungawah	-	-	-	1
Ghoorkharoo	-	-	1	Mulkhoah	-	-	-	1
Hundoah	-	-	1	Sullempoorah	-	-	-	1
Sionrah Boozooog Chackahey	-	-	1	Rumpoorah	-	-	-	1
Puthowreah	-	-	1	Kutraho	-	-	-	1
Baurrohey	-	-	1	Saujey	-	-	-	1
Batrurgawah	-	-	1	Russoolpoor and Jharrahey	-	-	-	2
Nawahey	-	-	1	Sulloheah	-	-	-	1
Barekharrey	-	-	1	Muldumpoorah	-	-	-	1
Gloghorey	-	-	1					215
Soonnareh	-	-	1					
Khurmeah	-	-	1					
Dhurrumpoorah	-	-	1					
Marreah	-	-	1					
				TOTAL	-	-	-	1,363

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to the Rajah Bajee Behauder, Rajah of Churkary.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongues, &c. of the pergunnahe of Raath and Sewndah and Kotobah, &c. in the province of Bundelcund: That whereas the Rajah Bekermajeet, Bajee Behauder, one of the ancient and hereditary chiefs of Bundelcund, to the dominions of the British Government, was the first of the Boondella chiefs who submitted and acknowledged the authority of that Government, and during the agency of Captain John Baillie, the former agent to the Governor-general, delivered in an Ikarnameh (or obligation of allegiance) to the British Government, and received a sunnud for the villages and lands in his possession, and has from that period remained firm and faithful to every article of his engagement, and in no instance deviated or swerved from that obedience, loyalty, and attachment due to the British Government, several villages belonging to the share and possessions of the said rajah, that were then in the possession of unjust claimants, and the right to which



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Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

at that period had not been investigated, remained in the hands of those unjust claimants, and were not included in the sunnud mentioned. On account of the above described villages, which were not included as stated in the said sunnud, disputes and quarrels existed, and half the talook of Kharelah, which was inserted in the sunnud received from Captain John Baillie by the said rajah, was resumed by the British Government, along with the joydai of the Rajah Himmud Behander. During the agency of Mr. John Richardson, agent to the Governor-general, after minute investigation, the said rajah was put in possession of the villages and lands withheld from him by several unjust claimants, and the rajah aforesaid received a deduction from the revenues of the tuppah of Chandella in lieu of half the share of Kharelah; and the disputes and claims that existed between the said rajah and the other chiefs of Bundelcund have been all adjusted. This being the case, a ratified sunnud and an ikarnameh being thought necessary, the said rajah has accordingly, at this period, delivered in an ikarnameh, containing eleven distinct articles, and required a sunnud for the villages and lands held in his possession; therefore the villages and lands enumerated in the subjoined schedule are granted to the said rajah and his heirs, with all their rights and usages, their land revenue and sayer, forts and fortifications, exempt from the payment of revenue to the British Government, in perpetuity; so long as the said rajah, and his heirs and successors, shall observe and remain faithful to the several articles of the ikarnameh that he had delivered in, no molestation or resumption of the possessions hereby granted shall take place on the part of the British Government. It is necessary that you all consider and account the said rajah the lord and proprietor of the possessions in question; and the conduct that is incumbent on the said rajah is to exert himself to the utmost to increase the cultivation and to improve his possessions, by promoting the prosperity and comfort of the inhabitants, and to enjoy the produce of his good governance in obedience, loyalty and attachment to the British Government.

TRANSLATION of the IKARNAMEH of the Rajah *Ruttun Sing*, the Rajah of *Bijawur*

WHEREAS since the time of the annexation of the province of Bundelcund to the dominions and authority of the British Government, my deceased father, the late Rajah Kiseri Sing, Rajah of Bijawur, invariably manifested his obedience and loyalty to the British Government, and remained in allegiance and submission thereto during his lifetime, and was recognized and admitted amongst the chiefs that acknowledged obedience to the British Government, and received its protection, and always conducted himself in obedience to the officers appointed to the superintendence of the province of Bundelcund: At this period, I, Rajah Ruttun Sing (the contracting party), eldest son to the aforesaid late rajah, with a view to confirming my obedience and attachment to the British Government, have proposed, under my seal and signature, and present this ikarnameh (or obligation of allegiance) containing eleven distinct articles, to Mr. John Richardson, agent to the Governor-general in Bundelcund, and request a sunnud for the villages and lands now in my possession, and composing my ancient rightful possession. I therefore hereby declare and bind myself that I will scrupulously observe all the articles contained in this ikarnameh, and never evade nor infringe any one of them.

ARTICLE 1.—I hereby promise and bind myself on no occasion to unite with external or internal enemies of the honourable Company in Bundelcund, and to be ever obedient and submissive to the will and commands of the British Government in all things.

ARTICLE 2.—If any one of my children, brothers or relations excite sedition or disturbance in the British territories or possessions, or the territories or possessions of any of the chiefs in allegiance to the British Government, I engage to do everything in my power to prevent and to restrain them, and in the case of their persisting in such condition, I engage to unite my force with the British troops in the punishment and suppression of such persons.

ARTICLE 3.—If any of the subjects of the British Government shall fly and take refuge in my territories, on application from the officers of the British Government, I will deliver them up to the British Government.

ARTICLE 4.—I further engage that I will never harbour or give protection in my country to persons accused or suspected of robbery or theft; that if a robbery be committed, or the property of merchants or travellers be stolen, in any of the villages subject to my authority, I will render the inhabitants of that village responsible for the restitution or value of the property stolen or robbed, or for the seizure and delivery of the thieves or robbers, and in general, that murderers, and all other persons amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of the British Government for crimes committed in the British possessions who may take refuge in my districts, shall be immediately seized and delivered over to the British authority in Bundelcund.

ARTICLE 5.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them, or any of their relations.

ARTICLE 6.—I engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute

arise between me and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case I promise to submit the cause of such dispute for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.—I engage to guard all the passes through the Ghauts under my authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers and ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chief or leader should meditate an incursion into the British territory through my possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, I engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances before his approach to the neighbourhood of my territory, and to exert my utmost efforts to obstruct his progress.

ARTICLE 8.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts through any of the passes subject to my authority, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of my possessions.

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas Gopal Singh and Rao Himmat Singh, Murriddah, and Zohn Singh, of Bundmah, and Puddam Singh, of Tehengah, and Gaoite Junaidar and Manick Jue, of Melit Gawah, have rebelled against the British Government, and are guilty of murdering and plundering in the territories of that Government, I hereby declare that I will never have any intercourse with the above-mentioned rebels, but on the contrary, whenever I shall hear of any of their joint or separate depredations in the territories of the British Government or any of its dependants, I engage to attack the aggressor or aggressors, and to the utmost of my power punish them; and in the event of any of them being seized, I engage to deliver them up to the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—Whereas between me and the rajahs and chiefs of Bundelcund there existed many disputed claims concerning many villages, which disputes have been adjusted and settled by the decision of the British Government; and as now there is no disputed point or cause of difference remaining, I therefore hereby declare and promise that hereafter I will not dispute or quarrel with any rajah or chief on account of any village or lands; if any rajah or chief shall dispute or quarrel with me, on account of any village or lands claimed, I engage to submit the same to the British Government and to abide by its decision, and not to dispute or quarrel about the point myself.

ARTICLE 11.—I engage that one of my confidential servants shall always be in attendance as a vakeel on the officer of the British Government in this province for the purpose of executing his orders, and in the event of such vakeel being from any reason disapproved of by the said officer, I agree immediately to appoint another in his stead.

26th March 1811.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to Rajah Rattum Sing, the Rajah of Bijawar.

BE it known to the chowdries, kaungoes, &c., of the pergunnahs of Kutdah, and the pergunnah of Paway, in the province of Bundelcund, that whereas the deceased Rajah Kussery Sing, the late rajah of Bijawar, one of the respectable hereditary chieftains of Bundelcund, and a descendant of the Rajah Jaggut Raja, since the period of the annexation of the province of Bundelcund to the dominions of the British Government, invariably conducted himself with obedience, submission and attachment, and remained firm in his allegiance, and in no instance deviated from the loyalty and dutiful demeanor that was due from him towards the British Government; and whereas a sunnod granting to the said rajah the confirmation of the villages and lands in his ancient possession, was promised to the said rajah on the part of the British Government, as soon as the adjustment of the disputed claim that formerly existed with respect to the right to the tuppah of Isanagar took place, and that point having been accordingly adjusted by the decision of the British Government, and at this period, the aforesaid rajah being dead; and the Rajah Rattum Sing, the eldest son and heir to the deceased rajah, having succeeded, by the sanction of the British Government an ikarnamah, or obligation of allegiance, under his seal and signature, containing eleven distinct articles, and requested a sunnod from the British Government; therefore the villages enumerated in the subjoined schedule, which were from ancient times in the possession of the deceased rajah, and also those villages which were given to the aforesaid rajah by the British Government in addition to his former possessions, through the liberality of the British Government, with a view to confirm and bind his allegiance, together with all the rights thereof, land revenue, axer, forts and fortified places, are now confirmed to the Rajah Rattum Sing and his heirs in perpetuity, exempt from the payment of revenue, and a sunnod for the same is hereby granted; so long as the said rajah, and his heirs or successors, shall remain firm to their engagements, and observe faithfully the terms of the several articles of this ikarnamah or engagement, no molestation or resumption of the above possessions shall have place on the part of the British Government. It is necessary that you all consider and account the said rajah the lord of the said possessions, and the conduct that is incumbent on the said rajah and his heirs is, that he shall exert himself to the utmost to cultivate and improve the said villages and lands, and to promote the prosperity of the inhabitants, and enjoy the produce of the above possessions, in obedience, submission, and loyalty to the British Government. After the sanction of the Right honourable the Governor-general in

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

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Council shall be obtained, another sunnud to the same effect, signed by the Right honourable the Governor-general, shall be exchanged and submitted, in the place of the present sunnud granted by the agent to the Governor-general.

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties, &c.	NAMES OF VILLAGES.	
Tuppah Bijawur	-	Wawaur
Kusabih Bijawur Khoss	- 1	Sewaur
Nantaut	- 1	Barraw
Bhurgawah Buzruch	- 1	Kootwarrah
Bhurruipoorah	- 1	Mowee
Puttuseel Zachit	- 1	Lehanny
Gopaulpoorah Buzruch	- 1	Judawrah
Buxwaho	- 1	Dunggorepoorah Kurd
Undhur	- 1	Hushrey
Decawby	- 1	Bhopaulpoorah
Muzgawah Khurd	- 1	Goozawrah
Kurrunney	- 1	Agrah
Sham Bhorey	- 1	Didwarrah
Demram	- 1	Singpore
Mogawarry	- 1	Lorawhey
Sungawah	- 1	Bamowrey
Gurkhawah	- 1	Choolah
Bhillumpoorah	- 1	Luckhungawah
Bohomony Ghautky	- 1	Pattin Khurd
Pearraw	- 1	Rannypoora
Bhoheypoora	- 1	Purganypoora
Muzgawah Khurd, near Moogwarry	- 1	Bhurwanney
Dunggurpoora Bhattanka	- 1	Runnoopoora
Ghorawby	- 1	Loonanjanypoora, below the Ghaut
Piprah Sumillinkah	- 1	Pertaubpoora
Divry Soorekey	- 1	Ramoney Bhattomkah
Bilwar	- 1	Surranjanypoora Woostemka
Bawdhew	- 1	Gopaulpoora Khurd
Chaurahay	- 1	Sungrumpoora
Piprah Puttainkah	- 1	Ramneytal
Gorah Khurd	- 1	Woodapoora, except sunnud given to }
Monkerrey	- 1	Rajah Kishore Sing }
Belgan	- 1	Chotaj Koah
Ghinawehy	- 1	Midneypoora
Berkrampoora	- 1	Aundey hurraw
Billawhaw	- 1	Teckoorry
Deopoe	- 1	Byrawgur
Khokasiao	- 1	Nagawrey
Bizzack	- 1	Pattiran Boozruck
Burretty	- 1	Punrow
Birrow	- 1	Punchey
Kain	- 1	Sawheyghur
Kurrah Bhurd	- 1	Umberpoora Paweye
Tiggersey	- 1	Ram Ghur
Sathpurro	- 1	Bagohore
Berrunpoora	- 1	Buinande
Bhoharro	- 1	Burranda
Thinggorey	- 1	Hurdooh
Garruckpoora	- 1	Joanwanney
Howarpoora (except sunnud given } to Rajah Kishore Sing )	- 1	Roychaur
Benckpoora	- 1	Kalloopoora
Bhuggawhoh	- 1	Kattah
Kundhowah Khurd	- 1	Khayrah
Phattwarrey	- 1	Imleh
Mooreyah	- 1	Goallant
Saindpow	- 1	Bunch Kharry
Burnah	- 1	Banjoopoora
Lukanneh	- 1	Puttam
Bumnarrah	- 1	Deorey Daronkey
Loadhawra	- 1	Bushrawhey
Mulpoorut Khurd	- 1	Puttarey Buzruck
Chundeah	- 1	Khawaugh
Soakhey	- 1	Surnuck
Kallorah	- 1	Kalipoora
Hattoeh Peim	- 1	Jassawah
Sumerah	- 1	Ghoosagawah
	- 1	Mawangh Jhallo
	- 1	Woolawilley
		Bhnegawah

Bhagawah Khund	1	Bugwuntpoorah	1
Domawleypoorah	1	Sawah	1
Rattimpoorah	1	Buckoon, Nankar of Bucksey	1
Khuagahpoore	1	Ranjore Sing	1
Kleson Ghur	1	Dhurtharry	1
Mamem	1	Buggawtah	1
Mulgawah	1	Utraur	1
Paulley, except sunnud given to Rajah	1	Rowrah	1
Bejey Behadur	1	Buddaur	1
Taypoorah	1	Sangney	1
Aumeerpoorah	1	Sallaheya Gorunkey	1
Nurriupore, except sunnud given to	1	Hoophey	1
Rajah Bejey Bahadar	1	Taungah Buzruck	1
Bumnowrah Khurd	1	Karrey	1
Sungrampoorah Khund	1	Dulleypore, Nukar of Dewan	1
Dawhey	1	Ram Sing	1
Waofrey	1	Poochey	1
Jirkurrah	1	Rampoorah	1
Agrah	1	Tuppah Sultyhey	1
Kooppeyah	1	Suttyhey	1
Jokhrun	1	Poongawah	1
Butchawneah	1	Jonah	1
Kaurcowhoh	1	Bameney	1
Naggawah	1	Bhyrah	1
Rampoor	1	Piprah	1
Lewranjipoorah, near Sattesh	1	Sillaront	1
Mundanaipoorah	1	Billazey	1
Chaurkah	1	Nundgawah	1
Rampoorah Khund	1	Hurrahpore	1
Doongreah	1	Warruneah	1
Kussaur	1	Chaytoah	1
Muzgawah Pohurwah	2	Juppah Dhunrempore	1
Huthurrah	1	Dhurumpore	1
Baserohy	1	Puttarah	1
Sajah Beokrampoorah	2	Chemprah	1
Gunggawaho	1	Kutchgawah	1
Jhamtooley	1	Wanddeakpoorah	1
Sillaun	2	Tuppah Banjenah	1
Pathurgawah	1	Banjenah	1
Woolvy	1	Soobban	1
Saurora	1	Muttarah	2
Khohey	1	Baurramnaud	1
Rampoor	1	Timmowrawah	1
Tuppah Ruggawby	1	Chanprah	1
Ruggawley Khass	1	Chain	1
Luchungawah	1	Kinjullah	1
Lunnorah	1	Bassuntpoorah	1
Hattawah	1	Roondpoorah	1
Tuhangah Khurd	1	Villages not situated in the Tuppah	1
Nawahdah	1	Gaurbah	1
Pippit	1	Burkharrah, near Goolgunge (except	1
Punnahgur	1	the sunnud given to Rajah Kishore	1
Sirrawn	1	Sing	1
Bhanggobahrey	1	Goolgunge	1
Bhurthowby	1	Bawkahbah	1
Pepperiah	1	Passawlah	1
Jallahpore	1	Purrehah	1
Owreah	1	Burrahah	1
Chaupper	1	Himmutpoorah	1
Puggawro	1	Duhargawah	1
Gusharwar	1	Hurrah	1
Pahareo Gehwah	1	Bidjajpore	1
Putrah	1	Lallgawah	1
Nundyahwah	1	Hinrawneah	1
Burimk	1	Bhaassaur Rungawah	2
Gorahatalleo	1	Bhurtoollah	1
Daharry	1	Maurah	1
Khaanty	1	Pipnah	1
Russabek Domrahey	1	Jusagawah	1
Dhowsy	1	Mohunpoorah	1
Mathgawah	1	Kawnpore, near Mawrah	1
Laloney	1	Mawrah	1
Harney	1	Boorah	1

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

Pingluah Pawey	-	-	-	-	Kalkahah	-	-	-	-	1
Tallookah Kulboheyah	-	-	-	-	Runwaho	-	-	-	-	1
Kawnpore Khass	-	-	-	-	Boodlboro	-	-	-	-	1
Kahurrah	-	-	-	-	Goozabeyah	-	-	-	-	1
Ruhatah	-	-	-	-	Tannhey	-	-	-	-	1
Sugwarro	-	-	-	-	Nungrey	-	-	-	-	1
Munesh	-	-	-	-	Woodawney	-	-	-	-	1
Goormaneah	-	-	-	-	Churrah	-	-	-	-	1
Chundempoorah	-	-	-	-	Moholey	-	-	-	-	1
Imleah Khungumka	-	-	-	-	Sooltypoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Putlawry	-	-	-	-	Pipperah Korchoo	-	-	-	-	1
Paullun Buzruck	-	-	-	-	Putturroo Putuah	-	-	-	-	2
Hurrah	-	-	-	-	Biggahey	-	-	-	-	1
Pullohey	-	-	-	-	Burrawah	-	-	-	-	1
Bilho	-	-	-	-	Imleah	-	-	-	-	1
Mohoolah Chuppolah	-	-	-	-	Socjanpoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Pippereah Buzruck	-	-	-	-	Gurrawley	-	-	-	-	1
Badah	-	-	-	-	Mushey	-	-	-	-	1
Rickey	-	-	-	-	Jhagruah	-	-	-	-	1
Pugrey	-	-	-	-	Muzgawah, near Suptoleah	-	-	-	-	1
Simney	-	-	-	-	Juttoopoorah	-	-	-	-	1
Burah	-	-	-	-	Moonnawhitch (except sunnud given to Rajah Kishore Sing)	-	-	-	-	2
Pugrah Sogancyah	-	-	-	-	Khumrah Bizaruck (except sunnud given to Rajah Kishore Sing)	-	-	-	-	1
Moltey	-	-	-	-	Sirrah, with Diamond Mines	-	-	-	-	1
Dhimney	-	-	-	-	Dhannauzah ditto	-	-	-	-	1
Koolwauney	-	-	-	-	Chuhallah ditto	-	-	-	-	1
Woossaur Kharo	-	-	-	-	Dewry ditto	-	-	-	-	1
Khurundah	-	-	-	-						
Ettawah	-	-	-	-						
Hurdalawah Kurkoho	-	-	-	-						
Kauntry	-	-	-	-						
Tarawho	-	-	-	-						
Burbasspoorah	-	-	-	-						
Buckharrey, and Imleah	-	-	-	-						

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27th March 1811.

SUNNUD granted to the Chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind, on this side of the River Sutlege.

On the 3d of May 1809, an Itila-namoh, comprised of seven articles, was issued by the orders of the British Government, purporting that the country of the sirdars of Sirhind and Malwa having come under their protection, Rajah Runjeet Sing, agreeable to treaty, had no concern with the possessions of the above sirdars; that the British Government had no intention of claiming Peshawar or Nuzerana, and that they should continue in the full control and enjoyment of their respective possessions. The publication of the above itila-namoh was intended to afford every confidence to the sirdars, that they had no intention of control, and that those having possessions should remain in full and quiet enjoyment thereof.

Whereas several zemindars, and other subjects of the chiefs of this country, have preferred complaints to the officers of the British Government, who, having in view the tenor of the above itila-namoh, have not attended, and will not in future pay attention to them; for instance, on the 15th June 1811, Deltawer Ali Khan, of Samana, complained to the resident of Delhi against the officers of Rajah Sahib Sing, for jewels and other property said to have been seized by them, who in reply observed, "that the cusbs of Samana being in the onaldery of Rajah Sahib Sing, this complaint should be made to him;" and also, on the 12th July 1811, Dussonda Sing and Goonmook Sing complained to Colonel Ochterlony, agent to the Governor-general, against Sirdar Churrut Sing, for their shares of property, &c.; and in reply it was written on the back of the urzee, that "Since during the period of three years no claim was preferred against Churrut Sing by any of his brothers, nor even the name of any co-partner mentioned; and since it was advertised in the itila-namoh, delivered to the sirdars, that every chief should remain in the quiet and full possession of his domains, their petition could not be attended to." The insertion of these answers to complaints is intended as examples, and also, that it may be impressed on the minds of every zemindar and other subjects, that the attainment of justice is to be expected from their respective chiefs only, that they may not in the smallest degree swerve from the observance of subordination. It is therefore highly incumbent upon the rajahs and other sirdars on this side of the river Sutlege, that they explain this to their respective subjects and court their confidence; that it may be clear to them that complaints to the officers of the British Government will be of no avail, and that they consider their respective sirdars as the source of justice, and that of their free will and accord they observe uniform obedience.

And

And whereas according to the first proclamation, it is not the intention of the British Government to interfere in the possessions of the sirdars of this country, it is nevertheless, for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of the community, particularly necessary to give general information, that several sirdars have, since the last incursion of Rajah Runjeet Sing, wrested the estates of others and deprived them of their lawful possessions, and that in the restoration they have used delays until detachments from the British army have enforced restitution, as in the case of the rance of Joera, the sikhs of Cholian, the talooks of Karowky and Chehloundy, and village of Cheeba; and the reason of such delays and evasions can only be attributed to the temporary enjoyment of the revenues, and subjecting the owners to irremediable losses. It is therefore by order of the British Government hereby proclaimed, that if any of the sirdars or others have forcibly taken possession of the estates of others, or otherwise injured the lawful owners, it is necessary that, before the occurrence of any complaint, the proprietor should be satisfied, and by no means to defer the restoration of the property, in which, however, should delays be made, and the interference of the British authority become requisite, the revenues of the estate from the date of the ejection of the lawful proprietor, together with whatever other losses the inhabitants of that place may sustain from the march of troops, shall, without scruple, be demanded from the offending party, and for disobedience of the present orders, a penalty, according to the circumstances of the case and of the offender, shall be levied agreeably to the decision of the British Government.

Loodiana,  
22d August 1811.

(signed) D. Ochterlony,  
Agent to Governor-general.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD granted to Dewan Gopaul Sing.

To the mutsuddies employed in the affairs of the government, to the jaghirdars, the kroories, chowdries and kanagoes, present and future, of the pergunnah of Punwarry, in the province of Bundelcund: Be it known, that whereas the Dewan Gopaul Sing, impressed with a due sense of the acknowledged justice and benevolence of the British Government, has voluntarily and sincerely professed his obedience and submission to that government, and whereas he has attended in person for the purpose of soliciting forgiveness of his former offences, and has presented an obligation of allegiance, expressive of his obedience and submission, comprising seven distinct articles, signed and sealed by himself; and whereas the forgiveness of contrite offenders, and the support and encouragement of defendants, are consistent with the benevolent principles of the British Government; therefore, and in pursuance of those benevolent principles, the villages of Gerowally, &c. and others in the pergunnah aforesaid, agreeably to the subjoined schedule, are hereby granted in Nanhar, exclusive of alienated lands, to the said Dewan Gopaul Sing, to be enjoyed by him and his successors in perpetuity; and so long as the said Gopaul Sing shall continue strictly and faithfully to adhere to the terms of his obligation of allegiance, the aforesaid villages shall never be resumed.

It is incumbent on the said Dewan Gopaul Sing, to render the inhabitants and peasantry of the aforesaid villages contented and grateful by his good government, to direct his utmost endeavours to the promotion of their comfort and happiness, and to afford no asylum to thieves and robbers in any of those villages. It is the duty of the inhabitants to consider the said Dewan Gopaul Sing as the jaghirdar of the aforementioned villages, to acknowledge his title to the privileges and immunities appertaining to them, to evince no opposition or disobedience whatever to the said Dewan Gopaul Sing, nor require from him the annual renewal of his sunnud.

This sunnud, after obtaining the sanction of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, shall be considered as valid and in full force.

SCHEDULE of the Villages composing Dewan Gopaul Sing's Jaghire

No. of Villages.		No. of Villages.	
Monjet and Gurrwoley Cottah	- 1	Purrareah	- - - 1
Kurtoul	- - - 1	Potareah	- - - 1
Kaunergopore	- - - 1	Putchwarrah	- - - 1
Kunnawrah	- - - 1	Suttaheah	- - - 1
Tuttawrah	- - - 1	Butchore	- - - 1
Amaunpore	- - - 1	Gungekurharrah	- - - 1
Richarrali	- - - 1	Bhutzowrah Khard	- - - 1
Bhaneat Parrah	- - - 1		
Koolwarro	- - - 1		
Luckbunnent	- - - 1		
Sittarpore	- - - 1		
			18 Vill.

Dated this 24th day of February 1812, corresponding with the 27th Fangoon 1819 Fussyly.

TRANSLATION of the *IKARNAMAH* of the *Chobey Darrao Sing*, late *Killedar* of *Calinger*, dated 19th June 1812.

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

I, **CHOBAY DARRAO**: Whereas the rulers of the British Government, at the period of the acquisition of the province of Bundelcund to the British possessions, after having entered into an *Ikarnamah*, or written engagement of allegiance, with a view to the more firmly binding me to a faithful discharge and fulfilment of the terms of the several articles of the engagement, the British Government granted me a *sauwast* in perpetuity, generation after generation, for the jaghire of Calinger, including the fortress; but on my part and that of my partners, the terms of the aforesaid *Ikarnamah* were not observed and adhered to in the manner that it was incumbent on us to observe and adhere to them; notwithstanding, the British rulers considered our crimes as false steps, and contented themselves finally by retaining the possession of the fortress, the cause of our refractoriness, and granted at my request, the villages *Paldeo*, &c. in the *pargunnah* of *Bhetty* and *Korris*, &c. in lieu of my share of the villages of the former jaghire: wherefore I, the contracting party of my own free will and pleasure, have delivered in this *Ikarnamah*, and hereby engage that I will firmly abide by, fulfil, and discharge the terms of the several articles thereof.

**ARTICLE 1.**—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them, or any of their relations.

**ARTICLE 2.**—I engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between me and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case I promise to submit the cause of such disputes for the decision of the British Government.

**ARTICLE 3.**—I engage to guard all the passes through the Ghauts under my authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers and ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes. And if any neighbouring chief or leader should meditate an incursion into the British territory through my possession, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, I engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances, before his approach to the neighbourhood of my territory; and to exert my utmost efforts to obstruct his progress.

**ARTICLE 4.**—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghants, through any of the passes subject to my authority, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies, so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of my possession.

**ARTICLE 5.**—I agree to reside with my family and children in one of the villages forming my jaghire. If I wish to reside in or build a dwelling in the territories of any of the chiefs dependent on the British Government, I shall first obtain the permission of the British Government, and not go to any other place, without the permission of the British Government.

**ARTICLE 6.**—I engage not only to have no connexion with any marauders, plunderers, robbers, or other evil-disposed persons, either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, or the other dominions of the British Government, and not to let them shelter or remain in any of the villages of my jaghire, but to give every information I may possess, regarding their haunts, to the officers of the British Government; and, if possible, I promise to seize and deliver them up to the British Government: I promise to discontinue all intercourse and correspondence with the above persons, and to avoid entering into disputes with any of the servants or adherents of the British Government. If eventually a dispute should arise between any of the adherents of the British Government, I further engage to afford no assistance to either party, without the orders of the British Government, but to remain quietly within my own territory, in complete obedience to the British Government.

**ARTICLE 7.**—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of my jaghire, I engage to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government, and should any person be sent to apprehend the fugitive, I engage not only not to obstruct nor impede such person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the fugitive. I further engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts, in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and shall be issued by the agent to the Governor-general; and never to excite commotions or disturbances, in any manner whatever.

**ARTICLE 8.**—I engage never to harbour thieves of robbers in any of the villages subject to my authority; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of my villages, I promise to render the *keminders* of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the thief or robber to the British Government; and if any person charged with murder, or amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territory, take refuge in any of my villages, I further engage to seize and deliver over such offenders to the British Government, or make the *keminder* appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas the villages of Paldeo, &c. which I have now obtained in jaghire, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations, if any decree in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the villages aforesaid, and the process to fulfil the execution of any such decree shall be issued, through the agent in the Governor-general for the time being, I hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead any exemption from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice: in such case I also engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—If in the villages of Paldeo, &c., which I have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or tucceevie shall remain due to the British Government by the zemindars, I engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government, without any pretence or excuse whatever.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNED granted to Chobey Dareao Sing, dated 4th July 1812.

BE IT KNOWN to the chowdries, kanongoes and zemindars, present and to come, of the pergunnah of Bhitry and Konis, &c. in the sillah of Bundelcund: That whereas at the time of the delivering up the fortress of Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into with the said Chobey Dareao Sing, that in lieu of those villages of the former jaghire, granted in his name, which he should transfer to the British Government, he should receive his share in exchange thereof, over and above the shares of Nawul Kishwur, &c. seven shares, consequently the aforesaid Chobey has delivered in a request to receive the villages of Paldeo, &c., villages according to the statement underneath belonging to the pergunnahs above-mentioned. For which reason the villages aforesaid, with the revenues and duties, and their rights and appurtenances, except the alienated lands, which are not included in the settlement of the British Government, in lieu of the villages transferred from his former jaghire, together with the villages of his former jaghirs, which were not transferred to the British Government, in conformity to the underneath statement, are hereby granted the aforesaid Chobey Dareao Sing in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever, as nankar, by the British Government. As long as the aforesaid Chobey Dareao Sing and his heirs shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ikarnamah, or written engagement which he has entered into with the British Government, the aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Chobey Dareao Sing and his heirs for ever, free and unmolested. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Chobey Dareao Sing the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, and that you do repair to his presence, and in all things endeavour to promote his advantage; it also is proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Chobey Dareao Sing to encourage and use his endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert his means to cultivate and render populous and productive his villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES of PERGUNNAH BHITRY and KONIS, &c.		VILLAGES of the former JAGHIRE, exclusive to the Exchange.	
Paldeo	- - - 1	Dial	- - - 1
Behairah	- - - 1	Chundobarrali	- - - 1
Buglohey	- - - 1	Saho, with Diamond Mine, one part of the eighth share	- - - 1
Rhotahia	- - - 1	Doorgapoor, with Diamond Mines, except the annual of Rajah Kishore Sing	- - - 1
Rewali	- - - 1		
Sayer Nowah Gowah, eighth part included in the annual of Chobey Chittersul and his mother	- - - 5 Villages.		4 Villages.
VILLAGES of PERGUNNAH BURHUR.			
Suswar	- - - 1		
Lallahpore	- - - 1		
Doorwah	- - - 1		
Khurha	- - - 1		
Barbowley	- - - 1		
	5 Villages.		



TRANSLATION of the *IKARNAMAH* of Nawal Kishwur and the Relict of *Bherit Jew Chobey*, dated 19th June 1812.

WE, Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jew Chobey: Whereas the British Government, at the period of the acquisition of the province of Bundelcund to the British possessions, after having entered into an ikarnamah or written engagement of allegiance, with a view to the more firmly binding to a faithful discharge and fulfilment of the terms of the several articles of the engagement, the British Government granted a sannd in perpetuity, generation after generation, for the jaghire of Calinger, including the fortress; and whereas, by the consent of the slurers, the ikarnamah and sannd were in the name of the Chobey Darsao Sing only: but on the part of the said Chobey and that of his partner, the terms of the aforesaid ikarnamah were not observed and adhered to in the manner that it was incumbent on the above persons to observe and adhere to them; notwithstanding, the British rulers considered our crimes as false steps, and contented themselves finally by resuming the possession of the fortress, the cause of our refractoriness, and granted us our request villages Besaut, &c. in the pergunnah of Bhetry and Kones, &c. in lieu of the villages of the former jaghire: wherefore, with contracting patty, of our own free will and pleasure, have delivered this ikarnamah, and hereby engage that we will firmly abide by, and fulfil and discharge, the terms of the several articles thereof.

ARTICLE 1.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be our near relations, we engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in our country to them or any of their relations.

ARTICLE 2.—We engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between us and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case we promise to submit the cause of such disputes for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 3.—We engage to guard all the passes through the Ghants under our authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, and ill-disposed persons from ascending the Ghants, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chiefs or leaders should meditate an incursion into the British territory through our possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, we engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances before their approach to the neighbourhood of our territory, and to exert our utmost efforts to obstruct their progress.

ARTICLE 4.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghants through any of the passes subject to our authority, we agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of our possessions.

ARTICLE 5.—We agree to reside with our families and children in one of the villages forming our jaghire. If we wish to reside in or build a dwelling in the territories of any of the chiefs dependent on the British Government, we shall first obtain the permission of the British Government, and not go to any other place without the permission of the British Government.

ARTICLE 6.—We agree not only to have no connection with any marauders, plunderers, robbers, or other evil-disposed persons, either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, or the other dominions of the British Government, and not to let them shelter or remain in any of the villages of our jaghire, but to give every information we may possess regarding their hints to the officers of Government, and if possible, I promise to seize and deliver them up to the British Government: we promise to discontinue all intercourse and correspondence with the above persons, and to avoid entering into disputes with any of the servants or adherents of the British Government. If eventually a dispute should arise between any of the adherents of the British Government, we further engage to afford no assistance to either party without the orders of the British Government, but to remain quietly within our territory in complete obedience to the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of our jaghire, we engage on requisition to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government; and should any person be sent on the part of the British Government to apprehend the fugitive, we engage not only not to obstruct, but to unite with him in the apprehension of the fugitive; we further do engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and shall be issued by the agent to the Governor-general, and never to excite commotions or disturbances in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 8.—We engage never to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages subject to our authority; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of our villages, we promise to render the zemindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivering of the thief or thieves to the British Government; and if any person charged with murder, or  
amenable

amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territory, take refuge in any of our villages, we further engage to seize and deliver over such offender to the British Government, or make the zemindars appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas the village of Besant, &c, which we have now obtained in jaghire, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations. If any dispute in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the villages aforesaid, the process to fulfil the execution of any such decree shall be issued through the agent to the Governor-general for the time being we hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead our exemptions from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice. We engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—If the village of Besant, &c, which we have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or siccnee shall remain due to the British Government by the zemindars, we engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government without any pretence or excuse whatever.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to the Chobey Nawal Kishwur, and the Relict of  
Bherit Jue Chobey, dated 4th July 1812

BE IT KNOWN to the chowdries, kanongoes and zemindars of the pergunnah of Bhetry and Kones, in the aillah of Bundelcund, that whereas, at the time of delivering over the fortresses of Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into, that Chobey Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey, proprietors of two shares out of eight shares of the former jaghire of Calinger, for which a sunnod was granted in the name of Chobey Daresao Sing, the late killed at Calinger, that in lieu of whatever portion of their shares of the villages and lands, included in the jaghire aforesaid, should be transferred to the British Government, the said Chobey Nawal Kishwur, and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey aforesaid, should receive an equivalent from the British Government, accordingly, the said Chobey Nawal Kishwur, and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey aforesaid, have delivered in a request, to receive the villages of Besawunt, &c as detailed in the underneath statement, belonging to the above mentioned pergunnahs, for which reason the villages aforesaid, with their revenues and duties, and all their rights and appurtenances, except the alienated lands, which are not included in the settlement of the British Government, in lieu of their shares of the villages, together with the villages of their former jaghire, which we have transferred to the British Government in conformity to the underneath statement, are hereby granted the aforesaid Chobey Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever, as nankin, by the British Government. As long as the aforesaid Chobey Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey and their heirs shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ekrarnameli, or written engagement, which they have entered into with the British Government, the aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Chobey Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey for ever, free and unmolested. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Chobey Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey the rent free landholders and controllers of the said villages, and that you do report to their presence, and in all things endeavour to promote their advantage. It also is proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Chobey Nawal Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey to encourage and use their endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert their best means to cultivate, and render populous and productive their villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES of PYRGUNNAH BHETRY  
and KONES

Bhasant -	-	-	-	1
Buggunpore -	-	-	-	1
Burwara -	-	-	-	1
Bemhar -	-	-	-	1
Muckero -	-	-	-	1
Burach -	-	-	-	1
Jhance -	-	-	-	1
Villages -	-	-	-	7

VILLAGES of the former Jaghire,  
exclusive of the Exchange

Kohree -	-	-	-	1
Gauzepore, with diamond mine	-	-	-	1
Rospanee, with diamond mine	-	-	-	1
Soho, with diamond mine, } (fourth share) -	-	-	-	1
Villages -	-	-	-	4

Appendix, No. 29.  
Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

WE, Chobey Chittersaul and the mother of Chittersaul: Whereas the British Government, at the period of the acquisition of the province of Bundelcund to the British possessions, after having entered into an *ikarnameh*, or written engagement of allegiance, with a view to the more firmly binding to a faithful discharge and fulfilment of terms of the several articles of the engagement, the British Government granted a *sunnud* in perpetuity, generation after generation, for the jaghire of Cahunge, including the fortress. By consent of the several sharers, the *ikarnameh* and *sunnud* were in the name of Chobey Dheao Sing only; but on the part of the above Chobey, and that of the other partners, the terms of the aforesaid *ikarnameh* were not observed and adhered to in the manner that it was incumbent to observe and adhere to them; notwithstanding, the British rulers considered our crimes as false steps, and contented themselves finally by resuming the possession of the fortress, the cause of our refractoriness, and granted, at our request, the villages Baretpore, &c. in the pergunnah of Bhetty and Konis, in lieu of the villages of the former jaghire. Wherefore we, the contracting parties, of our own free will and pleasure, have delivered this *ikarnameh*, and hereby engage that we will firmly abide by and fulfil and discharge the terms of the several articles thereof.

ARTICLE 1.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be our near relations, we engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in our country to them or any of their relations.

ARTICLE 2.—We engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between us and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case we promise to submit the cause of such disputes for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 3.—We engage to guard all the passes through the Ghauts under our authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, or ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chiefs or leaders should meditate an incursion into the British territory through our possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, we engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances before their approach to the neighbourhood of our territory, and to exert our utmost efforts to obstruct their progress.

ARTICLE 4.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts through any of the passes subject to our authority, we agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of our possessions.

ARTICLE 5.—We agree to reside with our families and children in one of the villages forming our jaghire. If we wish to reside in, or build a dwelling in the territories of any of the chiefs dependent on the British Government, we shall first obtain the permission of the British Government, and not go to any other place without the permission of the government.

ARTICLE 6.—We engage not only to have no connexion with any marauders, plunderers, robbers, or other evil-disposed persons, either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, or the other dominions of the British Government, and not to let them shelter or remain in any of the villages of our jaghire, but to give every information we may possess regarding their haunts to the officers of government, and if possible, we promise to seize and deliver them up to the British Government. We promise to discontinue all intercourse and correspondence with the above persons, and to avoid entering into disputes with any of the servants or adherents of the British Government. If, eventually, a dispute should arise between any of the adherents of the British Government, we further engage to afford no assistance to either party without the orders of government, but to remain quietly within our own territory, in complete obedience to the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of our jaghire, we engage to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government, and should any person be sent on the part of the government to apprehend the fugitive, we engage not only not to obstruct or impede such person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the fugitive; we further engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and shall be issued by the agent to the Governor-general, and never to excite commotion or disturbances in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 8.—We engage never to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages subject to our authority; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of our villages, we promise to render the zemindar of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the thief or robber to the British Government; and if any person charged with murder, or amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territory, take refuge in any of our villages, we further engage to seize and deliver over such offender to the British Government, or make the zemindars appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas the villages of Baretpore, &c. which we have now obtained in jaghire, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations: If any decree in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the villages aforesaid, and the process to fulfil the execution of such decree shall be issued through the agent to the Governor-general for the time being, we hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead our exemption from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice in such case; we also engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government

ARTICLE 10.—If in the villages of Baretpore, &c. which we have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or siccaue shall remain due to the British Government by the zemindar, we engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government, without any pretence or excuse whatever

Dated the 19th June 1812.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNUH granted to *Chobey Chittersaul* and his Mother,  
dated 4th July 1812.

BE IT KNOWN to the chowdries, kanongoes and zemindars of the pergunnah of Bhetry and Kones, in the zillah of Bundelcand, that whereas at the time of delivering over the fortress of Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into that Chobey Chittersaul and his mother, proprietors of two shares out of the eight shares of the former jaghire of Calinger, for which a sunnud was granted in the name of Chobey Dareao Sing, the late kildar of Calinger, that in lieu of whatever portion of their share of their villages and lands included in the jaghire aforesaid, should be transferred to the British Government, the said Chobey Chittersaul and his mother aforesaid should receive an equivalent from the British Government; accordingly the said Chobey Chittersaul and his mother aforesaid, have delivered in a request to receive the villages of Baretpore, &c. as detailed in the underneath statement belonging to the above-mentioned pergunnah, for which tenson the villages aforesaid, with their revenues and duties, and all their rights and appurtenances, except the alienated lands which are not included in the settlement of the British Government, in lieu of the villages transferred from the former jaghire, together with the villages of their former jaghire which were not transferred to the British Government in conformity to the underneath statement, are hereby granted the aforesaid Chobey Chittersaul and his mother in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever, as nankar, by the British Government, as long as the aforesaid Chobey Chittersaul and his mother, and their heirs, shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ikarnamah or written engagement, which they have entered into with the British Government. The aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Chobey Chittersaul and his mother for ever, free and unmolested. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Chobey Chittersaul and his mother the rent-free landholders and controllers of the said villages, and that you do repair to their presence, and in all things endeavour to promote their advantage. It also is proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Chobey Chittersaul and his mother, to encourage and use their endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert their best means to cultivate and render populous and productive their villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES of PERGUNNAH BHETRY and KONES		VILLAGES of the former JAHIRE, exclusive of the Exchange.	
	Villages.		Villages.
Bharatpore - - - -	1	Bursunket - - - -	1
Noingong - - - -	1	Jugnee Puddaok of Thakoor Jugool	
Putrah, exclusive 400 begahs of land		Kishore in the name of Gopy Kuriant	1
included in the sunnud of Chobey			
Sulgram - - - -	1	Thannulhalpore, with diamond mine,	
Beera - - - -	1	exclusive, from the sunnud of Laul	
Goberia Khoorol - - - -	1	Doometput - - - -	1
Anunepore - - - -	1		
Bhahye - - - -	1	Scho, with diamond mine, fourth share	1
Parree - - - -	1		
Etkarree - - - -	1	Chowprah, with ditto, exclusive of the	
Bhurtant - - - -	1	sunnud of Rajah Kishore Sing	1
Bleekunpore - - - -	1		
Villages - - - -	11	Villages - - - -	5

TRANSLATION of the IKARNAMAH of Gya Purshaud Chobey, 18th June 1812.

I, GYA PURSHAUD: Whereas the rulers of the British Government, at the period of the acquisition of the province of Bundelcund to the British possessions, after having entered into an ikarnamah or written engagement of allegiance, with a view to the more firmly binding to a faithful discharge and fulfilment of the terms of the several articles of the engagement, the British Government granted a sunnud in perpetuity, generation after generation, for the jaghure of Calinge, including fortress; and whereas by the consent of all the sharers, the above ikarnamah and sunnud were in the name of Chobey Dareso Sing only, but on the part of the said Chobey, and that of the other partners, the terms of the aforesaid ikarnamah were not observed and adhered to in the manner that it was incumbent on the above persons to observe and adhere to them; notwithstanding, the British rulers considered our crimes as false steps, and contented themselves finally by resuming the possession of the fortress, the cause of my refractoriness, and granted at my request the villages Terown, &c. in the pergunnah of Bhetry and Konis, &c. in lieu of the villages of the former jaghure. Wherefore I, the contracting party, of my own free will and pleasure, have delivered in this ikarnamah, and hereby engage that I will firmly abide by, and fulfil and discharge the terms of the several articles thereof.

ARTICLE 1.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them or any of their relations.

ARTICLE 2.—I engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between me and any other dependents of the British Government, in either case I promise to submit the cause of such disputes for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 3.—I engage to guard all the passes through the Ghauts under my authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, or ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chiefs or leaders should mediate an incursion into the British territory through my possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, I engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances before his approach to the neighbourhood of my territory, and to exert my utmost efforts to obstruct his progress.

ARTICLE 4.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghauts through any of the passes subject to my authority, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of my possessions.

ARTICLE 5.—I agree to reside with my family and children in one of the villages forming my jaghure. If I wish to reside in or build a dwelling in the territories of any of the chiefs dependant on the British Government, I shall first obtain the permission of the British Government, and not go to any other place without the permission of the government.

ARTICLE 6.—I engage not only to have no connexion with any marauders, plunderers, robbers or other evil-disposed persons, either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, or the other dominions of the British Government; and not to let them shelter or remain in any of the villages of my jaghure, but to give every information I may possess regarding their haunts to the officers of government, and if possible, I promise to seize and deliver them up to the British Government. I promise to discontinue all intercourse and correspondence with the above persons, and to avoid entering into disputes with any of the servants or adherents of the British Government. If, eventually, a dispute should arise between any of the adherents of the British Government, I further engage to afford no assistance to either party without the orders of government, but to remain quietly within my own territories in entire obedience to the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of my jaghure, I engage to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government; and should any person be sent on the part of the government to apprehend the fugitive, I engage not only not to obstruct nor impede such person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the fugitive. I further engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and never to excite commotions or disturbances in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 8.—I engage never to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages subject to my authority; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of the villages, I promise to render the zemindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the thief or robber to the British Government; and if any person charged with murder, or amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territories, take refuge in any of my villages, I further engage to seize and deliver over such offender to the British Government, or make the zemindar appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas the villages of Terown, &c. which I have now obtained in jaghire, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations: If any decree in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the villages aforesaid, and the process to fulfil the execution of any such decree shall be issued through the agent to the Governor-general for the time being, I hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead any exemption from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice in such case. I also engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—If in the villages of Terown, &c. which I have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or tuccevee shall remain due to the British Government by the zemindars, I engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government without any pretence or excuse whatever.

Dated the 29th June 1812.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to *Chobey Gya Purshaud*, dated 4th July 1812.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes and zemindars, present and to come, of this pergunnah of Bhetry and Konis, in the zillah of Bundelcund, that whereas at the time of delivering up the Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into with the said Chobey Gya Purshaud, the proprietor of the eighth share of the villages included in the former jaghire of Calinger, granted to the Chobey Dareao Sing, that in lieu of his share of the villages of the former jaghire granted to Chobey Dareao Sing, which he should transfer to the British Government, he should receive villages equivalent to his share in exchange thereof; consequently the aforesaid Chobey Gya Purshaud has delivered in a request to the British Government, begging to receive the villages of Terown, &c., villages, according to the statement underneath, belonging to the pergunnah above-mentioned; for which reason the villages aforesaid, with their revenues and duties, and all their rights and appurtenances, except the alienated lands, which are not included in the settlement of the British Government, in lieu of the villages transferred from his former jaghire, together with the villages of his former jaghire, which were not transferred to the British Government, in conformity to the underneath statement, are hereby granted the aforesaid Chobey Gya Purshaud in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever as nankar, by the British Government, as long as the aforesaid Chobey Gya Purshaud and his heirs shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ikarnamah or written engagement which he has entered into with the British Government. The aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Chobey Gya Purshaud and his heirs for ever, free and unmolested. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Chobey Gya Purshaud the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, and that you do repair to his presence, and in all things endeavour to promote his advantage. It is also proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Chobey Gya Purshaud to encourage and use his endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert his best means to cultivate and render populous and productive his villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES OF PERGUNNAH BHETRY and KONIS.	VILLAGES of the former JAGHIRE, exclusive of the Exchange.
Terown - - - - - 1	Puththaliah, with diamond mine - - 1
Puthroundy - - - - - 1	Saho, one part of the eighth share, with diamond mine - - - - - } 1
Rhushroeyah - - - - - 1	
Subhapore - - - - - 1	
Mowhey, third part - - - - 1	
	Villages - - - 2
Villages - - - - - 5	

TRANSLATION of the IKARNAMAH of *Poker Purshaud Chobey*.

I, *POKER PURSHAUD*: Whereas the rulers of the British Government, at the period of the acquisition of the province of Bundelcund to the British possessions, after having entered into an ikarnamah or written engagement of allegiance, with a view to the more firmly binding to a faithful discharge and fulfilment of the terms of the several articles of the engagement, the British Government granted a sunnod in perpetuity, generation after generation, for the jaghire of Calinger, including the forrease; and whereas, by the consent of the sharers, the ikarnamah and sunnod were in the name of the Chobey Dareao Sing only; but on the part of the said Chobey and that of his partners, the terms of the aforesaid ikarnamah were not observed and adhered to in the manner that it was incumbent  
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bent on the above persons to observe and adhere to them; notwithstanding, the British rulers considered my crimes as false steps, and contented themselves finally by resuming the possession of the fortress, the cause of my refractoriness, and granted at my request the villages Poorwah, &c. in the pergunnah of Bhety and Konia, &c. in lieu of my share of villages of the former jaghire. Wherefore I, the contracting party, of my own free will and pleasure, have delivered this ikarnameli, and hereby engage that I will firmly abide by and fulfil and discharge the terms of the several articles thereof.

ARTICLE 1.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them or any of their relations.

ARTICLE 2.—I engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between me and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case I promise to submit the cause of such disputes for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 3.—I engage to guard all the passes through the Ghats under my authority, so as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, all ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghats, or from entering the British territories, through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chief or leader should meditate an incursion into the British territory through my possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, I engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances before his approach to the neighbourhood of my territory, and to exert my utmost efforts to obstruct his progress.

ARTICLE 4.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to ascend the Ghats through any of the passes subject to my authority, I agree not only not to obstruct or impede their progress, but to depute respectable and intelligent persons to conduct them by the most convenient route, and to furnish them with the necessary supplies so long as they remain within or in the vicinity of my possessions.

ARTICLE 5.—I agree to reside with my family and children in one of the villages forming my jaghire. If I wish to reside in or build a dwelling in the territories of any of the chiefs dependent on the British Government, I shall first obtain the permission of the British Government, and not go to any other place without the permission of the government.

ARTICLE 6.—I engage not only to have no connexion with any marauders, plunderers, robbers, or other evil-disposed persons, either within or out of the province of Bundelcund, or the other dominions of the British Government: and not to let them shelter or remain in any of the villages of any jaghire, but to give every information I may possess regarding their haunts to the officers of government; and if possible, I promise to seize and deliver them to the British Government. I promise to discontinue all intercourse and correspondence with the above persons, and to avoid entering into disputes with any of the servants or adherents of the British Government. If eventually a dispute should arise between any of the adherents of the British Government, I further engage to afford no assistance to either party without the orders of Government, but to remain quietly within my own territories, in obedience to the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of my jaghire, I engage to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government, and should any person be sent on the part of the government to apprehend the fugitive, I engage not only not to obstruct nor impede such person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the fugitive. I further engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and shall be issued by the agent to the Governor-general, and never to excite commotions or disturbances in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 8.—I engage never to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages subject to my authority; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of my villages, I promise to render the zemindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the thief or robber to the British Government; and if any person charged with murder, or amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territories, take refuge in any of my villages, I further engage to seize and deliver over such offenders to the British Government, or make the zemindar appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE 9.—Whereas the villages of Poorwah, &c. which I have now obtained in jaghire, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations: if any decree in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the villages aforesaid, and the process to fulfil the execution of any such decree shall be issued through the agent to the Governor-general for the time being, I hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead any exemption from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice in such case. I also engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—If in the villages of Poorwah, &c. which I have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or tucavees shall remain due to the British Government by the zemindars, I engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government, without any pretence or excuse whatever.

Dated the 19th June 1812.

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to *Chobey Poken Purshaud*, dated 4th July 1812.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes, and zemindars, present and to come, of the pergunnah of Bhetry and Konis, in the zillah of Bundelcund, that whereas at the time of delivering up the Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into with the said Chobey Poken Purshaud, the proprietor of the eighth share of the villages included in the former jaghire of Calinger, granted to Chobey Daseo Sing, that in lieu of his share of the villages of the former jaghire granted to Chobey Daseo Sing, which he should transfer to the British Government, he should receive villages equivalent to his share in exchange thereof; consequently, the aforesaid Chobey Poken Purshaud has delivered in a request to the British Government, begging to receive the villages of Poorwah, &c. villages, according to the statement underneath, belonging to the pergunnah above-mentioned; for which reason, the villages aforesaid, with their revenues and duties, and all their rights and appurtenances, except the alienated lands, which are not included in the settlement of the British Government, in lieu of the villages transferred from his former jaghire, together with the villages of his former jaghire, which were not transferred to the British Government in conformity to the underneath statement, are hereby granted the aforesaid Chobey Poken Purshaud in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever, as nankar, by the British Government. As long as the aforesaid Chobey Poken Purshaud and his heirs shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ikarnameli or written engagement which he has entered into with the British Government, the aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Chobey Poken Purshaud and his heirs for ever, free and unmolested. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Chobey Poken Purshaud the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, and that you do repair to his presence, and in all things endeavour to promote his advantage. It also is proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Chobey Poken Purshaud to encourage and use his endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert his best means to cultivate and render populous and productive his villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES OF PERGUNNAH BHETRY and KONIS.				VILLAGES of the former Jaggeer, exclusive of the Exchange.			
			Villages				Villages.
Cusbah Poorwah	-	-	- 1	Nagawah and diamond mine	-	-	1
Mosa Uckburpore	-	-	- 1				
Chuckerwandee	-	-	- 1	Seho, eighth share with datta	-	-	1
Bogkella	-	-	- 1				
Heirapore, in Pergunnah Badouni	-	-	- 1	Villages	-	-	2
Villages	-	-	- 5				

TRANSLATION of the IKARNAMEH of the *Chobey Salagram*.

I, SALAGRAM: Whereas the British Government, at the period of the acquisition of the province of Bundelcund to the British possessions, after having entered into an ikarnameli or written engagement of allegiance, with a view to the more firmly binding to a faithful discharge and fulfilment of the terms of the several articles of the engagement: the British Government granted a sunnod in perpetuity, generation after generation, for the jaghire of Calinger, including the fortress. And whereas by the content of the shariets, the ikarnameli and sunnod were in the name of Chobey Daseo Sing only; but on the part of the said Chobey and that of his partners, the terms of the aforesaid ikarnameli were not observed and adhered to in the manner that it was incumbent on the above persons to observe and adhere to them; notwithstanding, the British rulers considered our crimes as false steps, and contented themselves finally by resuming the possession of the fortress, the cause of our refractoriness, and granted at my request villages Parah, &c. in the pergunnah of Bhetry and Konis, &c. in lieu of my share of the villages of the former jaghire. Wherefore I, the contracting party, of my own free will and pleasure, have delivered this ikarnameli, and hereby engage that I will firmly abide by and fulfil and discharge the terms of the several articles thereof.

ARTICLE 1.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them or any of their relations.



ARTICLE 8.—I engage to guard all the passes through the Ghauts under my authority, as well as to prevent all marauders, plunderers, all ill-disposed persons from ascending or descending the Ghauts, or from entering the British territories through any of those passes; and if any neighbouring chiefs or leaders should meditate an incursion into the British territory through my possessions, or those of the chiefs in allegiance thereto, I engage to furnish the officers of the British Government with information of the circumstances before their approach to the neighbourhood of my territory, and to exert my utmost efforts to obstruct their progress.

ARTICLE 5—I agree to reside with my family and children in one of the villages forming my jaghire. If I wish to reside in or build a dwelling in the territories of any of the chiefs dependent on the British Government, I shall first obtain the permission of the British Government, and not to go to any other place without the permission of the government.

ARTICLE 7.—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of my jaghire, I engage to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government, and should any person be sent on the part of the Government to apprehend the fugitive, I engage not only not to obstruct nor impede such person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the fugitive. I further engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts, in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and as shall be issued by the agent to the Governor general, and I never to excite commotions or disturbances in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 8—I engage never to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages subject to my authority, and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of my villages, I promise to render the semindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the thief or robber to the British Government, and if any person charged with murder, or amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territory, take refuge in any of my villages, I further engage to seize and deliver over such offender to the British Government, or make the semindar appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE 9.—Where the villages of Para, &c which I have now obtained in jaghirs, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations, and any decree in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the villages aforesaid, and the process to fulfil the execution of any such decree shall be issued through the agent to the Governor general for the time being, I hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead any exemption from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice in such case, I also engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 10.—If in the villages of Para, &c which I have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or tucnaee shall remain due to the British Government by the semindars, I engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government, without any pretence or excuse whatever

**TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD granted to Chobey Salagram, dated 4th July 1812.**

As it known to the chowdries, kanungoes and zemindars, present and to come, of this pergunnah of Sherry and Kona, in the sillah of Bandelkand, that whereas at the time of delivaring up the Galigner to the officers of the British Government, an agreement was entered into with the said Chobey Salagram, the proprietor of the said lands of the said pergunnah, in the former jaghirs of Galigner granted to the Chobey Deyasa Sany, that in the

his share of the villages of the former jaghire, granted to Chobey Dareao Sing, which he should transfer to the British Government, he should receive equivalent to his share in exchange thereof; consequently the aforesaid Salagram has delivered in a request to the British Government, begging to receive the villages of Para, &c., villages, according to the statement underneath, belonging to the pergunnahs above-mentioned. For which reason the villages aforesaid, with their revenues and duties, and all their rights and appurtenances, except the alienated lands, which are not included in the settlement of the British Government, in lieu of the villages transferred from his former jaghire, together with the villages of his former jaghire, which were not transferred to the British Government in conformity to the underneath statement, are hereby granted the aforesaid Salagram in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever, as nankar, by the British Government. As long as the aforesaid Salagram and his heirs shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ikarnamoh or written engagement which he has entered into with the British Government, the aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Salagram and his heirs for ever, free and unmolested. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Salagram the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, and that you do repair to his presence, and in all things endeavour to promote his advantage. It also is proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Salagram to encourage and use his endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert his best means to cultivate and render populous and productive his villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES OF PERGUNNAHS BHETRY and KONIS.				VILLAGES of former JAGHIRE, exclusive of the Exchange.			
			Villages.				Villages.
Pura	-	-	1	Salgipore, with diamond mine	-	-	1
Patawah	-	-	1	Soho, with ditto, one part of the	-	-	1
Urroopore	-	-	1	eight share	-	-	1
Moho Kun Ghur	-	-	1				
Putrah, which is inserted in the sun-							2
nud of Chobeh Chittersaul, 400							
begghas of lands in Mowye, two-							
thirds in the name of Kisoo Roy							
Chobeh and Muna Laul, except one-							
third, which is inserted in the sun-							
nud of Chobeh Gya Purshaud			1				
			5				

TRANSLATION of the IKARNAMEN of Gopaul Laul.

I, GOPAUL LAUL: Whereas in the former jaghire of Calinger, granted in the name of Chobey Dareao Sing, I held lands which were granted to me in perpetuity; the said lands were included in that portion of the above-mentioned jaghire which has been transferred to the British Government; and whereas by the consent of the above-said Chobey and his several partners, I have received from the British Government the villages of Comtah and Rajawiah, in the pergunnah of Bhetry and Konis, in lieu of the villages held by me as before specified; accordingly, I, the contracting party, of my own free will and pleasure, deliver in this ikarnamoh, or written engagement, and hereby promise and engage that I will firmly adhere to and fulfil the several articles thereof detailed underneath.

ARTICLE 1.—If any of the surrounding chiefs rebel against the British authority, although they be my near relations, I engage to abstain from every manner of friendly intercourse with such chiefs, and not to harbour or give protection in my country to them or of their relations.

ARTICLE 2.—I engage not to enter into quarrels or disputes with any chief who is obedient or submissive to the British Government; and if at any time a quarrel or dispute arise between me and any of the other dependants of the British Government, in either case I promise to submit the cause of such disputes for the decision of the British Government.

ARTICLE 3.—If any subject of the British Government abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of my jaghire, I engage to seize and deliver up such absconder to the officers of the British Government; and should any person be sent on the part of the British Government to apprehend the fugitive, I engage not only not to obstruct or impede such person, but to co-operate with him in the apprehension of the fugitive. I further engage to obey the orders of the civil and criminal courts in all transactions which shall occur after the date of this obligation, and shall be issued by the agent to the Governor-general, and never to excite commotions or disturbances in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 4.—I engage never to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages subject to my authority; and if the property of any of the inhabitants or of travellers be stolen or robbed in any of my villages, I promise to render the zemindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and delivery of the thief or robber

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Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

to the British Government; and if any person charged with murder, or amenable to the British laws for any other crimes committed in the British territory, take refuge in any of my villages, I further engage to seize and deliver over such offender to the British Government, or make the zemindars appear before the officers of the British Government.

ARTICLE 5.—Whereas the villages Comtah and Rajawlah, which I have now obtained in jaghire, have been heretofore subject to the jurisdiction of the British laws and regulations: If any decree in any suit shall have passed against any of the ryots or zemindars of the village aforesaid, and the process to fulfil the execution of any such decree shall be issued through the agent to the Governor-general for the time, I hereby engage to obey and fulfil that officer's orders, and not to plead any exemption from the jurisdiction of the British courts of justice; in such case I also engage to keep an authorized agent with the agent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 6.—If in the villages of Komtah and Rajawlah, which I have received in jaghire, any arrears of revenue or tucavee shall remain due to the British Government by the zemindars, I engage to collect the same, and to pay the amount to the British Government without any pretence or excuse whatever.

Dated the 4th July 1812

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to *Gopaul Lul*, dated 4th July 1812.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes, and zemindars of the pergunnah of Bhetry and Konis, in the zillah of Bundelcund. Whereas at the period of the surrender of the fortress of Calinger to the British Government, an engagement was entered into by the British Government with the Chobey Dareso Sing, and Nawul Kishore, &c. his co-partners, that in lieu of whatever villages belonging to the jaghire to Calinger they should deliver up to the British Government, they should receive an equivalent in exchange; accordingly, the aforesaid persons have delivered in their separate requests, enumerating the villages required in exchange for those delivered to the British Government and whereas the aforesaid persons have stated, that "amongst the villages of their former jaghires, lands amounting to the annual sum of 990 rupees were settled upon Gopaul Lul since the time of his ancestors. Now the aforesaid lands are included in the villages delivered to the British Government, and the sunnods for the lands exchanged as an equivalent for those of the former jaghire delivered to the British Government have been received by each respective sharer. Let the aforesaid Gopaul Lul also receive a separate sunnod for an equivalent for his former lands." Wherefore the villages of Comptah and Rajawlah in the aforesaid pergunnah, in lieu of the lands in question, and the garden and lands formerly belonging to it, which are situated in the town of Tirrutch, and were excluded from the exchange, are hereby granted to the said Gopaul Lul in perpetuity, generation after generation for ever, as nankar, by the British Government. As long as the aforesaid Gopaul Lul and his heirs shall remain firm and faithful in the full discharge of the terms of the several articles of the ikarnameli, or written engagement, which he has entered into with the British Government, the aforesaid villages shall remain in the possession of the said Gopaul Lul and his heirs for ever, free and unincumbered. It is necessary that you should consider the aforesaid Gopaul Lul the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, and that you do repair to his presence, and in all things endeavour to promote his advantage. It also is proper and incumbent on the aforesaid Gopaul Lul to encourage and use his endeavours for the comfort and happiness of the zemindars and ryots, and to exert his best means to cultivate and render populous and productive his villages, and to enjoy the produce in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

VILLAGES OF PERGUNNAH BHETRY AND KONIS.					Garden, and lands belonging to it, in the village of Turlhettee in pergunnah Calinger, included in the former jaghire, now exchanged in garden - - - begas 24 Lands known by the name of Cutcha, Gutcha and Buggah - - - 26 50
Komtah	-	-	-	1	
Rajawlah	-	-	-	1	
Villages				2	

TRANSLATION of a SUNNOD granted to *Thakoor Doorjun Sing*.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes, zemindars and mokyddims of the pergunnah of Mehr, dependent in Bundelcund, that whereas Thakoor Doorjun Sing, the younger son of Benes Hoosoonoe, being the established proprietor of the pergunnah of Mehr, situated above the Ghauts, having professed his obedience and submission to the British Government, and having conducted himself, ever since the period of the accession of the province of Bundelcund to the British Government, with strict zeal and unshaken attachment to the British cause: and whereas the said Doorjun Sing having during the officiate of Captain John Baillie, agent to the Governor-general, deputed his confidential vakeels to that officer to solicit a grant

a grant of his jaghire from the British Government, and having accordingly, after presenting an obligation of allegiance, comprising five articles, received a sunnud under the seal and signature of the said Captain Baillie; and whereas that sunnud, comprehending no separate list of villages, and the other jaghirdars of Bondelcund having received revised sunnuds under the seal and signature of the Right honourable the Governor-general, and Thakoor Doorjun Sing having now solicited a revised grant, comprising a list of the names of all the villages in his possession, and ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general, and having also, with a view to strengthen his allegiance to the British Government, presented a revised obligation of allegiance, containing nine distinct articles: this hereditary grant, ratified by the seal and signature of the Right honourable the Governor-general, and confirming in perpetuity to Thakoor Doorjun Sing the villages detailed in the subjoined schedule,\* with all the rights, appurtenances and revenues thereunto belonging, is hereby confirmed upon the said Doorjun Sing; and so long as the said Thakoor Doorjun Sing, and his heirs and successors shall firmly abide by the conditions contained in his obligation of allegiance which he has delivered, the British Government will not interfere with nor resume these lands.

You will accordingly consider the said Thakoor Doorjun Sing proprietor and manager of these villages; and it is the duty of Thakoor Doorjun Sing, on his part, to devote himself to the amelioration and improvement of his lands, rendering the inhabitants contented and grateful by his management, and to enjoy the produce of his jaghire in the exercise of zeal and attachment to the British Government.

*SUNNUD to Rajah Maha Chund, of Belaspore.*

WHEREAS Rajah Maha Chund, of Belaspore, has, with sincerity of heart, proposed obedience and submission to the British Government, and become a dependent of the honourable Company, and has cast off all connexion with the Goorka state: therefore, in conformity with the tenor of the proclamation issued under the authority of his Excellency the Governor-general, on the 17th of October 1814, the Rajah is hereby confirmed in the possession of the lands of his ancient territory of Khyloor, actually occupied by him on this side of the river Sulege, subject to the following conditions:—He shall never openly or secretly ally himself with the Goorka state, or with an enemy of the honourable Company, but remaining steadfast in the path of obedience and submission to the orders of the British Government, shall at all times be prepared with the force which he may have, to render useful service to the British troops; providing supplies of grain and furnishing beegarahs (for the conveyance of burdens), and generally performing whatever may be intrusted to his charge. He shall ever be ready to obey such orders as may be signified to him at the present period, or which may be given to him at any future time, more especially on the occasion of any British force being sent against an enemy in that quarter, where he shall not fail to discharge to the utmost of his ability the obligations of fidelity and attachment to the British Government. Exclusive of the stipulations above-mentioned, the British Government, in its liberality and favour, will not require from the rajah any tribute or pecuniary indemnification of any kind. And in the event of a peace between the British Government and the Goorka state, provided the rajah shall have rendered faithful service, the British Government engages that nothing contrary to the conditions of protection as affecting the rajah shall be listened to by the British Government. Moreover, the terms of the replies to the rajah's requests, bearing the signature of Major-general Ochterlony, and dated on the 18th of February 1815, and approved and ratified by the Governor-general; it becomes the duty of the rajah, therefore, that being firmly fixed and established in his Raj, he set his mind at rest on that point, and divesting himself of all apprehension, devote his time to the promotion of the happiness and comfort of his subjects, and consider this as a valid sunnud for his country.

Dated 6th March 1815.

*TRANSLATION of a SUNNUD granted to different CHIEFS, as stated in List subjoined.*

WHEREAS the Goorkas have been completely expelled from these districts, and the whole of the hill country has come into the possession of the British Government: wherefore, by order of the Right honourable the Governor-general, this sunnud is granted to—  
conferring on him and his heirs for ever, the thakooranee of—  
with all the rights and appurtenances belonging thereto, on condition of his paying annually the stipulated nuzzerana, for defraying the expense of protection by the British troops, and of his attending with beegarahs and sepoy, as specified below, in case of his being so required. The said — will promote the welfare of his ryots and the cultivation of the lands, and look to the security of the roads, and ensure the due payment of his nuzzerana for defraying the expense of British troops, and be ready to attend with beegarahs and sepoy, as detailed below, when called upon, and will pay strict obedience to the British Government, and abstain from encroaching beyond his own limits. And if at any time the said — fail in the performance of any of the above obligations (again enumerated), he will be dispossessed. Considering this sunnud as a valid

\* This Schedule is not annexed to the copy from which this Sunnud has been printed.

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Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

valid instrument, he will conform to its terms. The duty of the ryots to the thakoorae on their part, will be considering \_\_\_\_\_ as their rightful lord, to obey him accordingly, and pay the revenues regularly.

4th September 1815.

Sunnuds now granted according to the above form.—

1st. To Rana Juggut Sing, of Bayhal, dated 3d September 1815, with condition of maintaining 100 beegarabs, with Captain Ross, at Sumbaloo; and in case of war, joining the British troops with his forces, and making roads twelve feet broad throughout his thakoorae. Nuzzerana remitted.

2d. To Rana Bhoot Sing, of Koobhar, dated 3d September 1815, with condition of furnishing forty beegarabs, and making roads throughout the thakoorae, and in case of war joining the British troops with his whole force. Nuzzerana altogether remitted.

3d. To Rooder Paul, of Boojye, 4th September 1815, to maintain forty beegarabs at Sumbaloo, to join with his force in case of war, to keep up roads throughout the thakoorae. Nuzzerana remitted.

4th. To Sunvaroo Thokar, for the thakoorae of Bherloop, 4th September 1815, to maintain forty beegarabs. Nuzzerana remitted. To keep up roads; to join with his troops in case of war.

5th. To Goburdhur Sing, of Dhamee, 4th September 1815, twenty beegarabs at Sumbaloo, to make roads twelve feet broad. Nuzzerana remitted. To join in case of war with troops.

6th. To Maunbhund of Boojye, 4th September 1815, five beegarabs; roads. Nuzzerana remitted. To join with troops in case of war.

7th. To Roy Mangree Deo, for thakoorae of Kurtoar, 4th September 1815, five beegarabs; roads twelve feet. Nuzzerana remitted. To join with troops.

8th. To Thokur Jugrak for thakoorae, of Bul 21st, 1815, thirty beegarabs at Sumbaloo; to attend with his force in case of war: roads twelve feet broad. Nuzzerana remitted.

#### TRANSLATION OF SUNNUD granted to Rajah Futteh Sing, of Nahan.

WHEREAS the Goorkas, &c., &c.

Wherefore, by order of the Governor-general, this sunnud is granted to Rajah Futteh Sing, conferring on him and his heirs for ever the lands of \_\_\_\_\_ with all the rights and appurtenances belonging thereto.

The ports of Monnee, and Juggugurh, and Doonkyardah, and the districts of Jounsar and Banwar Moolakee, have been dijoined from the Raj of Sirmoor, and taken into the possession of the British Government. And the forts of Kurchuree and Hunur, with the lands attached on the west of the Kuree Nuddee, have been annexed to the thakoorae of Keonthul; and the forts of Ghat and Suthur, on the east of the Kuree Nuddee, have been annexed to the Raj of Sirmoor.

It is proper that \_\_\_\_\_ being grateful to the British Government for its favour should occupy the lands granted to him, and never at any time think of laying claim to the places above enumerated, which have been dijoined from Sirmoor, and annexed partly to the British territories and partly to the thakoorae of Keonthul.

Further, he must not appoint a dewan or mutusuddies, or do anything in the management of the Raj of Sirmoor, without communicating and consulting with the officer who will be stationed there on the part of the British Government.

He will conform to the above stipulations, and, paying strict obedience to the British Government, he will, in case of war, join, when required, the British troops with all his force, and do the part of a true ally. He will also make roads twelve feet broad throughout his territory.

If he should fail in any of the above obligations (which are again enumerated), or shall encroach on the possessions of others, he will fall under the displeasure of the British Government, and will be dispossessed. He must consider this a valid instrument, and, conforming to its conditions, take possession of the lands granted to him. And he must promote the welfare of his ryots, and the extension of cultivation, and distribute justice, and look to the security of the roads, and not exact more from the ryots than their engagements, and, in short, make all people happy and contented. The ryots, on their part, will be bound to consider \_\_\_\_\_ aforesaid as their rightful lord, and to obey him accordingly.

21st September 1815.

SUNNUD to the Rajah Ram Sing (or Ram Surran) for Hindoor, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general in Council.

WHEREAS all the hill country has come into the possession of the British Government; and whereas Rajah Ram Sing has, during the present war, performed worthily the part of an ally of the British Government, joining the British troops in person with his forces, and furnishing beegarabs to level roads, and to perform other work: wherefore, by order of the Right honourable the Governor-general, this sunnud is granted to the said rajah, conferring on him and his heirs for ever Hencoor, &c. seven pergunnahs, and Buhtowiee with twelve villages,

villages, and Mangalee with four villages, (excepting, however, the half share of Fyzedallah-poorah in pergunnah Khas Hindoor, and the fort of Malown, with six villages of Mouzah Malown Chakirani, which are on the point (tegh) of the hill of Malown, and Mouzah Malown, Leadlow, Chulandooareo, Hallah, &c. the jumma of the whole seven villages being 118 rupees, and 123½ maunds of grain) together with all the rights and appurtenances belonging thereto, and the sayer collections, and the right of distributing justice to the ryots, without exaction of beegarabs or of service, or of nuzzerana, all these dues being remitted.

Whatever number of beegarabs the rajah shall furnish in case of war, shall be paid for by the British Government at the rate of four rupees per man. The rajah, however, will not receive any pay for himself and his troops on joining the British forces. The rajah, considering this sunnud a full and valid title for himself and his descendants, will exert himself to the utmost to promote the welfare of his subjects, and will abstain from encroaching on the possessions of others; and being grateful for the favour which has been shown him by the British Government, he will continue firm in allegiance to it, and will conform to all the conditions of this sunnud.

It will be the duty of the ryots, on their part, to consider the rajah as their rightful lord, and to pay their revenue punctually, and show obedience to his authority, and to exert themselves to improve the cultivation of their lands, and to augment the rajah's resources.

20th October 1815.

SUNNUD to Rajah *Ram Sing* (or *Ram Surran*) for the Thakoorree of *Buroulee*, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general in Council.

WHEREAS all the Hill country has come into the possession of the British Government, and many chiefs have had their former possessions wholly restored to them; and whereas the fort of Malown, with six villages, the estimated annual jumma of which is 118 rupees and 118 maunds of grain, has been withheld from Rajah Ram Sing in order to be retained as a post for British troops; therefore, as a compensation for the said fort and six villages, this sunnud is, by order of the Right honourable the Governor-general, granted to Rajah Ram Sing, conferring on him and his heirs for ever the thakoorree of Buroulee, with all the appurtenances belonging thereto, and the sayer collections. The said rajah, considering this sunnud to be a valid instrument, will, after leaving to the rannee of the said thakoorree four villages for his subsistence, take possession of the remainder. In case of war, he will be bound to furnish beegarabs and sepoy, and to pay nuzzerana according to the statement subjoined. He will make roads in all directions around the said thakoorree, and he will be careful not to encroach on the possessions of others. He will promote the welfare of his ryots, and pay strict obedience to the British Government, to whom he will be grateful for the favours which he has received. The duty of the ryots, on the other hand, will be, &c (as in others.)

Statement alluded to above:—Beegarabs remitted altogether; nuzzerana remitted altogether; roads to be prepared in every direction around the thakoorree.

20th November 1815.

SUNNUD to Rajah *Kurram Sing*, of *Puteela*, for Pergunnahs *Mahala*, &c. under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general in Council.

WHEREAS all the Hill country has come into the possession of the British Government; and whereas Rajah Kurram Sing was forward to afford the co-operation of his troops during the late contest; therefore the present sunnud is granted, conferring on the said Rajah Kurram Sing, and on his heirs for ever, the pergunnahs of Mehelee, Kaljoun, Buntera, Kooalla, Chulrote, Kelmulle, Baddaheer, Suqui, Tanatsudgown, Jaubul and Pallatote, together with the sayer duties of the same, and all the rights and appurtenances belonging to them, in exchange for a nuzzerana of the sum of one lac and fifty thousand rupees, and the said sum having been paid into the Company's treasury by kist, as agreed upon, nothing further shall ever be demanded on this account. The British Government will always protect and support the said rajah and his heirs in the possession of this territory. The rajah, considering this sunnud a legal and valid instrument, will immediately take possession of the aforesaid lands, but he must not encroach on any lands beyond the acknowledged limits of the pergunnahs enumerated. In case of war, the rajah must, on the requisition of the British authorities, furnish armed men and beegarabs to join the detachment of British troops, which may be stationed for the protection of the Hill country. He will omit no exertion to do justice, and to promote the welfare and happiness of the ryots; while they, on their part, considering the said rajah as their true and rightful lord, must obey him accordingly, and pay their revenue punctually, and be always zealous to promote the cultivation of their lands, and to testify their loyalty and obedience.

20th October 1815.

SUNNUD to Rajah *Kurram Sing*, of *Puteela*, for the Thakoorree of *Bughaut* and *Juggutgurh*, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general in Council.

WHEREAS all the Hill country has come into the possession of the British Government; and whereas Rajah Kurram Sing was forward in affording the co-operation of his troops (445.—VI.) during

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

during the late contest: wherefore, by order of the Right honourable the Governor-general, the present sunnud is granted to the said rajah, conferring on him and on his heirs for ever,—1st, the pergunnah of Rughaut, and the city of Takal, with the first fort at Soukchinchore, and the second fort at the end of the Bazar at Takal, and the fort of Tharogurh, and pergunnah Parlek-har, with the fort of Ageergurh, and pergunnah Resten, with the fort Rajgurh, and pergunnah Luchheraug, and pergunnah Berowiee, and together with these pergunnahs and the five forts specified, sayer collections, amounting to one thousand eight hundred rupees, the whole forming a portion of the thakoorae of Bughaut; also 2dly, the fort of Jaggutgurh, with the pergunnah of Jaggutgurh and its dependences, forming a portion of Sirmoor, together with all the rights and appurtenances belonging thereto, in exchange for the sum of 1,80,000 rupees; and the said sum having been paid at the Company's treasury, no further demand will ever be made on the rajah on this account. The British Government will always protect and support the said rajah in possession of the said lands; and the rajah taking possession of the aforesaid lands, shall not encroach on the possessions of another. In case of war, the troops stationed by the rajah for the protection of the said lands shall be sent to join the British forces. The rajah will promote the welfare of his ryots, and the ryots on their part, &c.

20th October 1815.

SUNNUD.

In the name of *Mehendra Sing Techa, of Bussahir.*

THE overthrow of the Goorka power in these Hills having placed the countries freed from it at the disposal of the British Government, Lieutenant Ross, Asst. A. G. G. by virtue of instructions conveyed to him by General Sir David Ochterlony, K. C. B., A. G. G., &c. &c. under authority of the Right honourable the Governor-general, confirm to Mehendra Singh, son of Rajah Oogui Singh, and to his descendants, the Raj of Bussahir, the same in extent and boundary as on the death of his father in Summat 1808 (A.D. 1811), on the conditions and with the exceptions and restrictions hereafter detailed.

1. The government of Bussahir shall pay in zaghundee, namely, as a contribution towards defraying the expense of the force maintained by the British Government for the preservation of the safety and tranquillity of the protected Hill states, the annual sum of fifteen thousand caddar rupees, agreeably to the rate of exchange between the Bussahir and British currency that may exist on the days of payment at the nearest posts of British troops, in the three following kists or instalments:

1. Poose (December, January)	-	-	-	5,000
2. Bysack (April, May)	-	-	-	5,000
3. Sawun (July, August)	-	-	-	5,000

2. The fort of Kaungurh, together with the district in which it stands, namely, the division of Raen pergunnah, situated on the left bank of the Puhur river, the pergunnah of Sundock, together with the forts of Saleedan and Whurloo therein contained, and the fort of Bagee in Kurangool, or another post in its neighbourhood, to be hereafter specified, will be retained by the British Government, as commodious stations for its protecting force.

3. The thakoorae of Dulaitoo, Kunaitoo and Kurangloo, having been virtually incorporated with the Bussahir Raj several years previous to the Goorka invasion, the same arrangement will exist with respect to them as under Rajah Ogur Sain; and the same assignments as made by him for the maintenance of the representatives of their respective thakours will be continued. The thakoorae of Kolegurh and Comarsain are hereby declared independent of all but the paramount authority of the British Government.

4. In the event of war, the troops of Bussahir will co-operate with the British force, on due requisition, and in such manner as may be pointed out to them.

5. The administration of Bussahir will furnish beegarals, when called on, for the construction of roads throughout their country.

(signed) *R. Ross, Asst. A. G. G.*

Rampore, 23d Kartick, Summat 1872.

November 6, A. D. 1815.

TRANSLATION, through the medium of a Persian version, of an Engagement (Ikarnamah) in the Hindoo language, executed at *Muckwampore Munree*, by *Kajee Bukhtanur Sing Thappa* and *Chunder Seekhar Opadee*, Plenipotentiaries on the part of the Rajah of Nepal.

AT the time of delivering the treaty, Major-general Sir David Ochterlony was pleased to observe, that the Right honourable the Governor-general had not authorized him to accept the treaty, and that he could not encourage any hope of those indulgencies, of which a prospect had been held out by Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, being granted in addition to the treaty; that his Lordship indeed would not grant them, and that he would not recommend him to do so: that nothing beyond what was stated in the treaty would be allowed. Accordingly, we, Sree Kajee Bukhtanur Sing Thappa, and Chunder Seekur Opadee, have agreed to what Sir David Ochterlony has required. In testimony whereof, we have executed this razinama, and delivered it to the Major-general. Dated 5th of Sooddees Phangoon 1872, Sunbit, corresponding with Tuesday the 4th of March 1816.

TREATY with the Rao of *Cutch*, 18th of June 1816; supplemental to that of the 16th January 1816.

(Seal of the  
Rao of Cutch.)

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

THE honourable Company and the Rao's sircars concluded a treaty of thirteen articles on the 16th January 1816. Supplementary to these, however, the following two articles are valid:

1. The Right honourable the Governor-general in Council has ratified the thirteen articles of treaty concluded on the 14th January 1816, between the English sircar and that of his Highness the Rao; but as his Highness's government is newly established and is responsible in the second article of the treaty for a debt of 20 lacs of rupees, which it would find much difficulty in discharging; the honourable Company, guided by feelings of friendship, relinquishes, as a voluntarily gift, the sum of eight lacs thirteen thousand eight hundred and twenty-six (8,18,826) rupees, being the amount charged to its military expenses.

2. In order still further to aid the Maha Rao's government, and as a testimony of the interest which the honourable Company takes in its welfare, the latter does, of its own free will, relinquish the annual sum of two lacs of corries which the Rao has agreed to pay by the tenth article of the aforesaid treaty. It is hoped that these disinterested and friendly aids conferred by the honourable Company's government on his Highness the Rao, will induce the latter to repose perfect confidence, to act with unanimity, and to preserve inviolate the stipulations contained in the original treaty.

Done at Bhoj, this Tuesday the 18th day of June, A.D. 1816.

(signed) J. Mac Murdo, resident at Bhoj.

FORM of a SUNNOD to be granted to *Kooar Purtaub Sing*, under the seal and signature of the Governor-general in Council, dated 11th January 1817.

BE it known to the choudies, kanongoes, and zemindars of the province of Bundelcund, that whereas in the year 1806, corresponding with the year 1863 Sumvut, Kooar Soonee Sah, having professed his obedience and submission, and having ceded to the British Government the towns of Chutterpore, Maw and Salut, with their depending villages, was vested by the British Government with an hereditary grant of the remaining lands then in his actual possession; and whereas, in the year 1808, the British Government was pleased to restore the town of Maw to Kooar Soonee Sah, and to settle the town of Chutterpore upon his eldest son, Kooar Purtaub Sing; and whereas in consequence of the demise of Kooar Soonee Sah (which happened on the 4th May 1816, corresponding with the 20th Bysack, Sumvut 1873), and the unequal and inconvenient disposition which the Kooar before his death made of his lands, rendering all his sons independent of each other, it has become necessary for the British Government to interpose the power which its feudal supremacy legally vests in it, in order to prevent the public inconvenience that was likely to result from that unequal disposition; and whereas the British Government, by virtue of that power, and in view to the public security and tranquillity, has been pleased to recognize Kooar Purtaub Sing as successor to his father, Kooar Soonee Sah, and to confirm him in possession of his father's jaghires, on condition of his making a suitable provision for his younger brothers and their families; and whereas Kooar Purtaub Sing has entered into and has this day presented an ikarnamah, or obligation of allegiance, to the British Government, comprising ten articles, by which he binds himself, among other stipulations, to leave to his younger brother, the unmolested possession, during their life-time, of the lands which are hereafter particularised in this sunnod; wherefore, and under the considerations and principles above set forth, the villages and lands specified in the subjoined schedule, with the reservation of the life tenure to his younger brothers, which is also particularised in the said schedule, and hereby granted to Kooar Purtaub Sing, and to his heirs in perpetuity, rent free, by the British Government; and so long as the said Kooar Purtaub Sing and his heirs shall conduct themselves in obedience and submission to the British Government, and shall strictly adhere to all the terms and conditions of their engagements, they shall not be molested nor disturbed in the possession of the lands and villages aforesaid.

It is your duty, therefore, to acknowledge and obey Kooar Purtaub Sing as the jaghirdars of the aforesaid villages, and to consider yourselves as accountable to him for all rights and immunities appertaining thereto. It is on the other hand incumbent on the said Kooar Purtaub Sing to conciliate and render grateful the peasantry and inhabitants by his good government, to devote his endeavours to increase the population, and to enhance the prosperity of his jaghire, and to employ its flourishing resources in the service of the British Government.



## SCHEDULE of the VILLAGES granted by the SUNWUD.

Pergunnah	No	VILLAGES	Jumma.	Total	Pergunnah	No	VILLAGES	Jumma.	Total
Lowree	- 1	<i>Koar Purtab Sing's Share.</i>			Lowree	- 1	- - Buchohoun to Ameld		
	1	Louree Khas - - -	3,650			1	Koowar Choonerah for		
	1	Goonka - - -	4,500			1	her subsistence - -	250	
	1	Shahpoor - - -	1,200			1	Dhamna - - -	1,250	
	1	Sejzee - - -	2,900			1	Kurreea - - -		
	1	Muddenpoora - - -	600			1	Hajnuggur with Fort -	700	
	1	Murrah - - -	1,275			1	Khajraho - - -	1,500	
	1	Teekareh. - - -				1	Oodypoor - - -	1,500	
	1	Jhounmur - - -	1,450			1	Lakheree. - - -		
	1	Behittah. - - -				1	Khandbaree Alias Beni-		
	1	Bheekesh. - - -				1	gunge - - -	400	
	1	Kurpresh. - - -				2	Mow Masanuah Mankar,		
	1	Bugmou - - -	1,500			1	of Koar Guj Sing - -	510	
	1	Ghungsey. - - -				1	Fah ditto, of Dewan Hut-		
	1	Talgong - - -	1,400			1	tee Sing - - -	200	
	1	Attawah - - -	850			1	Barrohee ditto, of Dewan		
	1	Lulgowah - - -	450			1	Khoonan Sing - - -	75	
	1	Ruppoor - - -	800			2	Towreeah Bhagotah ditto,		
	1	Tappahan. - - -				1	Runja Sing - - -	110	
	1	Akanah - - -	750			1	Putrah ditto, of Taj Sing		
	1	Amlesah Khewkhond -	40			1	Telwar. - - -		
	1	Tappah Tullien, 6 Villages:				2	Khorkharahee ditto, of		
	1	Furtum Khas. - - -				1	Kirhun Sing Gonde. -		
	1	Gomo - - -	125			1	Kattowah ditto, of Khan-		
	1	Newado. - - -				1	gar - - -	150	
	1	Nutwah - - -	900			1	Muttendah ditto, of Row		
	1	Rumawree - - -	80			1	Soundehjoo - - -	500	
	1	Fulleehree. - - -	1,105			1	Gurba ditto, of Suwant		
	1	Deoree. - - -				1	sing Ghosey - - -	700	
	1	Wersam. - - -				1	Newaree ditto, of Man-		
	1	Jamepoora Varkar, of				1	nick Foudjar. - - -		
	1	Mukend Sing Tour -	400			2	Mohurgowa Khumree		
	1	Pepree ditto, of Bharut				1	ditto, of Manick Foudjar		
	1	Bunnafer - - -	100			1	Barree ditto, of Gumb-		
	1	Jugsorah ditto, of Fetteh				1	heer Sing Dowah. -		
	1	Bunnafer - - -	150			1	Hamah ditto, of Deevah		
	1	Hurduea ditto, of Huramun				1	Sereje. - - -		
	1	Bunnafer - - -	500			1	Basaree ditto, of Row		
	1	Lulpoorah Nankar, of				1	Purtab Sing. - - -		
	1	Duvan Zorawur Sing -	600			1	Harrieditto, of Newarjee		
	1	Auchnur ditto, 'elwar -	700			1	Sing. - - -		
	1	Nadoha ditto, of Dewan				1	Ahreeah Nankar, of Bas-		
	1	Mandhata - - -	300			1	saree Wallah. - - -		
	1	Pootry ditto, of Koosar				1	Beypoor ditto, of Dewan		
	1	Rhapah Sing - - -	90			1	Doorjun Sing. - - -		
	1	Rhajnah ditto, of Koosar				1	Barpouhan ditto, of Him-		
	1	Sonee Sah - - -	2,100			1	mut Sing Gonde. - -		
	1	Bhyrah ditto, of Lalla				1	Seemereah ditto, of Ba-		
	1	Purtab Sing - - -	3,600			1	saree Wallah. - - -		
	1	Pholerah ditto, of Telwar	250			1	Dhowar Puddaruk, of		
	1	Moorasun Paddawek, of				1	Mainsook Awasther -	550	
	1	Ram Ruben Lookool -	150			1	Baumnorah Puddaruk, of		
	1	Pandow ditto, of Nuggen				1	Rajsakha - - -	290	
	1	Doobey - - -	75			1	Jutkera ditto, of Puddrack		
	1	Tuhangong Puddawek, of				1	of Hamdoss - - -	175	
	1	Makhari. - - -				1	Seoree ditto, of Bhoore		
	1	Pubuck. - - -				1	Naik. - - -		
	1	Bhelgwah ditto, of Chen-					Tappah Mahanah, 12		
	1	lamun Bhul. - - -					Villages: - - -		
	1	Gorah ditto, of Lal Gooroo	195			1	Doree - - -	2,100	
	1	Looruppoorah ditto, of				1	Gouaree with the		
	1	Acharee. - - -					following Hamlets 5,700		
	1	Sundamee ditto, of Bho-				1	Lahar. - - -	7,800	
	1	run Naik. - - -				1	Barmoulah. - - -		
	1	Debeckhero ditto, of Nut-				1	Garee. - - -		
	1	tun. - - -				1	Bardwa. - - -		
	1	Bomoreeah ditto, of Taj-				1	Mohataul. - - -		
	1	pin Tawaree. - - -				1	Gour. - - -		
	1	Banjah Khire ditto, of				1	Malhar Mankar, of Dewan		
	1	Lookool. - - -				1	Urjoon Sing. - - -		
	1	- - Chetrye granted to				1	Purhar ditto, of Messah		
	1	Ameld Koowar for her					Khan. - - -		
	1	subsistence - - -	275						

**SCHEDULE of the Villages granted by the Sunnud—continued.**

[illegible]

## SCHEDULE of the Villages granted by the Sunnud—continued.

Pergunnah. No.	VILLAGES.	Jumma.	Total.	Pergunnah. No.	VILLAGES.	Jumma.	Total.
Lowree - 1	Tappa Tutam, three Villages :			Lowree - 1	Bhemoursee Puddara, of Bhunturko -	100	
1	Dhigpooa - - 400			1	Deghaunee, granted for the subsistence of Bya Makoon Koowur -	500	
1	Joonda - - - 100	550		Kuttolah 1	Jumlee with Seer -	1,200	
1	Mookhuna -			1	Rudohan Nankar, of Dewan Khanjoo -	275	
1	Puttee Nankar, of Doo-yan Punjuwa -	40		1	Burpohana ditto, of Him-mut Sing Goud -		
1	Rikha ditto, of Pututwan Sing Hoozooree -	550		1	Puhara ditto, of Dewan Fehur Sing -	450	
1	Dhund Mow ditto, of Punchum Sing Chou-haud -			1	Goorphara ditto, Dewan Nerain Sing -		
2	Soonra and Betta ditto, of Dewan Naweno Sing -			1	Goodaro ditto, of Dewan Kheemon Sing -		
1	Ekthohan ditto, of Kooar Soeneeh Sah -	3,500		1	Beerouna ditto, of Pun-cham Sing -	115	
1	Byoura Puddarak, of Herdehrani -	50		1	Nowgong Nonkar, of Dewan Khooman Sing -	275	
1	Pahuna Kud, ditto of Manjoo Poorree -	100		1	Gythawra ditto, of Kooar Woodwht Sing -	700	
2	Bhurserar ditto, of My-serka -	150		Lowree - 1	Kooarpoor, granted for the subsistence to Bya-buddun Kowar -	40	
1	Hunowtah ditto, of Bha-tanka -	40		Kuttolah 1	Dhugowah Nankar, of Narian Doss -	50	
1	Hunapooa ditto, of ditto Gudhouree ditto, of By-ragea -	150		1	Bhabowah ditto, of Koor-behen Sing -	700	
1	Soopooa, ditto of Bha-tunko -	70		1	Bumharee ditto, of Futeh Sing -	50	
		150		1	Villages not named in Kooar Sancee Shah's former Sunnud :		
Kuttolah	Tuppa Muharejpoor, two Villages :			1	Imleca - - -		
1	Maharajpoor - 4,000			1	Imloye - - -		
1	Koasama with } 2,000	6,000		1	Nanhoo Burwaro -	1,000	
	Glurhee - }			1	Kurrola - - -		
1	Surhannee - - -	4,075		1	Maharyown - - -		
1	Puna - - -	800		204			6,965
1	Mankurree and Juhura, Nankar of Koor Her-deh Sah -	400					73,466
1	Koorabaditto, of Purkhan Sing -	1,200					
1	Kantee ditto, of Koor Nerput Sing -	925					
		29,815					
Kooar Bukht Sing's share to revert to Koor Purtaub Sing after his death				Kooar Perihu Sing's share to revert to Koor Purtaub Sing after his death.			
Lowree - 1	Doomrah.			Lowree - 1	Moorenda - - -	5,000	
1	Nond - - - 200			1	Goodhowera - - -	1,800	
1	Omureea - - - 300			1	Putna - - -	600	
1	Singpoor.			1	Loheepooa - - -	425	
1	Bydar - - - 700			1	Nugwurbo - - -	625	
1	Kushenpoona - - - 450			1	Katchara - - -	1,000	
1	Berree Nankur, of Urjoon Sing -	1,900		1	Murwa - - -	475	
1	Souraha ditto, of Perthiaij Dava -	200		1	Ruttunparo - - -	700	
1	Kotah Nankar, of Kooar Khanjoo -	300		1	Nionaber. - - -		
1	Kuteiah ditto, of Kooar Ranjoo -	500		1	Pursunnua - - -	900	
1	Luckroon Nankar, of Dewan Khaman Sing.			1	Sulputpoor - - -	350	
1	Gungwit ditto, of Dewan Butt Sing.			1	Bura - - -	850	
1	Malkar, ditto of Kooar Nurput Sing -	600		1	Deokullee - - -	650	
1	Oood Mow ditto, of Dewan Nerund Sing -	450		1	Beekoura. - - -		
				1	Lallyah. - - -		
				1	Pecpabut - - -	1,000	
				1	Andheareeburg - - -	500	
				1	Berjpoor - - -	600	
				1	Gomubabako - - -	850	
					Tuppa Tutam, three Villages :		
				1	Muneah - - - 875		
				1	Maanpoor - - - 200		
				1	Kahree - - - 575		
						1,650	



DRAFT of a SUNNOD to *Chobey Nawul Kishore*, dated 11th January 1817.

Appendix, No 29.  
Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes, and zemindars of the pergunnah of Bhetree and Koonhuss, in the zillah of Bundelcund, that whereas on the occasion of the surrender of the fortress of Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into, in which it was stipulated that Chobey Nawul Kishore and the widow of Bhurjoo Chobey, proprietors of two shares out of eight shares of the former jaghire of Calinger, for which a sunnod was granted in the name of Chobey Dareso Sing, the late kildar of Calinger, should receive from the British Government equivalent for whatever portion of their shares of the said lands and villages should be transferred to the British Government, and the said Nawul Kishore and the widow of Bhurjoo Chobey having selected the villages of Bysont and six other villages, situated in the pergunnah of Bhitree and Koonhuss, in this district, in lieu of such of their original lands as were transferred to the British Government; and they having further agreed to hold their shares under one and a joint sunnod, a joint sunnod was accordingly granted to them, under date the 4th of July 1812, assigning to them and their heirs and successors in perpetuity, the following villages, namely, Bhyont, Bhuggunpoor, Burwara, Bewhar, Newkiee, Barn, and Thuree; seven villages in the pergunnah of Bhitree and Koonhuss, and Koharee, Ghazeepoore with its diamond mines, Roypanee with its diamond mines, and one-fourth share of Sela with its diamond mines, four villages retained from their original jaghire. And whereas differences have arisen between the said Chobey Nawul Kishore and widow of Bhurjoo Chobey, in consequence of which the said widow has solicited to be put in possession of her own share, to be held separately from Chobey Nawul Kishore; and whereas the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council has been pleased to comply with the request of the said widow, and has directed that the villages specified underneath shall henceforth form the separate share of Chobey Nawul Kishore, that division being founded on an equitable regard to the original rights of the parties, and also on the award of an umpire of their own choice; therefore the under-written villages, with all the revenues, duties, immunities and rights thereunto belonging are hereby granted as unkar to the said Chobey Nawul Kishore, his heirs and successors in perpetuity, and so long as the said Chobey and his heirs shall firmly and faithfully adhere to the terms of the several articles of the ikarnamah or written engagement, which under date the 19th June 1812, corresponding with 25th Jyth 1219, Pussly, he executed jointly with the widow of Bhurjoo Chobey, he shall not be disturbed in the possession of the said lands and villages.

It is proper that you regard the said Nawul Kishore as the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, that you attend him when required, and in all things study to promote his interests. It is incumbent on the aforesaid Chobey Nawul Kishore to devote himself to the improvement of the happiness and comfort of the zemindars and ryots, and to the extension of the cultivation, population and prosperity of his villages, and to enjoy the produce thereof in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

LIST of the Villages forming the separate JAGHIRE of the Widow of *Bhurjoo Chobey*

Muckree.	} Rajpatee, with its diamond mines.
Bumhore.	
Barach.	
	One-eighth of the Village Seab, with its diamond mines.

DRAFT of a SUNNOD to the widow of *Bhurjoo Chobey*, dated 11th January 1817.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes, and zemindars of the pergunnahs of Bhitree and Koonhuss, in the zillah of Bundelcund, that whereas on the occasion of the surrender of the fortress of Calinger to the officers of the British Government, an engagement was entered into, in which it was stipulated that Chobey Nawul Kishore and the widow of Bhurjoo Chobey, proprietors of two shares out of eight shares of the former jaghire of Calinger, for which a sunnod was granted in the name of Chobey Dareso Sing, the late kildar of Calinger, should receive from the British Government an equivalent for whatever portion of their shares of the said lands and villages should be transferred to the British Government; and the said Nawul Kishore and the widow of Bhurjoo Chobey having selected the villages of Bysont, and six other villages, situated in the pergunnah of Bhitree and Koonhuss in this district, in lieu of such of their original lands as were transferred to the British Government; and they having further agreed to hold their shares under one and a joint sunnod, a joint sunnod was accordingly granted to them, under date the 4th of July 1812, assigning to them and their heirs and successors, in perpetuity, the following villages, namely, Bhyont, Bhuggunpoor, Burwara, Bemhar, Muckree, Barn and Thuree; seven villages in the pergunnah of Bhetree and Koonhuss, and Koharee, Ghuzeepoor with its diamond mines, Rajpatee with its diamond mines, and one-fourth share of Sela with its diamond mines, four villages retained from their original jaghire; and whereas differences have arisen between the said Chobey Nawul Kishore and widow of Bhurjoo Chobey, in consequence of which the said widow has solicited to be put in possession of her own share, to be held separately from Chobey Nawul Kishore; and whereas the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council has been pleased to comply with the request of the said widow, and has directed that the villages specified underneath shall henceforth form

form the separate share of the said widow, that division being founded on an equitable regard to the original rights of the parties, and also on the award of an umpire of their own choice. Therefore, the under-written villages, with all the revenues, duties, immunities and rights thereto belonging, are hereby granted as nunkar to the said widow of Bhurjoo Chobey, her heirs and successors, in perpetuity, and so long as the said widow and her heirs shall firmly and faithfully adhere to the terms of the several articles of the thanameh or written engagement, which, under date the 19th June 1812, corresponding with 25th Jyth 1219 Fussy, she executed jointly with Chobey Nowni Kishore, she shall not be disturbed in the possession of the said land and villages. It is proper that you regard the said widow of Bhurjoo Chobey as the rent-free landholder and controller of the said villages, that you attend her when required, and in all things study to promote her interests. It is incumbent on the aforesaid widow to devote herself to the improvement of the happiness and comfort of the zemindars and ryots, and to the extension of the cultivation, population and prosperity of her villages, and to enjoy the produce thereof in good faith and loyalty towards the British Government.

LIST of the VILLAGES forming the separate Jaghire of the Widow of Bhurjoo Chobey.

Muckree,	Rajapane, with its diamond mines.
Bumbore, "	One-eighth of the village Selu, with its
Barach,	diamond mines.

DRAFT of a SUNNOD for the Rajah of Siccim, dated 7th April 1817.

THE honourable East India Company, in consideration of the Services performed by the Hsi tribes under the control of the Rajah of Siccim, and of the attachment shown by him to the interests of the British Government, grants to the Siccimputty rajah, his heirs and successors, all that portion of low land situated eastward of the Metichu river, and westward of the Maha Nuddee, formerly possessed by the Rajah of Nepal, but ceded to the honourable East India Company by the treaty of Segowly, to be held by the Siccimputty rajah as a feudatory, or as acknowledging the supremacy of the British Government over the said land, subject to the following conditions.

The British laws and regulations will not be introduced into the territories in question, but the Siccimputty rajah is authorized to make such laws and regulations for their internal government, and as suited to the habits and customs of the inhabitants, or that may be in force in his other dominions.

The articles or provisions of the treaty signed at Titalaya on the 10th February 1817, and ratified by his Excellency the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council on the 15th of March following, are to be in force with regard to the lands hereby assigned to the Siccimputty rajah, as far as they are applicable to the circumstances of those lands.

It will be especially incumbent on the Siccimputty rajah and his officers to surrender, on application from the officers of the honourable Company, all persons charged with criminal offences, and all public defaulters who may take refuge in the lands now assigned to him, and to allow the police officers of the British Government to pursue into those lands and apprehend all such persons.

In consideration of the distance of Siccimputty rajah's residence from the Company's provinces, such orders as the Governor-general in Council may, upon any sudden emergency, find it necessary to transmit to the local authorities in the lands now assigned for the security or protection of those lands, are to be immediately obeyed and carried into execution in the same manner as if coming from the Siccimputty rajah.

In order to prevent all disputes with regard to the boundaries of the low lands granted to the Siccimputty rajah, they will be surveyed by a British officer, and their limits accurately laid down and defined.

TREATY between the Honourable English EAST INDIA COMPANY and the *Maha Rao Rajah Buxen Sing Behauder*, Rajah of Boondee, concluded by Captain James Tod, on the part of the honourable Company, in virtue of full powers from His Excellency the most Noble the Marquis of Hastings, &c. Governor-general, &c. &c. and by *Bohara Tolaram*, on the part of the Rajah, in virtue of full powers from the said Rajah.

ARTICLE 1.—There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests between the British Government on the one hand, and the Rajah of Boondee and his heirs and successors on the other.

ARTICLE 2.—The British Government takes under its protection the dominions of the Rajah of Boondee.

ARTICLE 3.—The Rajah of Boondee acknowledges the supremacy of, and will co-operate with, the British Government for ever. He will not commit aggressions on any one. He will not enter into negotiations with any one, without the consent of the British Government.

If by chance any dispute arise with any one, it shall be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. The rajah is absolute ruler of his dominions, and the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced therein.

ARTICLE 4.—The British Government spontaneously remits to the rajah and descendants, the tribute which the rajah used to pay to Maha Rajah Holkar, and which has been ceded by Maha Rajah Holkar to the British Government. The British Government also relinquishes in favour of the state of Boondee, the lands heretofore held by Maha Rajah Holkar, within the limits of that state, according to the annexed Schedule, No. 1.

ARTICLE 5.—The Rajah of Boondee hereby engages to pay to the British Government, the tribute and revenue heretofore paid to Maha Rajah Scindia, according to the Schedule, No. 2.

ARTICLE 6.—The Rajah of Boondee shall furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means.

ARTICLE 7.—The present treaty of seven articles having been settled at Boondee, and signed and sealed by Captain James Tod and Bohara Tolaram, the ratification of the same by his Excellency the most Noble the Governor-general, and Maha Rao Rajah of Boondee, shall be exchanged within one month from the present date.

Done at Boondee this 10th day of February, A.D. 1818, corresponding to the 4th Rubbee-od-Jamee 1238, and 5th day of Mauj Soodie of the Sumvut or era of Bickramjeet 1875.

(signed) James Tod. (L. s.)  
Signature of Bohara Tolaram. (L. s.)  
(signed) Hastings. (Seal of the Governor-general.)

Ratified by his Excellency the Governor-general in Camp, near Cawnpore, this first day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen.

(signed) J. Adam,  
Secretary to the Governor-general.

#### No. 1.

SCHEDULE of Lands relinquished by the British Government to *Rao Rajah Bishen Sing Behauder*, according to the 4th Article of the Treaty.

Pergunnah Bahmugong.	One-half of Pergunnah Burroondun.
Pergunnah Lakharia.	One-third of Pergunnah Patun.
Pergunnah Deh.	Chouth of Boondee, &c.
One-half of Pergunnah Kurwar.	

#### No. 2.

SCHEDULE of Amount of Net Revenue and Tribute from Lands held by *Maha Raj Scindia*, to be paid henceforth to the British Government, according to the 5th Article of the Treaty of Boondee.

TOTAL Delhi Sicca Rupees	-	-	-	80,000
Two-third shares of Pergunnah Patun	-	40,000		
Pergunnah Oriela.				
Pergunnah Lamendee.				
One-half of Pergunnah Kurwar.				
One-half of Pergunnah Burroondun				
Chouth of Boondee and other places	-	40,000		
				80,000

(signed) James Tod. (L. s.)  
Signature of Bohara Tolaram. (L. s.)

#### SUNNUD to Shujahut Khan.

WHEREAS the most Noble the Governor-general in Council having been pleased to grant permission to Shujahut Khan, Chief of Pindaries, to remain in Malwa as a special indulgence, under the stipulation that he shall reside with his family and dependents at Bhopaul, and be subordinate in every respect to the jurisdiction of the Nawaub, in the same manner as the other subjects of that state; and his Lordship having further been pleased, in expectation of his future conduct being in every respect satisfactory, to grant to the said Shujahut Khan, for his support and that of his family, an annual stipend of 2,000 Bhopal rupees, that

that sum will accordingly be paid to Shujahut Khan in quarterly instalments, by the nearest political agent or other British officer that may be appointed by Government, as follows :

In February of each year	-	-	-	-	500
- May ditto	-	-	-	-	500
- August ditto	-	-	-	-	500
- November ditto	-	-	-	-	500
TOTAL Bhopaul Rupees					2,000

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Given under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general, this 28th day of November 1818.

SUNNUD granted to *Naumdhur Khan*.

WHEREAS the most Noble the Governor-general in Council having been pleased to grant permission to Naumdhur Khan, Chief of Pindarries, to remain in Malwa as a special indulgence in consideration of his early surrender to the British Government through the medium of the Nawab of Bhopaul, and of his former service to that state, and under the stipulation that he shall reside with his family and dependents at Bhopaul, and be subordinate in every respect to the jurisdiction of the Nawab, in the same manner as the other subjects of that state, and his Lordship having further been pleased, in expectation of his future conduct being in every respect satisfactory, to grant to the said Naumdhur Khan, for his support and that of his family, an annual stipend of 8,125 Bhopaul rupees, that sum will accordingly be paid to Naumdhur Khan, in quarterly instalments, by the nearest political agent or other British officer that may be appointed by Government, as follows :—

In February of each year	-	-	-	-	2,125
- May ditto	-	-	-	-	2,000
- August ditto	-	-	-	-	2,000
- November ditto	-	-	-	-	2,000
TOTAL Bhopaul Rupees					8,125

In the event of Naumdhur Khan continuing to conduct himself to the entire satisfaction of the British Government, a suitable provision will be made for his immediate descendants.

Given under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general, this 28th day of November 1818.

SUNNUD granted to *Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar*.

BE it known to the chowdries, kanongoes, and zemindars of the province of Saugur, that Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar having professed his obedience and submission to the British Government, and in testimony of the sincerity of his professions yielded, without hesitation, on the demand of the British Government, the fort and territories of Mulhargurh, which he occupied as komavisdar: And whereas Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar has subsequently entered into an ikarnamah, or obligation of allegiance to the British Government, contained in six articles, which ikarnamah he has signed, sealed and delivered to the agent of the Governor-general in Bundelcund and Saugur; therefore the British Government, in order to mark the approbation with which it regards the ready loyalty and submission of the aforesaid Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar, is pleased to confer on the said Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar, a life tenure in the villages and lands specified in the subjoined Schedule, to be held by him in jaghire, with all zemindaree and other rights appertaining to the same.

It is your duty to acknowledge and obey Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar as the jaghirdar of the said villages, and to consider yourselves accountable to him for all rights and immunities belonging thereto; and it is incumbent on the said Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar to conciliate the inhabitants by his good government, to devote his endeavours to increase the population, and to enhance the prosperity of his jaghire, and to employ its resources in the service of the British Government.



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SCHEDULE of VILLAGES in the Mehals of *Eiawah* and *Mohasah*, showing the temporary demand fixed for the Year 1875 Sumvat, till a regular Settlement is made.

NAMES of VILLAGES.	Jumma assessed.	NAMES of VILLAGES.	Jumma assessed.
1.—Eiawah Khas - -	550 - -	28.—Hynghootee - -	700 - -
2.—Keerie - - -	60 - -	29.—Keerdebasoorg - -	400 - -
3.—Kulrawunie - -	175 - -	30.—Dushore - - -	200 - -
4.—Kerodi Khord - -	375 - -		
5.—Kallooa Kheree - -	275 - -	Carried forward - -	7,008 4 -
6.—Kullooa - - -	350 - -		
7.—Kuroah - - -	71 - -	1.—Mohasah Khas - -	200 - -
8.—Kothema - - -	150 - -	2.—Sahotawarah - -	230 - -
9.—Dhagroah - - -	200 - -	3.—Lakhunkhree - -	130 - -
10.—Dhye, Great and Small - -	70 - -	4.—Hurboonooporah - -	75 - -
11.—Dhunorah - - -	55 - -	5.—Rampore - - -	50 - -
12.—Ranpuorah - - -	111 4 -	6.—Burowdha - - -	75 - -
13.—Nangoan - - -	400 - -	7.—Bhokhary - - -	75 - -
14.—Peepul Khiree - -	—	8.—Jinabaud - - -	75 - -
15.—Palee - - -	207 - -	9.—Huswah - - -	10 - -
16.—Phootana - - -	100 - -	10.—Pandavee - - -	375 - -
17.—Bindorah - - -	85 - -	11.—Douloutpore - -	90 - -
18.—Mushoodah - - -	250 - -	12.—Gugoonooporah - -	175 - -
19.—Nowlee - - -	184 - -	13.—Dhoodullah - -	150 - -
20.—Bhilawalee - - -	275 - -	14.—Gadhah - - -	169 - -
21.—Mulwoo - - -	300 - -	15.—Choudarah - - -	37 - -
22.—Munkhree - - -	215 - -	16.—Khoomlee - - -	—
23.—Kasaheli - - -	400 - -		
24.—Rooptoo - - -	175 - -	Brought forward for	1,956 - -
25.—Sahdha - - -	350 - -	Mehal Eiawah - -	7,008 4 -
27.—Harrunchuppa - -	325 - -	TOTAL - Rupees	8,964 4 -

\* So in original.

OBLIGATION of ALLEGIANCE and FIDELITY to the BRITISH GOVERNMENT, entered into and subscribed by *Bhow Ram Chunder Bulsar* before Mr. ———, \* Agent of the Governor-general in Bundelcund and Saugur.

WHEREAS in consequence of my voluntary and prompt surrender to the officers of the British Government of the fort and dependencies of Mulhargurh contained in the jaydal of the Oreekur, and held by me as komavisdar, the British Government, in token of its approbation of my ready and cheerful submission on that occasion, is pleased to bestow upon me a jaghirc for life of the town and mehal of Eiawah with Mohasah, and certain villages belonging to it in the dilahek of Saugur, according to a separate list; and whereas preparatory to my being invested with a sannd for the lands and villages composing the said jaghire, an obligation of allegiance to the British Government has been required from me: wherefore, in proof of my submission, fidelity and attachment to the British Government, I have prepared and do hereby present to Mr. ———, agent of the Governor-general in Bundelcund and Saugur, this Ikarnameli, containing the following six articles, from which I solemnly engage never to deviate or depart in any instance whatever.

ARTICLE 1st.—I engage to conduct myself on all occasions with the strictest obedience and submission to the British Government, and to carry its orders into effect without murmur or delay.

ARTICLE 2d.—I engage to entertain no intercourse with any marauders, whether in or out of the district of Saugur, and to give them or their families no asylum in my jaghire; and if it shall come to my knowledge that any predatory parties of horse or foot have arrived in, or in the neighbourhood of my jaghire, I promise to afford the earliest information of such predatory parties to the officers of the British Government, and to render all the assistance that my means will admit of to attack them, and prevent them from plundering the honourable Company's territories, and I engage that on all such occasions no endeavour shall be wanting on my part to manifest my fidelity and attachment to the British Government.

In case of any cause of quarrel arising between me and any other person, whether an adherent of the British Government or independent of its authority, and on occasion of all disputes respecting the boundaries of my villages, or on any other subject whatever, I engage to represent all the circumstances of the case to the British Government with a view to its adjustment of the dispute, to abide implicitly by its decision, and to take no steps whatever towards obtaining redress by my own means.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE 3d.—I engage to give no assistance, directly or indirectly, to any person or chieftain at enmity with the British government; I further engage not to enter nor to permit my followers or dependents to enter into the service of any chieftain, whether on terms of friendship with the British Government or not, without the express sanction of the British Government.

ARTICLE 4th.—Whenever the British troops shall have occasion to pass through my jaghire, I engage to execute with zeal and alacrity all requisitions I may receive from the commanding officer of the British troops in furnishing him with supplies and other necessary articles, and in co-operating, if requisite, for the accomplishment of whatever object he may have in view.

ARTICLE 5th.—If any of the inhabitants of the British territory abscond and take refuge in any of the villages of my jaghire, I engage to seize and deliver up such persons to the officers of the British Government, and to co-operate cordially with any officer of the British Government, who may be sent for the purpose of apprehending such fugitives.

ARTICLE 6th.—I engage not to harbour thieves or robbers in any of the villages comprising my jaghire, and if the property of any inhabitants or travellers be stolen or robbed in any of my villages, I engage to make the semindars of such villages responsible for the restitution of the stolen property, or for the seizure and surrender of the thief to the British officers; and if any person, amenable to the British law for murder or other crimes, shall take refuge in any of my villages, I engage to apprehend and deliver up such offender to the British Government; and further, to give every assistance in my power to any person who may be sent on the part of the British Government in pursuit of them.

I hereby declare that I will in no respect whatever omit to fulfil all the conditions of the foregoing six articles contained in this obligation.

SCHEDULE of VILLAGES in the Mahals of Etawah and Moharrah, showing the temporary demand fixed for the Year 1875 Sumvat, till a regular Settlement is made.

[The same as stated in the preceding page.]

TREATY of FRIENDSHIP and ALLIANCE between the Honourable English East India Company and the Kingdom of Acheen, concluded by the Honourable Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Knight, and Captain John Monckton Combe, Agent to the Governor-general, in the name and on the behalf of the Most Noble Francis Marquess of Hastings, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-general in Council of all the British Possessions in India, on the one part, and his Highness *Sree Sultan Alla Idhem Jonhar Aulum Shah*, King of Acheen, for himself, his heirs and successors, on the other.

In consideration of the long and uninterrupted peace, amity, and good understanding which has subsisted between the Honourable English East India Company, and his Highness's ancestors, the kings of Acheen, and in order to perpetuate and improve their friendship to the advantage and prosperity of their mutual states and subjects, it is hereby agreed and determined:

ARTICLE 1st.—There shall be a perpetual peace, friendship, and defensive alliance between the states, dominions, and subjects of the high contracting parties neither of whom shall give any aid or assistance to the enemies of the other.

ARTICLE 2d.—At the request of his Highness, the British Government engages to require and to use its influence to effect the removal of Syfful Aulum from his Highness's territories; and the British Government further engages to prohibit him or any of his family, as far as they may be subject to their authority, from doing or committing in future any act or acts, tending to prevent or impede the full re-establishment of his Highness's authority, his Highness the King engaging himself to place at the disposal of the Supreme Government of British India such pension or annuity as it may in its wisdom deem meet to recommend for the said Syfful Aulum on the consideration of his retiring to Penang, and engage to relinquish all claims to the sovereignty of Acheen within three months from the date hereof.

ARTICLE 3d.—His Highness the King grants to the British Government the free trade of all his ports, and engages that the duties on merchandize levied at these ports shall be fixed and declared, and shall also be payable by the resident merchant; his Highness likewise engages not to grant or otherwise a monopoly of the produce of his states by any person whatever.

ARTICLE 4th.—His Highness engages, whenever the British Government may desire it, to receive and protect an accredited agent of the British Government with a suitable establishment, who shall be permitted to reside at his Highness's court for the purpose of conducting the affairs of the Honourable Company.

ARTICLE 5th.—In consideration of the injury which might result to the British trade from its exclusion from the ports of his Highness's states, not at present subject to his

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authority, his Highness agrees and consents that the ships and vessels of Great Britain shall continue their commercial intercourse with the ports of Acheen and Tillamasay in the same manner as heretofore, unless a temporary blockade of these ports, or either of them, shall be established by and with the consent of the British Government or resident authority. It is clearly understood, however, by the contracting parties, that no warlike stores or arms of any kind shall be furnished, given, or sold to any of his Highness's rebellious subjects by the vessels so trading to the aforesaid ports, under penalty of confiscation of ship and cargo.

**ARTICLE 6th.**—His Highness Sree Sultan Alla Iddien Jowhan Aulum Shah agrees, promises, and engages himself, his heirs and successors, to exclude the subjects of every other European power, and likewise all Americans, from a fixed habitation or residence in his dominions. He also engages not to enter into any negotiations or conclude any treaty with any power, prince, or potentate whatsoever, unless with the knowledge and consent of the British Government.

**ARTICLE 7th.**—His Highness engages not to permit the residence in his dominions of any British subject to whom the resident agent shall offer any objection.

**ARTICLE 8th.**—The British Government agrees to give and furnish to his Highness, without delay, all the arms and military stores which are detailed in the paper appended to this treaty, and signed by his Highness. The British Government likewise agrees to advance to his Highness the sum of money therein mentioned as a temporary loan, to be repaid by his Highness at his earliest convenience.

**ARTICLE 9th**—This treaty, consisting of nine Articles, has this day been concluded, subject to the ratification of the Governor-general within six months from the date hereof; but it is to be understood that the several provisions herein contained may be carried into immediate effect without awaiting the said ratification.

Done at Sridule, near Pider, in the country of Acheen, on the 22d day of April, in the year of our Lord 1819, corresponding with the year of the Hegira 1234, and the 26th day of Jamadil Aker.

(The Company's  
Seal)

• (signed)

*T. S. Raffles.*  
*John Monckton Coombs.*

LIST of ARTICLES referred to in the annexed Treaty, to be furnished by the Honourable East India Company to his Highness Sree Sultan Alla Iddien Jowhan Aulum Shah, agreeably to the stipulation of the 8th Article.

**Arms and Military Stores.**

Gunpowder	-	-	-	-	Forty Barrels.
Field Pieces	-	-	-	-	Six Pair Brass Four.
Round Shot for ditto	-	-	-	-	Four hundred
Grape Shot	-	-	-	-	Four hundred.
Muskets complete	-	-	-	-	Four hundred.
Musket Balls	-	-	-	-	Thirty Barrels.
Musket Flints	-	-	-	-	Three thousand.

**Cash.**

Spanish Dollars	-	-	-	-	Fifty thousand.
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Pider, the 22d April 1819.

SUBSCRIBED, under the seal and signature of his Excellency the Governor-general in Council, to *Maha Rao Omed Sing, of Kotah.*

To all officers present and to come, officers of the British Government: Be it known—Whereas the friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maha Rao Omed Sing, of Kotah, and the good offices rendered by him to the English Government are well known and established; in consideration of this friendship, the most noble the Marquis of Hastings, Governor-general in Council, through the medium of Captain Tod, has granted the sovereignty unto the Maha Rao aforesaid of the undermentioned places, together with the relinquishment or mawfee of the tribute of Shahabad, due from the Maha Rao under the provisions of the treaty concluded at Delhi, on the 28th December 1817, to be enjoyed by him, his heirs and successors.

The Maha Rao will, therefore, consider himself master of the said places, attach the ryots to him by kindness, and take them under his government. No other shall interfere therein.

Pergunnah Dio.  
" Puchpuhar.  
" Ahore.  
" Gungrawyr.

Given under the seal and signature of the Governor-general in Council, this 25th day of September 1819, A. D.

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with *Hassan bin Rama*.

Know all men, that *Hassan bin Rama* has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations :

ARTICLE 1st.—The town of Ras ul Khyma and Mahons, and the towers in the Date Groves near the town in, shall remain in the hands of the British Government.

ARTICLE 2d.—If any of the vessels of *Hassan bin Rama* are in Shorgah or Umur ul Gywyn or Imān, or any other of the places to which the general shall go with the force, they shall be surrendered to the general, and the general will leave those which are for the pearl-fishery and fishing-boats.

ARTICLE 3d.—*Hassan bin Rama* shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE 4th.—After the execution of these engagements, *Hassan bin Rama* shall be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs.

End of the Articles.

Done at Ras ul Khyma, in the forenoon of Saturday the 22d of the month of Rebi ul Awwal, in the year of the Hegira 1235, (corresponding to the 8th January 1820).

(signed) *W Grant Keir, (I.s.)*

Major-general

(signed) The signature of *Hassan bin Rama*,  
with his own hand.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with *Sultan bin Suggur*.

In the name of GOD, the merciful, the compassionate : Know all men, that *Sultan bin Suggur* has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations :

ARTICLE 1st.—*Sultan bin Suggur* shall surrender to the general the towers, guns, and vessels which are in Shargah, Imau, Hinnaal, Gywyn and their dependencies. The general will leave the boats which are for the pearl-fishery and fishing-boats, and the remainder of the vessels shall be at the disposal of the general.

ARTICLE 2d.—*Sultan bin Suggur* shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE 3d.—The general will not allow the troops to enter the towns, to lay them waste.

ARTICLE 4th.—After the execution of these engagements, *Sultan bin Suggur* shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly (pacificated) Arabs.

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the general and *Sultan bin Suggur* and his followers, with the exception that their boats are not to go to sea.

Done at Ras ul Khyma, on the 20th of Rebi ul Awwal, in the year 1235, corresponding to the 9th of January 1820).

(signed) *W. Grant Keir, (I.s.)*

Major-general.

(signed) *Sultan bin Suggur, (I.s.)*  
with his own hand.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with the Sheikh of *Dubey*.

In the name of GOD, the merciful, the compassionate : Know all men, that *Mahomed bin Kaya bin Zaal*, a minor, accompanied by *Ahmed bin Futteh*, has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations :

ARTICLE 1st.—The people of *Dubey* shall surrender to the general the vessels which are in *Dubey* and its dependencies, and the guns which are in the town and in the towers. The general will have the boats which are in the pearl-fishery and fishing boats.

ARTICLE 2d.—The people of *Dubey* shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in their possession.

ARTICLE 3d.—The general will not allow the troops to enter the town to lay it waste, and further, as a mark of consideration towards his Highness the *Imaun Said bin Sultan*, on the part of the general, he will not demolish the fort and towers.

ARTICLE 4th.—After the execution of these engagements, *Mahomed bin Kaya bin Zaal* and his followers shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly (literally, the pacificated) Arabs.

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the British and Mahomed bin Kaya bin Zaal and his followers, with the exception that their boats shall not go to sea. Done at Ras ul Khyma, on the 23d of Rebi ul Awa, in the year 1235, (answering to the 9th January 1820).

(signed) *W. Grant Keir, (L.s.)*  
Major-general.  
(signed) Witnessed by the signature of  
Sheikh of *Kishmee*,  
(Seal of Ahmed bin Futeh.) *Sheikh Kameya bin Mahomed bin Jabul al Moyeying*, with his own hand.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with *Sheikh Shakhool bin Dhyab*,  
of *Abon Dhyabee*.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate: Know all men, that Sheikh Shakhool bin Dhyab, of Falaky, hath been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:

ARTICLE 1st.—If in Abon Dhyabee, or any other of the places belonging to Sheikh Shakhool, there are any of the piratical vessels which have been attacked, or may hereafter be attacked by the general during the present war against the pirates, he shall deliver such vessels to the general.

ARTICLE 2d.—Sheikh Shakhool shall be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs.

Done at Ras ul Khyma, on the 25th of Rebi ul Awa, in the year of the Hegira 1235, (corresponding to the 11th January 1820).

(signed) *W. Grant Keir, (L. s.)*  
Major-general.  
(signed) The signature of *Sheikh Shakhool*,  
with his own hand.

TRANSLATION of the PRELIMINARY TREATY with *Hassan bin Ali*.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate: Know all men, that Hassan bin Ali has been in the presence of General Sir William Grant Keir, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:

ARTICLE 1st.—If any of the vessels of Hassan bin Ali are in Shorghoh, or Um ul Gywyn, or Imán, or Abon Dyabee, or any other of the places to which the general shall go with the force; such vessels shall be surrendered to the general, and the general will leave those that are for the pearl-fishery and fishing-boats.

ARTICLE 2d.—Hassan bin Ali shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE 3d.—After this, Hassan bin Ali shall be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs.

End of the Articles.

Issued at Ras ul Khyma in the forenoon of Saturday, the 29th of the month of Rebi ul Awa, in the year of the Hegira 1235, (corresponding to 15th January 1830).

(signed) *W. Grant Keir, (L.s.)*  
Major-general.  
(signed) The signature of *Hassan bin Ali*,  
with his own hand.\*

COPY of SUNNOD to the Rajah of *Gurhwal*, under the Seal and Signature of  
the Governor-general.

WHEREAS the provinces heretofore forming the Raj of Gurhwal have come into the possession of the British Government; and whereas Rajah Soodersun Sah, a descendant of the ancient Rajah of that country, has evinced his zeal and attachment to the British Government: the Governor-general in Council has conferred on Sordursun Sah, his heirs and successors, in perpetuity, on the conditions hereinafter expressed, the whole of the territory of Gurhwal, with the following exceptions, that is to say:

1st, The districts situated to the eastward of the river Alikanunda, and to the eastward of the river Mundagunee, above its confluence with the aforementioned river.

2dly, The Deyra Doon.

3dly, The Pergunnah of Raean Gur.

It will be the duty of the Rajah to make such settlement of the country now conferred upon him as shall be calculated to promote the happiness and welfare of the inhabitants, and to

\* The seal is Captain Thompson's (17th Light Dragoons and Interpreter), as Sheikh Hassan bin Ali had no seal at the time of signature.

to govern his subjects with justice, and to collect the revenues which he will appropriate to his own use. He is further required to prohibit and prevent the traffic in slaves, which is forbidden by the Regulations of the British Government. Whenever the British Government shall have occasion to require from the Rajah assistance in beegarahs or supplies for the use of its troops, the Rajah is to provide the same to the extent of his ability, to afford every facility to the subjects of the British Government and others trading in his territory, or with the countries beyond it, and is at all times to conform to the directions of the British Government and its officers. The Rajah is not to alienate or mortgage any part of his possessions without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. While these conditions shall be faithfully observed, the British Government will guarantee the Rajah and his posterity in the secure possession of the country now conferred upon him, and will defend him against his enemies.

Fort William, 4th March 1820.

(A.)

SKETCH of the ARTICLES proposed by Captain *Moresby* to his Highness the Imaum of Muscat, for the Prevention of the Foreign Slave Trade.

ARTICLE 1st.—The Imaum to agree that all external traffic in slaves shall cease and be abolished for ever from his dominions and dependencies.

ARTICLE 2d.—The Imaum to agree that all vessels carrying the flag of his Highness, or belonging to or navigated by his subjects found or convicted of being engaged in the traffic of slaves to other places than his dominions, shall be considered as pirates, and confiscated; the owners, captain, and officers shall be treated as pirates, and have their goods and property forfeited to the Imaum.

ARTICLE 3d.—That all other persons serving on board such vessels as seamen, or in any capacity, who shall not give information of such unlawful transactions to the Imaum or his governors, within three months after the period of the termination of the voyage, shall be punished by fine, imprisonment, and corporeal infliction.

ARTICLE 4th.—His Highness to engage to deliver up, or cause to be delivered up, all British subjects who shall attempt the traffic of slaves; and the Imaum shall imprison such English subjects until an opportunity may offer to give them over, with the proof of their crime, to any of His Britannic Majesty's cruisers, or those of the East India Company, or others appointed to receive them, it being understood that such British subjects so seized shall have been actually detected in embarking slaves, or having them on board as cargo.

ARTICLE 5th.—That no individual may plead ignorance of the limit within which the slave trade is confined, the Imaum to agree, that all vessels under his Highness's flag, commanded or owned by any of his subjects found trading in slaves to the southward of the parallel of Cape Delgado, his Highness's most southern possessions in Africa, or to the eastward of a line drawn from that Cape past the east point of the Isle Socatra on to the Persian shore, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by any of His Britannic Majesty's cruisers or officers of customs, or others deputed by any of His Britannic Majesty's governors, and dealt with the same as if such ship or vessel seized was navigated under the English flag.

ARTICLE 6th.—His Highness the Imaum must engage to publish in all the dominions and dependencies of his government the present treaty, and to consider it equally binding on them all.

And, finally, to agree that the treaty is provisional until ratified and confirmed by His Majesty's ministers on the part of the King of Great Britain; which ratification is to be forwarded without loss of time to his Highness the Imaum; nevertheless, the treaty is to be carried into full effect from the present date.

Done at Muscat,  
29th August 1822.

(signed) *F. Moresby*,  
Capt. H. M. S. Menai.

(B.)

Fourth Article marked (B.), substituted for the Fourth Article in Paper (A.), the latter having been objected to by the Imaum.

ARTICLE 4th.—His Highness engages to appoint, at such places as His Majesty the King of Great Britain may wish, habitations for the residence of consuls, agents, and others charged with the suppression of the slave trade by English subjects; such consuls, agents, or others are to receive the assistance, on application to his Highness the Imaum, or his lieutenant-governor, or others, for the apprehension and detention of all English subjects who may attempt the traffic.

Done at Muscat,  
29th August 1822.

(signed) *F. Moresby*,  
Capt. H. M. S. Menai.

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

(C.)

Additional Requisition made by Captain *Moresby* to his Highness the Imaum of *Muscat*.

That it may be understood in the most comprehensive manner, where Arab ships are liable to seizure by English cruisers; after the expiration of four months, the Imaum to make known that any vessel found with slaves on board as cargo by British cruisers to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing east of Socotra and on to Dieu Head, the western point of the Gulph of Cambay (unless driven by stress of weather), shall be treated by the English in the same manner as if they were under the English flag and navigated by English subjects.

Done at Muscat,  
8th Sept. 1822.

(signed) *G. F. Moresby*,  
Capt. H. M. S. Menai.

(D.)

Additional Requisition altered from the First Proposal in Paper (C.) to his Highness the Imaum of *Muscat*, by Capt. *Moresby*.

That it may be understood in the most comprehensive manner, where Arab ships are liable to seizure by the King of England's ships employed to prevent the illicit traffic in slaves after the expiration of four months from the date of the treaty; the Imaum to proclaim, that all ships under his flag found with slaves on board as cargo by the King of England's ships employed in the prevention of the traffic, to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado passing 60 miles to the east of Isle Socotra, and on to Cape Dieu (the western point of the Gulph of Cambay), unless driven by stress of weather, shall be treated in the same manner as if such vessels were under the English flag, and navigated by English subjects.

Done at Muscat,  
10th Sept. 1822.

(signed) *F. Moresby*,  
Capt. H. M. S. Menai.

Additional Requisition by Captain *Moresby* to the Imaum of *Muscat*.

That it may be understood in the most comprehensive manner where Arab ships are liable to seizure by His Majesty the King of England's cruisers after the expiration of four months, the Imaum to authorize that the King of England's cruisers finding Arab ships with slaves on board to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado passing (60) sixty miles east of Socotra, on to Dieu Head, forming the western point of the Gulph of Cambay (unless driven by stress of weather), shall be seized and treated by His Majesty's cruisers in the same manner as if they were under the English flag.

His Highness the Imaum of *Muscat's*  
Answer.

I permit to the Captain of His Majesty the King of England's cruiser to seize vessels to the eastward of the line drawn by Captain *Moresby*, but confine the permission to the King of England's cruisers, and not the Company's.

#### TREATY with the SULTAN and *Tumongong* of *Johore*; 2d August 1824.

A TREATY of Friendship and Alliance between the Honourable the English East India Company on the one side, and their Highnesses the Sultan and *Tumongong* of *Johore* on the other, concluded on the second day of August one thousand eight hundred and twenty-four (1824), corresponding with the sixth day of the month of Zulkar, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-nine (1239) by the above Sultan of *Johore*, his Highness Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah, and the above *Tumongong* of *Johore*, *Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah*, on their own behalf; and by John Crawford, esquire, British resident at Singapore, vested with full powers thereto by the Right honourable William Pitt, Lord Amherst, Governor-general of and for Fort William in Bengal, on behalf of the said Honourable English East India Company.

ARTICLE 1st.—Peace, friendship, and good understanding shall subsist for ever between the Honourable the English East India Company and their Highnesses the Sultan and *Tumongong* of *Johore*, and their respective heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 2d.—Their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah, and *Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah*, hereby cede in full sovereignty and property, to the Honourable the English East India Company, their heirs and successors for ever, the island of Singapore situated in the straits of Malacca, together with the adjacent sea, straits, and islets, to the extent of ten geographical miles from the coast of the said main island of Singapore.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE 3d.—The Honourable the English East India Company hereby engages, in consideration of the cession specified in the last article, to pay unto his Highness the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah, the sum of Spanish dollars thirty-three thousand two hundred (33,200), together with a stipend, during his natural life, of one thousand three hundred (1,300), Spanish dollars per mensem, and to his Highness the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah, the sum of twenty-six thousand eight hundred (26,800) Spanish dollars, with a monthly stipend of seven hundred (700) Spanish dollars during his natural life.

ARTICLE 4th.—His Highness the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah hereby acknowledges to have received from the Honourable the English East India Company, in fulfilment of the stipulations of the two last articles, the sum of thirty-three thousand two hundred (33,200) Spanish dollars, together with the first monthly instalment of the above-mentioned stipend of one thousand three hundred (1,300) Spanish dollars; and his Highness the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah also hereby acknowledges to have received from the Honourable the English East India Company, in fulfilment of the stipulations of the two last articles, the sum of twenty-six thousand eight hundred (26,800) Spanish dollars, with one month's instalment of the above stipend of seven hundred (700) Spanish dollars.

ARTICLE 5th.—The Honourable the English East India Company engages to receive and treat their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah and Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah, with all the honours, respect, and courtesy belonging to their rank and station, whenever they may reside at or visit the island of Singapore.

ARTICLE 6th.—The Honourable the English East India Company hereby engages, in the event of their Highnesses the Sultan and Tumongong, their heirs or successors, preferring to reside permanently in any portion of their own states, and to remove for that purpose from Singapore, to pay unto them, that is to say, to his Highness the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah, his heir or successor, the sum of twenty thousand (20,000) Spanish dollars, and to his Highness the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah, his heirs or successors, the sum of fifteen thousand (15,000) Spanish dollars.

ARTICLE 7th.—Their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah and the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah, in consideration of the payment specified in the last article, hereby relinquish for themselves, their heirs and successors, to the Honourable the English East India Company, their heirs and successors for ever, all right and title to every description of immovable property, whether in lands, houses, gardens, orchards or timber trees, of which their said Highnesses may be possessed within the island of Singapore or its dependencies, at the time they may think proper to withdraw from the said island, for the purpose of permanently residing within their own states; but it is reciprocally and clearly understood that the provisions of this article shall not extend to any description of property which may be held by any follower or retainer of their Highnesses, beyond the precincts of the ground at present allotted for the actual residence of their said Highnesses.

ARTICLE 8th.—Their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah and the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah hereby engage, that as long as they shall continue to reside within the island of Singapore, or to draw their respective monthly stipends from the Honourable the English East India Company, as provided for in the present treaty, they shall enter into no alliance, and maintain no correspondence with any foreign power or potentate whatsoever, without the knowledge and consent of the said Honourable English East India Company, their heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 9th.—The Honourable the English East India Company hereby engages, that in the event of their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah and the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah removing from the island of Singapore, as contemplated in the 6th article, and being distressed within their own territories, on such removal to afford them, either at Singapore or Prince of Wales's Island, a personal asylum and protection.

ARTICLE 10th.—The contracting parties hereby stipulate and agree, that neither party shall be bound to interfere in the internal concerns of the other government, or in any political dissensions or wars which may arise within their respective territories, nor to support each other by force of arms against any third party whatsoever.

ARTICLE 11th.—The contracting parties hereby engage to use every means within their power respectively, for the suppression of robbery and piracy within the straits of Malacca, as well as the other narrow seas, straits, and rivers bordering upon or within their respective territories, in as far as the same shall be connected with the dominions and immediate interests of their said Highnesses.

ARTICLE 12th.—Their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah and the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman Sree Maharajah hereby engage to maintain a free and unshackled trade every where within their dominions, and to admit the trade and traffic of the British nation into all the ports and harbours of the kingdom of Johore and its dependencies, on the terms of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 13th.—The Honourable the English East India Company hereby engages, as long as their Highnesses the Sultan Hussein Mahomed Shah and the Datu Tumongong Abdul Rahman



Rahman Sree Maharajah shall continue to reside in the island of Singapore, not to permit any retainer or follower of their said Highnesses, who shall desert from their actual service, to dwell or remain in the island of Singapore or its dependencies. But it is hereby clearly understood that all such retainers and followers shall be natural born subjects of such parts of their Highnesses' dominions only, in which their authority is at present substantially established, and that their names, at the period of entering the services of their Highnesses, shall have been duly and voluntarily inscribed in a register to be kept for that purpose by the chief local authority for the time being.

ARTICLE 14th.—It is hereby naturally stipulated for and agreed, that the conditions of all former conventions or agreements entered into between the Honourable the English East India Company and their Highnesses the Sultan and Tumongong of Johore, shall be considered as abrogated and annulled accordingly, always however with the exception of such prior conditions as have conferred on the Honourable the English East India Company any right or title to the occupation or possession of the island of Singapore and its dependencies, as above mentioned.

Done and concluded at Singapore, the day and year above written.

	(The Sultan's Seal.)	
	(The Duta Tumongong's Seal.)	
(signed)	<i>J. Crawford.</i>	
(signed)	<i>Amherst.</i>	
(The Company's Wafer Seal.)	<i>Edw<sup>d</sup> Paget.</i>	(The Gr <sup>o</sup> Seal)
	<i>Jno Fendall.</i>	

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this nineteenth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-four.

AGREEMENT between his Majesty Abul Mozuffer Moizood Deen Ghazeevur Deen Hyder Shah, King of Oude, and the British Government, on account of a sum which the former has given as a loan to the Honourable Company, settled by His Majesty, on his part, and by M Ricketts, Esquire, Resident at the Court of Lucknow, in virtue of full powers in him by the Right honourable William Pitt, Lord Amhurst, Governor-general in Council, &c. &c. &c. &c.

ARTICLE 1st.—His Majesty the King of Oude has given as a loan for ever to the Honourable Company one crore of rupees; the interest whereof being five lacs of rupees per annum, will be paid from the first Mohurrum, one thousand two hundred and forty-one Hijerah, to the persons hereafter particularized by monthly instalments, and the interest of this sum will always remain at five per cent. per annum, though the British Government may reduce their interest below, or raise it above the aforesaid rate.

ARTICLE 2d.—This loan is made in perpetuity. The sovereigns of the kingdom of Oude shall never have the power to take it back, nor shall they exercise any interference with its interest.

ARTICLE 3d.—The British Government guarantee that it will pay, for ever, the monthly sums hereafter mentioned out of the interest of the above loan, to the persons set down in the instrument, in that current coin of the place where they may reside, without any deduction whatsoever.

ARTICLE 4th.—The Honourable Company will always protect the honour of the stipendiaries, who will be paid out of this fund; and it will be the protectors of their possessions, such as houses and gardens (whether bestowed by the King of Oude, or purchased or built by themselves) from the hands of the sovereigns and their enemies: and in whatever city or country they may be, their allowance will be paid to them there.

ARTICLE 5th.—This agreement having been settled by his Majesty the King of Oude, for himself, and by M. Ricketts, Esquire, Resident at the Court of Lucknow, on the part of the British Government, the Resident at Lucknow has delivered one copy thereof, in Persian and English, signed and sealed by him, to his Majesty the King of Oude, from whom he has received a counterpart, also duly executed by his Majesty. The Resident engages to procure and deliver to his Majesty the King of Oude a copy of the same under the seal and signature of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, when that executed by the Resident will be returned.

Interest, rupees five lacs per annum, by solar years. Twelve months, at per month, rupees forty-one thousand six hundred and sixty-six, ten annas and eight English pice.

To the persons attached to the new Janamberee Nujuf Ushruf, according to a separate detail, rupees one thousand one hundred and thirty-seven, ten annas and eight pice (R<sup>y</sup> 1,137. 10 a. 8 p.)

This

This sum will be paid for ever to the person who will be appointed to the charge of the Imambareh through the King, and its Amlah or officer will be kept or discharged at the pleasure of the superintendent.

Nurawal Mabaruk Mahul, Rupees ten thousand (R<sup>r</sup> 10,000).

This allowance will be paid to the Begum Nawab Mobaruk Muhul during her lifetime, and after her demise, one-third of the allowance will be paid to any person or for any purpose she may will; the remaining two-thirds, and whatever may be the saving of the one-third, agreeably to the will, which will be an addition to the two-thirds, or in case of her not making a will, the whole allowance is to be divided into two equal parts, one-half to be given to the Nujuf Usruf, and the other half for Kerbulla to the High Priest and Nujawurs (or persons who have its charge), on the part of the said King, that his Majesty might thereby derive its benefits.

Sultan Mariam Begum, Rupees two thousand five hundred (R<sup>r</sup> 2,500).

To be given during the lifetime of Sultan Mariam Begum, as to Nawaub Mobaruk Muhul, and after her death to be appropriated in the same manner.

Moontaz Moohul, Rupees one thousand and one hundred (R<sup>r</sup> 1,100).

As the foregoing.

Surfraz Muhul, Rupees one thousand one hundred (R<sup>r</sup> 1,100).

Ditto. ditto.

The servants and dependents of Surfraz Muhul, as per separate list, Rupees nine hundred and twenty-nine (R<sup>r</sup> 999).

To be paid in perpetuity, as per separate statement The allowance of persons dying without heirs to be added to the sums for Nujuf Usruf and Kerbulla Nawaub Moatummud ood Dowla Behauder, Rupees twenty thousand (R<sup>r</sup> 20,000).

This allowance is to be paid in perpetuity to the Nuwab and his heir. It will be paid in perpetuity, after his demise, agreeably to his will, to his sons, daughters and wives, and other dependents. If it happen that he makes no will, in that case the allowance is to be given to his lawful heirs, according to the laws of inheritance, in conformity to the tenets of the Sheas. The allowances which are assigned to his wife, one son and a daughter from this fund, as specified below, are also to be continued in perpetuity separately, and whatever the number may bequeath to them out of the allowance is to be given to these three persons from the Nawaub's allowance, according to law.

Nawaub Begum, the wife of Nawaub Moatummud ood Dowla, Rupees two thousand (R<sup>r</sup> 2,000).

This allowance is to be paid to her during her lifetime, and after her death to be paid to her lawful heirs in perpetuity, according to the laws of inheritance, in conformity to the tenets of the Sheas.

Nawaub Auleeah Begum, the daughter of the said Nawaub, Rupees one thousand (R<sup>r</sup> 1,000).

According to the foregoing rule—

Ameen ood Dowla Behauder, son of the Nawaub, Rupees two thousand (R<sup>r</sup> 2,000).

According to the foregoing rule—

Done at Lucnow, the 1st Mohurrum, one thousand two hundred and forty-one Hegira, corresponding with the 17th August 1825.

(signed) M. Ricketts, Resident.

(signed) Amherst.  
J. H. Harrington.  
W. B. Bayley.

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council at Fort William in Bengal, this thirteenth day of September, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five, a. d.

ARTICLES of AGREEMENT concluded between *Shajee Chettraputty Maharaj Kurraveer*, the Rajah of *Colapore*, and the British Government.

PREAMBLE:—Whereas a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded between the British Government and the Rajah of Colapore on the 1st of October 1812; and whereas certain misunderstandings have since arisen: with a view to the removal of those misunderstandings, and to the confirmation of the alliance, the following articles have been agreed on between the two Governments:

ARTICLE 1st.—Such parts of the former treaty, concluded on the 1st October 1812, as are not effected by the provisions of the present engagement, shall remain in full force, and are mutually binding on the contracting parties.

ARTICLE 2d.—The Rajah of Colapore engages to reduce his army to the peace establishment, and never to raise or assemble such a force as shall be likely to endanger the public tranquillity within or without his territories, unless with the previous consent of the British Government. The Rajah further engages to attend to the advice of the British Government on all measures calculated to affect the public tranquillity; but this Article is nowise to diminish the independence of the said Rajah as a sovereign prince.

ARTICLE 3d.—The Rajah of Colapore engages never to molest Hindoo Rao Ghatke Kaguleur, or Narrain Rao Gorepuda, Echdeurinjecoor, in the enjoyment of their respective customs.

ARTICLE 4th.—The districts of Chuckoree and Manoolie were transferred to the Rajah of Colapore by a sunnud, under the signature of Major-general Sir Thomas Munro, Baronet, K. C. B., but have not yet been mentioned in any treaty or agreement; the Honourable East India Company now acknowledges them to be ceded to the Rajah of Colapore in full sovereignty, the Rajah engaging on his part to respect the rights and privileges of the semindars, enamdars, and wuttundars of the Sind districts.

ARTICLE 5th.—His Highness the Rajah of Colapore hereby recognizes the award of the British Government, made in 1822, relative to the half umils in the Sawaunt Warree territory, and engages to respect the rights of the Warree state conferred by that award. He also consents to the territorial arrangement of assigning to him an equivalent in land in such part of the Carnatic collectorate as may be allotted to him by the British local authorities.

ARTICLE 6th.—The Rajah of Colapore engages never to grant an asylum to the enemies of the British Government, nor to rebels. The Rajah also promises, that if any robbers or other offenders issuing from his territories, shall commit robberies or other offences in that of the British Government or of other states, his Highness will apprehend them, and deliver them up; and his Highness further consents, that in case he shall not fully restrain such offenders, the British Government shall give due notice to the Rajah, and shall, after such notice, be competent at all times to send its troops and police into his Highness's territories for the apprehension of the said offenders, and his Highness shall afford any necessary assistance to the troops or police to enable them to discover and apprehend the objects of their pursuit. If any persons who have committed offences in the Rajah's territory shall take refuge in that of the Company, the British Government will, after due investigation, adopt such measures in regard to the said offenders, as equity and justice may appear to require, adopting at the same time every means to prevent their committing any act injurious to the territories of the Rajah.

ARTICLE 7th.—The Rajah of Colapore promises to continue to show Maharnj and Belia Maharaj their respective lands and rights agreeably to the Schedule annexed.

The guarantee of the British Government to the enjoyment of the above lands and rights shall only continue during the lifetime of the above-mentioned persons; but the rights of their descendants, as founded on sunnud or custom, shall not be prejudiced by the cessation of the said guarantee.

ARTICLE 8th.—The Rajah having given his unqualified assent to the demand upon him for the injuries occasioned to the several individuals whose possessions and rights he had invaded, according to the Schedule annexed, hereby agrees to pay such demand as may be adjusted, after a full investigation into the extent of the losses actually incurred, and in failure thereof, within sixty days after such final adjustment, to transfer to the British Government such portions of the pergunnahs of Chickodey and Manowle, as were formerly ceded to the Colapore Rajah, and for such term of years as may be necessary to collect a sum equal to the amount due, the Principal Collector and Political Agent engaging on his part to render a faithful account of the sum collected and expenses of management during the occupation of those pergunnahs.

This agreement agreed to at Colapore on the 30th December 1825, between J. H. Baber, Esquire, Political Agent, on the one part; and by Krishna Rao Girde, and Jeeva Rao, Jawda, Havildar, on the other; it is confirmed with certain modifications by the Governor in Council of Bombay, on the 24th January 1826, and will be binding on both parties unless disapproved by the Governor-general in Council.

#### TREATY of Peace with the King of Ava.

TREATY of Peace between the Honourable East India Company, on the one part, and his Majesty the King of Ava, on the other, settled by Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. and K. C. S., commanding the expedition, and Senior Commissioner in Pegue and Ava, Thomas Campbell Robertson, Esq. Civil Commissioner in Pegue and Ava, and Henry Ducie Chads, Esq. Captain commanding His Britannic Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Naval Force on the Irrawaddy River, on the part of the Honourable Company, and by Mengyee Maha-meer-klah Kyanten Woodgyee, Lord of Lay-kaing, and Mengyee Maha-men-klah-thuhah-thoo-Atween-woon, Lord of the Revenue, on the part of the King of Ava, who have each communicated to the other their full powers, agreed to and executed at Yandaboo, in the kingdom of Ava, on the twenty-fourth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six, corresponding with the fourth day of decrease of the Moon Taboung in the year one thousand one hundred and eighty-seven Gandina ara.

ARTICLE 1st.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company, on the one part, and his Majesty the King of Ava, on the other.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE 2d.—His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims upon, and will abstain from all future interference with, the principality of Assam and its dependencies; and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Jyntea. With regard to Munnipore, it is stipulated, that should Gumbheer Sing desire to return to that country, he shall be recognised by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof.

ARTICLE 3d.—To prevent all future disputes respecting the boundary line between the two great nations, the British Government will retain the conquered provinces of Arracan, including the four divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba and Sandoway, and his Majesty the King of Ava cedes all right thereto. The Unospectowment, or Arracan Mountains (known in Arracan by the name of the Yeomattoung, or Pokhingloun Range,) will henceforth form the boundary between the two great nations on that side. Any doubts regarding the said line of demarcation will be settled by Commissioners appointed by the respective Governments for that purpose, such Commissioners from both powers to be of suitable and corresponding rank.

ARTICLE 4th.—His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the British Government the conquered provinces of Yeh Tavoy and Mergue and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining, taking the Saleun River as the line of demarcation on that frontier; any doubts regarding their boundaries will be settled as specified in the concluding part of Article 3d.

ARTICLE 5th.—In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese Government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the nations, and as part indemnification to the British Government for the expenses of the war, his Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of one crore of rupees.

ARTICLE 6th.—No person whatever, whether native or foreign, is hereafter to be molested by either party on account of the part which he may have taken or have been compelled to take in the present war.

ARTICLE 7th.—In order to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two Governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers, retaining an escort or safeguard of fifty men from each, shall reside at the Dharhur of the other, who shall be permitted to purchase or to build a suitable place of residence of permanent materials; and a Commercial Treaty, upon principles of reciprocal advantage, will be entered into by the two high contracting powers.

ARTICLE 8th.—All public and private debts contracted by either government, or by the subjects of either government with the others, previous to the war, to be recognized and liquidated upon the same principles of honour and good faith as if hostilities had not taken place between the two nations, and no advantage shall be taken by either party of the period that may have elapsed since the debts were incurred, or in consequence of the war, and according to the universal law of nations; it is further stipulated that the property of all British subjects who may die in the dominions of his Majesty the King of Ava shall, in the absence of legal heirs, be placed in the hands of the British resident or consul in the said dominions, who will dispose of the same according to the tenor of British law. In like manner the property of Burmese subjects, dying under the same circumstances in any part of the British dominions, shall be made over to the minister or other authority delegated by his Burmese Majesty to the Supreme Government of India.

ARTICLE 9th.—The King of Ava will abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports that are not required from Burmah ships or vessels in British ports; nor shall ships or vessels, the property of British subjects, whether European or Indian, entering the Rangoon River or other Burman ports, be required to land their guns or unship their rudders, or to do any other act not required of Burmese ships or vessels in British ports.

ARTICLE 10th.—The good and faithful ally of the British Government, his Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war, will, to the fullest extent, as far as regards his Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above treaty.

ARTICLE 11th.—This treaty to be ratified by the Burmese authorities competent in the like cases, and the ratification to be accompanied by all British, whether European or native, American, and other prisoners, who will be delivered over to the British Commissioners. The British Commissioners on their part engaging that the said treaty shall be ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council; and the ratification shall be delivered to his Majesty the King of Ava in four months, or sooner if possible; and all the Burmese prisoners shall in like manner be delivered over to their own government as soon as they arrive from Bengal.

(signed) *Largeen Meonya Woonge.*

(signed) *A. Campbell, (L.S.)*  
Major-general and  
Senior Commissioner.

(signed) *Shwagun Woon Atuam.* (Seal of the  
Lootoo.)

(signed) *T. C. Robertson, (L.S.)*  
Civil Commissioner.

(signed) *H. D. Chads, (L.S.)*  
Captain Royal Navy.

VI.  
POLITICAL  
or  
FOREIGN.

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

508 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE [VI. Political.

**ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.**—The British Commissioners being most anxiously desirous to manifest the sincerity of their wish for peace, and to make the immediate execution of the 5th Article of this treaty as little irksome or inconvenient as possible to his Majesty the King of Ava, consent to the following arrangements with respect to the division of the sum total, as specified in the article before referred to, into instalments, viz., upon the payment of 25 lacs of rupees, or one-fourth of the sum total (the other articles of the treaty being executed), the army will retire to Rangoon. Upon the further payment of a similar sum at that place, within 100 days from this date, with the proviso as above, the army will evacuate the dominions of his Majesty the King of Ava with the least possible delay, leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid by equal annual instalments in two years from this 24th day of February 1826, A. D. through the consul or resident in Ava or Pegue, on the part of the Honourable the East India Company.

(signed) *Largen Meeonga Woongee.*

(signed) *C. Campbell, (L. S.)*  
Major-general and  
Senior Commissioner.

(signed) *Shwagun Woon Atawoon.* (Seal of the  
Locoten.

(signed) *T. C. Robertson, (L. S.)*  
Civil Commissioner.

(signed) *H. D. Chads, (L. S.)*  
Captain Royal Navy.

(signed) *Amherst,*  
*Combermere.*  
*J. H. Harrington, (L. S.)*  
*W. B. Bayley.*

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this 11th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1826.

(signed) *George Swinton, Sec<sup>y</sup>. to the Gov<sup>t</sup>.*

**TREATY between the Honourable East India Company and the King of Siam.**

THE powerful lord who is in possession of every good and every dignity, the god Boodh, who dwells over every head in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-ther-sye (titles of the King of Siam), incomprehensible to the head and brain. The sacred beauty of the royal palace, serene and infallible there (titles of the Wuangoo or second King of Siam) have bestowed their commands upon the heads of their Excellencies, the ministers of high rank, belonging to the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-ther-sye, to assemble and frame a treaty with Captain Henry Burney, the English envoy on the part of the English Government, the Honourable East India Company, who govern the countries in India belonging to the English, under the authority of the King and Parliament of England; and the Right honourable Lord Amherst, Governor of Bengal, and other English officers of high rank, have deputed Captain Burney as an envoy to represent them, and to frame a Treaty with their Excellencies, the ministers of high rank, belonging to the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-ther-sye, in view that the Siamese and English nations may become great and true friends; connected in love and affection, with genuine candour and sincerity on both sides. The Siamese and English frame two uniform copies of a Treaty, in order that one copy may be placed in the kingdom of Siam, and that it may become known throughout every great and small province subject to Siam; and in order that one copy may be placed in Bengal, and that it may become known throughout every great and small province subject to the English Government, both copies of the Treaty will be attested by the royal seal, by the seals of their Excellencies, the ministers of high rank in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-ther-sye, and by the seals of the Right honourable Lord Amherst, Governor of Bengal, and of the other English officers of high rank.

**ARTICLE 1st.**—The English and Siamese engage, in friendship, love, and affection, with mutual truth, sincerity and candour. The Siamese must not meditate or commit evil, so as to molest the English in any manner. The English must not meditate or commit evil, so as to molest the Siamese in any manner. The Siamese must not go and molest, attack, disturb, seize or take any place, territory or boundary belonging to the English in any country subject to the English. The English must not go and molest, attack, disturb, seize, or take any place, territory or boundary belonging to the Siamese in any country subject to the Siamese. The Siamese shall settle every matter within the Siamese boundaries, according to their own will and customs.

**ARTICLE 2d.**—Should any place or country subject to the English do anything that may offend the Siamese, the Siamese shall not go and injure such place or country, but first report the matter to the English, who will examine into it with truth and sincerity; and if the fault lie with the English, the English shall punish according to the fault. Should any place or country subject to the Siamese do anything that may offend the English, the English shall not go and injure such place or country, but first report the matter to the Siamese, who will examine into it with truth and sincerity; and if the fault lie with the

Siamese

Siamese, the Siamese shall punish according to the fault. Should any Siamese place or country, that is near an English country, collect at any time an army, or a fleet of boats, if the chief of the English country inquire the object of such force, the chief of the Siamese country must declare it. Should any English place or country, that is near a Siamese country, collect at any time an army, or a fleet of boats, if the chief of the Siamese country inquire the object of such force, the chief of the English country must declare it.

ARTICLE 3d.—In places and countries belonging to the Siamese and English, lying near their mutual borders, whether to the east, west, north or south, if the English entertain a doubt as to any boundary that has not been ascertained, the chief on the side of the English must send a letter with some men and people from his frontier posts, to go and inquire from the nearest Siamese chief who shall depute some of his officers and people from his frontier posts, to go with the men belonging to the English chief, and point out and settle the mutual boundaries, so that they may be ascertained on both sides in a friendly manner. If a Siamese chief entertain a doubt as to any boundary that has not been ascertained, the chief on the side of the Siamese must send a letter with some men and people from his frontier post, to go and inquire from the nearest English chief, who shall depute some of his officers and people from his frontier posts, to go with the men belonging to the Siamese chief, and point out and settle the mutual boundaries, so that they may be ascertained on both sides in a friendly manner.

ARTICLE 4th.—Should any Siamese subject run and go and live within the boundaries of the English, the Siamese must not intrude, enter, seize or take such person within the English boundaries, but must report and ask for him in a proper manner; and the English shall be at liberty to deliver the party or not. Should any English subject run and go and live within the boundaries of the Siamese, the English must not intrude, enter, seize or take such person within the Siamese boundaries, but must report and ask for him in a proper manner; and the Siamese shall be at liberty to deliver the party or not.

ARTICLE 5th.—The English and Siamese having concluded a treaty, establishing a sincere friendship between them; merchants, subject to the English, and their ships, junks and boats, may have intercourse and trade with any Siamese country which has much merchandize; and the Siamese will aid and protect them, and permit them to buy and sell with facility. Merchants, subject to the Siamese, and their boats, junks and ships, may have intercourse and trade with any English country; and the English will aid and protect them, and permit them to buy and sell with facility. The Siamese desiring to go to an English country, or the English desiring to go to a Siamese country, must conform to the customs of the place or country on either side; should they be ignorant of the customs, the Siamese or English officers must explain them. Siamese subjects who visit an English country, must conduct themselves according to the established laws of the English country in every particular. The English subjects who visit a Siamese country, must conduct themselves according to the established laws of the Siamese country in every particular.

ARTICLE 6th.—Merchants subject to the Siamese or English, going to trade either in Bengal, or any country subject to the English, or at Bankok, or in any country subject to the Siamese, must pay the duties upon commerce according to the customs of the place or country on either side; and such merchants and the inhabitants of the country shall be allowed to buy and sell without the intervention of other persons in such countries. Should a Siamese or English merchant have any complaint or suit, he must complain to the officers and governors on either side; and they will examine and settle the same according to the established laws of the place or country on either side. If a Siamese or English merchant buy or sell, without inquiring and ascertaining whether the seller or buyer be of a bad or good character; and if he meet with a bad man, who takes the property and absconds, the rulers and officers must make search and produce the person of the absconder, and investigate the matter with sincerity. If the party possess money or property, he can be made to pay; but if he do not possess any, or if he cannot be apprehended, it will be the merchant's own fault.

ARTICLE 7th.—A merchant subject to the Siamese or English, going to trade in any English or Siamese country, and applying to build godowns or houses, or to buy or hire shops or houses, in which to place his merchandize, the Siamese or English officers and rulers shall be at liberty to deny him permission to stay. If they permit him to stay, he shall land and take up his residence according to such terms as may be mutually agreed on; and the Siamese or English officers and rulers will assist and take proper care of him, preventing the inhabitants of the country from oppressing him, and preventing him from oppressing the inhabitants of the country. Whenever a Siamese, or English merchant or subject, who has nothing to detain him requests permission to leave the country, and to embark with his property on board of any vessel, he shall be allowed to do so with facility.

ARTICLE 8th.—If a merchant desire to go and trade in any place or country belonging to the English or Siamese, and his ship, boat or junk meet with any injury whatever, the English or Siamese officers shall afford adequate assistance and protection. Should any vessel belonging to the Siamese or English be wrecked in any place or country where the English or Siamese may collect any of the property belonging to such vessel, the English or Siamese officers shall make proper inquiry, and cause the property to be restored to its owner, or in case of his death, to his heir, and the owner or heir will give a proper

remuneration to the persons who may have collected the property. If any Siamese or English subject die in an English or Siamese country, whatever property he may leave shall be delivered to his heir; if the heir be not living in the same country, and unable to come, appoint a person by letter to receive the property, the whole of it shall be delivered to such person.

ARTICLE 9th.—Merchants subject to the English, desiring to come and trade in any Siamese country, with which it has not been the custom to have trade and intercourse, must first go and inquire of the Governor of the country. Should any country have no merchandise, the Governor shall inform the ship that has come to trade, that there is none. Should any country have merchandise sufficient for a ship, the Governor shall allow her to come and trade.

ARTICLE 10th.—The English and Siamese mutually agree, that there shall be an unrestricted trade between them in the English countries of Prince of Wales' Island, Malacca and Singapore, and the Siamese countries of Ligore, Merdillon, Singora, Patam, Junkceylon, Queda, and other Siamese provinces. Asiatic merchants of the English countries, not being Burmese, Peguers or descendants of Europeans, shall be allowed to trade freely overland, and by means of the rivers. Asiatic merchants, not being Burmese, Peguers or descendants of Europeans, desiring to enter into and trade with the Siamese dominions, from the countries of Mergni, Tavoy, Tenasserim and Ye, which are now subject to the English, will be allowed to do so freely, overland and by water, upon the English furnishing them with proper certificates; but merchants are forbidden to bring opium, which is positively a contraband article in the territories of Siam; and should a merchant introduce any, the Governor shall seize, burn and destroy the whole of it.

ARTICLE 11th.—If an Englishman desire to transmit a letter to any person in a Siamese or other country, such person only, and no other, shall open and look into the letter. If a Siamese desire to transmit a letter to any person in an English or other country, such person only, and no other, shall open and look into the letter.

ARTICLE 12th.—Siam shall not go and obstruct or interrupt commerce in the states of Tringano and Calantan. English merchants and subjects shall have trade and intercourse in future with the same facility and freedom as they have heretofore had, and the English shall not go and molest, attack or disturb those states upon any pretence whatever.

ARTICLE 13th.—The Siamese engage to the English that the Siamese shall remain in Queda, and take proper care of that country and of its people; the inhabitants of Prince of Wales' Island and of Queda shall have trade and intercourse as heretofore; the Siamese shall levy no duty upon stock and provisions, such as cattle, buffaloes, poultry, fish, paddy, and rice, which the inhabitants of Prince of Wales' Island, or ships there, may have occasion to purchase in Queda; and the Siamese shall not farm the mouths of rivers or any stream in Queda, but shall levy fair and proper import and export duties. The Siamese further engage, that when Chao Phyer, of Ligore, returns from Bankok, he shall release the slaves, personal servants, family and kindred belonging to the former Governor of Queda, and permit them to go and live wherever they please. The English engage to the Siamese, that the English do not desire to take possession of Queda, that they will not attack or disturb it, nor permit the former Governor of Queda, or any of his followers, to attack, disturb or injure in any manner, the territory of Queda, or any other territory subject to Siam. The English engage that they will make arrangements for the former Governor of Queda to go and live in some other country, and not at Prince of Wales' Island or Prye, or in Perak, Salengore, or any Burmese country. If the English do not let the former Governor of Queda go and live in some other country, as here engaged, the Siamese may continue to levy an export duty upon paddy and rice in Queda. The English will not prevent any Siamese, Chinese or other Asiatic, at Prince of Wales' Island, from going to reside in Queda if they desire it.

ARTICLE 14th.—The Siamese and English mutually engage, that the Rajah of Perak shall govern his country according to his own will. Should he desire to send the gold and silver flowers to Siam as heretofore, the English will not prevent his doing as he may desire. If Chao Phya, of Ligore, desire to send down to Perak, with friendly intentions, 40 or 50 men, whether Siamese, Chinese or other Asiatic subjects of Siam; or if the Rajah of Perak desires to send any of his ministers or officers to seek Chao Phya, of Ligore, the English shall not forbid them. The Siamese or English shall not send any force to go and molest, attack or disturb Perak. The English will not allow the State of Salengore to attack or disturb Perak, and the Siamese shall not go and attack or disturb Salengore. The arrangements stipulated in these two last articles respecting Perak and Queda, Chao Phya, of Ligore, shall execute as soon he returns home from Bankok. The 14 articles of this treaty, let the great and subordinate Siamese and English officers, together with every great and small province, hear, receive and obey without fail. Their Excellencies the ministers of high rank at Bankok, and Captain Henry Burney, whom the Right honourable Lord Amherst, Governor of Bengal, deputed as an Envoy to represent his Lordship, framed this treaty together, in the presence of Prince Krom Menu Soorin Thirakser, in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-ther-sye. The treaty written in the Siamese, Malayan, and English languages, was concluded on Tuesday, on the first day of the seventh decreasing moon, 1188 year, dog 8, according to the Siamese era, corresponding with the

20th day of June 1826, of the European era. Both copies of the treaty are sealed and attested by their Excellencies the Ministers, and by Captain Henry Burney. One copy Captain Burney will take for the ratification of the Governor of Bengal; and one copy, bearing the royal seal, Chao Phya, of Ligore, will take and place at Queda. Captain Burney appoints to return to Prince of Wales' Island in seven months, in the second moon of the year dog 8, and to exchange the ratification of this treaty with Phra Phak di Bor-rak at Queda. The Siamese and English will form a friendship that shall be perpetuated, that shall know no end or interruptions as long as heaven and earth appear.

A literal translation from the Siamese.

(signed) *H. Burney, Captain,*  
Envoy to the Court of Siam.

(Place for  
the King of  
Siam's Seal.)

(L. s.) (signed) *Amherst.*

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Camp, at Agra, this 17th day January, 1827.

(L. s.) By command of the Governor-general.

(L. s.) (signed) *A. Stirling, Secretary to Govt,*  
In attendance on the Governor-general.

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Chak-kri.)

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Akho Mahasara  
(Kalabona).)

(L. s.) (signed) *Combermere.*

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Phra, Khlang.)

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Tharana.)

(L. s.) (signed) *J. H. Harrington.*

(Seal of  
Chao-Phya  
Phallo-thep.)

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Yomarat.)

(L. s.) (signed) *W. B. Bayley.*

(Sealed and  
signed)

(signed) *H. Burney, Captain,*  
Envoy to the Court of Siam from  
the Right honourable the Governor-  
general of British India.

(L. s.) By command of the Vice-president in Council.

(L. s.) (signed) *G. Swinton, Secretary to Govt.*

#### TREATY with the Rajah of Nagpore.

TREATY of perpetual Friendship and Alliance between the Honourable the East India Company and his Highness Maharajah Ragojee Bhoolah, his heirs and successors, settled by Richard Jenkins, Esquire, Resident at the Court of his Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the Right honourable William Pitt, Lord Amherst, one of His Britannic Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, Governor-general in Council appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies:—

Whereas a treaty of perpetual defensive alliance, consisting of fifteen articles, was concluded at Nagpore, between the Honourable the East India Company and the State of Nagpore, under date the 27th May 1816, corresponding with the 28th of Jumadon Senee, in the year of the Hegira 1231; and whereas, during the subsistence of that treaty in full force, in violation of public faith and of the laws of nations, an attack was made by Rajah Moodhahjee Bhoolah on the British Resident and the troops of his ally stationed at Nagpore for the said Rajah's protection, thereby dissolving the said treaty, annulling the relations of peace and amity between the two states, placing the state of Nagpore at the mercy of the British Government and the Maharajah's Musnud at its disposal; and whereas the British Government, still recollecting the former close alliance, consented to restore the relations of amity and friendship, and to replace his Highness on the musnud; and whereas in utter forgetfulness of this lenity, and in disregard of every principle of faith and honour, Appa Sahab entered into fresh concert with the enemies of the British Government: that Government was consequently compelled to remove him from the musnud, and Maharajah Ragojee Bhoolah having succeeded to the same by the favour of the said Government, the following treaty is concluded between the states.

ARTICLE 1st.—All articles of the treaty concluded at Nagpore on the 27th of May 1816, which are not contrary to the tenor of the present engagement, are hereby confirmed.

ARTICLE 2d.—Although the Rajah assumes, with the permission of the British Government, the title and ensigns of Sena Sahab Soobah, which have been held by former Rajahs of Nagpore; he hereby renounces for ever, for himself and successors, all dependence upon or connexion with the Rajah of Sattara or other Mahratta powers, and agrees to relinquish all ceremonies and observances whatever, referring to the dignity of Sena Sahab Soobah.

(445.—VI.)



**ARTICLE 3d.**—By the 10th article of the treaty of Nagpore, it is agreed that the Maharajah is neither to commence nor to pursue any negotiation with any other state whatever, without giving previous notice to, and entering into mutual consultation with the Company's Government. In order to the more effectual fulfilment of this article, Maharajah Ragojee Bhosolah hereby agrees neither to maintain vakeels or other agents at the courts of any foreign state whatever, or to permit the residence of vakeels or other agents from any such state at his court; and his Highness further engages to hold no communication with any power whatever, except through the Resident or other minister of the Honourable Company's Government residing at his Highness's Court.

**ARTICLE 4th.**—By the 4th article of the treaty of Nagpore, it was agreed that with the reserve of two battalions of sepoy, which were to remain near the Rajah's person, the residue of the subsidiary force which the British Government thereby agreed to furnish, should be posted in such a situation near the south bank of the Nerbudda, as might be chosen by the British Government. By the present article, it is agreed that the British Government shall be at liberty in future to station its troops in any part of the Rajah's territories, as it may deem necessary for their protection and the maintenance of tranquillity; and also to decide upon the number of troops to be so maintained, whether greater or smaller than the amount of the subsidiary force before fixed.

**ARTICLE 5th.**—The late Rajah Moodhajeo Bhosolah, commonly called Appa Sahab, agreed to cede to the Honourable Company certain territories for the payment of the expenses of the permanent military force maintained by the British Government in his Highness's territories, and in lieu of the subsidy of 7,50,000 rupees formerly paid by the said Rajah, and of the contingent he was bound to maintain by the former treaty. These territories, as detailed in the Schedule annexed to this treaty, shall remain for ever under the dominion of the Honourable Company. His Highness Maharajah Ragojee Bhosolah hereby expressly renounces all claims and pretensions of whatever description on the territories aforesaid, and all connexion with the chiefs and zemindars or other inhabitants of them; the British Government on its part, hereby guarantees the rest of the dominions of the Nagpore state to Maharajah Ragojee Bhosolah, his heirs and successors.

**ARTICLE 6th.**—As it may be found that some of the territories ceded to the British Government in the foregoing article would, from their situation, be more conveniently attached to the territories of the Nagpore state, his Highness agrees that such exchanges of talooks and lands shall be made hereafter on terms of a fair valuation of their respective revenues, as may be necessary for the convenience of both parties; and it is agreed and covenanted that the territories to be assigned and ceded to the Honourable Company by the 5th article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated eventually in this article, shall be subject to the exclusive management of the said Company and their officers.

**ARTICLE 7th.**—The British Government undertook, during the Rajah's minority, the settlement and management of the whole of the country reserved to his Highness, and the general direction of his affairs in his Highness's name and on his behalf. His Highness's homage, according to Hindoo law and usage, being now expired, the powers of Government and the administration of his dominions under the several conditions and exceptions herein-after specified are declared to be vested in the Rajah.

**ARTICLE 8th.**—For the more complete and effectual fulfilment of this intention and object of the 11th article of the treaty of 27th May 1816, the military force of the state of Nagpore, with the exception of a small body of infantry and horse, which may be maintained with the sanction of the British Government for the Rajah's personal retinue and the requisite subsidies for the police and collection of revenue (to be subject to the same sanction with regard to their numbers, descriptions and employment), shall always remain under the authority of the British Government and at its disposal for his Highness's benefit, and sufficient funds shall be permanently appropriated for its regular payment from his Highness's resources.

**ARTICLE 9th.**—The districts of Deogurh above the Ghauts, Chandah, Saughee and Chutteesgurh, and their dependencies, together with some additional districts, yielding altogether a clear net revenue of 17 lacs of rupees per annum, will for the present be retained under the management of European superintendents acting for the Rajah, but subject to the orders of the British Resident, to provide funds for the payment of the military establishments referred to in the preceding article, and for the civil expenses of the said districts. A true and faithful account of the revenue and produce of the said districts, and of the military and civil disbursements, shall be rendered to his Highness, and any surplus remaining after payment of the above charges shall be paid into his Highness's treasury.

The rest of his Highness's territories, including the city of Nagpore, shall be replaced under the direct administration of his Highness and his ministers, the British superintendence being gradually withdrawn; and it is hereby further declared, that whenever the state of the districts retained under British superintendence under this article, and the success of his Highness's management in the country now transferred to him shall appear to the British Government to justify such a measure, the districts excepted in this article shall also be restored to the direct management of the Rajah; his Highness appropriating sufficient funds from his resources for the payment of the military force, and the British Government

Government remaining the medium of conducting all affairs with the tributary chiefs and zemindars of the country.

ARTICLE 10th.—In the management of the country transferred to the Rajah's immediate authority by the preceding article, and in that of the excepted districts when restored to his Highness's control, Rajah Ragojee Bhosolah hereby promises to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the British Government shall judge it necessary to offer him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenue, the administration of justice and police, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people and the mutual welfare of both states, and always to conduct the affairs of his government by the hands of ministers in the confidence of the British Government, and responsible to it, as well as to his Highness, in the exercise of their duties in every branch of the administration.

His Highness specifically agrees to adopt such regulations and ordinances as may be suggested by the British Government through its representative at his Highness's court, for ensuring order, economy and integrity in every department of his government, and the engagements and settlements which have been or may be concluded with the putels and ryots, or others in his name, through the intervention of British agents, shall be faithfully maintained and acted upon. The civil establishments of the government, the appointment of persons to fill them, and the expenditure on account of those establishments, as well as of his Highness's court and household, shall be fixed and continued according to the advice of the British Government; and the resident shall be at all times at liberty to inspect and investigate the accounts of the receipts and disbursements of the government in every branch, as well as to have access to the treasury, in order to be assured of the actual state of the finances.

ARTICLE 11th.—If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any state or power, Rajah Ragojee Bhosolah agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the military force, and the unavoidable charges of the war, such a sum as shall appear to the British Government, on an attentive consideration of the means of his said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenue of his said Highness.

ARTICLE 12th.—And whereas the interests and reputation of the contracting parties require that the prosperity of his Highness's dominions should be increased and perpetuated by the operation of this treaty; and it is indispensable that effectual and lasting security should be provided for the welfare and happiness of the people, and against any failure in the funds destined to defray the expenses of his Highness's permanent military establishment in the time of peace, as well as to secure an eventual surplus for the purposes mentioned in the 11th article, it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that if from the mismanagement of his Highness's officers, and from the neglect of the advice and suggestions of the British Government on the part of his Highness, the British Government shall have reason to apprehend, at any future period, a failure in the funds so destined, or a deterioration, instead of the expected improvement in his Highness's resources and in the condition of the people, the British Government shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the British Government such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness as shall appear to the said Government necessary to render the funds efficient and available either in time of peace or war, or the whole, should the welfare of the country require it.

ARTICLE 13th.—It is hereby further agreed, that whenever the British Government shall signify to the said Maharajah Ragojee Bhosolah, that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provision of the 12th article, his said Highness shall immediately issue orders to his amils or other officers for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the said government; and in case his Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the British Government shall be at liberty to issue orders by its own authority for assuming the collections and management of the said territories: provided always, that whenever and as long as any part of his said Highness's territories shall be placed and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the said British Government, the said Government shall render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed; provided also, that in no case whatever shall his Highness's actual receipt of annual income, arising out of his territorial revenue, be less than the fifth part of the net revenues of the whole of his territories, which amount of one-fifth of the said net revenues, the British Government engages at all times to secure and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

ARTICLE 14th.—The hill of Seetabulde and that adjacent to it, with the land and bazars adjoining, within a boundary line which will be settled, shall be annexed to the British residency; and the British Government shall be at full liberty to keep up the necessary works for rendering them a good military position which have been or may be erected upon them, or elsewhere within the boundary aforesaid.

The Maharajah also engages at all times to furnish such pasture land as may be required for

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for the use of British forces at the most convenient places adjoining to the cantonments of the different divisions of the said forces.

ARTICLE 15th.—The Maharajah also agrees that the British Government shall be at all times at liberty to garrison and occupy such fortresses and strong places within his dominions as it shall appear to them advisable to take charge of; and that all officers and all troops, whether individually or collectively, belonging to the Honourable Company, shall have free ingress to and egress from all his Highness's forts and places of strength when necessary for their safety.

ARTICLE 16th.—Whenever called upon by the British Government, the Maharajah agrees to collect as many brinjaries as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in convenient places, for the purpose of aiding the supplies of the armies of both states in any contest in which they may be engaged.

ARTICLE 17th.—This treaty, consisting of seventeen articles, being settled and concluded at Nagpore, on the 1st day of December, in the year 1826, corresponding with first Jumadee 1st, in the year of the Hegira 1242, by Richard Jenkins, Esq. with Maharajah Ragojee Bhonsla, Mr. Jenkins has delivered to the said Maharajah a copy of the same in English, Persian and Mahratta, sealed and signed by himself; and his Highness has delivered to Mr. Jenkins another copy, also in English, Persian and Mahratta, bearing his Highness's seal and signature, and Mr. Jenkins has engaged to procure and deliver to his Highness, without delay, a copy of the same duly ratified by the Right Honourable William Pitt, Lord Amherst, Governor-general, &c. &c. &c., on the receipt of which by his said Highness, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable East India Company and on his Highness, and the copy now delivered to his said Highness shall be returned.

(Governor-general's  
Seal)

(signed) *Amherst.*

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council at Shahjihanpore, this 13th day of December 1826, A. D.

(signed) *A. Stirling*, Secretary to the Government,  
In attendance on the Governor-general.

SCHEDULE of Cessions to the British Government.

- |                           |                                      |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1st. Mundilla, including  | 7. Kutungee.                         |
| 1. Fort of Mundilla.      | 8. Ghinsoor.                         |
| 2. Burgee.                | 9. Goondoe.                          |
| 2d. Jubbulpore, including | 10. Oogullee.                        |
| 1. Hrudlee Gurha.         | 11. Chindee.                         |
| 2. Seehora.               | 12. Chulpura, and 2 Khasee villages. |
| 3. Sondpore.              | 4th. Chouragurh, including           |
| 4. Khoombhee.             | 1. The Fort of Chouragurh.           |
| 5. Bhunee Ban.            | 2. Shapoor.                          |
| 6. Ghosalpore, including  | 3. The Kuzba of Chougan.             |
| 1. Sirclee.               | 5th. Rewa, including                 |
| 2. Kooa.                  | 1. Bohurgurh.                        |
| 3. Turwa.                 | 2. Bara.                             |
| 4. Ghosalpore             | 3. Sakurguira.                       |
| 7. Funnagurh.             | 4. Babnee.                           |
| 8. Mujholee.              | 5. Sewnee.                           |
| 9. Kemoree.               | 6. Bhambooree Zumala.                |
| 10. Bareilly.             | 7. Singpore Bara.                    |
| 11. Bulhory.              | 8. Buchae.                           |
| 12. Tezgurh.              | 9. Pelapumee.                        |
| 13. Kusingee, &c.         | 10. Hoosingsabad.                    |
| Zeminder Talooks.         | 11. Zumanee.                         |
| 1. Mulumpoor.             | 12. Sohagpore.                       |
| 2. Peepreea.              | 13. Chiklee Bara.                    |
| 3. Mungurh.               | 6th. Baitool, including              |
| 4. Narayumpoor.           | 1. Huvellee Khalea Baitool:          |
| 5. Nuwas.                 | 2. Jayutgurh Amla.                   |
| 6. Wurea.                 | 3. Khunder Kirawundee.               |
| 7. Senghoree Chaya.       | 4. Jamuee.                           |
| 8. Bundra.                | 5. Musud.                            |
| 9. Sahupoor.              | 6. Sowligurh.                        |
| 8d. Sewnee, including     | 7. Mhairdue.                         |
| 1. Sewnee.                | 7th. Moolagee, including             |
| 2. Doongureeza.           | 1. Mootayee.                         |
| 3. Anee Ushta.            | 2. Suykhera.                         |
| 4. Denosbee.              | 3. Satner.                           |
| 5. Dungurthat.            | 4. Patan.                            |
| 6. Kuroia.                |                                      |

5. Mandree.
6. Ashta.
7. Metsalwaree.
8. Pownee.
9. Ashner.
- 8th. Sumbulpoor, including
  1. Khalsa Sumbulpoor.
  2. Chunderpoor.
  3. Ambowna.
  4. Kurrul.
  5. Ghems.
  6. Hootal.
  7. Burpalee.
  8. Patkulda.
  9. Sukunpoor.
  10. Boordah.
  11. Barbar Killa.
  12. Phoordah.
  13. Dama.
  14. Soungah.
  15. Sappurgurh.
  16. Serrah.
  17. Coolabora.
  18. Rampoor.
  19. Rejepoor.
  20. Pundumpoor.

Zemindarries.

1. Sumbulpoor.
2. Burgurh, including
  - Half of Boteea, and
  - Half of Saragong.
3. Suktee, including
  - Half of Boteea, and
  - Half of Saragong.
4. Saringurh, including
  - Sureea.

- Suraawah.
- Sobagpoor.
5. Gungpoor.
6. Boree.
7. Boomra.
8. Berakole.
9. Soondpoor.

Patna and its Dependencies.

1. Patna.
2. Assee Salda.
3. Jura Singa.
4. Bectata.
5. Deakgurh.
6. Topal.
7. Teelgurh.
8. Gumleea Dolah.
9. Huldee.
10. Sandukala.
11. Surpehar.
12. Bud Puhar.
13. Boy Moorda.
14. Salee Butha.
15. Hatkund.
16. Doonbatta.

Patna Zemindarries.

1. Patna Proper.
2. Phool Gher.
3. Boora Samer.
4. Rumoon.
5. Autgroom.
6. Sohar Singha.
7. Kheriar.
8. Nuwagurh.
9. Dewlee.
10. Sohagpoor Bhugdoker.

REVISED ENGAGEMENT between the Honourable Company and the Rajah of Nagpore.

WHEREAS, in view to the promotion of the welfare, dignity and independence of the Rajah of Nagpore, and to the mutual benefit and convenience of the Honourable Company and his Highness's Government, it has been deemed expedient to alter and modify certain articles of the treaty of 13th December 1826, the following provisions have accordingly been arranged and concluded; on the one part by Francis B. S. Wilder, Esq., Resident at the Court of Nagpore, in the name and on behalf of the Right honourable Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-general in Council, and on the other by Maha Rajah Ragojee Bhoosla, Rajah of Nagpore.

ARTICLE 1st.—Articles 8th and 9th of the existing treaty are hereby rescinded, and it is agreed that in lieu of the obligations contracted by those articles, the Rajah of Nagpore shall pay to the British Government an annual subsidy of sonnat rupees eight lacs per annum, by quarterly instalments, i. e. on the 6th September, 6th December, 6th March and 6th June of each year; in consideration whereof the reserved districts will be given up to his Highness's management, and his army made over entirely to his own authority and disposal, the British officers employed in the Nagpore service being at the same time withdrawn. The transfer of territory is to take effect from the close of the present Nagpore Fuzily year, on 6th June 1880; arrangements for gradually disbanding the auxiliary force, as at present constituted, will be immediately put in train, it being of course the duty of the Rajah to provide in their room, and from his own funds, a national force adequate to the ordinary protection of his subjects, and the performance of internal duties.

ARTICLE 2d.—The Rajah agrees to respect and abide by the conditions of the quinquennial settlements, concluded with potails, ryots and others, by the British authorities in his name, during the period for which the several leases were contracted. His Highness also binds himself to maintain inviolate, all agreements and engagements formed with the Goud and other tributary chiefs and zemindars by British officers, under the sanction and authority of the Resident.

ARTICLE 3d.—Articles 10th, 12th and 13th of the existing treaty are hereby cancelled, and the following modified provisions substituted in lieu thereof. It shall be competent to the

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the British Government, through its local representatives to offer advice to the Maha Raja, his heirs and successors, on all important matters, whether relating to the internal administration of the Nagpore territory, or to external concerns, and his Highness shall be bound to act in conformity thereto; if, which God forbid, gross and systematic apprehension, anarchy and misrule should hereafter at any time prevail, in neglect of repeated advice and remonstrance, seriously endangering the public tranquillity, and placing in jeopardy the stability of the resources, whence his Highness discharges his obligations to the Honourable Company, the British Government reserves to itself the right of reappointing its own officers to the management of such district or districts of the Nagpore territory in his Highness's name, and for so long a period as it may deem necessary, the surplus receipts in such cases, after defraying charges, to be paid into the Rajah's treasury.

**ARTICLE 4th.**—Article 11th of the existing treaty is hereby declared subject to the following modification. In lieu of the obligation it imposes, the Rajah agrees to maintain at all times in a state of efficiency, a body of not less than 1,000 of the best description of irregular horse, organized and disciplined after the native fashion, commanded by his own native officers, and subject to his Highness's exclusive authority. In the event of war, this force shall be liable to serve with the British army in the field, receiving batta from the Honourable Company in compensation of the extra expense of their maintenance, whenever employed beyond the Nagpore frontier.

**ARTICLE 5th.**—Article 15th of the existing treaty is hereby abrogated.

**ARTICLE 6th.**—All the other provisions and conditions of the treaty concluded at Nagpore on the 13th December 1826, which are not affected by the above convention, are to remain in full force and effect.

**ARTICLE 7th.**—This engagement, consisting of seven articles, being settled and concluded at Nagpore on the 26th day of December 1829, corresponding with 29 Jumadila Kher, in the year of the Hegira 1245, by Francis B. S. Wilder, Esq., with Maha Raja Ragoojee Bhicosla, Mr. Wilder has delivered to the said Maha Raja a copy of the same in English, Persian, and Mahratta, sealed and signed by himself; and his Highness has delivered to Mr. Wilder another copy, also in English, Persian, and Mahratta, bearing his Highness's seal and signature; and Mr. Wilder has engaged to procure and deliver to his Highness, without delay, a copy of the same, duly ratified by the Right honourable Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-general, &c. &c. &c., on the receipt of which, by his Highness, the present engagement shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable East India Company, and on his Highness, and the copy now delivered to his said Highness shall be returned.

Given on the 26th December 1829, corresponding with the 29th Jumadila Kher 1245.

(signed) *F. B. S. Wilder*, Resident.  
*W. C. Bentinck*,  
*Dalhousie*  
*W. B. Bayly*,  
*C. T. Metcalfe*.

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, the 15th day of January 1830.

(signed) *A. Stirling*, Secretary to Government.

THEIR Excellencies the Ministers and Captain *Henry Burney* having settled a treaty of friendship, consisting of fourteen articles, now frame the following Agreement with respect to English vessels desiring to come and trade in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yo-ther-sye (Bankok).

**ARTICLE 1st.**—Vessels belonging to the subjects of the English Government, whether Europeans or Asiatics, desiring to come and trade at Bankok, must conform to the established laws of Siam in every particular. Merchants coming to Bankok are prohibited from purchasing paddy or rice, for the purpose of exporting the same as merchandize; and if they import fire-arms, shot, or gunpowder, they are prohibited from selling them to any party but to the government. Should the government not require such fire-arms, shot, or gunpowder, the merchants must re-export the whole of them. With exceptions to such warlike stores, and paddy and rice, merchants, subjects of the English, and merchants at Bankok, may buy and sell without the intervention of any other person, and with freedom and facility. Merchants coming to trade shall pay at once the whole of the duties and charges consolidated according to the breadth of the vessel.

If the vessel bring an import cargo, she shall be charged seventeen hundred (1,700) triels for each Siamese fathom in breadth.

If the vessel bring no import cargo, she shall be charged fifteen hundred (1,500) triels for each Siamese fathom in breadth.

No import, export or other duty shall be levied upon the buyers or sellers from or to English subjects.

ARTICLE 2d.—Merchants' vessels, the property of English subjects, arriving off the bar, must first anchor and stop there, and the commander of the vessel must despatch a person with an account of the cargo, and a return of the people, guns, shot, and powder on board the vessel, for the information of the governor, at the mouth of the river, who will send a pilot and interpreter to convey the established regulations to the commander of the vessel. Upon the pilot bringing the vessel over the bar, she must anchor and stop below the chokey, which the interpreter will point out.

ARTICLE 3d.—The proper officers will go on board the vessel and examine her thoroughly, and after the guns, shot, and powder have been removed and deposited at Panam (port at the mouth of the Menam) the governor of Panam will permit the vessel to pass up to Bangkok.

ARTICLE 4th.—Upon the vessel's arriving at Bangkok, the officers of the customs will go on board and examine her, open her hold, and take an account of whatever cargo may be on board, and after the breadth of the vessel has been measured and ascertained, the merchants will be allowed to buy and sell according to the first article of this agreement. Should a vessel upon receiving an export cargo, find that she cannot cross the bar with the whole, and that she must hire cargo boats to take down a portion of the cargo, the officers of the customs and chokeys shall not charge any further duty upon such cargo boats.

ARTICLE 5th.—Whenever a vessel or cargo boat completes her lading, the commander of the vessel must go and ask Chao-Phya-Phra-Khlang for a port clearance, and if there be no cause for detention, Chao-Phya-Phra-Khlang shall deliver the port clearance without delay. When the vessel, upon her departure, arrives at Panam, she must anchor and stop at the usual chokey, and after the proper officers have gone on board and examined her, the vessel may receive her guns, shot, and powder, and take her departure.

ARTICLE 6th.—Merchants being subjects of the English Government, whether Europeans or Asiatics, the commanders, officers, Lascars, and the whole of the crew of the vessels must conform to the established laws of Siam, and to the stipulations of this treaty in every particular. If merchants of every class do not observe the articles of this treaty and oppress the inhabitants of the country, become thieves or bad men, kill men, speak offensively of, or treat disrespectfully, any great or subordinate officers of the country, and the case become important, in every way whatever the proper officers shall take jurisdiction of it, and punish the offenders. If the offence be homicide, and the officers upon investigation see that it proceeded from evil intention, they shall punish with death; if it be any other offence, and the party be the commander or officer of a vessel or a merchant, he shall be fined; if he be of a lower rank, he shall be whipped or imprisoned, according to the established laws of Siam. The Governor of Bengal will prohibit English subjects desiring to come and trade at Bangkok from speaking disrespectfully or offensively to one of the great officers in Siam. If any person at Bangkok oppresses any English subjects, he shall be punished according to his offence in the same manner.

The six articles of this agreement let the officers at Bangkok and merchants subject to the English fulfil and obey in every particular.

A literal translation from the Siamese.

(signed) *H. Burney*, Captain,  
Envoy to the Court of Siam.

(Place for  
the King of  
Siam's Seal.)

(L. s.) (signed) *Amherst*.

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, at Agra, this 17th day of January, 1827.

(L. s.) By command of the Governor-general.

(L. s.) (signed) *A. Stirling*, Secretary to Govt.  
In attendance on the Governor-general.

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Chak-kr.) (Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Akko Mahasarak  
(Kalabour)

(L. s.) (signed) *Combermere*.

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Phra Khlang.) (Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Thurnew.)

(L. s.) (signed) *J. H. Harrington*.

(Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Pholli-thep.) (Seal of  
Chao Phya  
Yomort.)

(L. s.) (signed) *W. B. Bayley*.

(Sealed and  
signed.)

(signed) *H. Burney*, Captain,  
Envoy to the Court of Siam from  
the Right honourable the Governor-  
general of British India.

(L. s.) By command of the Vice-president in Council.

(L. s.) (signed) *G. Swinton*, Secretary to Govt.

Appendix, No. 20.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

ARTICLES of AGREEMENT concluded between *Raja Shah Chetraputtee Kurneer Kur,*  
*Rajah of Colapore,* and the British Government.

PREAMBLE:—Whereas a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded between the British Government and his Highness the Rajah of Colapore, on the 24th of January 1826; and whereas his Highness has lately committed several acts in direct violation of the said treaty, and in hostile opposition to the British Government; the following articles for repealing, altering, and confirming respectively the conditions of the said treaty, and providing for others of a new nature, have been agreed on between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 1st.—In the 2d article of the aforesaid treaty, his Highness Chetraputtee Sahab engaged to reduce his army to the peace establishment, and never to raise "or assemble such a force as should be likely to endanger the public tranquillity, within or without his dominions, unless with the previous consent of the British Government;" notwithstanding which, his Highness lately collected a large army, and in spite of all advice from the British Government proceeded to commit a variety of excesses; it has therefore become requisite to limit the number of his Highness's troops, and he hereby engages not to keep more than 400 horse (including *Khas Pergah Surinjamee, Shetsundee, &c.*) and 800 of infantry, exclusive of moderate garrisons for his forts, as per annexed list. His Highness further engages never to be accompanied by guns, without the sanction of the British Government.

ARTICLE 2d.—In the 4th article of the above treaty, the British Government ceded the districts of "Chickree and Manowlee in full sovereignty to his Highness," he engaging, "on his part, to respect the right and privileges of the zemindars, enamdars and wuttandars of the said districts." When this grant was made by the British Government, it was hoped that peace and good-will would have subsisted for many generations between the two Governments; but instead of this, his Highness has uniformly evinced a total disregard of the friendship of the British Government, and in violation of the above conditions, has repeatedly infringed the rights of the enamdars and wuttandars of these talooks. It therefore becomes necessary that his Highness should give back to the British Government the said talooks in the same state in which he received them, and his Highness hereby agrees to do so.

ARTICLE 3d.—In the 7th article of the said treaty, the possessions of Bhoori Maharaj and Baba Maharaj were guaranteed to them for the terms of their respective lives only (provision being made that the rights of their descendants, as founded on sunnud or custom, should not be prejudiced by the cessation of the said guarantee). As, however, his Highness Chetraputtee Sahab has never ceased to annoy and distress their persons, by seizing their villages and other property, it has been deemed necessary to extend the guarantee of the British Government to their descendants, and his Highness accordingly engages never to molest them.

ARTICLE 4th.—Maharaj Chetraputtee Sahab having, on the death of Wiswar Rao Ghatkey, resumed all but two of the eight and half villages held by him in the Kagul talook, now engages to restore the whole to the heir of the deceased, and never again to interfere with them.

ARTICLE 5th.—It having been deemed necessary, in consequence of the number of robberies committed on the Surinjamee and other persons under the protection of the British Government, by the inhabitants of Akewat, and of its being a place of general resort for robbers, that it should be given up to the British Government, the Maharaj hereby engages to cede the same, together with the lands adjoining, to the value of 1,000 rupees per annum.

ARTICLE 6th.—His Highness Chetraputtee Sahab having compelled the British Government, by various acts of aggression committed in direct breach of the above treaty, to have recourse to arms, it has been deemed necessary, as security for his future good conduct, that he should admit British garrisons into the forts of Colapore and Pannallaghur, and his Highness hereby accordingly agrees to do so, and further engages to pay the expense of such garrisons.

ARTICLE 7th.—His Highness Chetraputtee Sahab having hitherto neglected to afford redress to Govind Rao Sahab Putwurdun Appajee Rao Seetole Bou Maharaj, and Baba Maharaj, for the injuries done to them in 1826, as agreed with the late political agent, Mr. Baber, and having recently committed still more serious aggressions against these and other chiefs, under the protection of the British Government, his Highness hereby engages to pay, as per annexed Schedule, the sum of one lac forty-seven thousand nine hundred and forty-eight rupees (1,47,948), the same being the aggregate amount of claims admitted, after a full investigation, to be due to the injured parties; and his Highness further agrees to transfer to the British Government, for the purpose of liquidating the said debt, territory yielding an annual revenue of 50,000 rupees, the principal collector and political agent engaging on his part to render a faithful account of the sums collected and expenses of management during the occupation of the said territory.

ARTICLE 8th.—The British Government deeming it necessary to appoint a chief minister for the future management of the Rajah's government, his Highness Chetraputtee Sahab hereby

hereby engages to be guided by his advice in all matters relating to the administration of his state, the British Government having the sole power of appointing or removing the said minister as they may see fit.

ARTICLE 9th.—Such parts of the former treaty concluded on the 24th day of January 1826, as are not affected by the provisions of the present agreement, shall remain in full force, and are mutually binding on the contracting parties.

This treaty, agreed to at Colapore on the 23d day of October 1827, between Josiah Nisbet, Esq., political agent, on the one part, and Raje Sah Chetraputtee, Rajah of Colapore, on the other; and confirmed by the Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, on the 5th day of November 1827, is here finally ratified.

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Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT between the *Rajah Shah Chetraputtee Kuraveer Kur*, Rajah of Colapore, and the British Government.

PREAMBLE.—Whereas a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded between the British Government and his Highness the Rajah of Colapore, on the 24th of January 1826; and whereas his Highness having committed several acts in direct violation of the said treaty, and in hostile opposition to the British Government, a preliminary treaty for repealing, altering, and confirming respectively the conditions of the aforesaid treaty, and providing for others of a new nature, was agreed to at Colapore on the 24th of October, A. D. 1827, between Raj Sah Chetraputtee Maharaj, Rajah of Colapore, on the one part; and Josiah Nisbet, Esq., political agent, on the other; and whereas it has been deemed advisable to modify certain parts of the said preliminary treaty, the following articles are now finally agreed on by the two Governments:

ARTICLE 1st.—In the 2d article of the aforesaid treaty, his Highness Chetraputtee Sahab agreed “to reduce his army to the peace establishment, and never to raise or assemble such a force as should be likely to endanger the public tranquillity within or without his dominions, unless with the previous consent of the British Government;” notwithstanding which, his Highness lately collected a large army, and in spite of all advice from the British Government, proceeded to commit a variety of excess; it has therefore become requisite to limit the number of his Highness's troops; and his Highness hereby engages not to keep more than 400 horse (including “Khas Pagah,” “Surnajamee,” “Shelsundee,” &c.) and 800 infantry, exclusive of moderate garrisons for his forts as per annexed list. His Highness further engages never to be accompanied by guns without the sanction of the British Government.

ARTICLE 2d.—In the 4th article of the above treaty, the British Government “ceded the districts of Chiecover and Manowlee in full sovereignty to his Highness, he engaging on his part to respect the rights and privileges of the zemindars, “enamdars,” and “wuttundars,” of the said districts. When this grant was made by the British Government, it was hoped that peace and good-will would have subsisted for many generations between the two Governments, but instead of this, his Highness has uniformly evinced a total disregard of the friendship of the British Government, and in violation of the above conditions, has repeatedly infringed the rights of the enamdars and wuttundars of those talooks; it therefore becomes necessary that his Highness should give back to the British Government the said talooks in the same state in which he received them, and his Highness hereby agrees to do so.

ARTICLE 3d.—In the 7th article of the said treaty, the possessions of Bhow Maharaj and Baba Maharaj were guaranteed to them for the terms of their respective lives only (provision being made that “the rights of their descendants, as founded on sunnud or custom, should not be prejudiced by the cessation of the said guarantee”); as however his Highness Chetraputtee Sahab has never ceased to annoy and distress those persons by seizing their villages and other property, it has been deemed necessary to extend the guarantee of the British Government to their descendants, and his Highness accordingly engages never to molest them.

ARTICLE 4th.—Maharaj Chetraputtee Sahab having, on the death of Wiswas Rao Ghatkay, resumed all but two of the eight and a half villages held by him in the Kagul talook, now engages to restore the whole to the heir of the deceased, and never again to interfere with them.

ARTICLE 5th.—It having been deemed necessary, in consequence of the number of robberies committed on “Sursinjamedars,” and other persons under the protection of the British Government, by the inhabitants of Akewat, and of its being a place of general resort for robbers, that it should be given up to the British Government; the Maharaj hereby engages to cede the same, together with lands adjoining, to the value of 10,000 rupees per annum.

ARTICLE 6th.—His Highness Chetraputtee Sahab having compelled the British Government by various acts of aggression, committed in direct breach of the above treaty, to have recourse to arms, it has been deemed necessary, as security for his future good conduct, that he should admit British garrisons into the forts of Colapore and Punnalagbur, and



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**Copies of Treaties,  
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his Highness hereby accordingly agrees to do so, and further engages to pay the expense of such garrisons.

**ARTICLE 7th.**—His Highness Chetraputtee Sahib having hitherto neglected to afford redress to Govind Rao Sahib Palwurdun, Appajee Rao Seetole, Bhow Maharaj and Baba Maharaj, for the injuries done to them in 1826, as agreed with the late political agent, Mr. Baber; and having recently committed still more serious aggressions against those and other chiefs under the protection of the British Government; his Highness hereby engages to pay as per annexed Schedule, the sum of one lac forty-seven thousand nine hundred and forty-eight rupees (1,47,948), the same being the aggregate amount of claims admitted, after a full investigation, to be due to the injured parties; and his Highness further agrees to transfer to the British Government, for the purpose of liquidating the said debt, territory yielding an annual revenue of 50,000 rupees, the principal collector and political agent engaging on his part to render a faithful account of the sums collected and expenses of management during the acceptance of the said territory.

**ARTICLE 8th.**—The British Government deeming it necessary to appoint a chief minister for the future management of the Rajah's Government, his Highness Chetraputtee Sahib hereby engages to be guided by his advice in all matters relating to the administration of his state; the British Government having the sole power of appointing or removing the said minister, as they may see fit.

**ARTICLE 9th.**—Such parts of the former treaty concluded on the 24th day of January 1826 as are not affected by the provisions of the present agreement, shall remain in full force, and are mutually binding on the contracting parties.

This definitive treaty, agreed to at Colapora on the 15th of March 1829, between Rajah Sah Chetraputtee Kurravenkur, Rajah of Colapora, on the one part; and Josiah Nisbet, Esq., political agent, on the other, is now confirmed by the Governor in Council of Bombay on the 15th of July 1829; the preliminary treaty of the 24th of October 1827, above referred to, having been previously confirmed in like manner.

(signed) *John Malcolm.  
T. Bradford.  
Jas. Romer.*

Ratified by the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this 21st day of August 1829.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.  
Combermere.  
W. B. Bayley.  
C. T. Metcalfe*

By command of the Right honourable the Governor-general in Council.

(signed) *Geo Sinton, Chief Secretary to Government.*

**TREATY with Meer Roostum Khan, Chief of Khyrpoor.**

A TREATY consisting of four articles having been concluded on the 2d Zeckad 1247 A H, corresponding with the 4th April 1832, between the Honourable East India Company and Meer Roostum Khan Talpoor Behauder, Chief of Khyrpoor, in Scinde through the agency of Lieutenant-colonel Henry Pottinger, Envoy, on the part of the British Government, acting under the authority vested in him by the Right honourable Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, G.C.B. and G.C.H., Governor-general of the British possessions in India, this engagement has been given in writing at Shumla, this day, the 19th June 1832, both in English and Persian, in token of the perfect confirmation and acknowledgment of the obligation which it contains in the following manner.

**ARTICLE 1st.**—There shall be eternal friendship between the two states.

**ARTICLE 2d.**—The two contracting powers mutually bind themselves, from generation to generation, never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

**ARTICLE 3d.**—The British Government having requested the use of the river Indus, and the roads of Scinde, for the merchants of Hindoostan, &c., the Government of Khyrpoor agrees to grant the same within its own boundaries, on whatever terms may be settled with the Government of Hyderabad, namely Meer Moorad Ali Khan Talpoor.

**ARTICLE 4th.**—The Government of Khyrpoor agrees to furnish a written statement of just and reasonable duties to be levied on all goods passing under this treaty, and further promises that traders shall suffer no let or hindrance in transacting their business.

(Honourable Company's  
Seal.)

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.* (G.G.'s Seal.)

**TREATY**

TREATY with the GOVERNMENT of *Hyderabad*, in *Scinde*.

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Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

A TREATY consisting of seven articles having been concluded on the 18th Zehy 1247 A. H., corresponding with the 20th April 1832, between the Honourable East India Company and his Highness Meer Moored Ali Khan Talpoor Behauder, ruler of Hyderabad, in Scinde, through the agency of Lieutenant-colonel Henry Pottinger, Envoy, on the part of the British Government, acting under the authority vested in him by the Right honourable Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, a. c. b. and a. c. h., Governor-general of the British possessions in India, this engagement has been given in writing, at Shimla, this day, the 19th June 1832, both in English and Persian, in token of the perfect confirmation and acknowledgment of the obligations which it contains, in the manner following:

ARTICLE 1st.—That the friendship provided for in former treaties between the British Government and that of Scinde, remain unimpaired and binding, and that this stipulation has received additional efficacy through the medium of Lieutenant-colonel Pottinger, Envoy, &c., so that the firm connexion and close alliance now formed between the said states shall descend to the children and successors of the house of the above-named Meer Moored Ali Khan, principal after principal, from generation to generation.

ARTICLE 2d.—That the two contracting powers bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

ARTICLE 3d.—That the British Government has requested a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindoostan by the river and roads of Scinde, by which they may transport their goods and merchandize from one country to another, and the said Government of Hyderabad hereby acquiesces the same request on the three following conditions:

1st.—That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads.

2d.—That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.

3d.—That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Scinde, but shall come as occasion requires, and having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India.

ARTICLE 4th.—When merchants shall determine on visiting Scinde, they shall obtain a passport to do so from the Government, and due intimation of the granting of such passports shall be made to the said Government of Hyderabad by the Resident in Kutch, or other officer of the said British Government.

ARTICLE 5th.—That the Government of Hyderabad having fixed certain, proper and moderate duties to be levied on merchandize and goods proceeding by the aforesaid routes, shall adhere to that scale, and not arbitrarily and despotically either increase or lessen the same, so that the affairs of merchants and traders may be carried on without stop or interruption; and the custom-house officers and farmers of revenue of the Scinde Government are to be specially directed to see that they do not deny the said merchants, on pretence of awaiting for fresh orders from the Government, or in the collection of the duties; and the said Government is to promulgate a tariff, or table of duties, leviable on each kind of goods, as the case may be.

ARTICLE 6th.—That whatever portions of former treaties entered into between the two states, which have not been altered and modified by the present one, remain firm and unaltered, as well as those stipulations now concluded, and by the blessing of God no deviation from them shall ever happen.

ARTICLE 7th.—That the friendly intercourse between the two states shall be kept up by the despatch of vakeels, whenever the transaction of business or the increase of the relations of friendship may render it desirable.

(Honourable Company's  
Seal)

(signed) W. C. Bentinck. (G. G.'s Seal)

SUPPLEMENTAL to the TREATY with the GOVERNMENT of *Hyderabad*, in *Scinde*.

The following article of engagement having been agreed on and settled on the 22d April 1832, between the Honourable East India Company and his Highness Meer Moored Ali Khan Talpoor Behauder, ruler of Hyderabad, in Scinde, as supplement to the treaty, concluded on the 20th April 1832, through the agency of Lieutenant-colonel Henry Pottinger, Envoy, on the part of the said Honourable East India Company, under full power and authority vested in him by the Right honourable Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, a. c. b. and a. c. h., Governor-general of the British possessions in India, this engagement has been given in writing, at Shimla, this day, the 19th June 1832, both in English and Persian, in token of the perfect confirmation and acknowledgment of the obligations which it contains, in the manner following:

Appendix, No. 29.

Copies of Treaties,  
&c.

ARTICLE 1st.—It is inserted in the 5th article of the perpetual treaty that the Government of Hyderabad will furnish the British Government with a statement of duties, &c., and after that, the officers of the British Government, who are versed in affairs of traffic, will examine the said statement. Should the statement seem to them to be fair and equitable and agreeable to custom, it will be brought into operation and will be confirmed; but should it appear too high, his Highness Meer Moorad Ali Khan, on hearing from the British Government to this effect, through Colonel Pottinger, will reduce the said duties.

ARTICLE 2d.—It is as clear as noonday that the punishment and suppression of the plunderers of Parkur, the Thull, &c., is not to be effected by any one Government; and as this measure is incumbent on and becoming the states, as tending to secure the welfare and happiness of their respective subjects and countries, it is hereby stipulated, that on the commencement of the ensuing rainy season, and of which Meer Moorad Ali Khan shall give due notice, the British, Scinde and Joudpoor Governments shall direct their joint and simultaneous efforts to the above object.

ARTICLE 3d.—The Governments of the Honourable East India Company and of Khyrpoor, namely, Meer Roostum, have provided, in a treaty concluded between the states, that whatever may be settled regarding the opening of the Indus, at Hyderabad, shall be binding on the said contracting power. It is therefore necessary that copies of the treaty should be sent by the British and Hydrabad Governments to Meer Roostum Khan, for his satisfaction and guidance.

(Honourable Company's  
Seal.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.* (G. G's Seal.)

## I N D E X

TO

VI.—*Political or Foreign.*

[N.B.—In the following Index, *Rep. p.* refers to the page of the *general Report*; the *Figures* following the names, to the questions of the Evidence, and *App. p.* to the page of the Appendix.]

## A.

*ABON DHYABEE.* See *Sheik Shakhbool*.

*Accredited Agents.* See *Political Agents Residents*.

*Acheen*, King of. Treaty of friendship and alliance between the East India Company and the Kingdom of Acheen, concluded by the Honourable Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, knight, and Captain John Monckton Coombs, agent to the Governor-general, in the name and on behalf of the Marquis of Hastings, Governor-general, on the one part, and his Highness Sree Sultan Alla Iddiem Jonbar Aulum Shaw, king of Acheen, for himself, his heirs and successors, on the other part, contracting for mutual peace; British Government engages to use its influence to remove Syfful Aulum from Acheen, and preventing him impeding the establishment of the king's authority; the king to grant him an annuity in consideration of his retiring to Penang; free trade in all the ports granted the British Government, duties to be fixed; monopoly of the produce of the states not to be granted; accredited agent of the British Government to be received, British ships to continue their commercial intercourse with the ports of Acheen and Tillamasaw, unless a temporary blockade established with the consent of the British Government, ships not to furnish warlike stores to the king's enemies, under penalty of confiscation, king to exclude subjects of every other European power, also Americans, from residence in his dominions, and not to negotiate with any potentate without the consent of the British Government, not to permit the residence of any British subject to whom the resident agent shall object; British Government to furnish stores as per list, and grant loan, *App. p.* 497—List of articles referred to in the above treaty to be furnished by the East India Company to the king of Acheen, *App. p.* 498.

*Administration of Justice.* See *Courts of Justice Justice, Administration of.*

*Aeen Sing.* Manner in which the number of his followers, his fort, and haughty unruly disposition keeps the samlil in awe, *App. p.* 420.

*Affghawn.* Treaty, 1809, on an expected invasion of the French, *Jones, App. p.* 201.

*Agencies.* See *Civil Establishments*.

*Agricultural Produce.* Fall off of revenue, from the depreciation in agricultural produce, *Barnwall*, 151-154, 186, 187.

*Akber.* Governed India better than any conqueror, and made use of natives for the purpose, *Russel*, 143.

*Alliances.* See *Treaties. Subsidiary System*.

*Allied States.* See *Protected States. Treaties*.

*Ambassadors.* Duties of the resident at the Court of Persia, *Mill*, 21—All diplomatic intercourse with China, Cochin China, Siam, and Persia, should emanate from the Crown, and not from the delegated authority of the Governor-general of India, *Crawford, App. p.* 93—Diplomatic agents at Ava or Nepal more likely to be a source of irritation than conciliation, *Crawford, App. p.* 94—Expenses of the residency at Nepal, *Crawford, App. p.* 94—Expenses of the establishments for keeping up our trade and intercourse with the chiefs on the Persian and Arabian Gulfs; reductions which might be advantageously effected, *Crawford, App. p.* 94—Checks upon the Diplomatic department, *Duff, App. p.* 176.

See *Cabal*.

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Ameer

**Ameer Khan.** Efficient state of Ameer Khan's train of horse artillery, *Jones, App.* p. 266.

**Ameers of Scind.** Political connexion with the ameers of Scind originated in the apprehension of an invasion of the French, *Crawford, App.* p. 94.

**America.** See *Ava*.

**Amherst Town.** After the termination of the Burmese war a military post was formed at Moalmine, and settlement formed, called, in compliment to the Governor-general, Amherst Town, at which such of the Burmese as dreaded the resentment of their government, on account of their conduct during the war, were offered an asylum, *Jones, App.* p. 189.

**Angria.** See *Colabba*.

**Annow.** Manner in which the individual placed in the charge of Annow was formerly in a very humble capacity, but raised to the station from female influence in the palace of Oude, *App.* p. 418.

**Anund Rao Guicowar.** Articles of convention between the honourable Governor in Council at Bombay on behalf of the East India Company, and Rowjee Appajee on behalf of Anund Rao Guicowar, for the security of the dominion and government of the Guicowar in Guzerat, *App.* p. 440—Agreement concluded between the resident at Baroda and Anund Rao Guicowar, confirming agreements made by Rowjee Appajee with the Governor of Bombay, on behalf of the Guicowar, *App.* p. 440.

See also *Guicowar*.

**Arab Chiefs.** No alteration has taken place in our subsisting engagements with Arab chiefs; piracy has been much repressed; consequent increase of the trade, *Malcolm, App.* p. 358—Stipulations in certain treaties, that upon the performance of certain conditions, the contracting parties are to be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs, *App.* p. 500.

**Army.** From so large a portion of British troops being maintained by subsidiary pincies, the Supreme Government have, within the last three years, been enabled to make great military reductions; British subsidiary force is distributed amongst the allied states according to the terms of treaties; additional security provided for by permanent camps in the most eligible situations; if the direct sway of the Company extended over the subsidiary territories, there would not be an obligation of stationing a specific number of troops therein, opinion, in such case, that a smaller aggregate force advantageously disposed for general purposes, would be as efficient as the present larger force, *Rep.* p. 83—Effect of the establishment of our supremacy on our military reductions, *Malcolm, 287*—Consequences of the defensive system on our military expenses, *Malcolm, 287, 288*—Cases under which British Troops interfere with native powers; circumstances under which refused, *Bayley 326*—State of the army in India; dangers which may arise to the Government from its present formation, *Bayley 356*—Difficulty of getting recruits in the Company's territory, army now finds soldiers principally from the territory of the King of Oude, *Bayley 361*

Difficulty under existing circumstances of regulating the army with any tolerable regard to efficiency or economy, *Hill, App.* p. 82—Necessity of a large military force in India; the present army not more than adequate to the efficient protection of our widely extended interests, *Close, App.* p. 86—Defect in the constitution of the army from the want of a sufficient number of European officers, *Close, App.* p. 86—Jealousy of the military population of the Indian states at the appointment of European officers, which precludes them from rank, *Jones, App.* p. 267—Extent of the army in India, and manner in which, from the extent of territory, it has been difficult to assemble a sufficient number of troops available for action, *Walker, App.* p. 304.

How far the strength and distribution of the British Indian army have been regulated by due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition, with references to the forces belonging to native states on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard, *Macculloch, App.* p. 79; *Hill, App.* p. 82; *Baillie, App.* p. 89; *Wilder, App.* p. 92; *Edmonstone, App.* p. 104; *Munro, App.* p. 117; *Pitman, App.* p. 121; *Tod, App.* p. 130; *Malcolm, App.* p. 145; *Gardner, App.* p. 153, as far as regards the Bombay army; *Elphinstone, App.* p. 156; *Russell, App.* p. 169; *Duff, App.* p. 175—Amount of military force required in each instance, whether by express stipulation, by the ordinary effects of our obligations, or as a security against extraordinary risks, *Macculloch, App.* p. 77; *Hill, App.* p. 81; *Baillie, App.* p. 87; *Wilder, App.* p. 91; *Edmonstone, App.* p. 101; *Pitman, App.* p. 118; *Tod, App.* p. 124; *Malcolm, App.* p. 138; *Gardner, App.* p. 152; *Russell, App.* p. 164.

See also *Artillery*. *Ava*. *British Force*. *Civil and Military*. *Military Power*. *Sirdar's Horee*.

**Arrears of Revenue.** Manner in which Aumnee managers are invested with powers to make remissions, and in cases of balances for years, coupled with poverty, cancel the debt of Government, receiving a bribe; and in cases of balances and ability to pay, receive the money, appropriate it to their own use, and enter it in the Government accounts as remitted, *App.* p. 419.

*Artillery.*

**Artillery.** Sir Samuel Auchmuty's opinion, that at a distance the native artillery is as well served as our own, *Jones, App. p. 265*—In mortar practice they are greatly inferior to us, *Jones, App. p. 265*—Lord Hastings' opinion, that natives are as expert as ourselves in the use of a single piece of ordnance, *Jones, App. p. 265*—Advantages of the establishment of a corps of Golundauze, *Jones, App. p. 265*—Gallantry of the Golundauze during the Mahratta war, *Jones, App. p. 266*—Ordnance of native princes as well cast as our own, *Jones, App. p. 266*—Superiority of European artillery consists in the knowledge of the officers, *Jones, App. p. 266*—Sir T. Heslop's notice of the gallant manner in which native artillery was served at the battle of Maheidpore, *Jones, App. p. 266*.

See also *Ameer Khan*.

**Assam.** See *Ava*.

**Auchmuty, Sir S.** His opinion as to the efficiency of the artillery corps of native princes of India, which he considers to be as well served as our own, *Jones, App. p. 266*.

See also *Nepaul*.

**Aumils.** Manner in which the aumils of farmers of the revenue in Oude obtain the situation by bribery or court favour; security given by him; his exactions to pay for his bribery; their methods of proceeding upon taking possession of their office; engagements made with the cultivators for paying an exorbitant rent, their consequent ruin, *App. p. 416, 417*—Statement of abuses practised by aumils, *App. p. 418*—Reform must begin at the fountain-head, by remodelling the aumils and their charges, *App. p. 420*.

See also *Farming System*.

**Ava.** Intercourse of the Company therewith is principally of a commercial nature, where they have a resident established, opinion of one witness, that the resident might be withdrawn, the intercourse being kept up by occasional special envoys, which would relieve the Company from considerable annual expense, *Rep. p. 80*.

Irritated feelings of the court of Ava, 1793, on the protection given to fugitives, who were allowed by the British Government to settle at Chittagong, *Jones, App. p. 188*—

Nature of the treaties entered into with this power since 1795, war in 1823, *Jones, App. p. 201*.

Treaty of peace with the king of Ava, claims upon, and future interference with the principality of Assam renounced, manner in which disputes as to boundaries to be settled; certain conquered provinces ceded by the king to the British Government, sun to be paid by the king, as part indemnification for the expenses of the war, indemnification of persons compelled to take part in the war, accredited agents with certain retainers to reside at the court of each power, provision respecting debts occasioned by the war; British ships in the Burman ports to be on the same terms as Burman ships in the British ports; king of Siam to be included in the treaty, manner in which treaty to be ratified, *App. p. 506*—Additional article respecting the withdrawal of the army upon certain payments being made, *App. p. 508*.

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*Bankers.* Connexion between bankers of India, (of the sect of Jain); however scattered, who always act as a body, *Malcolm* 282.

*Bankok.* Agreement between the ministers of Siam and Captain Henry Burney, with respect to English vessels trading to Bankok, *App.* p. 516.

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*Barnwall, Lieutenant-colonel.* (Analysis of his Evidence).—Situations held by witnesses in India, 146.—Effect of the system of subsidiary treatment in the state of Baroda, 146.—Beneficial results of the system to the country, 149.—Fall off in revenue owing to a depreciation in agricultural produce, 151, 154.—Safety of ryots from oppression from the vicinity of the English states, to which they can retire, 157.—Subsidiary troops not allowed to assist the Government in oppressing their ryots, 161.—Interference cannot be carried on with benefit to the people or ruler, unless princes be entirely controlled by the Government of India, 165.—No state in India has derived more benefit from our interference than the Guicowar state, 167.—State after the prince became his own master, 167.—Disposition of Mahratta chiefs to be parsimonious, 169.—Suspicion subjects have always had of their princes, 173.—Arab Zemindars are generally security for Government engagements, 173.—Superior state of the territory added to the Company over the native states of Guicowar, 178.—Revenue of the Ceded Provinces, 180.—Fall in prices in all agricultural produce since the war, 186.—There is a considerable decrease in revenue, and a fall of prices in produce, 187.

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*Batavia.* Would have been more expensive to this country than it is worth, *Mill*, 83.

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*Belasore.* See *Maha Chund.*

*Benaick Rao.* Stipend allotted to him and his descendants, 1803, by the East India Company, *Jones*, *App.* p. 193.

*Benares.* Was ceded to the Company in the year 1775; Asoph ul Dowlah the Vizier of Oude, *Jones*, *App.* p. 177.—Circumstances under which this territory was transferred to the East India Company; amount of allowances to the reigning family, *Jones*, *App.* p. 192.

*Bengal, Nabob of.* State of the Nabob of Bengal, who has long ceased to possess any power or territory in India, *Bayley*, 333.—Nature of the compensation to the Nabob of Bengal and his family by the East India Government, *Jones*, *App.* p. 192.

*Bentinck,*

*Bentinck, Lord William.* Minute by, dated 30th July 1831, relative to the endeavours of the Supreme Government to induce the rulers of Oude to reform the administration thereof, *App.* p. 396.

*Berar.* Definitive treaty concluded with the Rajah of Berar, 1826, restoring to him part of his property, *Russell, App.* p. 162.

*Beringpore.* See *Saul Aumau Sing.*

*Bherit Jew Chobey.* See *Nawul Kishwur.*

*Bherloop.* See *Sansaroo Hoker.*

*Bhoosla.* Nature of the transactions between the British Government and this prince, *Jenkins, App.* p. 160—Agreement, in 1829, under which the British officers were withdrawn from the rajah's army, *Jenkins, App.* p. 160

*Bhopaul.* See *Naumdhur Khan.*

*Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar.* Sunnud granted to Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar, reciting his obedience and surrender of the fort of Mulhargarh, and the delivering in an ikarnameh or obligation of allegiance; and conferring on the said Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar, in certain villages and lands specified in schedule, duties of the said Jaghirdar and his ryots, *App.* p. 495—Schedule of villages in the Mehals of Etawah and Mohasah, showing the temporary demand fixed, till a regular settlement is made, *App.* p. 496

Obligation of allegiance and fidelity to the British Government, entered into and subscribed by Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar before the agent of the Governor-general in Bundelcund and Saugar, engaging to be obedient, to hold no intercourse with marauders; to give notice of invasion; to refer disputes to the decision of the British Government; not to assist enemies of the Government, or enter into the service of any chieftain without its sanction; to furnish supplies to British troops passing through the jaghire; to deliver up fugitive British subjects, not to harbour thieves; zemindars of villages to be responsible for stolen property of travellers, murderers and criminals to be given up, *App.* p. 496

*Bhurtjoo Chobey, Widow of.* Draft of a sunnud to the widow of Bhurtjoo Chobey, reciting the joint interest of the widow and Chobee Nawal Kishore in certain lands, and their agreement to hold their shares under a joint sunnud, and reciting differences between them, and that the widow had solicited to be put in possession of her own share; consequent division of the property, and rights and duties of the said widow and her subjects, *App.* p. 492—List of the villages forming the separate jaghire of the widow of Bhurtjoo Chobey, *App.* p. 493

*Bhurtpore.* Siege of this fortress by Lord Combermere, 1825, storming of the fortress; which was gallantly defended, *Jones, App.* p. 189—Bishop Heber's remarks on the prosperous state of the villages belonging to the rajah of Bhurtpore, through which he passed, *Craufurd, App.* p. 97—Probable consequences which would have resulted from any failure of our operations against Bhurtpoie, *Jones, App.* p. 292

*Bhurtpore and Macherry.* First alliance with these states, 1803, by which treaties these states were taken under our protection, *Jones, App.* p. 196

*Bijawur, Rajah of.* Translation of the ikarnameh of the Rajah Ruttun Sing, rajah of Bijawur, engaging not to unite with the enemies of the Company, to restrain relations from exciting sedition or disturbance in the British territories; to deliver up absconding subjects of the British Government taking refuge in his territories, not to harbour robbers, inhabitants of villages to be responsible for robberies on travellers, to deliver up murderers and criminals taking refuge in his territories, not to hold intercourse with rebel chiefs; not to engage in quarrels with those obedient to the British Government, to guard passes of the ghats against marauders; to give timely notice of any meditated invasion, to find guides and supplies for British troops ascending the ghats; not to quarrel with rajahs and chiefs respecting villages, but to refer disputes originating with them to the British government, *App.* p. 464—Translation of a sunnud granted to the Rajah Ruttun Sing, the rajah of Bijawur, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of his obedience and delivering in the above ikarnameh, *App.* p. 465—Names of the villages referred to in the above sunnud, *App.* p. 466.

*Bughaut.* See *Kurrum Sing.*

*Board of Control.* Establishment of the Board of Control has operated both as a check, and, when wanted, as a support to the Directors, *Russell, App.* p. 170—Influence acquired by the Minister of the Crown in the superintendence of the Indian Government through the medium of the Board, *Russell, App.* p. 170—Present system of direction and control are as good as any that could be devised for India, *Duff, App.* p. 176.

See also *Governor-general.*

*Bombay.* Peculiar advantages of this settlement to the British power in India, *App.* p. 525.

See also *Docks. Flax. Ship-building. Timber.*

*Boojys.* See *Maumbhund. Rooder Paul.*



**Boondee, Rajah of.** Treaty between the Honourable English East India Company and the Maha Rao Rajah Bishen Sing Behauder, rajah of Boondee, concluded by Captain James Tod on the part of the Company, in virtue of full powers from the Marquis of Hastings, K.G., Governor-general, &c. and by Bohara Tolaram on the part of the rajah, in virtue of full powers from the said rajah; stipulation, mutual friendship; British Government takes under its protection the dominions of the rajah, rajah acknowledges the supremacy of, and will co-operate with, the British Government; not to commit aggression, not to enter into negotiations without the consent of the British Government; disputes to be submitted to the award of the British Government; rajah to be absolute ruler in his dominions, and British jurisdiction not to be introduced therein; remission of a certain tribute by the British Government, also certain lands, according to schedule, rajah to pay a certain tribute, according to schedule; to furnish troops, according to requisition, *App.* p. 493—Schedule of lands relinquished by the British Government to Rao Rajah Bishen Sing Behauder, according to above treaty, *App.* p. 494—Schedule of amount of net revenue and tribute from lands held by Maha Rajah Scindia, to be paid henceforth to the British Government according to the above treaty, *App.* p. 494.

**Boondela States.** Native states under the protection of the British Government, but without subsidiary treaties, *Mill* 12—Origin of our connexion with Bundelcund, 1803, nature of the present arrangements with these chiefs, *Jones*, *App.* p. 196, 197.

**Boulderson, Mr** See *Khloodkhash*.

**Bourbon** Captured by the British under the administration of Lord Minto, *Jones*, *App.* p. 184.

**Bovaks**, are a numerous and united commercial class, *Malcolm*, 282

**Boundaries.** Stipulations in the treaty with the king of Ava as to the settlement of disputes regarding boundaries, *App.* p. 506.

**British Force.** Provision contained in subsidiary treaties, by which the Allied State agrees to receive and maintain a British force for the protection of the state, *Rep.* p. 81—In some cases, princes, who had engaged to pay a pecuniary subsidy for the maintenance of a British force, have subsequently ceded territory in lieu of subsidy; in recent subsidiary alliances, this practice has been generally adopted, *Rep.* p. 81

See also *Army. Subsidiary Force*

**British Residents.** See *Europeans*

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**British Subjects.** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties that British subjects, to whom the resident shall object, shall not be permitted to reside in the territories of the subsidiary power, *App.* p. 497—Also to deliver up absconding British subjects taking refuge, and to co-operate with officers sent for their apprehension, *App.* p. 496.

**Bugut Sing.** His power of defying the annul unless backed by his troops, from his having nearly 2,000 or 3,000 sepoy ready for action, with 7 or 8 guns, and a strong fort with a deep ditch, *App.* p. 420.

**Buls** See *Thokur Jygrak*.

**Bundelcund** See *Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar. Boondela Chiefs*.

**Burmese** Conduct of this power, 1823, on the commencement of the Government of Lord Amherst, *Jones*, *App.* p. 185—War declared, 1824, plan of the operations, success of the campaigns, terms of peace; territory acquired by this war, *Jones*, *App.* p. 188, 189 See also *Ava*.

**Burmese Frontier.** Native states under the protection of the British Government, but without subsidiary treaties, *Mill* 12.

**Burmese War.** Stipulation in the treaty with the king of Ava for the payment of a certain sum, as part indemnification for the expenses of the war, *App.* p. 506.

**Burwolee.** See *Ram Sing*

**Bussahir** See *Mehendra Singh Teeka*.

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**Cadets.** Ages at which they can be sent to India, *Russell*, *App.* p. 171—No class in the kingdom receive a better education than that from which cadets are drawn, *Russell*, *App.* p. 171.

**Calcutta College** encourages those habits of early extravagance and debt which are the besetting sins of India, *Russell*, *App.* p. 171.

**Calinger, Killedar of.** See *Dareao Sing*.

*Caulbul*

*Caulbul.* Intercourse of the Company therewith is principally of a commercial nature, *Rep.* p. 80.—Nature of the treaty entered into between the East India Company and the king of that territory, *Macculloch, App.* p. 75.—Cause of the political connexion originated in the apprehension of a French invasion, *Craufurd, App.* p. 94.

*Camps.* Stations at which troops should be stationed, instead of the present numerous posts, *Tod, App.* p. 130.

*Carnac, Major.* (Analysis of his Evidence).—Offices held by witness in India, 487.—Population of Guicowar territories, 489.—Treaties with that state, 490.—System of Government adopted on acquiring the Deccan; alterations which it has since been deemed advisable to make, 500.—Present state of the revenue, arising from the depression of agricultural produce, 502.

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*Caste.* Predilection for caste as strong as ever with the Hindoos, *Russell* 119.

#### CEDED PROVINCES.

1. *Nizam.*
2. *Guicowar.*

##### 1. *Nizam.*

Progressive improvement of the Ceded Provinces, which have been recovering in the same ratio as the rest of the Nizam's country has declined, *Russell* 116

##### 2. *Guicowar.*

Superior state of the territory ceded to the Company over the native states of Guicowar, *Barnwall* 178.

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*Central India.* Treaties, guaranteeing protection and defence, entered into with the chiefs of Bundelcund, Central India, and Rajpootana, *Macculloch, App.* p. 76.

*Ceylon.* See *Dutch Settlements.*

*Chaplin, William.* (Analysis of his Evidence).—Situations held by witness, 503.—Improvement of the state of the inhabitants of the Deccan, after they were under the charge of the British, 508.—In the first instance, no courts of law were introduced; judicial affairs were conducted by collectors; since that, courts have been introduced, 514.—Objections which have been principally urged against subsidiary system, 518.—While the upper orders were generally averse to the change of government, the lower preferred it on account of their increased security, 519, 520.—Feeling of the upper classes towards the British Government, 522.—Consequences of the partition of property, 526, 527.

*Charter.* Difficulty of making equitable arrangement on the close of the present charter of the East India Company, *Duff, App.* p. 176.—Difficulty of affording such equitable compensation as may not occasion a stop or derangement in the machine of government, *Duff, App.* p. 176.

*Checks.* See *Residents.*

*Chiefs of India.* Statement explanatory of the nature of the relations subsisting between the British Government and the several states and chiefs of India, *Jones, App.* p. 191

*Child, Governor.* Cause of his war with the Mogul empire, and disastrous consequence thereof, which stopped the desire of conquest for a considerable period, and caused European possessions to be only subservient to the purposes of commerce, *Waller, App.* p. 300.

*China.* State of the Company's relations, both political and commercial, with the empire of China, has been considered in a former Report in connexion with the important question respecting the monopoly of the China trade, *Rep.* p. 80.

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*Chobey Chittorsaul.* Translation of the ikarnameh of the Chobey Chittorsaul and the mother of Chobey Chittorsaul, reciting the breach of a former ikarnameh, and the resumption of the fortress of Calinger by the British Government, and engaging to abstain from friendly intercourse with rebel chiefs; not to enter into disputes with the chiefs obedient to the British Government, to guard passes of the ghauts; to give timely notice of invasion; to furnish guides and supplies to British troops ascending the ghauts; to reside in one of the villages of the jaghire; to have no connexion with marauders, to give up subjects of the British Government absconding, zominidars of villages to be responsible for robberies on travellers; murderers and criminals to be given up; and to do other acts of obedience, *App.* p. 474.

**Chobey Chitternau**—continued.

Translation of a sunnud granted to Chobey Chitternau and his mother, granting them possession of certain villages in consideration of obedience, and delivering in the above ikarnameh; also list of the villages, *App. p. 475.*

**Chobey Salagram.** Translation of the ikarnameh of the Chobey Salagram, reciting the breach of a former ikarnameh and the resumption of a fortress by the British Government, and entering into engagements relative to rebel chiefs; disputes with obedient chiefs; guarding passes of the ghats; giving notice of invasion; finding guides and supplies for British troops; residing on the jaghire; holding no connexion with marauders; giving up British subjects absconding; not harbouring thieves, and doing other acts of obedience, *App. p. 479.*—Translation of a sunnud granted to Chobey Salagram, granting him possession of certain villages, in consideration of his obedience, and delivering in the above ikarnameh; list of the villages referred to therein, *App. p. 480.*

**Christianity.** Doubts whether natives of India can ever be converted, *Russell, App. p. 169.*—Conversion will be preceded by an advance in knowledge and power, wholly incompatible with their submission to our sway, *Russell, App. p. 169.*

**Chukary, Rajah of.** Translation of a sunnud granted to the Rajah Bajes Behauder, Rajah of Chukary, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of his obedience, and his having delivered in an ikarnameh, *App. p. 468.*

**Chunder Seekhur Opadesa.** See *Nepaul, Rajah of.*

**Civil Establishments.** How far the civil establishment of the several presidencies and agencies have been regulated, so as to secure efficiency and economy, *Macculloch, App. p. 80, Hill, App. p. 82; Raillie, App. p. 89, Wilder, App. p. 92; Munro, App. p. 117; Pitman, App. p. 151; Tod, App. p. 132; Malcolm, App. p. 145; Gardner, App. p. 153.*

**Civil Offices.** Committee appointed, 1828, for the purpose of inquiring into the state of those establishments, *Macculloch, App. p. 80.*

**Civil and Military Administration.** Interference by the East India Company in the affairs of native states, having for its object the reformation of the civil and military administration of our allies, *Jones, App. p. 268.*—With the state of Oude, *Jones, App. p. 268.*—With Mysore, *Jones, App. p. 269.*—With Travancore, *App. p. 274.*—With Guickwar, *App. p. 281.*—Nagpore, *App. p. 282.*—Sattarah, *App. p. 283.*—Holkar, *App. p. 283.*—Nizam, *App. p. 283.*—Of interference with respect to the protected states, that is to say, states which are entitled to our protection, but which do not stand to us in the relation of subsidiary allies, *Jones, App. p. 290.*

**Civil and Military Offices.** Evil effects of the exclusion from offices of natives, *Russell, App. p. 172.*—No native in a civil office can sit down before the youngest writer, *Russell, App. p. 172.*—In the army no native can rise to a rank that will place him above being commanded by an English serjeant, *Russell, App. p. 172.*

**Clavering, General.** His opinion of the injustice of depriving our allies in India of every vestige of military power, *Jones, App. p. 266.*

**Close, Major.** (Analysis of his Evidence).—Situations held by witness in India, 369.—Nature of treaties between East India Company and Scindia, 375.—Interference of the Company has a beneficial effect on the prosperity of the inhabitants, 382, 384.—Subsidiary system is calculated to promote the interests of English Government, and to increase the prosperity of the country at large, 399.—The system has not answered so well under Mahomedan governments as Hindoo states, 400.—Explanations concerning treaties with Scindia, 406.

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**Colabba.** First treaty concluded with the chief was 1822; nature of these engagements, *Jones, App. p. 197.*

**Colapors.** In 1812, engagements were first contracted between the East India Company and this prince, *Jones, App. p. 197.*

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**Colapore, Rajah of.** Articles of agreement concluded between Shajee Chhetraputty Maharej Kuraveer, the rajah of Colapore, and the British Government; reciting a previous treaty, and certain misunderstandings since; such parts of former treaty not affected by the present are to remain in force; rajah to reduce his army to the peace establishment, and not raise a force likely to endanger the public tranquillity without consent of Government; rajah to attend to the advice of the British Government; independence of the rajah not diminished as a sovereign prince; rajah not to molest certain parties named; certain districts ceded to the rajah; rajah recognizes an award of the British Government; not to grant an asylum to rebels or enemies; robbers and criminals to be given up; rights of certain persons named to certain lands; remuneration to be given for certain rights invaded, *App. p. 505*—Articles of agreement, or preliminary treaty, concluded between the rajah and the British Government, reciting breach of the above treaty; particularly as to the strength of the army; limitation thereof; certain territories taken possession of by the British from breach of faith; guarantee of the British protection, extending to the descendants of certain parties; villages taken possession of by the rajah to be restored to the right heir; certain places frequented by robbers given up to the British; British garrisons to be admitted into the rajah's territories, who is to bear the expense; pecuniary remuneration to be granted for certain aggressions, rajah to be guided by the advice of the British minister, parts of the former treaty not affected by the present to remain in force, *App. p. 518*—Definitive treaty according to above preliminary treaty, *App. p. 519*.

**Collection of the Revenue.** Inefficiency of the local officers of Oude, aided by the troops of the king of Oude, to collect the revenue thereof, from the disordered state of the country, *App. p. 397*.

**Colleges.** See *Calcutta*. *Haileybury*.

**Colonisation.** No sprinkling of colonists in India, if allowed to colonize, would render them a support upon which we could rely for the preservation of the empire, *Malcolm, App. p. 144*.

**Commissioners.** See *Political Agents*.

**Concans.** Rapid improvement taking place in the Concans, *Malcolm, 278*.

**Conquests.** Financial effects of the conquests, and of the changes or enlargements of our political relations, which have been made since 1813, *Macculloch, App. p. 78*; *Hill, App. p. 81*; *Baillie, App. p. 89*; *Wilder, App. p. 91*; *Edmonstone, App. p. 103*; *Munro, App. p. 116*; *Pitman, App. p. 120*; *Toa, App. p. 127*; *Malcolm, App. p. 142*, *Gardner, App. p. 153*; *Russell, App. p. 168*, *Duff, App. p. 174*—Causes of the rapid conquests of the British powers in India, *Close, App. p. 85*—Territories and tributaries acquired in India since 1813; viz. name of each state, date of treaty or cession, particulars of tribute, acquired territories, population and surface of square miles, *Macculloch, App. p. 71*.

**Conquest in India.** See *Government of India*.

**Contracts.** Manner in which constant oppression and habitual breach of contracts in Oude have destroyed the confidence of the people in their rulers, *App. p. 397*.

**Coombs, Captain.** See *Achen, King of*.

**Cornwallis, Lord.** Manner in which he was led into wars on his arrival in India, *Russell, 75*.

**Court of Directors.** See *Directors, Court of*.

**Courts of Justice.** From the disorder of the district of Oude, courts of justice and police would be almost nugatory, *App. p. 420*.

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**Crawford, Mr.** (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Situations held by witness in India, 531—Reference to a letter delivered in by witness, 532.

**Crime.** Capital of Oude and its environs are the scenes of nightly robberies and murders, and roads in the vicinity are so beset with thieves that no person can pass without protection, *App. p. 397*—Manner in which crime is promoted by the extortions of the amils or revenue farmers in Oude, preventing the cultivators obtaining an honest subsistence, and forcing them to join predatory tribes, *App. p. 417*.

**Criminals.** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties for the delivery up of criminals taking refuge in allied territories, *App. p. 496*.

**Cuchoerah and Nagode.** Translation of an ikarnamah, or obligation of allegiance, presented by Lahl Shew, rajah of Cuchoerah and Nagode, engaging not to protect marauders, nor enter into disputes with the servants of the British Government; to guard the passes up the ghauts; to prevent marauders entering the British territories; to give timely notice of any meditated invasion; with other engagements of obedience and allegiance to the British Government, *App. p. 442*—Translation of a sunnud by Lahl Shew Rajah Sing, granting him possession of certain villages, in consideration of his obedience and delivering in the above ikarnamah, *App. p. 443*—List of the villages mentioned in the above sunnud, *App. p. 444*.

(445.—VI.)

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Currency

*Currency.* Plan in progress for equalizing the currency of India; injurious consequences to the shroffs, or money-lenders, *Malcolm*, 281.

*Cutch.* Nature and extent of this province; administration of justice, *Malcolm*, 289, 291—Since the subsidiary alliance, this province in a comparative state of tranquillity, *Malcolm*, 291—Value of this country from the navigation of the Indus by steamboats, *Malcolm*, 291—Engagement of the East India Company to guarantee the power of the Rao of Cutch, and the integrity of his dominions, *Macculloch*, *App.* p. 77—Nature of the engagements with the government of Cutch, *Jones*, *App.* p. 158—Causes of our first alliances with this state the necessity of defending that petty state against the Ameers of Sind, *Jones*, *App.* p. 239—Extracts from despatches from the Court of Directors to the Governor-general in Council at Bengal, relative to political transactions with the state of Cutch, *App.* p. 344.

*Cutch, Rao of.* Treaty with the Rao of Cutch of 18th June 1816, supplemental to that of the 16th January 1816, confirming former treaty, and relinquishing a certain sum in rupees, being the amount charged for military expenses; also renouncing annually two lacs of corries, agreed by the said treaty to be paid by the Rao, *App.* p. 467.

## D.

*Danish Settlements in India.* Serampore, near Calcutta, Belzore, and Tranquebar belong to the Danes, *Mill*, 26.

*Dareao Sing.* Translation of the ikarnamoh of the Chobey Dareao Sing, late Killedar of Callinger, reciting the breach of a former ikarnamoh, and resumption of the fortress by the Government, and engaging not to hold friendly intercourse with rebel chiefs; not to enter into disputes with chiefs obedient to the Government; to guard passes of the ghauts against marauders; to give timely notice of any meditated invasion; to furnish guides and supplies for British troops ascending the ghauts; to reside in one of the villages of his jaghire, and not elsewhere without permission of the British Government; to have no intercourse with marauders; to deliver up absconding subjects of the British Government; not to harbour thieves; to deliver up murderers and criminals; and other engagements of obedience, *App.* p. 470—Translation of a sunnud granted to Chobey Dareao Sing, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of his obedience and having delivered in the above ikarnamoh; also list of the villages referred to therein, *App.* p. 471.

*Debt.* See *Gujowar*.

*Deccan.* System of government adopted on acquiring the Deccan; alterations which it has since been deemed advisable to make, *Carnac*, 500—Present state of the revenue from the depression of agricultural produce, *Carnac*, 502—Improvement of the state of the inhabitants of the Deccan after they were under the charge of the British, *Chaplin*, 508—Manner in which judicial affairs were formerly conducted; courts have been introduced, *Chaplin*, 514.

See also *Natives*.

*Delhi.* Happy condition of the people of Delhi; better off than subjects of neighbouring states, *Wilder*, 471—Came under British protection, 1803; stipends allotted to the family then reigning, *Jones*, *App.* p. 192.

Dependent States. See *Loans*.

*Dewan.* Different results of managing districts through a dewan, *Macculloch*, 7—Nature of government in India by dewan, *Mill*, 40—Opinion on the interference of the choice of dewan or minister of native princes; cases in which this power has been exercised, *Jones*, *App.* p. 255.

*Dewanny.* The dewanny or collection of the revenue of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, granted to the East India Company by the Mogul Shah Allum in 1765, *Jones*, *App.* p. 177.

*Diplomatic Expenses.* May be deemed excessive; some reductions have been made; there is abundant room for still greater, *Crawford*, *App.* p. 100.

See also *Ambassadors*.

*Directors, Court of.* Improvements suggested in the formation of the Court, *Russell*, *App.* p. 171—Want of effective responsibility, and unsteadiness and change of purpose, arising from the frequent change of chairmen, *Russell*, *App.* p. 171—The present system of direction and control as good as any that could be devised for India, *Duff*, *App.* p. 176—Extracts from despatches from the Court of Directors to the Governor-general in Council at Bengal, relative to the political transactions with the states of Oude, Nagpore, Katwyar, Hyderabad, Cutch, Mysore, Travancore, *App.* p. 335.

See also *Governor-general*.

*Disputes.* Stipulation in subsidiary treaties to refer disputes to the decision of the British Government, *App.* p. 496.

*Docks.* Capacity of the Docks at Bombay, which are capable of containing ships of any tonnage, *Walker*, *App.* p. 376.

**Docab.** Valuable tract of territory in the Docab, situated between the rivers Jumna and Ganges, acquired from Scindia, by the treaty of Sevije Aujengaum, *Jones, App p. 180*

**Doorgunpore.** See *Laul Aumau Singh*.

**Double Governments.** Evil effects of double governments, and conflicting authorities and opinions of Sir Thomas Munro and Lord Wellesley thereon, *App. p. 399*.  
See also *Subsidiary System*

**Dubey,** Sheikh of. Translation of the preliminary treaty with the Sheikh of Dubey, stipulating for the surrender of certain guns and vessels; Indian prisoners to be delivered up; troops not to enter the town to lay it waste; and as a mark of consideration towards his highness the Imam Said bin Sultan, the fort and towers are not to be demolished. After execution of engagements, Mahomed bin Kaya bin Zaid to be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly Arabs; cessation of hostilities, except that the boats of said Mahomed are not to go to sea, *App p. 499*.

**Duff, Capt. J. G.** What acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1813, *App. p. 174*—Actual condition of the relation of the Indian Government with the several states under its control, *App. p. 174*—Character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the internal affairs of the protected states, *App p. 174*—Duties of residents and political agents, *App p. 174*—Financial effects of the conquests and of the changes or enlargements of our political relations, which have been made since 1813, *App p. 174*—How far the strength and distribution of the British Indian army have been regulated by due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position and relations, and to their actual condition, with references to the forces belonging to native states, on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility or insubordination we have to guard, *App p. 175*—How far the civil establishments of the several residencies and agencies have been regulated so as to secure efficiency and economy, *App. p. 175*—How far residents and agents have been subject to the necessary checks, *App. p. 176*—How far the existing system of Indian government or some direction and control has been successful or calculated to succeed in maintaining the requisite vigour, constancy, promptitude, and unity of purpose in the several gradations of government direction, control, or influence, and if any, what change is necessary or advisable in the constitution of the Home or Indian Government, *App. p. 176*.

**Dutch.** Motives which led them to venture into the Indian Seas; their first object was to acquire fortified settlements; their progress was marked by every kind of secret and open violence against those who attempted to share their advantages; their feelings and proceedings against the Portuguese, manner in which these nations obtained their opulence and power, though regarded by the natives with hatred and jealousy, *Walker, App p. 299*.

See also *Portuguese*

**Dutch Settlements.** Dutch possessions on the continent of India were ceded by the King of the Netherlands, in 1824, in exchange for the British settlement of Bencoolen, *Ilep. p. 79*—Dutch settlements on the continent of India, and on the Island of Ceylon, were, during Sir John Shore's administration, taken possession of by expeditions fitted out from Madras by Lord Hobart, *Jones, App. p. 178*.

**Duties.** Stipulations in subsidiary treaties respecting the fixing the amount of duties on merchandize, *App. p. 497*

## F.

**East India Company.** Cause of success of the English in India more to be found in the ability of their servants abroad, than in the wisdom or stability of the views and principles of the Home Government, *Munro, App. p. 117*.

See also *Board of Control. Charter. Directors. England. Trade with India.*

**Edmonstone, N. B.** Character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the internal affairs of protected states, *App. p. 102*—How far the strength and distribution of the British Indian army have been regulated by due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position, &c with reference to the forces belonging to native states, on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility we have to guard, *App. p. 104*—What acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change of our political relations has been effected since, *App. p. 100*—Actual condition of the relation of the Indian Government with the several states under its control, *App. p. 101*—Amount of military force required, whether by express stipulation, &c. or as security against extraordinary risks, *App. p. 101*—Financial effects of the conquests, and of the changes and enlargements of our political relations which have been made since 1813, *App. p. 103*.

**Education.** Objections to the colleges of Haileybury and Calcutta, *Russell, App. p. 171*—Disadvantages of Haileybury, *Russell, App. p. 171*—Mischiefs of the college at Calcutta, *Russell, App. p. 171*—System of education which would be best suited to ~~the~~ *Indie, Russell, App. p. 171*.

(445.—V8)

**Elphinstone, Hon. Mountstuart.** Extract from a Minute of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, late Governor of Bombay, dated 3d May 1820, respecting the affairs of the Guicowar, *App. p. 339*—Substance of a letter from the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, to his highness Syajee Row Guicowar, dated 3d April 1820, *App. p. 355*—Answer to circular from Board of Control, relative to character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the internal affairs of the protected states, *App. p. 154*—Strength and distribution of the Indian army, how far they have been regulated by due attention to our political position with other states, with reference to the forces belonging to native states on whose aid we depend, and those against whom we have to guard, *App. p. 156*—How far the principles of justice and expediency have been adhered to by the East India Company in their conquests in India, *App. p. 156*—Good intentions generally of the Indian government in their proceedings with the natives, *App. p. 156*—Acquisitions of territory which have been made, and what material enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1818, *App. p. 154*.

See also *Natives of India*.

**Enemies.** Observations showing the power and extent of the enemies the British Government have to fear, who look with jealousy on the extent of its possessions in India, *Walker, App. p. 303*; *App. p. 326*—Provision contained in subsidiary treaties for protection of the British Government against all enemies, foreign or domestic, *Rep. p. 81*; *App. p. 496*.

**England.** Motives by which British merchants were actuated upon their first trading to India; habits of piracy in the Indian Seas rendered arming the vessels necessary, *Walker, App. p. 299*.

**Envoys, Special.** Manner in which the intercourse between the Company and the states of Nepaul and Ava might be kept up by occasional special envoys, instead of residents at the respective courts, which would relieve the Company from considerable annual expense, *Rep. p. 80*.

**Etawah.** See *Bow Ram Chunder Buller*.

**Europeans.** British residents in Travancore and Cochin were employed in ship-building and private trade, *Munro, 266*—General good conduct of British residents towards natives, *Munro, 268*—Benefit to India which must arise from introduction of capital, enterprise, and science of Europeans, *Malcolm, App. p. 144*—Behaviour of Indian states towards mercantile adventurers from all European nations was uniformly friendly and encouraging; policy which actuated the reception of Europeans with manifestations of joy; causes which led to the interruption of this harmony, *Walker, App. p. 299*.

**European States.** See *Ava, King of*.

**Expenditure of India.** Observations showing the evils of the revenue of India being insufficient to meet its expenses, and upon the consequent necessity of reducing the expenditure, *Walker, App. p. 310*.

## F.

**Farming System.** The desolate and deserted state of one of the finest portions of Oude, and in fact of India, in respect of fertility of soil and goodness of climate, affords a melancholy proof of the oppression occasioned by the farming system, *App. p. 397*.

See also *Aumilla*.

**Female Influence.** Manner in which female influence in Oude causes the distribution of high and lucrative offices among persons in the lowest grades of society, *App. p. 416, 418*.

**Ferruckabad.** Ceded to the East India Company 1802; stipend settled on the nabob; payments to relations and dependents, *Jones, App. p. 192*.

**Fines upon Succession.** Opinions of Sir J. Malcolm on the Nuzerana; familiarity of natives with this form; its popularity with landholders, on account of the certainty it gave to succession to property, *Malcolm, App. p. 361*—Objections of the supreme Government to its adoption, *Malcolm, App. p. 361*—Sums which the Bombay treasury would have received if this law had existed, *Malcolm, App. p. 361*—Right of particular jaghirdars to have their claims admitted; state of their lands owing to uncertainty of succession, *Malcolm, App. p. 361, 362*—Grounds on which the Government are not obliged to acknowledge the rights of jaghirdars to fines upon succession, *Malcolm, App. p. 362*.

**Flax.** Of a good quality is the produce of our territories in India, *Walker, App. p. 316*.

**Foreign Powers.** Provision contained in subsidiary treaties by which the prince agrees to abandon all political intercourse with other powers, except through the medium of the British Government, and binds himself to refer to the latter all disputes that may eventually arise with other powers, *Rep. p. 81*; *App. p. 497*—Further provision that they shall not enter into the service of any chieftain without the sanction of the British Government, *App. p. 496*.

**Foreign States.** Names of foreign independent states, *Rep. p. 80*.

*Fortifications.*

**Fortifications.** Principles upon which the agents of the Company early began their applications to the different governments in India for leave to fortify their factories, and in which no difficulty was experienced, *Walker, App. p. 299.*

**France.** The French began to establish themselves on the coast of Coromandel towards the end of the seventeenth century, *Walker, App. p. 300*—Danger we have to fear from France, who will eventually exert her utmost to gain possession of power in India, *Walker, App. p. 308-311; App. p. 326.*  
*See also Scindia.*

**Free Trade.** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties for free trade with the ports of the subsidiary power, *App. p. 497.*

**Frontier.** Northern frontier of the British possessions in India, *Mill 16*—Frontier of India, ease of its defence, *Mill 35.*

**French Possessions in India.** Pondicherry, Mahé, and some other places, *Mill 25.*

**Futteh Sing.** Translation of a sunnud granted to Rajah Futteh Sing, of Nahan, conferring on him and his heirs certain lands with their rights and appurtenances; certain forts taken possession of by the British Government, and certain other forts disjoined from, and others annexed to, the Raj of Sirmoor; those places not to be laid claim to by the rajah; not to interfere in the management of the Raj of Sirmoor without consulting British officer stationed there; to conform to stipulations and pay strict obedience to the British Government; to join with troops in case of war; to make roads twelve feet broad throughout the territory; in case of failure in above stipulations, or encroaching on the possessions of others, he will be dispossessed; to promote the welfare of ryots, extending cultivation, and distribute justice; look to security of roads; not to exact from ryots more than their engagements; to make them happy and contented; ryots to consider the rajah as their rightful lord and obey him, *App. p. 484.*

## G.

**Gardner, Hon. Edward.** (Analysis of his Evidence).—Offices held by witness in India, 408—Nature of the connexion between Nepal and the Indian Government, 413—Inhabitants of Nepal are Goorkhas, and are entirely and strictly Hindoos, 420—Though differing from the Newars, who are Bhoodists, 424—Nature of their government, 427—State of the peasantry, who can be bought and sold, 430—They form an inconsiderable portion of the inhabitants, 436—Manner in which British territories are secured against the danger which formerly existed from the Nepal state, 438—State of the Nepaulesse army and its discipline, 447—Education among the natives, 451—Administration of justice, 454—Of public works, 455—Of agriculture, 456—Commerce, 457—Of climate, 462—Character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the internal affairs of the protected states, *App. p. 152.*

Strength and distribution of the British Indian army; how far they have been regulated by political position, with reference to forces belonging to native states on whose aid we could depend, or against whose hostility we have to guard, *App. p. 153*—How far the principles of justice and expediency have been adhered to by the East India Company in their conquests in India, *App. p. 153*—Good intentions generally of the Indian Government in their proceedings with the natives, *App. p. 153*—Acquisitions of territory made, and what material change of our political relations has been effected since 1813, *App. p. 152*—Condition of the relation of the Indian Government with the several states under its control, *App. p. 152*—Amount of military required in each instance, whether by express stipulation, by the ordinary effects of our treaties, or as a security against extraordinary risks, *App. p. 152*—Financial effects of the conquests and changes or enlargements of our political relations since 1813, *App. p. 153.*

**Ghaats.** Stipulation contained in subsidiary treaties for the Allied Power to guard the passes of the ghats against marauders, *App. p. 464.*

**Goburdhur Sing.** Translation of a sunnud granted to Goburdhur Sing, of Dhames, on condition of maintaining twenty beegrahs at Sambaloo, to make roads twelve feet broad, Nuzzerans remitted; to join with troops in case of war, *App. p. 484.*

**Golundauc.** *See Artillery.*

**Gopaul Laul.** Translation of the ikarnamh of Gopaul Laul, reciting the resumption of certain lands by the British Government, and the receiving certain others in exchange, and engaging not to hold friendly intercourse with rebel chiefs, nor quarrel with those obedient to the British Government; to deliver up British subjects absconding, and to co-operate with those in search of fugitives; to obey civil and criminal courts; not to harbour thieves; semindars of villages to be responsible for property of travellers stolen, or for the apprehension of the offender; to deliver up murderers and criminals, and to do other acts of obedience, *App. p. 481*—Translation of a sunnud granted to Gopaul Laul, granting him certain lands in exchange for others, in consideration of his obedience, and fulfilling the terms of the above ikarnamh; list of the villages, *App. p. 482.*



*Gopaul Sing.* Translation of a sunnod granted to Dewan Gopaul Sing, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of his obedience; necessity for his rendering the inhabitants contented and grateful by his good government; to afford no asylum to robbers; inhabitants to acknowledge his title, and to offer him no opposition, *App. p. 469*.—Schedule of the villages composing Dewan Gopaul Sing's jaghire, *App. p. 469*.

*Gorkah.* See *Nepaul*.

*Government of India.* How far the existing system of India government or home direction and control are calculated to succeed in maintaining the requisite vigour, consistency, promptitude, and unity of purpose, &c.; has been successful; improvements of which the system may be susceptible, *Macculloch, App. p. 80; Hill, App. p. 82; Baillie, App. p. 90; Wilder, App. p. 92; Munro, App. p. 117; Pitman, App. p. 121; Tod, App. p. 134; Malcolm, App. p. 145; Gardner, App. p. 153; Elphinstone, App. p. 157; Russell, App. p. 170; Duff, App. p. 176*.—Actual condition of the relation of the Indian Government with the several states under its control, *Macculloch, App. p. 78; Hill, App. p. 81; Baillie, App. p. 87; Wilder, App. p. 90; Edmonstone, App. p. 101; Pitman, App. p. 118; Tod, App. p. 123; Malcolm, App. p. 136; Gardner, App. p. 152; Russell, App. p. 163; Duff, App. p. 174*.—Good intentions generally of the Indian Government in their proceedings with the natives, *Macculloch, App. p. 79*.—How far have the principles of justice and expediency been adhered to, *Hill, App. p. 82; Baillie, App. p. 89; Wilder, App. p. 92; Munro, App. p. 117; Pitman, App. p. 120; Tod, App. p. 129; Malcolm, App. p. 145; Gardner, App. p. 153; Elphinstone, App. p. 156; Russell, App. p. 169*.

Instructions from this country, both from the East India House and British Government, have been unceasing to prevent aggrandizement by conquest, *Mill 42, 57; Russell 75*.—British Government should be nominally as well as really extended over these territories, *Mill 43, 44, 49*.—The whole government and revenue of India should be taken, and pensions allowed to the native princes as soon as such arrangement could be made, *Mill 63*.—Our largest acquisitions in India have been made since the express orders of the Legislature in 1784 against further extension of territory, *Russell 75*.—Opposition of every Government against aggrandizement of territory, *Jenkins 276*.—Useless to look for any means of maintaining our footing in India but by the cultivation and improvement of our intrinsic strength to exclusion of all reliance on our foreign relations for anything but a gradual preparation for the entire conquest of the continent, *Jenkins 276*.—Necessity for placing our chief reliance on our military force, *Malcolm 281*.—Principal danger to the Government to be apprehended from native troops, *Russell 133*.

Effect of the substitution of our Government for the misrule of the native princes, on the prosperity of the agricultural and commercial part of the population, *Malcolm 278*.—Bad effect of the systems introduced by Europeans instead of the old governments, *Malcolm 281*.—On account of the complete change in our situation within the last 15 years, a reconstruction of our local rule is necessary, *Malcolm 284*.—Inexpedient both in a financial and political point of view to continue the administration of India by the multiplicity of European officers hitherto employed, *Malcolm 285*.—Local checks on governors of provinces no longer practicable, *Malcolm 285*.—Salutary influence of the maxims of our Government upon the minds of the natives, *Malcolm 289*.—Opinion of witness as to the eligibility of establishing a local government for Central India, *Malcolm 292*.—Opinion of witness on the scheme of doing away the Supreme Government, *Bayley 363*.—Upper orders generally averse to the change of government; the lower prefer it on account of their increased security, *Chaplin 519, 520*.—Feeling of the upper classes towards the British Government, *Chaplin 522*.—Beneficial results of admitting natives to participate in, *Russell 140*.—Their introduction would be a work of difficulty and danger, *Russell 141*.—Akber, who governed India well, used Hindoos, the natives of the country, *Russell 143*.—Policy of this country to maintain the native states now existing; every effort should be made to prevent the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule, *Malcolm 277*.—Effect of the states of India losing their native governments; dangers which would result from the extinction of the upper classes, *Malcolm 277*.—Protection given by the British Government must render it beneficial to a great proportion of the agricultural classes, *Malcolm 280*.—Classes which may be excepted; nature of these offices, *Malcolm 281*.

Political object of importance to attach the superior classes to our government, and to use them as our chief instrument for the administration of our Eastern Empire, *Malcolm 281*.—Commercial classes decidedly benefited by our rule, *Malcolm 281*.—Should the any class have to the British Government, *Malcolm 281*.—Necessity of deference to the higher classes in India in order to avoid frequent revolts, *Malcolm 281*.—Opinions of witness as to the tyranny of the native princes when left to themselves, with reference to the agricultural and commercial classes, *Malcolm 282*.—People generally better off under the British Government than formerly, *Bayley 349*.—Difficulty of controlling the extravagance of the respective governments, *Hill, App. p. 82*.—Politics of no nation administered with greater regard to justice than that of India, *Hill, App. p. 82*.—Suggestions for improvements in either fixing the governors' permanent residence at the

Presidencies,

*Government of India—continued.*

Presidencies, or empowering the executive to proceed with regularity during their absence, *Hill, App. p. 83*—Suggestions as to alterations proposed in the government of India, *Malcolm, App. p. 146, 147.*

*Governor-general.* It appears desirable that the Governor-general should be relieved from the internal administration of Bengal, and left free to direct his mind to the political and general government of the whole empire, *Munro, App. p. 117*—Opinion of witness as to the expediency of decreasing the power and interference of the Governor-general in the local governments, and relieving him from many matters of detail, *Elphinstone, App. p. 157*—Governors should have commissions from the King, as the commanders-in-chief have now, good effects which would result from this arrangement, *Elphinstone, App. p. 158*

Sir George Barlow succeeded to the office of Governor-general in virtue of a provisional appointment, upon the death of Lord Cornwallis, Court of Directors wished his continuance; the Grenville Administration appointed Lord Lauderdale, whom the Court refused to appoint, or to displace Sir George Barlow, who was removed by an exercise of the prerogative of the Crown for the first time, Court afterwards acquiesced in the appointment of Lord Minto, *Jones, App. p. 181*

*Guicowar.* No state in India has derived more benefit from our interference than the Guicowar state, *Barnwall 167*—State after the prince became his own master, *Barnwall 167*—Superior state of the territory added to the Company over the native states of Guicowar, *Barnwall 178*—Revenue of the Ceded Provinces, *Barnwall 180*—Effect of the treaty with the Guicowar of Guzerat, *Malcolm 277*—Population of Guicowar states, *Carnac 487*—Treaties with that State, *Carnac 490*

Agreement of the East India Company to furnish this prince with troops, &c. on account of treaties entered into between them, *Macculloch, App. p. 74*—Nature of the treaties entered into with the princes of that family, owing to the state of mind of the head prince of that house, *Elphinstone, App. p. 155*—Arrangements with Gykwar have been considerably modified since the original subsidiary treaty, 1802, *Jenkins, App. p. 160*—Treaties with this state, *Jones, App. p. 189*—Conduct of Syajee towards his creditors, who were guaranteed by the British Government, consequent sequestration of his provinces by Sir J. Malcolm, *Jones, App. p. 189, 190*—Nature of our treaties with this ally, from 1773 to the present period, *Jones, App. p. 195*—During Lord Wellesley's government, *Jones, App. p. 219*—Of interference by the East India Company in the affairs of this state, having for its object the reformation of the civil and military administration of the country, *Jones, App. p. 281*—Conduct of Colonel Walker in the reformation of the civil and military establishments, *Jones, App. p. 281.*

Extract from a minute of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, late Governor of Bombay, dated 3d of May 1820, respecting the affairs of the Guicowar, *App. p. 349*—Substance of a letter from the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, to his Highness Syajee Row Guicowar, dated 3d April 1820, *App. p. 353*—Translation of a memorandum under the seal of his Highness Syajee Row Guicowar, 11pp p. 354—Means taken to ensure the payment of debts due from this state, guaranteed by the East India Company, Extract of a Minute of Sir J. Malcolm, Governor of Bombay, 30th Nov 1830, *App. p. 355.*

See also *Baroda. Guzerat*

*Guides.* Stipulation in subsidiary treaties for the Allied Power to find guides for British troops ascending the ghats, *App. p. 464*

*Gurhwal, Rajah of.* Copy of the sunnud granted to the Rajah of Gurhwal, under the seal and signature of the Governor-general, granting to the rajah the whole of the territory of Gurhwal, with certain exceptions; rajah to make such settlement as best calculated to promote the happiness and welfare of the inhabitants; to govern with justice; to collect revenues and appropriate them to his own use; to prohibit traffic in slaves; begarrah, or supplies for troops, to be furnished on requisition, facility to be afforded British subjects trading; not to alienate or mortgage possessions without consent of the British Government; while conditions observed, rajah and his posterity guaranteed possession, and will be defended against his enemies, *App. p. 500*

*Guzerat States.* Native states under the protection of the British Government, but without subsidiary treaties, *Mill 12.*

*Guzerat.* In Guzerat, they are in as prosperous a state as when the cession was first made, *Malcolm 278*—Advantages of this province from its particular position, in respect to other powers in India, *App. p. 325*—Wealth, both landed and commercial, very great, *App. p. 323, 326*—Necessity for increasing rather than diminishing the strength of the British in Guzerat, *App. p. 327*—Minute of the Governor-general in Council at Fort William, dated 22d September 1810, on the subject of this province, *App. p. 328*

Articles of Convention between the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, President and Governor in Council of Bombay, for and on behalf of the Honourable East India Company of the one part, and Rowjee Appajee for and on behalf of Anund Rao Guicowar (445.—71.)

**Guzerat—continued.**

**Sensajmehale Shumabere Behader** of the other part, for the security of the dominion and government of the Guicowar in Guzerat, *App.* p. 440.—Agreement concluded between the resident at Boroda and Anund Rao Guicowar, confirming agreements made by Rowjee Appjee with the Governor of Bombay on behalf of the Guicowar, *App.* p. 440.

**Gya Purnahud Chobey.** Translation of the ikarnamah of Gya Purnahud Chobey, reciting the breach of a former ikarnamah and resumption of the fortres of Calinger by the British Government, and engaging to abstain from friendly intercourse with rebel chiefs, not to enter into disputes with chiefs obedient to the British Government; to guard the passes of the ghats; to give notice of invasion; to furnish guides and supplies to British troops; to reside in one of the villages of the jaghire; not to shelter marauders; to give up British subjects absconding; zamindars of villages to be responsible for robberies on travellers; to give up murderers and criminals, and to do other acts of obedience, *App.* p. 476.—Translation of a sunnud granted to Gya Purnahud Chobey, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of obedience, and delivering in the above ikarnamah; list of the villages comprised therein, *App.* p. 477.

**H.**

**Haileybury.** Objectionable nature of this establishment, *Russell, App.* p. 171.—Partakes of the disadvantages of both colleges and schools, *Russell, App.* p. 171.

**Hasan bin Ali.** Translation of the preliminary treaty with Hasan bin Ali, stipulating for the delivery up of certain vessels; Indian prisoners to be given up; Hasan bin Ali to be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs, *App.* p. 500.

**Hasan bin Rama.** Translation of the preliminary treaty with Hasan bin Rama, stipulating for certain places remaining in the hands of the British Government; that certain vessels shall be surrendered to the British; Indian prisoners to be given up; after execution of those engagements Hasan bin Rama to be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs, *App.* p. 499.

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**Malwa and Sirhind.** Translation of an Ittilah Nameh, addressed to the chief of the country of Malwa and Sirhind on this side the River Sutlege, engaging to secure the country from the control of Maharajah Runjeet Sing; country to be exempted from pecuniary tribute to the British Government; chiefs to exercise the same rights and authority within their own possessions which they enjoyed before they were taken under the British protection; necessities to be supplied British forces marching through the country for the general welfare; chiefs with their forces to join the British army in repelling enemies; European articles brought by merchants from eastern districts for the use of the army to pass without molestation or demand of duty; horses purchased for cavalry regiments to pass without molestation or demand of duty, *App.* p. 445.

Translation of a sunnud granted to the chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind on this side the river Sutlege, reciting the above Ittilah Nameh, and disclaiming intention of the British Government to pay attention to the complaints of certain zemindars, but to leave the zemindars to exercise their own authority in their own possessions; but in case of forcible dispossession, restitution to be made, *App.* p. 469.

**Manufactures.** Manufactures of Chandeli, and Runnode and Cashmere are fast losing their influence, and giving way to Norwich, *Tod, App.* p. 126.

**Maunbhund.** Translation of a sunnud granted to Maunbhund of Booyje, on condition of maintaining five beegaraes, to maintain roads through the thakorraes; nuzzeraud remitted; to join with troops in case of war, *App.* p. 484.

**Marauders.** Engagements in subsidiary treaties that subsidiary power shall not hold any intercourse with marauders, *App.* p. 496.

**Mauritius.** Captured by the British under the administration of Lord Minto, *Jones, App.* p. 184.

**Measurement of Land.** Loss to the Government from the receipt of bribes by aumils in the premedancy of Oude, upon the measurement of land, *App.* p. 418.

**Mecca.** Manner in which the vast sums expended in the pilgrimage to Mecca during the Mogul Empire, was a drain upon the resources of India, *Walker, App.* p. 315.

**Meer Khan.** Manner in which the political state of India is affected by the proceedings of the Pindarries, but more especially of Meer Khan; he is actuated by a rancorous enmity to the British power, manner in which we are restricted from interfering in consequence of the treaties with Sindia and Holkar, *Jones, App.* p. 296.

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**Mehendra Singh Teeka.** Sunnud granted Lieutenant Ross, confirming to Mehendra Sing and his descendants, the Rajah of Bussahir, on condition of paying a certain contribution towards defraying the expense of the force maintained by the British Government for the preservation of the safety and tranquillity of the protected Hill States; certain forts retained by the British Government as commodious stations for its protecting force; arrangements with regard to certain thakoorraes incorporated with the Basalur Rajah previous to the Goorka invasion to be maintained, other thakoorraes declared independent of all but the paramount authority of the British Government; troops to co-operate with British force on requisition; beegaraes to be furnished when called for, for the construction of roads throughout the country, *App.* p. 486.

**Military Government.** Military branch of our government in India, is that which has been generally the best administered, *Russell, App.* p. 170

**Military Power.** Injustice of depriving our allies in India of every vestige of military power, *Jones, App.* p. 266.

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*Mirzapore.* Nature of the connexion with the rajah of Rewah, 1812, on the incursion of the Pindarries into the Company's territory, *Jones, App.* p. 183

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*Mohasah.* See *Bhow Ram Chunder Bullar.*

*Monopolies.* Stipulation in subsidiary treaties, that monopoly of the produce of the state shall not be granted, *App.* p. 497.

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*Munro, Sir Thomas.* Extract of a letter from him to the Marquis of Hastings, on the objections to the employment of a subsidiary force, *Macculloch, App.* p. 78—Difficulties surmounted by him in the war in India, in 1817, *Jones, App.* p. 186—Extract from a report of Colonel Munro, as to the manner in which the affairs of the state of Travancore had been conducted, previous to his undertaking the administration of the government, *Jones, App.* p. 276—Justification of the alterations introduced by Colonel Munro into the land revenue system of Travancore, *Jones, App.* p. 278—His opinion in 1799 upon the evils attending the double governments of Oude and Tanjore; also upon the evils attending a subsidiary force, *App.* p. 399.

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**Murderers** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties for delivery up of murderers taking refuge in the territories of Allied Powers, *App.* p. 496.

**Muscat**, Imaum of. The Company have treaties with the Imaum of Muscat for commercial purposes, and for the suppression of the slave trade and piracy; in order to secure the fulfilment of the provisions of these treaties, the Company have established political agents; suggestion that a native agent at Muscat, or a European merchant as consul, with one or two cruisers, would do all that is necessary, at a considerably diminished expense, *Rep.* p. 80—No change has taken place in our engagements with this chief, interference having been carefully avoided, *Malcolm, App.* p. 358.

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**Mysore** Plan of management by dewan under Pooniah successful, *Macculloch* 7—Subsidiary treaties promoted the prosperity of the Mysore, *Munro* 192—Subsidiary treaty formed for the protection of the Hindoo Rajah of Mysore, upon the death of Tippoo Sultan, *Malcolm* 277—Good conduct of the native troops of the Mysore, *Malcolm* 277—In as good a condition under our government as it was under that of Tippoo, *Malcolm* 278—Good government under the dewan system, *Baillie* 590—Agreement of the Company to maintain, and of the rajah to receive, troops for the defence of his dominions, *Macculloch, App.* p. 74—This kingdom is a striking example of the evils arising from the mixed government which prevails in the protected states, *Crawford, App.* p. 95—Opinion of Sir T. Munro on the consequences of this treaty, *Crawford, App.* p. 95—Nature of our treaties with this state, *Edmonstone, App.* p. 106—Effect of our treaties of Mysore, and management of our residents at that court, *Barnwall, App.* p. 114—State of our connexion with this government, conduct of the rajah; revolt of his subjects, our military interference, *Jenkins, App.* p. 160.

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**Nagode.** See *Cucheerah*.

**Nagpore** Government of, better than the Nizam's, but not so well as the Peishwa's, *Russell* 126—Treaty with, *Malcolm* 277—State of engagement with the Rajah of Nagpore; as defined in the treaty of 1826, and revised 1829, *Macculloch, App.* p. 76—Conduct of the affairs of Nagpore after the flight of Appa Sahib, 1817, *Jones, App.* p. 190—Treaties concluded with this state, 1816, *Jones, App.* p. 198, 238—Extracts from Despatches from the Court of Directors to the Governor-general in Council at Bengal, relative to political transactions with the state of Nagpore, *App.* p. 340—Of interference by the East India Company in the affairs of this state, having for its object the reformation of the civil and military administration of that country, *Jones, App.* p. 282.

**Nagpore**, Rajah of. Treaty with the Rajah of Nagpore, reciting breaches of a former treaty, and cause of the present; articles of the former treaty not contrary to the present are confirmed; title of the rajah and certain ceremonies and dignities relinquished; correspondence with foreign states only to be carried on through the British Resident; number and disposal of British troops in the rajah's territories to rest with the British Government; certain territories to remain under the dominion of the British; manner in which exchanges to be made of those territories; territories of the rajah during his non-age governed by the British; administration thereof now given up to the rajah; troops of the rajah to be at the disposal of the British; certain territories to remain under the superintendence  
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intendence of the British, revenue accounts being submitted to the rajah; period at which territories to be placed under the management of the rajah; management of the rajah's territories to be conducted under the advice of the British; extra expense of necessary hostilities to be borne by the rajah; in the event of any apprehension of diminution of revenue, territories to be resumed by the British; proceedings to be taken in that event; account of revenues to be rendered the rajah; certain lands to be annexed to the British Residency, and Government to keep up necessary works for rendering them a good military position; pasture land to be provided for troops; British Government to garrison fortresses, and Company's officers and troops to have ingress and egress; rajah to collect brinjaries and store grain when called on, for supply of troops, *App.* p. 511-514—Schedule of cessions to the British Government under the above treaty, *App.* p. 514—Revised engagement between the Company and the rajah, modifying and altering certain articles in the above treaty, *App.* p. 515.

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*Nairs.* Usages of the state of Nairs, where property is inherited through the females entirely, *Munro* 260.

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*Natives of India.* Are worse off under subsidiary treaties, than before we interfered, *Mill* 86, 37—Care very little by whom they are governed, *Mill* 48—Eligibility of admitting them to participate in the government of India, *Russell* 140—No measure so essential to the good government of India as the advancement of the natives to a share in the administration, *Malcolm* 279—Effect of employing natives in Bombay under witness's government, *Malcolm* 279—Employment given to natives by Mr. Elphinstone, who concurred with witness in his views of raising them to political offices, *Malcolm* 279—Establishment of the privileged classes of the Deccan, by Mr. Elphinstone; good results which have followed, *Malcolm* 279—Advantages enjoyed by natives under British Government, *Bayley* 309.

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*Natives.* See also *Bankers. Government of India. Justice, Administration of. Offices.*

*Native Princes.* Political situation of the subsidiary princes, *Mill* 19; *Barnwall* 146—Importance attached by native princes of India to the shadow of majesty they are left to enjoy, *Mill* 72—State of native princes under subsidiary system, *Barnwall* 187—Interference with the people of India cannot be carried on with benefit to the peasants, unless princes be entirely controlled by the Government of India, *Barnwall* 165—Of interference in the affairs of allied and protected states, *Jones*, *App.* p. 247—Interference in cases of disputed succession to the throne, *Jones*, *App.* p. 247—Disposition of the native princes to turn their connexion with the British Government to the best advantage, *Closs*, *App.* p. 84—Consequences to the people of our military protection and interference in the civil administration of the native governments, *Crawford*, *App.* p. 94—Stipends paid to native princes, their relatives and dependants, whose territories are incorporated with the British possessions, or transferred to other families, 1817-18, 1827-28, *App.* p. 202—Proposition for restoring the administration entire into the hands of native princes, and to attach them rather as allies than reluctant dependants, manner in which it would cause a certain augmentation of clear revenue, *Walker*, *App.* p. 305

*Native States.* Names of native states not under British protection; of those with which subsidiary treaties exist; and of those under British protection, but without subsidiary treaties, *Rep.* p. 80.

*Naumdhur Khan.* Sunnud granted to Naumdhur Khan, chief of Pindarries, reciting permission given him by the Governor-general to remain at Malwa, in consideration of his early surrender and former services, and under stipulation to reside with his family and dependants at Bhopaul, and to be subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Nawab, granting him an annual stipend in expectation of future good conduct, *App.* p. 495

*Nawul Kishwur.* Translation of the ikarnamah of Nawul Kishwur and the relic of Bherit Jew Chobey, reciting the breach of a former ikarnamah and resumption of the fortress of Calinger by the British Government, and engaging to abstain from friendly intercourse with

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with rebel chiefs; not to enter into disputes with chiefs obedient to the British Government, but to refer disputes arising at their instigation to the decision of the British Government; to guard passes of the ghauts against marauders; to give notice of meditated invasion; to furnish guides and supplies to British troops ascending the ghauts, to reside in one of the villages of the jaghire, and not elsewhere without leave of the British Government; to have no connexion or give shelter to any marauders, to give up subjects absconding from the British Government; zemindars of villages to be responsible for robberies on travellers; murderers and criminals to be given up, and to do other acts of obedience, *App.* p. 472.—Translation of a sunnud granted to the Chobey Nawul Kishwur and the relict of Bherit Jue Chobey, granting them possession of certain villages in consideration of their obedience and having delivered in the above ikarnameli; also list of villages referred to therein, *App.* p. 473.—Draft of a sunnud to Chobey Nawul Kishore, reciting the joint interest of Chobey Nawul Kishore and the widow of Bhurtjoo Chobey in certain lands, and their agreement to hold their shares under a joint sunnud; and reciting differences between them, and that the widow had solicited to be put in possession of her own share; consequent division of the property, and rights and duties of the said Chobey Nawul Kishore and his subjects, *App.* p. 492.—List of the villages forming the separate jaghures of the widow of Bhurtjoo Chobey, *App.* p. 492.

*Navy.* Advantages of a navy as attached to the East India Company in India, *Malcolm, App.* p. 143.—Reasons for a local navy being of more service than the employment of king's ships, *Malcolm, App.* p. 143.—Important assistance derived by Sir Archibald Campbell during the Birmese war from the active exertions of the Royal Navy, and also from the Company's marines, *Jones, App.* p. 189.

*Nepaul.* Intercourse of the Company is principally of a commercial nature where they have a resident established, opinion of one witness that the resident might be withdrawn, the intercourse being kept up by occasional special envoys, which would relieve the Company from considerable annual expense, *Rep.* p. 80.

The threatening and commanding position which the Nepaulese held along the whole northern frontier before the war which broke out during the administration of Lord Hastings, is defeated by the treaty which terminated the war, the Nepaulese are confined on three sides by our territory, and on the north by the Himalaya mountains, so that they are completely enclosed, and have no power of acting beyond their own territory, *Rep.* p. 80, 81.

Nature of the connexion between Nepal and the Indian Government, *Gardner* 413  
—Nature of their government, *Gardner* 427—State of the peasantry, who can be bought and sold, *Gardner* 430—Manner in which British territories are secured against the danger which formerly existed from the Nepal state, *Gardner* 438—State of the Nepaul army and their discipline, *Gardner* 447—Education among the natives, *Gardner* 451—Administration of justice, *Gardner* 454—Of public works, *Gardner* 455—Of agriculture, *Gardner* 456—Of commerce and climate, *Gardner*, 457, 462—Treaty of peace concluded with the rajah of Nepaul, with whom we had no former relation, *Russell, App.* p. 162.

War with the Gorkahs, 1813, under the administration of Lord Hastings, *Jones, App.* p. 184—Bravery of the Gorkahs; difficulties of the war; success of the British under Sir D. Ochterlony, *Jones, App.* p. 184—Provinces acquired by this war, *Jones, App.* p. 184—Nature of the treaties of the East India Company, the first relations commencing 1792, *Jones, App.* p. 201—Translation through the medium of a Persian version of an engagement (ikarnameli) in the Hindoo language, executed at Muckwanpore Munree by Kajee Bukhtawur Sing Thappa and Chunder Seekhur Opadeea, plenipotentiaries on the part of the rajah of Nepal, *App.* p. 486.

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*Nizam.* Failure of the system of dewan, *Macculloch* 7—State of, under subsidiary system, *Russell* 75—Date of the first treaty with the Nizam, 1776, *Russell* 79, 91—Deterioration of the population of the Nizam between 1800—1820, under subsidiary treatment, *Russell* 107—Progressive improvement of the Ceded Provinces, which have been recovering in the same ratio as the rest of the Nizam's country have declined, *Russell* 116—Formation of subsidiary treaty with this power on going to war with Tippoo Sultan, *Malcolm* 277—State of the Nizam before the formation of the subsidiary treaty, *Malcolm* 277—Evil consequences of the treaty in this country, *Malcolm* 277—Obligations of the East India Company owing to treaties and engagements with this state, *Macculloch, App.* p. 74—Advantages to the Nizam's government of its connexion with the British, *Pitman, App.* p. 120—Consequences of any attempt to withdraw our influence from his state, *Pitman, App.* p. 120—From 1803 to the present time, all the affairs of the government have been conducted by a minister supported by us, *Jenkins* 159—Nature of the various treaties and agreements from 1780—1822, *Russell, App.* p. 164—Transactions at his court, 1808—His dissatisfaction at his dependent condition; choice of his minister, *Jones, App.* p. 183—Nature of our relations with the Nizam from the earliest period to the present time, *Jones, App.* p. 194, 213, 216—Of interference by the East India Company in the affairs of native states, having for its object the reformation of the civil and military administration (445.—VI.)

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*Netherlands, King of.* Treaty with, in 1824, by which Malacca, Singapore, and the Dutch possessions on the continent of India were ceded in exchange for the British settlement of Bencoolen, in Sumatra, *Rep. p. 79*.

*Nobility.* Evil consequences of the introduction of our system in utterly extinguishing the upper classes of society among the natives, *Russell, App. p. 172*—Not a single individual can now be found answering to our description of a gentleman, *Russell, App. p. 172*—Few considerations more connected with the political prosperity of the territories of Bombay than the maintenance of the privileged classes of the Deccan, *Malcolm, App. p. 358*—Employment and means of distinguishing themselves in the public service should be early afforded to the higher classes, *Malcolm, App. p. 360*.

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*Northern Circars.* Nature of the Northern Circars, *Mill 58*—Were among the earliest part of our possessions in India, *Mill 60*—Were granted to the East India Company in 1765 by the Mogul Shah Allum, by way of imaum or free gift, without the least participation of any person whatever in the same, *App. p. 177*

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*Opium.* Injustice of our conduct in abolishing the imposts and appropriating the transit duties on opium, in contradiction to the treaties, &c. with Rajpoot states, *Tod, App. p. 125*—Immoral tendency of the measure, gambling in opium, *Tod, App. p. 126*—Modifications which have taken place in the opium regulations, *Tod, App. p. 126*.

*Ordnance.* Elegance and skill with which the ordnance of the native princes of India is cast; efficient state of Ameer Khan's horse artillery, *Jones, App. p. 266*—In the practical part of the art there is little left for European artillery-men to communicate to native, *Jones, App. p. 266*.

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2. *Government of the Country*
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1. *Treaties*

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Agreement between his Majesty Abul Mozuffer Moizood Deen Ghazeeror Deen Hyder Shah, King of Oude, and the British Government, on account of a sum given as a loan to the East India Company; manner in which interest to be paid; loan to be in perpetuity; sovereigns of Oude never to have power to take it back, or exercise any interference with its interest; certain persons to be paid out of the interest of the loan; Company to protect the honour and possessions of the stipendiaries paid out of the fund; rate of interest; names of persons to whom interest to be paid; and manner in which payments to be made, *App.* p. 504

## 2 Government of the Country.

Endeavours by the Supreme Government to induce the rulers of Oude to reform the administration of the country, manner in which those endeavours have proved unavailing, and hopelessness of their ever being successful, *App.* p. 396—Administration of the country under the present reign is more vicious than under the former one, country is going to ruin; people have no faith in the Government, and constant desertion is going on from the capital and rest of the kingdom, *App.* p. 397—Opinion of the resident that the suspension of the interference over the affairs of Oude, which was stipulated for in the treaty of 1801 made by Lord Wellesley, is the cause of the mismanagement, necessity for an assumption of the Government, either directly by the substitution of British authority, or indirectly in the nomination of a minister, *App.* p. 398—Proceedings taken by Lord Wellesley to reform the administration, and opposition of the vizier, *App.* p. 399, 400—Proceedings of Lord Hastings in completion of the system previously pursued by Lord Wellesley, *App.* p. 400—Ineffectual attempts by Lord Minto to effect the necessary reform, from the continued opposition of the vizier, *App.* p. 401—Further attempts by Lord Hastings, *App.* p. 401—Manner in which the pressure of the measure of reform was weakened by an advance by the vizier in the way of loan, to carry on the war with Nepal and the Malirattas, *App.* p. 402—Opinions of the Court of Directors upon the proceedings taken with regard to Oude, *App.* p. 402, 403—Suggestions by Lord W. Bentinck upon the measures necessary to be taken with regard to Oude, *App.* p. 403—406—Memorandum on the affairs of Oude by the resident, Mr Maddock, *App.* p. 406—Abstract of the state of Oude, as gathered from the Persian papers, *App.* p. 406

## 3 Revenue.

Divisions or districts into which the state is divided and average amount of jumma, *App.* p. 416—Statement of the immense sums diverted from the general treasury into the coffers of an individual empowered to collect the revenue, *App.* p. 419.

## 4 King of Oude

Effeminacy of his ideas, and causes thereof; he has no sound talents, and less habitude for business; extravagant and wasteful, and will not be satisfied with any administration that attempts to limit his income, his weakness causes him to be a tool in the hands of others who have gained their influence by subserviency to his bad passions, *App.* p. 398—Manner in which the kingdom of Oude might be recovered from its disorder, and its revenues doubled, if the ruling authority would remodel the government, introduce reform in the administration, establish a reasonable and fixed revenue for land, and collected at stated periods, and exercising a vigilant control over its officers, *App.* p. 418—The king might be induced to establish courts of justice and good police, but only through British councils, *App.* p. 420.

## 5. Minister of Oude.

Disadvantages he labours under from the feeling of distrust and insecurity by the people in the government, impossibility for him to prevent those employed in collecting the revenue under him from acting oppressively, and making undue exactions, *App.* p. 397—His admission of the disorders existing in the kingdom, made for the purpose of attaching blame upon his predecessors, and his showing the difficulties he had to encounter by way of excusing any future failure or enhancing future success, *App.* p. 398—Advantages gained by him from the British Government; feeling of the British resident against him; his ability as a revenue officer to effect reform in the administration, and his difficult task in governing an imbecile, childish, and capricious monarch, *App.* p. 398.

See also *Contracts. Crime. Farming System. Female Influence. Hostilities. Justice. Administration of. Munro, Sir Thomas. Police. Rents. Revenue System. Treaties*

*Osseley, Sir Gore.* See *Persia.*

## P.

*Patans.* See *Predatory Tribes.*

*Patronage.* Manner in which the patronage of India is necessarily exercised by the Court of Directors, *Tod, App.* p. 135—There should be a certain number of cadetships reserved for the children or near relatives of those who have served the Company, *Tod, App.* p. 135—Placed in the hands of the East India Directors, to prevent its giving  
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**Patronage**—continued.

an undue influence to the Crown, *Russell, App. p. 171*—Manner in which patronage is generally exercised, *Russell, App. p. 171*—Difficulties which suggest themselves as to appointments to India being regulated by open competition and public examination, *Russell, App. p. 171*.

**Pecuniary Supplies.** Manner in which the unlimited power the Company's servants possess of obtaining pecuniary supplies, have raised the credit of the Company, and given them a command over military operations, and removed a main bar to the execution of the most extensive projects, *Walker, App. p. 309*.

**Pecuniary Subsidy.** See *British Force*.

**Peishwah.** Bad effects of the subsidiary treaties on the, *Macculloch 1*—Fall of the Peishwa in attempting to break the yoke of the British Government, *Russell 116*—Formation of subsidiary treaty with this power on going to war with Tippoo Sultaun, *Malcolm 277*—Good result of the subsidiary treaty with this power in the Mahatta war, *Malcolm 277*—State of the Peishwa; causes of its declension in prosperity; effect of Mr. Elphinstone's government, *Malcolm 278*.

Bound by treaty to enter into no political transactions without the approbation of the British Government, *Elphinstone, App. p. 155*—Great improvement which took place in the Peishwa, subsequent to its alliance with the British Government, *Elphinstone, App. p. 156*—Treaty imposed on him in consequence of the murder of the minister of the Guikwar at his court, *Russell, App. p. 162*—Peishwa had been the secret abettor of every plot formed against our power in India; his deposal contributed in an essential degree to remove dread of external hostility, *Duff, App. p. 176*—Stipend allotted to his family, 1816, when he gave in his submission, *Jones, App. p. 193*—Treaties formed with this prince during the government of Lord Wellesley, *Jones, App. p. 221*.

Evil effects of the subsidiary system shown in decaying villages and decreasing population in the dominions of the Peishwa, according to the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro in 1817, *App. p. 399*.

See also *Benaick Rao*.

**Penang** See *Acheen*, King of

**Pensioned Princes.** See *Protected States*.

**Pensions.** Stipends paid to native princes, their relatives and dependants, whose territories are incorporated with the British possessions, or transferred to other families, 1817–18, 1827–28, *Jones, App. p. 202*.

**Pepper.** See *Revenue Travancore*.

**Persia.** The Company are in alliance with Persia, and have a resident at the court of the sovereign, *Rep. p. 80*—Nature of the duties of the ambassador in that country, *Mill 21*.

Embassy of the French to Persia, at which court they for a time supplanted British influence, *Jones, App. p. 182*—Alliance entered into by Sir H. Jones with the Shah of Persia, *Jones, App. p. 182*—Alteration of the treaty by Sir Gore Ouseley, who was deputed from this country, *Jones, App. p. 182*—Treaty at present existing with Persia, entered into 1811—Disastrous consequences of the war with Russia, *Jones, App. p. 190*—Alteration of the treaty with Persia, as to subsidiary payments, *Jones, App. p. 191*—Manner in which danger may be apprehended from an invasion from Persia, *Walker, App. p. 303*; *App. p. 326*.

See also *Ambassadors*.

**Persian Gulf.** Company have treaties with chiefs on the Western shores of the Persian Gulf, for commercial purposes, and with a view to the suppression of the Slave Trade, and of piracy in the Gulf; political agents have been established on the shores of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs for the fulfilment of the provisions of the treaties, whose duties would be conducted at a diminished expense by a native agent or European merchant as consul, with one or two cruisers in the Gulf, *Rep. p. 80*.

**Pindarries.** Were entirely extirpated by Lord Hastings, *Mill 51*—Scindia's connexion with them, *Mill 52*—Justification of the war with them, *Jenkins 619*—Causes of the determination of the British Government to put an end to these bands of robbers, *Edmonstone, App. p. 107, 108*—Necessity of the war for their dispersion, *Russell, App. p. 167*—Great increase of their force collected before the war of 1817, *Russell, App. p. 168*.

Outrages committed by them, 1817, *Jones, App. p. 184*—Conduct of Scindia on the breaking out of the war, 1817, *Jones, App. p. 185*—Defeat and dispersion of the Pindarries, *Jones, App. p. 186*—Declaration of Lord Hastings, at the close of this war, of the political supremacy of the British, *Jones, App. p. 186*—History of the Pindarries, and periods therein, which must be carefully distinguished, *Walker, App. p. 320, 321*.

See also *Naumdhur Khan*. *Predatory Tribes*. *Shujahut Khan*.

*Piracy*

**Piracy.** Manner in which the duties of the political agents, established at Muscat and on the shores of the Persian Gulf for the fulfilment of the treaties for the suppression of piracy, might be as efficiently and less expensively conducted, *App.* p. 80.

**Piratical States.** Parts of the Malabar coast addicted to piracy, and proceedings taken by Lord Minto in 1812 for its suppression, *Jones, App.* p. 184.—Efforts under Lord Hastings's administration to suppress piracy on the Arabian coast and Persian Gulf, *Jones, App.* p. 187.—Successful suppression of piracy, and consequent increase of trade carrying on in Arab Buglas, *Malcolm, App.* p. 358.

**Pitman, Colonel.** Answer to Circular from Board of Control relative to character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the internal affairs of the protected states, *App.* p. 118.—How far the strength and distribution of the Indian army have been regulated by due attention to the changes that have occurred in our political position, &c. with references to the forces belonging to native states on whose aid we could depend, *App.* p. 121.—How far the principles of justice and expediency have been adhered to by the East India Company in their conquests in India, *App.* p. 120.—Good intentions generally of the Indian Government in their proceedings with the natives, *App.* p. 120.—Acquisitions of territory made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1813, *App.* p. 118.—Actual condition of the relation of the Indian Government with the several states under its control, *App.* p. 118.—Amount of military force required in each instance, whether by obligation or security against risk, *App.* p. 118.—Financial effects of conquests and changes of our political relations since 1813, *App.* p. 120.

**Poker Purshaud Chobey.** Translation of the ikarnamah of the Poker Purshaud Chobey, reciting the breach of a former ikarnamah and the resumption of a fortress by the British Government, and entering into engagements relative to rebel chiefs; disputes with obedient chiefs; guarding the passes of the ghauts, giving notice of invasion; finding guides and supplies for British troops, residing on the jaghire; holding no connexion with marauders; giving up British subjects absconding, not harbouring thieves, and doing other acts of obedience, *App.* p. 478.—Translation of a sunnud granted to Poker Purshaud Chobey, granting him possession of certain villages, in consideration of his obedience and delivering in the above ikarnamah, list of the villages referred to therein, *App.* p. 478.

**Police.** Glaring inefficiency of the police at Oude, strength of the force of the King of Oude; their detached duties, and reason of their inefficiency, *App.* p. 397.—Reform necessary in the police of Oude; means taken by the late king for making alteration in the abuses therein, and manner in which his plan was opposed, *App.* p. 419.—Manner in which the aumils appropriated to their own use the funds they were allowed to retain from the revenue collections towards the maintenance of police, *App.* p. 419.

**Political Agents.** Manner in which the duties of political agents established on the shores of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs for the fulfilment of certain treaties, might be as efficiently and less expensively performed, *Rep.* p. 80.—Opinion of Sir John Malcolm, that instead of keeping up so many substantive political agents carrying on a direct correspondence with the British Government, it would be better to assign extensive districts to the superintendence of commissioners or officers of a high rank, under some other designation, to whom subordinate agents should report, and from whom they should receive instructions, which would establish a more uniform system of management, and relieve the Governor-general from matters of inferior importance, *Rep.* p. 84.—Stipulation in subsidiary treaties, that accredited agent of the British Government shall be received at the court of the subsidiary power, *App.* p. 497.

**Political Relations.** Financial effects of the conquests in India, and of the changes or enlargements of our political relations, which have been made since 1831, *Macculloch, App.* p. 78.—Summary statement, explanatory of the progress of the territorial dominion and political connexions of the British Government in India from 1766, *Jones, App.* p. 177.

**Pondicherry.** A French settlement in India, *Mill* 25.

**Poorneah.** See *Mysore*.

**Portuguese.** Their armaments were fitted out by an active and warlike monarch, who united ambition of conquest with the desire of extending commerce; conduct of the Portuguese on taking possession of any newly-discovered territory, *Walker, App.* p. 299. See also *Dutch*.

**Predatory Tribes.** Anxious discussion caused during the latter years of Lord Minto's administration, by the growing power of the predatory forces in Central India and Hindostan; exactions by the Patans upon the Rajpoot states, incursions of the Pindaries; understanding between the two tribes, *Jones, App.* p. 183.—Further observations upon the incursions of predatory tribes, and upon the measures necessary to be taken in consequence, *Jones, App.* 295, 296.

**Presidencies.** See *Civil Establishments*.  
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*Privileged Order.* See *Jagheerdars. Nobility. Sardars.*

*Protected States.* System has proved universally injurious to the princes and people, with the exception of Travancore, *Hill, App. p. 81*—The less we interfere in their affairs the better, *Crawford, App. p. 94*—As far as the states are concerned, they are among the worst governed countries in the world, *Crawford, App. p. 94*—Instead of adding strength, have become a burden to the British Government, *Crawford, App. p. 94*—Injurious effects which naturally arise from the state of the protected princes, *Edmondstone, App. p. 105*—In this condition of affairs, several of the petty states are destitute of all vigour in their administrations, *Barnwall, App. p. 114*—Consequences of our conduct at Mysore, *Munro, App. p. 116*—Witness decidedly of opinion that the security of the Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the protected states, *Malcolm, App. p. 136*—Different degree of interference in the affairs of protected states, *Elphinstone, App. p. 154*.

Scheme of confederation which we have adopted with the protected states is inevitably progressive, *Russell, App. p. 167*—Of interference in the affairs of allied and protected states, *Jones, App. p. 247*—Interference in the case of disputed succession, *Jones, App. p. 247*—Of interference in the choice of a dewan or minister, *Jones, App. p. 255*—Of interference with a view to insure the efficiency of the contingent force which our allies are respectively bound to hold at our disposal, *Jones, App. p. 259*—Of interference by the East India Company with respect to the civil and military affairs of protected states, viz. states which are entitled to our protection, but which do not stand to us in the relation of subsidiary allies, *Jones, App. p. 290*—Latterly Government have shown a determination not to interfere in the management of these states, *Hill, App. p. 81*—Declared principle of Government has been that of non-interference, *Cloze, App. p. 84*—Remedial measures suggested for the present wretched state of the protected and pensioned princes, *Crawford, App. p. 99*.

Of late, prohibition against interference has been more peremptory than ever, *Russell, App. p. 165*—Diversity of opinion upon the subject of interference with native states, *Russell, App. p. 165*—Degree of interference most necessary for the maintenance of our power, *Russell, App. p. 166*—Necessity for uniformity in our interference, *Russell, App. p. 166*—System has tended to check the rapacity and misrule of native governments, *Cloze, App. p. 84*—In our state of circumstances, the formation of subsidiary and protecting alliances seems quite essential to the maintenance of our power, *Munro, App. p. 116*.

Character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the internal affairs of the protected states, *Macculloch, App. p. 77*; *Hill, App. p. 81*; *Baillie, App. p. 88*; *Wilder, App. p. 91*; *Edmondstone, App. p. 102*; *Munro, App. p. 115*; *Pitman, App. p. 118*; *Tod, App. p. 124*; *Malcolm, App. p. 138*; *Gardner, App. p. 152*; *Elphinstone, App. p. 154*; *Jenkins, App. p. 158, 160*; *Russell, App. p. 165*; *Duff, App. p. 174*.

See also *Hydrabad. Mysore. Oude. Peishwa.*

*Punchayet*, Nature of the, *Bayley 320*.

*Punjab.* See *Runjeet Sing.*

*Punnah*, Rajah of. Translation of an ikarnamah presented by the Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder, the Rajah of Punnah, engaging not to unite with the enemies of the Company; to restrain relations from exciting sedition or disturbance in the British territories; to deliver up abetting subjects of the British Government taking refuge in his territories; not to harbour robbers; inhabitants of villages to be responsible for robberies on travellers; to deliver up murderers and criminals taking refuge in his territories; not to hold intercourse with rebel chiefs, nor to engage in quarrels with those obedient to the British Government; to guard passes of the ghats against marauders; to give timely notice of any meditated invasion; to find guides and supplies for British troops ascending the ghats; not to quarrel with rajahs and chiefs respecting villages, but to refer disputes originating with them to the British Government, *App. p. 454*—Translation of a sunnud granted to the Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder, rajah of Punnah, granting him possession of certain villages, in consideration of his obedience and delivering in the above ikarnamah, *App. p. 455*—Statement of the villages inserted in the former sunnud of Rajah Kishore Sing Behauder, Rajah of Punnah, *App. p. 456*.

*Puttala.* See *Waste Lands.*

*Puttala.* See *Kurrun Sing.*

Q.

*Queen Elisabeth.* Her letter to the different sovereigns of India, sent out with the first fleet, merely entreats that her subjects may be allowed to do business in their ports, and to leave a few factors, who may learn the language and the mode of conducting trade, but does not express any wish for permission to erect fortifications, *Walker, App. p. 222*.

## R.

*Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford.* See *Acheen, King of*

*Rajpoot States.* They stand in the same relation to the British in which they stood towards the paramount power in former times; the general feature of the Company's engagements with them is protection, and guarantee of their territory; and on their part, an acknowledgment of the British supremacy; some are bound to furnish contingents of a specified amount, others to place the whole of their resources at our disposal; some pay tribute, while others are exempt, *Rep. p. 83*—Rajpoot chiefs are men of high military spirit, and would be likely to revolt from vexatious restraints; policy to interfere as little as possible in their internal affairs; difference of opinion exists as to whether it would be desirable to emancipate them from the obligations imposed upon them, *Rep. p. 84*.

Native states under the protection of the British Government, but without subsidiary treaties, *Mill 12*—Resident at the Rajpoot states, *Bayley 336*—Insecurity of persons and property in these states; improvement since the alliance with the English, *Wilder 475*—Nature of engagements in these states, *Russell 12-618*.

Interference in these states has never hitherto extended to the entire management of their affairs, except at Oodipore, *Jones, App. p. 291*—Nature of our relations with these states, *Tod, App. p. 123*—Engagements of these states to aid us on emergency with the whole of their forces, *Tod, App. p. 124*—Conduct of Messrs Bailey and Rutherford, who proceeded to Rajpootana to inquire into the state of its commerce, *Tod, App. p. 126*—To combine the Rajpoot states in a federal union, of which the British Government constituted itself protector, had long been looked upon by the Governor-general as a desideratum, *Tod, App. p. 127*.

Chief objects to which attention should be directed in our treaties with the Rajpoot states, *Tod, App. p. 128*—Evil effects of our alliances, in almost every state of Rajpootana, *Tod, App. p. 131*—Importance of our connexion with these states, *Jenkins, App. p. 162*—Nature of arrangements entered into with various states of Rajpootana, &c. the object of which was to secure their co-operation against the predatory associations, *Jones, App. p. 199*—Impolicy of the present conduct of the British Government towards these people, *Masculloch, App. p. 79*—Nature of their obligations with the British Government, *Elphinstone, App. p. 154*—Rajpoots acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, and are bound to refer to its arbitration any disputes which may arise among them, *Jones, App. p. 186*.

See also *Jonapore. Oodipore.*

*Ram Sing.* Sannud to the Rajah Ram Sing, or Ram Surrun for Hindoor, under the seal and signature of the Governor-general in Council, reciting his performance of the part of an ally, and conferring on him certain lands, with the appurtenances, and sayer collections, the right of distributing justice to the ryots, without exaction of beegarabs, or service, or nuzzerana, those dues being remitted; rate of payment for beegarabs furnished by the Rajah during war to the British Government; the Rajah not to receive pay for himself or his troops on joining the British forces; Rajah to promote the welfare of his subjects, and not encroach on the possessions of others; to continue firm in allegiance, and conform to the conditions of the sannud; ryots to consider the Rajah as their rightful lord, to pay revenue punctually, to show obedience, exert themselves to improve cultivation, and augment the Rajah's resources, *App. p. 484*—Another sannud granted to the Rajah Ram Sing, or Ram Surrun, for the thakoorae of Burowlee, under the seal and signature of the Governor-general, in exchange for another fort taken possession of by Government; in case of war to furnish beegarabs and sepoyas, and pay nuzzerana; to make roads, and not encroach on the possessions of others; to promote the welfare of the ryots, and pay obedience to Government; duties of the ryots, *App. p. 485*.

*Rampoor.* Extract from the Report of Commissioners on Ceded and Conquered Provinces, 1808, proving the high state of cultivation and general prosperity of the territory, *Craufurd, App. p. 96*.

*Rana Bhoot Sing.* Translation of a sannud granted to Rana Bhoot Sing of Koobhar, with condition of furnishing forty beegarabs, and making roads throughout the thakoorae, and in case of war, joining the British troops with his whole force; nuzzerana altogether remitted, *App. p. 484*.

*Rana Juggut Sing.* Translation of a sannud granted to Rana Juggut Sing of Bayhal, with condition of maintaining 100 beegarabs, with Captain Ross, at Sumbaloo; and in case of war joining the British troops with his forces, and making roads twelve feet broad throughout his thakoorae; nuzzerana remitted, *App. p. 484*.

*Rebel Chiefs.* Stipulation in subsidiary treaties, not to hold intercourse with rebel chiefs, *App. p. 464*.

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**Rents.** People of Oude declare they would agree to pay much higher rents than at present, if they were assured that the contracts made with them would not be infringed, *App.* p. 397.

**Residence.** Stipulation in some subsidiary treaties, that the allied power shall reside in one of the villages of his jaghire, *App.* p. 474.

**Residents.** Opinion of one witness that residents might be withdrawn, and the intercourse kept up by occasional special envoys, which would relieve the Company from considerable annual expense, *Rep.* p. 80.—Provision contained in subsidiary treaties, by which the state agrees to receive a British resident, through whose medium is imparted the advice and counsel of the British Government on all affairs connected with external and sometimes internal administration, by which advice and counsel the allied state is bound to abide, *Rep.* p. 81.—Importance necessary with regard to the personal character of the resident; he is more of a minister than an ambassador; he carries the subsidiary system into effect, and is the organ through which the views of the British Government must be promoted, he has to govern those who should be governors, and has to contend with the perpetual intrigues of the natives who surround the court; if his efforts are judiciously directed, he may promote the interests of his own government, and promote the prosperity of the country in which he is placed, *Rep.* p. 83.

Checks upon the conduct of political residents, *Macculloch, App.* p. 80; *Hill, App.* p. 82; *Close, App.* p. 85; *Baillie, App.* p. 89; *Wilder, App.* p. 92; *Edmondstone, App.* p. 104; *Munro, App.* p. 117; *Pitman, App.* p. 121; *Tod, App.* p. 134; *Malcolm, App.* p. 145; *Gardner, App.* p. 153; *Elphinstone, App.* p. 156; *Russell, App.* p. 166, 170; *Duff, App.* p. 174.—Power of communication between the different states and the government, which serves as checks on the conduct of residents, *Close, App.* p. 85; *Elphinstone, App.* p. 156.—Advantages which might be derived from the more frequent removal of residents, *Close, App.* p. 85.—Duties of a resident comprise all those which belong to a diplomatic agent in Europe, with many others, *Russell, App.* p. 166.—Various duties of a resident at a native court, *Russell, App.* p. 166.—How far the residents and agents have been subjected to the necessary checks, *Russell, App.* p. 170.—Their distance from the seat of government requires that extensive confidence should be reposed in them, *Russell, App.* p. 170.

See also *Political Agents. Treaties*

**Resources of India.** Had it been an established principle of Indian produce to make the resources of India supply all exigencies, with the present revenue, the debt would not have reached its present amount, nor would the revenue have been burthened with so heavy an expenditure as to intercept every benefit, *Walker, App.* p. 309.—Manner in which these resources have been applied at different periods, *Walker, App.* p. 315.

**Revenue.** Evil effects of the subsidiary alliances with princes of India on the mode of collecting, *Mill* 36; *Russell* 75; *Burnwall* 165.—Exactions at present practised in raising the revenue; odium attaching to England therefrom, *Mill* 68.—Oppression caused by assignment of revenue to natives for debt, *Mill* 71.—Revenues and charges of several states subject to subsidiary treaties, *Jenkins* 276.—No system for the collection of the public revenue more calculated to be beneficial to cultivators than that established under native administrations, *Malcolm* 282.—Assistance given by British forces to enforce the payment of revenue under their system, *Baillie* 547–549.—In the protected states the collection of the revenue is delivered over to contractors, as well as the administration of justice, *Crawford, App.* p. 94.

See also *Deccan. Oude Travuncoors*

**Revenue System.** No revenue system on equitable principles can ever be effected by the unaided efforts of the Oude Government, *App.* p. 397.

**Reswah, Rajah of.** Treaty with this prince on the incursion of the Pindarries into Mirzapore, 1812, *Jones, App.* p. 183.—In 1812 engagements were first entered into with this prince; in 1813–14 further treaties were effected, *Jones, App.* p. 197.

**Robberies.** See *Crime*

**Robbers.** See *Thieves*

**Rohilcund.** See *Rampoor*

**Rooder Paul.** Translation of a sunnud granted to Rooder Paul of Bojje, to maintain forty beegrahs at Sumbaloo; to join with his force in case of war; to keep up roads through the thakoorae; nuzzerana remitted, *App.* p. 484.

**Rowjee Appajee.** Articles of Convention between the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, esq., President and Governor in Council of Bombay, for and on behalf of the Honourable East India Company, of the one part, and Rowjee Appajee, for and on behalf of Anund Rao Guicowar Senakassake Shumshere Behauder, of the other part, for the security of the dominion and government of the Guicowar, in Guzerat, *App.* p. 440.—Agreement concluded between the resident at Baroda and Anund Rao Guicowar, confirming agreements made by Rowjee Appajee with the Governor of Bombay on behalf of the Guicowar, *App.* p. 440.

Roy

**Roy Mungree Deo.** Translation of a sunnud granted to Roy Mungree Deo for the thakoorae of Kurtoar, on condition of maintaining five beegarahs; to maintain roads twelve feet broad through the thakoorae; nuzzerana remitted; to join with troops in case of war, *App.* p. 484.

**Ranjit Sing.** He is the most powerful independent prince in India; his territory is the only one not substantially British dominion; it consists of the Punjab, or country lying within the five branches of the Indus; the population consists of various tribes of unsettled and predatory habits, *Rep.* p. 81.—Is the only power in India that could pretend to cope with the British power, *Russell, App.* p. 168.—Nature of his transactions with the British Government; movements of Lord Minto, in consequence of his military operations; present conduct of this chief, *Jones, App.* p. 182.

See also *Lahore. Loane. Matwa.*

**Rupees.** Percentage charged by Amnatee Aumils for the test of examination of rupees passing through their hands, under the head of nakadee money, *App.* p. 419

**Russel, Henry.** (Analysis of his Evidence).—Evil effects of the subsidiary system on native governments in India, 75.—The largest acquisitions in India have been made since the express declaration of the Legislature, 1784, against further conquest, 75.—Wars in which the Company have been engaged, 75.—First subsidiary treaty was with the Nabob of Lucknow, now king of Oude, 76.—Made by Lord Clive, 78.—Date of the first treaty with the Nizam, 1766, 79.—Nature of the treaty with the Nizam in 1800, 91.—The first cession of territory was owing to a subsidiary alliance, 102.—Deterioration of the population of the Nizam between 1800–1820 under subsidiary treaty, 107.—Progressive improvement of the Ceded Provinces, which have been recovering in the same ratio as the rest of the Nizam's countries have declined, 116

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**Russia.** Probability of any invasion from Russia discussed; policy of guarding our Northern frontiers by well arranged treaties with the Rajpoot states, *Tod, App.* 128.—Should the policy of Russia be again directed against India, the barbarous nations intervening would rather be disposed to augment her power than oppose her progress, *Walker, App.* p. 303.

**Rutherford, Mr.** His conduct in Rajpootana; combination of the commercial people against him; jealousy excited by his attempting to form entrepôts for trading purposes, *App.* p. 126.

**Rutrum Sing.** See *Bijawar, Rajah of.*

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**Ryots.** Safety of ryots from oppression from the vicinity of the English states, to which they can retire, *Barnwall, 157.*—Subsidiary troops not allowed to assist Government in oppressing their ryots, *Barnwall, 161.*

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**Salsette.** By the treaty of Salbey, in 1782, the Mahrattas ceded to the Company the island of Salsette, in the vicinity of Bombay, an acquisition of considerable value, *Jones, App. p. 177.*

**Salt.** Benefits which might be derived both to our allies and inhabitants of our own provinces, but for our Bengal salt monopoly; and our protecting duties, *Id., App. p. 125.*

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**Sattarah.** Nature of the treaty with the rajah of Sattarah, *Jenkins, App. p. 159.*—The rajah now administers his own government with credit, *Jenkins, App. p. 160.*—By treaty with him, 1819, the rajah was fixed in complete dependence, and an English resident has been stationed at his court, *Russell, App. p. 162.*—His elevation to a principality formed by the British power on the destruction of Bejee Row's government, *Jones, App. p. 186.*

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**Sangua.** See *Bhow Ram Chunder Buller.*

**Saul Doonierput.** Translation of an ikarnamoh, or obligation of allegiance, presented by Saul Doonierput, engaging to abstain from intercourse with marauders; to avoid quarrels with government servants; to refer disputes of officers of government, and abide by their decisions; to guard the passes of the ghats against marauders; to give timely notice of any invasion; to find guides and supplies for British troops ascending the ghats; to give up British subjects absconding; not to harbour thieves, to give up felons and murderers; not to give shelter to certain rebels; and to do other acts of allegiance to the British Government, *App. p. 450.*—Translation of a sunnud granted to Saul Doonierput, granting him certain villages in consideration of his obedience and delivering in the above ikarnamoh, *App. p. 452.*—List of the villages referred to in the above sunnud, *App. p. 452.*

**Savuntwarree.** In 1812 engagements were first entered into with the chief, which were afterwards altered, 1819–1820, *Jones, App. p. 197.*

**Schools.** See *Calcutta College. Haileybury College.*

**Scindia.** See *Hyderabad.*

**Scindia.** He is the only prince within the Peninsula who preserves the semblance of independence, and he preserves no more than the semblance, his power has been completely broken by a succession of reverses. his dominions are surrounded by the territory of the Company, or of allies, who are bound to negotiate with foreign states only through the intervention of the Company, there is a resident at his court, and a stationary camp in his neighbourhood, *Rep. p. 81.*—Nominally independent, but only dependent on British Government, *Mill 17.*—Treaties with Scindia, *Russell 131.*—*Closs 375, 406.*—Treaties of alliance and subsidy between this prince and the East Company, *Macaulock, App. p. 74.*—Not connected by subsidiary treaty, but dependent upon the British Government as much as if he were so connected, *Jenkins, App. p. 161.*—Treaty with him to act in concert against the Pindarries, *Russell, App. p. 162.*—Conduct of Scindia at the commencement of the Pindarry war, 1817, *Jones, App. p. 185.*—Nature of our relations with Scindia, which commenced 1781, *Jones, App. p. 200, 225.*—Important result of the war with Scindia, was the annihilation of the French interest at his court; means taken by Lord Wellesley to procure the desertion from Scindia's service of French and other European officers; effect of which policy was to weaken the confidence of Scindia, and other native chiefs, in the fidelity of European adventurers, *Jones, App. p. 189.*

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**Seiks, Chiefs.** Situation of their territory, *Mill 13.*—In 1809 these chiefs were declared to be under the protection of the British Government; nature of the engagements entered into with these chiefs, *Jones, App. p. 197.*

**Serampore.** A Danish settlement near Calcutta, *Mill 20.*

**Seringapalam.** See *Tippoo Sultan.*

**Shah Alum.** See *Deccanny.*

**Shajee Chattraputty Maharaj Kurraver.** See *Colapere, Rajah of.*

*Shajpore,*

**Shapuree**, Island of. Claim by the rajah of Arracan, of the island of Shapuree; rejection of claim, from the British right thereto being undoubted; seizure by the Birmees of the island, and slaughter of the sepoy guard; re-occupation of the island by British troops, but which were withdrawn from the unhealthiness of the station; possession consequently taken by the Birmees, and subsequent war with them, *Jones*, *App.* p. 188.

**Sheikh Shakhboul bin Dhyab**. Translation of the preliminary treaty with Sheikh Shakhboul bin Dhyab of Abon Dhyabee, stipulating for the delivery up of piratical vessels; Sheikh Shakhboul to be admitted to the terms of the general treaty with the friendly Arabs, *App.* p. 500.

**Shipping**. Facilities for ship-building at Bombay, *Walker*, *App.* p. 316.—Value of ship-building built of teakwood, as compared with British built vessels, *Walker*, *App.* p. 316.—Cheapness of ship-building as compared with England, *Walker*, *App.* p. 316.  
*See also Acheen.*

**Shore**, Sir John. *See Dutch Settlements.*

**Shroffe**. *See Currency.*

**Shujahut Khan**. Sunnud to Shujahut Khan, chief of Pindarries, reciting leave having been granted by the Governor-general for the chief to remain at Malwa, under stipulation to reside with his family and dependents at Bhopaul, and be subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Nawab, and granting him, in expectation of his future good conduct, an annual stipend, *App.* p. 494.

**Siam**. Intercourse of the Company therewith, is principally of a commercial nature, *Rep.* p. 80.—Negotiations entered into with this power at the commencement of the Birmees war; commercial treaty concluded by Captain Burney, *Jones*, *App.* p. 189.—Treaty concluded by Major Burney, 1826; commercial arrangements entered into, 1827, *Jones*, *App.* p. 201.—Treaty between the East India Company and the King of Siam; mutual engagements of friendship; manner of settling differences, object of armies or fleets to be declared, manner of ascertaining boundaries; manner in which refugees to be dealt with, engagements as to trades and visitors; manner in which duties to be paid by merchants, and complaints settled, also as to dealings with bad characters, regulations as to the residence of merchants; remuneration with regard to damages to vessels or in case of wreck; disposal of the property of persons dying; as to trading with countries in which it has not been customary to trade; mutual free trade with different countries; inspection of letters; obstruction to commerce not to be given to certain states, regulations as to trading, and other matters relating to Queta; and Perak, *App.* p. 508-511.—Agreement with respect to English vessels to Bangkok, *App.* p. 516.  
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**Siccim**. Nature of the treaty guaranteeing the dominions of the Rajah of Siccim, *Maculloch*, *App.* p. 76.—Draft of a sunnud for the Rajah of Siccim, granting certain lands to the rajah in consideration of his services, to be held under the supremacy of the British Government, and on conditions named; British laws not to be introduced into the territories, but the rajah to make laws suited to the habits of the inhabitants, a previous treaty to remain in force as far as applicable to the circumstances of those lands; criminals and public defaulters to be surrendered, police officers to be allowed to pursue them, from the distance of the rajah's residence from the Company's provinces, orders sent to the local authorities by the Governor-general on an emergency are to be carried into execution in the same manner as if coming from the rajah; boundaries of the low lands granted to the rajah to be surveyed by a British officer, and their limits defined, *App.* p. 493.

**Sinoor**. *See Futtah Sing.*

**Singapore**. Was ceded by the King of the Netherlands, in 1824, in exchange for the British settlement of Benoolen in Sumatra, *Rep.* p. 79.—Extent of trade at, *Mill*, 20.—Negotiations by which we first obtained a footing in the island, and have since become sovereigns of the whole and the adjacent islets, *Crawford*, *App.* p. 99.  
*See also Johore.*

**Sirdars**. In the estimation of their countrymen are a hereditary nobility, association with them is prized by the natives, *Malcolm*, *App.* p. 144.—Impolicy of displacing the native Sirdars and of thereby exciting a feeling of hostility to our political influence, *Jones*, *App.* p. 267.—Exemption of Sirdars from the process of the Adawlut courts, *Malcolm*, *App.* p. 388.

**Sirhind**. *See Malwa.*

**Slave Trade**. Treaties of the Company with the imams of Muscat and other chiefs on the western shores of the Persian Gulf, for the suppression of the Slave Trade; manner in which the duties of the political agents established for the fulfilment of those treaties might be as efficiently and less expensively performed, *Rep.* p. 80.



*Souhawul and Rygown.* Translation of an ikarnameh or obligation of allegiance presented by Laul Amaun Sing of Sohawul and Rygown, engaging not to protect marauders or hold intercourse with them, to avoid disputes with the servants of the British Government, to refer disputes to the decision of the British Government, and to abide thereby; to make no reprisals, to guard passes up the ghauts, to give notice of invasion; to find guides and provisions for British troops ascending the ghauts; to give up British subjects absconding and taking refuge in his territories; not to give certain rebels shelter or protection and to do other acts of allegiance to the British Government, *App.* p. 446.—Translation of a sunnud granted to Laul Amaun Sing, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of his obedience and the delivering in the above ikarnameh, *App.* p. 447.—Statement of the villages in Juppa Souhawul and Rygown, Talook Doorgunpore and Beringpore, referred to in the above sunnud, *App.* p. 448.

See also *Laul Amaun Sing*.

*Sree, Sultan Alla Iddiem Johar Aulum Shaw.* See *Acheen*, King of.

*State Pensioners.* Names of state pensioners, *Rep.* p. 80.—They are the descendants of native sovereigns whose dominions are possessed by the British, on these princes and their posterity pensions have been settled suitable to their birth, they are greatly attached to the remnant of dignity left them, and are held in a certain degree of respect by the natives; there is no danger of their disturbing the peace of India, *Rep.* p. 84.

*Steam Vessels.* Injurious effects to the happiness of the people to be apprehended from the introduction of steam for the purposes of grinding corn in India, *Tod*, *App.* p. 127.—Importance of maintaining an establishment at Bombay for the purposes of defence, suppression of piracy, and mercantile pursuits on the Indus, *Malcolm*, *App.* p. 142, 143.

See also *Cutch*.

*Stipendiary Princes.* Names of the principal stipendiary princes in India, and nature of the relations of the British Government with them, *Jones*, *App.* p. 191.

*Stolen Property.* See *Villages*.

*Stores.* See *Acheen*, King of.

*Subsidiary System.* Recapitulation of the evidence, showing the diversity of opinion that seems to exist on the subject of the subsidiary system, *Rep.* p. 81–84.—General effect of the subsidiary system; advantages and disadvantages thereof, *Macculloch*, *App.* p. 78; *Duff*, *App.* p. 174.—Extract from a letter from Sir Thomas Munro to the Marquis of Hastings on the subject of these alliances, *Macculloch*, *App.* p. 78.—Our interference in the internal affairs of protected states varies much both in character and extent, *Elphinstone*, *App.* p. 154.—Relations arising out of an alliance with us upon the subsidiary system is one of absolute dependence, *Russell*, *App.* p. 167.—Evil of which our subsidiary system has been productive is irremediable, *Russell*, *App.* p. 168.

System of subsidiary alliances, as planned by the Marquis of Wellesley, was formed on a clear view of what our situation rendered expedient, *Duff*, *App.* p. 175.—Review of the system of subsidiary alliances with reference to its subserviency to British interests, and to its operation on the character and condition of the native states in which it has been established, *Jones*, *App.* p. 208.—State of our subsidiary alliances subsequently to the close of Lord Wellesley's administration, *Jones*, *App.* p. 228.—Objections to the subsidiary system, *Jones*, *App.* p. 240.—Advantages of subsidiary treaties, *Jones*, *App.* p. 242.—Whether it be practicable to abandon the system of subsidiary alliance, *Jones*, *App.* p. 243.

See also *Treaties*.

*Subsidiary Force.* Natural tendency thereof in every country in which they exist to render the government weak and oppressive, and to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people, *App.* p. 399.

*Succession to the Throne.* Opinion concerning interference of disputed succession, *Jones*, *App.* p. 247.

*Sulbey*, Treaty of. See *Salsette*.

*Sultan bin Suggur.* Translation of the preliminary treaty with Sultan bin Suggur, stipulating for the surrender of certain towers, guns, and vessels, Indian prisoners to be delivered up; British troops not to enter the towns to lay them waste after execution of engagements; Sultan bin Suggur to be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly Arabs, cessation of hostilities, with the exception that the sultan's boats are not to go to sea, *App.* p. 499.

*Sumbaloo.* See *Goburdhun Sing*.

*Sunnuds.* Translation of a sunnud granted to different chiefs, as stated in a list subjoined, *App.* p. 483.

See also *Treaties*.

**Sunsaroo Thokar.** Translation of a sunnud granted to Sunsaroo Thokar for the thakoorae of Bherloop; to maintain forty beegaraha, nuzzerana remitted; to keep up roads, to join with his troops in case of war, *App* p. 484.

**Supplies.** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties for furnishing supplies to British troops passing through the jaghire, *App* p. 496.

**Supreme Court.** Importance of questions connected with the supreme court and the Government; alterations suggested which might prevent collision, *Elphinstone, App* p. 158.

**Surje Aujengau.** Treaty of. See *Doocab*.

**Surat** Civil and military government was, 1830, vested in the East India Company, stipend allowed to the nabob, *Jones, App* p. 192

**Sutlege, River** Translation of an ittilah nameh addressed to the chief of the country of Malwa and Sirhind, on this side the river Sutlege, placing the country under British protection, without pecuniary tribute, chiefs to exercise authority in their own possessions; necessaries to be supplied British forces marching through the country for the general welfare, chiefs with their forces to join the British army in repelling enemies, European articles brought by merchants for the use of the army, as also horses purchased for cavalry regiments, to pass without molestation or demand of duty, *App* p. 445.—Translation of a sunnud granted to the chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind, on this side the river Sutlege, reciting the above ittilah nameh, and disclaiming intention of the British Government to pay attention to the complaints of certain zemindars, but to leave them to exercise their own authority in their own possessions, but in case of forcible dispossession, restitution to be made, *App* p. 469

**Syajee.** See *Gujicowar*

**Syful, Aulum.** See *Acheen*, King of

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**Tanjore, Rajah of** Cession of his territories to the East India Company, 1799, sums agreed to be allowed for his use, regulation of annuity, 1828-29, *App* p. 192.

See also *Munro*, Sir *Thomas*

**Teakwood.** Superior advantages of teakwood over other timber for ship-building, *Waller, App* p. 316

**Tenasserim Provinces** The Tenasserim provinces, which include Tavoy and Mergui, have hitherto proved but an unprofitable acquisition, but from impulse given by government to productive industry, and security afforded by the institutions to life and property, may draw forth hidden resources and have a favourable effect on the revenue, *Jones, App* p. 189

**Territory** What acquisitions of territory have been made, and what material change or enlargement of our political relations has been effected since 1813, *Macculloch, App* p. 73, *Hall, App* p. 80; *Close, App* p. 83, *Baillie, App* p. 87, *Wilder, App* p. 90, *Edmonstone, App* p. 100, *Munro, App* p. 115; *Pitman, App* p. 118; *Tod, App* p. 122; *Malcolm, Sir John, App* p. 186, *Gardner, App* p. 152, *Elphinstone, App* p. 154, *Russell, App* p. 162, *Duff, App* p. 174.—Acquisitions of territory which have been made, and material change or enlargement of political relations which has been effected, since 1813, *Macculloch, App* p. 73.—Summary statement explanatory of the progress of the territorial dominion and political connexions of the British Government in India, from 1765, *Jones, App* p. 177.—Observations upon the practicability, without endangering the safety of the Indian Empire, to arrest its progress towards further extension, or to contract its present limits, *Jones, App* p. 295; *Walker, App* p. 298.—Arrangements necessary on any plan being carried into execution for a curtailment of territory, *App* p. 325.—Neither strength nor security have been increased by extended empire, *App* p. 327

**Thakoor Doorjun Sing** Translation of a sunnud granted to Thakoor Doorjun Sing, reciting his established proprietorship of a certain pergunnah, and his attachment to the British Government, his request of a grant of a jaghire from the British Government, his presentation of an obligation of allegiance, granting him possession of certain villages in consideration of his obedience, *App* p. 482

**Thannadars** Attempt by the late King of Oude to keep the appointment of thannadars in the hands of Government, instead of leaving them to be filled by aumils, opposition thereto by Ramlal, being aided by the aumils; distress of the thannadars, from receiving no pay; consequent abolition of their functions, *App* p. 419

**Thieves.** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties against harbouring thieves, *App* p. 496.

See also *Crime*.

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*Thokur Jugrak.* Translation of a sunnud granted to Thokur Jugrak, for the thakooras of Bula, on condition of maintaining thirty beegarhs at Sumbaloo ; to attend with force in case of war ; to maintain roads twelve feet broad throughout the thakooras ; nuzzarana remitted, *App.* p. 484.

*Tillamasavy.* See *Acheen*, King of.

*Timber.* Admirable situation of Bombay for receiving constant supplies of timber, *Walker*, *App.* p. 316.

See also *Travancore*.

*Tippoo Sultan.* War with the British, his downfall, storming of Seringapatam, and his death, *Jones*, *App.* p. 178—Observations upon the causes and effects of the wars with Tippoo, *Walker*, *App.* p. 318, 319

*Tobacco.* See *Revenue*. *Travancore*.

*Tod*, Lieutenant-colonel. Answer to Circular by the Board of Control relative to character and extent of the interference exercised by the East India Company in the territorial affairs of the protected states, *App.* p. 124—How far the strength and distribution of the British army in India has been regulated with attention to the changes in our political position, &c. with reference to the forces belonging to native states on whose aid we could depend, or against whom we have to guard, *App.* p. 130—How far the principles of justice and expediency have been adhered to by the East India Company in their conquests in India, *App.* p. 129—Good intentions generally of the Indian Government in their proceedings with the natives, *App.* p. 129—Acquisitions of territory made, and change of our political relations effected, since 1813, *App.* p. 122—Actual condition of the relation of the Indian Government with the several states under its control, *App.* p. 123—Military force required in each instance, whether by stipulation or security against risks, *App.* p. 124—Financial effects of conquests, changes of our political relations since 1813, *App.* p. 127.

*Trade with India.* Extent of trade at Singapore, *Mill* 28—Pacific and dependent state in which trade with India was at first for a short time conducted, manner in which protection became necessary, from the caprices of the Indian sovereigns, and the danger from other European nations, who viewed England as a rival, *Walker*, *App.* p. 299.

See also *Europeans*. *Queen Elizabeth*

*Tranquebar.* See *Danish Settlements in India*.

*Travancore.* Difficulties in which the departments of the state were involved when witness was appointed resident, *Munro* 193—Changes which were introduced in consequence of witness's suggestion, *Munro* 200—While the influence of the resident was used, affairs went on well, since that has been withdrawn, affairs have relapsed into their former state, *Munro* 204—Dates and nature of the subsidiary treaties at Travancore, *Munro* 208-218—Ryotwar system of land prevails at Travancore, *Munro* 227—Great improvement in the commerce and agriculture of these provinces during witness's residence, *Munro* 274—State of the reciprocal engagements of this state and the East India Company, as to the maintenance of a military force by the latter, *Macaulloch*, *App.* p. 75—First date of our treaties with Travancore, arrangements made to enable that state to discharge its debts to the British Government ; administration of government then restored to the native power, *Jenkins*, *App.* p. 160—Nature of our alliance with Travancore from 1788 to the present period, *Jones*, *App.* p. 195—Prior to Lord Wellesley's administration, *Jones*, *App.* p. 212—Of interference of the East India Company in the affairs of this state, having for its object the reformation of the civil and military administration of the state, *Jones*, *App.* p. 274—Extract from a Report prepared by Colonel Munro, stating the manner in which the affairs of this country had been conducted, *Jones*, *App.* p. 276—Justification of the alterations introduced by Colonel Munro into the land revenue system of Travancore, *Jones*, *App.* p. 278—Alterations introduced by Sir T. Munro in the revenue system of the country, *Jones*, *App.* p. 279—Increase in the revenue in consequence of the abolition of several taxes, and the consolidation of others, amount received formerly, and subsequent to the alterations on tobacco, salt, lands, sea customs, pepper, timber, &c. *Jones*, *App.* p. 279—Colonel Munro's opinion of the character of the natives of Travancore, *Jones*, *App.* p. 280—Extracts from Despatches from the Court of Directors to the Governor-general in Council at Bengal, relative to political transactions with the state of Travancore, *App.* p. 349.

*Travellers.* See *Villages*.

*Treaties.* Enumeration of the chief provisions which are contained in subsidiary treaties, *Rep.* p. 81—Native states under the protection of the British Government with whom no subsidiary alliances exist, *Mill* 12—States not under British protection, *Mill* 6—Native states with which subsidiary alliances exist, *Mill* 12 ; *Russell* 76, 610—Political situation of the subsidiary princes, *Mill* 19—Effect of system at Beroda, *Barnwall* 146.

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General character of the subsidiary treaties in India and of their effect upon the different countries to which they relate, *Macculloch* 1-3; *Jenkins* 276; *Malcolm* 277

—Bad effect of the subsidiary system upon the well-being of the inhabitants of India, *Mill* 36, 37, 42, 61, *Russell* 75—Opinion of Sir John Malcolm as to the policy of continuing to govern the subsidiary states as at present, *Mill* 62—Witness's opinion on the same subject, *Mill* 62—Appear eminently calculated to strengthen our military and political power in India, *Munro* 191—Cannot be withdrawn without endangering the security of the British Government, *Munro* 226—Calculated to occasion misgovernment unless corrected by the influence of the British resident, *Munro* 229, 230—Opinion of witness upon the general nature and character of our subsidiary treaties in India, and of their effect upon the good government of the respective countries to which they relate, *Jenkins* 276—Great proportion of power has arisen from subsidiary treaties, *Jenkins* 276—Revenue and charges of several states subject to subsidiary treaties, *Jenkins* 276.

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Subsidiary system is calculated to promote the interests of English Government, and to increase the prosperity of the country at large, *Closs* 389—System not answered so well with Mahomedan governments as with Hindoos, *Closs* 400—Objections which have been principally urged against the subsidiary system, *Chaplin* 518—Justice and expediency of the subsidiary system, *Baillie* 535—Abandonment totally impossible, *Baillie* 535—How far residents can interfere in cases of oppression, *Baillie* 538-530—Ill effect of the vacillation of residents at different times, as to interfering between the sovereign and the people, *Baillie* 588—Doubts as to the effects of subsidiary treaties on the people generally, *Baillie* 594—Impossibility of abandoning them without subverting the Indian empire, *Baillie* 602—Necessity of the policy adopted by Lord Wellesley, *Russell* 610—Necessity of increased interference where subsidiary treaties have once been established, *Russell* 612, 613—Supposition by Governors-general of India, that they are forbidden by a strict interpretation of existing treaties, forcibly to compel the fulfilment of a stipulation by which the Vizier of Oude bound himself and his successors to introduce a system of administration conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and to act under the advice of the Supreme Government; difference of opinion thereon, by Lord Bentinck, *App* p. 397.

## LIST OF TREATIES or ENGAGEMENTS between the British Government and the Native Princes and States in Asia, arranged alphabetically, viz.:—

Acheen, King of - -	<i>App</i> p. 497	Guzerat - - -	<i>App</i> p. 440
Anund Rao Guicowar - -	440	Gya Furshad Chobey - -	476
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**Ukuloote.** Rupture between the Rajah of Sattarah and the family of the minor chief of Ukuloote; prompt manner in which the tumult was put an end to, owing to the Governor of Bombay being in the provinces at the time, *Malcolm, App. p. 358.*

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**Villages.** Stipulation in subsidiary treaties that zemindars and heads of villages shall be responsible for the property of travellers stolen, *App. p. 496.*

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**Walker, Colonel.** Zeal and ability with which that officer reformed the abuses of the civil and military establishments in the Guicowar during the time he held the office of resident at Baroda, *Jones, App. p. 281*—Letter from B. S. Jones to Lieutenant-colonel Walker from the India Board, 1817, concerning the practicability, without endangering the safety of the Indian empire, to arrest its progress towards further extension, *Jones, App. p. 295*—Reply of Colonel Walker to the foregoing letter, *Jones, App. p. 298*—Consideration of the affairs of India, accompanying the letter of Colonel Walker, *Jones, App. p. 310*—Letter from Colonel Walker to B. Jones, 1818 and 1819, *App. p. 317, 318.*

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**Waste Land.** Manner in which waste lands might be brought under tillage, were puttals granted at low rents for a limited period, *App. p. 418.*

**Wellesley, Marquis of.** See *Oude, Province of.*

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*Wilder, Francis.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—Offices held by witness in India, 463—Happy condition of the natives of Delhi, better off than subjects of neighbouring states, 471—Insecurity of persons and property in the Rajpoot states; improvement since the alliance of the English, 475.

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